Note On Sources


When the Center of Military History volumes on World War II in the Soviet Union were planned in the late 1950s, the German military records then in the custody of the National Archives were almost the only primary sources available. Although a vast quantity of Soviet literature having to do with the war has since been published, the accessible Soviet documentary evidence remains sparse. Consequently, the German records are still the source closest to the events. They are a vast collection even after having been selectively microfilmed under the auspices of the Committee for the Study of War Documents of the American Historical Association. Although the originals, from which this volume was written, have been returned to Germany, the documents cited can, for the most part, be located by unit or agency and folder number through the Guides to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, Va. (1974 to 1977) prepared and published by the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 20408-0001.

In the German military records, those of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW), Army High Command (OKH), and army field commands (army groups, armies, corps, and divisions) are the most useful. Relatively few German Air Force operational records survived the war. The best general summary of those that did is British Air Ministry Pamphlet 248, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948). Hermann Plocher, The German Air Force Versus Russia, 1942, USAF Historical Studies No. 154, published by the U.S. Air Force Historical Division, treats the 1942 operations in general from an air force point of view. The German Navy and the High Command of the Navy (OKM) were only peripherally involved in the war on the Eastern Front. The OKM, however, received and preserved a complete set of strategic directives, the OKM, Weisungen OKW (Fuehrer), 1939-45, which are cited in the text as German High Level Directives, CMH files, and have been published with a few variations and omissions as Walter Hubatsch, ed., Hitler's Weisungen Fuer die Kriegsfuehrung 1939-1945 (Frankfurt: Bernard and Graefe, 1962).

Although the OKW occupied the next to highest place in the German chain of command and acted as Hitler's personal staff, its position with regard to the Eastern Front was somewhat anomalous because the East (Finland excepted) was designated as an OKH theater and because by 1941 rivalry between the OKW and the OKH had ripened into outright hostility. The conversion of the Army General Staff into a second personal staff after Hitler became commander in chief, army, in December 1941, added a complication. Nevertheless, until late September 1942 when it was bypassed almost completely,


the OKW received detailed daily reports on the operations in the East, and the OKW Operations Staff had a significant hand in strategic decision making for the Eastern Front. A convenient compilation of OKW materials is Percy Ernst Schramm, gen. ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab) (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1961-1965). Volume I, 1940-1941 (Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed.), and Volume II, 1942 (Andreas Hillgruber, ed.), contain the so-called OKW War Diary for 1941 and 1942 with commentary by the former deputy chief of the OKW Operations Staff, General Walter Warlimont, and related documents. The most useful OKW document is the OKW WFST, Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung, Kriegstagebuch, the war diary fragment for the months April through June 1942 by Colonel Walter Scherff, Hitler's official war historian, that became International Military Tribunal Document 1809 PS. It is supplemented by Helmuth Greiner's Aufzeichnungen ueber die Lagevortraege und Besprechungen im Fuehrerhauptquartier vom 12. August 1942 bis zum 17. Maerz 1943 (Greiner Diary Notes, Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, MS # C-065a). A description of the OKW role in the conduct of the war by an eyewitness who was also a professional historian is in Helmuth Greiner, Die Oberste Wehrmachtfuehrung, 1939-1943 (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1951).

The OKH was the central staff for the conduct of the war against the Soviet Union, and after September 1942 the Eastern Front was its exclusive and sole responsibility. The OKH records that have survived, though substantial in bulk, are fragmentary. The two most valuable are the Halder Diary and the Lage Ost situation maps. The Halder Diary, published as Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1964), is the personal diary kept by the chief of the General Staff until September 1942. It is supplemented by General Halder's Daily Notes (Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, EAP 21-g-16/4/0 file). The Lage Ost maps, printed daily by the Operations Branch, OKH, at a scale of 1:1,000,000, are the source, with corrections and additions to the Soviet dispositions, for the maps that appear in this volume.

Among the OKH records, those of the most important branch, Operations, are the least complete, but, fortunately, Operations Branch documents and communications of other kinds frequently found their way into the files of other branches and of the field commands. The Organization Branch records still in existence give information concerning German strengths, losses, replacements, manpower resources, and changes in the army organizational structure. A branch war diary (OKH, GenStdH, Org. Abt., Kriegstagebuch) also exists for the months January through June 1942. The most nearly continuous of the OKH files are those of Foreign Armies East (Fremde Heere Ost), the Eastern Intelligence Branch. The branch turned out a vast number of intelligence estimates dealing with individual sectors and with the whole Eastern Front. It also issued frequent long- and short-range summaries and from time to time made comparisons of German and Soviet strengths. Enough of those have survived to form a complete intelligence picture for the Eastern Front as


it appeared to the Germans. Unfortunately, the Eastern Intelligence Branch much of the time was more diligent than perspicacious. The most tantalizing of the OKH records is Der Chef der Heeresruestung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres, Der Chef des Stabes, Tagebuch, the intermittent diary of the chief of staff to the powerful chief of Army Armament and the Replacement Army.

For the history of the war in the Soviet Union the army group records are prime sources. The army group headquarters were the direct link between the German High Command (Hitler and the OKH) and the front and were, within the limits Hitler imposed, themselves originating agencies for operational decisions. In accordance with German practice, the army group and other field commands each kept an Ia ("operations") war diary in which were recorded the incoming and outgoing orders, summaries of reports and conferences, situation estimates, the progress of operations, weather, temperature, and other items of operational or historical significance. The orders, reports, and other papers were filed separately in annexes (Anlagen) that were the central records of the field commands. At the army group level, the war diaries were generally kept with a conscious eye to history, sometimes by trained historians; and frequently the commanding generals and chiefs of staff confided matters to the diary that were not recorded elsewhere or transmitted outside the headquarters. The army group records also provide operational plans, after-action reports, transcripts of telephone and other conferences, message files, and files of Chefsachen--top secret documents that were not entered in the war diaries.

For the period this volume covers, the Ia war diaries of Army Group North and Army Group A are complete. The Army Group A Anlagen are missing; those for Army Group North are partial. Only the December 1941 segment of the Ia war diary and scattered Anlagen survive from Army Group Center, and from Army Group South (B), only a very few Anlagen. For the months January to July 1942, Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock's Kriegstagebuch, Osten (the Bock Diary) is an adequate and in some respects superior substitute for the missing Army Group South Ia war diary. Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb's Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976) supplements the Army Group North Ia war diary for the period to February 1942.

The army records, which are organized in the same manner as those of the army groups, provide tactical information and compensate in the main for the missing parts of the army group collections. While the army commands did not have as continuous access to the top or as broad a view as the army groups had, they were a great deal closer to the battlefield; consequently, the actual conduct of operations, even in the period of Hitler's ascendancy, was determined much of the time by the interaction of an army with the army group and the OKH (Hitler). The army records are sufficiently complete to give reasonable and, in the majority of cases, detailed coverage of all important operations.

Operations and aspects of command at various levels are dealt with from the


points of view of participants in Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters (New York: Praeger, 1961); Walter Goerlitz, ed., The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel (New York: Stein and Day, 1966); Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1958); Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Dutton, 1952); and a biography with papers, Paulus in Stalingrad (New York: The Citadel Press, 1963), by Walter Goerlitz. E. W. Mellenthin, German Generals of World War II (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977) and Otto E. Moll, Die deutschen Generalfeldmarschaelle, 1939-1945 (Rastatt/Baden: Erich Pabel, 1961) provide general biographical information and assessments.

Some aspects of the German conduct of the war in the Soviet Union that have been regarded as peripheral to this volume have been given extensive treatment elsewhere: occupation policy and practice in Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957); the mass murder of Soviet Jews in Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961); and the Waffen SS in George H. Stein, The Waffen SS (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1966); Charles W. Sydnor, Jr., Soldiers of Destruction (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); and James J. Weingartner, Hitler's Guard (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1974).


Except for scattered captured documents, interrogations, and analyses which filtered through the German wartime intelligence agencies, the only materials available for the study of the Soviet side of the war are those that have been processed by the Soviet publishing machinery. They are indispensable because there are virtually no others, but they pose problems, sometimes of credibility, more often of exegesis. The approved Soviet picture of the war is not false, but it is always controlled, often contrived, and, in spite of its earnestness and bulk, in some respects gives an impression of being historical trompe l'oeil. A comprehensive overview and an expert analysis of the Soviet World War II literature are available in Michael Parrish, The USSR in World War II: An Annotated Bibliography of Books Published in the Soviet Union 1945-1975 With Addenda for the Years 1975-1980 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1981).

The Great Patriotic War is, next to the Bolshevik Revolution, the most important event in the history of the Soviet state. As such it has retained an immediacy for the Soviet government, military forces, and society that has long ago faded among the other participants in World War II. Consequently, in the Soviet official view, the war is not just history or nostalgia, it is a matter of present consequence with implications for the future. Marshal A. A. Grechko, in The Armed Forces of the Soviet State (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977; Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1975), ranks the known lessons of the war and those still to be discovered equally with new technology and military theory as guidance for the Soviet armed forces in the 1970s and 1980s. The Soviet concern, therefore, goes beyond description and analysis and extends to protecting much that is considered still to be security information


and to translating the war and its lessons into currently meaningful terms. As a result, the Soviet literature on the war has emerged incrementally, accumulating substance at times very slowly, at times in bursts, always stopping short of complete disclosure, always subject to revision in substance as well as in interpretation.

Although the Soviet Army's Directorate of Military History had been at work under Boris Shaposhnikov, the former chief of the Army General Staff, since late 1942, war history did not begin to appear in the Soviet Union in open form until more than a decade after the war ended. As long as Stalin lived, problems of security and credit (and blame) prevented release of anything beyond panegyrics to Stalin, blasts against former allies and enemies, and compilations of the wartime TASS communiques. One exception was the partisan aspect of the war, about which several substantial books appeared, notably P. Vershigora's Lyudi s chistoi sovestyu (Moscow: Sovetskiy Pisatel, 1951). Nikita Khrushchev launched the systematic Soviet study of World War II in his speech to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. He announced then that he had ordered a comprehensive history of the Great Patriotic War to be written, and during the hours-long speech he made a series of revelations about the conduct of the war that by themselves constituted a major act of revisionism.

While the big work was being written a number of single-volume histories were put into print to preview it and apparently to establish parameters of approach and treatment. The first of these was Vazneyshye operatsiy Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1956) edited by Col. P. A. Zhilin. As a collection of battle studies rather than a continuous picture of military infallibility, this work dealt with the early defeats--as defensive successes. Stalin's name virtually disappeared, and the glory and credit were redistributed to the party, the army, and the Soviet people. Scattered mentions of mistakes and errors, none big enough or reaching high enough to roil the smooth surface, gave a touch of critical analysis. In 1958 General S. P. Platonov published a history of World War II, Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo). The Platonov history carried somewhat further the trend toward limited objectivity Zhilin had begun and broached aspects of the Soviet conduct of the war that Zhilin's episodic approach had sidestepped. Both Zhilin and Platonov were associated with the Soviet Army Directorate of Military History, and Zhilin would later be its longtime chief. The Vazneyshye operatsiy and Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna established standards for Soviet World War II historiography that have prevailed ever since. The deviations, though numerous, have never been in more than degree. Two other early works are K. S. Kolganov, Razvitye Taktiku Sovetskoy Armii v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny 1941-45 (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1959) and B. S. Telpukhovskiy, Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-45 (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1959).

Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-45 [History of the Great Patriotic War] (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo) began appearing in 1960 and was completed in six volumes in 1963. Prepared by the Institut of


Marxism-Leninism (Institut Marksizma-Leninizma), it covers in substantial detail the whole military, political, and economic history of the war in the Soviet Union, including its origins and its aftermath. The authorship is collective and includes prominently three of the writers mentioned above, Zhilin, Platonov, and Telpukhovskiy, among some dozens of others. Certain sections dealing with military operations appear to follow, in places almost word for word, the Platonov history. On the whole, the accounts of military operations carry forward the trends observed in the Zhilin and Platonov works without approaching full frankness or objectivity. Names, dates, units, tactical maneuvers, and operational plans are given more coherent treatment than in the earlier works. Soviet mistakes, defeats, and setbacks, with relatively few known exceptions, though not ignored, are often handled so obliquely as to escape all but the closest attention. Strengths, losses, production figures, and other statistics are given in detail for the German and other armies but not for the Soviet forces. For the first time Soviet strengths are occasionally given in concrete figures, but Soviet casualties and losses continue to be generally ignored, and Soviet statistics are most often presented as percentages and ratios derived from undisclosed bases. The volumes are heavily documented with sources published outside the Soviet Union but only with meaningless file-number references to Soviet documents. The process of high-level decision making is left nebulous except for frequent citations of presumably unanimous decisions and directives from the Stavka. Notable in the volumes is the all but total disappearance of Stalin and Marshal Zhukov and Khrushchev's elevation to a position of military prominence.

During the Khrushchev years the war history became or at least came to be regarded as a significant asset to the government, the party, and the armed forces and to many individuals in each. The credit Stalin had formerly monopolized could be redistributed and in the process increased not diminished. Even the mistakes, Khrushchev had demonstrated, could be interpreted to advantage. And the victory was there, indisputable, to be celebrated without end.

Particularly when it came to persons, however, past achievement had to be coordinated with current status; consequently, Khrushchev's enforced retirement in 1964 made the History of the Great Patriotic War politically obsolete a few months after its concluding volume was published. The History was not disavowed and has continued since as ostensibly the definitive work on the Great Patriotic War, but publication of book-length war history of any kind dropped markedly through the rest of the 1960s, apparently because a new orientation was being sought. In the interim, the organ of the Ministry of Defense, the Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal (Military History journal), became the forum for competing approaches and an outlet for persons and interests that had been slighted during the Khrushchev years. Articles from the journal form a substantial part of the source material for this volume.

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the victory brought a wave of war history publication in 1970. Most of the works were merely commemorative. One,


however, established a landmark: it was the second edition of the Institut Marksizma-Leninizma, Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1941-45 (Kratkaya Istoriya) (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo). The first edition of the Kratkaya Istoriya (Short History), printed in 1964, had been a one-volume summary of the six-volume history. In it already the larger work's frequent and often fulsome references to Khrushchev had disappeared, and Stalin had been partially rehabilitated as supreme commander in chief. The second edition, also later published in abridged form in English as the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), was presented as a revision and expansion incorporating five years' progress in research and the results of recently published memoirs and monographs. It was in actuality a new work, more an interim substitute for the six-volume history than a short version of it. Like the Platonov volume in the late 1950s, it apparently also was designed to establish new standards for the future. Its chief attributes were factualness, meaningful use of statistics (by comparison with previous practice), determinedly evenhanded treatment of persons, and a heightened effect of objectivity in judgments on events.

Also in 1970, apparently as a companion piece to the Kratkaya Istoriya, P. A. Zhilin edited and the Izdatelstvo Politcheskoy Literatury (Moscow) published Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna, Kratkiy nauchno-popularnyy ocherk (Great Patriotic War, Popular Scientific Sketch). Since no Soviet work on the whole war, particularly one edited by the chief of the Military History Directorate, is meant to be merely a popularization, the Popular Scientific Sketch must be taken, along with the Platonov history, the Kratkaya Istoriya, and A. A. Grechko's Gody voyny (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1976), as a major part of Soviet war literature.

The Twenty-fourth Party Congress, held in early 1971, took note of recent Soviet achievements in military history and charged the historical profession with two tasks for the future: one was to delineate the Soviet collaboration with all "progressive" peoples in World War II; the other was to combat "falsifications" perpetrated in World War II history by bourgeois historians.1 With that guidance and with the then Minister of Defense, Marshal A. A. Grechko, as chairman of the editorial commission, the historical organizations in the Ministry of Defense, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and the Academy of Sciences set about writing a comprehensive history of World War II in twelve volumes, the Istoriya Vtoroi Mirovoi Voyny, 1939-1945 (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1973-1982). Aside from establishing an official Soviet version of the whole war, the History of the Second World War has provided a vehicle for rewriting the Great Patriotic War on a scale substantially the same as the six-volume history of the Khrushchev period. The approach parallels the Kratkaya Istoriya in treatment of information and persons. Notable are the reappearance of Stalin as the central figure, thoroughgoing discussions of strategic decision making, and lavish provision of statistics.

The History of the Second World War is


currently the most authoritative Soviet work on the war, and all others conform to it in fundamental matters of substance and interpretation (as they did previously to the History of the Great Patriotic War). It has brought Soviet historiography of the war to the state of being highly informative without being truly enlightening. On the latter score, it does somewhat less then the Sbornik materialov po izucheniyu opyta voyny (Collection of Materials for the Study of the War Experience) produced by the Directorate of Military History under the former chief of the General Staff, Shaposhnikov, between late 1942 and 1945 (for distribution only to division commanders and above).

The publication of the general histories in the 1960s and 70s was accompanied by a flood of memoirs of all descriptions. A generous sampling of the memoirs published in the early to mid-1960s is to be found--together with commentary and an extensive "selected" bibliography--in Seweryn Bialer's Stalin and His Generals (New York: Pegasus, 1969). Because of the roles of their authors in the war, the most significant memoirs are those of the Marshals G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskiy, which were published as The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971) and Delo vsey zhizni (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1976).

Vasili Chuikov's The Battle for Stalingrad (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), published in Russian in 1959, has the distinction of being the first major war memoir, and it remains one of the best. The most prominent figure in many of the memoirs is Stalin, and some of the most revealing recollections of him are given in A. I. Eremenko's The Arduous Beginning (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966) and Pomni voyny (Donetsk: Donbass, 1971). In two books, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1941-45 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970) and The Last Six Months (Garden City: Doubleday, 1977), S. M. Shtemenko has provided the closest, though still fragmentary, look into the workings of the Soviet General Staff. Nikita Khrushchev's Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970) offers sidelights on the war and the text of his speech to the Twentieth Party Congress. K. K. Rokossovskiy, in A Soldier's Duty (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), and K. A. Meretskov, in Serving the People (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), give army group commanders' views of the war. At the army level are I. Kh. Bagramyan's Tak shli my k pobede (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1977); D. D. Lelyushenko's Moskva-Stalingrad-Berlin-Praga (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Nauka," 1970); and K. S. Moskalenko's Na yugo-zapadnom napravlenii (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Nauka," 1969).

In the accounts of campaigns and battles, the line between history and reminiscence frequently is somewhat indistinct. Andrei Grechko's Battle for the Caucasus (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971) is a history written by a former minister of defense who had commanded armies in the Caucasus, where Leonid Brezhnev had also served--as a political officer. Nachalnyy period voyny (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1974) is a study of the prewar plans and the first phase of the war done under the supervision of S. P. Ivanov, commandant of the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff. G. I.


Vaneyev, et al., Geroicheskaya oborona Sevastopolya, 1941-1942 (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1969) is a collective work with participants in the Sevastopol siege among the authors. The most intensively researched works are A. M. Samsonov's Stalingradskaya bitva (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Nauka," 1960, 1968); Dimitri Pavlov's Leningrad 1941 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); and V. M. Kovalchuk's Leningrad i bolshaya zemlya (Leningrad: Izdatelstvo "Nauka," 1975). Among the many works in which the contributors were also participants in the battle are Bitva za Stalingrad (Volgograd: Nizhniye-Volzhskoye Knizhnoye Izdatelstvo, 1969), edited by A. M. Borodin; Stalingrad: yroki istorii (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Progress," 1976), edited by V. I. Chuikov; Razgrom nemetsko fashistikh voysk pod Moskvoy (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1964), edited by V. D. Sokolovskiy; Velikaya bitva pod Moskvoy (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1961), edited by V. N. Yevstigneyev; and Proval gitlerovskogo nastupleniya na Moskvu and 50 let vooruzhennykh sil SSSR (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Nauka," 1966 and 1968, respectively), edited by M. B. Zakharov. Two works not of Soviet authorship but written from an intimate acquaintance with the events they describe are Harrison E. Salisbury's The 900 Days (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) and Alexander Wirth's, The Year of Stalingrad (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947).

Background and miscellaneous information on a broad range of subjects having to do with the Soviet war experience are to be found in the following: G. A. Deborin and B. S. Telpukhovskiy, Itogi i uroki velikoy otechestvennoy voyny (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Mysl," 1975), on the results and lessons of the Great Patriotic War; Embassy of the USSR, Washington, D.C., Information Bulletin (1942-1948); Ministerstvo Oborony, SSSR, Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskustva (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1970), on the history of war and the art of war; Ministerstvo Oborony, SSSR, Institut Voyennoy Istorii, Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1976-1980), a military encyclopedia; and S. A. Tyushkevich, et al., Sovetskiye vooruzhennye sily (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1978), on the organization and development of the Soviet armed forces. The Information Bulletin is the source for a number of the illustrations in this volume. Itogi i uroki also includes an essay on "bourgeois falsifiers" of World War II history, the present writer among them. The same subject is given book-length treatment in V. S. Makhalova and A. V. Beshensteva's Voyna, istoriya, ideologiya (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1974).

Partisan and underground operations are treated separately in the general histories and have a literature of their own. The works cited here are a miniscule sample of the many that have been published. V. Ye. Bystrov, ed., Geroi podpolya (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1970) and A. A. Kuznyaev, Podpolnye partinynye organy kompartii belorussii v gody velikoy otechestvennoy voyny (Minsk: Izdatelstvo "Belarus," 1975) deal with the underground. In addition to Vershigora's Lyudi s chistoi sovestyu, already mentioned, representative works on partisan warfare are L. Tsanava's Vsenarodnaya partizanskaya voyna v Belorussii protiv fashistskikh zakhvachnikov (Minsk:


Gosizdat, 1949-1951) and A. I. Zalesskiy's Geroicheskiy podvig millionov v tylu vraga (Minsk: Izdatelstvo "Belarus," 1970). The more analytical accounts are those in the Soviet general war histories and in studies of partisan warfare done outside the Soviet Union. The most comprehensive of the latter are the monograph series published as War Documentation Project, Project "Alexander" Studies (Washington, D.C.: Air Research and Development Command, 1953-55). Others are The Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), edited by John A. Armstrong, which presents some of the War Documentation Project monographs in condensed form with an introduction and extensive bibliography; Erich Hesse's Der sowjetrussische Partisanenkrieg, 1941 bis 1944 (Goettingen: Musterschmidt, 1969); and Edgar M. Howell's The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1956).


To provide the Army with a comprehensive record of the German military experience in World War II, the Foreign Military Studies Program of the Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, produced, by the time it was terminated in 1961, some 2,400 manuscripts. The authors were, for the most part, former high-ranking German officers. At first they wrote mainly from memory about events in which they had played key roles. Beginning in 1948 more comprehensive projects were initiated. These were assigned to teams that then made use of records in the custody of the United States Army, records secured through private sources, interviews, and the members' own experience. Overall supervision and direction of the projects was in the hands of a Control Group, headed throughout its existence by Generaloberst a.D. Franz Halder. In 1954 the Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, published a complete list of the manuscripts, then completed or projected, in the Guide to Foreign Military Studies 1945-54. A full set of the manuscripts is on deposit in the Center of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. A second set has been furnished to the historical office of the German Bundeswehr. That part of the war in the Soviet Union with which this volume is concerned is covered by the series at the strategic level by MS # T-9, Generaloberst a.D. Gotthard Heinrici, Der Feldzug in Russland ein operativer Ueberblick; and at the operational level by MS # P-114a, Generalleutnant a.D. Friedrich Sixt, Der Feldzug gegen die Soujet-Union im Nordabschnitt der Ostfront and by MS # P-114c, General der Artillerie a.D. Friedrich Wilhelm Hauck, Die Operationen der deutschen Heeresgruppen an der Ostfront 1941 bis 1945 suedliches Gebiet.

The Center of Military History, Department of the Army, has projected in its Army Historical Series a three-volume history of the German-Soviet conflict. The present volume is the second, and the third is Earl F. Zieinke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968). Additionally, the Center of Military History has published Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-261a, George Blau, The German Campaign in Russia--Planning and Operations, 1940-1942 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1955) and


Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, 1940-1945 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1959).

The Historical Office of the German Bundeswher has published Manfred Kehrig's Stalingrad (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974) and Klaus Reinhardt's Die Wende vor Moskau (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1972), and is engaged in publishing a ten-volume official history, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979- ). The Academy of Sciences, Central Institute for History, of the German Democratic Republic is publishing a projected eight-volume history, Deutschland im zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1974- ).


The body of general literature dealing with the German-Soviet conflict is large and growing. Comprehensive bibliographies, periodically brought up-to-date, are to be found in the Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale and the Buecherschau der Weltkriegsbuecherei. Both list books and articles in all languages and carry bibliographic articles and reviews of significant works.

Two comprehensive studies in English are John Erickson's The Road to Stalingrad (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1975) and Albert Seaton's The Russo-German War 1941-1945 (New York: Praeger, 1971). A noteworthy account in German is Kurt von Tippelskirch's Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag, 1956). The author was both a trained historian and a corps and army commander on the Eastern Front. Brief authoritative accounts of the whole war are to be found in Vincent J. Esposito's A Concise History of World War II (New York: Praeger, 1964); Martha Byrd Hoyle's A World in Flames (New York: Atheneum, 1970); and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen's 1939-1945, Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik and Dokumenten (Darmstadt: Wehr and Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1961).

The German-Soviet conflict has been set in the contexts of politics and grand strategy in a variety of works. The Soviet Union's relations with its Western Allies are treated in, among others, Winston S. Churchill's The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950); Herbert Feis' Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); J. M. A. Gwyer's Grand Strategy (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), vol. III, pt. 1; Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell's Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1953); Robert E. Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper, 1950); and Llewellyn Woodward's British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962). Hitler, Reden und Proclamationen, 1932-1945 (Munich: Sueddeutscher Verlag, 1965), edited by Max Domarus, is a mine of information on Hitler's war leadership including relations with his allies, as is also, in a more limited fashion, Goebbels-Reden (Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972), edited by Helmut Heiber. Other works dealing with the German coalition are Wipert von Bluecher's Gesandter zwischen Diktatur and Democratie (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1951); Galeazzo Ciano's The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1946); Waldemar Erfurth's Der


Finnische Krieg, 1941-1944 (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1977); Mario D. Fenyo's Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972); Juergen Foerster's Stalingrad, Risse im Buendniss, 1942-1943 (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1975); and Paul Schmidt's Statist auf diplomatischer Buehne, 1923-1945 (Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag, 1949).

Albert Speer, in Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan, 1970), and Nikolai Voznesenskiy, in The Economy of the USSR During World War II (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948), describe their countries' war economies from the points of view of the men who ran them. Two other significant works on German war production are Willi A. Boelcke, Deutschlands Ruestung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt: Athenaion, 1969) and Deutsches Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung, Die Deutsche Industrie im Kriege, 1939-1945 (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1954). The Soviet war economy is covered in the general histories.

Allied aid shipments to the Soviet Union through the Arctic ports and the Persian Gulf are treated in David Irving, The Destruction of Convoy PQ-17 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968); Robert H. Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969); Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1955); Samuel Eliot Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947); T. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1952); and S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954).

Information on weapons, fighting vehicles, and aircraft is available in John Batchelor and Ian Hogg, Artillery (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972); Peter Chamberlain and Hilary L. Doyle, Encyclopedia of German Tanks (New York: Arco, 1978); Ian V. Hogg and John Weeks, Military Small Arms of the Twentieth Century (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1977); John Kirk and Robert Young, Jr., Great Weapons of World War II (New York: Bonanza Books, 1961); I. E. Krupchenko et al., Sovetskiye tankovye voyska (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1973); Rudolf Lusar, German Secret Weapons of the Second World War (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959); John Milsom, Russian Tanks, 1900-1970 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1970); Ian Parsons, ed., The Encyclopedia of Air Warfare (London: Salamander Books, 1974); B. Perrett, Fighting Vehicles of the Red Army (London: Ian Allen, 1969); and Christopher Shepherd, German Aircraft of World War II (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1975).


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1. "XXIV S'ezd KPSS i vennoye-istoricheskiy nauka," Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal, 5(1971), 1-13.

Transcribed and formatted by Jerry Holden for the HyperWar Foundation