The Zanussi Mission
After Castellano's departure for Madrid and Lisbon, Ambrosio continued to cooperate warily with the Germans; until Castellano brought back word that the Allies were willing to support open rupture with the Germans, the Italians could do little else.
Roatta, Army chief of staff who was responsible for defending Italy against Allied attack, still did not know of Castellano's mission. His recognition since May that Italian forces alone were not equal to the task of opposing an Allied invasion prompted him to keep calling for German reinforcements, ground as well as air. But the German troops in Italy were poorly distributed for defense against the Allies. Anxious to defend the entire peninsula and believing the most threatened area to be southern Italy, particularly the Naples-Salerno area, Roatta pointed out to the Germans that loss of southern Italy would open the Balkans to Allied operations. He proposed that the Germans group their divisions into mobile reserves deployed at several key points throughout Italy to meet various Allied capabilities. A heavy concentration of German units in northern Italy would then be unnecessary, Roatta urged, unless, of course, the Germans intended to abandon southern and central Italy at the very outset.1
Because the Germans and Italians at the Tarvis conference had not agreed on a common plan for the defense of Italy, on the command problem posed by German forces in Italy, and on the return of the Italian Fourth Army from France, Roatta proposed a new conference for purely military matters. The German Government accepted on the condition that the meeting be held at Bologna, the area where the II SS Panzer Corps was stationed.2
Roatta's strategic views were not essentially different from those of Kesselring, who still believed that the Italians showed a genuine will to co-operate. Kesselring also discerned, by the middle of August, a slight but definite improvement in the morale of the Italian troops. Intent on defending the whole of Italy and believing the task feasible, he reported that it would be difficult for the Germans quickly to seize Rome and the Italian Government. The 26th Panzer Division's vehicles, essential to render fully mobile the German forces around Rome (3d Panzer Grenadier and 26 Parachute Divisions), had not yet arrived. More important, Italian forces were present around Rome in considerable strength. If Italo-German conflict started in the Rome area, the German
forces in Sicily and southern Italy would be cut off. Kesselring therefore urged a postponement of the seizure operation (Operation SCHWARZ) until the Germans had incontrovertible proof of Italian negotiations with the Allies. Continued co-operation with the Italians, he felt, would gain the Germans enough time to move in sufficient reinforcements to hold the entire peninsula, thus preventing the Allies from seizing southern Italy, the springboard to the Balkans.
The weakness of Kesselring's position lay in his lack of troops in southern Italy. He had only a few battalions of the 1st Parachute Division and certain security units in the Naples-Salerno area. The 16th Panzer Division alone could not hold both Puglia (the heel) and Calabria (the toe). Pleading for reinforcements to enable him to station a full division in each of the most threatened areas in the south--the heel, the toe, and Naples-Salerno--he, like Roatta, regarded the heavy concentration of German troops in northern Italy as wasteful.3
Jodl and Rommel, in contrast, saw the main danger not in Allied power but in Italian treason. Since southern Italy needed stronger forces, and since the movement of forces from the north would merely aggravate the supply problem, Jodl recommended an immediate withdrawal from Sicily (this was already under way). With the XIV and LXXVI Panzer Corps concentrated on the mainland, the time would be ripe for grabbing Rome. Then Kesselring's forces would fall back northward and be absorbed by Rommel's Army Group B.4
The decision was left for Hitler. Hitler continued to insist on the liberation of Mussolini, though General Student and Captain Skorzeny were still unable to locate him. Hitler refused to permit reinforcement of south Italy, and he instructed Kesselring to keep the 3d Panzer Grenadier and 2d Parachute Divisions near Rome, to move the 16th Panzer Division from the Taranto area to the Gulf of Salerno area. This left the heel unguarded, and Hitler asked Kesselring to use his influence with the Italians to induce them to assume the defense of Puglia, even though the Italians since July had sent no forces to southern Italy. Hitler refused to evacuate Sicily at once because arrangements for defending the Balkans were not yet complete. He wanted the Allies tied down in Sicily (although by this date a large part of the XIV Panzer Corps had already been ferried over to the mainland) as long as traffic could cross the strait. Eventually, the movement of the XIV Panzer Corps from Sicily to the mainland could provide a force to help defend against an Allied invasion of southern Italy.5
The military conference at Bologna on 15 August was as inconclusive and unsatisfactory for both Italy and Germany as was the earlier conference at Tarvis. Diplomatic representatives, as well as Keitel and Ambrosio, were absent. Jodl represented OKW and attended in company with Rommel. The presence of Kesselring and Rintelen tended only slightly to soften the brusqueness of the German attitude. Roatta, Rossi (deputy chief of Comando
Supremo), and Zanussi (of Roatta's office) represented Italy.
When Roatta stated the need to withdraw the Fourth Army from France to Italy to help defend the Italian homeland, Jodl asked the direction of an anticipated attack--the Brenner frontier or southern Italy? Roatta refused to answer the question on the ground that it was tendentious, but he agreed to leave two coastal divisions and a corps headquarters in southern France. Acrimonious discussion took place on the northward movement of Italian divisions into the Brenner area. When Rommel was presented as commander of all German forces north of the Apennines, Roatta said that he had not been informed that the German troops in northern Italy were to remain there. Who would be Rommel's superior? Roatta asked. The Germans then agreed to recognize Ambrosio's supreme command on condition that the Italians recognize the German command over the forces of both nations in the Balkans and Greece. Both parties then professed to agree, but in bad faith, to reduce their forces along the Brenner frontier. As for Roatta's proposal that an additional German division be sent to Sardinia, Jodl replied that none could be spared. Jodl made no objection to moving an Italian corps from Thessaly to Albania, and three divisions from the Balkans to southern Italy.6
When the Italian representatives returned to Rome on 16 August, the King summoned Badoglio, Ambrosio, and Roatta to a special council at the Quirinal Palace and asked about the outcome of the conference. Roatta described the cold, suspicious, almost hostile attitude of the Germans. He ascribed their use of a detachment of SS troops as a guard during the meeting to their fear of an Italian ambush. Badoglio stated that it would be necessary to act toward the Germans with the greatest prudence for a few days more, in view of the negotiations initiated with the Allies. Otherwise, the Germans would descend upon Rome in force and seize the Italian Government. Roatta thus learned of Castellano's mission. The King reaffirmed the fundamental lines of the Badoglio government, stipulated at the time of its formation: personnel limited to military men and technicians, excluding politicians; and the prevention by force if necessary of political agitation and organization to avoid "the absurdity of judging and condemning by implication the work of the King."7
A few days afterward, Ambrosio suggested to Badoglio the advisability, in view of Castellano's mission, of issuing written instructions to the top commanders to inform them of Castellano's mission and to outline the course the armed forces were to pursue in case of an armistice. Badoglio disapproved. He wished to keep the secret of negotiations with the Allies limited to the smallest possible circle. He told Ambrosio, "We must not give Germany the least possibility of discovering our intentions."8
Roatta, because he had not been informed of Castellano's mission before he
met with the Germans at Bologna, had been something of a dupe--a mere tool for negotiating with the Germans while Ambrosio himself was making contact with the Allies. Roatta could not object to the new course of the government, but he questioned whether Castellano was the most appropriate choice as emissary. In any event, Roatta wished to learn more about what was going on.9
Roatta found an ally in General Carboni, commander of the Motorized Corps protecting Rome and known for his pro-Allied sympathies. Appointed by Ambrosio director of Military Intelligence Service on 18 August in the hope that Carboni would be able to disentangle the close connection between Italian and German intelligence offices, Carboni quickly picked up the news of Castellano's departure. Though Roatta may have had some doubts as to Castellano's suitability for the mission, Carboni had none. He hated Castellano, whom he blamed, along with the Duke of Acquarone, for Carboni's having been passed over for an appointment in Badoglio's cabinet. Believing that Castellano was inadequate for the task and untrustworthy besides, Carboni urged that a more reliable envoy be sent to control Castellano and to prevent that ambitious Sicilian from trying to grab all the glory in representing Italy "in dealings with" the Allied powers. Carboni appealed to Badoglio, Acquarone, Ambrosio, and Roatta. But all apparently wished to await Castellano's report. After more than a week passed without word, they began to fear that the Germans had discovered Castellano. Roatta then took the lead in urging that a second dove of peace be released from the ark, with the same mission as the first.10
A suitable man was at hand. With no clearly defined functions in Roatta's office, General Zanussi could be spared. His absence would be no more noticeable to the Germans than Castellano's. Like Castellano, Zanussi thoroughly believed in changing sides. He had written several memorandums for his colleagues and superiors, indicating that a switch to the Allied side was the only sensible course after the overthrow of Mussolini.
Ambrosio probably wanted to keep the dispatch of a second emissary secret from Badoglio, but in the end he decided to let the Marshal know. Badoglio approved, as he had earlier assented to Castellano's mission. But because Guariglia, Minister of Foreign Affairs, would probably object to what he might consider another military usurpation of a diplomatic function, the Foreign Office was not approached for a passport.11 As credentials, Carboni suggested that Zanussi take with him a British prisoner of war. Lt. Gen. Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart was selected. He was a good choice, for he was well known and easily recognized--he had lost an eye and an arm in the service of his country. If the Germans discovered him in Zanussi's company, it would be obvious that the mission concerned merely the exchange of prisoners. Lt. Galvano Lanza di Trabia, Carboni's aide, was to go along as the interpreter.12
On 22 August, two days before Zanussi departed from Rome, Ambassador Prunas in Lisbon informed Guariglia that Castellano had made contact with the Allies and would soon report. Expecting Castellano's quick return, Guariglia saw no reason to inform Badoglio or Ambrosio. Because Ambrosio and Badoglio had kept the Zanussi mission secret from Guariglia, they did not know that Castellano had already carried out his mission by the time Zanussi had left.
Like Castellano, Zanussi carried no written orders. Ambrosio briefed him, but his instructions were broad and vague. If Castellano had disappeared, Zanussi was to take his place. If Castellano were still in Lisbon, Zanussi was to support him in his quest to concert plans with the Allies for a war against the Germans.
Zanussi informed Roatta of Ambrosio's instructions. Carboni passed along some advice--first, Ambassador Prunas could be trusted, and second, it was important to urge the Allies not to fight their way up the Italian peninsula but to land in force north of Rome.13
Castellano at Lisbon
General Castellano had arrived in Lisbon at 2200, 16 August. On the next day he called on Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, the British Ambassador. Campbell told Castellano he would inform him of developments just as soon as he, Campbell, received instructions to negotiate. A day later Campbell learned that Osborne, British Minister to the Holy See, had verified to the Foreign Office the letter of introduction he had prepared for Castellano. Sir D'Arcy had also obtained a signed statement from Badoglio to the effect that Castellano was authorized to speak for the Marshal.14
On the same day, 18 August, Maj. Gen. Walter B. Smith, the AFHQ chief of staff, and Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong, the AFHQ G-2--appointed by General Eisenhower to meet with Castellano--were flying to Gibraltar in civilian clothes and without titles. From there they went to Lisbon, where they arrived on the morning of 19 August. That evening, at 2200, Smith and Strong, accompanied by Mr. George F. Kennan, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, met Castellano and Montanari at the British Embassy.15
After an introduction by the British Ambassador, General Smith opened the discussion by stating that on the assumption
SECRET EMISSARIES TO LISBON (left to right) Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong, Generale di Brigata Giuseppe Castellano, General Smith, and Consul Franco Montanari, an official from the Italian Foreign Office.
that the Italian armed forces were ready to surrender, he was authorized to communicate the terms on which General Eisenhower was prepared to agree to a cessation of hostilities. The terms, Smith said, constituted a military armistice only and had to be accepted unconditionally.
Somewhat surprised by this abrupt statement, Castellano said he had come to discuss how Italy could arrange to join the United Nations in expelling the Germans from Italy.
Smith replied that he was prepared only to discuss the terms of Italy's surrender. The status of the Italian Government and Army operations against the Germans were, he declared, matters of high governmental policy to be decided by the heads of the United States and British Governments. But the Allies were ready to assist and support any Italian who obstructed the German military effort. General Smith then read the armistice conditions point by point, the short terms that had been furnished General Eisenhower on 6 August.16
To permit careful translation of the documents and an opportunity for study, the British and Americans withdrew from the room, leaving Castellano and Montanari alone.
When the group reassembled, Castellano stated that he had no power to accept the armistice but that he wanted an explanation of certain terms for his government's information. With regard to prisoners and internees, practical limitations might hinder the extent to which the Italians could prevent the movement of such personnel to Germany, though the Italians would make every effort to comply with this condition. General Smith replied that the United Nations understood the problem, but expected the Italian authorities to do their best.
When Castellano requested clarification of the clause on Italian ships and aircraft, Smith explained that this meant surrender of the fleet and of the planes, their future disposition to be decided by General Eisenhower. Castellano mentioned the lack of fuel that might prevent some warships and planes from complying. The authorities, Smith said, had to make every effort to provide sufficient fuel.
As for Allied use of Italian airfields and ports, Castellano pointed out that most of the airfields were already in German hands; those remaining under Italian control were small and scattered.
As for withdrawing Italian armed forces to Italy and moving units stationed inland in the Balkans, this might prove an impossible task. Smith assured Castellano that the Allies did not expect the impossible; certain Italian divisions, however, were near enough to the coast to permit their removal to Italy by Allied ships.
Castellano inquired about the meaning of setting up an Allied military government and also about the decision to give General Eisenhower an overriding authority over the Italian Government--would the Italian Government retain sovereignty? Smith reiterated that his instructions referred only to the terms of a military armistice. He was not empowered to discuss questions relating to the future government of Italy. He said that the Allies would establish military government over parts of Italian territory, and he observed that this was being exercised in Sicily in a fair and humane manner.
Castellano cited the danger to the person of the King. Accepting the terms might prompt the Germans to hold the King as a hostage and even to threaten his life. It was suggested that the King might leave Italy on an Italian naval vessel. Castellano was assured that the King would be treated with all due personal consideration.
The discussion then returned to the essential point in Castellano's proposal: the manner and extent of Italian military collaboration with the Allies against Germany. The Allied representatives reiterated that the clauses of the armistice were a military capitulation, not an agreement for Italy's participation in the war on the Allied side. Immediately thereafter, however, Smith read to Castellano a paragraph based on the Quebec Memorandum:
The extent to which these terms of armistice would be modified in favor of Italy would depend on how far the Italian Government and people did in fact aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war, but that wherever
Italian Forces or Italians fight the Germans, destroy German property or hamper German movements they will be given all possible support by the forces of the United Nations.
He then asked Castellano to weigh carefully the significance of the paragraph and explained that the Allied terms had been drawn up by General Eisenhower and approved by the Allied governments without considering the possibility of active Italian participation in the war against Germany. As President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had declared at Quebec, with Stalin's approval, the conditions enforced would be modified to Italy's advantage in proportion to the sum total of Italy's participation in the war. Without using the unconditional surrender phrase, without modifying the impression demanded by the predominant Allied powers, Smith skillfully used the Quebec telegram as an inducement to secure Italian capitulation.17
Castellano returned to the point he had emphasized to Hoare in Madrid: the Italian Government, without effective aid from the Anglo-Americans, was unable to turn against the Germans. If Italy accepted and put into effect the armistice terms, the Germans would counter with immediate reprisals. Italy was an occupied country, and Italians were alarmed by the degree of control already exercised by the Germans. Nor was Castellano exaggerating, he said, in order to try to convince the Allies to accept his proposal to co-ordinate military plans. Though the Luftwaffe was relatively weak, it could wreak great damage on Italy. The strength of the German Army was impressive. The war, Castellano believed, would continue for some time because the Germans had not used up their reserves in their recent Russian operations. Castellano hated the Germans because of their abominable behavior toward Italian troops in Russia. Each time Kesselring visited Ambrosio, it was an occasion for a row. Despite the fact that the Italian secret services worked closely with German intelligence, and despite the fact that many pro-German officers were in the Italian Army, including Roatta, Castellano believed that Badoglio was quite capable of directing policy as the situation required.
When Castellano again cited the German threat to use gas, the Allied representatives pointed out the folly of such an act because the Allies would themselves counter with gas. In any event, the effect of a few days' vindictive action by the Germans would be far less serious for Italy than a long war of attrition.
Stating that he now fully understood both the terms of the armistice and the supplementary information derived from the Quebec telegram, Castellano added that he was not authorized to accept the terms but would submit them to his government. He said that it would be useful for the Italian Government to know when or where the Allies planned to invade the mainland because German countermeasures would probably make it necessary for at least part of the government to leave Rome simultaneously with the armistice announcement. It was in the Allied interest, he believed, to prevent capture of that government which, he again insisted, wanted to reach an understanding. General Smith replied that Castellano, as a soldier, would understand why it was impossible to reveal Allied plans in detail. Castellano therefore repeated that he
would limit his function to that of acting as bearer of the Allied terms to his government.
They then discussed arrangements for a direct channel of communication, and it was proposed that if Badoglio should accept the terms, General Eisenhower would announce the armistice five or six hours before the main Allied landing on the Italian mainland. Castellano objected vigorously. Such short notice, he declared, would not allow his government enough time to prepare for the landing. He asked for longer notice, preferably two weeks. Smith thought a longer advance notice might be possible, and he assured Castellano that he would present the Italian views to General Eisenhower. But Smith maintained the point that public announcement of the armistice would have to precede the principal Allied landing by a few hours only.
All agreed that the Italian Government was to signify its acceptance of the armistice by a radio message. If it proved impossible for the Italians to do so directly, the government was to send a message to the British Minister at the Holy See as follows: "Il Governo italiano protesta contro il ritardo nella comunicazione delle liste complete die nomi dei prigionieri catturati in Sicilia." (The Italian Government protests against the delay in the communication of the complete list of names of Italian prisoners captured in Sicily.)
The Italian Government was to communicate its acceptance by 28 August. If no reply came by 30 August, the Allies would assume that the terms had been refused. Acceptance of the armistice terms meant also acceptance of the method of announcement as then determined--a radio announcement by General Eisenhower with five or six hours preliminary warning to Italy. For a secret channel of communication with AFHQ, Castellano was to receive a portable radio, a code, and instructions on their use. All communications from the Italian Government to AFHQ were to be in the Italian language. In case of acceptance, Castellano was to meet again with General Eisenhower's representatives in Sicily, and the precise hour of the meeting and the course of Castellano's flight to Sicily was stipulated: from Rome at 0700, 31 August, to reach Termini Imerese shortly before 0900.
After copies of the armistice terms and of the AFHQ memorandum based on the CCS directive were furnished to Castellano, Ambassador Campbell and Mr. Kennan withdrew and the discussion turned to purely military matters. Brigadier Strong began to question Castellano on German troop dispositions, first in general, then in detail. Castellano offered only general information until he observed Strong's map, which had accurate information on it. Castellano then gave detailed unit locations, hoping thus, as he stated later, to show his good faith. Strong asked no questions about Italian units, but Castellano noted that the AFHQ map showed them quite as correctly as the maps of the Operations Section of Comando Supremo.
Castellano estimated the total German military strength in Italy as 400,000 men. More troops could come from France. The Germans intended to defend on a line from Genoa to Ravenna and to fall back, if necessary, to the Po. They also planned to hold Sardinia and Corsica.
Castellano painted a pitiful picture of the Italian armed forces. The fleet had enough oil for only one action. The air
force was very short of matériel, though the fighter elements were quite good. All airfields except a few small ones were under German control. The Italian Army was short of gasoline, entirely dependent on the Germans for fuel, very short of antitank guns, antitank ammunition, and even of such items as boots. If Italy detached itself from the German alliance, the nation would require supplies of wheat and coal from the Allies.
The Italian general urged the Leghorn area as the best place for an Allied landing. German lines of communication were extremely vulnerable, particularly along the Brenner route, and Castellano recommended attacking the Brenner Pass. The Italians planned to withdraw their troops from Corsica, he explained, but not from Sardinia. At the Bologna conference of 15 August, Roatta had discussed plans for defending Italy with Rommel and Jodl, but, of course, Castellano was ignorant of the results.
Though a number of German commanders wished to get rid of Hitler, loyalty to the Fuehrer was so widespread throughout the armed forces, Castellano believed, that overthrow appeared unlikely. The Gestapo was an important factor in preventing the collapse of German morale.
In conclusion, Castellano mentioned his part in Mussolini's downfall--how Grandi had been induced to take the lead in the Fascist Grand Council only to be double-crossed when Badoglio was named Mussolini's successor. On the whole, Castellano made a favorable impression. He seemed earnest and sincere, and he had an intense hatred of the Germans. Yet the Allied representatives wondered why he had neither credentials nor formal written instructions from Badoglio. Nor was Allied confidence in the new Italian regime enhanced by Castellano's disquisitions on honor, peculiar accompaniment to his description of the double-cross of Grandi and the idea of turning against Germany and jumping into the Allied camp.18
The conference lasted all night, breaking up at 0700, 20 August, nine hours after it had started. Smith shook hands with Castellano and expressed the hope that their meeting would prove to be the beginning of a new collaboration between their countries. Smith and Strong then flew back to Algiers and AFHQ. Castellano and Montanari remained in Lisbon to await the arrival of the Italian Ambassador to Chile, whose ship was several days late.
After reflecting on the conference, Castellano realized that the situation was far different from that imagined in Rome at the time of his departure. He and Ambrosio had believed that Italy was still in a position to bargain. Actually, it was too late. They had thought that the British and Americans would be receptive to the proposal that Italy switch sides. Allied suspicion and distrust came as a sobering shock. Castellano had, however, been able to avoid the humiliating phrase, "unconditional surrender." And the Quebec telegram offered assurance that the terms of capitulation would be modified in Italy's favor if the government and people rendered effective aid to the Allies. Castellano believed that the Allied invasion of the Italian mainland would be short and successful because of Allied air superiority.
He had great faith in Anglo-American generosity.
On the following morning, 21 August, Castellano presented himself at the Italian legation in Lisbon, where D'Ajeta was astonished to see him. D'Ajeta took him immediately to Prunas, the Italian Minister, who could not conceal his disappointment that such important negotiations had taken place without his knowledge and participation. Prunas on 22 August sent two cables to Guariglia and informed him that Castellano had made contact with the Allies and would soon report. The British Embassy delivered to Montanari the radio and code for future communications. On Ambassador Campbell's advice, Castellano, who had been thinking of returning to Rome by plane, took his place among the party of officials who left Lisbon by train on 23 August. The Italian Ambassador to Chile carried Castellano's papers across French territory, restored them at the Italian frontier. Reaching Rome on the morning of 27 August, Castellano made haste to report to his superior.19
Zanussi's Negotiations in Lisbon and Algiers
Three days earlier, the second Italian emissary, General Zanussi, together with General de Wiart, had arrived in Madrid. More fortunate than Castellano, Zanussi traveled by plane. The next morning, 25 August, he was in Lisbon. He promptly got in touch with Prunas, who was not overjoyed to see him. Prunas cautioned Zanussi to be on his guard, not only against German spies, but also against some members of the Italian legation. Though Zanussi learned that Castellano has been successful in meeting members of General Eisenhower's staff, and was even then on his way back to Rome, he asked to see the British Ambassador. Sir Ronald replied through an intermediary, since he saw no reason why he should meet another Italian general. The Allied terms were already in Castellano's hands. Still, he asked Zanussi to remain in Lisbon until he, the Ambassador, was certain that there was no message for him. General Carton de Wiart, the British "prisoner-of-war," offered to return to Rome with Zanussi since it began to appear that Zanussi had come on a futile mission.20
At Quebec on 26 August, Churchill and Roosevelt had at last agreed on the long terms for Italy. The Foreign Office therefore instructed Campbell to present the comprehensive document to Zanussi and to explain that it embodied both the short terms, already in Castellano's possession, and the political and economic terms that Castellano had been told to expect. He was also to suggest that Zanussi fly back to Rome immediately with the text of the long terms.21
Accordingly, on the morning of 27 August, Campbell met Zanussi and gave him the long terms. Zanussi immediately noticed the absence of reference to Italian military co-operation with the Allies, and asked why no mention of this had been made. Campbell read the Quebec telegram to him; this at least left the door open for eventual Italo-Allied co-operation.
Zanussi and his interpreter retired to their hotel to study the comprehensive conditions of capitulation.22
The British Government had acted with extraordinary speed in getting the text of the long terms into Zanussi's hands. So fast had the government acted that Ambassador Campbell at Lisbon had the comprehensive document before AFHQ received it. When Eisenhower's headquarters later that day received the document, Allied commanders became thoroughly alarmed. The main invasion of the Italian mainland, planned for the Salerno area, was less than two weeks away. It was a risky operation, particularly because the rate of German reinforcement was seriously changing the estimates on which the landing plan had been based. The success of the operation, it seemed, was becoming increasingly dependent on getting the Italian Government to surrender beforehand. Not only did Italian opposition have to be eliminated before the landing, but Italian assistance during the critical period of getting troops ashore now appeared necessary. Even Eisenhower had doubts that Castellano would be able to persuade the Italian monarch and high command to accept surrender on the conditions of the short terms; now the CCS had insisted on introducing the long terms with the harsh initial statement of unconditional surrender and had ordered their use in all additional negotiations with Badoglio.
General Eisenhower therefore appealed to the Joint Chiefs for some leeway. The President relented, and Eisenhower received authorization to proceed with the surrender negotiations on the basis of the short military terms. After getting the Italians to accept and sign this document, Eisenhower could submit the comprehensive paper to the Italian Government.23
Anxiety still persisted at AFHQ, however. The Allied commanders hoped to receive some sort of message from Castellano re-establishing contact with the Italian Government. Presumably Zanussi was a representative of Roatta, who was believed to have strong pro-German tendencies. Castellano had told Smith and Strong at Lisbon that Roatta had not been taken into the confidence of the Badoglio government, though Castellano had added that he presumed Roatta, as a soldier, would loyally follow the government if it shifted to the Allied side. Zanussi had no credentials whatsoever, whereas Castellano at least had brought a letter of introduction from Osborne. Did the two emissaries represent two distinct factions within the Italian Government, one in close co-operation with the Germans? Or was the Zanussi mission bona fide, and were Roatta and Ambrosio working semi-independently toward the same end?24
What General Smith feared most was that Zanussi would make immediate use of the diplomatic channels of the Lisbon Embassy to inform Roatta of the long terms and thereby nullify Castellano's negotiations. Smith therefore made arrangements to get Zanussi out of the hands of the diplomatists and into military hands
before Zanussi could do any damage. While Carton de Wiart was kept out of sight and later returned to London, Zanussi was invited to visit the Allied camp. Zanussi accepted. Relieved of his copy of the long terms, and flown first to Gibraltar under the assumed name of Pierre Henri Lamartine, Zanussi, accompanied by his interpreter, departed Gibraltar in the early afternoon of 28 August; to his surprise he found himself that evening at Algiers.25
Castellano later asserted that General Eisenhower at first planned to admit the Italian armed forces to full collaboration with the Allies and that Eisenhower was about to explain his plans in full when Zanussi's intervention rendered AFHQ suspicious, thereby inhibiting the Allies from divulging their plans to Castellano. Castellano also believed that AFHQ contemplated shooting Zanussi as a spy. But this was mere speculation; at no time did Eisenhower and Smith consider revealing Allied plans to Castellano, and they had no thought of shooting Zanussi. General Smith was prepared to hold Zanussi in case he turned out to be, under questioning, something other than a genuine emissary.26
During several conferences with General Smith, Brigadier Strong, and Mr. Robert D. Murphy, General Eisenhower's U.S. political adviser, Zanussi gave considerable information about the German forces in Italy, information that checked quite well against that obtained from other sources. He did not, however, divulge the Italian order of battle, though he convinced the Allied officers that he was genuine and sincere in his efforts to arrange the armistice. As "Chief of Staff of Roatta," he was in a position to know the military situation, and he seemed as thoroughly persuaded as Castellano of the necessity for Italy to make an arrangement with the Allies. Like Castellano, Zanussi labored under the incubus of the German threat to overthrow the Badoglio government and occupy Italy.
Zanussi saw five possible developments, each of which made it essential to act in concert with the Allies: (1) if Germany took the initiative and attacked the Badoglio government, it would be in the interest of the Allies and the Italians to join forces and prevent the return of fascism or the advent of communism in Italy; (2) though the Italians did not favor an Allied attack on Germany through the Italian mainland, a campaign requiring an estimated fifteen to twenty divisions, the Italians wanted their armed forces to have a specific role in any such campaign; (3) if the Allies directed their attack into the Balkans, the Italians wished to co-operate; (4) if the Allies avoided the Italian mainland and occupied Sardinia and Corsica, they should make no request for direct Italian assistance, for in that case the Germans would immediately occupy Italy; (5) if the Allies bypassed Italy and attacked the Germans on the Continent beyond Italy's borders, the Germans might withdraw some divisions from Italy, which would make it possible for Italy to fight the Germans unaided.
Zanussi's exposition indicated careful consideration of Italy's plight and the conclusion that Italy had no way out except by joining forces with the Allies. He made no objection to the specific clauses of the
terms--military, political, or economic--demanded by the Allies, but he was certain that Badoglio would object strenuously to the formula of unconditional surrender as stated in the preamble and in the initial article of the long terms. Could not the Allies secure everything they wished, he asked, without imposing this unneccessary indignity, which might even result in a refusal of the armistice by the Badoglio government?27
Zanussi painted a gloomy picture of the Italian political situation--the government was dominated by old men who were tainted by long association with the Fascist regime and who were incapable of vigorous action. He compared Badoglio to Marshal Henri Pétain, and asked how long the Germans would allow Italy any freedom whatsoever. Badoglio's slowness, he said, had given the Germans time to occupy the country. At any moment the Germans might decide to oust Badoglio and set up a Quisling government under Farinacci. The only hope, according to Zanussi, was in the younger Army officers, all of whom, he declared, were fed up with the Germans and would welcome collaboration with the Allies. He insisted that the Italians would defend Rome at all costs if the Germans tried to seize control, and he cited the movement of five or six Italian divisions into positions from which they could protect the capital. Although these troops had no written orders, Mussolini's overthrow told them what was expected of them.
Assertions that Rome would be defended were not altogether consistent with Zanussi's expressions of fear for the safety of the members of the government. He and his friends, he said, "for months have given much study and thought to these eventualities [and] have considered the means necessary to effect the escape from German control of the Government and King." These old men, he said, were rather helpless in their expectation of being rescued by the Allies, and Zanussi felt that some scheme to rescue them ought to be planned. If the Allied landing on the mainland would not be able, in conjunction with the Italian Army, to protect Rome, the King and government leaders might escape on a naval vessel from La Spezia to Sardinia. There, he said, "the four Italian divisions could easily overcome the German division present, especially if the Allies could provide a little support." Zanussi regarded Ambrosio as the only man who could possibly replace Badoglio, though he admitted that the chief of Comando Supremo lacked the marshal's prestige.
The Italian Government, Zanussi explained, was not only obsessed by fears for its own immediate safety but greatly alarmed that the German High Command, realizing that the war had been lost, might throw Germany into the arms of the Soviet Union. In this case, Italy, in the Anglo-American camp, would face a Russo-German combination at its front door with Britain and America far away. Zanussi stated his opinion that the House of Savoy had to be preserved to avert chaos in Italy; the dynasty, he said, had been a stabilizing influence for six centuries.28
As a result of these conversations with Zanussi, General Eisenhower decided to permit Zanussi's interpreter, Lt. Galvano
Lanza, to return to Italy with a message from Zanussi to Ambrosio--a letter urging the Italian Government to accept immediately the military terms of the armistice; indicating that the clauses of the long terms were relatively unimportant as compared to the main issue of how much practical assistance Italy would give the Allies against Germany; and recommending that the Italian Government trust the good faith of the Allies and send Castellano to Sicily in accordance with the agreement reached in Lisbon.
On 29 August Lanza was to take the letter to Sicily, and there he was to be transferred to an Italian plane for the remainder of the journey to Rome. The text of the long terms, which Zanusi had received in Lisbon, was not entrusted to Lanza, for AFHQ, besides having no official confirmation of Zanussi's mission, did not wish to run the risk of having the document fall into German hands. Zanussi, therefore, retained his copy of the long terms, which had been returned to him.
In reporting his action, General Eisenhower urged the American and British Governments to delay communicating the text of the long terms to the other United Nations governments. He expressed astonishment at the thought of a public armistice ceremony in the Compiègne tradition when negotiations were still not only tenuous and delicate but also being conducted with emissaries who had come at great risk to themselves and to the members of the Italian Government.29
As increasing information on the buildup of German forces in Italy came to AFHQ's attention, it became increasingly necessary, it seemed to Eisenhower, to have the Italian surrender as a condition essential for the success of AVALANCHE, the projected invasion of Italy at Salerno. The co-operation of Italian forces, even though those forces had little fighting power, could well prove the difference between defeat and success and could possibly assure a rapid advance up the Italian mainland.
Thoughts in Rome
In Rome, meanwhile, Castellano had returned on the morning of 27 August, just three days after Zanussi's departure. Finding Ambrosio temporarily gone from the capital, Castellano spoke briefly with Ambrosia's deputy, General Rossi, and arranged to see Marshal Badoglio. Guariglia and Rossi were also present to hear Castellano report on the Lisbon meeting.
When Castellano explained that the Allies insisted on announcing the armistice at their own discretion in order to have it coincide with their main landing on Italy, Guariglia was much upset. Declaring that Castellano had not been authorized to state Italy's intention to attack the German forces--a statement Castellano countered by saying that he had received no precise instructions--Guariglia advocated a different approach. Since it appeared that the Allies intended to invade the Italian mainland, the government should wait until after the landing had been made and the Allies were within striking distance of Rome. At that time, when the Allies were in position to rescue the Italian Government, and only then should the Italian Government request an armistice. Badoglio listened to all that was said, but said nothing himself. At the end of the meeting, Badoglio took Castellano's documents of the Lisbon conference
and consigned them to Guariglia.30
Later that day Castellano managed to get in touch with Ambrosio by telephone. Ambrosio promised to return to Rome on the next day. At Comando Supremo, Castellano learned that Zanussi had been sent to Portugal to make contact with the Allies. This development disturbed him because he feared it would complicate the negotiations. Furthermore, he was not reassured by the lack of frankness on the part of those who had sent Zanussi--Roatta denied his knowledge of the affair, as did Carboni.
Ambrosio, on the morning of 28 August, was in Rome as promised, and he listened to Castellano's account. Ambrosio then took Castellano and Carboni to Badoglio's office, where he found Guariglia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs again declared that Castellano had had no authorization to offer Italian military collaboration, and he protested once more against agreeing to announce the armistice at the time of the Allied invasion. In any case, Guariglia considered the negotiations to be essentially political. On that basis, he argued, his ministry alone should conduct diplomatic negotiations. Ambrosio and Carboni advocated continuing the negotiations through Castellano. No decision was reached.
A few hours later Guariglia prepared a memorandum as a counterproposal to the Allies. While not objecting to any of the Allied terms, Guariglia's memorandum stressed the fact that Italy was unable alone to separate from the Germans. Consequently, it was essential that the Allies land before the armistice and in sufficient force to guarantee the safety of the Italian Government against German reaction.
When Ambrosio and Castellano studied Guariglia's proposal, Castellano, though agreeing with Guariglia's analysis, said that he had already explained the situation and the Italian position to the Allied generals at Lisbon. The decision, therefore, rested with the Italian Government.
Ambrosio and Castellano saw Badoglio again on 29 August. Badoglio said that he would have to consult with the King before reaching a decision. Badoglio, Ambrosio, and Guariglia then arranged for an audience. When they arrived at the Quirinal Palace, they met Acquarone, who asked Ambrosio for a detailed account of Castellano's mission and for a copy of the Allied terms. Acquarone took these to the King.
Acquarone returned to tell the three who waited that before the King gave the final word, Badoglio, as Head of Government, should reach a decision and suggest a definite course of action. The three men discussed the matter but had reached no decision when the King received them for a brief audience.
Immediately after seeing the King, Ambrosio called Castellano and asked how a reply could be sent to the Allies, a reply which would not refuse the armistice and at the same time not accept the conditions stipulated at Lisbon. The King and his advisers did not, apparently, object to the terms of the armistice, but they feared that if they surrendered without knowing where, when, and in what strength the Allies would land, they would expose themselves to capture by the Germans--particularly if the Allies were not planning to land in strength near Rome.
Castellano replied that the Allies demanded a yes or no answer. The message
could be sent through Osborne (in the Vatican) or by means of the radio he had brought from Lisbon.
After speaking briefly with Guariglia and Ambrosio once more, Badoglio departed, leaving to the others the decision on how to arrange the details of the message.
After further discussion with Guariglia, Ambrosio called Castellano again. Admitting that the Allies in Lisbon had clarified all points, Ambrosio nevertheless felt it essential to secure an agreement that the proclamation of the armistice would be made only after the Allies had landed in force. He directed Castellano to encode and transmit a message to the Allies to embody this request.
Castellano did not dispatch the message. For at that moment Carboni came in with news that he had word from Zanussi, believed to be in Lisbon (though in actuality Zanussi was in Algiers). Zanussi said he had documents of the greatest importance and requested that a plane be sent to the Boccadifalco airfield near Palermo, Sicily, in order to bring those documents to Rome. Though it was not clear how Zanussi in Lisbon could have gotten papers to Sicily, Castellano dispatched a plane as requested, then informed the King and Badoglio of his action.31
The plane dispatched by Castellano reached Palermo safely, picked up Lanza, and returned to Rome the same day, 29 August. But Lanza carried only two letters, one to Ambrosio recommending acceptance of the armistice conditions as explained to Castellano, the other to Carboni urging him to support those who were trying to arrange an armistice. Since Zanussi had not wired the text of the long terms from Lisbon, Badoglio and his advisers remained in ignorance of it.32
Summoning Ambrosio, Guariglia, and Castellano to him on the morning of 30 August, Badoglio gave Castellano a revised version of the Guariglia memorandum as his written instructions. Castellano was to make contact with the Allies again and present the following points. If Italy had still enjoyed liberty of political and military action, the government would have requested an armistice immediately and accepted the conditions offered. But Italy was not able to do this at once because the Italian military forces in contact with the German forces inside and outside Italy were inferior to these forces. Unable to withstand a collision with the Germans, the Italian forces would be crushed in a very brief time. The whole country, but Rome above all, would be exposed to German reprisal. Since the Germans intended, at whatever cost, to fight in Italy, Italy was bound to become a second Poland. Consequently, Italy was able to request an armistice only when, because of landings by the Allies with sufficient forces and at appropriate places, the conditions were changed, or when the Allies were in a position to change the military situation in Europe.
Marshall Badoglio canceled the penultimate paragraph of the memorandum. In its stead he wrote out with pencil on a piece of paper which he gave to Castellano
the following points as guidelines for his discussion with the Allied generals:
Report the memorandum.
In order not to be overwhelmed before the English [sic] are able to make their action felt, we cannot declare our acceptance of the armistice except after landings have taken place of at least 15 divisions, with the greater part of them between Civitavecchia and La Spezia.
We will be able to place at their disposition the following airfields . . .
The fleet goes to Maddalena; learn the approximate period in order that preparations may be made.
Protection of the Vatican.
The king, the heir apparent, the queen, the government and the diplomatic corps remain at Rome.
The question of prisoners.
Badoglio instructed Castellano to indicate the airfields still in Italian hands and on which Allied planes might land. Castellano was to explain that the German authorities had asked repeatedly about the status of Allied prisoners, and that the Italian Government had put off the Germans with various excuses. But German insistence made further delay difficult, if not impossible.
Happy at last to have a piece of paper and precise instructions, Castellano made haste to confirm, by means of his secret radio, his appointment with the Allied generals.33
1. Situation appreciation by Roatta of 11 Aug 43, as forwarded by Rintelen, OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VIII.43, 13 Aug 43. Cf. Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 261.
2. OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VIII.43, 12 Aug 43; Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, pp. 399-400.
3. Kesselring's estimate of the situation, 12 Aug 43, in OKH/Op. Abt.,Westl. Mittelmeer, Chefs., 19.V.43-II.VII.44 (H 22/290).
4. Addendum by Jodl to Kesselring's situation estimate; see also, OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VIII.43, 13 Aug 43.
5. OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VIII.43, 13 and 14 Aug 43.
6. OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VIII.43, 15 Aug 43; Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 385-401; Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, pp. 242-45; Rommel, Private KTB, 9 May-Sep 43, entry for 15 Aug and appended rpt.
7. Mussolini, Storia di un anno, p. 25; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 77; Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 294; Monelli, Roma 1943, pp. 298-99.
8. Monelli, Roma 1943, p. 299; MS #P-058, Project 46, 1 Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 11.
9. Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 75.
10. Giacomo Carboni, L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma: Verità e menzogne (Rome: Donatello de Luigi, 1945), pp. 18, 23-24; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 82; Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 294-95.
11. Guariglia, Ricordi, p. 671.
12. Happy Odyssey: The Memoirs of Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart (London: Cape Publishers, 1950), pp. 225-29; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 83-85; Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 295-96.
13. Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 87.
14. Castellano, Come firmai, p. 98; copy of Telg, Foreign Office to Lisbon, 18 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 89.
15. The conference is described in: Minutes of a conference held at the residence of the British Ambassador at Lisbon on August 18, 1943 at 10 P.M., Capitulation of Italy, pp. 85-88. These are condensed minutes, not a verbatim record. They were telegraphed to Washington and London in Telg, NAF 334, 21 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 112-17. The second part of the conference, which concerned purely military matters, is summarized in Telg, Eisenhower to Marshall, NAF 335, 21 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 126-27.
At the end of the conference, Castellano was handed a copy of the minutes and asked to check them for accuracy; it appears in translation in his Come firmai as Appendix I, pages 211-15 (his résumé of the military discussions is in pages 215-18); in addition, he gives his account of the conference which in some points supplements the minutes (pages 102-09).
The copy of the minutes in Capitulation of Italy (pages 85-88) and NAF 334 dates the conference 18 August, which is incorrect. Smith and Strong arrived in Lisbon only on the morning of 19 August. The correct date is the 19th as given by Castellano, and by Churchill in a speech to the House of Commons on 21 September 1943.
16. See Appendix C for the text of the short terms. Clause 3 now read: "All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, and none of these may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany." On instruction from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill the words indicated by italics were substituted for the original phrase, "from the beginning of the negotiations," in order to avoid any possible inference that they were "negotiating" with the Badoglio government. (Telg, USFOR to AFHQ, repeated to Lisbon, No. 4522, 19 Aug 42.)
17. Ambassador Campbell, a professional diplomatist, was much impressed with the skill displayed by General Smith as a negotiator. See Interv, Smyth with Mr. George F. Kennan, 2 Jan 47.
18. See Telg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 336, 22 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 126-27; Interv, Smyth with Ambassador Walter B. Smith, 13 May 47, and with Brigadier Kenneth D. Strong, 29 Oct 47.
19. Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 116-25.
20. Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 91-94; Telg 1721, 26 Aug 43, Campbell to Foreign Office, and Telg 1723, Campbell to Foreign Office, 26 Aug 43, both in OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 50; Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey, p. 230.
21. Telg 1352, Deputy Prime Minister to Campbell, 26 Aug 43. OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 50. See also, pp. 448-50.
22. Telg, 27 Aug 43, British Embassy at Lisbon to Foreign Office, OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 53; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 91-94.
23. Telg, CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 203, 27 Aug 43, with text of long terms; Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 342, 28 Aug 43; and Telg 6398, AGWAR to Eisenhower, 29 Aug 43, all in Capitulation of Italy, pp. 137, 160-64.
24. Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 342, 28 Aug 43, and Telg, Eisenhower to Lt Gen Sir Noel Mason-MacFarlane, 28 Aug 43, both in Capitulation of Italy, pp. 160-64.
25. Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey, p. 231; Interv with Smith, 13 May 47; Telg 6990, AFHQ to Gibraltar, 28 Aug 43, and Telg 25227, Gibraltar to Lisbon, repeated to AFHQ, 28 Aug 43, both in Capitulation of Italy, pp. 156-57. Cf. Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 90-99.
26. Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 174-75; Interv with Smith, 13 May 47.
27. Telg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 344, 30 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 166-71; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 101-08.
28. Telgs W-8750 and W-8751, FREEDOM to AGWAR, 30 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 179-84.
29. Telg W-8726, AFHQ to AGWAR, 30 Aug 43. Capitulation of Italy, pp. 175-76.
30. Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 125-26; Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, p. 101; Guariglia, Ricordi, pp. 663-65.
31. Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 126-30; Guariglia. Ricordi, pp. 672-74. Castellano's is the only account in detail. There is no mention of particulars by Badoglio (Memorie e documenti, page 101), and by Rossi (Come arrivammo, pages 126-27). Carboni's account (L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma, pages 24-25) is quite fantastic and in glaring contradiction to all the other evidence. It is testimony only of Carboni's violent hatred of Castellano.
32. Castellano, Come firmai, p. 130; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 110.
33. Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 130-32. Cf. Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, p. 101; Guariglia, Ricordi, p. 675.