The principal manuscript sources for this study are the records of the War Department General and Special Staffs and records of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, in the National Archives. Record Group 165 includes records of the War Plans Division, to which Albert Wedemeyer was assigned in 1941. THE WPD cared file index. on Reel 18, Group M-1080, General Correspondence of the War Plans Division, January 1921-March 1942, in RG 165, is the essential guide to the documents. Many of the materials pertaining to the Victory Plan exist only in G-4 files. Record Group 225, records of the Army and Navy Joint Boards, contains papers relating to the overall Victory Program, especially the detailed, tabulated production estimates. Few papers in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library at Hyde Park, N.Y., relate to mobilization, in part because of President Roosevelt's habit of conducting business orally. There is little of relevance in his papers, or in those of Harry Hopkins or Henry Morgenthau. The George C. Marshall Papers in the George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Virginia, likewise contain little information pertinent to the Victory Plan, although they do contain copies of certain key directives and letters. General Albert C. Wedemeyer's personal papers, which focus on the latter part of his career, are in the archives of the Hoover Institution at Stanford, California; documents pertaining to the Victory Plan in that collection may also be found in the records of the War Plans Division. While they offer little information that reflects the day-to-day development of the Victory Plan, the Robert P. Patterson Papers and the Henry L. Stimson Papers in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., are helpful in gaining an overall perspective on the mobilization period. The manuscript memoir of Truman Smith, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, enlarges upon the documentary record for the period that Smith worked in the Army G-2 in 1941.

The basic source of biographical data on General Wedemeyer is his memoir, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), supplemented by the standard reference works. Keith E. Eiler has edited a selection of documents from General Wedemeyer's papers,


including portions of his report on attendance at the German war college and of the Victory Plan in Wedemeyer on War and Peace (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987). Decennial editions of the Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United States Military Academy (West Point: Association of Graduates, U.S.M.A., annually), give biographical data for all graduates. Somewhat more detailed information on the earlier phases of officers' careers may be gleaned form the precursor to that series, edited by Brevet Major General George W. Cullum, the Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy At West Point, N.Y. From Its Establishment in 1801 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, annually through 1950). T.M. Dunleavy (ed.), Generals of the Army and the Air Force (Washington: Dunleavy Publishing Company, 1954), and Roger J. Spiller (ed.), Dictionary of American Military Biography (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985) are also useful. A semi-official War Department Biographical Summary (1 June 1946) is on file in the Historical records Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. General Wedemeyer has granted a number of interviews, each of which tends to focus on different aspects of his career. Keith E. Eiler published on interview that summarized Wedemeyer's career as "The Man Who Planned Victory. An Interview With Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer," American Heritage 34:6 (1983), 36-47). Three major, but unpublished, interview transcripts are available in the United States Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: "A Man In History. Interviews With General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)," interviews by Anthony J. Deskis, 25 April 1973; and "Analysis and Comparison of Albert C. Wedemeyer, General USA (Ret.) and Mark W. Clark, General, USA (Ret.)," interviews by Richard L. Tripp, 30 May 1974; and Interview by Don H. Hampton with General Albert C. Wedemeyer, 14 March 1984. The latter interview offers little beyond confirmatory detail that was not covered in the previous two. Transcripts of interviews with General Wedemeyer by Dr. A.M. Beck (14 June 1974) and by the author (24 April 1987, 5 May 1987, and 3 June 1987) are deposited in the Historical Records Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History. A.M. Beck, "The Ambivalent Attaché: Friedrich von Boetticher in America, 1933-1941" (unpublished Ph.D.. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1977) casts sidelights on Wedemeyer's relationship with German officers in the late 1930s.

General Wedemeyer's professional reading included many of


the traditional military classics, of which comparatively recent editions were used in this study. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), is the best version. The works of Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, which popularized Clausewitz's writings for the German officer corps of the late nineteenth century, include Nation in Arms (London: W.H. Allen, 1887), and The Conduct of War: A Short Treatise On Its Most Important Branches and Guiding Rules (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner, 1899). While a student at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, Wedemeyer read J.F.C. Fuller's On Future Warfare (London: Siften Praed, 1928), The Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson, 1923), and Lectures on F.S.R. III: Operations between Mechanized Forces (London: Siften Praed, 1932). Interestingly, he commented that he was unaware of B.H. Liddell Hart during his tenure in Berlin. The best translation of Sun Tzu's The Art of War is that by Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 19363), although Wedemeyer read the earlier edition issued by Military Service Publishing Company. Frederick II von Hohenzollern, King of Prussia, Instructions For His Generals (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1944), was the most important of Frederick the Great's works that Wedemeyer read. Geopolitics, a subject that some WPD planners had read, and with which more were familiar, was introduced to Wedemeyer by Sir Halford John Mackinder, The Scope and Methods of Geography and the Geographical Pivot of History (London: Royal Geographic Society, 1969 reprints of papers given in 1902 and 1904), as well as Mackinder's Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York: Henry Holt, 1919), "Round World and the Winning of the Peace," Foreign Affairs 21 (1943), 595-605, is an exceptional summary of Mackinder's thought. On Wedemeyer's conception of air power, see Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983); William Mitchell's Our Air Force, the Keystone of National Defense (1921), Winged Defense (1925), and Skyways, a Book on Modern Aeronautics (1930); and the works of Alexander P. DeSeversky, whose ideas and observations, published in such magazines as American Mercury, Look, and Atlantic Monthly, were collected in Victory Through Airpower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942). Air power theory as understood in the 1940s is aptly summarized in Edward Warner's essay "Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare," in Edward Meade Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From Machiavelli


to Hitler (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943). For the modern view, see Bernard Brodie, "The Heritage of Douhet," Air University Quarterly Review 6 (1953), 120-26; and David MacIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).

To gain an appreciation of the military school system that gave General Wedemeyer his professional credentials, begin with Timothy K. Nenninger, The Fort Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism and the Officer Corps of the United States Army 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977). For the curriculum at the Command and General Staff School in the 1920s and 1930s, see A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1881-1963 (Fort Leavenworth, 1963); "Annual Report for the School Year 1922-1923, The General Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, 30 June 1923" (Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth), and subsequent annual reports; Deborah Gallagher, "Leavenworth: The Army's Lyceum of Learning," Armed Forces Journal International 123:5 (May 1986), 51-56; and Huba Wass de Czege, "Challenge for the Future: Educating Field Grade Battle Leaders and Staff Officers," Military Review 64:6 (June 1984), 2-13. For a comparative look at the functions of the Army War College, see Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Alumni Association of the United States Army War College, 1984); and George E. Pappas, Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College, 1901-1967 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: The Alumni Association of the U.S. Army War College, 1967).

For an understanding of international tensions of the interwar period, one should begin with E.H. Carr, The twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1939). Public opinion played a role in shaping American policy, particularly as the European crisis developed in the late 1930s. See Harold T. Butler, "Partisan Positions on Isolationism vs. Internationalism, 1918-1933" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1963); Thomas N. Guinsburg, "Senatorial Isolationism in America, 1919-1941" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1969); Warren F. Kuehl, "Midwestern Newspapers and Isolationist Sentiment," Diplomatic


History 3:3 (1979), 283-306; Dexter Perkins, "The Department of State and American Public Opinion," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (New York: Atheneum Press, 1953), Vol. I, pp. 282-308; Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street: (New York: Macmillan, 1964); David H. Culbert, News for Everyman: Radio and Foreign Affairs in Thirties America (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976); Jerome E. Edwards, The Foreign Policy of Col. McCormicks' Tribune, 1929-1941 (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1971); and, for an analysis of public opinion, Alfred O. Hero, Jr., Americans in World Affairs (Boston World peace Foundation, 1959). For statistics: "A Peace Policy for 1935," Christian Century 52 (January 1935), 40; and George Gallup and Claude Robinson, "American Institute of Public Opinion--Surveys, 1935-38," Public Opinion Quarterly 2 (July 1938), 388, and subsequent issues of Public Opinion Quarterly.

For a synthesis of the secondary literature that considers the impact of domestic politics on foreign relations, see Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars (New York: Macmillan, 1965). An early, but still authoritative work, is Allan Nevins, The United States in a Chaotic World, 1918-1933 New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). Likewise see Nevins' The New Deal in World Affairs, 1933-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). Dixon Wechter, The Age of the Great Depression: 1929-1941 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), is a useful survey that considers the economic perspective. Equally useful is John E. Wiltz, From isolation to War, 1931-1941 (New York: Crowell, 1968), a survey with a special focus on the 1930s, but that outlines the background to the war. See also Frederick W. Marks III< Wind Over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988). Among the best recent works are Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987); and Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

Isolationism, a powerful sentiment in the 1930s, influenced both public policy and military planning. For the purest statement of isolationism, see Charles A. Lindbergh, The Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh (New York: Harcourt Brach Jovanovich, 1970). Also see Oswald Garrison Villard, Our Military Chaos. The Truth


About Defense (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939); Archibald Fleming MacLeish and Cushman Reynolds, Strategy of the Americas (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1941); and Hanson W. Baldwin, United We Stand! Defense of the Western Hemisphere (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941). One of the best early studies of isolationism is by Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957). Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), relates the war guilt issue to isolationism. For a balanced study that considers the content of isolationist thought, see Manfred Jonas, Isolationism In America 1935-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966). Charles A. Beard and G.H.E. Smith, sympathetically attuned to the isolationist sentiment, wrote The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Relations (New York: Macmillan, 1934). An excellent survey is Wayne Cole, America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940-1941 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953); see the same author's Roosevelt and the Isolationists (Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). On the socialists, see Norman Thomas, The Choice Before Us (New York, 1934); Thomas and Bertram D. Wolfe, Keep America Out of War (New York, 1939); and Thomas' articles: "The Pacifists' Dilemma," Nation 144 (January 1937), 66-68; "America's Contribution to an Enduring Peace," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 110 (July 1940), 43-49; and "The Threat from the Axis," New Republic 103 (October 1940), 466-67. Also see Justus D. Doenecke, "Non-Intervention of the Left: The Keep America Out of the War Congress, 1938-1941," Journal of Contemporary History 12:2 (1977), 221-36; and Samuel Walker, "Communists and Isolationism: The American Peace Mobilization, 1940-1941," Maryland Historian 4:1 (1973), 1-12. Robert Wohl provides an excellent discussion of the antiwar and pacifist literature of the 1920s and 1930s in The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). Army officers sympathetic to the isolationist point of view are best typified by Johnson Hagood II. See his We Can Defend America (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, Doran, and Co., 1937) and a summation of his view in "Rational Defense," Saturday Evening Post (24 October 1936), 40-43.

Congressional attempts to keep America out of war included the Nye Committee inquiries on the connection between munitions manufacturing and war, the Neutrality Acts, and the Ludlow Resolution


for a National Referendum on a Declaration of War. On the Nye Committee, see John E. Wiltz, In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934-36 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963). A book that helped to prompt the Nye investigation was Helmuth C. Engelbrecht and Frank C. Hanighen, Merchants of Death (New York: Garland, 1934). E.C. Bolt, Jr., Ballots Before Bullets: The War Referendum Approach to Peace in America, 1914-1941 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1977), discusses the Ludlow Amendment; also see Richard D. Burns and W. Adams Dixon, "Foreign Policy and the 'Democratic Myth': The Debate on the Ludlow Amendment," Mid-America 47:4 (1965), 288-306; and Walter R. Griffin, "Louis Ludlow and the War Referendum Crusade, 1935-1941," Indiana Magazine of History 64:4 (1968), 267-88. On the neutrality acts, see Stuart L. Weiss, "American Foreign Policy and Presidential Power: The Neutrality Act of 1935," Journal of Politics 30:3 (1968), 672-95; and John E. Wiltz, "The Nye Committee Revisited," Historian 23:2 (1961), 211-33.

For foreign policy during the early part of the Roosevelt administration, see William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1952). The controversy about whether Roosevelt "led" the nation into war continues. For the opening round of debates, see Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940: A Study in Responsibilities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), Robert A. Divine shows FDR leading the nation, without appearing to do so, toward intervention in Europe in The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), complements the work of Langer and Gleason, Robert A. Divine's The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry Into World War II (New York: Wiley, 1965), is a balanced summary. An extreme view to the effect that the European Allies did not need American help is Bruce M. Russett's revisionist book, No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the United States Entry into World War II (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). For reviews of the literature, see Wayne S. Cole, "American Entry into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 43:4 (1957), 595-617; and Justus D. Doenecke, "Beyond Polemics: An Historiographic Re-Appraisal of American Entry into World War II," History Teacher 12:2 (1979), 217-51. For Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech,


in which he suggested that the democratic nations should act to protect themselves from aggressors, see Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech," Political Science Quarterly 72:3 (1957), 405-33; John McVickar Haight, Jr. "Roosevelt and the Aftermath of the Quarantine Speech," Review of Politics 24:2 (1962), 233-59; and Travis B. Jacobs, "Roosevelt's 'Quarantine Speech,'" HistorianI 24:4 (1962), 483-502.

The question of national policy in the years immediately preceding World War II may be pursued by reviewing the outlook of the major figures involved. On the Army chief of staff, see Larry I. Bland, et. al. (eds.), The Papers of George Catlett Marshall (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986-) and Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 New York: Viking Press, 1966). For the Secretary of War, refer to Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper, 1947), particularly valuable because it reproduces important portions of Stimson's papers; Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: The Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960); and Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954). To trace the president's position, see Elliott Roosevelt (ed.), F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950); Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper, 1960); John M. Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965-1967); The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 volumes, includes a volume for 1941: The Call to Battle Stations (New York: Harper, 1950); and Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972). In FDR's published materials, as in the archival materials, one finds little on the subject of mobilization, although Lend Lease and foreign policy issues appear relatively frequently. The State Department's tangential role in mobilization questions is illustrated in Norman A. Graebner (ed.), An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

American military preparedness in 1941 may be reviewed in Walter Millis' acclaimed Arms and Men. A Study in American Military History (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1956). Russell F. Weigley's surveys are more current. See his History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), and The American Way of War: A History of


United States Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977). When considering American strategy in World War II, it is useful to review Michael Howard (ed.), The Theory and Practice of War (London: Cassell, 1965); Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Faber and Faber, 1954); and the authoritative Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963). The president's focus on Europe, outlined by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason in The Undeclared War (New York: Harper, 1953), was not necessarily shared by the military establishment. On this point, see Roy K. Flint, "The United States Army On the Pacific Frontier, 1899-1939," The American Military and the Far East, proceedings of the Ninth Military History Symposium (Colorado Springs: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1980); Mark A. Stoler, "The Pacific-First Alternative in American World War II Strategy," International History Review 3 (July 1980); Louis Morton, "War Plan ORANGE: Evolution of a Strategy," World Politics 2 (January 1959); Ronald Schaffer, "General Stanley D. Embick: Military Disssenter," Military Affairs: 37 (October 1973); and Fred Greene, "The Military Views of American National Policy, 1904-1940," American Historical Review 2 (January 1961). The intended structure of the Army in the decades of the 1920s and 1930s is outlined in The Progress of the War Department in Compliance with the National Defense Act of 1920 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922). Former Army chief of staff Peyton March compared intentions with reality in his critical book, The Nation at War (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1932). For another view, refer to John McAuley Palmer, American in Arms (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941). I.B. Holley provides an excellent discussion of Palmer and military reforms in General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of Democracy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).

Questions of operational plans and preparations for war are best approached by consulting the official history series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, particularly Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951); Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955); Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953); Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies (Washington: Office


the Chief of Military History, 1959); Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951); and Mark S. Watson Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950). Kent Roberts Greenfield (ed.), Command Decisions (Washington, Chief of Military History, 1984), supplements these volumes. With respect to war plans, also see Henry Gole, "War Planning At the War College in the Mid-1930s," Parameters 15:1, 52-64; Maurice Matloff, "Prewar Military Plans and preparations, 1939-1941," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 79 (July 1953), 741-48; Louis Morton, "National Policy and Military Strategy," Virginia Quarterly Review 36:1 (Winter 1960), 7-10; and Mark A. Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embic, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of National Policy during the Second World War," Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982), 303-21.

Any study of Army mobilization should start with Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-212, June 1955). Volumes in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II that are particularly useful include Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, The Army and Industrial Manpower (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959) and R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959). The Army Ground Forces studies written at the end of World War II are particularly useful in understanding the Army's expansion between 1940 and 1942: Kent Roberts Greenfield and Robert R. Palmer, "Origins of the Army Ground Forces General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940-1942" (Washington: Historical section, AGF Study No. 1, 1946); Robert R. Palmer, "Ground Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945: A Statistical Study" (Washington: Historical Section, AGF Study No. 3, 1945); the same author's "Mobilization of the Ground Army" (Washington: Historical Section, AGF Study No. 4, 1946); Palmer's "Procurement of Enlisted Personnel for the AGF: The Problem of Quality" (Washington: Historical Section, AGF Study No. 5, 1946); Bell I. Wiley, "The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions" (Washington: Historical Section, AGF Study No. 12, 1946); and Wiley's "Problems of Nondivisional Training in the Army Ground Forces" (Washington: Historical Section, AGF Study No. 14, 1946). Some of those studies were later published; see Robert R.


Palmer, et. al. The Procurement and training of Ground Combat Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951).] General George C. Marshall's reflections on mobilization and organization of the war may be found in Report on the Army. July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1943: Biennial Reports of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army to The Secretary of War (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1943); and Biennial Report of The Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to The Secretary of War (n.p.: n.d., but a War Department publication of 1945).

Analyses of World War II Army mobilization include: James S. Nanney and Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Manpower Mobilization for World War II (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1982); David F. Trask (ed.), "Historical Survey of U.S. Mobilization: Eight Topical Studies of the Twentieth Century" (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History typescript, n.d.); Administration of Mobilization WW II (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, n.d.); Hardy L. Merritt and Luther F. Carter (eds.), Mobilization and the National Defense (Washington: National Defense University, 1985); Harry B. Yoshpe, Production: The Industrial Sector in Peace and War (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1966); Yoshpe's "Economic Mobilization Planning between the Two World Wars," Military Affairs 15 (Winter 1951), 199-204, and 16 (Summer 1952), 71-96. An excellent summary of industrial mobilization planning is Harold W. Thatcher, "Planning for Industrial Mobilization 1920-1940" (Washington: Historical Section, Office of the Quartermaster General, QMC, Historical Study No. 4, 1943). Harold Stein (ed.), American Civil-Military Decisions. A Book of Case Studies (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963), contains an article on the M-Day concept. Manpower mobilization, a particularly contentious issue, is specifically addressed in Byron V. Pepitone, "America in World War II: How Limitless Was the Manpower Pool?" Defense Management Journal 12:3 (July 1976), 57-64; J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., The First Peacetime Draft (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1986) and George Q. Flynn, The Mess in Washington: Manpower Mobilization in World War II (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979). John J. Corson provides the comments of a participant in the manpower mobilization process in Manpower for Victory: Total Mobilization for Total War (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1943). On the eventual leak of the Victory Plan to the press and assessments of its importance in war


planning, see Tracy B. Kittredge, "A Military Danger: The revelation of Secret Strategic Plans," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 81 (July 1955); and Thomas Fleming, "The Big Leak," American Heritage (December 1987), 64-71. For a survey of studies relating to American mobilization, see Charles A. Endress, Mobilization (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Historical Bibliography No. 7, 1987).

Discussion of the division slice concept is based upon S.T. Possony, Tomorrow's War: Its Planning, Management, and Cost (London, 1938); "The Division Slice and Division Force" (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History draft manuscript, Project No. 38, February 1964); Carl T. Schmit, "The Division Slice in Two World Wars," Military Review 31:7 (October 1951), 51-62; "A Modern Concept of Manpower Management and Compensation for personnel of the Uniformed Services" (Report and Recommendations for the Secretary of Defense, Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, May 1957); Staff Paper, RAC (ORO-SP-180), "A Preliminary Study of Approaches to the Problem of Combat/Support Ratios Within the Army Force Structure" (May 1962); Field Manual 101-10 (August 1949); Army Service Force Manual 409 (24 March 1945); draft Field Manual 101-10, "Logistical Data for Staff Planners" (September 1946 and September 1947); and Institute of Advanced Studies, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, "Strategic Land Force Requirements System. Final Report" (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: 28 May 1964). The unpublished studies cited above are deposited in the Historical Reference Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History. Basic sources for discussion of the replacement problem were "Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army" (12 December 1947); Edward J. Drea, "Unit Reconstitution--A Historical Perspective" (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1 December 1983); and the Army Ground forces studies already cited.

Data on activation of divisions for World War II were drawn from "Historical Resume, Division Force Structure, Active and Reserve 1935-1963" (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History unpublished typescript, 1963); and John B. Wilson, Armies, Corps, Divisions and Separate Brigades, Army Lineage Series (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987). Further discussion of types and numbers of divisions activated for the war is based on War Department, Biennial Report of The Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to The Secretary of War


(Washington, 1945); and Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., "A Perspective on the Light Division: The U.S. Army's Experience, 1942-1945" (Washington; U.S. Army Center of Military History unpublished manuscript, 1984), as well as the volumes in the Army's official history, already cited. For powerful examples of the role of tactical air power in land combat and the need for antiaircraft artillery units, see Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950). The official history series of the Air Force outlines prewar tactical doctrine for cooperation with ground forces, as well as the successes of tactical aviation during the war. See Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (eds.). THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II. Plans and Early Operations. January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), and ARGUMENT to V-E Day. January 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). Army analyses of the matter include "The Tank vs. Tactical Air Power" (Fort Knox research report, 1952), and Kent Roberts Greenfield, "Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team Including Organic Light Aviation" (Washington: Historical Section, AGF Study 35, 1948).

The Army studied the tank destroyer issue at the end of World War II; the General Board of the European Theater of Operations recommendations are in "Report of the Theater General Board USFET" (1945), Study No. 48. The Armor School also considered the question; see "Anti Tank Defense--Weapons and Doctrine" (Fort Knox, 1952). excellent current discussions of this doctrinal question have been authored by Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyers in World War II (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Paper No. 12, 1985); and Charles M. Baily, Faint Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyers During World War II (New York: Archon, 1983).


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