The disagreement during August over the time and place of the landings in North Africa was at the center of a vast confusion and uncertainty. The President, by serenely ignoring the terms of the agreement (CCS 94) reached in July, ended in the quickest possible way the attempt of General Marshall, with the acquiescence of his American colleagues and the British Chiefs, to delay the "decision" on TORCH. But General Marshall and his staff did not intend that CCS 94 should lapse, and the President's action did not stop thorn from applying their interpretation of CCS 94 to questions at issue with the British and the Navy.
The Interpretation of CCS 94
As late as 22 August it was evident, in the recommendations that General Handy sent back from London, that the War Department staff had not entirely given up the idea that the forth African operation might not be launched after all. This disposition had the sanction of General Marshall's own example. On 19 August, in connection with the question when to separate responsibility for TORCH from responsibility for SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, he declared to the staff that as he understood CCS 94, the responsibilities would not be separated "until the positive ardor for the TORCHoperation was given," that is, until the moment came "when the troops were actually committed to movements to base ports, etc." That moment, he went on, had not yet arrived. General Eisenhower and the British Chiefs apparently believed that "a final decision" on TORCHhad been made. General Marshall disagreed:
The "Final" Decision on TORCH
The decision to mount the observation has been made, but it still subject to the vicissitudes of war. Whether or not we should discuss this phase of the matter with General Eisenhower I do not know.1
General Marshall's position was an expression of his determination to treat the decision to invade North Africa as a momentous change in grand strategy. He and his advisers feared that to launch TORCH would lead to adopting the British aim of acquiring and exploiting control of the Mediterranean basin. Some bitterness entered into their dissatisfaction, for it appeared that in urging the concentration of American forces in the British Isles they had
merely facilitated the execution of the strategy they had hoped to supersede.2
Sir John Dill, whose chief duty was to understand General Marshall and keep on good terms with him, was sufficiently perturbed to write a note of gentle protest to him about the attitude displayed by members of his planning staff. Dill began:
I am just a little disturbed about TORCH. For good or for ill it has been accepted and therefore I feel that we should go at it with all possible enthusiasm and give it absolute priority. If we don't, it won't succeed.
From what our Planners tell me, there are some of your people who feel that TORCH is not a good operation. That, of course, must be a matter of opinion but those who are playing a part in mounting the operation must be entirely whole-hearted about it, or they cannot give it all the help it should have and overcome all the difficulties that will arise.
Sir John closed by declaring: "All I aim at is to ensure that we all think alike--and enthusiastically."3
General Marshall replied that he agreed that the officer charged with executing the TORCH operation must lend their "complete support" and their "most energetic cooperation." But he went on to say that there must be "absolute candor" among the planners, whose business it was to plan and prepare for several operations at the same time and to try to foresee and provide against all contingencies. Marshall was not impressed with Dill's final plea that they should "all think alike--and enthusiastically." The answer ended with the statement: "You may feel sure that U.S. Planners will enthusiastically and effectively support decisions made by the Commander-in-Chief."4
How closely the attitude of the War Department was connected with War Department views on grand strategy was shown in the main part of Sir John Dill's letter to Marshall. He drew attention to the fact that the American planners in Washington in their discussion of grand strategy were appealing to CCS 94, while the British planners appealed to the statement that the British Chiefs of Staff had proposed, and the American Chiefs had accepted, in December 1941 at the beginning of the ARCADIA Conference. This statement (in ABC-4/CS-1) prescribed for 1942, and perhaps 1943, a strategy of "tightening and closing the ring round Germany," by blockade, bombardment, and peripheral operations, specifically in the Mediterranean. Sir John's remarks were as follows:
CCS 94 and the Arcadia Statement of Grand Strategy
Another point which I think will require clearing up, and that is to what extent, if at all, does C.C.S. 94 alter ABC-4/CS.1. I have just re-read ABC-4/CS.1. It certainly covers TORCH and I should have said that it still holds the field as a guide to our major strategical policy. At any rate everyone
should be quite clear on this matter. At present our Chiefs of Staff quote ABC-4 /CS.1 as the Bible whereas some of your people, I think, look upon C.C.S. 94 your the revised version!5
It was expecting a great deal to ask General Marshall to disavow CCS 94. He had silently concurred in the version of strategy presented by the British Chiefs during the ARCADIA Conference, and he could not but concede that it covered the TORCH operation. But he had long since made quite plain his belief that the course of action propounded in the ARCADIA paper, beginning with "closing and tightening the ring" around Germany, would not bring about the defeat of Germany, and would not, therefore, justify leasing the Japanese to hold the strategic initiative in the Pacific. CCS 94 came close to meeting his views, in providing that a decision to undertake the TORCH operation would amount to accepting a "defensive" strategy of encirclement (so far as ground operations were concerned) and would justify a diversion of large air forces to the Pacific. The mere fact that the British Chiefs had agreed to CCS 94, if only for the sake of avoiding dispute, gave him an advantage in negotiations, and he was not likely to relinquish it and to restore to the British the advantage they had gained by his acquiescence in the ARCADIA paper.
In answering Sir John, General Marshall acknowledged that the ARCADIA paper included "many of the premises involved in the TORCH operation in its general concept." He took his stand on the "inconsistencies" between ABC-4/CS-1 and CCS 94. His first reference was to strategic bombing:
To illustrate, ABC-4/CS-1, which provides for "the wearing down of Germany's resistance by ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American forces", is of necessity modified by the provisions in CCS 94, one of which by the withdrawal of 17 groups of aircraft projected for the United Kingdom for the furtherance of offensive operations in the Pacific: the other makes available for transfer from the United Kingdom to the African Theater such heavy and medium bomber units as may be required.
To this contention the British could properly have replied that the principle of bombarding the Continent at the expense of other strategic aims was not a principle they had advanced at ARCADIA but a principle the War Department itself had advanced subsequently, and that CCS 94 modified the subsequent proposal (BOLERO) and not the ARCADIA agreement.
General Marshall also read into the ARCADIA agreement the peculiarly American idea that operations in the Mediterranean were not operations against Germany, and that offensive operations in the Mediterranean were not, for purposes of grand strategy, offensive at all:
Paragraph 3 of ABC-4/CS-1, under the subject "Grand Strategy", states that it should be a cardinal principle of our strategy that only the minimum of forces necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theaters should ho diverted from operations against Germany. Paragraph c (4) of CCS 94 indicates we have accepted the fact that a commitment to the TORCH operation renders ROUNDUP (operations directly against Germany) in all probability impracticable of successful execution in 1943 and that we have definitely accepted a defensive, encircling line of action for Continental Europe except as to air operations and blockade. The requirements for the effective implementation of TORCH as now envisaged, and agreed upon would, in my opinion, definitely preclude the offensive operations against Germany that were contemplated in ABC-4/CS-1.
After pointing to these two "inconsistencies," General Marshall shifted his ground to make the more telling point that it was after all in the common interest to take into account events that had happened and undertakings that had been made since the ARCADIA Conference:
ABC-4/CS-1 contemplates also such action in the Pacific as will deny to Japan access to raw materials. If we were to implement that provision rigidly, you can readily appreciate the full implications with reference to other projected operations. Therefore, while constituting a guide for our overall strategy, ABC-4/CS-1, it seems to me, must be considered in the light of subsequent agreements, particularly if those agreements serve to modify our concept of strategy as required by developments in the situation.6
Marshall thus confirmed Sir John's observation that the British planners and the War Department planners approached the problem of future plans with quite different views. Their disagreement was merely a sign of the real difficulty TORCH, even the cautious American version, fitted easily into British strategy; American strategy had to be fitted to TORCH, and the American planners were loath to make the adjustment.7
One indication of the reluctance of the Army planners to reconcile themselves to the President's decision was their view of the still undecided battle for control of Egypt and Libya. On 30 July, at the very moment of deciding to go ahead with TORCH, the President granted an interview to Colonel Fellers. Fellers' outspoken criticism of the British command in Egypt and his recommendation for full American intervention had led to his being recalled from Cairo to Washington.8 In presenting his case to the President, Fellers again recommended an intense effort to reinforce the British, urging that during the next few weeks American bombers be sent to Egypt at the rate of ten a day. His views had not changed since his return. The substance of them, according to the President's brief summary, was as follows:
The Middle East
Colonel Fellers was very pessimistic as to the ability of the British to hold the Nile Delta and the Suez Canal. He had estimated that General Rommel would penetrate the British positions by the last of August.9
Whatever may have been the President's reasons for seeing Colonel Fellers in person, there was no question but that the President was unready to accept the restrictive effects of TORCH on other projects, the effects in the near future as well as the long-range effects to which General Marshall had unsuccessfully tried to draw his attention.
Characteristically, the President combined the announcement of his decision on TORCH with the question whether the United States might not be able to send more planes to the Middle East (and perhaps a convoy to the Soviet arctic ports as well).10 In reply Marshall submitted a report telling what was being done, with only the remark that additional reinforcements for the Middle East would be at the expense of TORCH or BOLERO.11
Marshall's policy had been to co-operate with the British Chiefs of Staff in the Middle East in the hope of "preserving the BOLERO plan."12 His staff, vexed by the disappointment of this hope, went so far as to urge on General Marshall the view that
The Middle Fast should be held if possible, but its loss might prow to be a blessing in disguise. The British, once free of the tremendous drain upon their resources represented by Middle Easy requirements, might then be in a position to launch an effective offensive based on the British Isles, and directed against the enemy's citadel on the Continent.13
This last protest was a measure of how far the War Department planners were from meeting the British planners on the basis of thinking "alike" and "enthusiastically" about the problems of combined strategy in the Mediterranean. Even after reconciling themselves to the decision to mount TORCH, they were sure to disagree with the British over the exploitation of TORCH and the complementary offensive (LIGHTFOOT) that the British were planning to launch westward from El Alamein.14
The reluctance of the War Department planners to adjust their aims to the prospect of a North African operation appeared likewise in their unwillingness to increase Army commitments in the Pacific. The only notable concessions that the Army had made since the Battle of Midway on the allocation of forces to the Pacific were the provision of two infantry regiments (from the 40th Division) and a few supporting units to Hawaii, and the assignment of a few more bombers to General MacArthur.15 The most urgent question was what additional means, if any, the Army should provide to carve out operations in the South
and Southwest Pacific. The consideration of this question, raised on 8 July by General MacArthur and Admiral Ghormley, had been suspended during the brief interlude of rapprochement between King and Marshall over the "Pacific alternative" (10-14 July). It was opened on 14 July by Admiral King, who then passed on to General Marshall with his concurrence the recommendation of Admiral Nimitz that the Army should send three additional antiaircraft regiments to the South Pacific's.16 On 15 July Admiral King urged General Marshall to act on the proposal.17 Marshall, on the recommendation of his staff, gave way to the extent of agreeing to send one regiment--the 76th Coast Artillery (AA)--from the west coast as a partial replacement for the regiments due to be moved into the Solomons from Borabora and Tongatabu.18 Admiral King was willing to accept this solution, on the assumption that in the near future the Army would send additional units to complete the replacement of units moved forward from these bases.19 Admiral Ghormley protested that the antiaircraft defense of Borabora and Tongatabu were already at an "irreducible minimum," and notified Washington that he planned to use Marine antiaircraft until more Army units arrived. Thereupon, the Navy Department again requested that three regiments should be sent at once, and the War Department again refused to do so.20
The Navy pressed its objections not only to the provision for antiaircraft defense but also to the Army's approach in general. Admiral Nimitz urged the provision of an adequate, continuous flow of land and air replacements and reinforcements to consolidate the forward positions to be seized. The Navy Department agreed that the Army should provide them, calling attention to Japanese capabilities and recent reports of increased Japanese activity in the southwestern Pacific.21 The War Department reiterated that forces to garrison forward positions should be brought up from the rear. They would come from New Caledonia, and would be replaced in New Caledonia from Tongatabu and Borabora. The forces taken from Borabora and Tongatabu world not be replaced; nor would replacements be sent to Hawaii and Australia for the mobile bomber forces assigned to the operation.22
The negotiations in London at the end of July placed the argument over Pacific deployment on a new basis. Under the terms of CCS 94, one of the conditions of abandoning ROUNDUP, launching TORCH, and adopting a "defensive encircling" strategy
against the Continent was the withdrawal of forces from BOLERO for use in the Pacific. In that contingency, the CCS agreed that
. . . over and above the U.S. forces required from BOLERO for operations in North and North West Africa, the following readjustments of present U.S. commitments to BOLERO will be made for the purpose of furthering offensive operations in the Pacific:
(1) Withdrawal of the following air forces:3 groups heavy bombers
2 groups medium bombers 2 groups light bombers
2 groups fighter planes
2 groups observation planes 4 groups transport planes
(2) Probably shipping to move one infantry or Marine division from U.S. West Coast to South West Pacific.23
Admiral King took this provision to mean that he could expect the Army to commit at least the additional bombers to the line Hawaii-Australia for which he and the Pacific commanders had so long been asking. On 1 August he sent to General Marshall a request he had just received from Admiral Nimitz for two more heavy bombardment groups for Hawaii, to be used to meet a Japanese attempt to take advantage of the diversion of American forces to the Solomons operation. Admiral Nimitz held that existing air strength in Hawaii was not enough to furnish a reserve or even to "constitute a reasonable defense" when most of the Pacific Fleet was operating to the southwest. Admiral King at the same time repeated to General Marshall his own opinion that the land and air forces available in the South Pacific were inadequate. He requested that Marshall should review, " in the light of the recent decisions reached in London to re-enforce with air the Pacific Ocean Areas," the Army's decision of 27 July not to reinforce the South Pacific.24
The operations staff was not ready to make concessions, as it indicated in a message to General Emmons, who (as on previous occasions) had sent word of his hearty agreement with Admiral Nimitz' recommendations.25 The staff (with General McNarney's concurrence) advised Marshall to answer Admiral King to the same effect. The staff advised standing pat on the decision to commit no additional ground forces and making no specific commitment of additional air forces, since there were none available for immediate deployment and since the result of the London conferences was as yet uncertain.26 General Marshall withheld action, and explained himself to General Handy with the question: "In view of the present So. Pacific situation is this the time (or the manner) for replying to the Navy's paper"'27
The uncertainty of the situation in the South Pacific at that moment--the Marines were landing on Guadalcanal--was all the more reason why Admiral King should press his case.28
On 8 August (the first landings in the Solomons were on the 7th) Admiral King again wrote, in connection with recommendations he had just received from Admiral Ghormley and General Harmon, that although shortages of shipping would prevent the immediate dispatch of the additional forces requested, plans should be made "for first, the Air reinforcements and second, Ground reinforcements.29
The War Department staff remained unmoved. In a message for Harmon, the War Department repeated what it had told him before his departure for Noumea and again more recently--that no additional air units were available and garrisons for newly acquired forward bases would have to be drawn from forces available in the rear areas in the South Pacific.30 Once again the staff advised General Marshall to stick to the position that there were already enough ground forces in the Pacific to launch the operations then planned (including Tasks Two and Three) and to garrison the Solomons, and to notify Admiral King that the availability for the Pacific of the fifteen air groups listed in CCS 94 depended on what happened across the Atlantic.31 Again, Marshall withheld action.32
The War Department made one concession. On the recommendation of Admiral Nimitz, the War Department told General Harmon that if he thought best he could for the time being hold in the South Pacific bombers en route to Australia and warned General MacArthur that it might become necessary for him to shift pursuit planes (initially a squadron) to Guadalcanal.33
The unwillingness of the staff to commit additional forces to the Pacific was in keeping with its interpretation of CCS 94. The withdrawal of forces from BOLERO for the Pacific was contingent on the decision to abandon ROUNDUP and launch TORCH, and General Marshall held that the "final" decision to do so was vet to be made. What he had apparently not told the staff--or Admiral King--was that he intended to use the provision to regain some of the freedom of action as between the Navy and the British that he had given up in April. He had already explained this in a letter he had sent to General Eisenhower soon after returning from London:
I regarded the list of withdrawals for the Pacific as one which gave us liberty of action though not necessarily to be carried out in full, and no dates were mentioned. . . . I am quite certain that an additional heavy
bomber group must go into the Pacific in August. Additional withdrawals will depend on the development of the situation there.34
On 13 August Admiral King called General Marshall's attention to the two appeals, as yet unanswered, for reinforcements and again stressed the need for additional air units in Hawaii and the South Pacific.35 The situation in the South Pacific had meanwhile become extremely precarious, as a result of naval losses (four cruisers) incurred in a surprise engagement on 8 and 9 August off Savo Island and the withdrawal of American naval support from the Solomons area. Marshall finally authorized the commitment of one heavy bomber group to Hawaii, which was to be used to replace the mobile air force in Hawaii and not to be used in the South Pacific. General Arnold designated for this purpose the 90th Bombardment Group (H).36
In submitting an answer for Admiral King, to inform him of the commitment of the 90th Group to Hawaii and the authorization given to divert planes to the South Pacific from the Southwest Pacific, the staff once again proposed that '.Marshall should hold fast to the policy of sending no additional ground forces. Once again Marshall withheld action.37
Meanwhile, during the two weeks of Marshall's silence on the policy to be adopted with reference to deployment in the Pacific, the War Department had opened negotiations on the second phase (Task Two) of the projected offensive in the South and Southwest Pacific, the phase of operations against the east coast of New Guinea, under the command of General MacArthur. Following the Japanese landings in late July in the Buna-Gona region, Admiral King had asked the War Department to find out what MacArthur planned to do in response.38 MacArthur replied to the War Department in a long message describing the disposition of Japanese forces, assessing Japanese capabilities, and giving a detailed plan for countermoves and an ultimate offensive against Rabaul. He recommended the opening of this phase of operations as soon as the first phase in the Solomons was complete. The principal defensive measures he was taking were the development of air bases in northeastern Australia and the strengthening of the Port Moresby garrison with two Australian brigades, antiaircraft units, and fighter squadrons. In preparation for Tasks Two
and Three he was building air bases on New Guinea. One at Milne Bay was already occupied by fighter planes and defended by a garrison by fighter about 5,000 men. He was concentrating two American divisions (the 41st and 32d) at Rockhampton and Brisbane to be trained and prepared for action. As a step toward initiating offensive operations, he was sending the 7th Australian Division to New Guinea; a few troops were to be sent as reinforcements to secure the crest of the Owen Stanley Range. The factor's limiting operations in New Guinea would be shipping and naval support to keep open the lines of communication.39
On 14 August General Marshall reminded Admiral King of the original agreement to execute the three-phase plan of operations "without interruption" if the means were available, and suggested, on the basis of MacArthur's message, that there appeared to be means for beginning operations against Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast coast of New Guinea. Marshall took note of the fact that Admiral Nimitz appeared to favor such a course. Finally, he proposed asking MacArthur and Admiral Ghormley whether it were feasible to launch a "limited Task Two," how soon it could be done, and at what point command should pass to MacArthur.40 A request for answers to these questions, and for additional detailed information desired by King, went to MacArthur and Ghormley the following day.41
On 20 August Admiral King informed General Marshall that the development of the Solomons campaign would prevent Admiral Ghormley from releasing any forces to participate in Task Two in the near future, and he inclosed a request from Ghormley for reinforcements in the South Pacific and a list of the forces that Harmon, with Ghormley's approval, had recommended. He stated that it would be necessary to send both air and ground forces, as provided in CCS 94.42
By that time it was no longer the uncertainty of future plans across the Atlantic but the urgency of providing for the invasion of North Africa that limited the commitment of additional Army forces to the Pacific. On 21 August General Arnold struck the new note by urging the needs of TORCH as a reason for refusing to commit any more air forces to the Pacific.43 Admiral Leahy concurred, advising Marshall:
It seems to me that General Arnold is exactly correct in principle. Why not plan to saw all possible planes for "TORCH" and meet the requests of Ghormly [sic]
and MacArthur for additional ground troops, partially trained if none better are available.44
General Marshall acted on this advice. He answered the request for more planes, as the staff had earlier advised him to do, simply by transmitting to Admiral King a statement of the steps already taken--the commitment of one additional group to Hawaii and the authorization given for redistributing planes in the South and Southwest Pacific.45
General Marshall at the same time asked General Somervell to tell him what troopships would be leaving for the Pacific in the near future, and the operations staff to see what changes might be made in shipments in order to meet the requests of the Pacific commanders.46 In the light of Somervell's findings and consultation with Army Ground Forces, the operations staff concluded that about 20,000 men--an antiaircraft regiment, the 43d Division, and supporting troops--could be sent to the South Pacific in the latter part of September and early October, on two conditions: (a) that the Navy would release ships with a troop lift of about 13,000 (of a total troop lift for the period of about 20,000), and (b) that the War Department would postpone scheduled shipments to MacArthur during the period, except for headquarters troops for I Corps, which the staff thought to be essential. Pending the arrival of the reinforcements, General Harmon would have to go ahead on the presently prescribed basis of moving forward garrison forces from the rear areas to consolidate newly acquired positions and relieve Marine units for future landing operations.47 During the next week the War Department went ahead on this basis to prepare for the shipment of the antiaircraft regiment, the 43d Division, and supporting units.48
Even the value of this concession, as Admiral Leahy had anticipated, was limited by the prior claim of TORCH for the best trained divisions. The division that had been training for service in the Pacific the 3d Division--had already been transferred
to the east coast for use in the North African landings.49 There was nothing to do but send a division that had not been fully trained, leaving the South Pacific commanders--and the division itself--to make the best of the situation.50
The Navy Department quickly fell in with the proposed changes, accepting the concession for what it was worth.51 The War Department then informed General MacArthur of the postponement of scheduled shipments to his command.52 At the end of August the Navy indicated that the overseas destination of the reinforcements would be Auckland.53 Early in September, on receiving confirmation from General Harmon, the War Department issued the movement orders.54
The concessions made by the War Department in August did not end the disagreement with the Navy Department and the Pacific commands over the demands they advanced under CCS 94. Instead, the disagreement became more intense. The landings in the Solomons, as Admiral Kind had from the first expected, produced a strong Japanese reaction and a correspondingly urgent need for more American forces, particularly air forces. The reaction had already begun. By 21 August the marines had eliminated the first echelon of a Japanese combat force (about 900 men) that had landed on 18 August. A few days later (23-25 August) a naval task force had turned back a second Japanese convoy (Battle of the Eastern Solomons)
at the cost of damaging the Enterprise, the one American carrier then in operation in the Pacific.55 Further and stronger Japanese action was a virtual certainty in the near future, posing demands that were sure to conflict with the demands of TORCH, which had been enlarged by the final agreement of the President and the Prime Minister on 5 September to land forces in North Africa simultaneously at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers.
Table of Contents
Previous Chapter (12) * Next Chapter (14)
1. Memo, G.C.M. for OPD, 19 Aug 42, Tab 25b, 1trm 1, Exec 5.
2. Secretary Stimson, it may be noted, was himself bitter over the decision to land in North Africa, and had told the President exactly how he felt about the matter. His example doubtless had the effect of encouraging officers in the War Department to express their doubts and dissatisfaction. For the Secretary's views, his statement of them to the President, and the suspension of his relations with the White House for several months thereafter, see his own account. (Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 420-26.)
3. Pers ltr, Dill to Marshall, 8 Aug 42, WDCSA TORCH, 1.
4. Pers ltr, Marshall to Dill, 14 Aug 42, WDCSA TORCH, 1. This file also contains a first draft by General Handy, corrected in Marshall's hand. The draft contains a much fuller exposition of the credo of the Army planning staff. (Both versions of the principal passage changed by Marshall are given in Cline, Washington Command Post, p. 165n.)
5. Pers ltr cited n. 3.
6. Pers ltr cited n. 4.
7. General Marshall and his staff continued to revert to the points made in CCS 94 dealing with the strategic implications of TORCH-that it was defensive in purpose and not intended to help the USSR. (1) Min, 38th mtg CCS, 28 Aug 42. (2) OPD study [prepared about the end of Aug 42], title: Resume of Chronological Developments of our Bsc Strategy, with JCS 152 in ABC 381 (9-25-41), 3.
8. For Fellers' views, see above, Ch. XI. For his recall, see (1) ltr, WD to Maxwell, 20 Jun 42, sub: Ltr of Instns, OPD 384 Africa, 12; (2) msg, Marshall to Maxwell, 27 Jun 42, CM-OUT 6697 (R) ; (3) msg, Maxwell to Marshall, 27 Jun 42, CM-IN 8926 (R) ; (4) msg, same to same, 7 Jul 42, CM-IV 2659 (7/8/42) (R), and subsequent comment thereon in memo, no sig, for Wedemeyer, 26 Sep 42, no sub, ABC 381 Middle East (3-1042), 1-B, 8; (5) msg (originator OPD) Marshall to Maxwell, 10 Jul 42, CM-OUT 2774; and (6) stf correspondence filed OPD 319.1 Africa, 13.
9. The President stated that Fellers had recommended sending ten bombers a day to Egypt, even though they were of little use against vehicles in the desert. (Memo, Secy JCS for U.S. JCS, 1 Aug 42, sub: totes of Conf Held at White House at 8:30 P.M., Jul 30, 1942, ABC 381 (7-25-421, 4-B, 79.)
10. Memo cited n. 9.
11. Memo, CofS for President [4 Aug 42], sub: Air Reinforcement Middle East and Aid to Russia, WDCSA 381, 1. The memorandum was drafted by General Streett. The conflict between the requirements of TORCH and the scheduled reinforcement of the Middle East was currently under study by the War Department. (See above, Ch. XII.)
12. For Marshall's conciliatory policy, see above, Chs. IX and XI.
13. See first draft of study, title: Detailed Consideration of Memo for McCloy . . ., incl with memo, OPD for CofS, 21 Aug 42, sub: Memo from Fellers to McCloy, re Importance of Middle East, OPD Middle East, 26.
See also (1) note, Deane to Marshall, 12 Aug 42, and (2) note, GCM to Handy, n.d., both in WDCS:1 Middle East (S); (3) the first study in OPD was memo [four members of Strategy Sec] for Wedemeyer, n.d., sub: Analysis of Col Fellers' Study . . ., Tab IV, ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-42),1-B.
A dissent was entered by the chief of the Strategy Section, Col. Frank Roberts, who was "inclined to go against my experts in the section, and to recommend that the 300 [bombers] be sent to ME."; Informal memo, F.D.R. for Wedemeyer, n.d., Tab IV, ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-421, 1-B.)
The study submitted to Marshall (quoted in the text and cited above) went to McCloy with Fellers' memo, as an OPD study and not as a communication from the Chief of Staff, but Marshall first gave it a thorough editing all the same. (See corrected drafts filed OPD 381 Middle East, 26 and WDCS.4 Middle East (S).
14. These conflicts are discussed in Ch. XIV, below.
15. See above, pp. 256 ff.
16. Memo, King for CofS, 14 Jul 42, sub: Prospective Needs of AA Arty Units in SPA, OPD 320.2 PTO, 20.
17. Memo, King for CofS, 15 Jul 42, sub: Garrison Forces for Solomon Islands Area, OPD 320.2 PTO, 21.
18. Memo, Col Ritchie for Gen Handy, 15 Jul 42, sub: Memo from King to Marshall Ref Garrison Forces for Solomon Islands Area. (2) Memo, CofS for King, 16 Jul 42, sub cited n. 17. Both in OPD 320.2 PTO, 21.
19. See memo, OPD for CofS, 1 7 Jul 42, sub cited n. 17, OPD 320.2 PTO, 21. This memorandum also listed the first steps taken to carry out the plan. For later steps, see papers filed OPD 370.5 Fiji, 10.
20. (1) Memo, OPD for CofS, 23 Jul 42, sub: AA Regts for Solomon Islands Area. (2) Memo, DCofS for King, 28 Jul 42, same sub. Both in OPD 320.2 PTO, 21.
21. Memo, Vice Adm Russell Wilson for [Actg] CofS, 22 Jul 42, sub: Reinforcements for Holding Occupied Positions in S Pacific, OPD 320.2 PTO, 30.
22. (1) Memo, OPD for [Actg] CofS, 24 Jul 42, sub cited n. 21. (2) Ltr [Actg] CofS to King, 27 Jul 42, same sub. Both in OPD 320.2 PTO, 30.
23. Par e, CCS 94, 24 Jul 42.
24. Memo, King for CofS, 1 Aug 42, sub cited n. 21, OPD 320.2 PTO, 37.
25. Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Emmons, 4 Aug 42, CM-OUT 1424 (8/5/42) (R).
26. (1) Memo, OPD for CofS, 5 Aug 42, sub cited n. 21, OPD 320.2 PTO, 37. (2) Informal memo, G.F.S. [Col George F. Schulgen] for CofS, 8 Aug 42, sub: Reinforcements for Pacific Area, atchd to memo cited (1).
27. Informal memo, G.C.M. for Handy, atchd to memo cited n. 26 (1).
28. For accounts of the Marine landings on Guadalcanal, see: (1) Miller, Guadalcanal, Ch. III, and (2) Samuel Eliot Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942-February 1943 (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1949), Chs. I and II.
29. Memo, King for Marshall, 8 Aug 42, sub: Minimum Army Reinforcements Necessary to Provide Adequate Garrisons for Present Bases, to Conduct Opns Incident to Tasks Two and Three, and to Relieve Amph Units in Seized Areas, OPD 320.2 PTO, 3 7.
30. (1) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Harmon, 8 Aug 42, CM-OUT 2412. (2) See msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Harmon, 4 Aug 42, CM-OUT 0253, for the earlier reminder. The only additional units due to be sent were air service units needed to operate the mobile air force in the South Pacific. (3) For Harmon's views, see in particular, ltr, CG USAFISPA to COMSOPAC, 4 Aug 42, sub: Tr Disposition and Re-enforcement, OPD 320.2 PTO, 71.
31. For Tasks Two and Three, see above, pp. 262-63.
32. (1) Draft memo [OPD for CofS], 10 Aug 42, sub: Minimum Army Reinforcements. . . . (2) Memo, OPD for SGS, 29 Aug 42, sub: Memos from COMINCH Dated Aug 1 and Aug 8. . . . Both in OPD 320.2 PTO, 37.
33. (1) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Harman, 9 Aug 42, CM-OUT 2792 (R). (2) Msg, same to same, 10 Aug 42, CM-OUT 3043 (R). (3) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 10 Aug 42, CM-OUT 3042 (R). For follow-up, see msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 12 Aug 42, CM-IN 4236 (R), and msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 12 Aug 42, CM-OUT 4048.
34. Pers ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 30 Jul 42, filed under Eisenhower, D.D., in G.C.M. file. It is to be inferred that he did not show this letter to his staff, nor at that time discuss with the staff (or with anyone else) his interpretation of the passage in CCS 94. General Marshall later made this explanation to the other members of the JCS. (See (1) min, JCS 32d mtg, 8 Sep 42, and (2) min, JCS 36th mtg, 6 Oct 42.)
35. Memo, King for CofS, 13 Aug 42, sub: Reinforcements for S Pacific and Hawaiian Areas, OPD 320.2 PTO, 37.
36. (1) Informal memo, Arnold for Kuter, 14 Aug 42, sub: Mvmt of the 90th Hv Bomb Gp to Hawaii, OPD 370.5 Hawaii, 24. (2) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Emmons, 14 Aug 42, CM-OUT 4798 (8/15/42) (R).
On 15 August the operations staff issued a directive, and an 18 August orders, for its movement. See memo, OPD for AAF, 15 Aug 42, sub: Asgmt of Hv Bomb Gp to Seventh Air Force, OPD 370.5 Hawaii, 24, and memo, OPD for TAG, 18 Aug 42, sub: Mvmt Orders, Shipt No. 6006, OPD 370.5 Hawaii, 23.
37. (1) Memo, OPD for CofS, 15 Aug 42, sub cited n. 35. (2) OPD draft memo, CofS for King, n.d., same sub. This memo bears changes in Marshall's hand. Both in OPD 320.2 PTO, 37.
38. (1) Memo, King for CofS, 31 Jul 42, sub: Japanese Opns NE Coast of New Guinea, OPD 381 SWPA, 92. (2) For the War Department's immediate compliance, see msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 31 Jul 42, CM-OUT 9289. (3) Notification that the above message had been sent is in memo, CofS for King, n.d., sub cited above (1), OPD 381 SWPA, 92.
39. Msg MacArthur to Marshall, 3 Aug 42, CM-IN 1607. A copy went to King, who dealt with it in memo cited n. 29. At Marshall's direction, a brief of this message was sent to the President. See (1) note, G.C.M. on copy of CM-IN 1607, filed Item 23a, Exec 10, and (2) memo, CofS for President, 6 Aug 42, sub: Opns in SW Pacific, OPD 381 SWPA, 95.
40. Memo, CofS for King, 14 Aug 42, sub: Early Initiation of Limited Task Two, OPD 381 PTO, 84. This represents a revision of a draft by OPD. See draft, with Marshall's corrections, in Item 67a, Exec 10.
41. Memo, King for CofS, 15 Aug 42, sub cited n. 40, Item 67a, Exec 10. Attached is the draft message to send to MacArthur and Ghormley. The memorandum itself bears a note from Brig. Gen. John R. Deane (SGS) that the message as drafted was dispatched on 15 August.
42. Memo, King for CofS, 20 Aug 42, sub cited n. 40, OPD 370.5 PTO, 9. A list of the reinforcements requested came with the memorandum as Inclosure B. The ground reinforcements requested by Harman included two infantry divisions, three antiaircraft regiments, and sundry field, coast, and antiaircraft artillery battalions, all to be sent "as early as practicable." His most urgent demands for air reinforcements were for three fighter squadrons and plane replacements in all categories.
43. Memo, Arnold for CofS, 21 Aug 42, sub: NAf Opns, Item 67b, Exec 10.
44. Note, WDL [Leahy] to Marshall [22 Aug 42], Item 67b, Exec 10.
45. See memo, CofS for King, 24 Aug 42, sub cited n. 40, OPD 370.5 PTO, 9, which is in answer to memo cited n. 42, containing simply a reference to memo, CofS for COMINCH [21 Aug 42], sub cited n. 35, OPD 320.2 PTO, 37. This last memo is based on memo cited n. 37 (1) submitted by the staff on 15 August, which Marshall had revised and for the time withheld. Shortly thereafter, in a detailed analysis of air strength in and en route to the South and Southwest Pacific, the War Department incorporated the policy of no further commitments of planes to the Pacific, but adopted a still more liberal policy on the redistribution of planes in the Pacific by authorizing Admiral Nimitz to shift aircraft "as necessary to the success of the present operation." This concession removed the inhibition on the diversion from Hawaii of the 90th Bombardment Group (H). (Memo, CofS for COMINCH, 25 Aug 42, sub: Air Reinforcements for S Pacific Opns, Item 67b, Exec 10.)
46. (1) Memo, CofS for SOS, 20 Aug 42, no sub. (2) Memo, CofS for OPD, 21 Aug 42, sub: S (and SW) Pacific. Both in OPD 370.5 PTO, 9.
47. (1) Memo, SOS for CofS, n.d., sub: Shipping Capabilities for Reinforcement of S Central Pacific. (2) Memo, OPD for CofS, 22 Aug 42, sub: Shipping Capabilities for Reinforcement of S Pacific, with three incls and Tabs A-E. Both in OPD 370.5 PTO, 9. (3) Memo, AGF for CofS (attn OPD), 22 Aug 42, sub: Add Forces, S Pacific Theater, OPD 370.5 PTO, 14.
48. (1) Memos, OPD for AGF, AAF, and SOS, 23 Aug 42, sub: Availability of Units for Mvmt to Staging Areas for Overseas Destination. (2) Memo, AGF for OPD, 27 Aug 42, same sub. Both in OPD 370.5 PTO, 10. (3) Memos, OPD for AGF and SOS, 27 and 28 Aug 42, sub: Directive for Tr Mvmts. (4) Memo, AGF for OPD and SOS, 29 Aug 42, sub: Concentration Area. Last two in OPD 370.5 PTO, 14.
49. For the substitution, see: (1) memo streett for McNarney, 17 Aug 42, no sub, OPD 381 PTO,85; (2) memo, King for CofS, 18 Aug 42, sub: Third Army Div--Relief for, Item 67a, Exec 10; and (3) memo, CofS for King, 21 Aug 42, sub: Relief of Third Div, OPD 370.5 WDC, 105.
50. The Army did undertake to give what training it could to the 43d Division. (1) Memo, CofS for King, 24 Aug 42, sub cited n. 40, OPD 370.5 PTO, 9. (2) Memos, OPD for AGF and SOS, 10 and 14 Sep 42, sub: Change in Directive for Tr Mvmts, OPD 370.5 PTO, 14.
51. For transactions with the Navy, see: (1) memo, Col Leonard H. Rodieck for Gen Streett, 23 Aug 42, sub: Availability of Navy Shipping to SPA, OPD 370.5 PTO, 11; (2) memo, CofS for CNO, 24 Aug 42, sub curd n. 40, OPD 370.5 PTO, 9; (3) memo, Col Silverthorne for Gen Streett, 26 Aug 42, sub: Navy Ships for Mvmt 43d Div, OPD 370.5 PTO, 12: and (4) memo, King for CofS, 26 Aug 42, sub: Transportation of 13,000 Army Trs, OPD 381 PTO, 84.
52. Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 28 Aug 42, CM-OUT 8981 (R). The War Department asked MacArthur to recommend in what priority to send the units allocated to him. A full list of units the War Department had intended to send MacArthur is contained in memo, OPD for CINCSWPA, 10 Aug 42, sub: Add Units Authorized for U.S. Forces in Australia, OPD 320.2 Australia, 53. This memo was drawn up to be delivered to MacArthur by Maj. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger. MacArthur had been told to expect this memorandum in msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 8 Aug 42, CM-OUT 2515 (R).
53. (1) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Harmon, 30 Aug 42, CM-OUT 9541 (R). (2) On 4 September, not having received an answer, the War Department asked for confirmation. Msg (originator OPD), same to same, 4 Sep 42, CM-OUT 1397 (R).
54. See memo, OPD for AGF and SOS, 5 Sep 42, sub: Directive for Tr Mvmts, OPD 370.5 PTO 13: and memos, OPD for TAG, 5 and 7 Sep 42, sub: Mvmt Orders, Shipt Nos. 5181 and 4092, and OPD for TAG, 9 Sep 42, sub: Mvmt Orders, Shipt Nos 5181, 4092 and 4806, both in OPD 370.5 PTO, 14. These orders were later modified, to ship direct to a the 172d Regimental Combat Team of the 43d Division, along with a harbor defense unit that General Harmon intended to transship to Espiritu Santo (in the New Hebrides). See (1) msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Harmon, 14 Sep 42, CM-OUT 5196 (9/15/42) (R); (2) msg, same to same, 17 Sep 42, CM-OUT 5990 (R); (3) memo, OPD for AGF and SOS, 17 Sep 42, sub: Change in Directive for Tr Mvmts, OPD 370.5 PTO, 14: and (4) memo, Silverthorne for Handy, 17 Sep 42, sub: Action and Info, Pacific Theater Sec, OPD 370.5 PTO, 20.
55. For an account of the operations at Guadalcanal, see: (1) Miller, Guadalcanal, and (2) Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal.