Leyte Is Liberated
On 15 December, General MacArthur had directed General Eichelberger's Eighth Army to be prepared to assume control of nearly all Sixth Army units in the Leyte area at 0001 on 26 December 1944 in order to relieve the Sixth Army for future operations. The Eighth Army was to relieve the Sixth of all duties and missions in the area except certain ones dealing with logistics and construction. These were assigned to the USASOS (SWPA). The Allied Naval and Air Forces were directed to continue, in support of the Eighth Army, the missions which hitherto had been specified for the Sixth.1
In furtherance of General MacArthur's instructions, General Krueger issued orders covering the transfer to Eighth Army control of certain Sixth Army units. On 21 December he named the units over which he was relinquishing control as of 0001, 26 December, and stated that the responsibility for continuing assigned duties and missions in the area would then pass from him to the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army, the Commanding General, USASOS (SWPA), and the Commander, Allied Naval Forces.2
General Eichelberger, also, prepared orders for the forthcoming transfer of authority. The supply and evacuation procedures of the Sixth Army would remain in effect. The X and XXIV Corps would "continue on their present assigned missions of destroying Japanese wherever found, and . . . be prepared to conduct overland or amphibious shore to shore operations to seize enemy supply points and bases, and ports of entry."3
On 25 December, when elements of the 77th Division had seized Palompon, the last important port on Leyte, General MacArthur declared that all organized resistance had ended. He said in a message to General Krueger: "Heartiest congratulations on capture of Palompon. This closes a campaign that has had few counterparts in the utter destruction of the enemy's forces with a maximum conservation of our own. It has been a magnificent performance on the part of all concerned."4
The Eighth Army Assumes Control
On 26 December, General Eichelberger assumed control of all combat units in the Leyte-Samar area. It was not until the first part of January 1945 that the American troops secured the west coast of Leyte. Thereafter only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained.
Assembly of Japanese Forces
On 25 December 1944, General Yamashita, commanding the 14th Area Army,
notified General Suzuki, the 35th Army commander, that he had written off the Leyte Campaign as a loss; henceforward the 35th Army on Leyte would be self-sustaining and self-supporting, the units on Leyte would be transferred to other areas, and, finally, the units on the island would be assembled at a point from which raiding operations could be conducted. Since these orders were ambiguous and apparently contradictory, General Suzuki asked that the message be repeated but he never received an answer. Accordingly, in the latter part of December, he sent his chief of staff to Manila for further clarification of the orders. The chief of staff arrived at Manila, by way of Cebu, in late January, but he was unable to obtain any further information for General Suzuki.
The decision of General Yamashita to abandon the Leyte operation followed a series of rapidly moving events. On the 14th of December, he canceled an optimistic plan for an amphibious assault through the shallow waters of Carigara Bay against Carigara, an assault that had been scheduled for 16 December. This cancellation followed the sighting of an Allied convoy en route to Mindoro.5 The convoy reached Mindoro and the troops landed successfully on 15 December. On 19 December, two days prior to the junction of the X and XXIV Corps on Highway 2, General Yamashita told General Suzuki that he could no longer send any reinforcements and supplies to Leyte and that the 35th Army would have to become self-supporting. On the same day, General Yamashita assigned to the defense of Luzon three divisions that Imperial General Headquarters had earmarked for Leyte. Shortly afterward, at a conference with representatives from the Southern Army and Imperial General Headquarters, the representative from the latter told General Yamashita to forget the Leyte operation.
In the meantime, General Suzuki interpreted his orders to mean that units of the 35th Army would assemble at a common point at which they could be self-supporting. He had selected the western area of Matagob-Palompon in the vicinity of the road leading from Highway 2 at Libongao over the mountains to Palompon on the west coast. Palompon was to have been used as the rear center of the line of communications and the army headquarters was to have been established at Kompisao, but the seizure of Palompon on 25 December by the 77th Division forced Suzuki to change the location of his army headquarters.6 He then selected as a base of operations an area in the vicinity of Ginabuyan that overlooked Silad Bay and was about three kilometers north of Villaba.
The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about 1,200 feet, heavily forested and having rocky eastern and western slopes that made it "a natural fortress." From it one could command a view of Ormoc Valley to the east and the Camotes Sea and Cebu to the west. There were a few Filipino huts, and cultivated fields and coconut groves, interspersed with salt beds, lay along the beach. The area "was admirably suited for an extended period of defensive action."7 General Suzuki ordered the units of the 35th Army that were retreating westward to repair to the vicinity of the new base of operations.
The units continued to straggle westward towards the selected area. By 1 January, most of them had taken up positions in the Balanac sector, which was about three and a half miles southeast of Villaba and overlooked the Palompon road. They had been hard pressed. The 68th Brigade and the 1st Division made contact and successfully concentrated south of Villaba in early January. The 12th Independent Regiment (the Imahori Detachment), the Mitsui Shipping Unit, the 4th Airborne Raiding Regiment and the remaining troops of the 77th Infantry Regiment, which had been operating northeast of Ormoc, reached the southern Matagob area about the middle of January. It was not until the beginning of February that these units made contact with the 35th Army. The few remaining elements of the 16th Division stayed in the vicinity of Valencia until the end of February. The 26th Division also remained in this area until the middle of January, when it moved west and established contact with the 35th Army.8
The 102d Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of forty to fifty deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out of touch with Lt. Gen. Shimpei Fukue, the commanding general of the 102d Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukue was planning to evacuate to Cebu. General Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukue "was violating the military code in taking these steps without consent." He thereupon sent the following message to Fukue: "Lt. General Fukue and his headquarters will remain in Leyte and at the same time I am attaching other units and groups in the Visayan and Mindanao sectors to your Division. General Fukue and his Chief of Staff will report to me in person at Army Headquarters." The commander of the 102d Division did not answer but his chief of staff sent the following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters."9
General Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukue and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukue, with his chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for Cebu. This fact was communicated to General Suzuki by Tomochika, who states that "for several days I had a difficult time in consoling the general."10 The sequel to these events was that General Suzuki relieved General Fukue of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukue was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. General Suzuki asked Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo for authority to court-martial General Fukue; no reply was forthcoming. General Fukue was released and later returned to command of the 102d Division.11
In the meantime, the leaderless 102d Division, with a strength of approximately 2,000 men, crossed Highway 2 north of Libongao and reached the southern area of
Matagob about 24 December. The troops failed to contact the 35th Army and after remaining for a short time at Matagob moved to the vicinity of Villaba.
The units that arrived on the west coast were much understrength and very poorly equipped. All artillery had been lost. There were only five to ten machine guns per regiment in addition to individual weapons. Each man had an average of sixty rounds of ammunition and several hand grenades.
On the 30th of December, General Yamashita sent the following message to General Suzuki:
Sixty days have already elapsed since the American forces invaded Leyte Island, during which period the Thirty-fifth Army, under the forceful leadership of its commander, has waged many a heroic battle against superior enemy forces and in the face of numerous difficulties. The Army gave a great blow to the enemy. Moreover, the Thirty-fifth Army by containing the opposing enemy for this long period of time deprived him of freedom of action for the coming operation, thereby facilitating the general conduct of our operations in this battle and rendering great services to our cause. I am deeply impressed, particularly with the fact that the Takachiho Unit captured the hostile airfield at BURAUEN after the Thirty-fifth Army, despite its inferiority in equipment and number of men, and the stoppage of supply, made a timely and resolute attack against the enemy with the commander himself leading them. However, the enemy, who has increased his material power and war potential, now threatens, solely on the strength of his material superiority, to bear down on Luzon Island despite the heroic and desperate efforts of our sea and air forces as well as of the Thirty-fifth Army. In view of the sudden change in the situation, we shall seek and destroy our enemy on Luzon Island, thereby doing our part in the heroic struggle of the Army and avenging many a valiant warrior who fell before the enemy. As munitions have not been supplied adequately, I cannot keep back tears of remorse for tens of thousands of our officers and men fighting in Leyte Island. Nevertheless, I must impose a still harder task upon you. Please try to understand my intentions. They say it is harder to live than to die. You, officers and men, be patient enough to endure the hardships of life, and help guard and maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne through eternal resistance to the enemy, and be ready to meet your death calmly for our beloved country. I sincerely instruct you as above.12
General Suzuki took steps to make the force on Leyte self-supporting. In January 1945, he established two principles for his troops. First, the troops were to utilize as much of the local food and material as possible and plant sweet potatoes and Indian corn. Second, all provisions in the area outside of the operation base were to be purchased. The execution of the first part of his first precept worked reasonably well but the constant American air raids and mopping-up operations prevented the Japanese from being too successful in planting and harvesting the corn and potatoes. They were also not very fortunate in purchasing supplies from outside the area, although some supplies were obtained each time the men could pass through the American protective screen.
The Japanese arrived on the western shores of Leyte at the end of the harvest season. They secured large quantities of provisions which the Filipinos had stored and also a great number of coconuts and sweet potatoes. The soldiers used the carabaos of the island as meat and obtained salt from sea water. For vegetables, the army's chief reliance was upon wild ferns, tokay grass, and wild spinach.
In conclusion, "although there was not enough food to increase the fighting power of the Army, no one died of starvation and some units stored enough supplies for two to three months."13
By the end of December, most of the enemy troops were in northwest Leyte, west of Highway 2 and north of Palompon. Another large enemy concentration was located in the hills south of Palompon.14
The mop-up of any operation is dangerous, difficult, and unglamorous, but it is highly essential. The activities of the 7th Division on Leyte during January and February 1945 are typical of the large-scale mop-up in which many small units are sent out daily in all directions. This division was assigned all of the west coast area south of a line from Palompon to Valencia. Its records state that the division "sent out as many as forty combat patrols daily to hunt down and destroy thousands of Japanese stragglers wandering throughout the area."15
Eight divisions were engaged in mopping up for varying lengths of time on Leyte, but only an outline of their activities will be attempted here. The operation may be divided into three phases: XXIV Corps activities from 1 January to 15 February 1945; X Corps activities from 1 January to 24 February 1945; and Eighth Army Area Command operations from 24 February to 8 May 1945.16
During the XXIV Corps phase, the 11th Airborne Division encountered an enemy force well dug in on the southern slopes of Mt. Majunag, five miles northwest of Burauen. After much bitter hand-to-hand fighting the Japanese were destroyed. The 96th Division engaged in extensive patrolling, relieved the 11th Airborne Division, and relieved the X Corps of all tactical responsibility east of the mountains. The 7th Division sent out numerous patrols in the southern part of the island, and sent out a reinforced battalion that destroyed all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. The 77th Division, which operated in the northwestern part of the island, cleared up many pockets of enemy resistance.
In the X Corps phase, the island of Samar was cleared of Japanese troops. The Americal Division, advance elements of which arrived on 24 January, extensively patrolled both the islands of Leyte and Samar.
During the Eighth Army Area Command phase, the constant searching out of isolated groups of enemy soldiers continued. In addition to the Americal Division, the 1st Filipino Infantry Regiment patrolled Leyte. On 8 May, the control of the Eighth Army over the area came to an end.17
The Japanese Withdrawal
At the time that General Suzuki made his plans for the units of the 35th Army on Leyte to become self-sufficient, he felt that there were too many soldiers on the island to make the plan fully effective. General Suzuki decided therefore to transfer to other islands those who, because of their good physical condition and morale, would be able to withstand the rigors of a long fight.
Consequently the sick, weak, and wounded were dropped from the units that were to be withdrawn.18 General Suzuki also considered the selection of the location of the new headquarters for the 35th Army. Since there were 15,000 Japanese residents in and around Davao on Mindanao, it was finally decided to remove the army headquarters to Davao. As a preliminary step, the 1st Division was to be sent to Cebu.19
General Suzuki had plans drawn up showing the order of precedence by which the units on Leyte were to be withdrawn and their destinations. All available landing barges on Leyte and additional vessels from Cebu and other areas would be used. The order of the proposed withdrawal and the destinations of the units were as follows:
1st Division northern Cebu and later to Negros 41st and 77th Infantry Regiments Mindanao 102d Division Visayan area 26th Division Bacolod sector of Negros Takahashi Detachment northern Cebu Units of the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade northern Cebu
General Suzuki and 35th Army Headquarters would leave Leyte about the same time as the 26th Division. The 16th Division, the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade, and other small units were to remain on Leyte and would be under the command of Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, the 16th Division commander.20
When these plans were announced Lt. Gen. Tadasu Kataoka, the commanding general of the 1st Division, suggested that as the 1st Division had lost so many men and officers in the Leyte operation it might be better to use the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade, which had fresh troops and would be better suited for the assignment to Cebu. He was overruled.21 There were, however, other officers who were more anxious to leave Leyte. General Tomochika later wrote: "Many of the troops rushed to join this movement and Staff Officer Nakamura experienced difficulty in controlling them. However, quite a number of men succeeded in transferring without the commander's orders. The commander was displeased because only a small number of staff officers were willing to stay on Leyte."22
On the morning of 12 January, four launches arrived at Abijao to begin evacuation of the 1st Division. The Americans attacked and damaged the vessels, but three were repaired. By 2300, with the embarkation of the first party, composed of elements of the 49th Infantry and Division Headquarters, the evacuation got under way. This group left Abijao at 0130 on 13 January and reached Tabogon, in northern Cebu, about 0730. At about the same time, the remnants of the 57th Infantry reached Cebu. The rest of 1st Division Headquarters, the 1st Infantry Regiment, and part of the 1st Transport Regiment left Leyte on the 18th, and on the 20th the rest of the 49th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Division Transport quitted the island.
Between the 13th and 20th of January the three launches, each carrying about seventy men, made four round trips. After the second trip, the Americans spotted the operation. The hiding place of the craft at Tabogon was frequently strafed by aircraft and shelled by submarines and motor torpedo boats, which kept the channel waters
under sharp surveillance. On the night of the 20th, American aircraft sank three launches. Although additional craft were sent up from Liloan on Cebu, these were also sunk. It was impossible to evacuate any more personnel until the middle of March.23
The number of men from the 1st Division evacuated to Cebu was estimated to be as follows: 1st Division Headquarters, 73; 1st Infantry Regiment, 72; 49th Infantry Regiment, 208; 57th Infantry Regiment, 178; and 1st Transport Regiment, 212; a total of 743 men. The equipment evacuated included 332 rifles, 4 heavy machine guns, 11 light machine guns, 5 grenade launchers, and a small amount of small arms ammunition.24 In addition several hundred men obtained their own transportation and left for other islands in the Philippines.
The Road Ends
From 20 January on, the remaining Japanese forces stayed in the Villaba sector, hoping that succor would come. On 20 January General Tomochika "waited on the beach" for a boat that never came. The men were "plunged into the depths of despair." Time passed. On the evening of 17 March, two Japanese vessels appeared. General Suzuki and part of his staff boarded the craft and at 0030, 18 March, left the island of Leyte. For days the vessels sailed from island to island in the Visayas only to find that they were too late. The Americans were already in possession. On the evening of 16 April, the vessel bearing General Suzuki was bombed by American aircraft off the coast of Negros Island and Suzuki was killed.25 The Leyte Campaign had ended.
The liberation of Leyte had been accomplished at no slight cost. During the peak month, January 1945, there were 257,766 American Army, including Air Forces, troops on Leyte.26 The total Army casualties for the Leyte Campaign were over 15,500, including more than 3,500 killed and nearly 12,000 wounded. (Tables 4 and 5)
It is impossible, with data now available to determine with any degree of exactitude the number of Japanese who participated in the campaign or their casualties. The estimates of the Sixth and Eighth Armies vary greatly, as do those of the various Japanese sources. The Sixth Army estimated that it had killed 56,263 and captured 389 men.27 and that as of 26 December 1944 when it relinquished control to Eighth Army about 5,000 of the Japanese remained on the islands of Leyte and Samar.28 The Eighth Army estimated that, for the mop-up period from 26 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, it
TABLE 4a Estimated.
U.S. ARMY BATTLE CASUALTIES AT LEYTE
20 OCTOBER 1944-8 MAY 1945
Organization Total Killed Wounded Missing Total 15,584 3,504 11,991 89 Sixth Army Troops 961 141 813 a7 Eighth Army Troops 404 61 340 3 X Corps 7,126 1,670 5,384 72 Americal Div and 164th RCT 731 162 566 3 24th Infantry Division 2,342 544 1,784 14 32d Infantry Division 1,949 450 1,491 8 38th Infantry Division 272 68 171 33 1st Cavalry Division 931 203 726 2 11th Airborne Division 532 168 352 12 1st Filipino Division 52 14 38 0 108th RCT 53 14 39 0 112th RCT 160 32 128 0 Corps Troops 104 15 89 0 XXIV Corps 7,093 1,632 5,454 7 7th Infantry Division 2,764 584 2,179 1 77th Infantry Division 2,226 499 1,723 4 96th Infantry Division 1,660 469 1,189 2 Corps Troops 443 80 363 0
Source: Reports of the Commanding Generals, Eighth U. S. Army, Inclosure 1, and Sixth U. S. Army, on the Leyte-Samar Operation, p. 155.
killed and found dead 24,294 and captured 439 Japanese.29 General Eichelberger stated that his forces killed "more than twenty-seven thousand Japanese."30
The Japanese historians of the Leyte operation estimate that the total strength of their army ground troops was 70,000 men.31 General Tomochika, the chief of staff of the 35th Army, was interrogated several times after the war. On one occasion he estimated that the total number of Japanese involved in the Leyte operation, including naval and air personnel and those who lost their lives in transports sunk en route to Leyte, was 59,400 men, approximately one fifth of all Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands.32 On another occasion General Tomochika estimated that 61,800 Japanese had been on Leyte, and that 13,010 were alive and 48,790 had been killed by 17 March 1945.33
In the plan for the defeat of Japan the objective sought in reconquering the Philippines was not only to liberate the Filipinos
TABLE 5Source: Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, 20 October-25 December 1944, p. 155.
SIXTH ARMY BATTLE CASUALTIES BY ARM OR SERVICE
20 OCTOBER-25 DECEMBER 1944
Arm or Service Killed Wounded and Injured Missing in Action Total Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Infantry 2,380 82.42 7,749 78.61 85 52.80 10,214 79.14 Engineer 132 4.58 762 7.73 46 28.57 940 7.28 Medical 100 3.47 375 3.80 8 4.97 483 3.74 Field Artillery 96 3.33 328 3.33 5 3.11 429 3.32 Coast Artillery 47 1.59 248 2.52 1 .62 296 2.30 Ordnance 45 1.56 100 1.01 1 .62 146 1.13 Quartermaster 41 1.42 67 .68 9 5.59 117 .91 Signal 12 .42 76 .77 0 .00 88 .68 Transportation 7 .24 73 .74 1 .62 81 .63 Chemical Warfare 13 .45 44 .45 0 .00 57 .44 Military Police 13 .45 27 .27 4 2.48 44 .34 Chaplain 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 Miscellaneous 2 .07 9 .09 1 .62 12 .09 Total 2,888 100.00 9,858 100.00 161 100.00 12,907 100.00
but also to cut off the Japanese from the rich empire that they had acquired in the Netherlands Indies, and at the same time to establish a base for the final assault on the enemy's homeland. As early as 1942 Allied submarines had begun to gnaw at the lifeline between Japan and its new empire, rich in rubber, tin, rice, and, above all, in oil, without which Japan could not remain in the war. By the fall of 1944 the submarines had virtually cut this lifeline, which ran past the Philippines. The loss of the Philippines to the Allies would finally sever it.
The object of the Leyte Campaign had been to force an entry into the Philippines and establish a solid base for their reconquest. It had accomplished this object, though the base had not been secured and developed as promptly or as effectively as the planners had anticipated. The construction program on the island had been a disappointment. Leyte never became a major air base. But the campaign had other and more important effects that had not been foreseen when it was launched. In their determination to make Leyte the decisive battle of the Philippines, the Japanese had committed the major portions of their fleet and air force in a vain attempt to stay the American advance. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf the Japanese Navy suffered irreparable damage--all of the carriers were lost and most of the capital ships were sunk or damaged. The air force was now almost completely dependent upon the suicidal kamikaze pilot. Finally, the dispatch of reinforcements and supplies to Leyte had seriously crippled the defenses of Luzon--the strategic heart of the Philippine Archipelago.
The Americans had established an air base in the midst of the Japanese-held Philippine Islands--a base within medium bomber range of Luzon, the principal American target in the archipelago.34 As General Yamashita, commanding officer of all Japanese Army troops in the Philippines later said: "After the loss of Leyte . . . I realized that decisive battle was impossible. . . ."35
Three years of hard fighting over jungle trails had finally brought the U.S. forces back to the Philippines. Ahead lay months of weary struggle but ultimate victory was no longer in doubt.
1. GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 81, 15 Dec 44.
2. Sixth Army FO 40, 21 Dec 44.
3. Eighth Army FO 8, 20 Dec 44.
4. Quoted in Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 84.
5. See M. Hamlin Cannon and Robert Ross Smith, Luzon and the Southern Philippines, a forthcoming volume in this series.
6. 35th Army Opns, p. 119.
7. Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 32.
8. 35th Army Opns, pp. 115-16.
9. Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 29.
10. Ibid., p. 30.
11. 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 102d Division on Leyte and Cebu, App., p. 3; Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, pp. 29-31.
12. Msg, Gen Yamashita to Gen Suzuki, 1535, 30 Dec 44. Translation of HS-23A, file of 35th Army Headquarters documents held by former Maj. Takahash Kohet, P8, GHQ FEC, MI Sec, AXIS. Copy in OCMH.
13. 35th Army Opns, pp. 120-24.
14. Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3.
15. Ibid., p. 9.
16. Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. Unless otherwise cited, this subsection is based upon this operations report, pp. 1-18.
17. Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7-17.
18. Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 34.
19. 35th Army Opns, pp. 118, 127.
20. Ibid., pp. 127-28.
21. 10th I&HS, 35th Army Opns on Leyte, Part IV, Opns of Japanese 1st Division on Leyte, pp. 19-20.
22. Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 34.
23. 10th I&HS, 35th Army Opns on Leyte, Part IV, Opns of Japanese 1st Division on Leyte, pp. 21-22.
24. Ibid., p. 21.
25. During his travels, General Suzuki composed two poems which he presented to his "dear brother Tomochika." One of these, entitled "A Farewell Poem," ran as follows:Every soldier must expect to sacrifice his life in War,Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, pp. 34-39.
Only then has his duty been done;
Be thankful that you can die at the front,
Rather than an inglorious death at home.
26. Strength Accounting Br, AGO, STM-30, 1 Feb 45. These figures must be treated with caution as they include, in addition to those who had actually participated, troops who were merely staging on the island and had played no part in the operation. It is important to remember that at all stages of the Leyte Campaign troops and units were constantly coming and going.
27. Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 84.
28. Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3.
29. Ibid., p. 16.
30. Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New York, 1950), p. 181.
31. 35th Army Opns, p. 126.
32. 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Opns of Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Interrog of Gen Tomochika, pp. 9-10.
33. Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, Interrog of Gen Tomochika, p. 7.
34. See Cannon and Smith, Luzon and the Southern Philippines.
35. U.S. Military Commission, U.S. Army Forces Western Pacific, United States of America vs Tomoyuki Yamashita, Testimony of General Yamashita, XXVIII, 3527.