Organization and Command of the PacificThe general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.
At the outbreak of war the United States had in the Pacific four major commands, USAFFE and the Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines, the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian Department in Hawaii. All quickly proved inadequate to deal with a situation that had not been anticipated in prewar plans. They had no time to do more than improvise, sending forces where they were most urgently needed and establishing bases and commands as they were required and as troops and shipping became available.
As American responsibilities in the Pacific were extended and U.S. forces there increased, the need for centralized direction and control of the scattered and often independent garrisons which had developed helter-skelter became more urgent. There was no single agency in the Pacific to supply these forces, no plan to unify their efforts, and no single commander to mold them into an effective force capable of offensive as well as defensive operations. The fashioning of such an organization and the selection of a commander presented many problems, not the least of which was the delicate adjustment of the conflicting claims of the Army and Navy to command in the Pacific. By midsummer of 1942 the task was substantially completed and the Army and Navy organization in the Pacific had taken the form it would retain for almost three years of war.
Responsibility for the defense of Allied interests in the Far East and in the vast Pacific Ocean was divided at the start of war among the powers most directly concerned and there was little or no provision for common action. The British held the predominant interest in Southeast Asia, China on the Asiatic mainland, the Dutch in the Indies, Australia and New Zealand in the Southwest and South Pacific, and the United States in the western Pacific and the ocean reaches from the date line to the shores of the western hemisphere.
The Problem of Responsibility
Before the war was a month old the need for co-ordinated effort against the Japanese had produced agreement, somewhat unwillingly on the part of the Australians and the Dutch, for the establishment of ABDACOM. This agreement was limited to that portion of the
Pacific and Far East that lay between Burma and Australia and in no wise affected the responsibilities of each nation for the defense of its own interests and territory outside the ABDA area.
The fall of Singapore on 15 February, foreshadowing the loss of Sumatra and Java, made virtually certain the split of the ABDA area in two. The military staffs as well as their political chiefs began therefore to seek a substitute for the doomed ABDACOM. With the Japanese in control of the Malay Barrier, interposed between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, it was evident that the operations of those forces assigned to the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia could no longer be co-ordinated under a single commander. That responsibility would now have to be divided.1
There was no disagreement over the division of responsibility. Even before the fall of Singapore it was generally accepted that the United States had the primary interest in the Pacific Ocean, Great Britain in the Indian. China, because of political difficulties, was already recognized as a special problem. Talking with Harry Hopkins on the evening of 15 February, President Roosevelt clearly indicated that the United States should assume responsibility for the reinforcement of Australia and New Zealand, as well as China. The British, he thought, were in a better position to support India and Burma where their political and economic influence was paramount. These thoughts Roosevelt included in a message to Churchill three days later, with expressions of sympathy for the loss of Singapore.2
The same or similar ideas were advanced independently about the same time in other quarters. The day after Singapore's surrender Admiral King suggested that the east (Australian) flank of ABDACOM be combined with the ANZAC Area to form a single theater. While admitting that there were other ways to solve the problem of organization, he made it clear that the United States had the predominant interest in the area and that the operations of the Pacific Fleet required the defense of Australia and the line of communications. The British, he stated, should assume responsibility for China, Burma, and India.
This same idea was advanced also by the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee on the 18th. A few days later the Joint Staff Planners themselves suggested that a separate Australian command, to include part of New Guinea, be established, and that ANZAC be retained to defend the Northeast Area. Finally, on 23 February, the British Chiefs in London, apparently in response to the President's message to Churchill, declared in favor of establishing two areas of strategic responsibility: one a United States area to comprise the Pacific Ocean, including Australia and New Zealand, and the other a British area encompassing the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. The countries within these areas would
provide for their own defense, but the United States and Great Britain would furnish the forces and exercise strategic control "in accordance with the general policy agreed between London and Washington for the conduct of the war as a whole."3
Pending formal agreement between the British and American Governments, the Combined Chiefs in Washington discussed the practical problem of drawing the boundary line between the areas for which each nation would assume strategic responsibility when the time came. The British Chiefs had suggested on the 23d a line extending southeast from Singapore through the Java Sea to Timor, then south to Australia, thus placing most of the Malay Barrier in the British area. The planners in Washington objected to this division on the ground that those islands in the Netherlands Indies that were within range of Australia were vital to its defense and should be under its control. Moreover, they pointed out, submarine and air operations along the Malay Barrier could be more effectively based on Australia than on India, where the British Far Eastern Fleet was stationed. The line they proposed, therefore, placed all of the Indies except Sumatra, as well as the Philippines and Australia, within the American area, and it was this line, slightly modified, which was finally accepted by the Combined Chiefs early in March.4
Acceptance by the Combined Chiefs of the principle of strategic responsibility and of a line separating the Pacific and Indian Oceans did not in itself constitute formal authority for allocation of areas of responsibility or the establishment of new commands. These measures would have to wait agreement on the political level and formal dissolution of ABDACOM, a step that would not be taken so long as the Dutch continued to fight in Java. In the interim, adjustments were made in command to meet the changing situation and prepare for the reorganization that was certain to come. On 22 February General MacArthur was ordered to Australia to command what was euphemistically called "a reconstituted ABDA Area" and three days later Wavell left for India where Brereton had already gone. At the same time General Brett returned to Australia to command U.S. forces there until MacArthur's arrival.
These adjustments had scarcely been made when the news from Java gave increased urgency to the need for an early decision on the establishment of areas of responsibility and the formation of a new command in the Pacific. The problem was discussed at the White House on 7 March, and on the 9th, the day the Dutch in Java laid down their arms, Roosevelt broached the subject to Prime Minister Churchill. Starting with the obvious need to replace ABDACOM, the President suggested a three-way division of the Allied world into American and British areas. In the Pacific, where the United States would have responsibility, command would be exercised by an American officer responsible to the U.S. Joint Chiefs. The British, Roosevelt suggested, should assume similar
responsibility in a "middle area" stretching from Singapore to the Mediterranean. A third area comprising Europe and the Atlantic would be jointly administered by the United States and Great Britain through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This body, under Roosevelt's plan, would also co-ordinate operations in all three areas, allocate Allied resources, and formulate grand strategy.5
Substantially the same proposal was made the same day by General Marshall, acting at the President's behest, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This step introduced the plan officially into military channels and placed it ultimately before the Combined Chiefs. Though it produced no formal agreement, Marshall's statement to the Joint Chiefs is instructive for in it he undertook to clarify the control of the U.S. and British Chiefs over the proposed spheres of responsibility. Where strategic responsibility was assigned to a single nation, he stated, the government of that nation would make arrangements with the other governments in the area for its organization and command, and the Chiefs of Staff of that nation would exercise jurisdiction over operations and "minor strategy" -- presumably the strategy relating to that area alone. In those spheres where joint responsibility was established, strategic responsibility would devolve on the Combined Chiefs.6
While Marshall's memorandum was making its way upward through official channels and while the Joint Chiefs were working out an organization for the Pacific area, negotiations on the political level continued. On 18 March Churchill responded to the President's proposal with a hearty endorsement of the idea for American and British spheres, and of a single American commander for the Pacific responsible to the Joint Chiefs. The Combined Chiefs under his and Roosevelt's direction would see to it, Churchill assumed, that operations in each theater conformed to a common strategy. Both the Australian and New Zealand Governments, to whom Churchill had forwarded the President's proposals, favored the principle of spheres of responsibility also, but had serious objections to the command arrangements Roosevelt had suggested. They were willing, even anxious, to have an American commander but wanted a voice in the formulation of strategy and a seat on the Combined Chiefs of Staff when that body deliberated on Pacific matters.7
Reasonable as this request seemed, it was greeted in Washington with the same objections that had been offered to similar representations when ABDACOM was created. To the Joint Chiefs, the adoption of this arrangement, plus some other suggestions made at the same time, was inadvisable because it would slow up and complicate their work. This discussion, like the formal paper on spheres of responsibility, led nowhere, for already a new organization of the
Pacific theater, which the establishment of areas of responsibility would presumably authorize, had been created.8 Military exigency had outpaced political decision.
In the weeks that had passed since the fall of Singapore, the Army and Navy planners had been hard at work fashioning an organization in the Pacific that would satisfy both services as well as the governments involved. The task was a difficult one and resulted finally in a compromise that worked reasonably well and produced in three years the victories which took Allied forces from Australia and Hawaii to the Philippines and Okinawa.
The Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas
From the start the discussion over organization assumed that two theaters would be established in the Pacific despite the fact that the President evidently had in mind a single commander for the entire area and had so stated in his recent message to the Prime Minister. The appointment of a single commander had so many obvious advantages and was so close to General Marshall's belief in the importance of unified command that the failure of the Joint Chiefs and their planners to consider it is indeed surprising. One can only conclude that this omission was deliberate, but the record provides no clue to the reason. The answer may lie in the fact that everyone recognized that no officer could be found who would be acceptable to all. The outstanding officer in the Pacific was General MacArthur, who, if he had the support of the President, the Army, the American people, and the Australians, did not have the confidence of the Navy. There was a widespread feeling in the Navy that the Pacific was peculiarly its province. Certainly the Navy would never have entrusted the fleet to MacArthur, or to any Army officer. Admiral Nimitz, the chief naval candidate for the post, had not yet acquired the popularity and prestige he later enjoyed and was, moreover, considerably junior to MacArthur in length of service and seniority. There was no escape from this impasse except the creation of two commands.9
As in the discussion over spheres of responsibility, the decision on organization would have to await the outcome in Java. Suggestions made before that time, though helpful, could receive no official sanction. In that category fell Admiral King's proposal to combine that portion of the ABDA area still in Allied hands with ANZAC into a single command. The remainder of the Pacific, including the Philippines, King thought, could then be integrated into a separate command and subdivided into three areas, a north, south, and central Pacific. His proposal and others were studied by the planners but never got beyond that stage.10
Meanwhile the Australian and New Zealand Governments had joined forces to develop plans for their own defense. For four days, from 26 February to, March, their Chiefs of Staff met in Melbourne to discuss this problem as well as the related problem of organization and command in the Southwest Pacific. General Brett was present at these meetings and reported fully to the War Department, urging at the same time that the United States take immediate action to reorganize the area. The Dominion Chiefs of Staff, he told Marshall at the end of the conference, favored the establishment of a new area encompassing their own territory as well as Timor, Amboina, and New Guinea, and the appointment of an American officer to command it. (Brett was the man they had in mind.) This officer, the Australians and New Zealanders thought, should be responsible to the U.S. and British Chiefs, rather than the U.S. Chiefs alone.
Though this arrangement differed in several important respects from those already under consideration in Washington, Marshall seized this fresh opportunity to force a decision on the organization of the Pacific. "I should like to see the question of command settled quickly and specifically . . .," he wrote to Brett, "but the definite proposal to that effect should be made by the local governments." What he suggested was that the Australians and New Zealanders make their recommendations formally to the British who would eventually forward them to the Combined Chiefs. If this was done, he thought "the whole matter could be settled expeditiously." But, he warned Brett, "you must be careful not to give the impression that you are acting under instructions from the War Department."11
The Australian and New Zealand proposal reached Washington on 7 March, whereupon Marshall advised Brett to do nothing more until he received fresh instructions. "The Combined Chiefs of Staff," he explained, "are studying the subjects covered . . . which involve far-reaching readjustments."12 But the Combined Chiefs, having agreed only a few days before, on 3 March, that if the Pacific area was made an American responsibility, control would be vested in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, did not consider the ANZAC proposal at all but passed it on to the Joint Chiefs. There it met serious criticism from Admiral King who had strong objections to placing Australia and New Zealand in a single theater. New Zealand, he insisted, was a link in the line of communications and an integral part of the system of island bases stretching east and north to Hawaii. The defense of this line, King declared, was essentially a naval problem and intimately associated with the operations of the Pacific Fleet. Australia and its approaches through the Netherlands Indies and New Guinea formed a separate strategic entity and should, King asserted, be placed under another command.13 Here was a clear exposition, based on strategic considerations, for a twofold division of the Pacific.
The differences between the Army's and Navy's views emerged clearly in the next two days during which the naval staff members, following up King's lead, developed one plan and their Army colleagues another. The Navy's plan called for an Australian area whose western limits followed the line of demarcation between the Pacific and Indian Oceans accepted by the Combined Chiefs. The eastern boundary, the 160th and 165th meridian east as far as the equator, placed all of the Solomons in the Australian area, but excluded the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and New Zealand. On the north the area was bounded by an irregular line drawn to include New Guinea and the Indies, but not the Philippines. The rest of the Pacific, from New Zealand and New Caledonia eastward, the naval planners organized into a Pacific Ocean area subdivided into three parts and placed under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Operational control of both the Australian and Pacific Ocean areas, the naval planners recommended, should rest with the Joint Chiefs.14
The Army planners led by General Eisenhower accepted the twofold division of the Pacific but not Admiral King's claim that New Zealand belonged with the line of communications rather than Australia. Their arrangement followed closely the one proposed by the Dominions and provided for a Southwest and North Pacific area. The first would comprise all of the Pacific south of the line Philippines-Samoa. The supreme commander for this area, which would include New Caledonia, the Fijis, New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand, was to be selected by the governments in the area, but it was already understood that he would be an American, probably MacArthur. The North Pacific area, everything north and east of the Philippines and Samoa, would be commanded by a naval officer.15
The differences between the Army and Navy plans were reconciled by the Joint Chiefs between 9 and 16 March. In the 9 March meeting, at which the two plans were first discussed, Admiral King firmly defended the Navy solution, emphasizing the need for preserving freedom of action for the fleet. General Marshall, apparently convinced by King or unwilling to risk a deadlock that would require Presidential action, did not insist on the adoption of the Army's plan but only that the Philippine Islands, for "psychological reasons," be included in the Australia, or Southwest Pacific Area, as it came to be called. To this Admiral King agreed and the Navy's plan, with some slight modifications, was approved by the Joint Chiefs.16 Curiously enough, this action, which anticipated American and British approval of the division of the world into spheres of responsibility, had no official basis then or thereafter, for the British Government never took action on the proposal to establish these spheres of responsibility. The reason for this failure is not clear, but there is no doubt that the planners of both nations as well as their military and civilian chiefs favored the proposal and always acted as though it had official sanction.
Having reached agreement on the organization for the Pacific, the Joint
Chiefs proceeded to the task of selecting the commanders and preparing directives for them. Theoretically this task presented few difficulties but it was complicated by commitments already made and instructions previously issued. Though MacArthur's name had not been mentioned in the Joint Chiefs' discussions, he had been virtually promised the post of supreme commander in the Southwest Pacific Area even before such an area had been established. On 10 March, while he was still negotiating with King on the future organization of the Pacific, Marshall had instructed Brett to notify the Australian Prime Minister "within the hour" of MacArthur's arrival in Australia and of his assumption of command of U.S. forces there -- the post Brett himself held. "You will propose," Marshall further instructed Brett, "that the Australian Government nominate General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, and will recommend that the nomination be submitted as soon as possible to London and Washington simultaneously."17
General Brett followed his instructions faithfully. When MacArthur's plane reached Darwin on 17 March, Brett telephoned Prime Minister Curtin and in the President's name put forward MacArthur's nomination for the post for which the Australians had earlier nominated Brett himself. This was the first indication Curtin had of MacArthur's presence and he fell in with Brett's suggestion readily and with enthusiasm. That same day he named MacArthur as his government's choice for supreme commander. In Washington this request was the signal for an unusually prompt War Department press release announcing the news of MacArthur's arrival in Australia and his impending appointment "in accordance with the request of the Australian Government." To the British Prime Minister, Roosevelt explained that he had authorized this public statement to forestall Axis propaganda that MacArthur's departure from the Philippines meant that the United States had abandoned the Filipinos. MacArthur's nomination, the President assured Churchill, would "in no way interfere with procedure of determining strategic areas and spheres of responsibility through established channels."18
Whether by design or not, the effect of Marshall's instructions to Brett, which the President approved, was to present the British with a fait accompli. It also made any discussion by the Joint Chiefs of a commander for the Southwest Pacific entirely academic. The legal forms were preserved, however, and officially the Southwest Pacific Area was still to be established and its commander designated. These actions presumably would be completed only after agreement between the United States and Great Britain on spheres of responsibility. Thus it was that on 18 March, two days after the Joint Chiefs had agreed on an organization for the Pacific and the day after MacArthur reached Australia, Marshall dispatched a long message to MacArthur explaining the situation to him and assuring him that when the negotiations with the British and Australians were completed his appointment would be
made official. Until that time he would be, for all practical purposes, the supreme commander in the Southwest Pacific. As such, Marshall told him, he would be ineligible to command directly any national force and would therefore have to relinquish command of U.S. Army Forces in Australia to Brett from whom he had taken over only the day before. Ultimately, Brett would command the air forces, Admiral Leary the naval forces (ANZAC would cease to exist when the new organization went into effect), and an Australian officer the ground forces.19
MacArthur's position was anomalous. He commanded neither the Southwest Pacific Area nor U.S. Army Forces in Australia, but only USAFFE, which, since Wainwright's assumption of command in the Philippines, consisted only of the handful of officers he had brought with him. Until he received official authority, his control of. the forces in Australia would be difficult and his relationship with the Australian Government would have to be conducted on an unofficial and informal basis. Despite these handicaps, MacArthur quickly took hold. By the end of the month he had secured Brett's appointment as commander of the air forces, which he had found "in a most disorganized condition," placed American and Australian ground combat forces under an "appropriate Australian general," and American service troops in USAFIA under General Barnes. This arrangement, he told Marshall, would "free the combat echelons of all administrative, supply, and political considerations, permitting uninterrupted concentration on combat."20
Meanwhile the planners in Washington, spurred on by the necessity of regularizing MacArthur's position, were drafting the directives and completing their arrangements for the organization of the Pacific theater. Though there was no urgency in the Pacific Ocean Area, the naval planners wished to establish both areas simultaneously. Failure to do this, Admiral Turner thought, might open the way for an Army effort to enlarge the Southwest Pacific at the expense of the South Pacific along the lines laid down in the Army plan or in the ANZAC proposals. The naval planners feared also that the Army might raise objections, if the opportunity arose, to placing its forces under naval control. Thus, on the 19th, Admiral Turner, the chief naval planner, submitted to King draft directives for the Southwest and Pacific Ocean Areas with the recommendation that both be acted on at the same time.21
At this point Admiral King departed from the procedure usually followed in such matters and instead of processing the draft directives through the Joint Chiefs' committees sent them directly to General Marshall with the explanation that he was doing so "in order to save the time that might be lost through possible prolonged discussions of the
GENERAL MACARTHUR AND ADMIRAL NIMITZ
Planning Staff." He and Marshall, King suggested, should settle the problem between themselves.22 Apparently the Army Chief of Staff passed these draft directives to his own planners who found little to object to and at the next meeting of the Joint Chiefs on 30 March they were accepted and forwarded to the White House. Final approval by the President was given on the last day of the month.23
The directives thus approved -- they were dated 30 March -- established the two Pacific areas, set their geographical limits, named the commanders, and assigned their missions. MacArthur, as expected, was appointed Supreme Commander (a title he himself changed to Commander in Chief) of the Southwest Pacific Area; Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.24 The boundaries of the two areas conformed to the earlier agreement: MacArthur's domain included Australia, the Philippines, New Guinea, the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and all of the Netherlands Indies except Sumatra. Admiral Nimitz' command, though it had less land area, was even larger in extent and encompassed the remainder of the Pacific except for a broad band of ocean off the coast of Central and South America.25 It was divided into three subordinate areas, two of them, the Central and North Pacific, under Nimitz' direct control, and the third, the South Pacific, under a naval officer responsible to Nimitz. The dividing line between the first two was at 42' north, thus placing Hawaii, the Gilberts and Marshalls, the Mandated Islands, and Japan itself in the Central Pacific. The South Pacific Area, which extended southward from the equator, between the Southwest Pacific and longitude 110' west, included the all-important line of communications. (Map II)
Unlike the ABDA Area, in which each of the participating powers had equal responsibility and representation, the two areas established by the 30 March directives were the exclusive responsibility of the United States. The authority granted the commanders under this new arrangement was broader than that
exercised by General Wavell, and they were not bound by many of the restrictions that had limited the authority of the ABDA commander. ABDACOM had reported to the Combined Chiefs; MacArthur and Nimitz reported to the Joint Chiefs, which had jurisdiction over operational strategy subject to the grand strategy formulated by the Combined Chiefs. In its relations with the Pacific commanders, the Joint Chiefs would act through the chiefs of each of the services as executive agents, so that MacArthur would receive his orders from Marshall, Nimitz from King.
This organization, it should be noted, did not establish a unified command for the Pacific, but rather two separate area commands. Control over the theater as a whole was vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which became in effect the directing headquarters for operations in the Pacific. But that body lacked a single head -- except the President himself -- and operated under a committee rather than a staff system so that even in Washington command was diffused and decentralized and decisions on strategy and theater-wide problems could be reached only by debate and compromise. Within the theater itself there was no single authority which could choose between strategic plans, resolve the conflicting claims of MacArthur and Nimitz for troops and supplies, assign priorities, shift forces from one area to another, or concentrate the resources of both areas against a single objective. Such an arrangement complicated the problems of war in the Pacific. It led to duplication of effort and keen competition for the limited supply of ships, landing craft, and airplanes; and it placed on the Joint Chiefs the heavy burden of decision in many matters that could well have been resolved by lesser officials.
Of all the faulty decisions of the war [General MacArthur wrote] perhaps the most unexplainable one was the failure to unify the command in the Pacific. The principle involved is perhaps the most fundamental one in the doctrine and tradition of command. In this instance it did not involve an international problem. It was accepted and entirely successful in the other great theaters. The failure to do so in the Pacific cannot be defended in logic, in theory or even in common sense. Other motives must be ascribed. It resulted in divided effort, the waste of diffusion and duplication of force and the consequent extension of the war with added casualties and cost. The generally excellent cooperation between the two commands in the Pacific supported by the good will, good nature and high professional qualifications of the numerous personnel involved was no substitute for the essential unity of direction of centralized authority.26
Though superficially alike, the directives to the Pacific commanders differed in some fundamental respects. As supreme commander in an area that presumably would include large forces of other governments, MacArthur, like Wavell, was specifically enjoined from directly commanding any national force or interfering with its internal administration. Nimitz was not thus restricted for it was anticipated that his forces would be mostly American and his operations more closely related to the fleet. Thus, he was permitted to exercise direct command of the forces in the North and Central Pacific, and, through a subordinate commander, those of the South Pacific. Furthermore, he exercised direct control of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), in which capacity he was directly responsible
through naval channels to Admiral King. Undoubtedly the difference in the authority granted the two men, as well as the wording of the tasks assigned to each, was based partially on the Navy's conviction that MacArthur had a limited conception of the use of naval as well as air power. If he was given command of these forces, Turner told King, "I believe that you will find the Supreme Commander will tend to use . . . [them] in a wrong manner, since he has shown clearly unfamiliarity with proper naval and air functions."27
There were significant differences, too, in the tasks assigned each of the Pacific commanders. MacArthur's mission was mainly defensive and included only the injunction to "prepare to take the offensive." Combined with the statement that he was to "hold the key military regions of Australia as bases for future offensive action against Japan," it was possible to derive from it, as MacArthur quickly did, authorization for offensive operations based on Australia. This does not seem to have been the intention of the Army planners in Washington. At the time, they apparently had no thought of opening such an offensive, though the Navy did hope to launch operations in the Southwest Pacific, but not from Australia.
Admiral Nimitz' directive assigned a defensive mission, too, but it clearly envisaged offensive operations for the future by instructing him to "prepare for the execution of major amphibious offensives against positions held by Japan, the initial offensives to be launched from the South Pacific Area and Southwest Pacific Area."28 This wording implied that Admiral Nimitz would command not only the offensive in his own area, but that in MacArthur's area as well. And this may well have been the intent of the naval planners who drafted the directives, for in their view all amphibious operations -- and any operation in the Pacific would be amphibious -- should be under naval command. But the major offensive when it came, the Navy believed, would be across the Central Pacific along the route marked out in the prewar ORANGE plan.
Presidential approval of the directives to MacArthur and Nimitz did not constitute authority for assumption of command. The other governments involved would have to give their consent, too, and in view of the difference between the present version and the plan the Australians and New Zealanders had proposed, that consent might not be readily granted. The British and the Dutch raised the first objection, but it was a minor one and was easily met by a change in wording of the first paragraph of the directives. Their approval was won by the first week of April.
The objections of the Australians and New Zealanders were not so easily met. They were understandably dissatisfied with the separation of the Dominions and reiterated the arguments for a single strategic entity incorporating their own territory, the Fijis, and New Caledonia. To this Admiral King replied, in a memorandum for the President, that "The defense of Australia is primarily a land-air problem for which the best possible naval support is a fleet free to maneuver without restrictions imposed
by the local situation." New Zealand's defense was primarily a naval problem, and "has no relation," King insisted, "to the defense of Australia." Though they were not convinced, the Australians and New Zealanders finally accepted this separation "because of the necessity of an immediate decision."29
But the Dominion governments had other objections to the new organization. They found no guarantee in the new directive, they said, that their forces would not be moved out of Australian and New Zealand territory, or that the local commanders would be able to communicate freely with their governments, as had been the case in ABDACOM. These arguments King answered -- Marshall was in London -- by pointing out that the actions of the Joint Chiefs were subject to review by the President to whom the governments involved had recourse through diplomatic channels. "The interests of the nations whose forces or whose land possessions may be involved in these military operations are further safeguarded," Admiral King explained, "by the power each nation retains to refuse the use of its forces for any project which it considers inadvisable." This statement apparently settled the fears of the Australians. Approval of the directives followed not long after and on 18 April General MacArthur officially assumed command of the Southwest Pacific Area.30
The size of the area under MacArthur's command after 18 April can perhaps be appreciated by superimposing a map of the United States over one of the Southwest Pacific. Miami would fall on Townsville and Seattle on Sarawak in Borneo; San Francisco would fall in Java and New York on Rabaul. Thus, the headquarters in Melbourne would be equivalent to one in South America directing operations against Boston and New York, and planning for an invasion against northwest Canada.
The logistical difficulties in a theater of this size and in this part of the world were enormous. The line of communications to the United States (San Francisco to Sydney), the main source of supply, was over 4,000 miles long. This fact combined with the scarcity of ships constituted a major problem in the shipment of men and supplies from the United States, as well as within the theater. Ports, bases, airfields, and roads had to be carved out of jungle, and there was rarely enough equipment and men to do the job without extraordinary measures. "Forced risks" and "crisis management" were common parlance among the logisticians in the theater. Climate, terrain, and tropical diseases were an ever-present factor in planning and operations, imposing additional burdens on the supply system.
It would take time to overcome these difficulties but in the meantime General MacArthur could begin to organize his forces, provide for their administration and supply, and plan for future operations. The Australian commanders had been notified on the 17th that orders issued by him were to be considered "as emanating from the Commonwealth
Government," and MacArthur could therefore formally establish the three commands, Allied Land, Air, and Naval Forces, which, with the existing American commands, USAFIA, USAFFE, and Wainwright's USFIP in the Philippines, constituted his entire force. General Sir Thomas Blamey, recently returned from the Middle East, became Commander, Allied Land Forces; General Brett, Allied Air Forces; and Admiral Leary, Allied Naval Forces. All American units, with the exception of certain air elements, were assigned to USAFIA, the administrative and service agency for U.S. Army forces, which on 20 July was redesignated the U.S. Army Services of Supply under the command of Brig. Gen. Richard J. Marshall. But for operational employment, all American ground troops, soon to number two divisions, as well as those of the Australians, who contributed in addition to the militia two more seasoned divisions from the Middle East, came under General Blamey. Similarly, General Brett and his successor, Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney, commanded the American, Australian, and Dutch air elements and Admiral Leary (soon succeeded by Rear Adm. Arthur S. Carpender) the naval units which included four cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and auxiliary craft.31
MacArthur organized his own headquarters, located initially in Melbourne, along traditional U.S. Army lines. (Chart 5) There was nothing in his directive requiring him to appoint officers of the participating governments, as General Wavell had been required to do. General Marshall urged strongly that he do so and the President indicated that he would like to see Australian and Dutch officers in high position on the Supreme Commander's staff.32 But MacArthur did not follow these suggestions and the staff named on 19 April was almost entirely American with a few Australian and Dutch officers serving in subordinate posts. The top positions went to those USAFFE officers who had come from Corregidor; Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff; Brig. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, Deputy Chief of Staff; Col. Charles P. Stivers, G-1; Col. Charles A. Willoughby, G-2; Brig. Gen. Spencer B. Akin, Signal Officer; and Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, Engineer Officer. The others came from the USAFIA staff: Brig. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, G-3; Col. Lester J. Whitlock,
CHART 5--COMMAND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC, JULY 1942
G-4; and Col. Burdette M. Fitch, Adjutant General.33
The most serious problem confronting MacArthur was the defense of Australia. The Australian Chiefs of Staff, recognizing the impossibility of defending so vast an area with their small force, had in February decided to concentrate their strength in the Brisbane-Melbourne area, outposting the rest of the country as well as the Northeast Area.34 This concept MacArthur later characterized as passive and defeatist, strategically unsound and "fatal to every possibility of ever assuming the offensive."35 Speaking at an off-the-record press conference just one year after he had reached Australia, he declared that within three days of his arrival he had decided to scrap the Australian concept and to adopt instead an active defense far to the north in New Guinea. There at Port Moresby he would wage the battle for Australia on ground of his own choosing and on his own terms. This decision, in his view, "was one of the most decisive as well as one of the most radical and difficult decisions of the war."36
The Australians did not let MacArthur's characterization of their strategy or his claim to omnipotence go unchallenged. Their own plans, they claimed, did make provision for the defense of the forward area in New Guinea and they had reinforced Port Moresby to the fullest extent possible. They could find no evidence, either, that MacArthur had issued any directives or altered their troop dispositions in such a way as to indicate any fundamental change in strategy at that time. The change that was made came later, they claimed, and was made possible by the arrival of reinforcements from the Middle East and the United States. All these considerations John Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, called to MacArthur's attention after the press conference of March 1943, but MacArthur again asserted flatly, "It was never my intention to defend Australia on the mainland of Australia. That was the plan when I arrived, but to which I never subscribed and which I immediately changed to a plan to defend Australia in New Guinea."37
Whether the matter was as represented by MacArthur or by Curtin, the fact was that the forces required to put into effect an active defense in New Guinea were simply not available in April 1942. MacArthur's naval force was small and unbalanced and lacked aircraft carriers. The only combat troops he had were the 41st U.S. and two Australian divisions (less two brigades in Ceylon); the 32d Division was not due until May. And although he had 17 Australian air squadrons and American units consisting of 2 heavy and 2 medium bomber groups and 3 fighter groups (not all of them had yet arrived), his air component was below standard in organization and training. But all his efforts to secure more at that time were unavailing, and it was with this force that MacArthur
in April made preparations to hold Port Moresby.38
The organization of the forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas, where Admiral Nimitz assumed command on 8 May, was far more complicated than in the neighboring theater. Already in the area was the old prewar Army command, the Hawaiian Department, whose primary responsibility was the defense of Oahu, and especially the Pearl Harbor base of the Pacific Fleet. The unified command established on 17 December 1941, ten days after the Japanese attack, was limited to the Hawaiian area and did not include the chain of islands which had since been garrisoned by Army forces. In the absence of any other Army command, responsibility for the supply and administration of some of these island garrisons had fallen on General Emmons, the Hawaiian Department commander. But he did not have the broad authority that his naval colleagues had at the time for the control of forces along the line of communications.
As Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), Admiral Nimitz exercised considerably more direct control over his forces than did General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. In addition to his command of the Pacific Fleet, he also commanded directly two of the three areas established in the 30 March directives. (Later he relinquished personal command of the North Pacific.) Like MacArthur, he was prohibited from interfering in the internal administration of the forces in his theater, but as a fleet commander he remained responsible for naval administration as well as operations. He was thus answerable to himself in several capacities and it was not always clear whether he was acting as area commander, fleet commander, or theater commander responsible to the Joint Chiefs in Washington. This fact and the failure to define precisely the relationship between Admiral Nimitz and General Emmons led to the numerous misunderstandings that marked Army and Navy operations in that area during the war.
Of the three subordinate areas of Admiral Nimitz' command the one whose organization presented the greatest problem was the South Pacific where the Allied offensive would come first. Admiral Ghormley, who was in London when he received his appointment as Commander, South Pacific Area (COMSOPAC), on 13 April, did not assume command for two months although he arrived in Auckland, New Zealand, the site of his new headquarters, on 21 May. On the way out, he had stopped in Washington where King told him that his was "a most difficult task" and that the offensive against Japan would probably start from the South Pacific "possibly this fall."39 His next stop was Pearl Harbor, where he stayed for a week to confer with Nimitz and his staff. There he was told again to prepare for an amphibious offensive and met his air commander, Rear Adm. John R. McCain. His command, Nimitz told him, would include all the garrisons already in the area (about 60,000 Army troops plus three fighter and two medium bombardment groups), the remnants of
The South Pacific Area
the ANZAC naval force, a marine division already en route to New Zealand, plus whatever forces might be allocated by the United Nations. Exempted were those forces concerned with the land defense of New Zealand, a task that remained a responsibility of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff.40
Ghormley's organization closely paralleled Admiral Nimitz'. Retaining for himself control of all naval units in the area and of their administration as well, he exercised command through a staff that was essentially naval. Of 103 officers assigned in September 1942 only three wore the Army uniform. Thus his headquarters became the center for naval administration as well as joint operations and planning. He quickly established air, amphibious, and service commands, all under naval officers and predominantly naval staffs, but not a ground command, as General MacArthur had done. Instead, his own headquarters did the planning for and retained control of Army and Marine Corps elements in the theater.
The amphibious command was organized on 18 July and the Navy gave Ghormley one of its ablest -- and most contentious -- officers, Admiral Turner, chief of the War Plans Division, to command it. All air units in the theater were under Admiral McCain, soon to be replaced by Rear Adm. Aubrey W. Fitch. His responsibilities included not only operational control of all aircraft, but training and indoctrination as well. It was this latter responsibility that was to cause so much difficulty.
The first logistical agency for the South Pacific was the Service Force in New Zealand, but on his arrival Ghormley established the Service Squadron, South Pacific. Charged with responsibility for the procurement and delivery of all supplies in the theater, except those exempted from naval control, this headquarters quickly took charge of the transportation and base facilities of the Navy and Marine Corps in the area under a logistical plan issued on 15 July. As the highest supply agency in the South Pacific, Service Squadron co-ordinated all service organizations in the theater, controlled all ships and shipping, distributed all supplies obtained locally, designated ports of call, and established priorities.
The establishment of the South Pacific coincided with the opening of offensive operations and made more urgent the solution of the problems presented by the absence of a comparable Army command. There were Army troops in New Zealand, New Caledonia, Efate and Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, the Fijis, Tongatabu, and Bora Bora. These troops had been rushed out so quickly that there had been no opportunity to perfect arrangements for their support and control. Some commanders, like General Patch, were responsible directly to the War Department; others, to General Emmons in Hawaii. Administration therefore was complicated and command confused. Moreover the supply of these forces was cumbersome and inefficient with responsibility divided among the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, USAFIA, and the Hawaiian Department. Complicating the situation even more was the fact that responsibility for the airfields along the line of communications belonged to General Emmons, so that a base commander might report directly to the War Department, get his
supplies from the San Francisco port, and take his orders for airfield construction, possibly his most important task, from General Emmons.
Allocation of aircraft to the South Pacific Area constituted another major problem. Admiral King and his naval planners had long argued for heavy bombers in the area, contending that B-17's in Hawaii and Australia could not meet the threat of invasion along the line of communications. The army and air planners, backed by Presidential authority, had firmly resisted demands for a South Pacific heavy bombardment force as well as an increase in the air units already authorized, arguing for the same mobility for aircraft that the Navy insisted on for warships. Though the Navy lost the argument it did get a group of heavy bombers -- the 11th Bombardment Group -- for the South Pacific late in June by an arrangement which established an Hawaiian Mobile Air Force of B-17's that could be used anywhere in the Pacific subject to approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The assignment of the Army Air Forces' most precious weapon, the B-17, to the South Pacific brought into sharp focus the question of control of aircraft. The area command, despite its theoretically joint character, was naval and the air commander was a naval officer. Army aircraft thus came under naval control for operations, a fact that could not be avoided, distasteful as it may have been to the airmen. But when it
became apparent that Admiral McCain would also be responsible for the training and indoctrination of Army air units, the air planners expressed strong objections. Their forces, they felt, should retain their identity, be assigned appropriate missions, and execute them under their own commanders in accordance with Army Air Forces doctrine. Under no circumstances, they insisted, should air units be integrated into a naval force and commanded by naval officers.41
While this debate was in progress, the problem of administration and supply was becoming more acute. Admiral King's proposal on 10 April that a Marine officer be appointed as commander of the South Pacific bases and a joint supply organization established to take over responsibility for their logistic support only precipitated another disagreement between the Army and Navy. The idea of a separate commander for all the bases was rejected, but the proposal for an interservice logistical organization was the subject of discussions throughout April and May. The Navy favored a joint organization to supply all forces in the South Pacific on the ground that this arrangement would result in the greatest economy in shipping and avoid duplication of effort. This organization would function in the theater
under the Service Squadron in the South Pacific and in San Francisco under a comparable naval headquarters. The Army, fearing naval control over Army supplies, opposed this proposal and insisted on parallel Army and Navy supply organizations. "We have so dominant an interest . . .," wrote Maj. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, "so clear a responsibility in the supply of our large forces; we must definitely control the means."42 Agreement proved impossible and all that remained of the proposal when the debate ended was a joint purchasing office for local procurement in New Zealand.
Another solution to the problem of administration and supply was that recommended by General Emmons who wanted an Army commander for the South Pacific, stationed in the Fijis and subordinate to him, to co-ordinate the operations, supply, and maintenance of Army forces in that area.43 A month later, when the War Department had still failed to act on his proposal, Emmons asked for a clarification of his responsibilities, pointing out that confusion was resulting from the conflicting requests he was receiving from the base commanders. The clarification was not long in coming for already the War Department had decided to establish a separate Army command in the South Pacific, but along different lines from those suggested by Emmons.44
The solution arrived at in Washington was designed as much to meet the problem of the control of Army aircraft as it was to create a more orderly system of supply and administration. At the same time that the B-17's had been sent to the South Pacific the Army had decided to appoint an air officer as commander of all Army forces placed under Ghormley. This arrangement had been worked out, apparently, between General Eisenhower and Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Chief of Air Staff. After certain modifications, Admiral King finally accepted this arrangement on 2 July and five days later the new command, U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, was created. Harmon himself was the officer Marshall selected for this new and difficult assignment.45
General Marshall's instructions to Harmon were detailed and specific. His first task was to take over the administration and training of all U.S. ground and air troops in the South Pacific, and secondarily to assist Ghormley in the preparation and execution of plans then under consideration for the employment of Army forces. On his arrival in the theater, Marshall instructed, Harmon was to inspect the Army bases in the area and submit to Washington recommendations for "the rearrangement, reduction or augmentation of the personnel and materiel . . . with a view to establishing a balanced, cohesive and efficient Army contingent."46 This done he would take over responsibility for the logistic support of the Army bases in the area, utilizing to the full local resources. Through COMSOPAC he would procure whatever he could from the Joint
Purchasing Board, established by Ghormley in June 1942 and consisting of three American officers -- one from each of the services. Other supplies, except for petroleum products, which were a naval responsibility, he would procure from the San Francisco port.47
Unlike Ghormley, General Harmon had no operational control over his forces. Though he did later acquire such command it was by delegation from COMSOPAC, for limited periods and for specific purposes. His instructions, too, limited his authority. They lacked, he later said, "simplicity and directness," and by particularizing his duties had the effect of restricting his command. He had no power over the employment of Army forces, and could only plead his instructions to assist COMSOPAC in the preparation and execution of plans as authority for a voice in the discussions and decisions involving Army and Air Force units. So vague was this provision, that he commented to a Washington colleague later that "anyone could interpret [it) in any way they desired."48 His own interpretation was as broad as he could make it, with the result that he played a far more active role in operations than was ever intended.
Many of the officers General Harmon chose for his staff were highly trained airmen whose selection reflected the War Department's intention that the new headquarters would uphold the Army Air Forces' interests in this predominantly naval area. His chief of staff was Brig. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, later to become commander of the Thirteenth Air Force; his supply officer, Col. Robert G. Breene; his operations officers Cols. Frank F. Everest, Dean C. Strother, and Thomas D. Roberts; and his Signal officer, Col. Francis T. Ankenbrandt. On 16 July these men left Washington by air. After a brief stopover in San Francisco, where they met General Kenney, on his way to Australia to replace General Brett, they reached Hawaii on the 22d and Suva in the Fijis on the 26th. From there Kenney [Harmon?] reported to Admiral Ghormley and assumed command of U.S. Army forces in the area by radio. His headquarters, he announced, would be in Noumea, capital city of New Caledonia. Until he could issue further instructions on administration and supply, Harmon told the Army commanders, they were to handle such matters as before.
The headquarters in New Caledonia was opened on 29 July. Already Admiral McCain was established there and Ghormley soon moved his own headquarters, located aboard the USS Argonne, to the port of Noumea. Thus, the major Army and Navy headquarters were quickly brought together so that a close working relationship could be established. "There has been no suggestion of any lack of harmony," General Harmon told Arnold. "Neither Ghormley or McCain are inclined to demand or suggest tasks beyond the capabilities of our units and freely consult unit commanders and members of my staff on matters of technique. . . . All commands, forces, and units in this area are working full out, and in full accord to the common end; and this relationship will be preserved."49
The logistical problems that faced General Harmon were, like those of other commanders in the Pacific, perhaps the most difficult. His command covered a tremendous area, over one million square miles, practically all of it ocean. The most distant bases were 3,000 miles apart. Unlike a continental theater of operations with debarkation facilities, road nets, and railways, the South Pacific had almost no communications or developed industrial facilities except in New Zealand. Harbors and docks were scarce. In the entire area there were only four ports, Auckland, Wellington, Suva, and Noumea, with usable terminal installations, and of these only the first was adequate to support a major military effort. Before any of these ports could accommodate large shipments of troops and supplies it would be necessary to enlarge and improve harbors, docks, and warehouses. Roads and the other requirements for a large supply base were nonexistent or entirely inadequate. To add to this difficulty, Harmon had to impose order on an already complicated and confusing situation and deal with a naval supply organization which performed many of the functions his own would. "Our own Army logistic problem," he explained to Marshall, "is sufficiently difficult in itself. The one of coordination with the Navy to avoid duplication, economize on transportation and insure availability of surpluses in one service to meet deficiencies of the other is doubly so."50 He had been in the area only a month when he told a Washington colleague that "logistics is still, and for a long time will be in a muddle."51
It was not until 15 October, about two and one-half months after his arrival, that General Harmon assumed responsibility for supply and administration of Army forces in the South Pacific.52 This responsibility he delegated to a Service Command headed by his G-4, Colonel Breene, soon to be promoted to brigadier general, thus leaving himself free to concentrate on operational matters. All Army commanders were instructed to send their requisitions as well as all reports and requests, to the new headquarters, soon reorganized and redesignated the Services of Supply, where they would be consolidated and forwarded to Washington. In this way central control and standard procedure for all Army units in the area were established for the first time.
Harmon's control of Army air units in the South Pacific was less direct. From the outset he insisted, as did his superiors in Washington, that their administration, supply, and training were his responsibility, though Admiral McCain exercised operational control. Moreover, even in operations he did not concede that McCain's control was complete. It was his responsibility, he asserted, to see that the Army's aircraft were employed in a way that was consistent with doctrines and techniques of the Air Forces. Very early he came to the conclusion that this could only be achieved by a centralized Army air organization for the South Pacific. Failure to create such an organization, he told General Arnold, would soon place the Army "in the position
of being unable to refute an assertion to the effect: "You do not have in the Army any senior officer with operational experience of large Air Forces in this type of warfare."53 The organization Harmon wanted was finally established in January 1943 when the Thirteenth Air Force was activated, but already the major issue had been resolved.
Almost the first problem Harmon raised with Admiral Ghormley when he reached Noumea was that of Army control over the operations of the B-17's and B-26's based on Efate and Espiritu Santo. The solution worked out during several conferences with Ghormley and McCain late in July gave to Harmon responsibility for the training and indoctrination of Army air units, but left to McCain the formulation of doctrine for the employment of aircraft and their assignment to operations. In routine operations such as patrolling, the aircraft were to be controlled by the base commander through his air officer, who might be an Army or Navy officer. But the missions and objectives were to be assigned by McCain. In short, General Harmon received, in large measure, supervision over the administration of Army air units as well as control over their employment in normal and routine situations. But he had little to say in their assignment, the strategy that dictated their employment, and the organization under which they would operate.
By the time these problems had been solved and the organization of the South Pacific worked out, the forces in the area were already engaged in offensive operations. These operations had been made possible by a series of naval battles which had turned the balance in the Pacific and given the initiative for the first time since 7 December to the Allies.
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter  ** Next Chapter 
1. The material in this section is covered in part in Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 163; Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, ch. IX; history of U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA), MS prepared by the author and associates in 1944-45 at Hq USAFISPA, copy in OCMH. Besides using these works as necessary, the author has closely examined the sources on which they were based and has drawn his own conclusions.
2. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 502-03; Mins of the War Council, 16 Feb 42, Secy War Conf II, WDCSA; Rad, President to Churchill, No. 106, 18 Feb 42, ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 1A) POA.
3. Rad, BCOS SM, 23 Feb 42, ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 1-A) POA; Memo, King for CCS, 17 Feb 42, sub: Changes in ABDA, ABC 381 (1-12-42) SWPA; JUSSC, Review of Strategic Situation, 18 Feb 42, CCS 381 (1-30-42); Mins, CCS Mtgs, 17, 22, and 23 Feb 42.
4. CCS 53. Demarkation of New Strategic Areas, 28 Feb 42, CCS 381 (1-24-42 sec. 1); Mins, CPS Mtg, 25 Feb 42; CCS Mtg, 3 Mar 42.
5. White House Conf, 7 Mar 42, summarized in JCS 19, 9 Mar 42; Mins, JCS Mtg, 9 Mar 42; Memo, Eisenhower for JCS, 8 Mar 42, sub: Strategic Responsibility, JCS 19/1, 9 Mar 42; Rad, president to Churchill, No. 115, 9 Mar 42; Rad, President to Churchill, No. 115, 9 Mar 42, CCS 381 (3-5-42).
6. Memo, Marshall for JCS, 9 Mar 42, sub: Strategic Responsibility, JCS 19/1; Mins, JCS Mtg, 9 Mar 42, CCS< Mtgs, 187 and 24 Mar 42; CCS 57/2, Strategic Responsibility, 24 Mar 2; Memo, Secy JCS to JCS, 15 Jul 42, sub: Status of Agreements on Strategic Responsibility, CCS 381 (1-24-42 sec. 3).
7. Rads, Churchill to President, Nos. 46, 54, and 58, 18, 20 and 24 Mar 42, filed with JCS 19/1 and CCS 57/1, ABC 371 (3-5-42) and CCS 381 (1-24-42).
8. Memo, Marshall for Pres, 24 Mar 2, ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. I-B) POA; Mins, JCS Mtg, 25 Mar 42. See also WDCSA 381 Australia.
9. Memo, Turner for King, 198 Mar 42, Office of Naval Records, cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV, p. 18.
10. Memo, King for JCS, 16 Feb 42, sub: Changes in ABDA, ABC 381 (1-12-42) SWPA; Mins, CCS Mtg, 17 Feb 42; WPD Notes on Demarcation of New Strategic Areas CPS 19/D and CCS 53, ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec 1-A) POA; Mins, JCS Mtg, 2 Mar 42.
11. Rads, Brett to Marshall, Nos. 87 and 467, 27 Feb and 3 Mar 42, WPD Ready Ref File Australia; Marshall to Brett, No. 543, 5 Mar 42, WPD Msg File Australia.
12. Rad, Marshall to Brett, No. 589, 8 Mar 42, WPD Msg File Australia; Memo, British COS for JSM, 8 42, Governmental and Strategical Control, CCS 57, 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 1-A) POA.
13. Comments of Adm King on Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV, p. 21; JCS 18, Governmental and Strategical Control, 8 Mar 42.
14. JCS 18, Governmental and Strategical Control, 8 Mar 42.
15. Memo, Marshall for JCS, 9 Mar 42, sub: Creation of SWPA, JCS 18/2.
16. Mins JCS Mtgs, 9 and 16 Mar 42; CCS Mtg. 17 Mar 42.
17. Rad, Marshall to Brett, 613, 10 Mar 42, OPD Exec Files.
18. Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 18; Rads, Brett to Marshall, No. 736, 17 Mar 42, President to Churchill, same date, OPD Exec Files; WD Press Release, 17 Mar 42.
19. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 739, 18 Mar OPD Exec Files.
20. Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 19, 24 Mar 42; Brett to Marshall, No. 792, 21 Mar 42; Marshall to MacArthur, No. 791, 21 Mar 42; MacArthur to Marshall, No. 3, 21 Mar 42; Marshall to MacArthur, No. 81, 22 Mar 42, all in OPD Exec SWPA--MacArthur File.
21. Memos, Turner for King, 19 Mar 42; King for Marshall, same date, sub: Command Areas in pacific, both cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV, p. 25.
22. Memo, King for Marshall, 20 Mar 42, sub: Proposed Directives, cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV, p. 26.
23. Memos, Marshall and King for Pres, 30 Mar 42, no sub; U.S. Secy CCS for Marshall and King, 1 Apr 42, both in ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 3) POA; Mins, JCS Mtg, 30 Mar 42.
24. First designated in the singular, Pacific Ocean Areas.
25. This band included the area east of the 110th meridian, and south of latitude 11&d; north and was designated the Southeast Pacific Area. It was under separate command and never became an active theater.
26. Ltr, MacArthur to Maj Gen Albert C. Smith, Chief, Mil Hist, 5 Mar 1953, OCMH.
27. Memo, Turner for King, 19 Mar 42, cited in Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV, p. 30.
28. JCS Directive to CINCPOA, 30 Mar 42, ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 1 B) POA
29. Memo, King for President, 5 Apr ,CCS 57/2, ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 2) POA; Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. IV, p. 331.
30. General Order 1, GHQ SWPA, 18 Apr 42; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 327, 18 Apr 42, CM-IN-4719. The correspondence between the Dominion governments and Admiral King, who acted for the Joint Chiefs in Marshall's absence, is in ABC 323.31 (1-29-42 sec. 2) POA and CCS 381 (1-24-42 sec. 2).
31. GO 1, GHQ SWPA, 18 Apr 42; Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, Nos. 381 and 415, 20 Apr 42, OPD MacArthur File
32. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1178, 9 Apr 42, CM-OUT-1495.
33. GO 2, GHQ SWPA, 19 Apr 42.
34. Australian Chiefs of Staff, Appreciation, 27 Feb 42, G-3 Jnl, GHQ SWPA.
35. Ltr, MacArthur to Smith, response to question by the author, 5 Mar 53, OCMH.
36. Ibid.; Ltr, Curtin to Blamey, 16 Nov 43, copy in OCMH.
37. Ltrs, MacArthur to Curtin, 6 Nov 43; Curtin to Blamey, 16 Nov 43; Blamey to Curtin, 28 Jan 44; Rowell to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, Chief, Mil Hist, 6 Apr 51, all in OCMH; Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 24-25; McCarthy, Southwest Pacific Area--First year, pp. 25-33.
38. The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, SWPA Series, I, p. 40; McCarthy, Southwest Pacific Area--First Year, p. 82.
39. Morsion, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, p. 251.
40. Unless otherwise noted this section is based on Hist of USAFISPA.
41. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Pacific--Guadalcanal to Saipan: August 1942 t to July 1944, vol. IV, "The Army Air Forces in World War II" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 29-30.
42. Cited in Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, p. 189.
43. Ltr, Emmons to Marshall, 20 May 42, sub: Army Com in South Pacific, OPD 384 PTO case 18.
44. Rad, Emmons to TAG, 27 Jun 42, CM-IN-9002; Marshall to Emmons, 4 Jul 42, CM-OUT-1179.
45. Relevant Papers, all of which the author consulted, are filed in OPD 384 PTO case 18 and are listed in Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, p. 265.
46. Ltr, Marshall to Harmon, 7 Jul 42, sub: Instruction to USAFISPA, with amendment dated 12 Jul 42, OPD 384 PTO case 18.
47. See Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, pp. 190-92.
48. Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 4 Nov 43, copy in OCMH.
49. Ltr, Harmon to Arnold, 5 Aug 42, copy in OCMH.
50. Ltr, Harmon to Marshall, 9 Sep 42, copy in OCMH.
51. Ltr, Harmon to Brig Gen St. Clair Streett, 27 Aug 42, copy in OCMH.
52. GO 6F, Hq USAFISPA, 15 Oct 42.
53. Ltr, Harmon to Arnold, 12 Oct 42, copy in OCMH.