The invasion of Sicily on 10 July 1943 was unexpectedly easy. Directed by General Alexander's 15th Army Group headquarters, the landings by General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's British Eight Army and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.'s, U.S. Seventh Army succeeded with relatively light losses in men and matériel. It became quickly apparent in the Allied camp that Italian military power had seriously deteriorated.1
By 15 July, the fifth day of the Sicily Campaign, Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, the U.S. Army G-2, considered the time right for bold action and the assumption of great risks in conducting the war in Europe. In view of the decline of Italian combat efficiency, he believed that the Allies had more than enough resources in the Mediterranean theater to invade the mainland and force Italy out of the war. The best place to strike a blow of this sort, he suggested, was Naples. Good beaches in the vicinity offered landing sites. The prospect of quickly overrunning Sicily promised airfields from which planes might cover landing forces. The advantages of gaining lodgment at Naples were indisputable. A successful landing at Naples would avoid protracted land operations in Calabria and rule out the possibility of a stubborn Axis defense at the short and naturally fortified line between Naples and Taranto. It would place the large and modern port of Naples in Allied hands and make possible the logistical support of sustained operations in southern Italy. For these reasons, Strong recommended that planners investigate at once the feasibility of an amphibious assault to capture Naples as the first step toward securing Rome.2 Unmentioned by Strong, but possibly conditioning his thinking, was the fact that the Germans had launched a large-scale offensive in the Soviet Union ten days earlier, on 5 July, thereby prompting concern among Allied leader that the USSR might be knocked out of the war. Allied operations on the mainland of Italy would tie down far more German forces than an invasion of Sardinia and Corsica, would satisfy better the requirement of the CCS directive governing activities in the Mediterranean area, and would perhaps help the Russians by drawing German troops from the Eastern Front.
Favorably impressed by Strong's suggestion, General Marshall brought it to the attention of the Combined Chiefs on the following day. He pointed out that
since losses in shipping and landing craft had been negligible during the invasion of Sicily, and since the Allies would probably gain possession of Sicilian ports earlier than expected, an amphibious assault on Naples might be mounted before the onset of winter weather and launched without unreasonably great risks. He recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff advise General Eisenhower to study the matter. Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, commented that an invasion at Naples might serve in lieu of a landing on Sardinia.
Marshall's suggestion, supported by King, was adopted. While accepting the tentative operations General Eisenhower had outlined on the last day of June--the four possibilities he listed in his quest for flexibility--the Combine Chiefs also expressed interest in a direct amphibious landing against Naples in place of an attack on Sardinia, if, in Eisenhower's opinion, the Italian resistance in Sicily was so weak as to make acceptable the hazards of a mainland invasion farther north than the toe.3
Aside from the appearance of considerable strength in the Italian Army order of battle, the principal risks of an invasion at Naples came from two limitations--lack of air cover and too few assault vessels. Naples itself was just outside the effective range of single-engine fighter aircraft that would be operating from airfields in Sicily, and theater resources in assault lift seemed altogether inadequate, despite the negligible losses during the invasion of Sicily, to support a substantial landing.4
American planners who studied a possible Naples operation hesitated to endorse it. Conceding that it represented a sudden shift from conservative to bold strategy and therefore might surprise the enemy, admitting that it might well lead to the collapse of Italy, and recognizing that, even without the surrender of Italy or the capture of Rome, it would give the Allies air bases for strategic bombing of Germany and the Balkans, the planners in Washington could not ignore the disadvantages. Because land-based fighter planes flying from Sicily lacked the range to provide adequate air cover for the assault force, the Allies would have to depend on aircraft carriers. In a theater where the Allies had a distinct two-to-one superiority in shore-based aircraft, it seemed unsound to tie the success of a ground venture to carriers, particularly since the vessels were vitally needed elsewhere. Employing carriers offshore at Naples would not only lower the number of ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to unacceptable minimums but would also be an extremely dangerous use of a valuable resource. Furthermore, failure to capture Rome or to precipitate Italian collapse would probably mean a long and indecisive peninsula campaign that might well require additional resources in the Mediterranean to the extent even of vitiating the cross-Channel attack being planned for the spring of 1944. Finally, hurried operational planning and the use of assault forces insufficiently trained for amphibious
warfare would invite failure, if not disaster.
A successful operation near Naples, American planners believed, might advance the collapse of Italy by a few months, but a setback would prejudice the cross-Channel build-up, postpone progress in the Pacific for several months, and delay operations in Burma for year. The Allies could meet the requirements for aircraft carriers and for additional amphibious equipment only by disrupting the entire global strategy and logistics developed during the conferences at Casablanca in January and in Washington in May. Interference with the agreed-upon and projected world-wide strategy for 1943 and 1944, the Americans concluded, was therefore unacceptable because seizure of Naples would not assure what had become the primary object of Mediterranean operations--eliminating Italy as a belligerent.5
British planners in London were attracted to the Naples concept, and the expanded it into an assault on the Italian west coast with the object of capturing Rome as well as Naples. They recognized and admitted the disadvantages of such an operation, but saw the advantages as overriding. Seizure of Naples would be a serious blow to the Axis, and capture of Rome would be decisive for Italy. Compelled in all likelihood by an Allied landing on the west coast to extricate their forces from Sicily and the toe of Italy, the Germans would find it difficult to withdraw if the Allies held Naples and Rome.
In line with their expanded view, which they code-named AVALANCHE, the British planners suggested three general areas where Allied forces might go ashore: Rome south to Terracina; the Gulfs of Gaeta, Naples, and Salerno; and the Gulfs of Eufemia and Gioia. The first, the Rome area, was the most attractive, but an invasion there would be very much a gamble. No land-based air support of the assault forces would be possible. Should the operation fail to take Italy out of the war, the Allies would probably have to withdraw. In the second, the Naples area, a direct seaborn assault on Naples itself would be impossible because of strong defenses--at least fifty dual-purpose guns, with batteries of the flanking islands of Ischia and Capri. But landings were conceivable north of Naples at Gaeta and south at Salerno. Gaeta gave good access to Naples but was just outside the effective range of fighter aircraft. Salerno, barely within range of single-engine fighter planes, was separated from Naples by rugged terrain. Landings in the third area, the Gulf of Eufemia or the Gulf of Gioia, just above the toe, would pinch off German force in Calabria, but Allied troops subsequently advancing to Naples would have to cross very difficult ground. At the same time, a landing on the beaches of Eufemia or Gioia would offer little advantage over an assault on Reggio and San Giovanni and on nearby Crotone for which the headquarters of the British 10 and 5 Corps were then planning. But if the German Air Force could operate effectively from bases in southern Italy, an Allied invasion anywhere north of Gioia would be in jeopardy.
The forces slated for the attacks of the toe, those under the 10 and 5 Corps headquarters, could together do AVALANCHE, the planners believed, but a
switch would disrupt the earlier planning. And if at the last moment some untoward event made AVALANCHE impracticable, it would probably prevent mounting and launching the other operations. "Only the Commanders in the field," the British planners concluded, "can judge the chances."6
The commanders in the field--Eisenhower, Alexander, Cunningham, and Tedder--noted that the Italians were largely ineffective in Sicily but that the Germans were bitterly contesting the invasion and rapidly reinforcing their troops. The Allied commanders estimated that the Sicily Campaign would end some time in mid-August. They decided, therefore, to defer until then a final decision on what to do afterward, but they agreed that the mainland of Italy, somewhere between Reggio di Calabria in the toe and the Naples area, was the best place to exploit success in Sicily. A study made more than a month earlier had concluded that, because of the air cover problem, the west coast would be impractical for landings anywhere north of the toe. Consequently the Allied commanders inclined as before toward an invasion of the toe, followed perhaps by a landing at Crotone, both then developed overland toward Naples and the heel. Realizing that the unexpectedly light losses in landing craft and shipping during the invasion of Sicily might permit mounting an assault on the mainland before winter, they reconsidered a landing near Taranto. And in accordance with the CCS instructions, they re-examined a assault on Naples, an area earlier regarded as entirely too risky. Unwilling to make a final selection until the Sicily Campaign developed further and until his planners looked again at all the post-Sicily possibilities, Eisenhower nevertheless inclined toward a landing on the Italian mainland. He therefore, on 18 July, requested advance approval from the CCS to carry the war to the Italian mainland immediately after the end of the fighting on Sicily should he so decide. He had in mind a landing on the toe.7
Two days later the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved Eisenhower's request. But they reminded him that amphibious operations against the Italian mainland ought to be launched as far north as shore-based fighter cover would allow. The CCS also made available some shipping and landing craft but provided no additional long-range fighter aircraft, even for temporary use, because the planes were needed in the United Kingdom as escorts for the intensified air attacks of the Combined Bomber Offensive.8
The decision to carry the war to the Italian mainland brought planning for operations against Sardinia to an end. Sardinia, like Corsica, became a French responsibility, and these islands--until landings in southern France became a possibility in 1944--lost their strategic importance.
As the Allies turned toward the Italian mainland, two questions remained to be answered: where specifically should the assault be made? and how much, in terms of resources, should be expended?
In general, British planners favored AVALANCHE, a Naples operation, more than the Americans did. The British had been partial to a landing at Taranto in the heel, which was very much like AVALANCHE. A major port was the objective of each, and Taranto and Naples were about the same distance from Allied airfields in Sicily. Although AVALANCHE demanded greater resources, the benefits were bound to be greater. Even the use of aircraft carriers now appeared a justifiable risk in an operation expected to have a decisive effect. It would be wrong, the British believed, to deprive General Eisenhower of anything he might need to invade the mainland, a mistake to permit any resources to leave the Mediterranean for the United Kingdom, India, or the Pacific until Eisenhower could determine what he needed. They proposed that the CCS instruct Eisenhower to prepare a plan for a direct attack on Naples on the assumption that the necessary additional resources would be forthcoming. And they recommended that the movement of forces and equipment away from the Mediterranean theater, previously directed by the CCS, now be halted.9
The Americans demurred. According to agreements on strategic plans, operations projected in Burma primarily to keep China actively in the war required that some amphibious craft be released from the Mediterranean at the end of the Sicily Campaign; without these vessels, plans for Burma would be delayed or perhaps canceled. More important, the build-up for the cross-Channel attack had already drawn troops away from the Mediterranean. An admission of the attractiveness of AVALANCHE and the desirability of seizing Naples, the Americans believed, were no justification for changing global allocations to increase Eisenhower's resources.10 If sufficient means were available to seize Sardinia, why were more needed for Naples?
The CCS accepted the American point of view. They instructed Eisenhower "to prepare a plan, as a matter of urgency, for direct attack on Naples, using the resources which have already been made available . . . . "11
Dramatic news from Radio Rome heightened the urgency. King Victor Emmanuel III removed Benito Mussolini from power on 25 July and appointed Maresciallo d'Italia Pietro Badoglio head of a new government. Though Badoglio immediately announced Italy's intention to continue in the war, the elimination of Italy seemed much closer at hand.12
Since the Allies had no plans to exploit a sudden removal of Mussolini from
power, military leaders in Washington and in Tunis met the next day to discuss what they might do. In Washington, increasing Eisenhower's resources now seemed altogether unnecessary. A swift Allied descent on the mainland near Naples would strengthen any action the new Italian Government might wish to take to embarrass the Germans in Sicily, southern Italy, Sardinia, and Corsica. A short campaign appeared possible. The Combined Chiefs of Staff therefore reiterated their directive to Eisenhower to plan, though not necessarily to launch, AVALANCHE, a landing on the west coast north of the toe, for the earliest possible date with the object of expediting the withdrawal of Italy from the war. To help solve the problem of air cover in the assault area, the CCS granted him the use of one light and four escort carriers.13 In Tunis, General Eisenhower and his subordinate commanders came to the conclusion that AVALANCHE was becoming increasingly feasible--so much so that it could now be considered an alternative of equal practicality with a landing on the toe.14
From the original and somewhat vague conception of an assault landing on the west coast of Italy oriented on Naples and Rome, Eisenhower's planners began to develop and refine AVALANCHE into an amphibious operation designed to capture the port of Naples and nearby airfields. Exactly where the assault should be made was still under study during the latter part of July, but it began to seem that a landing on the beaches around Salerno, just south of Naples, offered the best prospect of success. Although the mountains of the Sorrento peninsula between Salerno and Naples would block direct access to Naples, the minor port of Salerno would be an asset during the initial stages of an opposed landing, as would the Montecorvino airfield, only three miles inland.15 There matters rested until the definitive decision could be made upon the completion of the Sicily Campaign.
A prerequisite for AVALANCHE, the planners agreed, was a beachhead on the Calabrian toe of Italy. Since conquest of Sicily would secure the western shore of the Strait of Messina, a beachhead across the strait would open the narrow waters for Allied ships. Airfields in Calabria would increase the shore-based air cover available for an assault on Naples. And Allied troops in Calabria would tie down German reserves that might otherwise be rushed to the Naples assault area.16
How gain a beachhead in the toe? The British 10 Corps headquarters was in North Africa and preparing plans for an invasion of the toe, but the forces it directed were needed, in combination
with American units, for the larger AVALANCHE operation. Could some of the troops actively engaged in Sicily cross the strait immediately after the campaign in an ad hoc operation? There was a drawback. If an improvised crossing proved unsuccessful, formal landing operation would become necessary. The 10 Corps would have to launch its invasion, and this would deprive AVALANCHE of a major component and might cause it to be canceled.
During the early days of the Sicily Campaign, when optimistic forecasts envisaged a very quick end to the fighting, Eisenhower and Alexander had talked of launching an offhand invasion of Calabria. They discussed having the British Eighth Army, immediately at the close of the campaign, send a brigade of infantry, plus commandos and paratroopers, across the strait. The 10 Corps would then carry out its landing as a follow-up, not on the toe but just above the toe in the Gulf of Gioia. But when stiff German resistance in Sicily dissipated the optimism, the commanders abandoned the idea.
In late July and early August, when Allied intelligence agencies anticipated an early end to the combat in Sicily and the withdrawal of German forces across the Strait of Messina, they estimated that the Germans would keep but few forces in the toe of Italy. In all likelihood, they would withdraw those forces if the Allies invaded the mainland. Since Italian resistance could be "ignored, except possibly for coast defense batteries," and since the opposition from enemy fighter aircraft based in the heel would probably be "negligible," the theater planners reconsidered an assault from Sicily across the strait to Reggio di Calabria. Forces occupying a beachhead there would safeguard the Sicilian port of Messina and the Sicilian coastal road from German gunfire; open the strait to Allied shipping; gain an airfield at Reggio from which planes could support AVALANCHE; tie down the German forces in the toe; and perhaps even draw German forces from the AVALANCHE area. A very limited advance in Calabria would gain all the benefits except the last. And if an assault across the strait prompted the Germans to withdraw from Calabria, the Allied forces would be in position to pursue vigorously. In that case 10 Corps might come ashore in the Gulf of Gioia and cut off the German withdrawal.17
On 1 August General Eisenhower still favored a 10 Corps landing in the toe, the operation to be mounted from North Africa; he still considered AVALANCHE to have only secondary priority. But on the following day, with his subordinate commanders in agreement, he decided to plan to rush "substantial parts" of the British Eighth Army across the strait from Sicily, while "going full out of the more ambitious plan," AVALANCHE, which would require the participation of the British 10 Corps, together with American forces.18
On 10 August, as the Sicily Campaign entered its final week, General Eisenhower stopped the planning for a more or less impromptu crossing of the Strait of Messina. He now wanted a well-prepared operation by the British Eight Army. Although he was thinking strongly
of launching AVALANCHE, he told the British 10 Corps commander to continue planning for a landing on the toe--just in case a shortage of landing craft or the prospect of strong enemy opposition made AVALANCHE impracticable. But no matter whether 10 Corps landed somewhere in Calabria by itself or entered the mainland as part of a larger AVALANCHE invasion force, Eighth Army troops in Operation BAYTOWN were to make the first landing across the strait from Sicily to secure a beachhead on the tip of the toe.19
The timing of an AVALANCHE invasion would depend to a large extent on the moon. If airborne troops were to participate, they would need moonlight for their drops. The naval forces to carry the assault troops to the beaches would require darkness for their offshore approaches. The period between 7 and 11 September would be suitable for both--during these nights a few hours of moonlight would precede total darkness.20
The availability of assault shipping also would affect the timing. On 26 July, the day after Mussolini's fall from power, when the commanders in the theater had considered whether they could exploit the event by launching some, almost any, amphibious operation, Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks, the AFHQ G-3, dashed their hopes. Enough landing craft and ships, he reported, could not be released from Sicily in time for refitting and redeployment for another major operation before 7 September at the earliest. This date coincided with the favorable phase of the moon.21
Because of the shortage of assault shipping in the theater, some vessels used in the Eighth Army crossing of the strait would have to be employed in AVALANCHE. A reasonable time interval between the two operations was, therefore, important. Yet accumulating the necessary artillery and naval support and the needed supplies for the Eighth Army crossing would take until the end of August. Even though commanders, according to Eisenhower, were "straining every nerve" to make the first landing at the earliest possible date, even though General Alexander hoped to launch it "before the end of August or early September," the Eighth Army assault appeared unlikely until some time between 1 and 4 September.22
On 16 August, the day before the Sicily Campaign came to an end, General Eisenhower made his final decision. He would send the Eighth Army across the Strait of Messina as early as possible, the date to be decided by General Alexander; he would launch AVALANCHE on 9 September.23
The Allied leaders, then meeting in Quebec, approved, although they agree that AVALANCHE was "the riskiest one that we have yet undertaken." What
concerned them primarily was the lack of resources in the Mediterranean theater, which would preclude what was deemed to be sufficient immediate follow-up forces.24 Adding to the hazards was the one great Allied failure of the Sicily Campaign--the failure to keep the Germans from successfully evacuating their forces across the Strait of Messina to the mainland.25 Allied estimates of German troops on the mainland increased from 60,000 on 7 August to 102,000 ten days later. If the Italians fought alongside the Germans, a total of thirty-five enemy divisions would oppose the Allies, a force far superior to the strength the Allies could put into the field. On the other hand, if Italy surrendered, the Germans would probably give up the southern part of Italy and retire slowly to the Pisa-Rimini line in the north.26
Italian surrender seemed near. The Badoglio government had made contact with General Eisenhower and was trying to come to terms. The negotiations were secret, for if the Germans learned of the discussions they might well occupy Italy in greater strength. General Eisenhower naturally wished to keep the German troop commitment in Italy to minimum, but he also hoped that if Italy agreed to an armistice the Italian Army, though demoralized and lacking equipment, might hold up the movement of certain German divisions for one or two days during the critical stage of the AVALANCHE landings. Oddly enough, AVALANCHE, a blow at the mainland, originally conceived as a means of forcing Italian surrender, had now--because of the air cover problem, the shortage of seaborne lift, and the strength of the opposition--become contingent on the prior elimination of Italy by military diplomacy.27
Since the main purpose of the invasion was to eliminate Italy from the war, why, in view of Italian willingness to surrender, invade Italy at all? Because there was no guarantee that the Italian Government, under the opposing pressures of potential German occupation and threatened Allied invasion, would be able to capitulate. Invading the mainland seemed the best way to catalyze the events. A subsequent campaign in Italy would then comply with the CCS directive to tie down German forces that might otherwise be used on the Eastern Front or to strengthen the Channel coast defenses of northwest Europe.
Despite the Allied victory in Sicily and the general satisfaction in the Allied camp with the developing situation, Eisenhower waited until 19 August to cancel the 10 Corps landing in the toe (BUTTRESS). Even then, he directed that sealed orders be delivered to appropriate commanders to reinstate the operation if some unexpected event at the last moment made it desirable or necessary to suspend AVALANCHE.28
All the risks of AVALANCHE were intensified by the terrain in southern Italy. The rugged mountain ranges below Rome are highest along the west coast, rising steeply from the sea and confining major communications to coastal routes. Although a relatively short invasion thrust would cut the main roads, force the enemy into difficult mountainous ground, and obstruct the escape of those enemy troops south of the invasion area, the invaders would be hampered by narrow valleys unsuited to military operations conducted by mechanized forces. The rough country would hinder deployment off the roads, restrict maneuver to the relatively few plains, and favor the defense.29
Looking at the terrain in detail to determine where to land the AVALANCHE forces, the planners narrowed the choice to the beaches fronting the Gulfs of Gaeta, Naples, and Salerno. They soon rejected the Gulf of Naples. Its beaches were unsuitable for landing operations, the adjacent ground, particularly the slopes of Mount Vesuvius, dominate the shore, and the sea approaches were strongly fortified. "Thank the Lord we did not have to make that landing," a division commander later remarked.30
Just north of Naples, the Gulf of Gaeta was better. No nearby mountains command the coast. The beaches merge into the Campanian plain around Naples, and relatively level ground would permit the rapid deployment of large forces and the use of armor. Troops could come ashore less than thirteen miles from Naples and find neither hill nor other obstacles to impede their approach to the city. Quick success might cut off a considerable number of enemy units south of Naples and perhaps force the Germans to evacuate Naples before they could destroy the port. The Volturno River on the north would give flank protection. Airborne troops dropped to secure the Volturno bridge could prevent enemy reinforcement of the Gaeta defenses and provide bridgeheads for a subsequent drive to Rome.
But Gaeta had its disadvantages. I was too far from the toe of Italy to allow mutual support between the AVALANCHE forces and those of the Eighth Army landing at Reggio. The sea approaches to Gaeta and the beaches were know to be heavily fortified with mines, pillboxes, gun emplacements, and barbed wire. The beaches were soft, the gradients of the slope unfavorable. A sandbar would prevent landing ships and craft from coming close to shore. Last, Gaeta was beyond the effective range of fighter aircraft based on Sicilian airfields.
As late as 12 August, less than a month before the invasion, commanders and planners were still discussing the possibility of an invasion at Gaeta. But whether the deciding factor was the offshore sandbar or the inability of land-based air forces to provide adequate cover, the Gaeta area was rejected.31 "I thanked my lucky stars that we did not land in that area," wrote the same division commander.32
Almost by default, the 20-mile stretch of beach south of Salerno was chosen.33 Excellent sea approaches, with no shoals and good underwater gradients, would permit ships to come close to land. A narrow strip of sand between water and dune and numerous beach exits leading to the main coastal highway--from Agropoli through Salerno to Naples and eventually to Rome--would facilitate shore operations. The small port of Salerno, about fifty miles south of Naples, and the tiny harbor of Amalfi, nearby on the Sorrento peninsula, would be helpful for receiving supplies. Coastal defenses in the Salerno area were almost exclusively fieldworks rather than permanent installations. Fighter craft based on Sicily, though operating at extreme ranges, could cover the assault landings. An excellent airfield, Montecorvino, capable of sustaining four fighter squadrons, was close to the shore line.
Inevitably, there were also serious disadvantages. As at Gaeta, the distance of Salerno from the toe precluded mutual support by the two invasion forces. The Sele River, which empties into the gulf about seventeen miles south of Salerno and divides the plain into two distinct sectors, would split the AVALANCHE invasion forces. The steep vertical bank of the Sele and of its principal tributary, the Calore, would hamper maneuver and require the assault troops early in the landing phase to bring ashore enough bridging to span the streams and provide communication between the two invasion forces. Mountains enclosing the Sele plain would limit the depth of the initial beachhead and expose the troops to enemy observation, fire, and attack from higher ground; but since there was no solution to this problem, the planners simply refused to dwell on it.34 Finally, the principal ridge system in the Naples-Salerno area, the rocky spur of the Sorrento peninsula, blocks access to Naples except for two narrow gorges piercing the Sorrento hill mass; to capture Naples quickly, the Allies would have to take control of these corridors very soon.
Altogether, the prospect for AVALANCHE was mixed. Though the Italian political situation dictated an invasion and though the time was propitious, the hazards were great. Not only was the Italian mainland forbidding, but other obstacles stood in the way of a successful amphibious operation.
1. For a detailed account of the campaign, see Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy.
2. War Dept G-2 Memo, Strong for Marshall, HUSKY Exploitation, 15 Jul 43, ABC 384.
3. Extract, Min, CCS 102d Mtg, 16 Jul 43, ABC 384; CCS to Eisenhower, 16 Jul 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5. See also Memo, Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy for Gen Marshall, 17 Jul 43, ABC 384.
4. See Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, Chapter VII.
5. Rpt, Joint War Plans Committee to the JPS, Rapid Exploitation of HUSKY, 19 Jul 43, ABC 384.
6. Post-HUSKY Opns: Opn AVALANCHE, 19 Jul 43, ABC 384.
7. Eisenhower to CCS, 18 Jul 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5; Draft Telegram, Gen Eisenhower to Gen Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (Middle East), 20 Jul 43; AFHQ G-3 Paper, Opns After HUSKY, 29 May 43, and AFHQ G-3 Memo, Outline Plan for Assault on Italian Mainland, 7 Jun 43, all in ABC 384.
8. CCS to Eisenhower, 20 Jul 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 4. The Combined Bomber Offensive, a sustained air bombardment, in the words of the CCS, was "calculated to materially and perhaps fatally impair Germany's capacity to logistically support her armed forces." CCS Study, Additional Bomber Groups for AVALANCHE, 29 Jul 43, ABC 384.
9. Memos, Reps of COS for CCS, 19, 21, 22 Jul 43, ABC 384. On the British regard for a Taranto operation, see Memo, Roberts for ACofS OPD, 3 Jul 43, ABC 384.
10. Memo, JCS for CCS, 22 Jul 43, and Rpt by Joint Staff Planners, 23 Jul 43 (with Appendix, Memo, JCS for CCS), both in ABC 384.
11. Extract, Min, CCS Mtg, 23 Jul 43, ABC 384. See also Memo, Reps of COS for CCS, 24 Jul 43, ABC 384. The British apparently issued a stop order on 24 July 1943 halting all movements of their own troops and shipping from the Mediterranean until Eisenhower could stipulate what he needed for an invasion of the Italian mainland. Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, ch. VII.
12. A detailed account of the events leading to the surrender of Italy can be found in Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy.
13. Extract, Min, JCS Mtg, 26 Jul 43, Memo, CofS for CCS, 26 Jul 43, and Extract, Min, Special CCS Mtg, 26 Jul 43, all in ABC 384; CCS to Eisenhower, 26 Jul 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 4. A few days later the CCS turned down Eisenhower's request for four squadrons of Flying Fortresses (B-17's), even on a temporary basis to disrupt enemy communication during the period immediately preceding the assault. Eisenhower to CCS, 28 Jul 43, and Memo, Brig Gen John R. Deane for Gen Marshall, 1 Aug 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5.
14. Eisenhower to CCS, 27 Jul 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5.
15. AFHQ G-3 Paper, Appreciation of an Amphibious Assault Against the Naples Area, 23 Jul 43.
16. Eisenhower to CCS, 28 Jul, 5 Aug 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5. See also Extract, Min, JPS Mtg, 7 Aug 43, dated 9 Aug 43, ABC 384.
17. AFHQ G-3 Estimate of the Situation for BAYTOWN, 31 Jul 43.
18. AFHQ CofS Mtg 35, 2 Aug 43, Salmon Files, OCMH; Eisenhower to CCS, 2 Aug 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5 (also cited in Summary of Corresp, ABC 384).
19. Eisenhower Msg, 7 Aug 43, and Eisenhower to CCS, 10 Aug 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5; Extract, Min, JPS Mtg, 7 Aug 43, dated 9 Aug 43, and Gen Smith to Gen J. F. M. Whiteley, 10 Aug 43, Summary of Corresp, both in ABC 384. See also Alexander Despatch, pp. 2883-84.
20. See Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, pp. 106, 110. The tide in the Mediterranean is negligible and had no effect on planning.
21. Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, ch. VII.
22. Eisenhower to CCS, 16 Aug 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5.
23. Eisenhower to CCS, 16, 18 Aug 43, and Smith to Whiteley, 17, 22 Aug 43, both in OPD Exec 3, Item 5; Eisenhower to Alexander, 16 Aug 43, 15th AGp Master Cable File, VI.
24. Smith to Whiteley, 22 Aug 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5.
25. Accounts of the German evacuation may be found in Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II," vol. IX, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, January 1943-June 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), pp. 209-18; Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 310; Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, chs. XIX, XX, XXI.
26. G-2 Annexes to Fifth Army AVALANCHE Outline Plan, 7, 17 Aug 43.
27. Smith to Whiteley, 22 Aug 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5.
28. Eisenhower Msg, 19 Aug 43, OPD Exec 3, Item 5.
29. As one example of many terrain studies, see AFHQ G-3 Memo, Outline Plan for Assault of Italian Mainland, 7 Jun 13, ABC 384.
30. Walker Diary, 1 Oct 43.
31. Fifth Army History, Part I, pp. 20-21; Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 177; Eisenhower Dispatch, pp. 110-11; AFHQ G-3 Planning Mtg 38, 12 Aug 43, Salmon Files, OCMH.
32. Walker Diary, 19 Oct 43.
33. Engineer History, Fifth Army, Mediterranean Theater, vol. III, Appendix G, Tactical Study of the Terrain, Naples and Vicinity, 7 August 1943.
34. Lecture by Col Robert J. Wood, The Landing at Salerno, at Army and Navy Staff College, presented various times, 1944-46, copy in National War College Library, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter cited as Wood Lecture.) (A copy of a slightly different version is in ABC 384, Post-HUSKY, Sec 2).