The American and the British Governments had been aware in the early summer of 1942 that a decision to invade North Africa might complicate relations with the Soviet Union. As the British Chiefs of Staff had noted on 2 July, in recommending that SLEDGEHAMMER should not be mounted, the Soviet Government would soon become aware that preparations were not proceeding according to the tentative declaration given to Mr. Molotov in May.1 Pending the result of further Anglo-American negotiations, there was nothing definite to tell the Soviet Government. On 8 July the Prime Minister, in notifying Sir John Dill of the War Cabinet's decision not to mount SLEDGEHAMMER, had ended with the information: "Naturally we are not as yet telling the Russians that there is no possibility of SLEDGEHAMMER."2 But the London conference in late July and the President's decision to mount TORCH made the problem real and immediate. The uneasiness in the War Department in early August found expression in a paper from the operations staff to General Marshall on the effect of launching TORCH
British and American Plans and Soviet Expectations
Allied military action in any area other than on the continent of Europe, particularly if it is an operation of the magnitude of TORCH, quite probably would have an adverse effect on Russian decisions.3
Churchill undertook to go to Moscow to break the news to Stalin--"a somewhat raw job," as he expressed it to President Roosevelt.4 Churchill has since recorded that, though he felt his mission was "like carrying a large lump of ice to the North Pole," still it was better "to have it all out face to face with Stalin, rather than trust to telegrams and intermediaries."5 Churchill arrived in Moscow in mid-August--at a critical moment in the Battle of Stalingrad. The United States was represented at the conference by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, and, in the accompanying Anglo-American-Soviet staff conversations, by General Maxwell, the senior American officer in the Middle East, and Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, who had been sent by the President to explore the possibilities of co-operation between American and Soviet air forces in the Far East.6
The conference began in a somber mood with Stalin and Churchill in sharp disagreement over the postponement of the "second
front."7 Stalin of course drew attention to the failure of the United States and Great Britain to deliver the supplies that had been promised to the Soviet Union and to continue the preparations for a second front as described to Molotov in May and as anticipated in the Anglo-Soviet communiqué of 12 June 1942. He spoke of the great sacrifices being made by the USSR to hold 280 German divisions, on the Eastern Front. It did not seem to him too difficult for the British and Americans to land six or eight divisions on the Cotentin peninsula in 1942. Stalin made the same point that Molotov had made in May--nobody could be sure whether conditions would be as favorable for opening a second front in Europe in 1943 as they were in 1942. In the discussions on TORCH Stalin wavered between expressions of interest and lack of interest. At the conclusion of the conference, he seemed reconciled to the operation.
Late in the month of August abbreviated accounts of the conference were sent directly to the War Department from Army representatives abroad. On 26 August Eisenhower transmitted to Marshall the report he had received from the Prime Minister upon the latter's return to England:
During his recent visit to an Allied Capital he [the Prime Minister explained the reasons for his rejection of SLEDGEHAMMER, but apparently without completely convincing his hearer of the military soundness of his views. He then outlined TORCH to his hearer as it was understood when you were here and awakened great interest in this proposition. Before the former Naval person terminated his visit to that Capital he was told "May God prosper that operation."8
On 30 August the War Department also received from General Bradley a delayed account of the staff conversations that had accompanied the conference.9 Bradley reported on a meeting of 15 August, which he and Maxwell had attended, between British Field Marshals Brooke and Wavell and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder and Soviet Marshals Kliment F. Voroshilov and Boris M. Shaposhnikov. The Americans had taken little part in the discussions at this meeting. The Soviet officers had urged opening the second front in Europe at once, if only with the available six British divisions and using the Channel Islands as abase. After two hours argument, however, Bradley reported, the Russians appeared to accept the "British decision" that no cross-Channel operation would be executed in 1942.
Anxious to offset the announcement of the change in their plans for a second front in 1942, the President and Prime 'Minister were eager to do something to show that they were still determined to defeat Germany as quickly as possible, and were convinced that it would require the combined
The Caucasus Project
efforts of all three nations to do so. One means of doing so would be to establish direct military relations with the Soviet Union in the field, in an area in which the Soviet forces were adjacent--the Middle East--by committing small British and American forces to the direct support of Soviet forces in the Caucasus.
A proposal to send a British-American air force to the Caucasus was introduced by the Prime Minister into his conversations with Stalin of mid-August.10 He suggested transferring air forces from Egypt to the Baku-Batumi area. His offer was contingent on the success of operations in the Libyan Desert. Stalin did not reject this proposal, but nothing was settled at the time, beyond an agreement in principle that once a definite offer had been made and accepted. British air representatives should go at once to Moscow and thence to the Caucasus to make plans and preparations.
When the President learned of the Soviet reaction to the Prune Minister's tentative offer, lie wrote to General Marshall:
I wish you would explore very carefully the merits and possibilities of our putting an American air force on the Caucasian front to fight with the Russian armies. Churchill, while in Moscow, cabled that Stalin would welcome such cooperation. If such an enterprise could be accomplished would it be advisable to have British air also represented?11
General Marshall's advisers concluded that a Caucasus air force could not go into operation before 20 January 1943, and that the need for U.S. air forces elsewhere might well prove to be greater than the need for them in the Caucasus. Weather conditions, moreover, would seriously interfere with Caucasus operations tip to 1 April. The staff pointed out also that to support operations in the Caucasus would reduce the volume of lend-lease aid sent to the Soviet Union via the Persian Gulf. The staff, therefore, concluded that no American air force should be sent to the Caucasus in 1942, but that the possibility suggested by the President should be kept under study during the rest of the Near. on the assumption that British participation would be essential. Marshall forwarded these conclusions to the President oil 26 August 1942.12
On 30 August the War Department learned something about the British proposal from General Bradley's delayed report of the staff conversations that accompanied the mid-August conference in Moscow.13 According to Bradley's report the British were considering the inclusion of perhaps one American heavy bomber group in the projected Caucasus air force. but had evaded repeated questions by the Soviet representatives about the exact composition of the force. On the same day in a long message to the President, the Prime Minister elaborated oil his ideas on the British-American air force for the Caucasus. He proposed that the British should furnish nine fighter squadrons and three light and two medium bombardment squadrons; the Americans, one heavy bombardment group already ire the Middle East, and. to supplement insufficient land transport, an air transport group of at least fifty
planes, which would have to come from the United States. The Americans would fight together with the British components under air RAF officer, who would be under Soviet strategic command. The Prime Minister reasoned that the project would employ British and American air forces at a critical point, reinforcing the Red Air Force and serving as "the advance shield of all our interests" in Iran. This proposal, like his earlier suggestion to Stalin, was contingent on a favorable issue of the battle for Egypt.14
General Marshall continued to oppose the project. On 18 September, with the concurrence of General Arnold, he recommended to the President that the Caucasus air force should not include American units, except for air air transport group which the British could not furnish.15 The Arm staff pointed out that the U.S. Government, having already demonstrated its willingness to support Soviet military operations, need not concern itself with what the Prime Minister had called the "moral effect of comradeship" with the Russians.16 General Marshall emphasized the point that the extremely difficult command decision to transfer units from Egypt would, in any event, devolve upon the British since they were responsible for operations in the Middle East, arid that it could be better made and carried out by the British on their own responsibility.
The President did not adopt the policy recommended by the War Department nor did he accept the Prime Minister's proposal. Instead, he came to tire conclusion that American units should take part in the operations, as proposed by the Prime Minister, but that the "definite" offer for which the Soviet Government supposedly was waiting should not depend on the course of other operations.17 His conviction was strengthened early in October when he was considering the draft of a message the Prime Minister intended to send to Stalin to announce the suspension of the convoys to Murmansk.18 The President reasoned, that, having made the unwelcome decision to invade North Africa and being forced as a result to take the even more unwelcome step of suspending regular convoys to Murmansk, the American and British Governments should do something to make up in part for the loss of support which the Soviet Government had been led to expect, in particular since the defense of the Caucasus was at a critical stage. He declared: "The Russian front is today our greatest reliance and we simply must find a direct mariner in which to help them other than our diminishing
supplies." He therefore advised that the Prime Minister's message to Premier Stalin should mention without qualification the British American determination to send proposed air forces to the Caucasus.19
On 8 October the President agreed that the force should be made up as originally proposed by the Prime Minister--including one American heavy bomber group and one transport group--and should be transferred to the Caucasus early in 1943.20 The Prime Minister so informed Stalin, and the President independently sent confirmation on 9 October.21
Up to this point the Soviet Government had continued to show interest in the project. On 6 October Stalin inquired of General Bradley, who had been waiting since early August 1942 to ask about a proposed American survey of air installations in Siberia, whether he could find out how many units were to be sent to the Caucasus, and when. Stalin was willing that Bradley should undertake a survey in the Caucasus as well as in Siberia, stating that he considered the Caucasus project to have priority. Both Stalin and Molotov, according to Bradley, regarded the situation in the Caucasus as most serious.22
Bradley then recommended to the War Department that the United States should offer to send at once at least a token force, and that he be authorized to make a preliminary survey in the Caucasus.23 Upon being informed that a specific proposal had been made to send a British-American force to the Caucasus early in 1943, he strongly recommended that the force should be composed entirely of American air units and that the first of them, at least, should be sent at once and not in 1943. He explained that his recommendations reflected his observation that Soviet officials distrusted the British and heavily discounted future commitments. He proposed that he should be authorized to carry out negotiations and make plans to execute his recommendations.24
The War Department replied that the project must be carried out as the President had proposed. Granted that Bradley's reasoning was sound, the War Department explained, the United States did not have available the units to act as he recommended. Even the President's more modest proposal would be fulfilled only by cutting replacements for American units then in action.25 Bradley was therefore not to undertake the survey he had proposed unless instructed to do so.
On 13 October, in response to questions from the JCS, the British Chiefs of Staff' made definite recommendations on the composition and authority of a mission to Moscow to work out details, as soon as the
Soviet Government should have accepted the offer of the President and Prime Minister.26 The mission the British Chiefs of Staff proposed would work out such problems as the "operational role," the facilities required for airfields and road reconnaissance, and the tonnage needed to maintain the British-American force. The mission would be sent by the British Middle Fast Command, with American representatives to come from USAFIME. The proposed force, the British stated in response to further questions, was to be under a British commander with the rank of air marshal. On the diplomatic: level, the British Government would conduct the necessary negotiations with the Soviet Government.27
The British proposals raised no objections except on the subject of command. The War Department operations staff recommended that an Air Corps officer should be put in command, "inasmuch as the heavy portion of the striking force (Heavy Bombers) is American, and the key logistical support comprising the Air Transport Group is likewise American."28 General Arnold considered it quite probable on the basis of past experience that in the end the United States would have to furnish all the planes. He stated that should the United States have to furnish fighter planes, he would request that an American commander be appointed.29
On 20 October the JCS accepted the British proposals in so far as they concerned the method of carrying on negotiations.30 The British named Air Marshal P.H. Drummond to head the mission. The JCS designated as the senior American representative the commanding general of the IX Air Force Service Command, Brig. Gen. Elmer F. Adler, who was suggested for the position by the War Department.31 On 25 October the War Department sent Adler his instructions.32
The AAF had already instructed General Brereton, the Ninth Air Force commander, to organize a new heavy bomber group (to be equipped with B-24's) from personnel and planes already in the Middle East, to be ready for operations in Transcaucasia at the beginning of January 1943. In so doing he was to redistribute personnel so that the new group (the 376th) would be about equal in experience to the other groups in the Ninth and Tenth Air Forces. He was also to tell Washington what else he would need from the United States, and he was to begin working with the British on logistic plans.33
At the end of October the British Government was still waiting for a sign that the Soviet Government would accept the offer made by the Prime Minister on 8 October. The British and American staffs continued to wait for a reply during the opening weeks of the campaign for North Africa--the beginning of the British offensive on the Alamein
Line (23 October, Operation LIGHTFOOT) and the British-American landings in French Morocco and Algeria (8 November, Operation TORCH). Finally, as the War Department learned on 13 November 1942, the British, still ignorant of Soviet intentions, arranged for the Drummond Adler mission to go to Moscow.34
On 22 November, the day after its arrival in Moscow, the mission held its first meeting with Soviet representatives, Lt. Gen. Fedor Y. Falalaeyev, Chief of Staff, Red Air Force, presiding. It quickly became evident that the Soviet Government had no intention of accepting the offer of art air force in the Caucasus. Soviet representatives proposed instead that in place of act air force, Great Britain and the United States Would send planes to the Soviet Union in addition to those already scheduled to be sent. They gave several reasons. Lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union would be decreased by the amount it would take to support a British-American force in the Caucasus. Soviet air units, which could be shifted according to operational needs, would make more effective use of the planes than could a British-American force, which would be restricted to a limited area. British and American troops would find it hard to get used to the primitive facilities of Soviet units. The Soviet representatives made the mission aware, moreover, that the Soviet Government did not want Allied soldiers to fight alongside Soviet soldiers or in Soviet territory. Adler reported that the Soviet representatives made it "quite clear" that from the Soviet point of view fraternization might have "a deleterious political effect" and the presence of Allied forces in the Caucasus "might give a future hold on or near their oil resources.35
The mission, while agreeing to report Soviet objections and the Soviet counterproposal, took the position that the counterproposal should come from Premier Stalin to the Prince Minister and the President, since the mission was not authorized to discuss it.36 Three weeks passed while the mission and the British and American Governments waited for Stalin to make a formal proposal. The Soviet Government finally conceded a point--that the crews could be sent with the planes to fight in Soviet air units.37 In spite of this concession, the War Department staff and the JCS in turn took the position that the mission ought to be instructed that the Soviet counterproposal was unacceptable so that the mission could either go ahead on the basis of the original proposal or return to the Middle Fast. The War Department was especially interested in making it clear that it was as undesirable to send planes with crews as without crews. The police at stake was the one the President had adopted in May 1942, which had served as the basis of the Arnold-Slessor Towers agreement of June 1942 : the allocation of planes to Allies should not slow down the activation of American air units or lead to the breaking up of units already
organized.38 Moreover, as War Department planners recognized, the important differences in the British and Soviet positions were essentially political. The Political aspect of the project--the "comradeship in arms" in it strategically important area--which made it desirable from the point of view of the Prime Minister, made it undesirable front the Soviet point of view.39
The mission continued to mark time in December awaiting the outcome of the impasse in negotiations. The Soviet Government continued to show no disposition to deal with the question on a political level. On 13 December Molotov informed Air Marshal Drummond that. since the United States and Great Britain were apparently not going to accept the Soviet vies as a basis for discussions, the Soviet Government was unwilling to proceed.40 Thereupon Soviet representatives asked when the mission was planning to leave, explaining that flying conditions would soon become very bad.41
The JCS were still of the opinion that the American and British Governments should make it clear that they here prepared to negotiate only on the basis of the original British-American proposal. The JCS advised the President that the mission should be so instructed. Passing over the political considerations, the JCS took the position that, as Marshall said, "it would be a great mistake" to provide heavy bombers instead of the heavy bomber group which the United States was committed to send, since it would take Soviet forces about six month to train units and construct facilities for heavy bomber operations.42
The President remained unwilling to drop the project until he knew for certain that Stalin would not accept it.43 On 16 December lie sent a message asking Stalin's views and offered the concession that the force need not operate as a whole under a single British (or American) commander, but only under British and American commanders by units.44 He thereby matched the Soviet concession to accept planes with crews. On 20 December Stalin answered stating that the crisis had passed in the Caucasus acid that the main fighting then and thenceforth would be on the central front. Stalin said that he would be very happy to get planes for use there, especially fighter planes, but that he had enough pilots
and crews.45 The President replied that he was glad to know there was no longer any need of British and American help in the Caucasus and that he meant to do everything within his power to keep deliveries of planes up to schedule. He concluded by pointing out that the United States, like the Soviet Union, lacked planes, not men to fly them, and could riot add to its commitments except by leaving trained units without planes.46
On this note the negotiations ended.47 On 25 December 1942 the mission left Moscow for the Middle East.
The other means of closer collaboration with the Soviet Union in the Middle East was the development of an alternative route for lend-lease aid. Even before the announcement of the TORCH decision to the USSR, American and British authorities had been considering ways and means of increasing the volume of traffic via the Persian Gulf, to which the traffic over the Murmansk and Archangel route might be shifted. By July naval and military authorities, both in Washington and London, facing heavy shipping and naval escort demands throughout the world and continued heavy losses in the Atlantic, were increasingly concerned over the prospect of subsequent losses in the Murmansk convoys.48 The convoy en route to Murmansk in early July (PQ 17) had suffered unprecedented losses. American officials could not avoid tire conclusion that the suspension of convoys via the North Cape was inevitable. So long as Japan and the USSR remained at peace, traffic in nonmilitary supplies might be shifted to tire Pacific for transport in vessels under Soviet registry.49 If technical difficulties could be solved, lend-lease planes might in time be shifted to the projected Alaska-Siberia ferry route. But for the delivery of other military equipment--in bulk mainly military vehicles and tanks the only alternative to the North Cape route was the Persian Gulf route. The Persian Gulf ports and overland transportation in Iran had by the early summer of 1942 been developed by the British to the point where they could handle about 40,000 tons a month for the Soviet Union.50 It was essential to increase monthly tonnage to more than three times that amount.
The Persian Gulf Service Command
Before the close of Jul 1942, Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding, Assistant Executive, Munitions Assignments Board, was designated its a representative of Mr. Hopkins acid the War Department to visit Iran and investigate ways and means of increasing the volume of lend-lease traffic: via the Persian Gulf.51 The War Department had tinder consideration at the same time the proposal b Mr. Harriman, forwarded from London to Washington in early Jul, that the United States should offer to take over the operation of the Iranian railroad.52 This policy had been recommended by Maj. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler a short time earlier rind had been suggested b the Prime Minister the year before. Harriman estimated that only, three or four more convoys could be sent via the northern route before winter set in. He pointed out that there was no time to lose if the Persian Gulf were to be ready to handle additional traffic b winter. Marshall and King agreed, in accord with Harriman's proposals, that all trucks to be sent in July were to be sent via Iran and all of the bombers sent to the Soviet Union after Jul were to be flight delivered.53
The increasing concern of the President and Prime Minister over the restrictive effects of TORCH on northern convoys to the USSR intensified their interest in further development of the Persian Gulf route. Upon his return from the Moscow conference of mid-August 1942, Harriman stopped off at Tehran and Cairo to study the problems of the supply route from the Persian Gulf ports over the Iranian railroad into the Soviet Union. In Cairo he rejoined Churchill. As a result of discussions in Cairo. the Prime Minister requested the United States to take over the development and operation of the British-controlled section of the Iranian railroad and of the ports serving it.54 On 22 August 1942, in accord with the Prime Minister's request, Harriman submitted a series of definite proposals. Generals Maxwell and Spalding, who had taken part in accompanying staff talks with British officials in the Middle East, concurred in his recommendations. On the basis of these proposals the President, on 25 August 1942, directed the Chief of Staff to have a plan prepared. The operations staff referred the directive to the Services of Supply. By 4 September 1942, SOS worked up a detailed plan for operating and developing the British-controlled Persian transportation facilities.55
While the CCS were resolving the difficult question of the division of authority between British military authorities and U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East in the control of the new project in the Persian Gulf area, the War Department proceeded with arrangements for a new American command.56 On 1 October the War Department issued a directive designating Brig. Gen. Donald H. Connolly as Commanding General. Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC).57 Connolly (who shortly thereafter promoted to major general) was given the primary mission "to insure the uninterrupted flow of an expanded Volume of Supplies to Russia." Although he was subject to the administrative Supervision of the Commanding General, USAFIME, he was to have "wide latitude," with authority to deal directly with British, Iranian, and Soviet authorities in all matters which did not require diplomatic channels. On other than administrative matters Connolly was instructed to report directly to Washington. Therefore, in so far as the conduct of its major task was concerned. the PGSC was from the outset largely autonomous in fact.58
Although these arrangements for control of the Persian Gulf ports and southern Iranian rail and, road transport left Connolly to a large extent independent in carrying out his primary mission, his responsibilities in Iran were otherwise limited. The new arrangements for the Persian Gulf area did not alter the basis of Anglo-Iranian-Soviet relations as established in August 1941. The British remained responsible for policy in southern Iran and almost entirely responsible for the defense of southern Iran.59 Connolly at best could expedite delivery of lend-lease aid only as far as Tehran.60 The modifications that the War Department had been compelled to adopt for the Middle East by the exigencies of the autumn of 1942 did not alter the contention of the
officers responsible for Army plans that American policy was best served by minimizing military commitments in the Middle East, for whatever purposes.61
During September and October, while the main questions of command were being settled, SOS went ahead setting up a troop list for the PGSC, and made tentative schedules for the shipment of units and of the heavy equipment they would need in carrying out their mission. As finally revised, the troop list called for units with a total strength of about 24,000. Most of the units had originally been designated for BOLERO; a few of them-about 4,000 troops--were in excess of the 1942 Troop Basis. By the end of September the War Department had cleared orders to activate these additional units.62 During October the operations staff cleared with Army Ground Forces the requests of SOS for ground units to be included in the force and issued movement orders for the force, which was to be shipped in several echelons. The first echelon was due to be shipped on 20 October 1942; the second, on 1 November 1942; and the remaining units, during December 1942 and January 1943.63
Toward the end of October 1942, Connolly arrived to set up the new command. Not until early in 1943 did an appreciable number of the allocated American forces begin to arrive in the Persian Gulf area. The full effect of these added commitments did not begin to be felt until late in the spring of 1943.64 The establishment of the PGSC in October 1942 was to have little immediate effect on the delivery of lend lease materiel to the USSR, but laid the basis for increased deliveries in the later war years.65
Like the Middle East, the North Pacific was an area in which supporting operations of the United States and the USSR might become closely related and in which an alternative route for lend-lease might be developed. One course of action, which did not present any great problems of strategy and policy, was to increase the ocean-going traffic in "nonmilitary" supplies from Portland and Seattle to Vladivostok and Soviet arctic ports.66 But it was as ever no simple
Air Collaboration in Alaska and Siberia
THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF at a luncheon meeting, October 1942 (top)
and THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF during a meeting in October 1942 (bottom).
Left to right (top): Admiral King, General Marshall, Admiral William D. Leahy, and General Arnold.
Left to right (bottom): Comdr. R.D. Coleridge, Rear Adm. W.R. Patterson, Field Marshal Dill, Brigadier Vivian Dykes,
Lt. Gen. G. MacReady, Air Marshal D.C.S. Evill, Lt. Col. T.W. Hammond, Jr., Lt. Gen. J.T. McNarney,
General Marshall, Brig. Gen. J.R. Deane, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King and Vice Adm. F.J. Horne.
matter to divert lend-lease planes for delivery by way of the North Pacific, or to carry out any other project for joint Soviet American ail, action in the Far East, although the United States persisted in trying to make at least a beginning. In Way 1942 General Arnold had reopened the question, undaunted by the earlier failures to bet am information from the Soviet Government on air facilities in Siberia or by the skepticism and objections of the War Department General Staff.67 Since the discussions of early 1942, which had ended inconclusively, one channel had opened that he could use directly and independently--the Soviet Purchasing Commission. General Arnold had often to deal with Maj. Gen. Alexander I. Belyaev, the head of this mission, in connection with the allocation and delivery of airplanes tinder the First (Moscow) Protocol. In his dealings with Belyaev, Arnold could at least juxtapose the questions of lend-lease and his plans in the North Pacific, even though it was contrary to American policy to make such a connection in formal official discussions. As Arnold explained to Eisenhower early in May, he intended to keep the subject of Siberia open through this channel, even though Soviet authorities had originally rejected as impracticable the idea of American air operations in Siberia. Arnold declared: "We cannot let the matter rest here. We must develop the facilities as quickly as possible. Furthermore, we must move into them so that when world conditions make it necessary there call be no argument about the matter."68
Besides continuing his talks with General Belyaev, Arnold had also proposed that the War Department should again impress on Admiral Standley the importance of getting information on air installations in Siberia.69 He submitted to the General Staff a message to this effect for transmission to Standley, and Eisenhower co-operated to the extent of sending the message, redrafted and addressed to the military attaché, who, as a member of Admiral Stanley's staff, could properly convey to him the, War Department view.70
In mid may the military attaché reported that the Soviet Government. though unwilling as before to permit American ferrying operations in Soviet-controlled territory, did appear willing to consider taking delivery of American planes in Alaska.71 Although Arnold's idea was, of course, that American pilots should deliver the planes in Siberia, thus familiarizing themselves with flying conditions and facilities there, AAF informed Admiral Standley that the Soviet proposal--which, of course, would mean that Soviet pilots would familiarize themselves with flying conditions and facilities in Alaska--would be considered in Washington.72
In Washington there was no room left to doubt that the subject would have to be taken tip through political channels. Ali Army intelligence officer reported in mid June that while arranging for a call by General Belyaev on General Strong, head of G-2, he had talked with Belyaev's aide, who had told him "substantially as follows."
Only last week Major General James H. Burns [Executive. Munitions Assignments Board l talked with General Belyaev on that time worn old topic of our releasing air information oil Eastern Siberia. As military men, our lips have been sealed oil that subject for over a year.
General Burns said "Why don't you let us deliver those planes that can fly by Bering Straits--then we can use what shipping we have to send more material instead of filling our ships with those pitiful, knocked down and crated planes.?"
General Belyaev answered "That is a matter entirely out of the hands of the military and in the hands of the politicians. The only thing to do is to have your politicians get iii touch with Litvinov."73
In late May and June the conditions for discussion on the political level appeared more favorable than any that had previously existed. The renewal of commitments to send material aid to the Soviet Union, the beginnings of preparations for the early invasion of the Continent--which the President discussed at length with Molotov at the end of May and a conclusive demonstration of American naval strength in the Pacific all indicated that American efforts Might prove to be of rapidly growing importance, and of rapidly growing interest to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Japanese naval offensive in the North Pacific in late May and early June gave some reason to believe that Japan might turn its attention away front the Southwest Pacific. In mid-June, on the basis of recommendations drawn up by the War Department and accepted by the Navy. the President proposed to Stalin a meeting of the American and Soviet representatives.74 He pointed out the immediate advantages of establishing a ferry route via Alaska and Siberia, and the subsequent advantage--in case of Japanese attack--of its being operated by American crews, who would be ready to operate against Japanese forces and installations from Siberian bases.75 To facilitate preparations he proposed that the Soviet Government should authorize a preliminary survey by one American crew.
At the beginning of July 1942 the Soviet Government agreed to the proposed conversations ire and the projected survey flight in so far as they would help ill arranging for the delivery of lend-lease planes to Soviet crews in Alaska.76 The Soviet Government did not allude to the possibility
that either of these proposals would serve, as the President lead suggested, to facilitate American air operations based on Siberia. The Soviet Government simply repeated its earlier declaration of willingness to accept plane deliveries in Alaska, as had been urged by General Arnold in March 1942 and proposed by Admiral Standley in Moscow toward the end of April.77 The President soon decided to go ahead on the basis of this partial acceptance of his proposals. On 6 July 1942 he informed the Soviet Government that he had designated as his representative to go to Moscow, Maj. Gen. Follet Bradley, who would be assisted by the U.S. military and naval attaches there.78
General Bradley left Washington at the end of July. Before leaving, he was briefed in detail by the War Department strategic planners oil the background and objectives of his mission.79 In stating his own conception of it, he differentiated three phases.80 The first was to arrange for the delivery of planes to Soviet crews in Alaska; the second, to arrange for a survey of air facilities in Siberia; and the third, to, discuss U.S. air operations based in Siberia. He recognized that the Soviet Government lead agreed to the first project and to the second Only In so far as required b the first. This view of his mission was confirmed in War Department instructions issued to him on 20 July.81 Before his departure for Moscow, Bradley also went over with Arnold and with General Belyaev of the Soviet Purchasing Commission a provisional schedule of plane deliveries via Alaska and the arrangements for a small American party to survey Siberian air facilities.82 Finally, Bradley saw the President, who advised hire to bear in mint) the various circumstances favoring Soviet American military collaboration the probability of alt early Japanese attack on Siberia, the disadvantages of sending planes by any route other than the North Pacific, and the willingness of the U.S. Government to furnish whatever the Soviet Union needed if a way could be found to deliver it.83
General Bradley arrived in Moscow in early August 1942--a few days before the TORCH announcement was made.84 For two months it remained uncertain whether the Alaska-Siberia ferry route Would go into operation. During the second half of August a small survey party under Col. Alva L.
Harvey flew in a Soviet bomber over the ferry route, by Seimchan, Yakutsk, and Krasnoyarsk west to Moscow. Colonel Harvey reported that the route was practicable.85 The principal difficulty, as it had meanwhile become evident from the discussions being held at Moscow, was that the Soviet representatives considered that the United States would have to furnish forty-three transport planes to ferry Soviet crews to Alaska. This figure was based on the assumption that the twelve medium bombers, one hundred light bombers, and one hundred fighters due to be received each month would all be flown over this route. The War Department replied that the United States could furnish only ten transport planes for use over that route. The Soviet Government at length agreed to begin ferrying operations on a reduced scale.86 Planes had begun to arrive at Fairbanks, which had been chosen as the delivery point, when General Belyaey in Washington announced, on 19 September 1942, that only the planes then at Fairbanks would be accepted for ferrying across Siberia.87 The War Department held up all flights, awaiting information from Bradley.
On 21 September Bradley reported that Soviet officials in Moscow professed ignorance of the order.88 Early in October 1942 the Soviet Government decided to go on with ferrying operations after all, but the War Department had meanwhile decided that the route was closed, except for delivery of planes already at Fairbanks.89 Bradley strongly protested the War Department action. After a conference with Soviet representatives in Washington held on 6 October 1942, the War Department agreed to reopen the route.90
While progress was being made slowly and haltingly in opening the ferry route, Bradley was still awaiting an interview with Stalin and a chance to raise the question of a more extensive survey of Siberian air facilities. On 6 October 1942 he was finally granted an audience. He then brought up the question of a further survey of Siberian air installations to follow the earlier cursory survey made by Colonel Harvey in August. Stalin stated that the Soviet Government was well aware that its neutrality pact with Japan would not prevent a Japanese attack, and that the attack might come at any time. Although he was primarily interested in the air ferry route, and in the possibility, suggested by the British in August, of air assistance in the Caucasus, he authorized Bradley to undertake a survey of air facilities
in Siberia in the vicinity of Manchuria.91
General Bradley advised the War Department to postpone the survey until the United States could make a specific proposal for using the bases in case of war between Japan and the Soviet Union. He believed that the United States should first offer something more definite in justification of the survey than the information furnished him before leaving Washington--the War Department had designated two squadrons of bombers for use in such a contingency.92 The War Department replied that he should undertake only to survey facilities for air supply into China--as the President had directed--returning to Washington for further instructions before starting to survey facilities for possible air operations against Japan.93
Bradley returned to Washington early in December 1942 and made his detailed report.94 Since he had reason to believe that the Soviet Government might be willing to consider U.S. air operations based in Siberia, Army planning officers collected the extensive, though necessarily tentative, studies of such operations into a single War Department plan.95 These studies had become of increasing interest in the fall of 1942 following the occupation of Adak. The Army strategic planners recommended that Bradley be sent back to make the survey already authorized, oil the basis of a new proposal by the United States to commit three heavy bomber groups to Siberia immediately in the event of hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Union. The proviso was that the Soviet Union could make available adequate facilities and furnish the main items of bulk supply.96 The Chief of Staff presented this proposal to the JCS with a message to that effect for transmission to Stalin.97 Following JCS approval of the draft message, the President sent it on 30 December to Stalin.98
In answer, Stalin made it very clear that he wanted planes at once in the Caucasus and not air units at some later date in Siberia.99 The President replied that the units in question were not available and would become available only if Japan should attack the Soviet Union, as a result of redisposing United States forces in the Pacific. The President alluded to an explanation he had already made in connection with the proposed Caucasus air force that the United States did not have aircraft
that were not assigned to units and that the United States did not intend to make units inoperative by withdrawing aircraft from them.100 On this note the correspondence ended. The War Department thereupon reached an agreement with JCS to take no further action on the matter.101
The Alaska-Siberia ferry route had meanwhile continued in operation with results that were disappointing, even after allowance was made for the lack of transports. The delivery of aircraft had been slowed down not only by Soviet indecision but also by the need for special winterization of planes and installation of radio compasses.102 Upon Bradley's return from Moscow Marshall had proposed, and the JCS had agreed, to develop the route so that by the spring of 1943 it could handle all planes assigned to the Soviet Union.103 But by the end of the year only eighty-five planes had been delivered in Alaska for transfer, and experience with the difficulties of the route led the AAF planners to rely for the time being on air and water deliveries to the Persian Gulf ports.104
In the end, the United States had to accept the fact that the Soviet Government wanted, not closer collaboration, but more planes. The Second Protocol offered to the Soviet Government in June 1942 had fixed commitments for only three months in advance. It had provided that in October 1942 commitments were to be made "for the balance of the year on the basis of developments incident to the progress of the war."105 In October there were pending before the Munitions Assignments Board, Soviet requests for an increase that would nearly double the rate of factory deliveries for transfer to the Soviet Government.106 The Soviet requests amounted to an average of slightly over 400 planes monthly for the last three months of 1942.
Soviet Plane Requirements
While the Munitions Assignments Board was considering these requests, the President
told the JCS that the United States must at least maintain the scale of its commitments. To do less, lie declared, would be to go back on the promise in the Second Protocol to renew the commitments in the light of "developments incident to the progress of the war." He asked the JCS to "give immediate and careful consideration to increasing this number." He indicated how he thought it might be done: "I wish you would consider particularly, in reaching a decision on this point, the present number of planes and plans to augment them in inactive theaters of the tear, including Continental United States."107
In effect, the President was suggesting that AAF might cut back its schedules for activating new units, though he was apparently not prepared to direct such a move in the face of rapidly expanding American air operations over the Continent and, before long, in North Africa and in the South Pacific. A AF was, of course, opposed to any cutback and so advised the Munitions Assignments Board. On 6 October General Arnold notified the Soviet Purchasing Commission of this action. General Arnold dwelt on the point that he hoped in the near future to improve the rate of deliveries overseas, which tip to that tune had not kept tip with factory deliveries. He also hoped, beginning in January 1943, to send no more P-40's, but only P-39's, as the Soviet Government desired. Nevertheless his estimate of future deliveries provided for no increases in fighters and medium bombers, for the decrease which he had earlier requested in light bombers, and for no deliveries of heavy bombers or observation planes.108
On 8 October the Munitions Assignments Board announced its decision simply to continue commitments at the existing rate.109 Following this announcement, the President received front Stalin an urgent request that plane allocations to the Soviet Union should be increased, at least for the next few months, to 500 planes a month. This was a figure some hat higher than the average monthly total contained in the previous Soviet request. On 10 October 1942 the President asked Hopkins to tell Marshall that in view of this personal request from Stalin he wanted to send some additional planes at once, even if it meant Withdrawing them from the coastal defenses of the United States. Hopkins explained to Marshall that the President understood it was out of the question to send 500 planes a month, but would like to be able to tell Stalin that over and above all of the U.S. protocol commitments the United States could and would send to hire, as soon as possible, 300 additional planes, preferably at the rate of 100 a month, beginning immediately.110
Marshall, after consulting with AAF, reaffirmed the War Department position that the Army's need for planes was urgent and should conic first. He stated that no additional planes Could be sent to the USSR except at the expense of "our active combat theaters," or of a serious curtailment of TORCH, then in the final planning stage. He reminded the President that the mission of the coastal defense units was in fact operational training, with a defense mission superimposed; that the units were only at half strength; and that the planes they had were unsuitable for "an active
theater." He explained that for every twenty-five additional fighter planes that the United States should undertake to send monthly to the Soviet Union, AAF would he able to maintain one less fighter group overseas; for every thirteen medium or light bombers, one less bombardment group.111
The JCS had still to respond to the President's directive of 1 October 1942, in which he had asked them to consider carefully whether scene increase in plane allocations to the Soviet Union could not be made.112 Before the JCS lead prepared their reply, the President had accepted the need to postpone until January 1943 any increase over the existing commitments as reviewed by the Munitions Assignments Board. The JCS, therefore, decided on 13 October not to take tip the question until the arrival of Admiral Standley, who was soon to return to Washington from the Soviet Union for conferences.113 They agreed that their basic difficulty was their ignorance of how critical the needs of the Soviet Union really were.
The JCS accordingly consulted with Admiral Standley after his arrival in Washington a few days later. He fully approved of the proposal, which by then had been made to the Soviet Government, to send a British American air force to the Caucasus. He felt that this measure, together with the continuance of the current rate under the protocol, would be completely satisfactory to the USSR and preferable to providing only a slight increase. On 24 October, with this confirmation of their opinions, the JCS answered the President's appeal by recommending that the existing rate be continued.114
Thus, by the early fall of 1942, the President as well as the, Prime Minister had to reckon with the effect of TORCH--added to the needs of other active theaters--on lend lease to the USSR. Just as the Prime Minister had had to acknowledge that lie must suspend the monthly northern convoys, so the President had to admit that lie could trot increase plane allocations to the USSR in the immediate future. Although apparently not completely satisfied, the President did not reopen the question of plane allocations until lie had first tried to get the Soviet Government to accept, as the British Government had earlier accepted. American air units in lieu of American planes.115 Upon the Soviet refusal to accept this solution, the prospect of a satisfactory settlement of the plane allocations problem seemed as remote as ever.
By the end of November 1942 the President and the Prime Minister could tell themselves that they had really tried to compensate for the effects of TORCH on lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union. But the War Department expected no improvement in British-American military relations with the USSR in the immediate future except where such collaboration would clearly contribute
to the one common interest--the early defeat of Germany.116 In other words, the question of the "second front" remained critical. The Prime Minister was anxious to reach an understanding. He told the President in early December 1942, with reference to proposed staff conferences in Moscow, that "what we are going to do about ROUNDUP," would be "almost the sole thing they will want to know."117 In the absence of specific manifestations of a definite British-American understanding on this issue, the fact that the War Department had long been pressing for the early establishment of it second front had proved of little assistance in American dealings with the Soviet Government.
Table of Contents
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1. See Ch. X, above.
2. Msg, War Cabinet Offs to Jt Stf Miss, Washington, 8 Jul 42, COS (W) 217, Item 9, Exec 5.
3. Memo, OPD for CofS, 6 Aug 42, sub: TORCH, Tab 21, Item 1, Exec 5.
4. (1) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 473. (2) See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 616, for the President's advice to the Prime Minister on the manner of handling the delicate task.
5. Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 475.
6. Mr. Harriman had been serving as lend-lease "Expediter," with the rank of minister, in London.
For the Bradley mission, see below, pp. 343 ff.
7. A picturesque detailed description of the meetings with Stalin in mid-August is contained in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 472 502.
For an account of Harriman's contemporary reports to Washington on the conference, see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 616-21. No copies of Harriman's reports have been found in War Department files. War Department leaders may, of course, have learned of them one way or another.
The tense atmosphere of the meetings was later described to the War Department General Council by Col. Joseph A. Michela, U.S. military attaché in Moscow. He stated that Churchill had at one point threatened to leave but was persuaded to remain. (Mtg, Gen Council, 26 Oct 42, OPD 334.8 Gen Council, 26.)
8. Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Aug 42, CM-IN 9966.
9. Msg, Bradley to Marshall, 28 Aug 42, CM-IN 11318 (8/30/42).
10. In a message to the Prime Minister shortly before the Moscow conference of mid-August 1942, the President had expressed interest in the possibilities of aiding the Soviet Union by direct air support to them on the southern end of their front. See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 616.
11. Memo, President for CofS, 21 Aug 42, OPD 381 Russia, 6.
12. Memo, CofS for President [26 Aug 42], sub: Merits and Possibilities of Placing an Amer Air Force on the Caucasian Front, submitted for Marshall's signature with memo, OPD for COfS, 24 Aug 42, same sub, both in OPD 381 Russia, 6.
13. Msg cited n. 9.
14. Msg, Prime Minister to President, 30 Aug 42, No. 141, with CCS 122 in ABC 370.5 Caucasus (10-13-42). Two weeks later, not having received a reply, the Prune Minister repeated his request for the President's answer. (Msg, same to same, 14 Sep 42. No. 148, Tab 50, Item 1, Exec 5.)
15. Memo, CofS for President, 18 Sep 42, sub: Proposed Anglo-Amer Air Force for Opn in Caucasus Area, incl draft msg; [President to Prime Minister], OPD 381 Russia, 7.
16. For the staff study and action, see: (1) memo, Wedemeyer for ACofS OPD, 6 Sep 42, sub: Proposed Anglo-Amer Air Force for Opn in Caucasian Area: (2) memo, OPD for CofS, 17 Sep 42, same sub (with this memo, bearing Gen Arnold's initials in concurrence, was submitted a draft rnsg [President to Prime Minister] and a draft memo [COfS for President] and (3) note, H. [Handy] "Coordinate with Gen. Arnold and prepare a proposed action," on cover sheet. All in OPD 381 Russia, 7.
17. Memo, Secy JCS [Deane], for OPD, 10 Oct 42, sub: U.S. and Br Air Units for Soviet Use in Caucasus, Item 20, Exec 1. This memorandum gives excerpts on the subject front several messages between the President and Prince Minister. See especially, excerpts front messages Nos. 186 and 187, 16 and 27 September, President to Prime Minister.
18. See msg, Prime Minister to President, 22 Sep 42, No.151, Item 63a, Exec 10.
19. Msg, President to Prime Minister, 5 Oct 42, Item 63, Exec 10. The message refers to the Prime Minister's message No. 154. The message of 5 October was transmitted to General Marshall by Comdr. W.L. Freseman, White House aide, for Admiral Leahy. This file also contains a War Department draft reply, with the notation "Draft sent to Pres."
20. Msg, President to Prime Minister (No. 192), as quoted in memo cited n. 17.
21. Msg, President to Prime Minister (No. 193), as quoted in memo cited n. 17.
22. (1) Msg, Bradley to Marshall, 5 Oct 42, CM-IN 29-10 (10/7/42). (2) Memo, Bradley for CofS, 8 Dec 42, sub: Mtg with Mr. Stalin, Incl 5 with ltr, Bradley to CofS (through OPD), 14 Dec 42, sub: Rpt of Miss, bound in Vol, title: Rpt of Bradley Miss to Russia, Jul 26, 1942 to Dec 3, 1942, filed in back of OPD file on F.O. Bradley.
23. (1) Msg cited n. 22 (1). (2) Msg, Bradley to Marshall, 6 Oct 42, CM-IN 3426.
24. Msg, Bradley to Marshall, 11 Oct 42, CM-IN 4909.
25. Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Bradley, 12 Oct 42, CM-OUT 3905.
26. These recommendations came in response to a series of questions raised by Secretary of the JCS, General Deane. Memo, Brigadier Vivian Dykes for Deane, 13 Oct 42, sub: Proposed Despatch of U.S. and Br Air Forces to Caucasus, incl with memo, Secy JCS for JPS, 13 Oct 42, no sub. Both memos are incls to JPS 72/D, 13 Oct 42.
27. Memo, Secy, Reps of Br COS, for Secy JCS, 16 Oct 42, circulated as JCS 131/1, 17 Oct 42.
28. OPD brief, Votes on . . . JCS 38th mtg, 20 Oct 42, with JCS 131/1 in ABC 370.5 Caucasus (10-13-42).
29. Min, 38th mtg JCS, 20 Oct 42.
31. (1) Memo, Streett for Handy, 15 Oct 42, sub cited n. 26, OPD 381 Russia, 7. (2) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Maxwell, 19 Oct 42, CM-OUT 6148 (R). (3) Note for red, with OPD 381 Middle Fast, 31. (4) Min cited n. 29.
32. Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Adler, 24 Oct 42, CM-OUT 8602 (10/25/42).
33. Msg (originator AAF), Marshall to Brereton, 10 Oct 42, CM-OUT 3346.
34. (1) Msg, Gen Parks for G-2, 13 Nov 42, CM-IN 5731. The mission left Cairo on 16 November. (2) See also ltr, Gen Adler to CofS, 30 Dec 42, sub: Rpt of Activities-Russian Miss, WDCSA Russia (S).
35. (1) Msg, Gen Adler to Gens Marshall and Andrews, 25 Nov 42, CM-IN 11066 (11/26/42). (2) Msg, same to same, 27 Nov 42, CM-IN 12335 (11/29/42). (3) Msg, Br Air Ministry to Marshall, 29 Nov 42 (Air 585), Item 11, Exec 1. (4) Msg, Adler to Marshall and Andrews, 2 Dec 42, CM-IN 1346 (12/4/42).
For a summary account of the mission, see ltr cited n. 34(2).
36. Msg cited n. 35 (1).
37. For the modified proposal, presented by General Falalaeyev, see msg cited n. 35(3).
38. (1) Memo, Streett for Arnold, 30 Nov 42, sub: Br and Amer Participation in Caucasus, Item 11, Exec 1. (2) Proposed msg to Drummond-Adler muss, incl with memo, Arnold for Deane, sub: Anglo-U.S. Force in Caucasus, with CCS 122/1 in ABC 370.5 Caucasus (10-13-42). Gen Handy, ACofS OPD, stated his concurrence in note, 2 Dec 42, OPD 381 Russia, 12. (3) Memo, Secy JCS for Leahy, Marshall, King, and Arnold, 3 Dec 42, sub: Aircraft for Caucasus. (4) Note for red, R.J.B. [Lt Col Brown], 5 Dec 42. Last two in OPD 452.1 Russia, 20.
39. For the Prime Minister's explicit statement on the "overriding political benefits" of the original plan, which the Soviet counterproposal would not permit, see msg, Prime Minister to President, 3 Dec 42.220, Item 11, Exec 1.
40. Msg, Adler to Marshall and Andrews, 14 Dec 42, CM-IN 6209.
41. Msg, COS to Jt Stf Miss [COs (W) 394], 16 Dec 42, Item 11, Exec 1. This message was at once circulated to the JCS.
42. (1) Min, 46th mtg JCS, 15 Dec 42. (2) Memo, Leahy for President, 16 Dec 42, sub: Anglo Amer Air Units in Caucasus, OPD 381 Russia, 14.
43. Memo, Handy for CofS, 16 Dec 42, no sub, OPD 381 Russia, 17.
44. Msg, President to Stalin, 16 Dec 42, draft in Item 11, Exec 1. The War Department was very much concerned during the drafting of this message--by Leahy for the President--to learn exactly what the President had in mind. See (1) memo, Handy for CofS, 16 Dec 42, no sub, Item 11, Exec 1, and (2) note, H.H.A. [Arnold] to Handy, in pen on memo cited above.
45. Msg, Stalin to President, 20 Dec 42, contained in msg, McCrea [White House naval aide] to Leahy, transmitted to JCS by Deane as incl with memo, Secy JCS for JCS, 21 Dec 42, sub: Use of Anglo Amer Air Squadrons in Transcaucasia, Item 11, Exec 1.
46. (1) Draft memo, Leahy for President, 21 Dec 42, incl with memo cited n. 45. (2) Msg, President to Stalin, 8 Jan 43, Incl B with JCS 180/1. The file, ABC 334.8 Bradley Mission (12-27-42), gives further evidence that the draft message contained in the draft memorandum of 21 December was actually sent.
47. (1) Note, Deane for Marshall, on memo cited n. 45. (2) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Adler, 21 Dec 42, CM-OUT 7243. (3) Msg, Adler to Marshall and Andrews, 24 Dec 42, CM-IN 10904 (12/25/42).(4) Ltr cited n. 34.
48. (1) Msg, COMINCH for COMNAVEU [Stark], 9 Jul 42 , top of file, Book 6, Exec 8. (2) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Jul 42, CM-IN 4940 (7/15 /42). (3) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 600. (4) Memo, Smith (Secy JCS) for JCS, I Aug 42, sub: Notes of Conf held at White House at 8:30 P. M., 30 Jul 42, Paper 78, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B. (5) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 262 ff.
49. Starting in August 1942, a program of transfer under lend-lease of U.S. ships to Soviet registry for the Pacific route (for nonmilitary supplies) was inaugurated. (See Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare.)
50. The British controlled the southern half of the trans-Iranian railroad from the ports at the head of the Persian Gulf to Tehran. The Soviet Union controlled the railroad north of Tehran.
51. See memo, Brig Geri Wilhelm D. Styer for Gen Somervell, 4 Jul 42, no sub, WDCSA Russia (S), and memo, Marshall and King for Hopkins, 15 Jill 42, no sub, Item 37, Exec 10. For Spalding's recommendations and action taken on than by the Munitions Assignments Board :end War Department, see: (1) msg, Gen Spalding to Gen Burns, 24 Jul 42, CM-IN 8947 (7/26/42)(R); (2) memo MAB (Gen Burns) for OPD, 27 Jul 42, sub: Delivery of Fighter Planes to Russia, and (3) memo, OPD for SOS, 29 Jul 42, sub: Delivery of Fighter Planes to Russia, both in OPD 452.1 Russia, 7: and (4) msg (originator OPD), Burns to Spalding, 1 Aug 42, CM-OUT 0251 (R). A full account of the action taken in the Sumner of 1942 to increase the flow of supplies via the Persian Gulf route is contained in Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, Ch. X.
52. (1) Msg, Harriman to Hopkins [ALUSNA, London, to Op Nav, No. 131220], 13 Jul 42, WDCSA Russia (S). (2) Memo, Marshall and King for Hopkins, cited n. 51. For authority and concurrence on this memorandum see notes attached to copies in WDCSA Russia (S).
53. Memo, Marshall and King for Hopkins, cited n. 51.
54. Msg, Harriman (signed Maxwell) to President, 22 Aug 42, CM-IN 8567 (8/23/42).
55. (1) Memo, Streett for Somervell, 25 Aug 42, no sub, OPD 617 Iran, 1. (2) Notes on War Council, 2 Sep 42, Vol II, SW Confs, WDCSA. (3) OPD brief, Notes on . . . 39th mtg CCS, 4 Sep 42, with CCS 109 in ABC 520 Persia (9-2-42), 1. (4) Memo, Brig Gen Leroy Lutes for Somervell,18, Sep 42, no sub, OPD 617 Iran,3. (5) Memo, Somervell for Lutes, 29 Aug 42, no sub, Opns SOS 1942-43 in Hq ASF file, Sp Collections Subsec, DRB AGO. (6) Tab A with CPS 46/2, 10 Sep 42, title: Development of Persian Transportation Facilities.
56. For the compromise on British-American command prerogatives in the Middle East, see especially: (1) CCS 109, 2 Sep 42, title cited n. 55(6); (2) OPD brief cited n. 55(3); (3) CPS 46 2, 10 Sep 42: (4) CPS 46/3, 16 Sep 42, title cited n. 55(6); (5) pers ltr, Lt Col W.E.U. Abraham [JSM] for Gen Wedemeyer, 17 Sep 42, with CCS 109:1 in ABC 520 Persia (9-2-42), 1; (6) min, 40th mtg CCS, 18 Sep 42; (7) CCS 109/1, 22 Sep 42, title cited n. 55(6); (8) min, 34th mtg JCS, 22 Sep 42; and (9) memo, Secy JCS [Comdr McDowell] for ACofS OPD and Aide COMINCH, 23 Sep 42, sub: Development of Persian Transportation Facilities, with CCS 109/1 in ABC 520 Persia (9-2-42) 1. The subject is described in considerable detail in Matter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, Chs. X, XI.
57. (1) Ltr, CofS to Connolly, 1 Oct 42, sub: Ltr of Instns. (2) Ltr, G-2 [for CofS] to Connolly, 21 Oct 42, sub: Supplement to Ltr of Instns: Mil Intel Instns. Both with CCS 109/1 in ABC 520 Persia (9-2-42), 1. The PGSC was a redesignation of the Iran Iraq Service Command, activated 24 June 1942. The latter was itself a redesignation of the U.S. Military Iranian Mission Headquarters, Basra.
58. It was not until more than a year later, when the Middle East had ceased to be a major theater of operations, that PGSC, reorganized as the Persian Gulf Command (PGC) on 10 December 1943, became autonomous in name as well as in fact.
59. The British responsibility for defense was clearly stated in CCS 109/1. See also msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Connolly, 15 Nov 42, CM-OUT 4986 (R).
60. There was later some talk about extending American operation to the northern section of the railroad. (1) See msg, Admiral Standley to State Dept, 26 Feb 43 [No 215 in 3 sees]. (2) For WD reaction to the idea, which had no support on the political level, see papers filed with above msg, incl Msgs (originator OPD), Marshall to Brereton and Connolly, 2 Mar 43, CM-OUT 588 and CM-OUT 589. First two in OPD 617 Iran, 7. (3) The question is treated definitively in Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia.
61. See, for example, memo, Wedemeyer for Chief, Africa Middle East Theater, OPD, 10 Dec 42, sub: Scope of PGSC, with CCS 109/1 in ABC 520 Persia (9-2-42), 1.
62. (1) Memo, SOS for OPD, 2 Sep 42, sub: Activation of Units above Tr Basis. (2) 1st Ind, OPD for SOS, 4 Sep 42, to above memo. Both in OPD 320.2 Middle East, 24. (3) Memo, SOS for G-3, 20 Sep 42, sub: Persian Gulf Railway Comd, OPD 617 Iran, 5.
63. (1) Memo, OPD for AGF and SOS 5 Oct 42 sub: Tr Mvmts to Middle East. (2) Memo, OPD for SOS, 10 Oct 42, sub: Priorities for Nov Shipt of Trs to PGSC. Both in OPD 370.5 Middle East. 28. (3) Memo, OPD for TAG, 10 Oct 42, sub: Mvmt Orders, Shipt No. 1616, OPD 370.5 Iran, 4. (4) Memo, SOS for OPD, 26 Oct 42, sub cited n. 56(9), with CCS 109/1 in ABC 520 Persia (9-2-42), 1. (5) Memo, AGF for OPD, 2 Nov 42, sub: AGF Units for PGSC, OPD 370.5 Iran, 3. (6) Memo, OPD for SOS and AGF, 4 Nov 42, sub: Tr Mvmts to PGSC, OPD 370.5 Middle East, 35.
64. On 1 October U.S. Army ground strength in Iraq-Iran was 310; on 31 December, 400; and on 14 January 1943, 5,890 troops. (OPD Weekly Status Maps for 1 Oct and 31 Dec 42, and 14 Jan 43, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).)
65. Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, Tables 1 and 2, pp. 481, 486; Charts 8 and 12, pp. 506, 508.
66. See Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XIX, pp. 90-91, and Ch. XX, pp. 29-33, MS.
From June through December 1942, 117 ships sailed from Western Hemisphere ports for Vladivostok carrying 560,000 gross long tons of cargo. (State Dept] Rpt (cited p. 205, n. 31) on War Aid furnished by U.S. to USSR, pp. 14-15, copy filed Item 5, OPD Hist Unit File.
67. For earlier negotiations and staff discussion;, see above, Ch. VI.
68. Memo, Arnold for Eisenhower, 5 May 42, sub: Possible Siberian Opns, OPD 4..52.1 Russia, 3.
70. (1) Memo, AAF for OPD, 6 May 12, sub: Cablegram to be Dispatched to Admiral Standley. The text of the proposed message was submitted therein. (2) Memo, Eisenhower for Arnold, 7 May 42, no sub. Both in OPD 452.1 Russia, 3. The proposed message, redrafted for transmission to the military attaché, Colonel Michela, was inclosed therewith. (3) Msg (originator AAF), Arnold to Military Attaché, Kuibyshev. 7 May 42. CM-OUT 1495
71. Msg, Michela to G-2, 16 May 42, CM-IN 4684. The JPS took note of the message a1 few days later, and discussed the Soviet position. (See min, 17th mtg JPS, 20 May 42.)
72. Msg (originator AAF), Marshall (to USFOR, London; for Standley, 23 May 42, CM-OUT 4743. Admiral Standley was asked to continue "pressure" to get permission for delivery by American pilots, for an American-operated delivery route from Basra, and for a route via the polar icecap. A few day's later Standley requested further information to use in pressing these points in his conversations. See 1700 Rpt, 27 May 42 entry, Current Gp File, DRB AGO.)
73. Memo, Lt Col Theodore Babbitt, Actg Foreign Ln Off, for Chief, MIS, 15 Jun 42, sub: :fir Info, E Siberia, WDCSA Siberia (S).
The air staff followed up the suggestion, to deal with Ambassador Litvinov, to no avail. As Arnold reported: "Litvinoff stated that he was not interested. All he. wanted was more planes shipped to Russia." (Notes on War Council, 22 Jun 42, SW Confs, Vol II, WDCSA.)
74. (1) OPD draft memo [SW fur President], l6 Jun 42, no sub. This memorandum states that Marshall and King had approved the attached draft message; (2) Memo, SW for President, 16 Jun 42, no sub. Both in Item 53, Exec 10. (3) Msg, President to Stalin [OpNav to ALUSNA Moscow], 17 June 42, Item 37, Exec: 10.
75. Msg, President [to Standley] for Stalin, 23 Jun 12, Item 37, Exec 10.
76. (1) Msg, Standley to President and Secy State, 2 Jul 42 [No. 227]. A copy of the message is also in WDCSA Russia (S), transmitting a reply as received from Molotov. (2) Msg, same to same, 2Jul 42 [No. 231]. Both in Item 37, Exec 10.
77. Msg, Standley to President and Secy State, 4 Jul 42 [No. 237], Item 37, Exec 10.
78. Msg, President to Stalin [OpNav to ALUSNA Moscow], 6 Jul 42, Item 37, Exec 10. General Bradley was then in command of the First Air Force.
79. (1) Memo, Col Gailey [Exec OPD] for Chief of S&P Gp [OPD], 10 Jul 42, sub: Miss to USSR. (2) Memo, OPD for G-2, 10 Jul 42, same sub. (3) Memo, OPD for AAF, 10 Jul 42, same sub. All in Tab Misc, Book 6, Exec 8.
80. Memo, Bradley for Arnold,15 Jul 42, sub: Miss to Moscow, Item 37, Exec: 10.
81. Ltr SW to Bradley, 20 Jul 42, sub: Ltr of Instn, WDCSA Russia (S). He was authorized to deal in detail with technical problems involved in planning for common action in the North Pacific and was empowered to discuss, without making. commitments, the courses of action which would be opened by Soviet participation in the war against Japan.
82. (1) Memo, Bradley for Arnold, l5 Jul 42 sub: Directive for Siberian Survey and ferry Flights. (2) Ltr, Bradley to Belyaev, 18 Jul 92, no sub. (3) Memo, Bradley for OPD, 23 July 42, no sub. All in Item 37, Exec 10.
83. Memo, Bradley for CofS, 22 Jul 42, sub: Visit whit President, WDCSA Russia (S). The President also instructed Bradley specifically to look into the possibility of sending supplies to China byway of Siberia.
84. Bradley's report on his mission lists his first conference in Moscow as being on 6 August 1942. Ltr, Bradley to CofS (through OPD), 14 Dec 42, sub: Rpt of Miss, bound in vol, title: Rpt of Bradley Miss to Russia . . ., filed in back of OPD file on F.O. Bradley.
85. For a complete report, see Sec III, Harvey Siberian Survey Miss, pp. 2-3, in Proceedings of Jt U.S.-Russian Mil Miss Convened in Moscow, U.S.S.R., 1942, Incl. 1 with ltr cited n. 84.
86. See Sec IV, Transports, pp. 6-11, in Proceedings . . ., cited n. 85.
87. Ltr, Belyaev to Arnold, 19 Sep 42, Item 37, Exec 10.
88. (1) Msg (originator AAF) Marshall to Bradley, 19 Sep 42, CM-OUT 6712 (R). (2) Msg, Bradley to OPD, 21 Sep 42, CM-IN 9943 (9/23/42) (R). (3) Msg, Bradley to OPD, 21Sep 42, CM-IN 10083 (9/23/42) (R). (4) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Bradley, 27 Sep 42, CM-OUT 9176 (R).
89. (1) Msg, Bradley to Marshall, 3 Oct 42, CM-IN 1941 (10/5/42) (R). (2) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Bradley, 4 Oct 42, CM-OUT 1371 (R). The War Department had not yet received CM-IN 1941, containing information of the "official Soviet request" to recommence operations over the Alaska-Siberia route.
90. (1) Msg, Bradley to Marshall (action OPD), 5 Oct 42, CM-IN 2481 (10/6/42) (R). (2) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Bradley, 7 Oct 42, CM-OUT 2193. (3) Memo, SOS for CofS, 8 Oct 42, sub: Rpt to President Showing Progress of WD in Mtg Second Russian Protocol, WDCSA Russia (S).
91. (1) Msg, Bradley to Marshall, 5 Oct 42, CM-IN 2940 (10/7/42). (2) Memo, Bradley for CofS, 8 Dec 42, sub: Mtg with Mr. Stalin, Incl 5 with Ltr cited n. 84.
92. Msg, Bradley to Marshall, 19 Oct 42, CM-IN 8920 (10/21/42). For the information furnished Bradley before he left Washington, see msg (originator SGS), McNarney to Marshall, 23 Jul 42, CM-OUT 6627.
93. Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Bradley, 23 Oct 42, CM-OUT 7891.
94. On 7 December Bradley reported orally to the General Council. (Mtg, Gen Council, 7 Dec 42, OPD 334.8 Gen Council, 32.). His full written report to the Chief of Staff was submitted a week later. This consists of a forwarding memorandum and nine studies bound in the volume cited n. 84.
95. WD Plan for Air Support of Russia in Event of Attack by Japan on USSR, G-3 Regd Docs. Short title of this plan is WDOPD-ASOR, code name: BAZAAR.
96. Memo, OPD for CofS, 21 Dec 42, sub: Bradley Miss, Item 20, Exec 1.
97. JCS 180, 27 Dec 42, title: Bradley Miss.
98. (1) Min, 48th mtg JCS, 29 Dec 42. (2) Draft msg with memo, JCS [Leahy] to President, a0 Dec 42, sub: Survey of Air Force Facilities in Far East, with JCS 180 in ABC 334.8 Bradley Miss (12-27-42). (3) Memo for rcd, JKW [Lt Col James K. Woolnough], on one of copies of above memo, stating, "President approved and message dispatched December 30, 1942."
99. (1) Msg, Stalin to President, 5 Jan 43, Incl A to JCS 180/1, 11 Jan 43, title: Bradley Miss/Bornbers for Far East. (2) Msg, same to same, 13 Jan 43, incl to JCS 180/2, 21 Jan 43, same title.
100. Msg, President to Stalin, 8 Jan 43, Incl B to JCS 180/1.
101. Memo, OPD for JCS Secretariat, 28 Jan 43, sub: WD Implementing Action on JCS 182. (2) Memo for rcd, JKW [Woolnough], 1 Feb 43, same sub. Both with JCS 182 in ABC 381 Japan (5-31-42), 2.
102. (1) Rpt of Bradley Miss cited n. 84. (2) Memo, Bradley for CG AAF, 14 Dec 42, sub: Air Transports for Russia, OPD 4.52.1 Russia, 21.
103. (1) Memo, OPD for CofS, 21 Dec 42, sub: Bradley Miss, Item 20, Exec 1. (2) JCS 180, 27 Dec 42. (3) Min, 48th nag JCS, 29 Dec 42.
104. (1) Table: Status of Russian Aid Aircraft, Tab C, with ltr, SW to President, 10 Feb 43, no sub, WDCSA Russia (S). (2) Msg (originator OPD), Gen Marshall to Gen Bradley or Brig Gen Philip R. Faymonville, Moscow, 14 Nov 42, CM-OUT 4671 (R). Ultimately, 8,000 out of 14,000-odd planes delivered to the Soviet Union were sent via Alaska and Siberia, with an enormous saving in shipping. (See table: Aircraft Delivered to USSR in [State Dept] Rpt on War Aid Furnished by U.S. to USSR, p. 18.
105. JCS 123 7 Oct 42 title: Allocation of Aircraft under the Russian Protocol. For June negotiations on the Second Protocol, see above, Ch. X. The Second Protocol was finally signed in Washington on 6 October 1942. (See p. 3 of [State Depth Rpt cited n. 104.). The Second Protocol had been serving since the summer of 1942 as a basis for scheduling shipments to the Soviet Union.
106. The extent of the increase requested is shown in the following tabulation:
Compiled from memo, MBW for JPS, 8 Oct 42, sub: Asgmt of Aircraft to USSR, filed with JCS 124 in ABC 452.1 (1-22-42), 2.
Heavy Bombers none 75 Medium Bombers 36 150 Light Bombers 300 525 Fighters (P-40's, 39's) 300 450 Observation (O-52) none 30 Total 636 1,230
107. Memo, President for JCS, 1 Oct 42, circulated as JCS 123, 7 Oct 42.
108. Ltr, Arnold to Belyaev, 6 Oct 42, no sub, OPD 452.1 Russia, 14.
109. Memo cited n. 106.
110. Pers ltr, Hopkins to Marshall, 10 Oct 42, Item 54, Exec 10.
111. Memo, CofS for President, 10 Oct 42, no sub, Item 54, Exec 10. An appended note states "memo as sent." An earlier WD draft is filed with this memorandum.
112. The JPS had submitted to the JCS a draft study in response to the President's directive. (This study was circulated as JCS 123/, 11 Oct 42, title cited n. 105.)
113. Min, 37th mtg JCS, 13 Oct 42.
114. Memo, JCS ,for President, 24 Oct 42, sub: Allocation of Aircraft under the Russian Protocol, with JCS 123/ 1 in ABC 452.1 (1-22-42), 2.
115. For an indication that the President had not given up the idea of increasing plane allocations to the USSR in the near future, see pees ltr, President to Prime Minister, 30 Nov 42, Item 63a, Exec 10.
116. (1) Draft memo [Gen Arnold for JCS], n.d., sill): Mil Police-Toward Russia. (2) Memo, Wedemeyer for Handy, 10 Dec 42, same sub.; (3) Memo, Handy for Arnold, 13 Dec 42, no sub. All in OPD 381 Russia, 13.
117. Msg, Prime Minister to President, 2 Dec 42, No. 216, Item 63a, Exec 10.