Ten days after the first Japanese landing at Basabua Admiral King wrote to General Marshall that, while he was willing to assume that General MacArthur was "taking all measures in his power to deny the threat of Japanese penetration toward Port Moresby," he doubted that the measures taken (which he described as "airpower supported by minor ground forces north of the Owen Stanley Mountains") would be successful. Since, in his opinion, the holding of Port Moresby and the Buna-Gona area was essential to the ultimate success of operations in both the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, he asked that General Marshall obtain from General MacArthur by dispatch the latter's "views as to the present situation in New Guinea, and his plan to deny further advance to the Japanese, pending execution of Task Two."1 General Marshall replied the next day. He agreed, he said, with the assumption that General MacArthur was taking all measures in his power to deny the Japanese threat, but he felt it was "a little early to assume that such measures [would] be unsuccessful." Admiral King was assured, however, that General MacArthur was being asked for his plan to counteract the Japanese offensive. Such a message had, in fact, gone out the day before.2
The SWPA: Early August
General McArthur's Accounting
General MacArthur had a reassuring story to tell. He had just ordered the 7th Australian Infantry Division to New Guinea--the 18th Brigade to Milne Bay, and the 21st and 25th Brigades to Port Moresby. His plan of operations to prevent further enemy encroachment in New Guinea had been greatly hampered, he noted, by a critical shortage of transportation, especially sea transport, and by a dearth of naval convoy ships to protect his supply routes. The work of defending the area had nevertheless gone on despite these difficulties. Before the defenses in New Guinea could be augmented, it had been necessary, as a first step, to move engineers and protective garrisons into the Townsville-Cloncurry area in order to complete a series of airfields there and to develop Port Moresby as an advance jump-off point for the air force. As a second step, the garrison
at Port Moresby was doubled to two brigades; engineers and antiaircraft units were sent forward to develop and protect the dispersal facilities in the area; and a beginning was made in developing and securing airfields in the Cape York Peninsula. As a succeeding step, airfields were built at Milne Bay and Merauke to cover Port Moresby from east and west, and troops were ordered forward to secure the crest of the range at Wau and Kokoda.
The experienced 7th Australian Infantry Division would begin moving to the front within the next few days--one brigade to Milne Bay, the other two to Port Moresby. Seven transpacific ships, which would in due course be returned to their regular runs, were being requisitioned to get the division and its equipment forward.
General MacArthur went on to say that the final solution to the problem of defending New Guinea would, of course, come with the completion of Task One and the inception of Tasks Two and Three. After sketching a plan of maneuver for the latter two tasks, he told General Marshall that, while further preparations were necessary for Task Three, immediately after Task One was successfully completed Task Two could begin if the aircraft carriers and the Marine division with its amphibious equipment were made available for the operation.3
It was an excellent accounting. Starting in late March with only a few airfields in the Townsville-Cloncurry area and two poor fields at Port Moresby, General MacArthur by early August also had effective bases in the Cape York Peninsula, at Merauke, and at Milne Bay--a remarkable accomplishment in view of the appalling terrain, the shortage of engineer troops, and the difficulties of supply.
General Rowell Takes Over in New Guinea
On 6 August all Australian and American forces serving in Australian New Guinea (Papua and North East New Guinea) were put under New Guinea Force. On 9 August Maj. Gen. Sydney F. Rowell, General Officer Commanding, 1st Australian Corps, took command of all forces in New Guinea. Nine days later, General Rowell became G. O. C. New Guinea Force.4
The orders of 6 August gave New Guinea Force a greatly expanded mission. It was to prevent further penetration of Australian New Guinea, hold the crest of the Owen Stanley Range, and retake Kokoda, the Buna-Gona area, and ultimately Lae and Salamaua. It was to carry out active reconnaissance of its area and the approaches thereto, maintain and augment KANGA Force, and establish a special force at Milne Bay. After infiltrating the northeast coast of Papua from East Cape to Tufi, the Milne Bay troops would join with the overland forces on the Kokoda trail in the capture of the Buna-Gona area.5
As General Rowell took command in New Guinea, the Japanese on the trail were at Isurava south of Kokoda. Radio intercepts
and documents captured by KANGA Force revealed that the Japanese intended to land at Samarai shortly.6 The situation was in crisis, but the Allied defensive position was stronger than it appeared to be--much stronger, in fact, than had been thought possible only a few short weeks before.
The Defense Falls Into Place
The North Queensland Bases
By the third week in August three fields had been completed in the Cape York Peninsula, one for fighters and two for heavy bombers. Three additional fields for heavy bombers were due to be completed by the end of September. The movement of aviation units, garrison troops, and supplies to the bases in northern Queensland was proceeding but was not expected to be complete until sometime in October because of the emergency troop movements to Port Moresby and Milne Bay, and the consequent shortage of shipping.7
To alleviate a critical shortage of U.S. engineer troops,8 and to speed construction where it was most needed, arrangements were made in August to turn over the task of airfield construction and maintenance in northern Queensland and elsewhere on the mainland either to the RAAF or to the Allied Works Council, a civilian construction agency of the Australian Government staffed for the most part by men who were over age or otherwise exempt from military duty. American engineer troops released in this way were at once transferred to New Guinea. The change-over was a gradual one, but by the end of the year almost all U.S. engineer troops in the Southwest Pacific Area were in New Guinea.9
By 19 August, Brig. A. W. Potts's 21st Australian Infantry Brigade, the leading brigade of the two 7th Division brigades ordered to Port Moresby, had already arrived there. It did not tarry but began moving at once to Isurava, where MAROUBRA Force--by this time a battalion and two companies of the 30th Brigade--was making a stand under the brigade commander, Brig. Selwyn H. Porter. The 25th Brigade, which was to follow the 21st, was delayed by the shipping shortage and was not expected to arrive until early September.
Even so, the Port Moresby garrison, with its three infantry brigades and its Australian and American air, antiaircraft, engineer, and service units, already numbered 22,000 men. When the 25th Brigade, 7th Division headquarters, and other divisional troops arrived, it would total 28,000. The seven-airfield
PORT MORESBY as it looked when the headquarters of the U.S. Advanced Base in New Guinea was established there.
program projected for Port Moresby was nearing completion. Four fields were finished and in use---two for fighters, one for medium bombers, and one for heavy bombers. The three remaining fields--two for heavy bombers and one for medium bombers--were expected to be ready by early September.10
Plans to make Port Moresby a large supply and communications area were well advanced. On 11 August the U.S. Advanced Base in New Guinea was established by USASOS with headquarters at Port Moresby. Its functions were to aid in the operation of the port and other ports in New Guinea, to control the activities of U.S. service troops in the area, and, in general, to provide for the supply of all American troops in the battle zone.11
The port itself, shallow and suitable only for light traffic, was to be improved. Existing facilities permitted only one ship to be unloaded at a time, and that very slowly, with the frequent result that as many as two or three others had to wait in the roads to unload, exposed all the while to enemy attack. Since the existing harbor site did not lend itself to expansion, General Casey planned to develop Tatana Island (a small island in Fairfax Harbor to the northwest of the existing harbor) into an entirely new
port. The new development, which would permit several ocean-going ships to be unloaded at one time, was to be connected with the mainland by an earth-filled causeway a half-mile long, over which would run a two-lane highway with a freeboard of two feet over high tide. The project was to be undertaken as soon as engineers and engineering equipment became available.12
Measures were being taken to improve the air supply situation both in the Owen Stanleys and in the Bulolo Valley. After a careful study of the problem, General Kenney assigned six A-24's, a B-17, and two transports--all the aircraft that could be spared--to the task of dropping supplies to the Australian troops in both areas. It was hoped that the use of these planes if only for ten days, the period of their assignment, would make possible a substantial improvement in the supply situation at both Kagi and Wau.13
By 21 August the 18th Australian Infantry Brigade (the 2/9, 2/10, and 2/12 Australian Infantry Battalions) under Brig. George F. Wootten completed its movement to Milne Bay. There it joined the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, Citizen Military Forces (the 9, 25, and 61 Australian Infantry Battalions), under Brig. John Field, which had reached Milne Bay in July. The following day, 22 August, Maj. Gen. Cyril A. Clowes, an experienced officer who had commanded the ANZAC Corps artillery in Greece, took command of Milne Force. His instructions were to protect the airfields and deny Milne Bay to the enemy.
After the company of the 46th U.S. Engineers had arrived in late June and the 7th Brigade, a 25-pounder battery, and some light and heavy Australian antiaircraft in early July, the second of two RAAF fighter squadrons equipped with P-40's and part of a RAAF reconnaissance squadron using Hudsons reached Milne Bay by early August. Two companies of the 43d U.S. Engineers had also arrived by this time as well as the 709th U.S. Airborne Antiaircraft Battery which was equipped with .50 caliber machine guns. The American engineer troops had a few .50-caliber machine guns and some 37-mm. antitank guns in addition to their rifles and light machine guns.14
Milne Force, when General Clowes took it over on 22 August, was a good-sized command. Australian troop strength was 7,429 men, of whom 6,394 were combat troops and 1,035 were service troops. American troop strength, mainly engineers and antiaircraft personnel, numbered 1,365 men;
the strength of the RAAF was 664 men.15 Clowes's total strength was thus 9,458 men.
To guard against Japanese infiltration from the Buna-Gona area patrols were operating between East Cape (the eastern tip of New Guinea ) and Goodenough Bay. The overland trails leading into Milne Bay were being patrolled regularly, as was the Mullins Harbor area to the southwest of Milne Bay. General Clowes had neither landing craft, coastal guns, nor searchlights, but the best defense that time would allow had been provided.16
The Battle of Milne Bay
The Scene of Operations
Milne Bay, about twenty miles long and five to ten miles wide, lies at the extreme southeast tip of New Guinea. (Map 5) The fact that it is often closed in from the air probably accounted for the long time that it took the Japanese to discover the presence of the Allies in the area. On either arm of the bay, mountains 4,000 feet high rise abruptly from the shore. Between the mountains and the sea are narrow coastal corridors consisting for the most part of deep swamp, and dense, almost impenetrable, jungle. The rainfall in the bay area averages 200 inches a year, and during wet weather the corridors are virtually impassable.
At the head of the bay is a large plain into which the coastal corridors merge. This plain, the site in prewar days of an immense coconut plantation operated by Lever Brothers, was the only place in the entire area which was not completely bogged down in mud. Because it already had a small, if inadequate, road net, all the base installations and airfields were concentrated there.
At the time General Clowes took command, one airfield--No. 1 Strip, in the center of the plantation area--had been completed and was being used by the P-40's and Hudsons. The 46th Engineer company was working on No. 2 Strip, which was about four miles inland at the western end of the plantation. The two companies of the 43d Engineers were working on No. 3 Strip, which was just off the north shore.
Although a great deal of hard work, under the most adverse conditions, had gone into the base, much still remained to be done. The roads, for the most part, a corduroy of coconut logs covered with decomposed coral, were in very poor condition. The dock, at Gili Gili, at the very head of the bay, consisted of two barges placed side by side with a ramp leading to the small and inadequate jetty that had been there when the military first arrived. Number 1 Strip, the only runway in operation, and very hastily constructed, consisted of an open-mesh steel mat, laid over a low-lying, poorly drained base. Mud seeped through the mat and caused aircraft using the runway to skid and sometimes crack up. Since there was no time to rebuild the field, all that could be done to remedy the situation was to have bulldozers scrape the mat daily and deposit the mud in piles on either side of the strip. The runway was particularly treacherous during wet weather. Though it
Japanese Attack at Milne Bay
26-31 August 1942
had originally been built as a bomber strip, the P-40's often required its entire length for their take-offs when it had rained for any length of time. When the rainfall was exceptionally heavy they were often unable to take off at all.17
This then was the place that the Japanese had chosen, at the last minute, to capture instead of Samarai. They had made the decision only in mid-August, when they first discovered the Allies were actually there. A few days later they issued the orders to attack.
Toward the latter part of August the Japanese decided to launch the Milne Bay operation immediately. The Aoba Detachment, the Army force earmarked to land at
Milne Bay, was still at Davao. Nevertheless the 8th Fleet, with naval troops available for action at Kavieng and Buna, decided to proceed with the operation without waiting for the detachment to come in. Judging that Milne Bay was held by two or three infantry companies and twenty or thirty aircraft, Admiral Mikawa on 20 August ordered some 1,500 men to Milne Bay. A total of 1,171 men (612 Kure 5th Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) troops, 362 16th Naval Pioneer Unit troops, and 197 men of the Sasebo 5th SNLF) were ordered to Milne Bay from Kavieng; the rest, 353 Sasebo 5th SNLF troops, were to come from Buna. Commander Shojiro Hayashi, of the Kure 5th SNLF, was in command of the landing forces from Kavieng. His orders were to land at Rabi, a point about three miles from the Gili Gili wharf area at the head of the bay. The troops from Buna were to land at Taupota on the north coast and march on Gili Gili overland.
The first echelon from Kavieng, bearing mostly Kure 5th troops, left Rabaul for Rabi in two transports in the early morning of 24 August. The troops of the Sasebo 5th SNLF at Buna left for Milne Bay at approximately
MILNE BAY AREA. (Photograph taken 1946.)
the same time in seven large motor-driven landing barges.18 The seven landing craft were the first to be detected by the Allies. The Coast Watcher at Porlock Harbor sighted them the same afternoon, and early the next morning a reconnaissance aircraft reported that they were nearing Goodenough Island.
Twelve P-40's from Milne Bay (which had been unable to attack previously because of enemy air raids and bad weather) took off for Goodenough Island at noon and shortly thereafter discovered the landing craft beached on the southwestern shore of the island, where the Japanese had put in to stretch their legs and prepare a meal. The P-40's gave the drawn-up barges and ration littered beach a thorough strafing. When the attack was over, all of the landing craft had been destroyed, and the Sasebo unit, its stores, ammunition, and communications equipment gone, was left stranded on Goodenough Island with no way of reaching
its objective, or even of resuming to Buna.19
The convoy bearing the Kure 5th troops fared better in its approach to the target. Heavily escorted by cruisers and destroyers, the transports were first sighted off Kiriwina Island, 140 miles northeast of Milne Bay, in the early morning of 25 August, making directly for Milne Bay. General MacArthur's headquarters immediately ordered the Air Force to attack the convoy and destroy it. All available B-25's and B-26's at Townsville and nine B-17's at Mareeba in the Cape York Peninsula took off at once for the attack, which was to be made that afternoon in concert with the RAAF P-40's and Hudsons from Milne Bay.
Fortunately for the Japanese, the weather (except for a short break at noon which the RAAF had exploited to the full in the attack on Goodenough Island) was very bad all day, both at Moresby and Milne Bay. For hours on end planes were unable to take off from either place. Attempts by the B-17's from the Cape York Peninsula and the P-40's and Hudsons from Milne Bay to hit the convoy proved fruitless because of violent rain squalls and a heavy overcast. By late afternoon visibility was down to zero, and despite occasional breaks thereafter the Air Force found it impossible to attack successfully that day.20
The Japanese landing began about 2200 hours, 25 August, on the north shore of the bay near Waga Waga and Wanadala--five to seven miles east of Rabi, their prescribed landing point. The landing force set up headquarters at Waga Waga and established a series of supply dumps there and in the Wanadala area. The shore east of K. B. Mission, which the Japanese continued to think for some time was the Rabi area, became their main bivouac site and forward jump-off point. Here, about one mile east of the mission, at 0145 hours on 26 August, elements of Milne Force met the Japanese column in an indecisive engagement when a screening platoon from Company B, 61 Battalion, at K. B. Mission started a fire fight with the Japanese that lasted until nearly dawn. Although the enemy used light tanks in support of his probe, he finally withdrew leaving the Australian detachment in place.21
The Japanese could scarcely have chosen a worse landing place. Their objectives, the airfields and the wharf, were at the head of Milne Bay, and they had landed several miles from the plantation area on a jungle covered coastal shelf, flanked on the right by mountains and on the left by the sea. Because the mountains in the landing area were steep and very close to shore, there was virtually no room for maneuver, and the heavy jungle which covered the bay shore made it impossible to find a dry bivouac for the troops anywhere in the area.
It had rained steadily during the preceding few weeks, and the heavy tropical downpour continued. The mountain streams had
become roaring torrents, and the spongy soil of the corridor a quagmire. The single coastal track that skirted the corridor had in places completely washed away, and the level of the many fords that cut across it had risen to almost three feet. Except for a few abandoned plantations and mission stations, the corridor was a sodden welter of jungle and swamp, an utter nightmare for any force operating in it.22
Although they had seriously misjudged Allied strength, and had landed on a muddy coastal shelf thousands of yards from the head of the bay, the Japanese nevertheless enjoyed some significant tactical advantages. Their left flank was secure because they had control of the sea, and their right flank could not easily be turned because of the mountains a few hundred yards away. It was true that they could count on little air power, since Lae and Salamaua, the nearest operational air bases, were more than 300 miles away; but unlike Milne Force, which could barely scrape up a few trawlers, they had plenty of landing craft and could therefore land troops and supplies freely under cover of darkness or of the weather, despite their deficiency in the air.
General Clowes, on the other hand, was a man fighting blind. Because of the dense jungle on the north shore of the bay and frequent heavy overcasts, neither his ground patrols nor his aerial reconnaissance could tell him what the Japanese were doing or what their numbers were. Worse still, he was face to face with the possibility that the Japanese, in addition to landing on the north shore, might land troops on the south shore, or even at the head of the bay. Having no idea as yet of Japanese intentions, Clowes held the bulk of his force in the plantation area, to be committed to the north shore when it became apparent from the circumstances that the Japanese had no intention of landing troops elsewhere in the bay area.
At the time of the Japanese landings during the night of 25-26 August, the main body of Milne Force was deployed in the plantation area in the vicinity of the airfields and two companies of the 61 Battalion were on the north shore in the path of the Japanese thrust. One of these companies was at Ahioma, just east of Wanadala; the other was at K. B. Mission. There was also a platoon of the 61 Battalion on the northeast coast guarding against an overland attack on Milne Bay from the Taupota side of the mountains, as well as a reinforced company of the 25 Battalion farther to the northwest on Goodenough Bay.
The company at Ahioma did not fare as well as the one at K. B. Mission. The troops at Ahioma had been under orders to return to Gili Gili by water, and two of the three platoons were already on their way in two ketches when the Japanese landings began. Shortly after leaving Ahioma the ketches plowed into a landing wave off Wanadala. In the melee one of the Australian craft was sunk. Some of the militia troops were lost; others struggled ashore and infiltrated back to their own lines. The platoon in the other ketch returned to Ahioma and, with the platoon that had remained there, marched overland to Taupota and thence back over the mountains to Gili Gili where they rejoined their battalion several days later.23
By 0745 that morning, 26 August, the weather had abated sufficiently for the P-40's from No. 1 Strip and the B-17's staging from Port Moresby to go into action. In an extremely successful morning's business, the P-40's managed to destroy most of the food and ammunition that the Japanese had brought with them. The B-17's, almost as successful, inflicted heavy damage on a large Japanese transport unloading offshore.24
Toward evening a second Japanese convoy (Commander Hayashi's second echelon) was sighted off Normanby Island in the D'Entrecasteaux Group, making at high speed for Milne Bay. Before it could be dealt with, a heavy fog descended over the area, blotting out the convoy's further movements. The troops aboard landed safely that night, completing the 1,170-man movement from Kavieng.25
K. B. Mission had meanwhile been reinforced by a second company of the 61 Battalion. The Japanese, who had reconnoitered the mission during the day, struck again that night in much greater strength than before. The Australian militia was forced out of the mission and all the way back to the line of the Gama River, just east of Rabi. Fortunately for the Australians, the Japanese again chose to break off the engagement at dawn.
The following morning, General Clowes sent the 2/10 Battalion of the 18th Brigade to K. B. Mission. The battalion, intended to be a reconnaissance force, was lightly armed. Its orders were to keep in contact with the Japanese, draw them out, and in general find out what they were up to. Without such essential knowledge, General Clowes was confronted with a cruel dilemma. If he moved his troops onto the north shore, the enemy might counter by landing fresh troops on the south shore or at the head of the bay itself. As he himself was to explain:
The presence of Jap naval elements in the vicinity throughout the operation and the freedom of activity enjoyed by the enemy by sea constituted a continuous menace in regard to possible further landings. These factors necessarily had a marked influence on plans and dispositions made to deal with the enemy. On several occasions, such plans were definitely slowed down or suffered variation through the delay involved in assuring that the south shore was clear, and, further, that reports of the presence of enemy ships at Mullins Harbor were not founded on fact.26
The 2/10 Battalion reached the mission unopposed in the late afternoon of 27 August. Under orders to move on again in the morning, the battalion had barely settled itself for the night when the Japanese struck at the mission again, this time with two tanks and all their available combat troops. Despite unceasing tropical rain, the ground in the well-drained and relatively open plantation area was firm enough for tank action. The two tanks, equipped with brilliant headlights that made targets of the Australians and left the attackers in darkness, inflicted heavy casualties on the 2/10 Battalion. The lightly armed Australians,
whose only antitank protection was "sticky-type" hand grenades, which would not stick, were unable to knock out the tanks and also failed to shoot out their headlights. After about two hours of fighting the Japanese managed to split the battalion in two. Battalion headquarters and two companies were forced off the track and into the jungle, and the remainder of the battalion was pushed back to the Gama River. A portion of the battalion reached the plantation area that night, but the main body took to the hills in order to get around the enemy's flank and did not get back to the head of the bay until three days later.27
With the 2/10 Battalion out of the way, the Japanese continued on to No. 3 strip. There a heavy fire fight at once developed, a fight in which American antiaircraft and engineer troops played a significant part.
The Fighting at No. 3 Strip
The east-west airstrip, just west of Kilabo and only a few miles from Rabi, was an ideal defensive position. The runway, a hundred yards wide and 2,000 yards long, was cleared but only partially graded, and there was a sea of mud at its eastern edge which made it impossible for tanks to get through. It afforded the defenders a broad, cleared field of fire, and, lying obliquely across the mouth of the corridor with its southern end less than five hundred feet from the water, was directly in the path of the Japanese advance.
Brigadier Field, in charge of the defense, ranged his troops along the southern edge of the strip, giving the Japanese no alternative but to attack frontally. The main burden of holding the strip fell upon the brigade's 25th and 61st Battalions, but the 709th U.S. Airborne Antiaircraft Battery and Companies D and F of the 43d U.S. Engineers held key positions in its defense. The antiaircraft battery with its .50-caliber machine guns was given the task of supporting the Australians at the eastern end of the strip, and the .50-caliber and 37-mm. gun crews of Companies D and F, 43d U.S. Engineers, flanked on either side by Australian riflemen and mortarmen, were stationed at the center of the line at the crucial point where the track from Rabi crossed the runway.
The Japanese reached the area immediately in front of the strip just before dawn. They attacked aggressively but were repulsed and forced to withdraw. No tanks were used in the attack, although two of them (apparently the same two that the Japanese had used with such success at K. B. Mission were brought up, only to be abandoned when they bogged down hopelessly.28
The attackers were now within a few miles of No. 1 Strip, and General Clowes, fearful lest they infiltrate it during the night, ordered the P-40's to Port Moresby. Fortunately the Japanese were quiet that night, and the following morning the fighters returned to Milne Bay to stay.29
AUSTRALIAN RIFLEMEN PASSING ABANDONED JAPANESE TANKS bogged down near No. 3 Strip.
On 26 August, the day of the landing, and again on the afternoon of the 28th, General MacArthur had ordered General Blamey to see to it that the north shore of Milne Bay was cleared of the enemy at once.30 Because of defective communications New Guinea Force did not receive the orders of the 26th until late on the 27th, and General Clowes, apparently, not until early the next morning.31 Early on the 28th Clowes ordered the 7th Brigade to be prepared to move forward at dawn the following day. Strong patrols of the brigade moved out early on the 29th but met stiff enemy opposition, and little progress was registered. Clowes thereupon ordered in the 18th Brigade with instructions to move at once on K. B. Mission. He canceled the orders at 1633 upon learning that another Japanese convoy was on its way to Milne Bay.
His reason for the cancellation--as he was to explain later--was the renewed possibility "of an enemy attempt to land on the west and south shores of Milne Bay."32
The convoy, escorted by a cruiser and nine destroyers, unloaded safely under cover of a heavy mist. It brought to the sore-beset Japanese on the north shore nearly 770 reinforcements--568 troops of the Kure 3d SNLF and 200 of the Yokosuka 5th SNLF--under Commander Minoru Yano, who, being apparently senior to Hayashi, at once took over command of operations.33
The daylight hours of the following day, 30 August, were quiet. Milne Force sent patrols to feel out the enemy in preparation for the long-delayed general advance, and the Japanese, hidden in the jungle, consolidated for another attack on No. 3 strip. The climax came that night when the Japanese made an all-out effort to take the strip. Brigadier Field was again ready for them. The only change in his dispositions was to place the .50-caliber machine guns of the 709th Antiaircraft Battery at both ends of the line instead of as before on its eastern end. The .50-caliber machine guns and 37mm. antitank gun crews of Companies D and F of the 43d Engineers were as before in the center of the line, flanked on either side by the riflemen and mortarmen of the 25th and 61st Battalions. The 25 pounders, about half a mile to the rear, lent their support, as did the P-40's from No. 1 Strip.
When the Japanese made their move against the airstrip, such intense fire hit them that not one man was able to cross the strip alive. The heaviest attack came before dawn. Like the others, it was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy, who withdrew at first light, leaving 160 dead behind.34
The Japanese were now in full retreat, and Brigadier Wootten's 18th Brigade, the 2/12 Battalion leading, began the long-delayed task of clearing them from the north shore. Very heavy fighting developed at once along the Gama River and later near K. B. Mission. Between 1 and 5 September the Australians lost 45 killed and 147 wounded. Japanese losses were much heavier. At the Gama River alone, the enemy lost at least 100 killed, and his casualties mounted steadily as the Australians advanced. Hungry, riddled with tropical fevers, suffering from trench foot and jungle rot, and with many wounded in their midst, the Japanese realized the end was near; and Commander Yano, himself wounded, so advised the 8th Fleet.35
The commander in chief of the 8th Fleet, Admiral Mikawa, considered the possibility of reinforcing the landing parties at Milne Bay with the 1,900-man advance echelon of the Aoba Detachment, which had finally reached Rabaul on 31 August. It was a sufficient force, he thought, to retrieve the situation if the troops ashore could hold out till it arrived. In an interchange of messages with Yano, Admiral Mikawa offered to land 200 more Yokosuka 5th troops immediately, and the Aoba Detachment by 12 September, if there was any possibility that the troops at Milne Bay could hold out till the Aoba Force arrived. When Yano told him that the troops ashore were physically incapable of making a further stand, Mikawa concluded the situation was hopeless and ordered Milne Bay evacuated.
The wounded were put on board ship on the night of 4 September. The rest of the landing force, except for scattered elements that had to be left behind, took ship the following night from the anchorage at Waga Waga one jump ahead of the 18th Brigade, whose forward elements were actually within earshot when the Japanese pulled out. Some 1,300 of the 1,900 troops landed were evacuated to Rabaul, nearly all of them suffering from trench foot, jungle rot, tropical ulcers, and other tropical diseases. Virtually none of the evacuees, not even those who landed as late as 29 August, were in condition to fight.36
The 2/9 Battalion, which was now leading the advance, met with only light and scattered resistance on the morning of 6 September. By the following morning it was clear that organized resistance had ceased. Small bands of stragglers were all that remained of the Japanese landing forces, and these were disposed of in the next few weeks by Australian patrols, which took only a handful of prisoners.
The Japanese lost some 600 killed in the operation, as against 321 Australian ground casualties--123 killed and 198 wounded.37 American losses in defense of No. 3 Strip were very low--one man killed and two wounded.38
The timely return from the Solomons in early September of Task Force 44 made it possible thence forward for the Allied Naval Forces to cover the sea approaches to Milne Bay;39 and the dispatch, at approximately the same time, of two 155-mm. guns with attached searchlight units helped further to secure the area.40
The base was meanwhile being steadily improved. More and better roads were built. A new wharf was constructed to replace the old inadequate jetty. Number 1 Strip was
WHARF AT GILI GILI built to replace old jetty.
rebuilt, and No. 3 Strip was completed.41 Bombing of Rabaul and of Japanese airfields in the northern Solomons without the need of crossing the Owen Stanleys became possible for the first time. Equally important the stage was set for a successful investiture of the north coast of Papua from East Cape to Buna.
The Allied victory at Milne Bay had snapped the southern prong of the pincers the Japanese had hoped to apply to Port Moresby. An essential part of the plan of 31 July had failed. The rest of the plan, the overland attack on Port Moresby by the South Seas Detachment, was now to be put to the test.
The Road to Ioribaiwa
General Horii Pushes the Australians Back
While the battle of Milne Bay was being fought, the Japanese on the Kokoda Trail were winning some of their most spectacular victories of the campaign. General Horii, who had left for the front on 22 August,
had issued orders on the 24th for a general offensive. The attack began at dawn on 26 August and developed such power after a week of unremitting pressure that the Australians found themselves unable to stand firm with the forces at hand. They had no choice but to give ground. Not only were they heavily outnumbered, but their supply difficulties were greater than those of the Japanese who were supplied from nearby Kokoda and whose way, once their supply parties had reached the crest of the range, lay down, not up.
The enemy advance continued despite the mountain trail, the bitter resistance of the Australians, and the sustained bombing and strafing of Japanese supply lines by the Allied Air Force. By 7 September, the date organized resistance ceased at Milne Bay, the troops of the South Seas Detachment had made tremendous gains. They had driven the Australians from Isurava, Alola, Eora Creek, and Templeton's Crossing. They had gained possession of the Gap, had taken Myola, Kagi, and Efogi on the southern slopes of the range, and stood poised to take Menari, Nauro, and Ioribaiwa, the last villages between them and Port Moresby.42 (See Map III. )
The Opposing Forces
General Horii had opened the attack with the 144th Infantry, reinforced by elements of the 55th Mountain Artillery, miscellaneous mortar and machine gun units, and the main body of the 15th lndependent Engineers. The artillery troops had left their guns behind pending a study of how they were to be brought forward, and the engineers were advancing with the infantry troops, improving the track as they went. One of the two battalions of the 41st Infantry, which had come in from Rabaul a few days before, joined in the attack on 28 August. The remaining battalion was held in reserve in the Kokoda area, where it helped out with supply. On the night of 2-3 September, approximately 1,500 Japanese reinforcements from Rabaul were landed safely at Basabua from a large convoy which managed to elude detection by the Allied Air Force. The reinforcements included the remaining battalion of the 41st Infantry and the rear echelon of the Nankai Shitai--the 67th Line of Communications Hospital, more service troops, and an "emergency" transport unit including vehicles and 300 pack horses. The incoming battalion was immediately ordered to the front and reached the scene of operations a few days later.
In contrast to General Horii's five reinforced battalions, the Australians, until Efogi was reached, never had more than three battalions in the forward area to oppose the Japanese advance. One of them was the depleted 39 Battalion, which had been in action for more than a month and should have been relieved long before. The Japanese, using continuous flanking operations, had no trouble driving the Australians back. Two regimental combat teams, one under command of Col. Masao Kusunose, commander of the 144th Infantry, and the other under Colonel Yazawa, commander of the 41st Infantry, alternated in pressing home the attack. They were thus able to outflank the Australians almost at will and, by bringing pressure to bear from different
directions, to push them from one ridge after another.43
When the Japanese opened their offensive in late August, the only combat troops facing them were the 39 Battalion, 30th Brigade headquarters, and the 53 Battalion. Two battalions of the 21st Brigade, the 2/14 and 2/16 Battalions (which were to be followed by the third battalion, the 2/27), were on the way to the forward area but had not yet arrived. They began arriving company by company the following day, each company being thrown into battle as soon as it came up.
The fighting was desperate and the Australians, weighed down with heavy packs and cumbersome .303 rifles, outnumbered and repeatedly outflanked, suffered heavy casualties. The 2/14 Battalion relieved the 39 Battalion on 29 August, and the latter unit moved to the rear to reorganize, as did the 53 Battalion which had been badly cut up in the battle. From 1 September to 5 September the 2/14 and 2/16 Battalions, bearing the full brunt of the enemy attack, were under such heavy pressure that they were forced to withdraw through the Gap and take up positions on the other side of the range.44
The Australians found it impossible to make a stand, not only because they were outnumbered but also because they were running short of food and ammunition. Their supplies had come either via native carriers or by airdrops, and neither carriers nor planes had been able to get enough supplies to them for more than hand-to-mouth operations. The forward supply system on the trail, which at best had operated only by fits and starts, collapsed completely when the Myola dropping grounds were lost, and the natives, demoralized by the Japanese advance, began to desert in large numbers.45 Suffering from exhaustion, fever, and dysentery, the Australians had to pull back to a defensive position closer to their source of supply, from which, after being properly reinforced, they could hope to launch an effective counterattack.
The retreat was bitterly contested but, despite the enemy's superior strength, orderly. The enemy's losses were heavy, but the cost to the Australians, continuously in danger of being surrounded and overwhelmed if they held a position too long, were heavier still. When the 2/14 and 2/16 Battalions fell back on Efogi Spur on 6 September (where they joined the 2/27 Battalion which was already in position there), the 2/14 Battalion was at half-strength and the 2/16 Battalion only a company stronger.46
General MacArthur Plans a Turning Moment
All this time General Headquarters had been under the impression that Japanese
strength on the trail was slight, and that the enemy had no real intention of advancing on Port Moresby.47 It therefore did not immediately understand the reason for the swift Japanese advance. General MacArthur indeed found himself puzzled by the situation. Being certain, he said, that the Australians on the trail outnumbered the Japanese, he had General Chamberlin ask Allied Land Forces on 7 September for an explanation of the repeated Australian withdrawals.48
The explanation came the next day from General Rowell himself, and was communicated immediately to General Chamberlin. General Rowell pointed out that, contrary to the prevailing opinion at General Headquarters, his forces had been heavily outnumbered during the previous week's fighting. He added that the Japanese appeared to have on the trail the maximum number of troops that they could supply there. While he was certain that he could regain the initiative with the help of the 25th Brigade, which was then disembarking at Port Moresby, he felt that he would need more troops later on in the operation. Because none of the CMF brigades at Port Moresby seemed to have enough training for the task, he asked that one of the two 6th Australian Infantry Division brigades that had recently come in from Ceylon be transferred to Port Moresby at once for action on the trail.49
On 9 September the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade of the 6th Division was
ordered to Port Moresby, and the 25th Brigade was rushed to the front.50 Since there now appeared to be sufficient Australian troops to contain the Japanese advance, General MacArthur began to plan a flanking movement by an American regimental combat team which would cut in on the enemy's rear and hasten his withdrawal from the Kokoda-Gap area.
Choice of the unit was left to Maj. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger (then newly arrived in Australia and soon to be promoted to lieutenant general), to whom as Commanding General, I Corps, U.S. Army, the 32d and 41st Divisions had been assigned on 5 September. General Eichelberger had already decided that the 32d Division would precede the 41st to New Guinea. He made
this decision because the training camp of the 32d Division at Camp Cable near Brisbane was inferior to that of the 41st Division at Rockhampton. The general believed the 32d should go first because it would in any event have to be moved to another camp. After consulting with General Harding, commanding general of the 32d Division, and learning from him that the 126th Infantry under Col. Lawrence A. Quinn was the best-trained and best-led of his three regiments, General Eichelberger chose the 126th for the task.
The regiment was at once alerted for transfer to New Guinea. The men prepared for immediate movement, and, on General Eichelberger's orders, a Brisbane cleaning establishment began dyeing the men's fatigues a mottled green for action in the jungle.51
General MacArthur's plan of maneuver was ready on 11 September, and he communicated it at once to General Blamey, Commander Allied Land Forces, to whom I Corps had been assigned for operational control.52 He was satisfied, General MacArthur wrote, that the dispatch of the 25th and 16th Brigades to Port Moresby would probably be sufficient to arrest any further forward movement of the Japanese toward Port Moresby, and ultimately to drive them back across the Owen Stanley Range. Since the Japanese were known to be extremely tenacious in holding ground once they had gained it, he believed that to force the Japanese back by direct attack along the Port Moresby-Kokoda track alone would be a very slow business. To hasten a Japanese withdrawal, he had therefore ordered "a wide turning movement" by the 126th U.S. Infantry to cut in behind the Japanese at Wairopi. This, General MacArthur thought, could best be accomplished by an overland advance from Port Moresby, via Rouana Falls and the Mimani, Irua, Mugoni, and Kumusi Rivers, a route his staff had particularly recommended be used.53
The following day, Brig. Gen. Hanford MacNider, of the G-4 Section GHQ SWPA, who had been chosen by General MacArthur to make advance arrangements for the regiment's reception and march over the mountains, left for Port Moresby by air. General MacNider was accompanied by Lt. Col. Joseph S. Bradley, the 32d Division G-4 (who returned to Australia several days later), and members of Colonel Quinn's staff including Maj. Bernd G. Baetcke, his executive officer, Capt. William F. Boice, his intelligence officer, and Capt. Alfred Medendorp, the assistant S-4. Suitable arrangements were made by these officers for the reception of the troops, and two days later, 15 September, the first element of the 126th Infantry left Brisbane for Port Moresby by air, the men's fatigues still wet with dye.
The movement consisted of Company E, a medical officer, Capt. John T. Boet, four aid men, and an attached platoon of Company A, 114th Engineer Battalion. The detachment, 172 men in all, was under command of Capt. Melvin Schultz, commanding officer of Company E. These former National Guard troops, most of them from Big Rapids, Michigan, arrived at Port Moresby
32D DIVISION TROOPS gathered to hear an address by General Harding, above; below, preparing to board a transport plane, for New Guinea.
from Amberley Field near Brisbane on the afternoon of 15 September, the first American infantry unit to set foot in New Guinea.54
General Harding had come down to Amberley Field to see the company off and, before it left, had given the men a little talk, in which he referred to them as "The Spearhead of the Spearhead of the Spearhead." Pleased with the general's happy phrase, Company E called itself thereafter, "The Three Spearheads."55
General MacNider's group had no sooner arrived at Port Moresby than it discovered that the route proposed by General MacArthur's staff for the advance to Wairopi was an impracticable one. Not only did it intersect the Australian rear and extend into an area where troops using it could be cut off by the Japanese, but it was so rough and mountainous that the only way to supply troops using it would be from the air. Consideration was then given to an alternative route--the eighty-five mile trail, Port Moresby-Kapa Kapa-Kalikodobu-Arapara-Laruni-Jaure. From Jaure lesser trails led to Wairopi and Buna. Little was known about the route for it had not been used in years. The coastal natives avoided it because they believed it to be haunted, especially at the divide; and no white man had passed that way since 1917, a quarter of a century before. Although the route had the advantage that troops operating over it could be supported logistically by land and sea for about a third of the distance, it had also a very serious disadvantage--a 9,100 foot mountain crossing, which the Australians feared was impracticable for marching troops. General Rowell strongly opposed using it and favored an alternative route running from Abau to Jaure where the crossings were under 5,000 feet.
After thinking the matter over, General MacNider and his group decided to send a pathfinder patrol, under Captain Boice, to reconnoiter the Kapa Kapa-Jaure trail; and Gereral Casey, who was at Port Moresby at the time, ordered his deputy, Col. Lief J. Sverdrup, to reconnoiter the Abau route.56
On 17 September, the same day that Colonel Sverdrup and a small party left for Abau to reconnoiter the route Abau-Debana-Namudi-Jaure (the Abau track), Captain Boice, accompanied by 1st Lt. Bernard Howes and six enlisted men of Company E, an officer of ANGAU, and forty native carriers, left Port Moresby for Kapa Kapa by lugger to begin the reconnaissance of the track leading from that point to Jaure. The rest of Company E and its attached medical personnel and engineer platoon were moved out to help a company of the 91st U.S. Engineers construct a motor road from Tupeselei (a few miles southeast of Port Moresby) to Kapa Kapa, and thence
to a rubber plantation at Cobaregari near Kalikodobu where an advanced base was to be established. The opening of the road Tupeselei-Kapa Kapa-Kalikodobu, as General McNider explained, would allow the advance base near Kalikodobu, nicknamed "Kalamazoo," to be supplied both by road and by water and would remove entirely the need for air supply until the mountains were reached.57
The main body of the regiment was now ready to move. The combat team, less artillery--180 officers and 3,610 enlisted men--took ship for New Guinea on 18 September. Colonel Quinn, who had been at Brett's Wharf, Brisbane, to see his men off, arrived at Port Moresby by air on the 20th, accompanied by two of his staff officers, Maj. Simon Warmenhoven, the regimental surgeon, and Capt. Oliver O. Dixon, the regimental S-3, and reported at once to General Rowell.
The regiment reached Port Moresby in convoy on 28 September to find that the 128th Regimental Combat Team, also less its artillery, was already there, having completed its move to Port Moresby by air five days before. The two American regiments, each with attached division engineer, medical, and signal troops were parceled out on arrival to different Australian commands.58 The 128th Infantry, commanded by Col. J. Tracy Hale, Jr., was assigned to the Port Moresby garrison force, and, as such, came under the operational control of Headquarters, 6th Australian Infantry Division, which was then in charge of Port Moresby's ground defense. It relieved the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion (which had been pulled from its normal airfield construction duties and given a combat role) and took up a defensive position along the Goldie River, north of Port Moresby. The 126th Infantry and attached troops were assigned directly to New Guinea Force for use in the advance on Wairopi. They went into bivouac at Bootless Inlet and were for the time being kept in garrison reserve.59
The reason for the swift and dramatic movement to New Guinea by air of the 128th Infantry (the greatest that the Air Force had undertaken up to that time) soon became obvious. It lay in the continued advance along the Kokoda Trail of General Horii's troops. Not only did Horii still have the initiative, but he seemed to be threatening Port Moresby as it had never been threatened before.
The Japanese Take Ioribaiwa
When General Horii attacked Efogi spur on 8 September, he had five reinforced battalions of infantry in action. The 21st Brigade, on the other hand, was down to nine companies, and only four of them (the four companies of the 2/27 Battalion) had fresh troops. Exploiting their numerical superiority, the Japanese first struck the 2/27 Battalion, cutting it off from the balance of
MAROUBRA Force, then pushed the unit completely out of the fight by forcing it off the trail. Another Japanese column struck elements of the 2/14 and 2/16 Battalions echeloned along the trail in rear of the 2/27 positions, established a trail block, and isolated 21st Brigade headquarters and a company from the 2/14 Battalion. With control lost, the command group and the Australian infantrymen fought their way through the block and with the rest of the 2/14 Battalion withdrew through the 2/16 Battalion to Nauro by nightfall on 9 September. General Horii had meanwhile called in his reserve, the 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry. After its arrival in the front lines about 12 September, the Japanese had two full infantry regiments on the trail, depleted in strength but with engineer and other attached troops, a force of at least 5,000 men.60
The 2/14 and 2/16 Battalions, now with a combined strength of 320 men and fighting as a composite battalion, yielded Nauro and fell back to an east-west ridge north of Ioribaiwa during 10-11 September. Already established on the ridge were the 2/1 Pioneer Battalion and the 3 Battalion, 14th Brigade (which had come up from Port Moresby ahead of the 25th Brigade). The 2/31 and 2/33 Battalions, the leading elements of the 25th Brigade, under Brig. Kenneth W. Eather, reached Ioribaiwa on 14 September and attempted to drive past both flanks of the Japanese position. When these flanking movements were met by a strong counterthrust that pierced the Australian line, a further withdrawal was ordered to the Imita Range, a strong defensive position, a full day's march from Ioribaiwa, and separated from it by the deep valley of Ua-Ule Creek.
The Japanese reached Ioribaiwa on 16 September and took up a position there. The Allied situation was not as difficult as it seemed. The Australians, then only one pack stage away from Uberi, their main rearward supply base, were finally in position to counterattack.61
The Japanese supply situation had by this time become impossible. That this was the case was in large part due to General Kenney, who had taken command of the Allied Air Forces on 4 August. The Fifth Air Force, the American element of the Allied Air Forces, which Kenney in the interests of greater operational efficiency had established as a separate command in early September,62 had completely disrupted Japanese
BRIDGE AT WAIROPI. Note bombed-out portion of bridge and bomb craters in area. (Photograph taken on 1 October 1942.)
supply. The advance echelon of the air force at Port Moresby, under General Kenney's deputy commander, Brig. Gen. Ennis P. Whitehead, was doing a magnificent job of pulverizing Japanese lines of communication. After considerable experimentation it had been found that the A-20 bomber, modified to carry eight forward machine guns and using a parachute fragmentation bomb invented by General Kenney himself, was particularly effective in low-level attacks on Japanese supply trains, dumps, and landing barges. The runway at Buna and the suspension bridge at Wairopi were under almost continuous attack. As fast as the Japanese naval construction troops at Buna filled in the runway, the Fifth Air Force would see to it that it was pitted again; and efforts of the 15th Independent Engineers to keep the Wairopi Bridge in use were
being continually set at naught by Fifth Air Force and attached RAAF units that would roar in at low levels to demolish it. Because of the relentless air attack, Japanese supply trains were virtually forced off the trails.63 Food, as a result, though still available to the Japanese in the rear areas, was not getting through to the front lines. Whole battalions of the South Seas Detachment were foraging everywhere along the trail for food. Native gardens along the line of march were being stripped of sugar cane, taro, yams, pumpkins, melons, and everything else that was edible, but there was not enough food in that poor upland area to feed such a host for long. By September the front-line ration was down to less than a cupful of rice per day. By 17 September, the day after the Japanese seizure of Ioribaiwa, with the beach at Port Moresby almost visible from the height on which the Japanese found themselves, there was not a grain of rice left on the ridge for issue to the troops.64
General Horii's Orders Are Changed
When he first opened his offensive on 26 August, General Horii's objective had been Port Moresby. The deterioration of the situation at Milne Bay, and the difficulty of getting troops ashore at Guadalcanal in the face of Allied naval and air forces operating in the Solomons area, caused General Hyakutake on 29 August to instruct General Horii to halt the South Seas Detachment as soon as it had reached the southern foothills of the Owen Stanley Range. The advance was not to be resumed, he was told, until such time as Milne Bay had been taken and the Guadalcanal operation was progressing satisfactorily. Imperial General Headquarters concurred in these orders and two days later directed that General Horii go on the defensive as soon as he had crossed the Owen Stanley Range.65
Upon receipt of these instructions, General Horii had pressed through the Gap, looking for a defensible position on the other side of the range which he could hold until he was ordered to resume the advance on Port Moresby. Horii's first choice had been Nauro, but after sending out a reconnaissance party forward of Nauro he chose Ioribaiwa as the place to make his stand. The day after its seizure the troops holding it were told that they were to wait there until the middle of the following month, when it was expected that the final push against Port Moresby would be undertaken.66
On 20 September General Horii called together his commanders at a hill near his headquarters at Nauro and told them how things stood. He praised them for the way in which they and their men had succeeded in crossing "the so-called impregnable Stanley Range," and explained that the reason for the halt was to regain their fighting strength, so as to be able, at the proper time, "to strike a crushing blow at the enemy's positions at Port Moresby."67 How this was to be done with the existing state of supply was not explained.
Shortly after General Horii had ordered his subordinate commanders to hold Ioribaiwa he received, as a result of further Japanese reverses at Guadalcanal, instructions which in effect ordered his withdrawal from Ioribaiwa. The Kawaguchi Detachment, which had finally reached Guadalcanal in late August, was virtually wiped out on the night of 13-14 September, in the Battle of Edson's or Bloody Ridge. The Japanese were thus left without an effective striking force on the Island.68 Because of this new reverse, and the complete failure of the Milne Bay operation, Imperial General Headquarters felt impelled once again to revise its operational plan for Port Moresby. On 18 September new orders were issued which emphasized that everything was to be subordinated to the retaking of Guadalcanal. Existing positions in New Guinea were to be held as long as possible, but the South Seas Detachment was to be absolved of the responsibility of maintaining itself indefinitely in the southern foothills of the Owen Stanley Range. Instead, it was to begin preparations at once for the defense of the Buna-Gona beachhead, which it was to hold as its primary defensive position until again ordered to advance.
By concentrating on the Guadalcanal operation and ordering the South Seas Detachment back from the southern foothills of the range to the more easily defended beachhead, Imperial General Headquarters could still hope to retrieve the situation in both the Solomons and New Guinea. It was now planned that, as soon as Guadalcanal was retaken, the forces committed to that operation would be diverted to New Guinea. A part would seize Milne Bay and then, in accordance with the original plan, would move on Port Moresby by sea. The rest would be used to reinforce the South Seas Detachment, which, at the proper time, would sally forth from the beachhead, recross the mountains, and, in spite of all previous reverses, complete the Port Moresby operation in concert with the forces coming in from Milne Bay.69
Complying with his new instructions, General Horii began at once to prepare for an orderly withdrawal that would commit a minimum number of troops while allowing the forces to the rear the maximum possible time to reinforce the beachhead. He left the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 144th Infantry at Ioribaiwa and two companies of the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, immediately to the rear at Nauro. The remaining battalion of the 144th Infantry
and supporting troops General Horii ordered to Isurava. The main body of the 41st Infantry, less the two companies at Nauro and a company at Kokoda, was ordered to the Sanananda-Giruwa coastal area.70 General Horii's instructions to the main body of the 144th Infantry were that it was to hold Ioribaiwa as long as possible and then retire northward to be relieved at the proper time by the troops in the Kokoda-Isurava area. As the latter fell back, they would be relieved in turn by troops from the beachhead.
On 24 September, the day the 2d Battalion, 144th Infantry, was pulled out of the line and sent to Isurava, the 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry, reached Giruwa. It was followed in a few days by the main body of the 41st Infantry, under Colonel Yazawa. The naval garrison and the airfield at Buna were under the command of Navy Capt. Yoshitatsu Yasuda, who had come in from Rabaul on 17 September with 280 Yokosuka 5th SNLF troops. Colonel Yazawa took over command in the Giruwa coastal area, where were to be found the main Japanese supply dumps and the most important medical installation, the 67th Line of Communications Hospital. Work on beachhead defenses was well under way by 23 September. There were several thousand service troops in the rear area to do the job, and as each new increment of troops reached the coastal area it joined with the others in building bunkers, emplacing guns, clearing fields of fire, and otherwise preparing the beachhead for defense.71
The Australians Take the Offensive
Allied Land Forces lost no time in taking the offensive. On 23 September General Blamey, Commander ALF, arrived at Port Moresby and took over command of New Guinea Force. Lt. Gen. Edmund F. Herring, succeeding General Rowell, became Commander, Advance New Guinea Force.72 On 26 September, after aggressive patrol action to fix the enemy's position, and a short preparation which included an artillery bombardment by two 25 pounders brought up from Uberi, the 25th Brigade began an all-out attack on Ioribaiwa, taking it with relative ease two days later.
The Japanese had put up only token resistance. Instead of making a stand, they had abandoned their elaborate positions on Ioribaiwa Ridge almost on contact, and had retreated so swiftly up the trail that the Australians, who took up the pursuit, were unable to keep up with them.73 Like the attempt to take Milne Bay, the Japanese overland offensive had collapsed.
1. Memo, Admiral King for Gen Marshall, 31 Jul 42, sub: Japanese Operations, Northeast Coast of New Guinea, in 381, OPD PTO, Sec 2.
2. Memo, Gen Marshall for Admiral King, 1 Aug 42, sub: Japanese Operations, Northeast Coast of New Guinea, in 381, OPD PTO, Sec 2; Msg, Gen Marshall to Gen MacArthur, CM-OUT 9289, 31 Jul 42.
3. Msg, Gen MacArthur to Gen Marshall, No. Q-147, CM-IN 1607, 2 Aug 42.
4. GHQ SWPA OI No. 15, 6 Aug 42; LHQ OI No. 30, 9 Aug 42; NGF OI No. 24, 18 Aug 42. General Morris, who in addition to being G. O. C. New Guinea Force had also been Administrator of New Guinea and head of the Australia-New Guinea Administrative Unit, ANGAU, continued in the latter two capacities, thereby making it possible for General Rowell to concentrate exclusively on combat operations.
5. GHQ SWPA OI No. 15, 6 Aug 42.
6. G-2 Daily Summary Enemy Intel, No. 135, 3-4 Aug 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns, Buna-Ioribaiwa.
7. Msg, Gen MacArthur to Gen Marshall, No. C-301, CM-IN 7017, 19 Aug 42.
8. General Casey had under his command on 1 May 1942 a total of 6,240 U.S. Engineer construction troops comprising the following units: the 43d and 46th General Service Engineer Battalions, the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion, the 91st and 96th Separate Engineer Battalions, and the 576th and 585th Engineer Dump Truck Companies. The first three were white units; the remaining four Negro. Except for the addition of the 69th Topographical Company, and the expansion of the 91st and 96th Battalions to regiments, an increase since May of some 1,200 men, his command was substantially the same at the end of the year. OCE SWPA Annual Rpt, 1942; OCE SWPA, Location and Strength of U.S. Engineer Units, 31 Dec 42. Both in AFPAC Engr File.
9. Gen Casey, Memo for Record, 11 Aug 42, sub: Conference with General Kenney, Air Vice Marshal William D. Bostock, and Lt Col R. E. Beebe; OCE SWPA, Draft Engr Rpt, 31 Dec 42. Both in AFPAC Engr Files. OCE, AFPAC, Engineers in Theater Operations (Washington, 1947), p. 38.
10. Msg, Gen MacArthur to Gen Marshall, No. C-301, CM-IN 7017, 19 Aug 42.
11. USASOS SWPA, GO No. 7, 11 Aug 42.
12. Memo, Col Beebe, Air Dir of Opns, Allied Air Forces, for CG, 18 Aug 42, in 385-9, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA; OCE SWPA, Draft Engr Rpt, 31 Dec 42; OCE SWPA, New Guinea Ports, 1942. Both in AFPAC Engr File.
13. Ltr, Gen MacArthur to Gen Blamey, 24 Aug 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA; Ltr, Gen Kenney to Gen Ward, 26 Feb 51.
14. Memo, Gen MacArthur for Comdr ALF et al., 2 Jul 42, sub: Reinforcement Fall River; Rad, Movements, Townsville, to GHQ SWPA, No. 2797, 7 Jul 42; Ltr, Gen MacArthur to Comdr ALF, 7 Aug 42. All in 384, FALL RIVER File, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. Memo, Gen MacArthur for CG USASOS, 28 Jul 42, sub: Movement of 2d Battalion, 43d Engineers, less one company, in 307.5, Rec Sec Files, GHQ SWPA; Unit Hist, 709 AAA MG Bty, copy in DRB HRS, AGO. The 25-pounder was the standard artillery piece of the Australian and British Army at this time. The caliber was about 3½ inches; the barrel was about 7¾ feet long; and the weight of the shell, as the name of piece suggested, was roughly 25 pounds.
15. Msgs, Gen MacArthur to Gen Marshall, No. C-301, CM-IN 7017, 19 Aug 42; No. C-382, CM-IN 11398, 30 Aug 42; Memo, Gen Chamberlin for Gen Sutherland, 23 Oct 42, sub: Allied Strength at Milne Bay, 25 Aug 42-Sep 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug 42-7 Sep 42, copy in OCMH files.
16. Memo, Gen Sutherland for Gen Blamey, 2 Aug 42, in 385, FALL RIVER File, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA; ALF Daily Opns Rpt No. 115, 8 Aug 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA.
17. Staff Mtg, CGS LHQ, 28 Aug 42, in 337, Conf File, Rec Sec Files, GHQ SWPA; G-3 [GHQ SWPA] Outline of Milne Bay Opns, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42; Ltr, Maj Gen Hugh J. Casey to author, 21 Jul 50, in OCMH files. General Casey's explanation of the hasty construction of No. 1 Strip is that the field had to be constructed that way "in order to secure an operable airdrome in the limited time available."
18. Diary, member Kure 5th SNLF, in ATIS CT 1, No. 41; Diary, member Kure 3d SNLF, in ATIS CT 3, No. 57; Diary, member Kure 5th SNLF, in ATIS CT 4, No. 76; Sasebo 5th SNLF Opns Orders, tr quoted in G-2 Daily Summary Enemy Intel No. 164, 2-3 Sep 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA; AMF, Interr Gen Adachi et al.; 17th Army Opns I, 50-51; Southeast Area Naval Opns I, 15; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, pp. 25-28.
19. Diary, member Sasebo 5th SNLF, in ATIS CT 4, No. 84; Allied Air Forces Opns Rpt, 25 Aug 42; GHQ Sitrep No. 347, 25 Aug 42; Interr Gen Adachi et al.; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42; G-3 Outline Milne Bay Opns, 25 Aug 42; G-3 Opns Rpt No. 140, 26 Aug 42, in G-3 Jnl GHQ SWPA; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, p. 27.
20. G-3 Outline Milne Bay Opns; G-3 Opns Rpt No. 139, 25 Aug 42, No. 140, 26 Aug 42; Allied Air Forces Opns Rpt, 25 Aug 42.
21. AMF, Interr Gen Adachi et al.; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, pp. 25-28; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42.
22. Staff Mtg CGS LHQ, 28 Aug 42; OCE SWPA, Draft Engr Rpt, 31 Dec 42; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42.
23. Memo, Brig John Field, CO 7th Aust Inf Bde, for Hq, Milne Force, 17 Sep 42, sub: Lessons from Recent Fighting, copy in OCMH files; G-3 Outline Milne Bay Opns; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, p. 26.
24. GHQ SWPA Sitrep No. 347, 26 Aug 42; Msg, Gen MacArthur to Gen Marshall, No. C-361, CM-IN 10432, 27 Aug 42; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, p. 26.
25. G-3 Opns Rpt, No. 140, 26 Aug 42; G-3 Outline Milne Bay Opns; Msg, Gen MacArthur to Gen Marshall, No. C-361, CM-IN 10432, 27 Aug 42.
26. Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns 25 Aug-7 Sep 42; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, p. 26; Interv with Lt Col Peter S. Teesdale-Smith, AMF, 22 Aug 49, copy in OCMH files. At the time the battle was fought, Colonel Teesdale-Smith, then a captain, was intelligence officer of the 2/10 Battalion.
27. Memo, Brig Field for Hq Milne Force, 17 Sep 42, sub: Lessons from the Recent Fighting, Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42; Interv with Col Teesdale-Smith, 22 Aug 49.
28. Ltr, Capt Joseph E. Wood, Adj 2d Bn, 43d Engr Regt (GS), to Chief Engr, U.S. Army, SWPA, 18 Sep 42, sub: Rpt of Participation in the Milne Bay Battle by U.S. Engr Troops in this Area; Memo, Gen Casey for Gen Sutherland, 25 Oct 42; Ltr, Maj Ludlow C. Adams, CO 2d Bn, 43d Engrs (GS), to CG USASOS SWPA, 2 Nov 42, sub: Participation of U.S. Engr Troops in the Battle of Milne Bay, 25 Aug-20 Sep 43. All in AFPAC Engr File. Unit Hist 709th AAA MG Bty.
29. Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42.
30. G-3 Outline Milne Bay Opns; Ltr, Gen Sutherland to Gen Blamey, 28 Aug 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA. General MacArthur, in conference with General Blamey on the 26th, gave it as his "professional opinion" that the Japanese would reinforce the landing on the north shore within seventy-two hours.
31. Ltr, Maj Gen George A. Vasey, DSGS ALF, to Gen Sutherland, 28 Aug 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42.
32. Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42. The 18th Brigade was, of course, less the 2/10 Battalion, which at this time was trying to find its way back to the head of the bay.
33. Diary, owner unknown, in ATIS CT 1, No. 41, 63; Diaries, members Kure 3d and Yokosuka 5th SNLF in ATIS CT 4, Nos. 63, 65, 67; USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 111; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, pp. 25, 28; 17th Army opns, I, 51.
34. Ltr, Capt Wood to Chief Engr, SWPA, 18 Sep 42, sub: Report of Participation in the Milne Bay Battle by U.S. Engr Troops in this Area; Memo, Gen Casey for Gen Sutherland, 25 Oct 42; Memo, Maj Adams for CG USASOS, 2 Nov 42, sub: Participation of U.S. Engr Troops in the Battle of Milne Bay; OCE SWPA, Draft Engr Rpt, 31 Dec 42; Unit Hist 709th AAA MG Bty; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, pp. 26, 27; Southeast Area Naval Opns I, 21.
35. Ltr, John Balfour, Office of the Official Australian War Historian, Canberra, to author, 8 Dec 50, in OCMH files; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42; Southeast Area Naval Opns I, 21; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, p. 27.
36. Intercept, rad COMCRUDIV 18 to Comdr Japanese Troops, Milne Bay, 3 Sep 42; Intercept rad, CINC 8th Fleet to Comdr Japanese Troops Milne Bay, 5 Sep 42; G-3 Opns Rpt No. 149, 4 Sep 42: GHQ Sitrep No. 356, 4 Sep 42. All in G-3 Jnl GHQ SWPA. Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug 42-7 Sep 42; AMF, Interr Gen Adachi et al.; Southeast Area Naval Opns I, 21-22; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, p. 28.
37. Ltr, Balfour to author, 8 Dec 50; Comdr Milne Force, Rpt on Opns, 25 Aug-7 Sep 42, AMF; Interr Gen Adachi et al., Southeast Area Naval Opns I, 22; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea, p. 28.
38. Ltr, Capt Wood to Chief Engr SWPA, 18 Sep 42, sub: Report of Participation in the Milne Bay Battle by U.S. Engineer Troops in this area; Memo, Maj Adams for CG USASOS, 2 Nov 42, sub: Participation of U.S. Engr Troops in the Battle of Milne Bay; Unit Hist 709th AAA MG Bty.
39. Msg, Gen MacArthur to Gen Marshall, No. C-267, CM-IN 574, 28 Aug 42; Rad, COMSOPAC to CTF 61 et al., 30 Aug 42, in SOPAC War Diary; Memo, Gen Sutherland for Admiral Leary, 4 Sep 42, sub: Employment of Naval forces Southwest Pacific Area, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA.
40. Memo, Gen Chamberlin for Gen Vasey, 10 Sep 42, sub: 155-mm. GPF Guns for Milne Bay, in 385, G-3, GHQ SWPA Files, in ORB RAC, AGO.
41. OCE SWPA, Draft Engr Rpt, 31 Dec 42; Ltr, Gen Casey to author, 21 Jul 50. Number 2 Strip was never completed, for it was decided immediately after the battle to discontinue work on it and to concentrate instead on the other two fields.
42. Nankai Shitai Opns Order No. A-102, 24 Aug 42, in ATIS EP No. 33; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns, Buna-Ioribaiwa; G-2 Daily Summaries Enemy Intel No. 166, 4-5 Sep 42, No. 167, 5-6 Sep 42, No. 168, 6-7 Sep. 42.
43. ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns, Buna-Ioribaiwa; Nankai Shitai Opns Orders No. A-102, 24 Aug 42, n. n., 29 Aug 42, n. n., 30 Aug 42, No. A-112, 4 Sep 42, in ATIS EP No. 33; 17th Army Intel Summaries No. 9, 22 Aug 42, No. 11, 26 Aug 42, No. 14, 29 Aug 42, No. 15, 30 Aug 42, No. 16, 31 Aug 42, No. 19, 3 Sep 42, in ATIS EP No. 28.
44. ALF Daily Opns Rpt No. 138, 31 Aug 42; G-3 Opns Rpt, No. 147, 2 Sep 42; G-2 Daily Summaries Enemy Intel No. 165, 3-4 Sep 42, No. 166, 4-5 Sep 42; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns, Buna-Ioribaiwa.
45. ALF Daily Opns Rpt No. 141, 3 Sep 42; G-3 Opns Rpt No. 148, 3 Sep 42; G-2 Daily Summaries Enemy Intel No. 164, 2-3 Sep 42, No. 166, 4-5 Sep 42, No. 167, 5-6 Sep 42. White, Green Armor, pp. 189-208. White was with the troops at this time, and his account of the retreat is a vivid and compelling one.
46. G-3 Opns Rpt No. 152, 7 Sep 42; Ltr, Gen Vasey, DCGS ALF, to Gen Chamberlin, 8 Sep 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA.
47. G-2 Daily Summaries Enemy Intel, No. 165 3-4 Sep 42, No. 168, 6-7 Sep 42.
48. Untitled Jnl Entry [Gen Chamberlin, Memo for the Record, 1800, 7 Sep 42], 8 Sep 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA.
49. Ltr, Gen Vasey to Gen Chamberlin, 8 Sep 42. The incoming 6th Division units were the 16th and 17th Brigades. The 19th Brigade, it will be recalled was at Darwin where it had been since March.
50. LHQ OI No. 33, 9 Sep 42; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns, Buna-Ioribaiwa.
51. GHQ SWPA GO No. 30, 5 Sep 42: Interv with Maj Gen Edwin F. Harding, 9 Dec 47: Interv with Lt Gen Robert L. Eichelberger, 20 Nov 48. Both intervs in OCMH files. F. Tillman Durdin, "The Grim Hide and Seek of Jungle War," in The New York Times Magazine, 7 Mar 43.
52. GHQ SWPA, GO No. 30, 5 Sep 42.
53. Ltr, Gen MacArthur to Comdr ALF, 11 Sep 42, sub: Shipment, 126th Inf, 32d U.S. Div, to Port Moresby, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA.
54. Ltr, Col Lawrence A. Quinn, CO 126th Inf, to CofS 1st Australian Corps (Brig Hopkins), 3 Oct 42, in 126th Inf Patrol Rpts Jnl, Buna-Papuan Campaign; Interv with Col Bernd G. Baetcke, 17 Nov 50, in OCMH files; 32d Div AAR, Papuan Campaign; 126th Inf CT AAR, Papuan Campaign. All AAR's and other combat records of the 32d Division and its organic and attached units are in DRB HRS, AGO. E. J. Kahn, Jr., "The Terrible Days of Company E," The Saturday Evening Post, January 8, 1944, pp. 9-10.
55. Kahn, "The Terrible Days of Company E," The Saturday Evening Post, January 8, 1944, pp. 9-10. The allusion was, of course, to the fact that company E was the spearhead of the 126th Infantry, and the 126th Infantry in its turn was to be the spearhead of the division and corps.
56. Special Abau Reconnaissance Party, MAPLE, Orders No. 1, 16 Sep 42, in AFPAC Engr File; Memo, Brig Gen Hanford MacNider for Gen Whitlock, 17 Sep 42, copy in OCMH files; Interv with Col Baetcke, 17 Nov 50; Maj Alfred Medendorp, The March and Operations of the Antitank and Cannon Company (32d Inf Div) in the Attack on Wairopi, 4 Oct-28 Nov 42, Infantry School Monograph, copy in TIS Files.
57. Memo, Gen MacNider for Gen Whitlock, 17 Sep 42; Rad, Gen MacNider for Gen Whitlock, 5th AF, No. S-136, 17 Sep 42; Rad, Col Matthews U.S. Adv Base, New Guinea, to CG USASOS, 18 Sep 42. Both rads in 384, G-3 Files, GHQ SWPA. Ltr, Col L. J. Sverdrup to Gen Casey, 19 Sep 42, sub: Rpt No. 1, in AFPAC Engr File; 126th Inf CT AAR, Papuan Campaign; AGS SWPA Terrain Study No. 28, Main Routes Across New Guinea, 18 Oct 42, pp. 19-54, 56-58.
58. Ltr, Col Quinn to Brig Hopkins, 3 Oct 42; 107th Med Bn AAR, Papuan Campaign.
59. Ltr, CINC SWPA to Comdr ALF et al., 17 Sep 42, sub: Troop Movement Dir No. 1; LHQ OI No. 35, 17 Sep 42; NGF OI No. 30, 19 Sep 42; Msg, Gen Casey to Gen MacArthur, No. 737, 18 Sep 42: Msg, Gen MacArthur to Gen Casey, No. C-561, 19 Sep 42. All in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA. 126th Inf CT AAR, Papuan Campaign; 128th Inf AAR, Papuan Campaign.
60. G-2 Daily Summaries Enemy Intel No. 170, 8-9 Sep 42, No. 171, 9-10 Sep 42, No. 172, 10-11 Sep 42; Lanops Bul No. 30, 9 Sep 42, in G 3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns, Buna-Ioribaiwa; Nankai Shitai Opns Order No. A-115, 11 Sep 42, in ATIS EP No. 33; Diary, Actg Comdr No. 2 MG Co, 2d Bn, 144th Inf, in ATIS CT 29, No. 358. The figure, 5,000, is of course an approximation, but it appears reasonably clear from captured enemy records that General Horii's frontline force, even allowing for heavy losses, and the diversion of part of its strength to supply duties was at least 5,000 strong at the time.
61. G-2 Daily Summary Enemy Intel No. 174, 12-13 Sep 42; ALF Daily Opns Rpt No. 156, 17 Sep 42; ALF Rpt on New Guinea Opns, Buna-Ioribaiwa; NGF, Rpt on Opns in New Guinea opns, Ser 3.
62. Msg, Gen Kenney to Gen Marshall, No. A-201, CM-IN 1752, 4 Aug 42: Fifth Air Force GO No. 1, 3 Sep 42. When he established the Fifth Air Force, General Kenney drew a clear line of demarcation between its responsibilities and those of the RAAF. Thus, while the Fifth Air Force became responsible for operations in the Northeast Area, the RAAF took over the responsibility for defense of the Australian continent and particularly of the Darwin area. In practice, the Fifth Air Force always had the support of Australian squadrons in its operations to the northeast of Australia, and the RAAF in turn was repeatedly reinforced by Fifth Air Force units, especially at Darwin, which was still under regular Japanese air attack. From Darwin, in turn, attacks were being mounted on strategic points in the Netherlands Indies. AAF, Air Actn in Papua, 21 Jul 42-23 Jan 43, pp. 51-52, copy in USAF Hist Off.
63. Photo Intel Rpts Buna Runway, Ser 242, 4 Sep 42, Ser 245, 10 Sep 42, Ser 247, 13 Sep 42, in AFPAC Engr File; Allied Air Forces Opns Rpt, 11 Sep 42, 17 Sep 42; G-3 Opns Rpt No. 159, 14 Sep 42: GHQ Sitreps No. 365, 11 Sep 42, No. 370, 17 Sep 42, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA; GHQ SWPA GO No. 34, 15 Sep 42; 17th Army Intel Rpt No. 36, 23 Sep 42; USSBS, The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan (Washington, 1947), p. 27.
64. Nankai Shitai Directions Regarding Economy in the Use of Ammunition and Provisions, 1 Sep 42, Nankai Shitai Bul Instns, 6 Sep 42; Nankai Shitai Instns Concerning Provisions and Forage, 10 Sep 42; Nankai Shitai Bul No. 3, 13 Sep 42. All in ATIS EP No. 33. 17th Army Intel Rpt, No. 33, 18 Sep 42, in ATIS EP 28; Diary, Actg Comdr No. 2 MG Co, 2d Bn, 144th Inf, in ATIS CT 29.
65. Ltr, Gen Willollghby to Gen Ward, 12 Apr 51; Hist Rec, Army Section Imperial General Headquarters, p. 62; 17th Army Opns, I, 49, 54, 55; Southeast Area Naval Opns I, 19.
66. Nankai Shitai Opns Order No. A-116, 12 Sep 42; Memo, Bde Med Dept to Med Offs 41st Inf, 12 Sep 42, sub: Matters Relating to Health During the Period of Waiting; Nankai Shitai Bul No. 3, 13 Sep 42. All in ATIS EP No. 33. Diary, Actg Comdr No. 2 MG Co, 2d Bn, 144th Inf.
67. An Address of Instruction by General Horii at a hill west of Wamai (Nauro), 20 Sep 42, quoted verbatim in Diary, Actg Comdr No. 2 MG Co, 2d Bn, 144th Inf.
68. 17th Army Opns, I, 39, 43, 54, 55, 59, 60; Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, pp. 116-119, 126.
69. Hist Rec, Army Section Imperial General Headquaters, pp. 62, 63; 17th Army Opns, I, 54, 55, 59-60; Southeast Area Naval Opns I, pp. 24, 25.
70. 17th Army Intel Rpts No. 36, 23 Sep 42, No. 38, 24 Sep 42, No. 39, 26 Sep 42, in ATIS EP 28; Diary, Actg Comdr No. 2 MG Co, 2d Bn, 144th Inf; Yazawa Det Bivouac Order, 1 Oct 42, Eastern Giruwa, in Fld Staff Diary, Medical Capt Fukunobu Okabu, in ATIS EP 24.
71. Log, Yokosuka 5th SNLF, 28 May-29 Sep 42, in ATIS CT 26, No. 309; Diary, member Yokosuka 5th SNLF, in ATIS CT 22, No. 269; 17th Army Intel Rpts, No. 36, 23 Sep 42, No. 39, 25-26 Sep 42, No. 40, 27-30 Sep 42, in ATIS EP 38; Yazawa Det Bivouac Order, 1 Oct 42, in ATIS EP 24; Diary, Actg Comdr No. 2 MG Co, 2d Bn, 144th Inf.
72. Comdr ALF, Rpt on opns, 23 Sep 42-22 Jan 43, in G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA; Rpt of CG Buna Forces on the Buna Campaign, 1 Dec 42-25 Jan 43, p. 45, in DRB HRS, AGO. Upon General Blamey's return to Australia, command of New Guinea Force would revert to General Herring.
73. ALF Opns Rpts No. 164, 25 Sep 42, No. 165, 26 Sep 42; G-2 Daily Summary Enemy Intel, No. 187, 25-26 Sep 42; G-3 Opns Rpt, No. 190, 28-29 Sep 42; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns, 23 Sep 42-22 Jan 43.