Biak: The Plan, the Landing, and the Enemy

When, on 10 May 1944, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, changed the original concept of the Sarmi-Wakde-Biak plan no significant changes were made in the assignment of units to the operations for the seizure of Wakde and Biak Islands. The 163d Regimental Combat Team of the 41st Infantry Division was ordered to capture Wakde Island and the adjacent New Guinea mainland beginning on 17 May. Ten days later, on 27 May, the remainder of the 41st Division was to land on Biak Island, 180 miles northwest of Wakde. The target date for the landings at Biak was designated Z Day.

The Biak Plan

The Objective

Biak is shaped roughly like an old-fashioned high-topped shoe.1 (Map 13) The sole is on the south, the back of the shoe on the west, and the instep runs southeast to northwest. Off the northwest corner of Biak (and about one third its size) lies Soepiori Island. The two are separated by a small creek-like strait. Off southeastern Biak lie a number of islets, including Owi, Aoeki, Mios Woendi, and others of the Padaido Group. In May 1944 Biak's principal towns lay along its southern shore. About fourteen miles west of the southeast tip was Bosnek, prewar administrative and commercial center.

Biak was formed as the result of underwater disturbances which in prehistoric times had brought part of the ocean's floor above the surface. Much of the island is cut by broken coral terraces, ridges, and shelves which in the course of centuries acquired a thick cover of tropical rain forest and dense jungle undergrowth. There are some extensive inland flat areas at the southeastern third of the island. Little fresh water is readily available on Biak, since most of the streams run through underground channels that drain even the heaviest rainfall from the surface. The island lacks good harbors,


Map 13
Schouten Islands

almost all its shore line being fringed by rough coral reefs.

A high, rough, and narrow coral ridge, lying in front of a generally flat inland terrace in levee-like fashion, parallels Biak's southern shore from a point about five miles east of Bosnek to Mokmer, a village located ten miles west of Bosnek. (Map 14) The seaward face of this ridge is from 180 to 250 feet high, while its landward slope rises only 100 feet or so above the flat but rough-surfaced inland terrace. Near Mokmer the coral ridge turns northward and inland for about a mile and a half, and then west again toward Biak's southwestern corner. At Parai, some 2,000 yards east of Mokmer, one spur of this coastal ridge comes down almost to the shore line to form a twenty-foot-high cliff. This cliff runs along the water line from Parai to a point about 1,000 yards west of Mokmer.

The turning of the main coastal ridge combines with a protrusion of the coast line beginning near Parai to form a plain about eight miles long and up to one and a half miles wide. The Japanese had begun to construct airfields on this plain late in 1943, and by April 1944 had completed two strips. The most easterly was Mokmer Drome, near the village of Mokmer. About two and one-half miles west was Sorido Drome, located near the village of the same name. Both these strips were close to the southern shore of Biak. Between them, but about three quarters of a mile inland, was Borokoe Drome, which became operational early in May 1944. A site for a fourth airfield had been surveyed on flat land north of the coral


Map 14
Bosnek-Sorido Coast

Note the location of the coral ridge line in relation to the coast and in relation to the plain upon which Mokmer, Sorido, and Borokoe Dromes were constructed.

ridge behind Bosnek, and for a fifth between Sorido and Borokoe Dromes.

There were few good localities for amphibious assaults along the shores of Biak, and the best lay far from the airstrips. Since these airfields were the principal Allied objectives, it was necessary to choose relatively poor landing points in order to put assault forces ashore close to the fields. ALAMO Force knew that reasonably good beaches, though fronted by coral reefs, were located at Bosnek, Mokmer, and along the coast between those villages. But the Mokmer area was known to be the most heavily defended on Biak, It would be foolhardy to land at the point of the enemy's greatest strength if other usable beaches could be found at near-by but more lightly defended areas. East from Mokmer, coral cliffs or mangrove swamps lie immediately behind the beach. These obstacles would prevent a landing force from maneuvering or finding room to disperse its supplies. The lessons of the Hollandia campaign were fresh in the minds of planners, who had no desire to find the troubles of the 24th Division at Tanahmerah Bay or those of the 41st Division at Humboldt Bay repeated on Biak. From aerial photographs., Bosnek appeared to be the point nearest to Mokmer


Drome where cliffs or swamps did not back the beach. It was also known that some roads or trails led both inland and along the coast in both directions from Bosnek. Moreover, at Bosnek two possibly usable jetties led to deep water beyond the coral reef which fringed the entire southern coast.

The men planning the Biak operation could obtain little definite information about this fringing reef, which was estimated to vary from 200 to 600 feet in width. According to aerial reconnaissance, much of the reef was dry at low water, but no information was available concerning the amount of water over the reef at high tide. In any case, reef conditions off Bosnek appeared to be no worse than elsewhere along the south coast of Biak. Since this was true, and because jetties, apparent lack of strong enemy defensive installations, and maneuver room on shore offered advantages not found any place else, General Krueger, in agreement with the air and naval commanders, decided that the initial landing would be made at Bosnek.

Organization, Logistics, and Intelligence

The organization designated to secure Biak was named the HURRICANE Task Force,


the principal combat component of which was the 41st Infantry Division, less the 163d Regimental Combat Team. Both the task force and the division were commanded by Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller, who had commanded a similar organization at Humboldt Bay. For Biak, the 41st Division was reinforced by two field and two antiaircraft artillery battalions, a 4.2-inch mortar company, a medium tank company (less one platoon), an engineer boat and shore regiment (less one boat company), and a number of antiaircraft batteries. Service troops assigned to the HURRICANE Task Force, in addition to those organic to the 41st Division, were three engineer aviation battalions (for airfield construction work), other miscellaneous engineer units, and many medical, quartermaster, and signal corps organizations.2

Control of the amphibious phases of the operation was vested in Rear Adm. William M. Fechteler (USN) as the Commander, Attack Force. Admiral Fechteler divided his combat vessels into four support groups, which totaled 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and 21 destroyers. Assault shipping, comprising 5 APD's, 8 LST's, 8 LCT's, and 15 LCI's, was placed in a separate unit which Admiral Fechteler designated the Main Body. Smaller craft, such as LVT's, LVT(A)'s, DUKW's, and LCVP's were to be carried to Biak aboard LST's and APD's. A Special Service Unit of the Main Body contained 4 SC's, 3 rocket-equipped LCI's, 1 LCI carrying underwater demolition teams and their equipment, and 1 seagoing tug (ATF). The Special Service Unit, among other duties, was to provide close support and control for landing waves. A naval beach party, which was to control the landing of troops and supplies once the first waves were ashore, was also part of the Attack Force.

The First Reinforcement Group, consisting of 3 LST's and 8 LCI's, protected by 3 destroyers and 2 destroyer escorts, was to arrive at Biak on 28 May, Z plus 1. On the next day the Second Reinforcement Group, made up of 7 LST's, 3 destroyers, and 2 frigates (PF's), was to reach Biak. Aboard the cargo vessels of these two convoys were to be artillery units, service troops, and supplies of all kinds.3

Close air support for the invasion of Biak was primarily the responsibility of the Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force, which was to operate from bases at Hollandia and Wakde Island. The Fifth Air Force, the Thirteenth Air Force, and Australian and Dutch aircraft were assigned long-range and strategical support missions similar to those they had undertaken prior to the landings at Wakde-Sarmi.4

ALAMO Force Reserve for Biak consisted of the 128th and 158th Regimental Combat Teams, which had also been in reserve for the Wakde-Sarmi operation. HURRICANE Task Force Reserve consisted of two units. The first of these was a battalion (less one rifle company and the heavy weapons company) of the 186th Infantry, and the other was the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop.5

Those elements of the HURRICANE Task Force scheduled to land on Biak on 27 and


28 May were to carry with them to the objective ten days supply of rations, clothing, equipment (but only organizational sets of spare parts), fuels, and lubricants. Sufficient engineer construction equipment was to be landed on Biak during the first two days of the operation to assure a rapid start on airfield rehabilitation, road construction, and clearance of dispersal areas. All weapons except 4.2-inch mortars arriving at Biak through Z plus 1 were to be supplied with two units of fire, while the mortars were to be supplied with six units of fire. Organizations arriving at Biak after 28 May were to bring with them thirty days' supply of rations, clothing and equipment, fuels and lubricants, medical, engineer, and motor maintenance supplies, and three units of fire for all weapons. Initial responsibility for the transportation of troops and supplies to Biak rested with the Allied Naval Forces. It was planned that the Services of Supply would relieve the Navy of this duty late in June.6

ALAMO Force was able to supply the Task Force with little detailed information concerning the enemy situation on Biak Island. It was known that early in May the Japanese had ordered the defenses of Biak to be strengthened. Aerial reconnaissance disclosed that some effort was being made on Biak to comply with these orders and that a large amount of matériel had reached the island during the early months of the year. The extent of the Biak defenses however, was unknown. The enemy garrison on Biak was thought to total about 4,400 men, including the bulk of the 222d Infantry Regiment, 36th Division, and the effective combat strength of the 222d Infantry would probably not exceed 2,500 men. It was further believed that the principal Japanese strength was concentrated in the vicinity of Mokmer Drome, and it appeared likely that enemy troops which had once been stationed in the Bosnek area had been moved west to Mokmer early in May.

The landing on Biak was expected to elicit a strong aerial reaction from the Japanese. However, it was not probable that the enemy air attacks could reach very damaging proportions because all Japanese fields within range of Biak could be subjected to heavy bombardment by Allied aircraft. Allied Naval Forces did not believe that the enemy would risk major fleet units in an attempt to retake Biak once Allied forces had established a firm foothold on the island. Finally, though the seizure of Wakde might give the Japanese some indication that the next Allied target would be Biak, it was thought possible that the HURRICANE Task Force might achieve local tactical surprise as to the date and place of landing.7

The Landing Plan

The HURRICANE Task Force was to land in the Bosnek area on beaches designated GREEN 1, 2, 3, and 4. GREEN Beach 1, 200 yards long, began at a point about 500 yards east of Bosnek. GREEN Beach 2 was 300 yards long and extended west from GREEN 1 to the most easterly of the two jetties which crossed the coral reef in front of Bosnek. GREEN Beach 3 was located between the two jetties and was about 750 yards long. GREEN


Beach 4 extended 300 yards along the shore beyond the western jetty.8

Since little was known about the coral reef fronting the four Biak beaches, the landing plans differed from those for most previous operations within the Southwest Pacific Area. Amphibian vehicles such as LVT's and DUKW's were to make up the initial waves, because it was obvious that standard landing craft could be counted on for only limited use. The amphibian vehicles of the first waves were to be carried to Biak aboard LST's and were to unload in the stream outside the reef. After putting the initial waves ashore, the vehicles were to return to the LST's and shuttle supplies to the beaches. LCPR's, considered light and small enough to find channels through the reef, were to take some troops ashore after the first few waves had landed.

Eight LCT's were supplied by Allied Naval Forces for the express purpose of taking ashore tanks, 105-mm. howitzers, trucks, and bulldozers. The LCT's were to be driven as far up on the reef as possible and over it if feasible, and it was hoped that there would be enough water shoreward of the reef to float them. The equipment these craft were to take ashore was so important to the success of the operation that the risk of damage to them on the coral reef had to be accepted. The LCT's and LCPR's were to be Navy-manned while the DUKW's were to be driven by men of the 3d Engineer Special Brigade. Some of the LVT's were to be manned by the latter unit and others were to be driven by specially trained men of the 41st Division.9

At first, H Hour was set for 0745. But the planners lacked knowledge of wind, tide, current, and offshore conditions at Biak, and therefore decided to keep the landing time flexible, dependent upon the conditions found at Biak on Z Day. Therefore, the naval and ground commanders objected to a Fifth Air Force plan to support the landing by having twelve B-24's bomb the beaches immediately before H Hour. However, General MacArthur's headquarters considered it inadvisable to eliminate the air bombardment, and the Fifth Air Force offered to increase the number of B-24's from twelve to fifty-two. The Biak planners thereupon decided that it was worth while to sacrifice H-Hour flexibility to secure the additional air support, a decision which General Krueger quickly approved.

Some conditions, accepted by the Fifth Air Force, were made in the final agreement between the air, naval, and ground force commanders. First, bombs were to be dropped from a high level in order to avoid having the B-24's interfere with naval fire. Second, the bombers were not to hit the two jetties, which might be found in good enough condition for use by assault ships. Finally, no bombs were to be dropped on the reef lest chunks of coral be dislodged and, rolling in the surf, endanger landing craft and amphibian vehicles.10 The aerial bombardment was to be co-ordinated with an H Hour which was finally set for 0715. Even at this earlier time the bombers would be able to see their targets (sunrise at Biak being at 0655) and the change in H Hour would gain a half hour of daylight for ship unloading. The half-hour change would also reduce the time the assault shipping would


have to remain off Biak during daylight and might increase chances for tactical surprise.11

Other than the beach bombardment by B-24's, close air support for Biak on Z Day was similar to that undertaken for the Wakde landing. Medium bombers and fighters were to maintain an air alert over the Biak landing area from first light to dusk on Z Day. The convoys from eastern ports to Biak were to be given cover by Fifth Air Force planes. At Biak the medium bombers and fighters would fly close support missions for the forces ashore and would also undertake artillery spotting roles until an artillery liaison plane strip could be constructed on the island.12

Naval fire support was to begin at H minus 45 minutes, 0630. From that time until H Hour, cruisers and destroyers were to expend 400 rounds of 8-inch, 1,000 rounds of 6-inch, 3,740 rounds of 5-inch, and 1,000 rounds of 4.7-inch ammunition on targets in the airfield area west of the landing beaches. After H Hour the cruisers were to continue intermittent fire on the airfields, bombard targets of opportunity, and respond to calls for support from the forces ashore. Because there were many known or suspected Japanese gun emplacements along the south shore of Biak, counterbattery fire was to take precedence over all other types of fire.

Bombardment of the landing beaches was also to begin at H minus 45 minutes. Five destroyers were to bombard the beaches and adjacent areas until H minus 30 minutes, when they were to move westward to join the cruisers firing on the airfield area. Then four other destroyers were to continue beach bombardment until H minus 3 minutes. Total ammunition allowance for beach bombardment was 4,900 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch shells, while 40-mm. and 20-mm. ammunition was to be expended at the discretion of individual ship commanders. Rocket and automatic weapons fire from three rocket-equipped LCI's and two SC's was to provide close support for the assault waves. This fire was to begin at H minus 5 minutes and was to last until H Hour or until the initial wave was safely ashore.13

The first landings on Biak were to be made by the 186th Infantry of the 41st Division. The regiment was to land in column of battalions, the 2d Battalion leading, on GREEN Beaches 2 through 4. The first three waves, consisting of sixteen LVT's each, were to land at five-minute intervals beginning at H Hour. DUKW's, with Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion (4.2-inch mortars), and the 121st Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm. pack howitzers) aboard, were to follow the 2d Battalion ashore beginning at H plus 15 minutes. Twelve LCPR's were to take elements of the 3d Battalion to the two jetties at H plus 20 minutes. Simultaneously, GREEN Beach 1 was to be seized by a rifle company and the heavy weapons company of the 1st Battalion.

Once the two jetties were secured, LCI's bearing the 162d Infantry, supporting troops, and the task force reserve were to move inshore and unload. LST's were also to move to the jetties when the beach area surrounding them had been cleared by the 186th Infantry. LCM's bearing artillery, tanks, and engineering equipment were to move to the beaches as soon as channels


MOKMER DROME, BIAK, under air attack.

through the coral were found or made, or to the jetties in waves following the 186th Infantry's assault companies.14

As soon as it reorganized ashore, the 162d Infantry was to advance rapidly west along the coast from Bosnek to seize the three airdromes. This drive was to be supported by eight tanks of the 603d Tank Company and the 146th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers). The fields were to be repaired quickly to accommodate one fighter group and then expanded to receive an additional fighter group, a heavy bomber group, a reconnaissance group, a night fighter squadron, and one photo reconnaissance squadron. Mokmer Drome was to be the first field developed.15

It was obviously impossible, for tactical reasons, to set a specific date by which the HURRICANE Task Force was to seize the Biak airfields. However, the urgency of quickly securing these fields was impressed upon General Fuller. One of the reasons for scheduling the Biak operation only ten days after the Wakde-Sarmi landing was to provide, from Biak, additional air support for the Central Pacific's invasion of the Marianas on 15 June. The Allied Air Forces intended that one heavy bomber group and, apparently, some reconnaissance aircraft would be in operation from Biak before that date. The inadequate size of Wakde Island and the terrain and geographical position of Hollandia inclined Southwest Pacific planners toward the belief that only from Biak could all the bombing and reconnaissance missions necessary to the support of the Marianas operation be properly executed. Finally, the faster the Biak fields were secured and made operational the more


rapidly could Allied forces of the Southwest Pacific undertake subsequent advances in their own theater.16 While it is not clear how soon after its landing the HURRICANE Task Force was expected to secure the Biak fields, it is probable that General Headquarters anticipated that at least one of the fields would be operational by 10 June.

The Landing

Preparations and Approach

Most of the HURRICANE Task Force staged at Humboldt Bay, where preparations for departure were made under difficult circumstances. Terrain considerations forced most of the task force to assemble on the southern of the two sandspits dividing Humboldt and Jautefa Bays. On this spit the beach had a steep slope which made it impossible for more than a very few LST's to be held against the shore line long enough to load bulk stores. The LST's had to beach on the northern spit, where clearing and salvage after the fires and explosions which had ravaged that beach during the early phases of the Hollandia operation had not been completed. In addition, the northern spit was being used to unload supplies destined to be used at Hollandia, to load supplies being sent to the TORNADO Task Force at Wakde-Sarmi, and to unload cargo for the HURRICANE Task Force.

No road connected the northern and southern sandspits. Consequently, most of the supplies and equipment, as well as many of the troops, had to be transported by water from the southern to the northern loading area. There were only a few LCT's available for this work and only by working twenty-four hours a day from 15 May on were all the troops and supplies transported to the loading beach in time for departure on the 25th. Some elements of the HURRICANE. Task Force, principally the 1st and 3d Battalions, 186th Infantry, were loaded by small craft from the southern spit onto the LCI's and APD's which were to take them to Biak.17

Most of the assault troops of the HURRICANE Task Force were trained and experienced in amphibious operations but not in landing on a hostile shore from LVT's and DUKW's launched from LST's in deep water. Rehearsals for the assault waves were therefore desirable, but there was time only for limited drills. A rehearsal with about 65 percent of the LVT's and DUKW's (the rest were either undergoing repairs or being used for lighterage at Humboldt Bay) was held at Humboldt Bay on 23 May, Z minus 4. Serious deficiencies were discovered in forming waves, timing, and communication between control vessels (SC's and LCI's) and the amphibian vehicles.

There was no time for more rehearsal. Therefore a conference of amphibian-vehicle drivers, assault-unit officers, and naval control-boat officers was immediately held. Detailed methods of control were planned, and illustrated by rehearsing on dry land with a few vehicles. It was decided that the timing of assault waves could best be accomplished by having each LST control the moment of launching of its component of each wave.18


The HURRICANE Task Force left Humboldt Bay on the evening of 25 May. Supporting cruisers and their accompanying destroyers joined the assault shipping offshore the following morning. Thereafter, since it seemed futile to attempt to evade enemy search planes (the large convoy moved at only 8.5 knots) the force proceeded to Biak by the most direct route. No contacts, visual or by radar, were made with enemy aircraft on 26 May. During the following night some radar contacts were made with Japanese planes, but none of the aircraft so spotted seemed to have discovered the Allied convoy and the force arrived off Biak early the next morning apparently without having been detected by the enemy.(Map V)

A westerly current had been expected in the Biak area and, on the basis of available hydrographic information, some allowance had been made for it. Long before first light on 27 May, the convoy found itself in the current. The hydrographic information now proved to be wrong. The current was stronger than anticipated, and despite subsequent reduction of cruising speed the convoy arrived off Bosnek about fifteen minutes early. In an amphibious operation, better early than late. Assault shipping and combat vessels immediately deployed in the transport and fire support areas. At 0629 Admiral Fechteler ordered the landing plan to be executed.19

Map V
Biak Landings and Seizure of Mokmer Drome
27 May-7 June 1944

The Assault

The naval fire support and the air bombardment were carried out as planned. All targets were well covered and there was little answering fire from Japanese shore installations. Local tactical surprise was complete. The first wave of LVT's, with elements of the 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, aboard, formed rapidly and crossed the line of departure exactly on schedule.20 From that time on, the landing operations did not proceed according to plan.

Since the westerly current off Biak proved to be much stronger than had been anticipated, during the air and naval bombardment the transport group had been set over 3,000 yards west of its proper location. Although some of the ships' officers realized that the transport group was being carried west, nothing could be done to rectify the situation without causing a great deal of confusion and delaying the landing. More difficulties were caused by the morning twilight and the smoke and dust raised by the preliminary bombardment. The correct beaches were obscured, and the shore line could not be seen from more than 400 yards out.

A rocket-equipped LCI, which began firing on the beaches about H minus 4 minutes, led the first LVT wave toward the shore. The LCI fire, consisting of rockets and fire from automatic weapons, continued until H plus 2 minutes, when it was lifted because it began to endanger the troops who were unloading and pushing inland. Then it was discovered that the LVT's had touched shore at a mangrove swamp almost 3,000 yards west of GREEN Beach 4. The next two LVT waves of the 2d Battalion also landed at the mangrove swamp, as did the fourth wave's DUKW's. Nevertheless, the


entire battalion was ashore by 0730 and was pushing beyond the mangrove swamp to the main coastal road connecting Bosnek and the airfields. Five minutes later, Companies I and K of the 3d Battalion, 186th Infantry, landed about 700 yards east of the 2d Battalion.

By this time the effect of the westerly current had been realized by all commanders, and naval control boat officers had started to turn succeeding waves eastward to the proper beaches. Some thirty minutes passed before the resultant confusion could be straightened out. For instance, part of an LCPR wave which was scheduled to land Company B of the 186th Infantry on GREEN Beach 1 at 0735, hit GREEN Beach 3 at 0742. The jetties, scheduled to be seized by Companies I and K at 0735, were not secured until after 0800, when the rest of the 3d Battalion began landing on them.21

Col. Oliver P. Newman, commanding the 186th Infantry, had the 2d Battalion and most of the 3d Battalion organized under his direct control near Mandom, 2,000 yards west of Bosnek, by 0740. With more than half of his regiment already far west of the proper landing beaches, and knowing that the landing had become disorganized and that the rest of the boat waves were being delayed, he asked the task force commander if the 186th Infantry should continue with its original mission (securing the beachhead) or whether it might be feasible to switch missions with the 162d Infantry and start moving west toward the airfields. General Fuller, the HURRICANE Task Force commander, ordered the 186th Infantry to continue with its original mission. As events turned out, it might have been better had the regiment continued west, and it is possible that a great deal of time might have been saved if the missions had been switched. In the first place, the maps with which the task force was supplied were so inaccurate that both regiments soon came upon terrain features that threw much planning out of gear. Secondly, most of the 186th Infantry had landed so far west that both it and the 162d (the latter had to cross the 186th's line of march) consumed much valuable time getting to their proper locations. Finally, an exchange of missions might have been executed without much difficulty, for, in amphibious training, the 41st Division had learned to switch missions when such mistakes were made.22

By 0745 the 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, and the two companies of the 3d Battalion had started moving eastward. Meanwhile, the proper beaches had been located and waves going ashore after 0745, although late, proceeded to the right beaches at correct intervals. These waves had to land without the anticipated cover of the first waves and the results might have been serious had there been strong enemy opposition in the Bosnek area. But Japanese resistance was only nominal, and the temporary disruption of the 186th Infantry did not prove dangerous.23


BIAK COAST LINE near Mandom. In left foreground is mangrove swamp where 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, landed.


Companies I and K moved east to their planned location 1,000 yards west of Old (west) Jetty, arriving there about 1030. As the two companies took up their positions and began probing inland to the coral ridge behind Bosnek, the 2d Battalion passed through them on its way to the east flank of the beachhead. As the 2d Battalion approached the jetty area, the rest of the 3d Battalion, together with regimental headquarters personnel, began moving west and inland from the jetties to their proper positions, crossing the 2d Battalion's line of march. To add to the difficulties of movement, at 0915, just as the 2d Battalion was clearing New Jetty, the task force reserve and task force artillery units began landing. It was 0930 before the 2d Battalion, the 3d Battalion, and the task force reserve were completely untangled and could move without further confusion to the planned limits of the initial beachhead. The line marking these limits was an arc centering on Bosnek and curving inland from a point on the beach 1,000 yards west of Old Jetty to the top of the ridge behind Bosnek. Thence it swung back to the beach 1,500 yards east of New Jetty. The area thus enclosed was secured by the 186th Infantry by noon on Z Day.24

The face of the coral ridge behind Bosnek was found to be rough and honeycombed with small caves. Companies F and G, aided by elements of the Support Battery, 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, sent patrols along the steep slope and to the top of the ridge to investigate many of the caves, most of which proved to be unoccupied, though three Japanese were killed near caves directly north of New Jetty. The companies moved over the first slope to a second ridge line which was parallel to and about seventy-five yards north of the first. Company G started looking for a trail which was thought to lead over the ridges to the plateau north of Bosnek, but it was Company E which, shortly after noon, found the ill-defined track. A few Japanese in a pillbox temporarily prevented the two companies from securing the trail, which was not cleared until 1400 hours, after the pillbox had been destroyed. During the late afternoon, patrols were sent north of the ridges to the area which the Japanese had surveyed for an airdrome. A few Japanese, most of whom fled upon being sighted, were found at the airdrome site, but there were no signs of large organized enemy groups north, northeast, or east of Bosnek insofar as the 186th Infantry could ascertain during 27 May.25

The 162d Infantry on Z Day

The 162d Infantry had begun landing shortly after 0900 on Z Day.26 The regiment quickly assembled and immediately started moving west along the main coastal road toward the task force objectives, the three Japanese airdromes. Two alternatives had been planned for this advance. The first was to send the three battalions in column along the coastal road in the order 3d, 2d, and 1st. The other was to have only the 3d Battalion attack along the road while the 2d Battalion


moved over the ridges to the inland plateau and pushed west, echeloned to the right rear of the 3d. In case the latter plan was used, the 1st Battalion was also to advance over the inland plateau on the 2d Battalion's right rear. This second plan was to be used only if the Japanese appeared to be holding the ground behind the initial beachhead in great strength, for it was realized that the echelon movement would probably be more time consuming than a column attack along the road, and speedy occupation of the airdromes was the principal mission of the 162d Infantry.

Since there had been few contacts with the enemy by the time that the 162d Infantry was ready to start its attack westward, it was decided that only one company of the 2d Battalion need be sent inland to protect the right flank. The rest of that battalion and all of the 1st were to follow the 3d along the main road. The 1st Battalion was to maintain contact with the 186th Infantry in the Bosnek area until such time as the tactical situation permitted this contact to be broken. Should the advance of the 2d and 3d Battalions be rapid, the 1st would have to stretch its companies west along the road from the positions of the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, at Mandom.

It was 0930 before the 3d Battalion had passed the point at which the first assault waves of the 186th Infantry had come ashore about 0715. An hour later, the battalion had passed through the village of Ibdi, west of the 2,000-yard-long mangrove swamp. Beyond Ibdi the coral ridge which paralleled the southern shore of Biak fell steeply to within 100 feet of the beach. At this point the ridge was a vertical cliff about 200 feet high, below which the main road ran along the coast. The defile between the beach and the cliff, not shown on any maps then available to the 162d Infantry, began about 1,500 yards west of Ibdi and ran in a generally southwesterly direction for almost 2,000 yards along the shore of Soanggarai Bay. At the village of Parai, on the beach just beyond the western end of the defile, the cliff broke into a series of parallel ridges which formed a continuation of the main coastal ridge.

It was about 1115, when the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon discovered an enemy position on the face of the cliff west of Ibdi, that the 162d Infantry first learned of the existence of the Parai Defile. At 1300 the 3d Battalion, with six tanks of the 603d Tank Company leading the advance, arrived at the eastern entrance to the defile. There was no large Japanese force stationed along the cliff, but the few Japanese had such a tactical advantage over troops moving along the coastal road that they were able to delay the 162d Infantry's advance for some time. The tanks fired on enemy-occupied caves along the cliff, and rocket-equipped LCI's, lying offshore, pounded the main road and ridge west of Parai. By 1500 the 3d Battalion had pushed through the defile and had secured Parai and a large jetty at that village.

Meanwhile Company E, which had been attempting to advance along the ridge north of the rest of the regiment, had found that the terrain and thick vegetation made progress along that route next to impossible. Since the company was lagging far behind the rest of the advance and since strong enemy opposition had not yet been encountered either inland or on the coastal route, it withdrew to join the rest of the 2d Battalion on the beach, and by the time that battalion had reached Parai, Company E was back in place. Progress west of the Parai Defile was without noteworthy incident during the rest of the afternoon, though scattered small groups of Japanese were seen


and fired upon. At the close of the day the 2d and 3d Battalions started digging in around Parai and along the coast west toward the village of Mokmer. The 1st Battalion remained at Ibdi.

Supporting Arms and Services, Z Day

The first artillery unit ashore on 27 May was Battery C, 121st Field Artillery Battalion, which, landing from amphibian vehicles, was set up and ready to fire by 0730. The rest of the battalion, together with the entire 146th Field Artillery Battalion, was ashore by 1100. Battery C, 947th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzers), in general support, came ashore during the morning and went into position east of New Jetty early in the afternoon. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion was prepared to support the operations of the 186th Infantry, but only Battery C, which did some firing on the coral caves behind Bosnek, got into action. By early afternoon the westward advance of the 162d Infantry had progressed so far that two batteries of the 146th Field Artillery Battalion were displaced to Ibdi. Other than the few shots by Battery C of the 121st, artillery fire during the day was limited to registration on check points, and no defensive or harassing fires were requested until 0115 on 28 May. Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, landed its 4.2-inch mortars at the jetties at 0815. The company followed the 162d Infantry to the west and bivouacked for the night near the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry. It did no firing during the day.27

Naval support vessels, in addition to furnishing rocket fire west of the Parai Defile, hit other targets. The cruisers and destroyers of Fire Support Groups A and B kept up harassing fire on the airdrome areas throughout the day until 1700. One destroyer sank six enemy barges west of Bosnek during the morning. Another destroyer, operating east of the beachhead, fired on many targets of opportunity, including enemy troops in caves along the water line and supply, ammunition, and fuel dumps.28 Not all the B-24's scheduled to engage in the prelanding bombardment reached Biak, but the principal targets were adequately covered by the planes which did reach them. The medium bombers, whose action was controlled by the Naval Attack Force commander on Z Day, arrived over Biak on time. These support aircraft delivered requested attacks accurately and promptly. Fighter cover could not be established over Biak until 1110 because a front of bad weather west of Wakde Island, where the fighters were based, delayed the planes arrival. Fortunately, no determined enemy air attacks were made before 1110.29

Antiaircraft artillery, under the control of Headquarters, 208th Antiaircraft Artillery Group, quickly set up its guns in the beachhead area during the morning. A few enemy planes which flew over Biak around noon fled before antiaircraft guns from ship or


shore could be brought to bear. But all antiaircraft crews were on the alert to expect further Japanese air action late in the afternoon. Because of the difference in time of sunset at the closest Allied and Japanese bases, Japanese aircraft could remain in the Biak area about half an hour after Allied planes had to leave.

The expected attacks developed shortly after 1600, when four Japanese two-engined bombers, accompanied by three or four fighters, approached the beachhead from the north, flying low over the ridge behind Bosnek and thus escaping radar detection. Some excellent targets were ready for the Japanese. Admiral Fechteler had permitted four LST's to tie up side by side at one of the jetties. Although he knew this move to be tactically unsound, he considered it justified because of the importance of the cargo aboard the LST's and because the jetty provided the only good spot for LST beaching. The Japanese bombing was accurate, but the LST's were lucky. None of the Japanese bombs exploded!

Though the Japanese planes also bombed and strafed the beaches, none of the bombs dropped ashore exploded, while the strafing runs killed only one man and wounded two others. All four bombers were shot down by ground or ship-based antiaircraft, and the Japanese fighters were driven off by some Allied fighter planes which had remained late in the area. One Japanese bomber crashed into the water, sideswiping an SC which was standing offshore. Two of the ship's crew were killed and nine wounded. The SC had to be towed away for repairs, and a few other naval vessels suffered minor damage from strafing. There was negligible damage to supplies and equipment ashore. Total Allied losses as a result of the air raid were three killed and fourteen wounded, most of them naval personnel.30

Unloading on Z Day was accomplished by a variety of means. Some of the LCT's were able to reach the beach over the coral reef, from which the craft received little damage during the day. Other LCT's, after a partially destroyed wooden pier off one of the large jetties was knocked down, unloaded artillery, tanks, trucks, and engineering equipment on the earth and rock section of the jetty. All LCT unloading was completed by 1000, after which hour the LCT's aided the LVT's and DUKW's to unload LST's still standing in the stream outside the reef. Calm water permitted the LCT's to fasten ramp to ramp with the LST's, allowing cargo to be transferred directly from the larger craft to the smaller. Most of the cargo so handled was brought ashore over the reef to GREEN Beach 1. Five of the LST's were unloaded at the two jetties, as were most of the LCI's. After they had put troops ashore, some the LCPR's which had been brought to Biak aboard APD's aided in unloading LST's. These LCPR operations ceased at 1000, when the APD's formed a convoy to return to Hollandia.

Unloading stopped at 1715, about half an hour earlier than had been planned, because of the threat of more Japanese air attacks. By that time all the Z-Day troops


UNLOADING AT BIAK. In the background are two LST's discharging at Old Jetty. In the foreground are LVT(A)'s.

of the HURRICANE Task Force, some 12,000 odd, were ashore, as were twelve medium tanks, five 155-mm. howitzers, twelve 105-mm. howitzers, twelve 75-mm. pack howitzers, and about 500 vehicles of all types. An estimated 3,000 tons of bulk cargo (including about 600 tons aboard vehicles) had been landed, and only 300 tons of bulk cargo had not been put ashore when unloading operations ceased for the day.31

Principal responsibility for moving the supplies ashore and establishing dumps was assigned to the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, which operated under the supervision of the Shore Party commander. Attached to the regiment for these purposes were the Cannon and Antitank Companies, 162d Infantry; the Cannon Company, 186th Infantry; Company B, 116th Engineers; four quartermaster companies of various types; a port company; an amphibian truck company; and an ordnance company. The Bosnek beachhead held by the 186th Infantry was ideal for the location of the initial task force supply dumps and there


was no difficulty finding dispersal areas. Movement of supplies from the beach to the dump areas was initially somewhat hampered by lack of wheeled vehicles, but the Japanese air raids had no effect upon these activities.32

The 116th Engineers (less Company A) upon landing devoted its attention to constructing and improving roads in the beachhead area and clearing the ground for supply dumps. Company C supported the westward advance of the 162d Infantry by repairing the road bed and bridges along the main coastal track. These repairs were necessary so that motor vehicles and the 603d Tank Company (which, coming ashore at H plus 50 minutes, had been attached to the 162d Infantry) could follow the infantry toward the airfields. Company B, 116th Engineers, in addition to working with the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, devoted some of its time to clearing and repairing the two jetties at Bosnek. The 116th Engineers also established task force water points on the beachhead.33

By nightfall General Fuller, who had assumed command ashore at 0930,34 had good reason to be optimistic about the outcome of the Biak operation.35 The landing, although confused, had been unopposed. Troops and supplies had come ashore without undue difficulty and had been well-dispersed. Japanese air defense had been ineffective. The 162d Infantry, although it had discovered unmapped terrain features and had been temporarily delayed at the Parai Defile, was well on its way to the airfields. The ridges behind Bosnek had been cleared. Artillery was well emplaced to support further advances both to the west and north. No large, organized bodies of Japanese had been encountered. Despite the fact that information gathered on Z Day indicated that the Japanese garrison on Biak was larger than had been estimated prior to the landing,36 no determined enemy ground defense had been encountered.

The Japanese were soon to change to pessimism any optimism the HURRICANE Task Force may have possessed on the evening of Z Day.

The Japanese on Biak

The Japanese, who had occupied Biak in early 1942, had paid little attention to the island until late 1943. Then they decided to convert Biak into a key air base which would be within fighter range of many other of their air bases in western Dutch New Guinea. To protect and hold the island, the Japanese sent to Biak one of their best regiments, the veteran (of China) 222d Infantry, 36th Division, which arrived on Biak in December 1943. It is probable that the Japanese initially intended to make Biak into a tremendous ground stronghold as well as a


major air base. However, when on 9 May Imperial General Headquarters moved the southeastern strategic main line of resistance west of Biak to Sorong and the Halmaheras, Biak was left as an outpost which was to be held as long as possible.

Japanese Defenses on Biak

The command of Japanese Army troops on Biak was vested in the commander of the 222d Infantry, Col. Naoyuki Kuzume.37 As Commander, Biak Detachment, Colonel Kuzume had under his control approximately 3,400 men of the 222d Infantry, a company of the 36th Division's light tanks, miscellaneous field and antiaircraft artillery units, and numerous service organizations, the largest of which were the 17th, 107th and 108th Field Airdrome Construction Units of about 500 men each. Also stationed on Biak and under Colonel Kuzume's operational control were about 1,500 naval troops, among whom the senior officer was Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Senda, the commanding officer of the 28th Naval Special Base Force. Most of the naval troops were members of service organizations, but the approximately 125 men of the 19th Naval Guard Unit had received some combat training. The strength of Colonel Kuzume's command on 27 May was some 11,400 men, of whom about 4,000 were combat effectives. Insofar as supplies allowed him to do so, Colonel Kuzume armed his service troops as auxiliary infantry and so used them throughout the Biak operation.38

The Allied landings at Aitape and Hollandia on 22 April had prompted the Biak Detachment commander to draw up detailed defense plans and to begin work on fortifications which would help his troops to hold the island. About mid-May Colonel Kuzume was warned by the 2d Area Army that an Allied advance to the Schouten Islands was a certainty. After the landings of the TORNADO Task Force at Wakde-Sarmi on 17 May, Colonel Kuzume ordered a cessation of all work on the Biak airdromes, started an ambitious program of fortification, and began deploying his troops for a protracted land defense.

Colonel Kuzume based his plans on the sound assumption that the principal Allied objective would be the airfield area along Biak's southern coast. Faced with the problem of defending an extensive coast line with a small body of troops, he chose to concentrate his defenses on terrain from which he could prevent Allied use of the airstrips for the longest possible time. For this purpose, he placed emphasis on high ground immediately north and northwest of Mokmer Drome.

Where the main coastal ridge turns sharply north just west of Mokmer village, it leaves in its wake a series of gradually rising small terraces, many of which have steep seaward sides and some of which have a levee-like formation similar to that of the main ridge. The forward edge of the first


prominent terrace rises steeply from the coastal plain in the form of a narrow ridge averaging sixty feet in height and lying a few hundred yards north of Mokmer and Borokoe Dromes. From this ridge and the rising terraces beyond it, the Japanese could look down on any activity along the coastal road west of Mokmer village and could observe activity at and near the three airfields.

In this amphitheater-like terrain and along the low ridge, both of which were covered with thick growth (scrub on the terrace and rain forest on the ridge), the Biak Detachment emplaced many field artillery and antiaircraft weapons. There were also many automatic weapons and a few mortars. All these weapons were located within range of Mokmer Drome and most of them could also fire on Borokoe Drome. The key to Colonel Kuzume's defenses in this area was the West Caves area, located about 50 yards north of the low ridge and about 1,200 yards north of the western end of Mokmer Drome. The West Caves were actually three large sumps, or depressions in the ground, which were connected by underground tunnels and caverns. The caves were ringed with pillboxes, bunkers, and foxholes, and an extensive system of coral and log emplacements was built along the spur ridge above Mokmer Drome. Biak naval headquarters was originally located in the West Caves, which could shelter 1,000 men, and Colonel Kuzume planned to move Biak Detachment headquarters to the caves for the final defense of the airdromes. As long as the West Caves and the positions along the low ridge were occupied by the Japanese, Allied planes could not safely use the airfields.

On the main coastal ridge between the village of Ibdi and the Parai Defile the Biak Detachment developed another center of resistance which came to be known as the Ibdi Pocket. The terrain in the area was a series of knifelike east-west ridges separated by depressions and crevices up to fifty feet deep. These ridges were connected in places by cross-ridges, and the entire area was covered with thick rain forest and dense jungle undergrowth which had found a foothold in the coral. Pillboxes of coral and logs, hasty emplacements of the same materials, small caves and crevices, and foxholes at the bases of large trees were all utilized by the enemy to defend the area.

On the main ridge north of Mokmer the Japanese constructed a third strong point, which was called by the Japanese the East Caves. Behind Mokmer the ridge rose to a height of 240 feet. It was not so steep a cliff as the Parai Defile barricade, but it could not be climbed without the use of hands. About three quarters of the way to the top was a flat ledge from which two large caverns, similar to those in the West Caves area, could be entered. The Japanese constructed pillboxes on the ridge both below and above the ledge, and in the caverns they emplaced mortars, 20-mm. guns, and heavy machine guns. Observation posts were also set up at the East Caves, from which an unobstructed view of the coast from Parai to the west end of Mokmer Drome could be obtained. The Biak Detachment used the East Caves principally as living quarters, supply dumps, and as a connecting link between the Ibdi Pocket and the West Caves. Continued Japanese occupation of the East Caves would endanger Allied troop and supply movements along the coastal road from Parai to Mokmer Drome.

Surprisingly, Colonel Kuzume made no attempt to set up a defense in depth along the road from Bosnek to the airfields. A haphazard beach defense, based on improved natural caves along the water line, was established


west of Mokmer and east of Bosnek. Between Opiaref, 6,000 yards east of Bosnek, and Saba, 3,000 yards west of Opiaref, such shore-line positions were well constructed and camouflaged. They could be entered from defilade and they were backed by prepared mortar positions. However, these beach defenses had no depth, and the pillboxes or improved caves along the water line consisted of a single line of positions, not all of which had overlapping fields of fire. Four large steel pillboxes, only one of which had been emplaced by 27 May, were to cover the open beach at Bosnek.

Dispositions of the Biak Detachment

Colonel Kuzume's initial plan for the defense of Biak was published on 27 April, just five days after the Allied landings at Hollandia and Aitape.39 The 1st Battalion, 222d Infantry, was responsible for the defense of the southeastern section of the island east of a line drawn northwestward from Opiaref. The 10th Company, 222d Infantry, reinforced with artillery and mortar units, was to secure Korim Bay, located halfway up the southeast-northwest side of Biak. The area between Opiaref and Bosnek was assigned to the 19th Naval Guard Unit. The bulk of the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry, was to defend the airfields and the coast from Bosnek west to Sorido. The 3d Battalion (less two companies and some artillery and mortar detachments) was to be held in reserve near the airfields, and the tank company was ordered to assemble near Saba.

The Biak Detachment was not in its selected defensive positions on Z Day but was apparently being held mobile. Detachment headquarters, the 1st Battalion of the 222d Infantry (less elements), about half of the 19th Naval Guard Unit, and miscellaneous service organizations were all located in a cave and garden area on the inland plateau about 3,000 yards north-northwest of Bosnek. Outposts at Saba and Opiaref were held by the 1st Company, 222d Infantry, and a platoon of the 2d Company was stationed along the main ridge behind Bosnek. The bulk of the 2d Battalion, the rest of the naval guard unit, and some naval antiaircraft organizations were located at the East Caves. Naval headquarters, various naval service units, and the 6th Company, 222d Infantry, were at the West Caves. Most of the army service units were at Mokmer Drome or disposed along the low ridge north of that field. The bulk of the 3d Battalion was posted at the west end of the same airfield. One platoon of the 10th Company was at Sorido, guarding the southern terminus of a trail which led north across the island to Korim Bay. The tanks had not yet moved to Saba but were assembled on the terrace north of the eastern end of Mokmer Drome.

At various points along the terrace and low ridge were emplaced a battery of mountain guns, four 120-mm. naval dual purpose guns, three or four 3-inch antiaircraft guns, and a large number of mortars and automatic weapons of all calibers. One 6-inch naval coast defense gun was located on the beach south of Mokmer Drome, from which position it could cover the coast line for about five miles to the east and west. Some large guns were awaiting emplacement on the Bosnek beaches, while others in the same area, including a second 6-inch coast defense gun, had been destroyed by Allied air and naval bombardment prior to the landings.


At least one mortar company was at the East Caves and a few more mortars, together with a small body of riflemen, were in the Ibdi Pocket area.

Reactions to the Allied Landings

Despite the fact that Colonel Kuzume had been warned that an Allied attack on Biak was imminent, the Biak Detachment was unprepared on 27 May. The troops were not in the best available positions, units were scattered, and the emplacement of artillery had not been completed. The bulk of the 2d Company platoon which was stationed on the ridges overlooking Bosnek committed suicide during the morning of Z Day, and survivors were either killed by 186th Infantry patrols or fled inland. The wasteful suicide of the 2d Company platoon was apparently the only action taken by any part of the Biak Detachment until the night of 27-28 May.

Caught out of position as he was, it is doubtful whether Colonel Kuzume either could or would have carried out his original defense plans. However, the problem was soon taken out of the colonel's hands. The 27th of May found on Biak Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, Chief of Staff of the 2d Area Army, who happened to be present on an inspection trip from army headquarters. General Numata, who remained on Biak until 15 June, immediately assumed direction of the island's defense. It is probable that many of the sweeping changes which were later made in the Biak Detachment's original plans were undertaken upon his orders.

The first offensive reaction on the part of the Biak Detachment was a night raid on the positions of Batteries B and C, 146th Field Artillery Battalion, which were located near Ibdi in thick scrub growth north of the main coastal road. Sometime before midnight a Japanese patrol of the 3d Battalion, 222d Infantry, had crossed the road to the south, and shortly after that time parts of this group charged with fixed bayonets into Battery C's wire section. Two artillerymen were immediately stabbed to death and others were wounded before the enemy was driven back by American machine gun fire which was aimed along the road. More men of the 3d Battalion, 222d Infantry, renewed the attack with grenades and rifle fire, some circling to the north around Battery C and a few others moving against Battery B, located 200 yards to the east. Attacks on Battery C continued until daylight, when the last Japanese withdrew. The action cost Battery C 4 men killed and 8 wounded, while a near-by antiaircraft detachment lost 1 man killed and 1 wounded. Over 15 of the enemy had been killed during the night and an unknown number wounded.40

The action was but a minor prelude to a larger battle in which the 162d Infantry, continuing its advance west on the 28th, was soon to become involved.


Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (XI) * Next Chapter (XIII)


1. Information in this section is based principally on: ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, pp. 6-7; HURRICANE Task Force [41st Inf Div] Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 3; CTF 77 [Comdr, Biak Attack Force] Opns Rpt Biak, p. 3. With regard to terrain on Biak it is necessary to bear in mind that many of Biak's coral ridges are very similar to levees, while many others are actually steps of a series of terraces which rise to inland heights. But the Allied forces which fought at Biak usually referred to all terrace steps or levee-like formations as ridges, and the latter term is generally employed in these chapters. The term terrace is generally reserved for flat though sometimes gradually sloping areas between the steps or ridges.

2. HTF FO 1, 15 May 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 24-25 May 44.

3. Ibid.; CTF 77 Opn Plan 5-44, 16 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 23-24 May 44; ALAMO Force Opns Rpt Wakde-Biak, chart following p. 37.

4. AAF SWPA OI 51/1, 11 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 14-18 May 44; see also above, Ch. IX.

5. ALAMO Force FO 17, 13 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44; HTF FO 1. 15 May 44.

6. ALAMO Force Adm O 9, 13 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44; GHQ SWPA OI 51/1, 10 May 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl 27 Apr 44.

7. ALAMO Force, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, Biak Island, 7 May 44, in ALAMO G-4 Jnl, Wakde-Biak, 13 Apr-19 May 44; ALAMO Force, G-2 Photo Int Sec, Rpt 122, 22 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wadke-Biak, 23-24 May 44; CTF 77 Opn Plan 5-44, 16 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 23-24 May 44.

8. CTF 77 Opn Plan 5-44, 16 May 44.

9. Ibid.; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 4; HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 2-3.

10. CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 5; Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, WF-3521, 21 May 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to ALAMO, AAF SWPA, and ANF SWPA, CX-12843, 23 May 44, both in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 23 May 44.

11. Rad, CTF 76 to ALAMO, 22 May 44, and Rad, 41st Div to ALAMO Force, DD-383, 23 May 44, both in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 23-24 May 44.

12. HTF FO 1, 15 May 44; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 5.

13. CTF 77 Opn Plan 5-44, 16 May 44; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 4-5; HTF FO 1, 15 May 44. The 4.7-inch ammunition was to be fired by Australian destroyers and the 8-inch by Australian heavy cruisers.

14. CTF 77 Opn Plan 5-44, 16 May 44; HTF FO 1, 15 May 44; 186th Inf FO 2, 22 May 44, atchd to 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44.

15. HTF FO 1, 15 May 44; ALAMO Force FO 17, 12 May 44; Advon5AF OI 1, 12 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 14 May 44.

16. Ltr, Col W. J. Paul [Dir, USAF Hist, Hq Air Univ] to Gen Ward, 7 Dec 50, no sub; and Ltr, Gen Krueger to Gen Ward, 2 Jan 51, no sub, both in OCMH files.

17. HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 2; Memo, Asst ACofS G-3 ALAMO to ACofS G-3 no sub, 9 May 44, in ALAMO G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 8-13 May 44; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44 pp. 1-2.

18. HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 2; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 6-7.

19. CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 7-8; Ltr, Adm Fechteler to Gen Ward, 8 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH files.

20. CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 8; HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 4.

21. 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, p. 2; 186th Inf S-3 Overlay A, in Annex 4-E to 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 8; CO USS LCI(L) 73 Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 1-2; CO USS Kilty (APD 15) Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 6-7; CO USS Schley (APD 14) Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; CO LCT Gp 23 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; Co K 186th Inf, Record of Events, 18 Apr-16 Jul 44, in ORB RAC AGO collection.

22. 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, p. 2; 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44, atchd to 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44; Newman Notes; Ltr, Gen Doe to Gen Ward, 4 Dec 50, no sub, in OCMH files.

23. CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 8; HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 4; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, p. 2.

24. 186th Inf Jnl, 27 May-20 Aug 44; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, p. 2; 3d Bn 186th Inf Jnl, 14 May-24 Oct 44, in ORB RAC AGO collection.

25. Ibid.; 542d EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, p. 3.

26. Information in this subsection is taken principally from: 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 1-3; 162d Inf FO 1, 15 May 44, and 162d Inf Jnl 22 May-19 Aug 44, both atchd to 162d Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 15 May-19 Aug 44.

27. 41st Inf Div [HTF] Artillery, Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 2-3; 947th FA Bn Jnl Biak, 23 May-20 Aug 44; 121st FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-18 Jul 44, pp. 1-2; Co D 641st Tank Destroyer (TD) Bn Jnl, 24 May-7 Jul 44 (this unit's records are variously entitled: Reconnaissance Co, 641st TD Bn; Co D, 641st TD Bn; Co C, 98th Chemical Mortar Bn; Co D, 98th Chemical Mortar Bn), in ORB RAC AGO collection; 146th FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, 22 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 3-4.

28. CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 9; CO USS Reid (DD 369) Opns Rpt Biak, 27-28 May 44, p. 1; CO USS Kalk (DD 611) Opns Rpt Biak, 25 May-4 Jun 44, p. 2.

29. CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 10.

30. Ltr, Adm Fechteler to Gen Ward, 8 Nov 50; CO LCT Gp 23 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; CO USS Kalk Opns Rpt Biak, 25 May-4 Jun 44, p. 2; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 10; CO USS LST 463 AA Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May 44, pp. 1-2; HTF G-3 Jnl, 15 May-21 Aug 44; History of First Battalion, One Hundred Eighty-Sixth Infantry, While Detached From Regimental Control, Task Force Reserve, 27 May-2 June 44 (hereafter cited as 1st Bn 186th Inf Hist, 27 May-2 Jun 44), p. 1, in Annex 4 to 186th Inf Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-19 Aug 44, pp. 1-2.

31. CO LCT Gp 23 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 9; CO USS Kilty (APD 15) Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; CO USS Schley (APD 14) Opns Rpt Biak, p. 2; CO USS LST 463 Opns Rpt Biak, p. 1; HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 5.

32. HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 5; 542d EB&SR Opns Rpt Biak, pp. 1-2; G-4 HTF, G-4 Opns Rpt Biak, 27 May-20 Aug 44, p. 6 (atchd to HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44).

33. HTF Opns Rpt Biak, 17 May-20 Aug 44, p. 5; 116th Engr Opns Rpt Biak, 10 May-20 Aug 44, Ch. III, pp. 1-9; Ltr, CO 162d Inf to CO 116th Engrs, 13 Sep 44, sub: Commendation of Company C, 116th Engrs, in 116th Engrs Opns Rpt Biak, 10 May-20 Aug 44, Ch. I; 603d Tank Co Opns Rpt Biak, p. 1, copy in OCMH files.

34. Rad, CTF 77 to Com7thFlt, 26 May 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 27-28 May 44; Rad, HTF to ALAMO, no number, 27 May 44, in ALAMO Rear Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 25-28 May 44.

35. Rad, ALAMO Rear Hq to ALAMO Adv Hq, WF-4546, 28 May 44, in ALAMO Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 28-29 May 44, states that Gen Fuller had some hope of taking the airstrips on 28 May.

36. G-2 HTF, G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. 1, Part I. Historical Narrative, p. 4.

37. Information in this subsection is from: MID WD, Military Reports, 24, pp. 1-9, copy in G-2 DofA files; ALAMO Force, (3-2 Wkly Rpt 53, 9 Aug 44, copy in G-2 DofA files; G-2 HTF, G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. I, Part II, Enemy Opns, pp. 1-6; Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 1-2; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), p. 49.

38. Incl 2, List of Corrections, to Ltr, Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby, ACoFS G-2 FEC, to Gen Ward, about 10 Mar 51, no sub, in OCMH files. According to this list, there were at least 12,000 Japanese on Biak on 27 May, but this figure seems high.

39. Unless otherwise indicated, information in this subsection is from: MID WD, Military Reports, 24, pp. 5-14; G-2 Hist of HTF, Vol. I, Part II, Enemy Opns, pp. 5-7; Opns of Yuki Group, pp. 3-4; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 50-56.

40. The story of this night action is from: 146th FA Bn Opns Rpt Biak, 22 May-20 Aug 44, pp. 4-6; Opns of Yuki Group, p. 3; 2d Army Opns at Sarmi and Biak (Rev), pp. 55-56.

Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Jerry Holden for the HyperWar Foundation