The Defensive: Pearl Harbor to MidwayWith broken heart and head bowed in sadness but not in shame, I report to your Excellency that today I must arrange terms for the surrender of the fortified islands of Manila Bay. . . . With profound regret and with continued pride in my gallant troops, I go to meet the Japanese commander.
General Wainwright to President Roosevelt, 6 May 1942
Why, victor, dost thou exults? The victory will be your ruin.
The First Weeks of War, 7-26 DecemberMars, unscrupulous god of war, rages throughout the world.
When the Japanese opened hostilities in the Pacific they struck with such dramatic suddenness, at so many points, and over so vast an area that the Americans, whose eyes were fixed on the Philippines and Southeast Asia, were taken completely by surprise. Almost simultaneously the Japanese attacked Hawaii, the Philippines, Wake, Guam, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaya and Thailand. All these assaults, even the one against Pearl Harbor, had been foreseen but no one had anticipated that they would all be made at once, on the first day of war.
In the Japanese plan for war, the 5-month period allotted to the seizure of the southern area, supporting operations, and the capture of positions necessary to establish a strong defensive perimeter was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of six separate and widely scattered operations, synchronized to obtain the maximum advantage of surprise, and timed to begin simultaneously on the date set for war. On that day Japanese forces would launch the attack on Pearl Harbor to destroy or neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet; cut the line of communications to the Philippines by occupying Guam, Wake, and the Gilberts; destroy American air power in the Philippines to remove the threat to their own right flank and as a prelude to the invasion of the islands; occupy Thailand to secure a base for operations against Malaya and Burma; land in northern Malaya and on the Isthmus of Kra to begin the drive toward Singapore off the base of the Malaya Peninsula; and take over the British outpost at Hong Kong. (Map 1)
The Japanese Offensive: First Phase
The force assigned to the Pearl Harbor attack--4 heavy and 2 light carriers supported by 2 fast battleships, a heavy cruisers, a destroyer squadron, submarines, tankers, and supply ships--left the assembly area in Tankan Bay in the desolate, snowbound Kurils on 26 November, Tokyo time. Following a northerly route across the Pacific, well off the shipping lanes and beyond the range of patrol planes from Wake and Midway, Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo took his formidable fleet eastward through fog and rough sea and early on the 4th of December, after the weather had moderated sufficiently to permit refueling, reached a point about 900 miles north of Midway. There the fleet turned southeast until it was about 500 miles north of Oahu. Then it shifted course due
south for the final run to the target at a speed of twenty-four knots. It was now 2100 of the 6th, Hawaiian time (1700 of the 7th Tokyo time) . In less than nine hours, just before 0600 of the 7th, the carriers had reached their launching point some 200 miles north of Oahu, having come 3,000 miles across the Pacific, much of it by dead reckoning, without detection. Immediately the heavy cruisers sent up four reconnaissance planes. Except for the richest prize, the three carriers and their escort, the entire Pacific Fleet was in port.1
It was still dark when the Japanese pilots, cheered by shouts of "Banzai" from their comrades, took off from the carriers. The first wave of 183 planes was formed and headed for Oahu by 0615, to be followed an hour later by a second wave of 167 planes. Already a force consisting of Japan's most modern submarines, based on Kwajalein in the Marshalls, had taken up positions covering the entrance to Pearl Harbor, and five midget submarines were making their way toward the open submarine net.
Flying at 9,000 feet, above a dense but broken layer of clouds, into a magnificent sunrise, the first wave of aircraft reached Oahu, "still asleep in the morning mist," at 0750. Part of the formation headed for the Army's Wheeler and Hickam airfields; the rest for the fleet anchorage at Ford Island. Five minutes later, after at least three of the midget submarines had penetrated into the harbor, the Japanese planes dropped their first bombs.
The next two hours of that Sabbath morning on Oahu, where all attention up to then had been focused on the possibility of sabotage, were a nightmare. Bombs and torpedoes dropped everywhere, on ships in the harbor, on Army installations, on depots, and other targets. Dive bombers machine-gunned parked planes and the ground crews rushed pell-mell to their battle stations. Within a half hour almost all the great ships lined up in "Battleship Row" had been hit. Oklahoma capsized, West Virginia sank, Arizona was aflame, and California was going down. Hickam and Wheeler Fields, hit in the first attack, suffered badly. The Army planes, parked in close order, wing tip to wing tip, were perfect targets.
By 1000 the raid was over and the Japanese planes were heading north toward the carriers. Three hours later the carriers were speeding away to the northwest, still undetected, leaving behind them on Oahu death and destruction. Some of the submarines remained in Hawaiian waters until early January, a few venturing as far as the west coast, to report on the movements of the Pacific Fleet and to attack American shipping.
The results achieved by the raid were a complete vindication of Admiral Yamamoto, originator of the plan. The Japanese pilots had studied their charts and intelligence reports well and knew exactly what to go after. Though there were 94 naval vessels in the harbor, they concentrated on the battle force of the Pacific Fleet, sinking or putting out of action in less than two hours 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and
a number of auxiliary vessels. They also destroyed 92 naval planes and damaged 31 more. The Army lost a total of 96 aircraft, including those destroyed in depots and those later cannibalized. American casualties for the day were 2,403 men killed and 1,178 wounded, most of them naval personnel.2
Despite the enormous damage they wrought, the Japanese had failed to take full advantage of their opportunity. For some unaccountable reason they overlooked entirely the installations at Pearl, the repair shops, the dry dock, and the oil tanks then filled to capacity. And even less understandable is their failure to seek out and destroy the American carriers at sea, which, with the cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, constituted an effective striking force. Both these failures cost the Japanese dearly later, but for the moment they had good reason to rejoice. With the loss of only about fifty planes and five midget submarines, they had inflicted on the United States what an official Congressional report described as "the greatest military and naval disaster" in the nation's history.3
While Admiral Nagumo's carrier-based planes were immobilizing the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, other Japanese forces were moving to cut the American line of communications to the Philippines and to knock out General MacArthur's air force. Planes from Saipan hit Guam shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack, and at about the same time planes based on Kwajalein began the bombardment of Wake. These attacks marked the opening of softening-up operations which continued for two days and on the 10th the invasion force moved up. Against Guam, Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inouye, commander of the Fourth Fleet, sent the Army's South Seas Detachment plus supporting naval units, all together about 5,000 men. Landing before dawn on the northwestern and eastern shores of Guam, this force quickly overcame the small Marine garrison and the native police and gained possession of the island in a matter of hours. That same day, the Japanese also occupied Makin and Tarawa in the British-held Gilbert Islands without resistance.
At Wake, where the defenders were more numerous and better prepared, the Japanese sent a smaller force and with quite different results. Led by Maj. James P. S. Devereux, the marines, on the morning of the 10th, beat off the first landing attempt by about 500 special naval landing troops. The weak Japanese force, less two destroyers sunk by Marine aircraft, withdrew to Kwajalein to await reinforcements and was back on the 22d with 500 more men and additional naval and air support, including two carriers diverted from the retiring Pearl Harbor force. Early the next morning the Japanese landed and before the day was over the garrison, after a bitter resistance, was forced to surrender. A naval expedition, sent to
"BANZAI!" Japanese sailors cheer the Pearl Harbor attack force as the airplanes take off from a carrier, 7 December 1941.
relieve the island, had approached to within 425 miles of Wake by the morning of 23 December. But when news of the surrender reached Hawaii, it was ordered to return to Pearl Harbor, to the bitter disappointment of the Marine aviators aboard the Saratoga. With the capture of Wake the Japanese gained control of the line of communication across the Central Pacific.4
As at Pearl Harbor, the keynote to the Japanese attack against the Philippines was surprise. The first aim was to destroy the Far East Air Force, then land advance units to build airstrips for the short-range Army fighters which would cover the landing and subsequent operations of the main invasion force when it came ashore later. The task of conquering the Philippines was assigned to Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma's 14th Army; naval support would be provided by the 3d Fleet assisted by elements of the 2d Fleet, air support, by the 5th Air Group and 11th Air Fleet. The main staging area for the invasion force was Formosa, but units staged from the Ryukyus, Pescadores, and Palau as well. Naval aircraft of the 11th Air Fleet based on Formosa were to deliver the main attack on American air installations in central
PEARL HARBOR, 7 DECEMBER 1941
Luzon and Army aircraft, which had a shorter range, would strike targets to the north.5
The opening air offensive was planned for daylight of the 8th--the 7th east of the date line--about three hours after the raid on Pearl Harbor. Simultaneous action was impossible, for the sun rose earlier in Hawaii. But even this plan for a 3-hour delay went awry, for at dawn of the 8th dense clouds of heavy fog blanketed the Formosa airfields. The Japanese were filled with dismay. As the early morning hours rolled by, their anxiety increased. The Americans, they were sure, would by now have news of the Pearl Harbor raid and would have taken precautions against air attack. Even more frightening was the possibility that this delay would enable the heavy bombers of the Far East Air Force to attack Formosa. Indeed, after an erroneous report and a misunderstood radio message, the alarmed Japanese began passing out gas masks.
News of the Pearl Harbor attack had indeed reached Manila, as the Japanese feared. The Navy radio picked up the message announcing the raid at 0230 of the 8th (0800, 7 December, Hawaiian time), and within two hours all commanders had been alerted and troops ordered to battle positions. At about
0500, Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, commander of the Far East Air Force, was waiting outside MacArthur's office for permission to send his B-17's, half of which had been moved south to Del Monte airfield in Mindanao, against Formosa. The events which followed have been obscured by the conflicting statements of the several participants, but this much is clear: (1) That an attack against Formosa was proposed; (2) that it was deferred in favor of a photo reconnaissance mission; (3) that at about 1100 the strike against Formosa was finally authorized; and (4) that the heavy bombers at Clark Field, which had been ordered aloft at about 0800 were called in to make ready for the raid on Formosa.6
Despite the fog a few Japanese Army aircraft had taken off from Formosa and bombed targets in northern Luzon between 0930 and 1030. Finally at 1015, as the fog began to lift, the 11th Air Fleet sent its planes out for the attack on Clark Field. The assignment was an important one and the pilots of the 192 aircraft assigned to the mission were the best and most experienced men available. They arrived over the target at about 1220 to find the B-17's lined up on the field below and the fighters readying for a take-off. After the delay in getting started and the lapse of time since the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese had not expected to find so rich a harvest. But they did not question their good fortune and went in for the attack.
The raid lasted for more than an hour, the first flights concentrating on the hangars, barracks, and warehouses. The greatest casualties were inflicted by the low-level attacks of the Zeros, which destroyed and damaged 17 or 18 B-17's and 18 P-40's--almost the entire force based at Clark--on the ground. Casualties were fifty-five killed and more than a hundred wounded. Japanese losses could not have been more than six fighters. The two squadrons of B--17's which had been transferred to the Del Monte airfield in Mindanao escaped the attack.
Simultaneously with the raid on Clark Field the Japanese struck the fighter base at Iba, to the west, destroying all but two of the P-40's there as well as the radar station, barracks, warehouses, and equipment. Before dawn the next day they hit Nichols Field near Manila, and on the 10th the naval yard at Cavite, which they practically destroyed. Thus, in two days and with insignificant casualties the Japanese virtually wiped out America's air power in the Far East and removed the threat to the flank of their advances southward.
At the start of war most of the surface strength of the small U.S. Asiatic Fleet was based south of Manila Bay, in the Visayas. By evening of the 8th, the fleet, except for the submarines and auxiliary craft, was steaming south out of Philippine waters. On the 14th, Patrol Wing 10 and three tenders followed, and two days later the remaining B-17's flew from Mindanao to Darwin in northwest Australia.
The Japanese began their landings in the Philippines on the first day of war on Batan Island, 150 miles north of Luzon. On the 10th, they made two more landings, one at Aparri and one at Vigan, in northern Luzon, and two days later more
Japanese came ashore at Legaspi, on the southeast tip of the island. These were not the main landings and were designed only to secure airfields and to cut communications between Luzon and the islands to the south. General MacArthur read the meaning of these moves right and refused to shift his forces to meet them, but waited instead for the main landings to come.
The Japanese landings in the southern Philippines had as their primary purpose the acquisition of bases for the attack on Borneo. Two landings were made: one at Davao in Mindanao on 20 December by a force from Palau; and another, by elements of the same force, on Jolo Island in the Sulu Archipelago four days later. In neither case were the Americans or Filipinos able to offer more than a token resistance. Within a short time the Japanese had moved two naval air flotillas from Formosa to Davao and Jolo, and the 3d Fleet began assembling in Davao harbor for the invasion of Borneo.
The main landings of the 14th Army came on 22 December at Lingayen Gulf 150 miles north of Manila, with a secondary effort at Lamon Bay, southeast of the capital, two days later. Opposition was slight and by Christmas Day General Homma had secured a firm lodgment and was ready to drive on Manila from two directions. Next day General MacArthur declared the capital an open city and transferred his headquarters to Corregidor. Already General Brereton, commander of the Far East Air Force, had left for Australia; Admiral Hart was on his way south to join his fleet; and the American and Filipino troops on Luzon were falling back to the Bataan Peninsula.
The Japanese had achieved remarkable successes thus far in their campaign to take the Philippines. Within a period of three weeks they had established complete aerial and naval supremacy, cut the line between the Philippines and Australia, and now they stood ready to move in force on Manila.
In the China area, the Japanese met with equal success. Their plans called for the occupation of the British base at Hong Kong, and the seizure of the foreign concessions in Shanghai and Tientsin. The latter were taken without difficulty, but the British and Canadian garrison at Hong Kong put up a stiff resistance. On the morning of 8 December Japanese planes from Canton bombed the Kowloon airfield on the mainland just across the strait from Hong Kong. The Japanese 38th Division, also based at Canton, moved out at about the same time and by 14 December had penetrated the British defenses on the mainland to reach the Kowloon Peninsula. On the night of the 18th, the 38th Division, aided by the Second China Expeditionary Fleet, began to cross the strait and by morning of the next day was firmly entrenched on the island of Hong Kong. The next week witnessed bitter fighting, but the odds against the British and Canadians were too great. On Christmas Day the garrison surrendered.7
The success of the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, in the Philippines, and in China was, in a sense, meaningless without similar successes in the principal theater of operations, Southeast Asia. It was there that the strategic resources Japan needed so badly were and it was there that the Japanese concentrated their main strength--three armies, with supporting air and naval forces. Malaya and Singapore were to be taken by Lt. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita's 25th Army; the Netherlands Indies by the 16th Army, and Burma by the 15th. The 3d Air Group, based in south China and northern Indochina, and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet were to support the forces in Malaya.
Advance units of the 25th Army left Hainan Island on 4 December and on the morning of the 8th began landing at Singora and Pattani in southern Thailand, and at Kota Bharu, just across the border, in British Malaya. At the same time Japanese aircraft in Indochina bombed military installations in Singapore. The first two landings were unopposed, and even assisted by local Thai authorities, but the Kota Bharu force came under strong attack from British aircraft and beach defense guns and withdrew with heavy losses. Later in the day, with stronger air protection, the Japanese tried again and this time succeeded in establishing a beachhead. On the evening of the 9th, the main body of the 25th Army began to arrive, and next day Japanese land-based naval aircraft removed the last danger to the beachhead by sinking the Prince of Wales and Repulse, which had ventured forth from Singapore without air cover. The loss of these two warships signaled the end of British naval power in the Far East. With the occupation of Singora, Pattani, and Kota Bharu, General Yamashita was soon able to gain control of the air over Malaya and close support for his ground forces. Deployed in parallel columns along the east and west coasts of the peninsula, the 25th Army began its drive toward Johore Bharu just across the strait from Singapore. By Christmas it was only 150 miles from its objective.
While the campaign for Malaya was moving forward rapidly, the Japanese took steps to gain control over Thailand. On the first day of war, elements of the Imperial Guards Division, stationed in Indochina and attached to the 15th Army, moved across the border into Thailand while other elements of the division were landed at points along the narrow Kra Isthmus. The Thailanders offered no opposition and, after consolidating their position the Japanese began to assemble their forces in Thailand for the invasion of Burma.
Japanese operations in Indonesia, which in this phase included only the seizure of positions in Borneo, met with the same success as had operations elsewhere. From Camranh Bay in French Indochina came the force which made the first landings in British Borneo. Composed of three battalions of infantry and special naval troops, covered by carrier, 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, and 4 destroyers, this force embarked on December and three days later landed near Miri where it promptly occupied an airstrip and seized the partially destroyed oil fields. On the 24th it made
an amphibious hop to Kuching, capital of Sarawak, a native state in northwest Borneo ruled by a British rajah.8
Their success in the opening weeks of the war exceeded the expectations of even the most optimistic Japanese leaders. By Christmas they had achieved all of the objectives outlined in their plan for the first phase of the war and were well on their way to completing the second phase. Except for the temporary setbacks at Wake and Kota Bharu, operations had proceeded with a smoothness rare in war. American and British forces everywhere had been decisively beaten and were on the defensive; the safety of the home islands was assured, and the resources of Southeast Asia were within grasp. Never were Japan's self-esteem and its prestige .in Asia so high; the fortunes of the Allies so low.
The amazing success of the Japanese can be attributed as much to the unpreparedness of the Allies and the suddenness of the attack as to the superiority of Japanese tactics, troops, and equipment. By concentrating overwhelming air and naval power for the attack and striking with a swiftness that gained for them the full advantage of surprise, they were able to win their objectives with a minimum of losses. From each new base they moved forward in the same manner, always achieving local air and naval supremacy before landing their troops. They avoided direct assault against fortified positions, using flanking maneuvers where possible. And when they could not avoid direct assault they struck at night and pushed on, regardless of loss. Their first objectives were always airfields, and air power (land- and carrier-based) dominated their operations during these first weeks of war, as it would dominate Allied operations later in the war.
The first reaction in Washington to Admiral Kimmel's message--"Air raid on Pearl Harbor. This is not drill"--received at 1350 of the 7th, was one of surprise and shock. "My God," exclaimed Secretary Knox incredulously, "this can't be true. This must mean the Philippines." He immediately telephoned the White House where Mr. Roosevelt, who was lunching with Harry Hopkins, remarked that "the Japanese had made the decision for him." Hull had the news before the Japanese Ambassadors arrived for their final meeting and expressed himself, when they appeared, in "pretty strong Tennessee mountain language." Stimson, who received the startling report a short time later, was astonished that the Japanese should have chosen Hawaii as "the point of attack."9
Meeting the Emergency
As soon as confirmation of the first report was received by telephone from Oahu, the Army and Navy put into effect their war plans. Messages went out to all commanders informing them that Japan had opened hostilities and directing them to carry out the tasks
assigned in RAINBOW 5, so far as they pertained to Japan. In Hawaii there was confusion over references to a warning about a Japanese attack, and it was not until 1500 that the confusion was resolved by the receipt of the long-delayed message Marshall had sent shortly before noon.10 The command there made a quick recovery from the attack and before the end of the day had instituted martial law in the islands, taken stock of its losses, and sent off an urgent plea for heavy bombers and fighters.11
With the War Department's message to General MacArthur invoking RAINBOW 5 went assurances of confidence and "every possible assistance and support within our power." No word had been received from the Philippines and when this message failed to evoke any response General Marshall sent still another asking whether the Philippines had yet been attacked. Finally, General Gerow was able to establish telephone communications with Manila and talk to MacArthur. He had known since about 0300 (Manila time) of the Pearl Harbor raid, MacArthur said, but there had been no attacks as yet and, he told Gerow, "our tails are up." General Arnold, too, talked by telephone with his air commander in the Philippines, General Brereton, and warned him specifically against a surprise Japanese attack.12 A short time later came news of the Japanese attack against Clark Field.
That day and the next, more news, all of it bad, continued to trickle into Washington. The Japanese bombings of Guam, Wake, Hong Kong, and Singapore and their landings in Malaya and Thailand were noted but without much surprise. Most of these attacks had been expected and none had the impact of Pearl Harbor and Clark Field. What was most alarming was the lack of information on the size and location of the force which had hit Pearl Harbor. For all anyone knew it might return to Pearl Harbor to bomb the installations overlooked before. Or it might be on its way to the Panama Canal or the unguarded west coast of the United States. Seattle had only one 3-inch gun and one automatic weapons battery; San Francisco, an antiaircraft brigade, and Los Angeles a regiment--and all those cities and many others were clamoring for more protection. Hawaii needed more planes, guns, and men; help would have to be sent to General MacArthur; and Panama was too vital to be ignored. Between San Francisco and Hawaii were three transports carrying men and supplies and farther west was a large convoy headed for Manila. All these problems and many more had to be solved at once, in an atmosphere of frenzied activity and deep concern over where the blow would fall next.
Complicating the task of commanders in Washington and in the Pacific was the inevitable flood of rumors and speculations, some of which were given credence in the highest official circles. Japanese aircraft were reported over Los Angeles, San Francisco, and other west
coast cities on the first day of war and for days thereafter. Pilots mistook floating logs for submarines and every vessel for a Japanese carrier. On the day following Pearl Harbor there was an alert in San Francisco and the schools in Oakland were closed on the basis of a report that enemy carriers were off the coast of California. Another report, which came from the Chief of Staff, alerted the Western Defense commander to the presence of a hostile force believed to be only 400 miles away.
In Hawaii, where "invasion fever" ran high, the rumors were even wilder. There were at least a dozen reports of paratroop landings in different places on the 7th, and Japanese voices were heard constantly on short wave radio. People saw flashing signal lights, flares, swatches cut in sugar cane fields to form arrows pointing at vital installations. Word that the water supply of Honolulu had been poisoned spread rapidly, and Japanese landing parties were observed at various points. The wildest tales were believed. A truck that had been delivering milk for months to Hickam Field became, on the morning of the 7th, a Japanese armored vehicle, complete with troops and machine guns. Japanese cars and trucks were supposed to have deliberately created traffic jams on the roads leading to military installations. Japanese pilots wore civilian clothes, it was thought, so that they could mingle with the civil population if they were shot down. Finally, it was reliably reported that on a specified kilocycle a message--"Chopsticks, I don't want to set the world on fire. Why can't it happen again tonight"--was heard, and all preparations were made for another attack on Pearl Harbor.
The excitable Filipinos saw as many specters as did the Hawaiians and Americans. Many of the Japanese bombers which hit Clark and Nichols Fields were believed to be piloted by Caucasians--presumably Germans. Arrows, like those in the sugar fields of Oahu, but formed by headlights, pointed at military targets; Japanese voices were heard over short wave. There were reports, as in Hawaii, of landings, of Japanese carriers off the coast, of paratroopers, poisoned water supply, and of active fifth columnists. As elsewhere, these reports had to be checked, and the staff kept busy searching for the grain of truth in the wild rumors that came in over the wires.13
Matters of grand strategy required little attention during the first days of the war. There was no disagreement about them, and they had little relevance to the immediate problems facing the Army and Navy. The staff conversations with the British early in the year had provided a global strategy and a basis for concerted action "so that at the very beginning," as General Marshall later explained, "we had a fair understanding of what we had best do rather than the necessity of engaging in prolonged conversations. . . ."14 This understanding, which included a recognition that Germany was the main enemy and that the major effort would be made initially in Europe, was obviously not applicable in the present situation. Of first importance now was the necessity to check the Japanese, to unify and co-ordinate "the
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT signs the Declaration of War, December 1941.
forces of all opposition to Japan in the Far East, with special reference to the South Seas area."15
It was to this task and to the immediate measures required to put the nation on a war footing that the President and his chief military and naval advisers addressed themselves on the outbreak of war. On the afternoon of the 7th, only a few hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, the President met with his War Council to consider what must be done. Those present at the meeting--Hull, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark--agreed that America's position in the Far East had been greatly weakened but that the Japanese attack had mobilized the nation as nothing else could have. They recognized the necessity for continuing shipments of war materials to Britain and the Soviet Union, and discussed at length the specific measures required to redress the naval balance in the Pacific and to defend vital installations in the United States and overseas. The President also told his advisors during the meeting that he would go before Congress next day to ask for a declaration of war.
Relations with the European Axis was one of the most troublesome questions facing the President. Japan alone had attacked the United States, but American strategy was oriented toward Europe and the nation was committed to the support of the powers fighting Germany and Italy as well as Japan. A declaration of war against the European Axis, without provocation, might arouse opposition in Congress and in the country. That there was no intention of abandoning England and the Soviet Union had been made clear in the meeting of the War Council, and again, later in the day, when Mr. Churchill telephoned the President to offer his support and say that he intended to go before the House of Commons to ask for a declaration of war against Japan. He proposed also that he come to Washington with his principal military advisers to discuss the changed situation now that "we are all in the same boat." To this, Roosevelt had promptly agreed.16
The question of relations with the European Axis was discussed on the evening of the 7th in a Cabinet meeting which Roosevelt termed the most serious "since Lincoln met with his Cabinet at the outbreak of the Civil War."17 The
draft message he read to the Cabinet members contained no mention of Germany or Italy. Evidently, in the belief that these nations would support Japan, he preferred to wait and let them declare war first. Later that night the President reviewed the situation with Congressional leaders and the next day went before Congress which, with only one dissenting vote, approved the declaration of war against Japan. Great Britain, the Netherlands Government-in-exile, the British Dominions, and various Central American republics followed suit soon after. It was not until the 11th that Germany and Italy declared war against the United States, thus ending the uncertainty of America's relations with the European Axis.
The significance of the damage inflicted on the Pacific Fleet on the first day of war was apparent almost immediately. The offensive power of the fleet, it seemed, had been shattered and its ability to defend Hawaii and to provide a screen for the west coast and the Panama Canal greatly reduced. In fact, there was a "grave possibility," the Navy planners thought, that "the Japanese might capture the Hawaiian Islands."18 On the 8th, therefore, the Navy changed Admiral Kimmel's instructions, and, in effect modified RAINBOW 5 and ABC-1.
The new mission of the Pacific Fleet was now almost entirely defensive. Deleted were the provisions for the support of British naval forces, operations against the Caroline and Marshall Islands, and the diversion of Japanese forces from the Malay Barrier. Kimmel was to limit himself largely to the defense of the islands and sea communications east of the date line. This decision was approved by the Joint Board the same day and about a week later, after further study by the naval planners, was communicated to the British.19
More than a change in mission was required to remedy the damage at Pearl Harbor. The first step in re-establishing American power in the Central Pacific and sharpening the badly dulled edge of the "strategic triangle" was to strengthen the Pacific Fleet. This was accomplished by ordering back to the Pacific those warships that had been sent to the Atlantic in the spring and summer to protect the convoys to England--the carrier Yorktown, 3 battleships, 9 destroyers, and 12 old submarines. This action, too, constituted a revision of the existing war plan, which provided for the transfer of units of the Pacific Fleet to the Mediterranean in the event of war so that the British could reinforce their Far Eastern fleet.20 Such a step was obviously out of the question.
The Pearl Harbor attack had not only
revealed the weakness of American defenses in the Pacific but had brought into the open, with dramatic suddenness, the inadequacies of command by mutual co-operation and the danger of divided responsibility. These weaknesses had been recognized before the war, General Marshall complaining in February 1941 that "old Army and Navy feuds" in Hawaii were becoming confused with questions of national defense.21 But all efforts to establish unity of command in those areas where the Army and Navy were jointly responsible for defense had foundered on the sharp crags of service jealousies and rivalries.
The disaster at Pearl Harbor aroused the President to the dangers of divided command. Determined that there should be no repetition of the confusion of responsibility that had existed in Hawaii, he ordered his military and naval advisers on the 12th to establish a unified command in Panama under the Army. Though some of the naval members of the Joint Board were opposed to the move, they had no choice but to accept it, for, as the minutes recorded, "unless unified control was effected by joint agreement between the Army and Navy, the establishment of a Department of National Defense . . . might be considered a certainty." In Hawaii, the Navy was given command effective 17 December. "For your confidential information," Marshall explained to the Army commander in Hawaii, this action had been taken because "the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there would be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. . . . Both Stark and I were struggling to the same end. . . ."22
The establishment of unity of command coincided with a complete turnover in the high command in Hawaii. As early as the 12th demands for an inquiry into the causes of the disaster at Pearl Harbor were being made in Congress, but they were staved off until the 14th when Secretary Knox returned from Hawaii after a quick inspection. His description of the situation there in the days preceding the attack did nothing to lessen the demand for an inquiry and the next day the President appointed a 5-man board headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts to make an official investigation. With the public explanation that it was acting to "avoid a situation where officials charged with responsibility for the future security of the vital base would otherwise at this critical hour also be involved in a searching investigation," the Navy on the 17th relieved Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin, the air commander. Rear Adm. Chester W. Nimitz was jumped two grades and appointed in Kimmel's place. Pending his arrival in Hawaii, Vice Adm. William S. Pye took. over command of the Pacific Fleet and of all forces in the area under the principles of unified command. Short's replacement, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, an air
force officer, was in San Francisco when he received Marshall's telephone call to proceed to Hawaii at once and take command of the Department. He arrived on the night of the 16th and the following morning relieved General Short. Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Tinker flew out the same day to take over command of the air forces.23 General Marshall survived this crisis but his naval colleague, Admiral Stark, was ultimately replaced by Admiral Ernest J. King.
The safety of the fleet base in Hawaii continued to be the main preoccupation of the Navy and the chief subject of debate between the Navy and Army planners during the first weeks of the war. The former believed that all available resources should be sent to Oahu immediately. The latter, harassed by calls for protection from civilian agencies and military commanders and fearful of attacks against the west coast and Panama, resisted these demands, but did agree with their naval colleagues on the strategic importance of Hawaii and the need for reinforcements. The question was how much of the slender resources then available should be sent and how much should be allotted to other commands and for civilian defense.
The problem of Hawaii's defenses was thoroughly discussed at the Joint Board meetings on 8 and 9 December. Already the War Department had received General Short's estimates of the equipment, supplies, and troops needed for his command, and had approved most of his requests, including those for 60 heavy bombers and 100 pursuit craft, 10,000,000 rounds of .50-caliber ammunition, and a large number of bombs.24 But the Navy did not regard these reinforcements--which were scheduled to leave the west coast after 12 December--as adequate. It wanted all available antiaircraft artillery and a large force dispatched to Oahu immediately, even, Admiral Stark
declared, "at the risk of taking a chance on leaving some installations in the United States unprotected." So serious was the danger, in Stark's estimation, that he advised Kimmel not to use Pearl Harbor as a base, except for submarines and patrol craft, until it was reinforced.25
The position taken by Stark and his naval planners was not an unreasonable one. Disaster had followed disaster in the Pacific. The naval base at Cavite in the Philippines had been virtually destroyed and Admiral Hart on the 10th had reported that Manila was no longer tenable as a naval base and that he was sending the rest of his fleet, except the submarines and patrol craft, south, a decision which Admiral Stark approved.26 Hard on the heels of this news came word that the Prince of Wales and Repulse had been sunk. Added to the loss of American strength in the Pacific and Far East, these fresh disasters had a profound effect on naval thinking and strategy.
Oddly enough, the naval commander in Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel, did not share the pessimism of his Washington superiors, though he pressed for reinforcements as vigorously as any and yielded to none in his view of the seriousness of the situation. But he also saw the bright side of the picture. For one thing, the workshops and depots at Pearl Harbor were still intact. And more important, the three carriers had escaped the attack and were available for limited missions. Certainly the strategy for the use of the fleet would have to be changed, Kimmel told Secretary Knox when he visited Hawaii on the 11th, but he added, "a very powerful striking force of carriers, cruisers and destroyers survives. These forces must be operated boldly and vigorously on the tactical offensive in order to retrieve our initial disaster."27
The Army planners, though they were unwilling to reinforce Hawaii to the extent desired by their naval colleagues or by Admiral Kimmel, did not minimize the danger to that outpost. In an estimate of 10 December, G--2 pointed out that the Japanese were striking out "in all directions simultaneously" and that their next objectives might include major elements of the fleet, installations and factories on the west coast, Alaska, and Panama. Of these the most serious, G-2 thought, would be the loss of the Panama Canal and of major elements of the fleet. An Army War Plans Division estimate two days later listed five possible lines of Japanese action: continued operations in the Philippines and Malaya; attacks against Hawaii, seizure of a base in the Aleutians; air strikes on the Panama Canal; and raids against shipping and installations on the west coast. To counter these the United States would only be able first, to resist Japanese attacks in the Philippines with the forces already there; second, reinforce Hawaii and defend it against attack, with the knowledge that "the naval situation in the Pacific is such that a successful defense of Hawaii cannot be absolutely assured"; and, finally, defend Alaska, the west coast, and the Panama Canal.28
The Navy's estimates differed from the
Army's mainly in the emphasis placed on Hawaii. Admiral Kimmel had admitted, even while urging boldness, that the most probable enemy action in his theater was a raid by fast striking forces against Oahu, Midway, or the Aleutians. But Admiral Stark took a more serious view. The Japanese, he told Marshall on the 11th, had the ships and men to land on any of the outlying islands in the Hawaiian chain, blockade Oahu, or attack the west coast, Alaska, and Panama. "This picture," he declared, "is not overdrawn. The Hawaiian Islands are in terrible danger of early capture. Every resource of the United States in ships, troops, aircraft, and material should be considered available for use in this emergency. . . . "29 He proposed, therefore, that the equivalent of three divisions, as many planes as possible, a large naval force, and a large amount of supplies--altogether 100,000 men and 500,000 tons of shipping--be dispatched immediately to Hawaii. And until these reinforcements arrived, he declared, the Navy would discontinue the use of Pearl Harbor as a base.
Such grand-scale reinforcement was impossible, even if the shipping could be found, without abandoning the defense of other vital points and endangering the safety of the Atlantic sea lanes. General Marshall reminded Stark of these obligations, while admitting the importance of Hawaii and agreeing to send additional reinforcements to the islands if it could be done without "jeopardizing the security of the Panama Canal and Continental United States."30 Finally, after a week of discussion, the two Chiefs collaborated on a joint estimate for the President that reflected Stark's view of the seriousness of the danger, but made allowance for the needs of other areas and listed the measures already taken.31
By this time the danger to Hawaii, though not ended, was waning. Reports of enemy landings and imminent attacks had all proved false. In General Short's opinion there was, by 15 December, little danger of a hostile landing; raids, he thought, were still possible. His successor, General Emmons, added to Short's requests for reinforcements two square divisions, two antiaircraft regiments, and 10,000 service troops. He was given only one of the divisions, the 27th, and told that reinforcements would reach him over an extended period of time, priority for emergency shipments having already passed to the Southwest Pacific.32 By Christmas it was clear that Hawaii was no longer in immediate danger of invasion, a view endorsed by the British planners who believed that the main Japanese effort was in Southeast Asia, and that, while raids and hit-and-run attacks in the eastern Pacific were still possible, a large amphibious operation in that area was most unlikely.33
The shift in focus of interest from Hawaii to the western Pacific evidenced by the higher priority given Australia and the Philippines on 24 December was the culmination of a dispute that had begun on the first day of war. The issue had been raised by the necessity for deciding the fate of a convoy of seven ships, escorted by the cruiser Pensacola and carrying men and munitions to Manila via the South Pacific route. The Navy had, on the 8th, ordered the Pensacola convoy to put in at Suva in the Fijis to await further orders, and on the 9th, at a meeting of the Joint Board, proposed that the ships be brought back to Hawaii to reinforce that badly battered garrison. The Army members of the board, notably General Gerow, supported this view and suggested further that a portion of the convoy might be returned to the United States. Following discussion the board agreed that the convoy should be ordered back to Hawaii. General Marshall concurred without comment.34
This decision of the Joint Board represented virtually the abandonment of the Philippines. There was ample precedent for such a policy in the prewar studies of the planners, approved by the Joint Board, demonstrating that the Philippines could not be held in the face of a determined Japanese attack. But between July and December 1941 there had been a reversal of that view and the inauguration of a large-scale program of reinforcements designed to make the islands strong enough to resist invasion. The program was still incomplete when war came and it was evident at once that the defense of the islands had become, as Secretary Stimson wrote, "once more the desperate and losing struggle which had been forecast in the planning of earlier years."35
Though the action of the Joint Board in ordering the Pensacola convoy back to Hawaii may have been necessary for military reasons, it overlooked the moral, psychological, and political considerations which affected the attitude of America toward the Philippines and its position in the Far East. Though these considerations were not, perhaps, strictly within the province of the Army and Navy planners, their existence and potential importance had been recognized in some of the early studies. As late as December 1940 the two service Secretaries and the President had approved a Joint Board study that made the point that in the event of war with Germany and Japan, the decision to make the main effort in the Atlantic initially might well be endangered "should Japanese success seem imminent." Public opinion, the board had suggested then, might lead to heavy pressure "to support the forces engaged in the Far East instead of leaving them to their fate" and result in stronger effort in that area than provided for in the plans.36
Though no war plans that took into full account the moral and political factors of the situation in the Far East were ever made, it was these factors that ultimately decided the strategy of the United
SECRETARY STIMSON confers with General Marshall, January 1942.
States during the opening months of the war. The President, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall all felt strongly with the American people that the United States had an obligation to do all in its power to aid the Philippine people and support General MacArthur whatever the risks. Moreover, General Marshall had already assured MacArthur that he could expect "every possible assistance," and he was reluctant to tell him now, after the Joint Board's decision, that the Pensacola convoy had been turned back. He wanted "to send some news," he told Stimson on the morning of the 10th, "which would buck General MacArthur up."37
Secretary Stimson was thoroughly in sympathy with the Chief of Staff's views. A former governor-general of the Philippines and one of the foremost advocates of a strong policy in the Far East, Mr. Stimson needed no urging to do all in his power for the Filipinos and General MacArthur, and immediately went to the White House with the problem. There, where there was a sensitive appreciation for the moral and political consequences of the Joint Board decision, he found ready support and a promise of aid. This assistance took the form of a request by the President that the Joint Board reconsider its decision on the fate of the Pensacola convoy. Thus, when the Board met that afternoon, 10 December, it had little choice but to reverse itself, though the naval members still felt that there was little hope of getting the supplies to MacArthur. The Army members followed the lead of their chief and argued that the vessels should proceed to Brisbane, after which some means would be sought to convoy them northward. Two days later, the senior Army officer in the convoy, Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, was placed under MacArthur's command and told that his principal task was to get the men, planes, and munitions in the holds of the seven ships to the Philippines by any means available and as quickly as possible.38
The news that reinforcements were on the way was received with enthusiasm in Manila. But Admiral Hart's response to MacArthur's request for help in bringing the convoy in dampened this enthusiasm. Like Admirals Stark and Turner, and like many Army planners as well, Hart thought the cause of the Philippines
was a hopeless one. The Japanese, he believed, would have established a complete blockade of the Philippines before the convoy could arrive, and he could not, he told MacArthur, take the responsibility for protecting the convoy if it tried to make the journey between Australia and the Philippines.39
MacArthur took strong exception to Hart's view that the convoys could not be brought in safely, but the admiral found firm support in Washington. The Chief of Naval Operations not only agreed with Hart's estimate but urged him to leave the Philippines as soon as possible "to support the defense of the Netherlands East Indies and Australia." Foreseeing the loss of Singapore and Luzon and unwilling to risk the loss of its warships in a hopeless cause, the Navy wished to concentrate Allied resources on the defense of the Malay Barrier and northwest Australia. The artillery and ammunition earmarked for MacArthur, it proposed, should be retained in Australia and used for the defense of Darwin. The Army planners did not differ with the naval estimate of the probable loss of the Philippines or of the importance of the Malay Barrier, but they did oppose any effort to divert aid from MacArthur. And so did naval officers in Australia, who asserted their belief that the Pensacola convoy could still reach the Philippines, provided that there was "adequate cooperation" between the Army and Navy.40
MacArthur not only refused to accept the view that the Philippines were doomed, but warned that "if the suspicion of such action ever materializes the entire structure will collapse over my head." What he wanted was a review of the accepted strategy in the Pacific and Far East "lest a fatal mistake be made." To him "the locus of victory or defeat" lay in the Philippines. If they and the Indies fell, so would Singapore and the Asiatic continent. The defense of the islands, therefore, justified, in his view, the allocation of the combined resources of the Allies to the Pacific. "If the Western Pacific is to be saved," he told the Chief of Staff in language similar to that used by Admiral Stark in describing the plight of Hawaii, "it will have to be saved here and now."41 Constantly he urged on the Chief of Staff a bold course of action against an overextended enemy. On the 10th, asserting that there existed a "golden opportunity . . . for a master stroke," he suggested a strong carrier-based air attack against the Japanese home islands which, he declared, would "at once relieve pressure from objectives of Japanese drive to southward" for Japan itself was weakly defended. "Definite information available here," he added significantly, "shows that entry of Russia is enemy's greatest fear." A few days later he advanced the idea that aircraft carriers be used to bring in 300 pursuit planes, a proposal the Navy vigorously and successfully opposed.42
Additional weight was given MacArthur's pleas by the arguments of Francis B. Sayre, High Commissioner for the Philippines. Stressing the moral and political aspects of the Philippine campaign and the importance of that campaign to America's position in the Far East, he urged the President to send MacArthur the reinforcements and supplies he had requested. Rumors that the United States was leaving the Filipinos to their fate were circulating in Manila, Sayre told Mr. Roosevelt, and if reinforcements did not arrive soon the Filipinos might abandon all resistance and submit passively to the Japanese.43
MacArthur's and Sayre's requests were received sympathetically in Washington, where they brought immediate results. The President had already ordered the Army and Navy to make every effort to aid the Philippine garrison, but the latter was noticeably lacking in enthusiasm for the program. This reluctance Roosevelt sought to overcome by calling in Acting Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, and telling him that "he was bound to help the Philippines and the Navy has got to help in it."44 To Sayre the President sent reassurances that he was keeping directly in touch with the situation in the Far East. At the same time Marshall sent a separate message to MacArthur explaining that the problem of getting supplies to him had been "complicated by Naval losses," but that reinforcements were being "rushed" to the Philippines. "The strategic importance of the Philippines is fully recognized," the Chief of Staff told MacArthur, "and there has been and will be no repeat no wavering in the determination to support you."45
This pledge was no empty promise. Marshall was doing everything possible to give MacArthur what he needed and had only the day before assigned the newly arrived deputy chief of the War Plans Division, Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the task of co-ordinating and directing this program of reinforcement. Like Stimson and Marshall, Eisenhower believed that it was necessary to make every effort to reinforce the Philippines, even if the hope of success was slim. The program would have to be based on Australia, he believed, and work should begin at once to construct military bases there from which to send supplies and men northward. "We must take great risks," he wrote, "and spend any amount of money required."46
Eisenhower's plan, which Marshall quickly approved, was to use the forces in the Pensacola convoy, due in Brisbane on the 22d, as the nucleus of the new command. Designated U.S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), this command would be essentially an air and supply base. General Barnes, when he arrived in Brisbane, was to be relieved as commander of the forces in the convoy by an air officer from the Philippines. Eventually, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, then in Chungking, would take over command of USAFIA, with Col. Stephen
J. Chamberlin, later to become MacArthur's G-3, as chief of staff.47 The primary task of the Australian command would be the support of the Philippines and for this purpose its commander would take his instructions from General MacArthur. In addition, the USAFIA commander was to arrange for the flight of the planes in the Pensacola convoy northward, loaded with all the ammunition they could carry, and to co-operate with the Navy in securing the sea lanes. Any course that would achieve these results, the Chief of Staff directed, was authorized.48
General MacArthur was kept fully informed of these developments and on the 18th Marshall undertook to summarize for him the measures being taken to send him help. Two transports, he told him, were to be loaded with aircraft and ammunition and dispatched shortly from San Francisco. Two additional shipments were scheduled to reach Brisbane early in January and would give that base 230 aircraft. Via the South Atlantic-Africa route, two Pan American clippers loaded with 50-caliber ammunition were heading for Australia. Fifteen heavy bombers were being diverted from their original destinations and ordered to the Southwest Pacific on a flight schedule which would see the arrival of three planes a day between Christmas and the New Year. Finally, Marshall said, the War Department was making available to the USAFIA commander the sum of $10,000,000 to finance blockade-runners between Australia and the Philippines.49 These measures added up to an impressive program of reinforcement and represented considerable staff work in Washington, but to MacArthur in the Philippines it was only a paper program. Until the aircraft and supplies reached him, he and his men could find little consolation in such summaries.
On 22 December, the same day that the bulk of the Japanese 14th Army landed at Lingayen Gulf, the Pensacola convoy with its valuable cargo of aircraft, artillery, and ammunition arrived in Brisbane. Already General MacArthur had instructed the USAFIA commander to send the convoy (less the aircraft, which were to be unloaded, assembled, and flown north) to the Philippines, and the Joint Board had provided for co-ordination between the Army and Navy forces in the area. This co-ordination it hoped to achieve by directing General Brett and Rear Adm. William A. Glassford, Hart's representative, to meet "for the purpose of agreeing upon common action" to transport the supplies MacArthur needed, and, in co-operation with the Australians, establish a base at Darwin and defend northwest Australia.50 Marshall had done all he could to assure the transshipment of the convoy to the Philippines, and, on the day the convoy reached its destination, once again reminded the Army commanders in Australia to spare neither effort nor expense to accomplish their task. At the same time, the Navy instructed its representatives in Austra-
lia to assist in every way and Admiral Stark asked Hart, who was to leave Manila shortly, to impress on the Australians the importance of keeping open the Torres Strait route for supplies to Darwin and the Philippines.51
Despite these elaborate preparations and the efforts of the small group of officers in Australia, none of the planes, men, or munitions of the Pensacola convoy ever reached the Philippines. When the planes were assembled it was discovered that they lacked vital parts needed in combat. Before the missing parts could be found or shipped from the United States, the fields on which the planes would base had fallen to the enemy. The field artillery brigade, together with other reinforcements and supplies from the convoy, left Brisbane on the 28th on two fast ships. By the time the ships got to Darwin the Japanese had already established themselves in Borneo athwart the line of communication northward and the convoy was halted. "It now appears," General Marshall wrote the Far East commander, "that the plans for reaching you quickly with pursuit plane support are jeopardized. Your day to day situation and that of Borneo will determine what can be done at any moment. . . ."52
Though there was no relaxation in the determination to reinforce the Philippines, it was evident by the last week in December that these efforts had but slight chance of success and that the men and supplies in and en route to Australia might be available for another cause. The President wanted them to be used "in whatever manner might best serve the joint cause in the Far East"; the British wanted them for Singapore, and the Navy pushed for the establishment of a strong base at Darwin. The Army planners, who were reluctantly coming to share the pessimism of their naval colleagues about the fate of the Philippines, limited their plans to the development of a strong air base in Australia from which to project air operations forward for the defense of Singapore and the Malay Barrier.53 It was to this problem that the American planners in Washington and their British allies turned their attention during the weeks that followed.
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter ** Next Chapter
1. The account which follows is based on Japanese Opns on SWPA, pp. 68-71; Japan's Decision to Fight, ATIS Research Rpt No. 131; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 89-95; Craven and Crate, AAF, I, pp. 194-201; Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, pp. 78-79.
2. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 126. These figures are revised estimates and are slightly higher than those given in Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 64-65. Other figures are used in Stetson Conn, Rose C. Dengelman, and Bryon Fairchild. Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, ch. VII, a volume now in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The reader should consult this work for a fuller treatment of the Army's role in the Pearl Harbor attack.
3. Pearl Harbor Report, p. 65. Admiral Stark wrote later, "Had the Japs devoted some of their attack to our shops, oil storage, etc.-it would have been a lot rougher going for a considerable period." Ltr, Stark to Hoover, 5 Aug 59, OCMH.
4. Heinl, The Defense of Wake; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 184-86. A Japanese account of these actions in contained in Japanese Opns in SWPA, p. 71; a fuller account of the Guam action is on Opns of the South Seas Detachment, Japanese Studies in World War II, 36.
5. For a full account of this plan and of the events which followed, see Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, ch. V, passim.
6. A full account of the events preceding the attack on Clark Field can be found in Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, pp. 79-84.
7. Despatch by Maj Gen E.M. Maltby, "Operations in Hong Kong, 8-25 December 1941." Supplement to the London Gazette, January 29, 1948; Japanese Opns in SWPA, p. 75. For full account of the battle for Hong Kong, see the official British volume, Maj. Gen. S. Woodburn Kirby, C.T. Addis, J.F. Meiklejohn, G.T. Wards, and N.L. Desoer, The Loss of Singapore, vol. I, "History of the Second World War: The War Against Japan" (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957).
8. Operations in Malaya, Thailand, and Borneo are described in Kirby, et al, The Loss of Singapore; Japanese Opns in SWPA, pp. 72-75; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 187-92; Despatches of Lt. Gen A.E. Percival and Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brook-Popham in the Supplement to the London Gazette, January 22 and February 26, 1948; Borneo Opns, 1941-42, Japanese Studies in World War II, 22; and 25th Army Opns in Malaya, same series, 85.
9. Quotes are from Pearl Harbor Report, p. 439; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 391; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 431.
10. Affidavit of Capt. William B. Cobb, cited in History of United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific and Predecessor Commands During World War II (hereafter cited as USAFMIDPAC Hist), pt. I, vol. 1, p. 58, copy in OCMH.
11. Rad, Short and Martin to TAG, No. 1068, 7 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East.
12. Rads Marshall to MacArthur, Nos 736 and 737, 7 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East; Record of Tel Conv between Gerow and MacArthur, WPD 4622; Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 272.
13. USAFMIDPAC Hist, pt. I, vol. 2, app. 3E; Craven and Cate, AA I, pp. 278-79; Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, p. 115. For rumors received in Washington see OCS 21105-3 and WPD 4622-13.
14. Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 3, p. 1222.
15. Hull, Memoirs, II, 1113.
16. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 432-33, 439; Hull, Memoirs, II, 1059-1100.
17. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 433.
18. Mins, JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41, Admiral Stark, though he did not minimize the seriousness of the damage at Pearl Harbor, reminded the President on the morning of the 8th that the striking force of the fleet--the carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines--had largely escaped damage and that shore base facilities were intact. Ltr, Stark to Hoover, 5 Aug 59, OCMH.
19. Rad, CNO to CINCPAC, 0139, 9 Dec 41; Ltr, Secy for Collab to Chief Staff Officer, British Staff Mission, 16 Dec 41, sub: ABC-1 Modification, both cited by Lt. Grace P. Hayes, USN, in Hist of JCS in World War II: The War Against Japan, vol. I, ch. II, p. 10; Mins, JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41.
20. Mins, JB Mtg. 8 Dec 41; Rad, CNO to CinC Atlantic, 8 Dec 41, copy in WPD Msg File, No. 116; ABC-1, pars. 55 and 57. Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 15, pp. 1526-27.
21. Ltr, Marshall to Short, 7 Feb 41, WPD4449-1; Ltr, Stark to Hoover, 5 Aug 59, OCMH.
22. Ltr, CofS to CG Hawaiian Dept, 20 Dec 41, Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, pt. 15, p. 1483; Mins, JB Mtgs, 13 and 17 Dec 41; Memo, Stark for Marshall, 17 Dec 41, sub: Unit of Command, WPD 2917-38. Ltr, Emmons to Hoover, 10 Jul 59, OCMH. General Emmons recalled that on the morning of 8 December he and Maj Gen Lesley J. McNair called on Marshall for instructions, and recommended that unity of command be established immediately in the Pacific. General Marshall told them that he intended to take the matter up with the Navy.
23. New York Times, December 18, 1941; Memo, Deputy CofS for TAG, 16 Dec 41, no subj; Tel Conf of CofS and Emmons, 16 Dec 41, both in OPD Exec Files. Ltr, Emmons to Hoover, 10 Jul 59, OCMH.
24. Rad, Short to Marshall, 8 Dec 41, AG 81 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East.
25. Mins, JB Mtg, 9 Dec 41; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 219.
26. Rad, CINCAF to OPNAV, 1330, 10 Dec 41; Mins, JB Mtg, 10 Dec 441.
27. Quoted in Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 220. The original of Kimmel's report has not been found in the Navy's files.
28. Memos, G-2 for GHQ, 10 Dec 41, sub: Brief Estimate of the Situation, WPD 4544-28; Gerow for CofS, 12 Dec 41, sub: Brief Current Strategic Estimate, WPD 4622-37.
29. Memo, CNO for CofS, 11 Dec 41, sub: The Dangerous Strategic Situation, OPD Exec Files.
30. Memo, CofS for CNO, 12 Dec 41, sub: Defense of Oahu, WPD 4544-29.
31. Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 20 Dec 41 (?), sub: Dangerous Strategic Situation, WPD 4449-6.
32. Rad, Short to Marshall, 15 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East; memos, WPD for CofS, 23 Dec 41, sub: Hawaiian Defenses, and WPD for TAG, 25 De 41, sub: Reinf for Hawaii, both in WPD 3444-19; Ltr, Emmons to Hoover, 10 Jul 59, OCMH.
33. ABC-1, 24 Dec 41, ann. 2 ARCADIA Proceedings. For reinforcements to Hawaii during this period, see Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, ch. VI, and ABC 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East, WPD 344-14 and 15, 4622-39, and 3674-74.
34. Min, JB Mtg, 8 and 9 Dec 41. In the convoy was a field artillery brigade, eighteen P-40s, fifty-two A-24s, a large quantity of ammunition and miscellaneous equipment, many vehicles and about 5,000 troops. Rad Marshall to MacArthur, No. 776, 12 Dec 41, WPD 4628.
35. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 395.
36. Memo, CNO for CofS, 15 Dec 41, Incl: Extract from JB 325, ser. 670, 21 Dec 40, WPD 4561-10.
37. Mins, CofS Conf, 10 Dec 41, WDCSA CofS Conf, II.
38. Mins, JB Mtg, 10 Dec 41; Rad, OPNAV to CTF 15, 10 Dec 41, WPD Msg File; Memo, CofS for Comdr D.H. Harries, Australian Naval Attaché, 12 Dec 41, sub: Msg for Transmission; Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 776, 12 Dec 41, both in WPD 4628.
39. Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, 13 and 14 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files; CNO to CINCAF, 1958, 10 Dec 41, WPD 4622-30.
40. Rad, Milid Melbourne to WD, No. 40, 18 Dec 41, WPD 4622-38; CNO to CINCAF, 14 Dec 41, copy in AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East; MacArthur to Marshall, 14 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files.
41. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 13 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files.
42. Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 198, 10 Dec 41, WPD 4544-26; 14 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files; memo, CNO for CofS, 23 Dec 41, sub: Transportation of Short Range Aircraft, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East.
43. Rad, Sayre to President, No. 628, 15 Dec 41, WPD 4622-38.
44. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 396.
45. Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 787, 15 Dec 41; President to Sayre, 15 Dec 41, both in WPD 4622-38.
46. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1948), p. 18.
47. Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Dec 41, sub: Plan for Australian Base, WPD 4628-1.
48. Ltr, Maj Gen Richard C. Moore to Brett, 19 Dec 41, OCS 18136-161; Rad, Marshall to Mil Attaché Melbourne for Brett, No. 31, 17 Dec 41, WPD 4628-1.
49. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 824, 18 Dec 41, WPD 4622-28.
50. Rad, Marshall to Brett, 21 Dec 41, WPD 4622-38; JB 325, ser. 783.
51. Rads, Marshall to Mil Attaché, Melbourne, No. 36, 22 Dec 41, WPD 4630-2; OPNAV to CINCAF, 2302, 22 Dec 41, Office of Naval Records.
52. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 879, 24 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East; Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, p. 154.
53. Notes on White House Mtg, 24 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files; Ltr, Marshall to Lt Gen H.C.B. Wemyss, British Mission, 24 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-7-41 Gen) Far East; Rad, Marshall to mil Att Melbourne, no. 41, 25 Dec 41, WPD 4628-3.