Chapter VIII
The Principle of Concentration in the British Isles

The program of the War Department for limiting Arm commitments in the Pacific was In keeping with previous understandings on British and American strategy. But the purpose of the War Department in advancing this program went beyond the previous understandings and was in conflict with the announced intentions of the Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff. As General Eisenhower had urged in February, the War Department began planning to gather U.S. Army forces in the British Isles as rapidly as possible, in preparation for an invasion of northwestern Europe across the English Channel. The reason given by Eisenhower for beginning at once to plan by this basis was the fear of a collapse of the Red Army in 1942. A collapse of the Red Army would leave Great Britain and the United States with little prospect of victory in northwestern Europe.1 Back of this reasoning lay the fear of becoming committed successively to a whole series of limited operations--peninsular campaigns in Europe and island campaigns in the Pacific. Behind this fear lay the conviction that these limited operations, would serve only to restrict the enemies' positions without greatly reducing their actual and potential strength, white tying down such large Allied armies and building up such formidable demands on overseas supply routes as to rule out the possibility of mounting a "decisive" campaign against the heavily defended main position of either Germany or Japan.

There seemed to be some chance that the War Department could avoid making such a series of commitments. The British shared the War Department's fears, in so far as operations against Japan were concerned, and the U.S. Navy shared its fears, in so far as operations against Germany were concerned. There was a possibility that Admiral King might accept what could not but seem to him a very inadequate provision for "defensive" operations in the Pacific, in order to avoid a prolonged involvement in secondary, campaigns against Germany that might indefinitely postpone decisive action against Japan. There was a parallel possibility that, in order to assure that U.S. Army forces would not become heavily committed to operations against Japan, the British Chiefs might be ready to forego their long-considered strategy of opening in the Mediterranean several limited offensives against Germany. There was of course no certainty, even if the military staffs should reach agreement on this basis, whether the President and the Prime Minister would accept it, restraining their desire to commit forces to action as fast as they became available.


The fiat condition of gaining approval for the War Department's plan for concentration in the British Isles was fulfilled when Admiral King acquiesced in the limitation of Arm strength in the Pacific.2 The second condition was fulfilled by the agreement of the British Chiefs, through their representatives in the CCS, to discontinue active planning, far the joint British-American invasion of North Africa.

The Cancellation of SUPER-GYMNAST

At the very end of the ARCADIA Conference the President and the Prime Minister had agreed to defer this operation until May, in order that the military staffs might go ahead with the scheduled reinforcement of Positions ill the South and Southwest Pacific and in southeast Asia, but it was evident that neither of them had given up the idea and that they expected to bring it up again in the late spring, and that they were strongly disposed to act sooner if they should receive an "invitation" from the French.3

After the ARCADIA Conference the planners set out to fix the meaning of the primary assumption of the plan-that the French authorities would issue an "invitation." The British planners in Washington stated that they presupposed "Whole-hearted French cooperation," especially on the part of the French Fleet units under the control of the Vichy government, whereas the ARCADIA language seemed to allow for "slight uncoordinated resistance."4 The combined planners and Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, who had succeeded General Stilwell in command of the American forces assigned to the African operation, eventually agreed to plan on the assumption that Vichy French authorities would be helpful and would have bound themselves to prevent the French Fleet units from opposing the operations.5

Securing assurances of this kind from Vichy seemed much less probable at the end of February 1942 than it had in December 1941. In December initial successes of General Sir Claude Auchinleck's Eighth Army offensive in Libya, which had started auspiciously in November, had caused the British to anticipate an early approach to Tunisia and a trench invitation to occupy forth Africa. By the end of January 1942 the initiative had passed to the Afrika Korps, and the British had fallen back to eastern Libya to establish a defensive line that would protect Egypt. United States and British military opinion was unanimous that "far from cooperating, the Vichy French will continue to aid the Axis . . . until such time as the Axis is on the run."6

The unfavorable turn of events in North Africa after the ARCADIA Conference simplified the problem for the Army planners, since it put entirely out of the question the SUPER-GYMNASTS operation, which they believed to be beyond the means of the United States and Great Britain, and unwise in


itself.7 Plans were made for the invasion of North Africa in case the trench should issue an "Invitation" some time soon.8 But even on this assumption, the War Department concluded that the requirements of the operation could be met only by suspending all movements to Iceland and Ireland, and reducing reinforcements to Australia and Hawaii to a "trickle."9 Furthermore, cargo ships, which were critical in supporting SUPER-GYMNAST, could be made available only at the expense of the Soviet aid program and Red Sea service. The British, too, were held back by a want of shipping, which made SUPER-GYMNAST" almost certainly impossible from the British point of view, during 1942.10

The conclusion drawn by the planners after several weeks of study was that planning for the invasion of North Africa was 'an academic study and should be treated as such.11 On 3 March 1942 the CCS agreed to drop SUPER-GYMNAST as an immediate operational possibility.12

Meanwhile, the President and the Prime Minister were also reaching agreement to lay aide the North African project. On 4 March the Prime Minister wrote to the President: "I am entirely with you about the need for GYMNAST, but the check which Auchinleck has received in Libya and the shipping stringency seem to impose obstinate and long delays."13

A few days later, in a message discussing the division of strategic responsibility, the President wrote to the Prime Minister: "It is understood that this presupposes the temporary shelving of Gymnast."14 The Prime Minister, concurring in the President's proposals for movement of British troops to the Middle East and for deployment of U.S. forces to the Southwest Pacific, implicitly accepted this conclusion.15 In conformity with the agreement reached by the CCS, the three War Department commands were told that "no forces, material, or shipping" would be "held in readiness" for SUPER-GYMNAST, and air force and service units assigned to the operation would be released immediately.16 This marked the end of the


planning begun in December 1941 for a combined British-American invasion of North Africa and opened the way for the War Department's proposal to concentrate forces in the British Isles.

The Washington Studies

As early as August 1941, a G-2 officer had written a paper urging the creation of a second land front as soon as practicable to divert German resources from the Russian front, as the "only possible method of approach to an ultimate victory of the democracies." This study pointed out that a second land front would also serve as a base for possible future offensive operations provided its location was in a theater containing a vital strategic objective. Proceeding from the axiom that a line of supporting operational bases had to form the base line of an equilateral triangle with assault objective at its apex, the paper advocated a landing on the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkerque in order to capitalize on supporting ground and air bases in England for mounting and protecting the assault forces.17 By the summer of 1941 the War Department planners had come to believe (as Admiral Stark had earlier concluded) that very large ground force operations in Europe would be necessary in order to bring about the defeat of Germany.18 But neither then nor thereafter had they even tried to work out any plan of operations in Europe. Nor would it have been to any purpose for them to do so while the future scope and scale of American involvement in the Pacific remained entirely undefined and indefinable

Finally, in March 1942, assuming that the War Department had succeeded in fixing limits to future claims for Army forces in the Pacific and could ignore the prospect that Army forces might be sent into North Africa, the War Department staff formulated and advanced its plan for future operations against Germany--a plan essentially different from the plan that the British had advanced.

Preliminary American Studies

General Eisenhower recommended in his '28 February study, "Strategic Conceptions and Their Application to the Southwest Pacific":

We should at once develop, in conjunction with the British, a definite plan for operations against Northwest Europe. It should be drawn up at once, in detail, and it should be sufficiently extensive in scale as to engage from the middle of May onward, an increasing portion of the German Air Force . . .

Eisenhower asserted that the United Kingdom offered the only point from which effective land and air operations against Germany could be attempted and pointed out that the gathering of forces in the British Isles for a cross-Channel assault would also protect the United Kingdom and the North Atlantic sea lanes.19

On 6 March the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee agreed that "the only means for quickly applying available force against the German war machine" was "use of the British Isles as a base area for an offensive to


defeat the German armed forces."20 The committee stated the general principle: "If the war is to be won in Europe, land forces must be developed and trained which are capable of landing on the continent and advancing under the support of an overwhelming air force." This meant "strict economy of force in other theaters." The committee emphasized the importance of supporting the Soviet Union as the only power "actively and aggressively operating against Germany" and listed as one means "a supporting offensive in 1942" based on the British Isles. The committee did not assert that such an offensive was possible, but did recommend "a maximum effort in cooperation with the British in offensive action operations against Germany" after minimum forces had been allocated to secure the Pacific area.21

The planners estimated that a force large enough to cause a "material diversion of German forces from the Russian front" would amount to about 600,000 ground troops, supported by an air force of some 6,500 planes. They further estimated that after needs in the Pacific, India-Burma-China, and other areas in the Atlantic were taken care of, the cargo shipping available to the Army would be sufficient to transport and maintain in the European theater only the following forces:

By Air Forces (Aircraft) Ground Forces
1 July 1942 50,000 (700) 51,000
1 October 1942 114,000 (1,400) 191,000
1 January 1943 183,000 (2,300) 252,000

It was evident that the Army forces that could be moved to Great Britain in 1942 were not enough for a major offensive, but the planners believed that they would be "adequate to assist effectively in such an offensive in the fall of 1942" and could be progressively increased. "Their prospective availability," they added, "should enable the British to initiate an offensive even sooner."22

The planners were thinking in terms of a British-American air offensive to be begun in the last two weeks of July 1942 followed by an assault with ground forces six weeks later.23 They concluded that the military prospects of the USSR were the crux of the military situation in Europe and perhaps in the world, and that the United Nations could most effectively assist the Soviet Union in 1942 by:

a) delivering the maximum quantities [of] appropriate munitions to the Red Army, and b) creating a diversion of the maximum number of German air and ground forces from the Russian front by launching as strong an air and ground offensive as it is possible to form from British and American Forces available after all essential strategic deployments in other theaters are provided with the minimum forces consistent with their missions.

The planners suggested destroying enemy forces in the general area of Calais-Arras-St. Quentin-Soissons-Paris-Deauville and establishing bases in that area to facilitate the extension of offensive air and ground operations against German military strength. The chief purposes of this mission would be to divert German forces from the Eastern theater and to destroy German air and ground forces. The planners also expected that such an operation would call


forth the support of the people in occupied Prance, and encourage other European peoples to resist the Axis. On the all important matter of timing, they stated:

An analysis of the available U.S. and British air and ground forces indicates that the British must furnish initially the bulk of the. forces if the offensive is launched in time to accomplish effective assistance to the Russians. . . . It is not possible at this time to state the definite date on which the combined US-British air and ground offensive will be undertaken. However, preparations should be based on a D day between July 15 and August 1st.

Before the deployment issue finally reached the JCS, estimates of United States forces had to be revised in the light of fresh commitment. made subsequent to the original JUSSC study. One of these commitments involved the provision of United States shipping for the movement of 40.000 British troops from the British Isles to the Middle East and India, and the consequent withdrawal of eleven lend-lease cargo ships from railings for Burma and the Red Sea during April and May. The second commitment was the movement of two additional United States divisions, One to Australia and one to New Zealand, and the withdrawal of twenty-five lend-lease ships from railings for Burma and the Red Sea for this purpose. These commitments, which caused troop transports to become the limiting factor during the second and third quarter of 194'2, would reduce the number of troops that could be moved to the United Kingdom, if all other troop movements were carried out as previously recommended. The revised estimates were:

by July 1, 1942, only 40,000 troops, instead of 101,000:

by October 1, 1942, only 180,000 troops, instead of 301,000; and

by January 1. 1943, only 390,000 troops, instead of 435,000.

This delay in the movement of U.S. forces to the British Isles obviously would prevent effective American participation in an offensive in Europe in mid-1942. The planners did not change their general strategic recommendations and listed several expedient that might ease the situation in regard to troop movements to the United Kingdom so that it might still be possible to keep to the previous schedule.24

The British Plan for 1943

On 16 March, with very little recorded discussion, the JCS settled the dispute over Army deployment in the Pacific, stating that Army the courses of action available" it was preferable" for the United States to restrict Pacific forces to the number allotted in "current commitments" and "to begin to build up forces in the United Kingdom."25 At a meeting of the JCS a week later, Marshall reported that the British had presented a paper on the possibilities of an invasion of the Continent in 1943, representing a quite different view from the American paper on the subject recommending action in 1942.26 The British study, which had been prepared in London in December 1941, consisted of a tentative plan for landing troops in the vicinity of Le Havre in the early summer of 1943 "under conditions of severe deterioration of German military power." It flatly stated that the operations would have to be postponed unless the enemy already had been "weakened in strength and morale" before


1943. This British plan conceived of a powerful fast-moving attack, landing troops quickly on the Continent and advancing rapidly into the Ruhr. For this purpose the most suitable landing area would be cast and west of Le Havre. In addition to the necessary RAF and Royal Navy forces, commandos, airborne and antiaircraft brigades, six armored divisions, and six and one-third infantry divisions would be necessary for the operation. American aid was viewed as facilitating battleship cover, providing sufficient escorts, and permitting conversion of some British Army units for necessary administrative duties.27

At General Marshall's suggestion, the CCS directed the combined planners to reconcile the British views with those previously set forth by the JCS (in JCS 23) which seemed, by implication, to recommend an invasion of the Continent, at least by British forces, in 1942.28 Specifically, the planners were to report on (1) the possibility of landing and maintaining ground forces on the Continent in 1942, and (2) the possibility of an invasion in 1943. If the latter were a possibility, the planners were to attempt to reconcile the materiel estimates of the British and American planners.29

Combined Studies

The first study prepared by the combined planners concluded that the decisive limitation upon the proposed invasion, for either target date, lay in the shortage of cargo shipping.30 This differed radically from the views of the U.S. planners, who had concluded that troop shipping would remain the limiting factor for the greater part of the year. The combined planners took the position that the date of the invasion would depend upon the amount of additional cargo shipping that could be found. But even in the event that cargo shipping could be found, there were not enough landing craft available or in sight for a beach landing either in 1942 or 1943. After analyzing the factors important to invasion attempts on 15 September 1942 and 1 April 1943, the combined planners concluded that (a) it was not possible in 1942 to put on the Continent the ground forces necessary for an invasion 'and provide for their support, and (b) an invasion early in 1943 was a possibility, provided the USSR was still actively fighting and containing the bulk of the German forces. This was an assumption different from the one made by the Joint Chiefs that it was very doubtful whether the USSR could continue the fight against Germany without the diversion


of German strength through the creation of another front. These differences necessitated further study to determine whether the Red Army could and would continue organized resistance even though a second front was not created in 1942. Meanwhile, planning was to be continued for an invasion in 1943, with a provision in the plans for an attempt to invade the Continent in 1942 in the event of an imminent Soviet collapse, or the development of a critical situation for Germany, which would make that power vulnerable to an attack in the West.31

Eisenhower Memorandum of 25 March

While this study of a future European offensive was going on in the combined staff, the War Department operations staff was trying independently to reach a "coordinated viewpoint" on the "major tasks of the war." On 25 March Eisenhower, in a memorandum, urged on General Marshall the necessity of deciding on the "theater in which the first major offensive of the United Powers must take place." This decision, setting "the principal target of all United Powers," was needed to regulate training and production programs and deployment of forces. Reiterating his comments of 28 February, General Eisenhower stated that the "immediately important tasks, aside from protection of the American continent, are the security of England, the retention of Russia in the war as an active ally and the defense of the Middle East. . . . All other operations must be considered in the highly desirable rather than in the mandatory class." He then declared that "the principal target for our first major offensive should be Germany, to be attacked through western Europe," and supported this choice with a long list of reasons: Since the lines of communication to England had to be kept safe in any event, operations in Western Europe would not involve a further dispersion of air and naval protective forces. By using the shortest possible sea route, the United States could maintain a large force with a minimum strain on shipping. The early gathering of air and ground forces in Great Britain would carry a sufficient threat to prevent Germany from complete concentration against the USSR. A cross-Channel attack represented the direct approach by superior land communications to the center of German might. The forward base in England already had the airfields from which a large air force could operate to secure the air superiority essential to a successful landing. A major portion of the British combat power could be used without stripping the home defenses of the United Kingdom. Finally, this plan provided for attempting an attack on Germany while German forces were engaged on several fronts.

Eisenhower pointed out that the success of the plan for taking the offensive depended on securing complete agreement among the CGS that the attack against Germany through Western Europe constituted the eventual task of their governments. With such a plan, training and production schedules


could be adjusted, "overwhelming air support" built up, ample ships and landing craft found, and combat strength husbanded. Eisenhower and his staff felt so strongly the necessity of having "a target on which to fix . . . [their] sights" that he declared, "unless this plan is adopted as the eventual aim of all our efforts, we must turn our hacks upon the Eastern Atlantic and go, full out, as quickly as possible, against Japan Above all, he emphasized "the tremendous importance of agreeing on some major objective" for a "coordinated and intensive effort."32

On the very day that Eisenhower presented this memorandum, General Marshall went to the White House for lunch, together with Stimson, Knox, King, Arnold, and Hopkins, to discuss possible offensive operations. According to Stimson, Marshall made a very fine presentation" of the case for a cross-Channel attack, and he and Marshall came away from the meeting with the President's approval of the idea and his order to put it "in shape if possible over this weekend." It was at this meeting, too, that Hopkins suggested that as soon as the plan had been perfected by the JCS, it should not be taken up with the British members of the CCS, but should be taken up directly with the highest British authorities.33

Estimates for Invasion

During this last week of March, while the combined planners were trying to reconcile American and British ideas about timing, the Army planners began to assemble detailed data to satisfy the presidential directive to get the plan in shape. In so doing, the Army planners resurveyed the possibilities of a planned invasion in the spring of 1943 and an emergency attack, if necessary, in the fall of 1942. G-2 estimated the number of British forces available for an invasion of the Continent.34 G-3 and G-4 estimated the readiness for combat of major U.S. Army units, indicating the status of their equipment and training as of 15 September 1942 and 1 April 1943. By the latter date at least eighteen and probably twenty-one divisions would be trained and equipped. They would include two divisions trained for amphibious operations, six armored divisions, fire motorized divisions, and one airborne division. By mid-August 1942 about six infantry, three armored, and two motorized divisions would be available.35 Army Ground Forces estimated the balanced ground forces necessary and available for the offensive as 975,394 for April 1943 operations and 364,585 for September


1942 operations.36 Army Air Forces drafted its own outline plan for air operations in support of an attack on either 15 September 1942 or 1 April 1943. It was estimated that 733 combat aircraft would be necessary and available by mid-September 1942 and 3,296 by April 1943.37 The Services of Supply (SOS) provided estimates for the forces that could be shipped to the British Isles and maintained there. SOS believed that, with the shipping prospectively available, only three and a half infamy divisions, with supporting troops, a force of about 105,000, or two armored divisions and supporting troops numbering 60,000 men, could be landed in the British Isles by mid-September. Of the more than one million men that the War Plans Division had estimated to be the minimum number to be assembled in Great Britain by the spring of 1943, probably not more than 400,000 could be transported by U.S. shipping.38

The Evolution of the Marshall Memorandum

On the basis of all the information gathered from G-2, G-3, and SOS, the War Department planners on 27 March drew up an outline of an invasion plan. This plan was a very simple sketch of the operations, giving the area of assault, the timing of the landings, and the forces necessary.39 After General Eisenhower and Colonel Thomas T. Handy and Colonel Hull had discussed the plan, they presented it to Marshall on 1 April, along with a memorandum repeating strategic justification for the choice of theater.40 General Marshall at once gave the plan his approval and support, suggesting important changes in language which Eisenhower and his two assistants incorporated. Marshall and Stimson presented the plan to the President the same day and succeeded in winning his approval and complete support for it immediately.41 For some time the President had been thinking


Left to right: Lt. Gen. H.H. Arnold, Maj. Gen. J.T. McNarney, General Marshall,
Maj. Gen. B.B. Somervell, and Lt. Gen. L.J. McNair.

of "a new front on the European Continent" and only three weeks before had told the Prime Minister that he was "becoming more and more interested in the establishment of this new front this summer, certainly for air and raids."42 The President directed Marshall and Hopkins to go to London to present the plan to the Prime Minister and his military staff and secure their agreement.43

The draft, which came to be known as the Marshall Memorandum, outlined the objective, the timing, the combat strength, and the strategic advantages of operations in northwestern Europe. First, it listed the arguments for selecting northwestern Europe for the first British-American offensive:


It is the only place in which a powerful offensive can be prepared and executed by the United Powers in the near future. In any other locality the building up of the required forces would be much more slowly accomplished due to sea distances. Moreover, in other localities the enemy is protected against invasion by natural obstacles and poor communications leading toward the seat of the hostile power, or by elaborately organized and distant outposts. Time would be required to reduce these and to make the attack effective.

It is the only place where the vital air superiority over the hostile land areas preliminary to a major attack can be staged by the United Powers. 'this is due to the existence of a network of landing fields in England and to the fact that at no other place could massed British air power be employed for such an operation.

It is the only place in which the bulk of the British ground forces can be committed to a general offensive in cooperation with United States forces. It is impossible, in view of the shipping situation, to transfer the bulk of the British forces to any distant region, and the protection of the British islands would hold the bulk of the divisions in England.

The United States can concentrate and use larger forces in Western Europe than in any other place, due to sea distances and the existence in England of base facilities.

The bulk of the combat forces of the United States, United Kingdom and Russia can be applied simultaneously only against Germany, and then only if we attack in time. We cannot concentrate against Japan.

Successful attack in this area will afford the maximum of support to the Russian front.44

The draft went on to state that a decision as to the main effort had to be made at once so that the Allies could direct all "production, special construction, training, troop movements and allocations" to that end. The American proposal was to direct all plans and preparations to the "single end" of "an attack, by combined forces of approximately 5,800 combat airplanes and 48 divisions against western Europe as soon as the necessary means can be accumulated in England--estimated at April 1, 1943.

The plan contemplated three main phases

a. Preparation, involving:

(1) Immediate coordination of procurement priorities, allocations of material and movements of troops and equipment.

(2) Establishment of a preliminary active front.

(3) Development of preparations for possible launching of an "emergency" offensive [in 1942.]

b. Cross-Channel movement and seizure of beachheads between Le Havre and Boulogne.

c. Consolidation and expansion of beachheads and beginning of general advance.45

The plan was based on four assumptions: (1) the line Alaska-Hawaii-Samoa-Australia would be held and Pacific garrisons increased from present approximate strength of 175,000 to about 300,000; (2) American commitments in troops and ships to New Zealand, the Middle East, and the China India theater would be met; (3) the USSR would continue to contain the bulk of German forces (the plan stressed the necessity of continuing shipments of material aid to the USSR to help keep the Red Army effective in the war); and (4) Axis forces would remain at approximately their April 1942 strength.

The United States proposed to furnish about one million men--including thirty divisions--and 3,250 combat aircraft, for an invasion on 1 April 1943. If the British


made available eighteen divisions and 2,550 combat aircraft, the combined forces would be strong enough to establish air superiority and make a landing on a six-division front between Le Havre and Boulogne. One American airborne division and American and British parachute troops would be used to slow German reinforcements, while "strong armored forces," drawn from the six American and three British armored divisions assigned to ROUNDUP, "rushed in to break German resistance" and eventually to spearhead a general movement toward the Belgian port of Antwerp.

The admittedly weak point in the American plan was that merchant shipping and landing craft would not be available in sufficient quantity by the time that aircraft, ground equipment, and ammunition could be supplied. However difficult it might be to make up shortages in the latter categories, it was evident that shipping and landing craft were the limiting factor.46 It was estimated that American troop shipping could transport only about 40 percent of the forces required by 1 April 1943, leaving some 600,000 men to be transported by shipping from British or other sources. American shipping alone could not move the entire ford until late summer of 1943, but it was anticipated that after the British had completed their movement of reinforcements to the Middle and Far East, they could aid in the movement of United States troops to England. Even so, it appeared uncertain whether there would be enough cargo shipping.47 The lack of sufficient landing craft--7,000 were considered essential--presented even more serious problems, which could be met only through an accelerated construction program.48

Finally, the 'Marshall Memorandum presented in some detail a "Modified Plan" for the "emergency" invasion that might have to be launched in September or October 1942.49 This landing operation would take place if the situation on the Soviet front became so desperate that only a British American attack in the west would prevent its collapse, or if the German position in Western Europe "critically weakened." The maximum forces that could be transported across the Channel would be used if and when this operation were launched. Landing craft would be sufficient to sustain only about five divisions, half British and half American, at any time in the fall of 1942. In any case, only three and one-half American divisions, including the Northern Ireland force, could be shipped to the United Kingdom by 15 September 1942, and only about 700 American combat aircraft would be available.

Apart from this contingent emergency operation, the only American activity scheduled for 1942 was the inauguration of air


attacks and minor coastal raids, which would be of some help to the USSR and would make "experienced veterans of the air and ground units," as well as raise the morale of both the troops and the general public. 'the planners dwelt on the advantage to be derived in the long preparatory phase by giving the troops in the United Kingdom "intensive and specialized training," beginning with "fundamentals of technique in loading and unloading of boats," and advancing through "constant raiding by small task forces." The whole program presented was directed toward a main effort in 1943 and, in this respect, was quite different from the program earlier proposed by the JUSSC: and by General Eisenhower, which assumed a 1942 attack was possible and necessary.50

The London Conference

The American representatives arrived in the British Isles on 8 April and, during the following week, met with the British Chiefs of Staff in London to discuss the American proposal. The meetings were devoted primarily to general strategy; little attention was paid to clarifying the problems of shipping and landing craft upon which the invasion so heavily depended. At the first meeting, Marshall explained that "the reason for his visit was to reach a decision as to what the main British-American effort was to be, and when and where it should be made." He emphasized the importance of arriving at a "decision in principle" as soon as possible so that production, allocation of material, training, and troop movements could go forward.51

Throughout the meetings the American representatives dwelt on "two main considerations." The first of these was that the Red Army should be maintained as an effective fighting force in 1942. Indeed, Colonel Wedemeyer later stated on the ground and in the air to gain combat experience. Such experience, incidentally, would lead to improvements in equipment. that this was the "main objective" of the American plan. The second was that the U.S. Army, then being built up and trained, should engage in active operations on the ground and in the air to gain combat experience. Such experience incidentally, would lead to improvements in equipment.52

One reason the Americans were anxious for a speedy decision on the BOLERO plan was that it might check the tendency to disperse forces ore secondary tasks.53 Early in the conference the British argued that it was essential to hold the Middle East whatever else happened, and also showed great concern for the Indian Ocean area. The Americans could not agree to the primary importance of the Middle Fast, India, and Burma since, as Wedemeyer put it, they were sure the military objective of Germany ire 1942 was the destruction of the Russian armies. While Wedemeyer agreed that Japanese successes should not be allowed to go so far as to prevent the defeat of Germany, he warned that the Allies must expect some loss of territory in the Pacific in order to concentrate on Germany.54 In attempting to win British agreement, the


American representatives exploited the basic line of strategic argument developed during the previous two months. As Wedemeyer phrased it:

The United Nations must adhere to the broad concept of strategy, viz, that Germany is our principal enemy . . . [and therefore] the dissipation of our combined resources . . . should be discontinued or at least held to a minimum, in consonance with the accepted strategy of concentration on offensive operations in the European theater. with concurrently defensive operations in all others.55

In reply to a British call for American fighters in the Middle East to enable the British to assemble a reserve in the United Kingdom for continental operations, Marshall stated that current American commitments to the Southwest Pacific, Middle East, and other theaters would be fulfilled, belt that additional reinforcements would have to be carefully limited56 Marshall emphasized that it was essential for the United Nations to focus attention on the main project--offensive operations on the Continent--lest it be reduced to the status of a "residuary legatee" for which nothing was left.57

The American representatives explained that the flow of American troops and aircraft to the United Kingdom would not reach large proportions until the fall of 1942, because of shipping limitations and other American commitments. Marshall pointed out that by the end of August the United States commitments to reinforce the Pacific, and the garrisons in Northern Ireland and Iceland should be completed. He hoped, therefore, that by mid-September five groups of air forces and three and a half Army divisions could be moved to Great Britain. Until that date the shipping restrictions were so great that no forces, other than those required for minimum defensive purposes, could be transported to the British Isles. As far as the timing of the emergency operation in 1942 was concerned, Marshall said that he could not press for one before September since a substantial American land force could not be sent over before then. If action became necessary before September, such American forces as were in the British Isles would be available. His own belief was that it might be necessary to take action on the Continent in the next few months, either because the Soviet Union would be in a serious position or because a favorable opportunity would present itself.58

On 14 April the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the American proposal, agreeing that planning should begin immediately for a major offensive in Europe in 1943 and for an emergency landing, if necessary, in 1942.59 On the evening of the same day, at a meeting of the War Cabinet Defence Committee attended by Marshall and Hopkins, the Prime Minister formally accepted the "momentous proposal" of the American representatives and predicted that the "two nations would march ahead together in noble brotherhood of arms."60


As General Marshall was hell aware, this agreement was only a beginning in dealing with a very treacherous problem. Everyone agreed, "in principle," he reported, but "many if not most" of the participants held "reservations regarding this or that." It would require "great firmness" to avoid "further dispersions."61 The reservations applied directly to the projected operation for 1942 and only indirectly to the projected operation for 1943, the fate of which was certain to be determined by the decision made about the 1942 operation. The Prime Minister has since recorded that he did not even at that time believe that the contingent operation for 1942 (SLEDGEHAMMER) would prove feasible; that he regarded the proposal as merely one additional proposal to be considered during the spring along with the operations he himself wanted to undertake; the North African operation and possibly one in Norway); and that his satisfaction in receiving General Marshall's proposal and his readiness to accept it grew out of his anxiety lest the United Mates continue to direct its main efforts to the Pacific.62

The Prime Minister did not express these broad reservations at the time of the conference. The one explicit reservation on the British side was the determination to strengthen and secure the precarious British positions in Egypt and in the Indian Ocean area. The Prime Minister and his staff were both more explicit and more united in their determination to hold these vital positions in the British sphere of strategic responsibility than were the President and his staff to hold the line Hawaii-Australia, for which the United States was responsible. It remained uncertain whether, for the sake of mounting a cross-Channel operation, the British Would withhold reinforcements needed in the Middle East and India, as the Americans proposed to withhold reinforcements needed in the Pacific.

During the conference the British Chiefs made it quite clear how important they considered the Middle Fast and India to be. After the conference the Prime Minister went over the same ground in a message to the President.63 The range of disagreement between the British and American staffs over the defense of that whole area was within the same relatively narrow limits as the disagreements within ,the Army and between the War and Navy Departments on the defense of the Pacific. Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower had stated in yew strong terms the importance of preventing a junction of Japanese and German forces somewhere east of Suez and west of Singapore. General Marshall had made it plain that he, too, believed in collaborating with the British' to meet any emergency in the area. But Marshall also believed in taking a calculated risk there, as in the Pacific, for the sake of building up a powerful offensive force in the British Isles.

The question did not become critical during the London conference. The situation in the Libyan Desert had cased somewhat since the middle of March. The British Chiefs agreed to drop the proposal that the JCS had made--to send an American air force to Egypt equipped with planes from British allocations. Nor did they press their demand for U.S. Navy reinforcement to


meet the crisis that had developed in the Indian Ocean. In lieu of both these projects, they accepted the very modest temporary expedient of strengthening the American bomber force in India (General Brereton's Tenth Air Force) and putting it at the disposal of the British India Command for operations in the Indian Oceans.64 The broad question of the relation between this newly accepted American proposal and the long-standing commitments of the British in the Middle East and India simply remained open.

From the American point of view there was little more to say than what the President said in answer to the Prime Minister's declaration of the British concern over the defense of Egypt and the Indian Ocean. The President tried to reassure the Prime Minister that the juncture of German and Japanese forces seemed remote but agreed that a close watch must be kept on the situation. "In the meantime," he added, "we have had a good crack at Japan by air [the Doolittle raid] and I am hoping' that we can make it very difficult for them to keep too many of their big ships in the Indian Ocean."65


The fact that the London agreement involved no discussion with the British of the defense of the Middle East and India, parallel with the previous Army-Navy discussion of the defense of the Pacific, was a direct result of the irregular manner in which the American proposal was drawn up and presented. The course of action urged by the War Department was at variance with the long-standing plans and expectations of the British Chiefs of Staff. Any agreement that was not preceded by and ,based upon a full and explicit analysis--even if not by a reconciliation--of the differences was liable to be upset at any tune by a reassertion of the differences.

The War Department stall was naturally disposed to make the most of the London agreement. As Eisenhower noted upon Marshall's return, ". . . at long last, and after months of struggle, . . . we are all definitely committed to one concept of fighting! If we can agree on major purposes and objectives, our efforts will begin to fall in line and we won't just be thrashing around in the dark."66 It was in this spirit that the American planners in Washington approached the problem of working out a detailed, long-range plan for the concentration of American forces in the British Isles. This phase of the planning (which bore the code name BOLERO) was the only phase in which the Washington stalls, British and American, were deeply involved. Detailed planning for the operations themselves--SLEDGEHAMMER, the contingent operation in case of an emergency in 1942, and ROUNDUP, the scheduled operation for 1943--was to be carried on, appropriately enough, in London.67

The BOLERO plan covered the preparatory phase of mounting the cross-Channel


operation, involving 1) immediate coordination of procurement priorities, allocations of material and movements of troops and equipment and 2) the establishment of a preliminary active front." Only the most hurried and superficial investigation of the complex logistic problems involved had been made before the London conference, and the conference contributed very little to an understanding of them or to agreement about them. Everything remained to be done.68

Phasing of Troop Movements

The first thing that the planners in Washington tried to do was to schedule the shipment of troops for the next few months. As long as SLEDGEHAMMER remained a possibility, it was important to move as many ground divisions and supporting units to the United Kingdom as was possible before September. In the short run, this need was even more pressing than that of hastening troop movements to relieve future congestion in the BOLERO program. Cargo shipments, on the other hand, were distinctly secondary as far as SLEDGEHAMMER was concerned but of prime importance to BOLERO. Thus, the requirements of SLEDGEHAMMER and BOLERO not only overlapped but competed in determining shipments during the summer. For BOLERO, moreover, the problem of long-range scheduling was far more important than that of total shipping resources. The ratio of available troop shipping to cargo shipping at any given time was likely to be entirely unrelated to actual deployment needs.

The results of early efforts to acquire troop shipping over and above what had been scheduled for Magnet were not encouraging. It appeared that, if ships were to be provided to meet Army and Navy commitments for BOLERO, .British and American shipping schedules would have to be drastically rearranged and aid to Russia and other Allies would have to be reduced. This was a choice the President and the Prime Minister were loathe to make.69 But by early June, as a result of the preliminary search for shipping and rearrangement of schedules by Washington and London authorities, the shipping prospects seemed more hopeful. By then the estimated number of United States troops that might be shipped in time for SLEDGEHAMMER had been raised from 101,000 to about 150,000. For Roundup in April 1943, it then seemed that over 890,000 United States troops would be present in the British Isles.70 The early movements were scheduled so as to build, first, an air force and, second, a ground force in the United Kingdom in time for offensive operations on the Continent in 1942. The schedule also took account of the creed for service troops in the United Kingdom to prepare for the troops to follow. By early June about 40,000 troops had arrived or were en route. Of these, 15,000 were in the 1st Armored Division, 15,000 in the 34th Infantry Division, and the remainder in the air and antiaircraft units and theater headquarters.71


The Landing Craft Problem

The most critical item in the planning of all the invasion operations was the provision of landing craft. The idea of using large numbers of specially constructed craft for landing operations was so new that no generally accepted doctrine had been developed. The Army knew very little about landing craft and, during the first years of the war, the Navy was urging other types of construction, with the result that landing craft requirements were not determined until too late to affect SLEDGEHAMMER.72

The United States program for mass production of landing craft got under way in April 1942. A White House conference on 4 April resulted in a tentative construction program being set up under which the United States was to make available 8,200 craft in the United Kingdom for Roundup, of which 6,700 were to be carriers for small tanks and vehicles. The objective for SLEDGEHAMMER was 2,500 craft, including 2,000 tank and vehicle carriers. This number, supposed to be sufficient to move two infantry divisions and two regiments of tanks in one trip, did not correspond to the expected U.S. troop participation in SLEDGEHAMMER. But, as Eisenhower wrote, if SLEDGEHAMMER Comes off at all, "it will be carried out with whatever personnel and equipment is actually available at the time. The maximum portion of the landing equipment set up for the main BOLERO plan which can be made available by the time of execution of the 'Modified' plan is the desirable amount."73

The London conference had not gone into the matter of the types of landing craft and the numbers of each type that would be required, and no one expressed doubt whether sufficient craft could be produced in time. Although War Department planners had furnished him with a somewhat higher estimate, General Marshall proposed 7,000 for ROUNDUP, a figure that turned out to be much too low.74 It was obvious that the British had given a great deal more thought than the Americans to the problem of landing craft, and they took the initiative in the discussions. From the first they questioned the emphasis of the American construction program on small craft. A British spokesman pointed to the difficulty of moving large numbers of the small craft across the Atlantic in the limited shipping available and urged greater emphasis upon United States construction of larger vessels that could cross the ocean under their own power. He also pointed out that larger craft were necessary for crossing the Channel and establishing beachheads.75

It was not until the first part of May that British objections to the small landing craft program became emphatic, and by then the American procurement program was four or five weeks old and a good many craft of the smallest types were scheduled for delivery.76 The issue was resolved at a White House meeting on 5 May at which the British successfully


presented their objections to the American production program.77 At the President's direction, a new program of requirements was drawn up based on a shift to larger, ocean-going landing craft.78

The very next day the "Special Committee on Landing Craft for the Continent," a subcommittee of the Washington BOLERO committee, of which General Eisenhower and Colonels Hull and Wedemeyer were members, met to prepare a statement for the President on the availability of landing craft for operations in September 1942 and April 1943.79 At the meeting the planners agreed that small craft could apparently be made available in considerable numbers for an operation in September 1942, but that the production of ocean-going tank landing ships (ATL's) could be increased only by giving it precedence over other construction, including priorities for hulls, engines, and equipment. General Eisenhower described this meeting in his personal notes. "This morning I attended a committee meeting on 'landing craft' at which were discussed the questions on which I begged the answers last February. Who is responsible for bldg landing crafts' Will the number of each type be sufficient' etc.? How . . . can we win this war unless we crack some heads?"80

On 14 May General Somervell and Vice Adm. Frederick J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, submitted to the President a comprehensive study, with an estimate of the number of landing craft that could be made available by 15 September 1942 and by April 1943. With an estimated force of from three to four American divisions in the United Kingdom by September, the landing craft estimated as available could carry assault elements to the number of 21,000 men, 3,000 vehicles, and 300 tanks. For ROUNDUP, current plans called for an assault force of approximately 77,000 men, 18,000 vehicles, and 2,250 tanks, which meant that the United States would have to build some 765 craft of several types by March 1943. Construction in time would be physically possible only if landing craft were given priority over all other items in the defense program of production.81 As a result of this study and other findings, the President two days later called a meeting attended by General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board (WPB). A number of expedients and proposed solutions were considered, but no decision was reached except that the program of antisubmarine construction and carrier building would not be delayed for any other project. The President, General marshal recorded, did not indicate the next steps to be taken, other than to say that "work must be gotten under way as quickly as possible."82

The landing craft program was heavily handicapped. The responsibility for procurement and for co-ordination of the program was given to the Navy, already bogged down in heavy naval construction schedules. Both the Navy and the shipyards to which


contracts were let were inexperienced in building the larger W pea of landing craft, and the problems they faced were unprecedented. The landing craft program had to compete with other programs already begun, for marine engines, steel, and other material. The new program for ATL's and Giant Y's (large landing craft, infantry) meant a reversal of policy for the Navy which had been concerned chiefly with shipbuilding and wish construction of small landing craft--personnel carriers--for ship-to-shore operations. During the first quarter of 1942 landing craft had been low on the priority list because the threat of German submarines necessitated the construction of destroyer escorts. Navy leaders continued to defend the naval shipbuilding program against a higher priority for landing craft. Only briefly--in the summer of 1942--was the landing craft program to be given priority over all other shipbuilding.83

Reorientation of Mobilization Programs

The adoption of the BOLERO-ROUNDUP strategy entailed a re-examination and reorientation of plans and programs of all kinds--production and allocation priorities, troop basis calculations, long-range deployment estimates, and even the Victory Program. Of course, many items besides landing craft were in short supply. Production and distribution plans would have to be reviewed, and many of them changed, in keeping with the undertakings agreed on in London. The JCS and the President soon decided on a way of determining priorities in the production of munitions and requested the War Production Board to increase production for a "decisive land and air offensive involving amphibious operations"--aircraft, ships, tanks, and guns as well as landing craft and amphibious equipment.84

To help the Munitions Assignments Board, (MAB) in the distribution of British and American munitions, the CCS, toward the end of March 1942, had developed a general guide.85 The CCS had grouped the several theaters of war in three general classes according to strategic importance and the imminence of combat operations. "Priority A" included the United Kingdom (but only in respect to air operations), the Middle Fast, India-Burma, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands on the lines of communication from the United States. Next came Hawaii and the United Kingdom, which were assigned "Priority B," for ground forces operations. The rest of the world was classed as "Priority C." Forces in training were to be given 100 percent of equipment and ammunition except in critically


short items.86 The acceptance of the BOLERO plan necessitated an amendment to this directive. The effect of the amendment, as adopted early in June, was that "forces assigned to operations on the continent of Europe" were placed in Priority A and were to continue to have first priority at all times after large operations on the Continent were begun.87

It was also necessary to estimate the total forces that would be present in each theater on given dates, since the assignment of munitions to the various theaters depended on the size of the forces present. For this purpose the War Department planners, in early April, prepared a survey of proposed deployment of American forces for 1942.88

According to this survey almost 540,000 ground forces would be in overseas theaters by 30 June, and this number would increase to more than 685,000 by December 1942. Of this number, about 43,000 ground troops would be in the United Kingdom by 30 June including one infantry and one I armored division) and 185,000 by 31 December (including two infantry divisions, two infantry motorized divisions, and three armored divisions). Ten American air combat groups with a strength of 37,900 men were projected for the United Kingdom for 30 June and forty-two air combat groups, totaling 151,000 ,men, for the end of the year.

The British then supplied similar information on proposed British deployment for 1942, and the British document combined with the American survey constituted "The Tentative Deployment of United Nations for 1942."89 The CCS accepted this as a guide for the assignment of munitions.90 Though revisions were made later in the summer, it served the immediate purpose of providing an approximate calculation of Allied armament requirements for preparing to take the offensive.

Finally, the BOLERO plan entailed a review of the War Department Troop Basis. The Army's mobilization schedule. as established in the War Department Troop Basis for 1942, called for a total strength of 3,600,000 enlisted men by 31 December 1942. In May the President approved an increase in the Troop Basis from 3,600,000 to 4,350,000 by the end of 1942. Of this 750,000 increase, approximately 300,000 were for necessary services to support


BOLERO and 150,000 were for additional air requirements for BOLERO.91 Air units were listed as first priority, essential service units second, ground forces third, and additional service units to lay the ground work for the troops to follow, fourth.92 This tentative Troop Basis, the War Department emphasized, was flexible and would permit substitutions and changes in priority.

At the same time the Victory Program, the Army's pre-Pearl Harbor estimate of its equipment requirements, came under close scrutiny. Since the 1941 Victory Program was premised on a strategic policy of offensive operations in Europe, which was still official British-American policy, the War Department planners concluded that no cuts should be made, and that the rate of production of materiel should be increased.93

Establishment of the European Theater of Operations

In the latter part of May, while the mobilization programs were being reviewed in Washington, General Eisenhower, accompanied by Generals Arnold and Somervell, and Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark, made a trip to the United Kingdom to observe the progress of planning for BOLERO there. On this trip Eisenhower served as Marshall's representative in discussions with General Chaney and American and British planners. He outlined to the British Chiefs of Staff the American position on the over-all command organization for ROUNDUP--that one man and not a committee must be in command. General Eisenhower reported: "It is quite apparent that the question of high command is the one that is bothering the British very much and some agreement in principle will have to be reached at an early date. . . ." However, no one thought it necessary as vet to name the supreme commander for, ROUNDUP, and, as far as SLEDGEHAMMER was concerned, it already had been decided that an emergency operation in 1942 would be under British command.94 Eisenhower got the impression that the British were skeptical about SLEDGEHAMMER and this impression was reinforced by Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, in his talks with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in Washington a few days later.95

Upon his return to the United States on 3 June, General Eisenhower observed: "Our own people are able but . . . it is necessary to get a punch behind the job or we'll never be ready by spring 1943 to attack. We must get going."96 Within a week General Marshall announced the establishment of a European Theater of Operations for the U.S. Army (ETOUSA) and selected Eisenhower, himself, as commander.97 By agreement of the U.S. War


and Navy Departments, and under the principle of unity of command, ETOUSA was to be a joint command in which the Army exercised planning and operational control over all U.S. Navy forces assigned to that theater.98 The Commanding General, ETOUSA, was directed to co-operate with the fortes of the British Empire and other nations but to keep in view the fundamental rule "that the forces of the U.S. are to be maintained as a separate and distinct component of the combined forces.

The stage was now set for sending the new American commander and his staff. On 10 June Marshall informed the British Chiefs of Staff that General Eisenhower would soon leave for London with General Clark, designated to command the U.S. II Army Corps.99 Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, the Air commander, left the same morning and Rear Adm. Henry K. Hewitt, chosen to be Admiral Mountbatten's naval opposite, was to leave within the week.

These were the fiat steps in gearing the command organization of U.S. forces to the contemplated major offensive in the European theater. General Marshall, in informing General Chaney of Eisenhower's appointment, explained the reason for the change. It was necessary to have as commanding general in the ETO an officer who was "completely familiar with all military plans and affairs and who has taken a leading part in the military developments since December seventh.100 Eisenhower was soon to have a chance to show, as a commander, the great adaptability he had shown as a staff officer, for, ironically enough, before he and his party actually arrived in London--24 June--the whole view of strategy that he had urged was being superseded in favor of the Prime Minister's long-cherished plan for invading North Africa.


Table of Contents
Previous Chapter (7) * Next Chapter (9)


1. For Eisenhower's studies, see above, Ch. VII.

2. See provisions of JCS 23 discussed in Ch. VII, above.

3. See above, Ch. VIICh. V.

4. CPS 2, 22 Jan 42, title: SUPER-GYMNAST.

5. (1) Min, 2d mtg CPS, 2 Feb 42. (2) CPS 2/1, 10 Feb 42, title: SUPER-GYMNAST. (3) CPS 2; 2, 10 Feb 42, same title. (4) Min, 3d mtg CPS, 14 Feb 42. (5) CCS 5/2, 3 Mar 42, same title.

6. CCS 5/2, 3 Mar 42. At this time it became known that Vichy was furnishing war materials for the use of Axis troops in Libya. The U.S. Government issued a strong note threatening the recall of the American ambassador. For accounts of this crisis in relations between the United States and the Vichy government, see: (1) Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 233-37, and (2) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 76-77.

7. The Army planners remained of the opinion that the "results obtained from this effort, even if successful," were "not apt to be decisive." (WPD brief, Notes on . . . 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42, with CCS 5/2 in ABC 381 GYMNAST (1-15-42).)

8. For the modified SUPER-GYMNAST plan, see: (1) CCS 5, 20 Jan 42, title: SUPER-GYMNAST; (2) CCS 5/1 [22 Jan 42], same title; (3) min, 1st mtg CCS, 23 Jan 42: and (4) min, 1st mtg CPS, 25 Jan 42. (By the time the modified SUPER GYMNAST would have been possible, the whole project was virtually dead.)

9. Memo, G-4 for WPD, 14 Feb 42, sub: Shipping for SUPER-GYMNAST, WPD 4511-65, circulated as CPS 2!3. For General Gerow's original inquiry, which led to the submission of the G-4 memo, see min cited n. 5 (4).

10. CCS 5/2, 3 Mar 42.

11. Ibid.

12. Min, 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42. The combined planners recommended, however, that "the US and British commanders should continue their plans as far as possible," and they did. The War Department plan was already finished, and the convoy schedules for the combined British-American operation were completed in April. Col. John E. Hull finished the convoy program with a British staff officer, Brigadier G.K. Bourne, before "putting the plan in cold storage." (See (1) min, 12th mtg CPS, 26 Mar 42, and (2) ltr, Bourne to 1-lull, 6 Apr 42. GYMNAST and SUPER-GYMNAST, Development File, G-3 Regd Docs.)

13. Ltr, Prime Minister to President, 4 Mar 42, CCS 56 in ABC 311.5 (1-30-42). This statement about GYMNAST greatly relieved the minds of the CCS, who were at the moment deliberating on ways of informing the President and Prime Minister that SUPER-GYMNAST was not feasible. (See min, 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42.)

14. Msg, President to Prime Minister, 9 Mar 42, filed with CCS 56/1 in ABC 311.5 (1-30-42).

15. Msg, Prime Minister to President, 18 Mar 42, filed with CCS 56/I in ABC 311.5 (1-30-42).

16. Memo, WPD for CGs AGF, AAF, and SOS, 22 Mar 42, sub: Opns SUPER-GYM, OPD 320.2 Air Corps, 6. This memo carried out CPS recommendations of 3 Mar 42 in CCS 5/2.

17. (1) Study by Lt Col Edwin E. Schwien [penciled date, August 1941], title: An Essential Strategic Diversion in Europe, WPD 4402-77. (2) See also, memo, Col Scobey (WPD) for Lt Col Ralph C. Smith (G-2), 24 Sep 41, sub: Strategical Diversion Paper by Col Schwien, WPD 4402-77.

18. See above, Ch. III, pp. 45, 58-61.

19. Memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 28 Feb 42, sub: Strategic Conceptions and their Application to SW Pacific, Env 35, Exec 4.

20. JPS 2/5, 6 Mar 42, title: Review of Strategic Sit in Japanese Theater of War.

21. JPS 2/6, 6 Mar 42, title: Strategic Deployment of the Land, Sea and Air Forces of U.S.

22. Ibid., and Annexes A-H thereto.

23. See JPS 2/6, Annex C-Forces Req for Offensive Action in European Theater. This paper contains a discussion of "projected offensive operations in Europe" in two parts: "Strategic Considerations" and "A Plan for Invasion of Europe."

24. JCS 23, App II, submitted to JCS, 14 Mar 42.

25. (1) Min, 6th mtg JCS, 16 mar 42. (2) See above, Ch VII.

26. Min, 7th mtg JCS, 23 mar 42.

27. (1) Br War Cabinet-Jt Plng Stf study, 9 Dec, 41, title: Opns on Continent in Final Phase. (2) Ltr, Sir John Dill to Gen Marshall, 16 Mar 42. Dill simply turned this copy of the British study over to Marshall personally "apropos of the offensive about which we spoke today." (3) Ltr, Marshall to Dill, n.d. Copies of all three filed in front of CPS 26/D in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-92), 1. This British study, JP (41) 823 (0), was marked as the second revised draft. The CPS used a later, almost identical draft, dated 24 December 1941, which bore the code name ROUNDUP, for their studies. (See CPS 26/1, 3 Apr 42. A copy of 24 Dec study is in JCS rcds, CCS 381 (3-23-42), 1.)

28. (1) Min cited n. 26. (2) Min, 13th mtg CCS, 24 Mar 42. (3) CPS 26/D, 25 Mar 42, title: Directive/Offensive Opns in Europe.

29. CPS 26/D, 25 Mar 42.

30. CPS 26/1, 3 Apr 42, title: Offensive Opns in Europe. The subcommittee used a British study (Opn ROUNDUP, JP (41) 1028, 24 Dec 41) as a basis for determining the maximum effort possible in one day in the landing area in northern France, and an American study (App I, Annex C, JCS 23) in reaching an estimate of the minimum number of troops required for the operation.

31. Notes on 10th mtg JPS, 4 Apr 42, with CPS 26/1 in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1. These two provisos for a 1942 operation were incorporated in the assumptions of the OPD modified plan for 1942, contained in the outline plan for invasion of Western Europe which General Marshall took to London in April. Not all the American planners agreed with the flat statement in the conclusions of the draft reply of CPS 26/1 that the operation was impossible in 1942. (See comments, "Jessbe" [Col Jesmond D. Balmer] for Col Albert C. Wedemeyer, on CPS 26/1, 3 Apr 42, title: Offensive Opns In Europe, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 2.)

32. Memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 25 Mar 12, sub: Critical Points in Development of Coordinated Viewpoint as to Maj Tasks of the War, OPD 381 BOLERO, 6. Attached are tables of ground forces and landing craft and on separate slip of paper, Marshall's penned note: "Hold for me. GCM."

For reference to the "Pacific alternative" discussed in JCS 23 in connection with deployment studies, see above, p. 161.

33. (1) Stimson and Bandy, On Active Service, pp. 416-17. (2) Min cited n. 26. (3) Memo, Col John R. Drano for Gens Arnold and Eisenhower, n.d., no sub, Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8.

34. Informal memo, Col Louis J. Compton, Chief, Br Empire Branch, G-2, for WPD, 25 Mar 42, sub: Br Forces Available for an Invasion of Continent, Book 1, ABC: 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

35. (1) Memo, Col Thomas D. Davis (OPD) for Col Hull, 27 Mar 42, sub: Availability of Certain Maj Units. (2) Memo, G-4 for OPD, 26 Mar 42, sub: Availability of Equip for Certain Maj Units. (3) Memo, G-4 for OPD, 27 Mar 42, sub: Est Dates by Which Certain Divs will be Equipped. (4) Memo, G-3 for WPD, 26 Mar 42, sub: Readiness for Combat of Units. All in Tab 13, Book 2, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

36. Memo, Hq AGF for ACofS OPD (Attn: Col Arthur S. Nevins), 2 Apr 42, sub: Opns Plan W Europe, Book 1, ABC BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

37. (1) Draft study, n.d., title: Brief of Air Opns in Support of Invasion of N France, Book 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4. (2) Memo, Arnold for Marshall, 30 Mar 42, sub: Air Support of Continental Invasion from Br Isles (to accompany WPD App, Sec V of "Plan for Operations in North west Europe,(27 Mar 42), with JPS 26/D in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1.

38. (1) Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII, p. 20, MS. (2) Memo, Col Stokes, Chief, Plng Br, SOS, for Col Hull, 27 Mar 42, sub: Shipping Est, Tab 14, Book 2, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4. (3) Table, 1 Apr 42, title: Shipping Capabilities in 1942. (4) Draft table, n.d., title: Landing Craft Available. Last two in Book 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

39. This plan was prepared by Lt Col Voris H. Connor under supervision of Col Hull in Future Plans See, S&P Gp, OPD, title: Plan for Opns in Europe, copy filed AAG 381 War Plans, Sec G. No copy retained in OPD files. An appendix in six sections is attached: I, Topography and Communications: II, Coast Line from the Seine to the Scheldt III, Enemy Forces in West Europe; IV, Table of Landing Craft Availability; V, Brief of Air Operations in Support of Invasion of Northern France: and VI, Outline of Ground Operations.

40. The only documentary record dating the submission of the outline plan to the Chief of Staff is in the OPD 1700 Report, 1 Apr 42, Current Gp Files, DRB AGO.

41. For presidential approval, sec: (1) Stinson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 418-19 (Stimson said the President accepted the BOLERO Plan on 1 April) ; and (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 521. A memorandum drafted by OPD referred to the "President's tentative decision of April 2nd, respecting our major effort." (See memo, ACofS for King [COMINCH and CNO], 6 Apr 42, sub: Strategic. Deployment in Pacific against Japan, OPD 381 PTO, 10.) The tentative nature of the decision presumably derived front the fact that final decision required British approval. Thus the date of approval may have been either 1 or 2 April, or possibly both. (For the different versions of the plan, see Appendix A below, p. 383.)

42. See msg, President to Prime Minister, 9 Mar 42, No. 115, with memo, SW for CofS, 25 Mar 42, in ABC 371 (3-5-42). Very much the same view, emphasizing an air effort, had been taken by Hopkins. On 14 March hr wrote a memorandum to the President on "Matters of Immediate Military Concern," stressing the importance of "getting some sort of a front this summer against Germany." (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 521. (2) See also the President's letter to the Prime Minister on 18 March 1942, in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 299-301.

43. (1) See memo, Actg CofS for SW, 12 Apr 42, sub: Review of Current Sit, OPD 381 BOLERO, 6, for reference to Marshall's position as negotiator "in the name of the President." The memorandum was drafted by Eisenhower. (2) See paper, n.d., title: Opn Modicum, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), for composition of delegation. In addition to Hopkins and Marshall, the party included Col. Wedemeyer, OPD; Col. Howard A. Craig, Air Farces planner; and Comdr. James R. Fulton, physician to Hopkins.

44. Tab A, Item 5a, Exec 1. This is the Chief of Staff's notebook. See Appendix B below, p. 384.

45. The preparatory phase constituted what later became known by the code name BOLERO. The contingency mentioned as part (3) of this preparatory phase (a) became known as SLEDGEHAMMER. The actual cross-Channel movement and the consolidation (b. and c.) became known as ROUNDUP

46. For detailed discussion of shipping and landing craft problems, see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII, pp. 29-37, 100-109, MS.

47. Ibid., Ch. XII, p. 27, MS.

48. Eisenhower had for some time been trying to get information on, and awaken interest in, the production of landing craft. (Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.) He noted, on 24 January 1942: "Went to Bill Somervell this a.m. to find out what he knows about this landing craft business. He has known nothing of it to date-but is having the matter looked up." Again, 28 February 1942, he noted: "I wonder when we're going to get dope on landing craft!" A few days later, 9 March 1942, he noted: "Gen McNaughton (Comdg Canadians in Britain) conic to see me. . . . He's over here in an effort to speed up landing craft production and cargo ships. . . . How I hope he can do something on landing craft." (See below, pp. 192-94, for landing craft developments.)

49. This was in line with the "middle-of-the-road" proposal (C) of JCS 23, 14 March 1942. (See above, Ch. VII.)

50. The issue was still being debated in Washington in the combined staff during the time that the Marshall Memorandum was bring presented to the American and British Governments.

51. (1) Min, mtg, U.S. Reps-Br CsofS, London, 9 Apr 42, Tab D, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. (2) See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 523, for Hopkins' notes on this first meeting.

52. (1) Min cited n. 51 (1). (2) Min, mtg, BrAmer Plng Stfs, London, 11 Apr 42, Tab 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-421), 5.

53. Min cited n. 51 (1).

54. Min, mtg, 10 Apr 42, no tab (left side of file), ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16 42).

55. Min cited n. 52 (2).

56. Paper, Br CsofS, 13 Apr 42, title: Comments on Gen Marshall's Memo, COS (42) 97 (O), Tab F, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.

57. Min, mtg, U.S. Reps-Br CsofS, London, 14 Apr 42, Tab E, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.

58. Tabs D and E, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.

59. (1) Min cited n. 57. (2) Paper cited n. 56.

60. (1) Min, mtg, U.S. Reps-Br War Cabinet Def Com, 14 Apr 42, WDCSA 381, 1 (SS), atchd to ltr, Maj Gen Sir Hastings Ismay to Gen Marshall, 17 Apr 42, referring to "the historic erecting held at No. 10 Downing Street." (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 534-36. (3) Churchill, Hinge of Fete, pp. 316--20. (4) The Prime Minister had personally advised Marshall of his acceptance on 12 April. Msg, Marshall to McNarney, 12 Apr 42, CM-IN 3210. (5) For announcement to the War Department of the formal acceptance by the British Government, see msg, Marshall to Stimson, 15 Apr 42, CM-IN 3939.

61. Msg, Marshall to McNarney, 13 Apr 42, CM-IN 3457.

62. Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 323-24.

63. (1) Paper cited n. 56. (2) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 17 Apr 42, No. 70, Book 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4. (3) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 181-85.

64. For establishment of the Tenth Air Force in India, see above, Ch. VI. For negotiations following on British requests for U.S. reinforcements in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area, see below, Chs. IX, X.

65. Msg, President to Prime Minister, 22 Apr 42, No. 139, Book 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

66. Notations by Eisenhower, 20 Apr 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

67. SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP were British code names. The name ROUNDUP had been assigned to the 1941 British study for a cross-Channel operation in 1943 mentioned earlier in the text. The retention of the sane code name was doubtless intentional but altogether inappropriate, given the very different strategic assumptions of the 1941 British study and the 1942 American proposal.

68. For an account of this whole aspect of the London conference, see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII, MS.

69. CMT, 5/3 8 May 42, title: Availability of UN Shipping for Mil Transport.

70. Memo, Col Hull for ACofS OPD, 21 May 42, sub: Tr Mvmt Sheds for BOLERO and NABOB, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1. NABOB was the U.S. Navy code name for Northern Ireland.

71. CPS 2614, 7 Jun 42, title: BOLERO Emb Sched. For accounts of the deployment programs as well as troop and cargo movements to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1942 for BOLERO, see: (1) Strategic Plans Unit Study 2, OCMH Files, and (2) Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII, MS.

72. See Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII, p. 100, MS.

73. Memo, Gen Eisenhower for Lt Gen Somervell, 10 Apr 42, sub: Landing Craft to be Available Sep 15 for BOLERO, OPD 560, 5.

74. (1) Tab P, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. (2) See also p. 187, above.

75. (1) Min, 3d mtg, U.S.-Br Planners, London, 12 Apr 42, Tab P, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5. (2) Paper by Capt Hughes-Hallett, RN, 16 Apr 42, title: Landing Craft Req to Carry out Marshall's Plan, Book 2, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4. See also, min, mtg with Vice Adm Lord Louis Mountbatten and his stf, 28 May 42, in Eisenhower's account of the BOLERO trip, 23-30 May 42, with CCS 72 in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1.

76. Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII.

77. Memo, Marshall for Somervell and Eisenhower,16 May 42, no sub, Item 4, Exec 1. Admirals King and Land, Harry Hopkins, and Donald M. Nelson were present.

78. See Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII, MS.

79. Min, mtg, Sp Com on Landing Graft . . ., 6 May 42, Tab 28, Book 2, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16- 42), 4.

80. Notations by Eisenhower, 6 May 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

81. Memo, Gen Somervell and Admiral Horne for President, 14 May 42, sub: Landing Graft for BOLERO Opn, WDCSA 400 (S).

82. Memo, Marshall for Eisenhower and Somervell, 16 May 42, no sub, OPD 381 BOLERO, 10.

83. See min, 17th mtg CPS, 14 May 42, and min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 Jun 42. The production of landing craft from mid-May into the summon was greatly affected by strategic developments discussed below, Chs. X-XIII. For later debates on the program, see especially: (1) CCS 78, 7 Jun 42, title: Landing Craft; (2) min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 June 42: (3) memo, Eisenhower for Somervell, 13 Jun 42, sub: Landing Craft, Book 3, ABC 381 BOLERO (3 16-42), 4. For discussion, see Cordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack. UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), Ch. I; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 554; and George F. Mowry, Landing Craft and the War Production Board Historical Reports on War Administration: WPB Special Study . 11 (rev. ed., Washington, 1946).

84. (1) JCS 30, 5 Ape 42, title: Priorities in Pdn of Mun Based on Strategic Considerations. (2) Min, 9th mtg JCS, 6 Ape 42. (3) Min, 13th mtg JCS, 4 May 42. (4) Pers ltr, President to Nelson, 4 May 42, with JCS 30 in ABC 400 (2-17-42), 1.

85. (1) Min, 12th mtg CCS, 17 Mar 42. (2) CCS 50/2, 23 Mar 42, title: Directive for Asgmt of Mun.

86. The provision to give troops in training 100 percent equipment was based on a recommendation of Colonel Handy, who feared that the policy suggested earlier by the British of strictly limiting the use of equipment and ammunition except in combat areas would destroy the U.S. Army training program and relegate the United States to the role of wartime arsenal. See (1) memo, Handy for Jt Secretariat 21 Mar 42, no sub with CPS 17/1/D and (2) WPD notes on agenda, 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42, with CCS 50, both in ABC 400 (2-17- 42), 1: (3) min, 9th mtg CPS, 19 Mar 42; and (4) memo, WPD far Marshall, n.d., sub: Points Raised by Sir John Dill re CCS 55, with CCS 55 in ABC 400 (2-17 421, 1.

87. Memo, JPS for Rear Adm Charles M. Cooke, Jr., Brie Gen Thomas T. Handy, et al., 2 Jun 42, sub: Amendment of CCS 50/2, Directive for Asgmt of Mun, ABC: 400 (2-17-42), 1. This amendment was approved by the JPS, CPS, JCS, and CCS in early June. See (1) min, 18th mtg CPS, 5 Jun 42, and (2) min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 Jun 42.

88. Memo, OPD for CofS [10] Ape 42, sub: Proposed Deployment of AGF and AAF for 1942 as Basis for Asgmt of fun, with JCS 23 in ABC 170 (1-28-42). The three charts prepared by OPD were entitled: (a) Tentative Deployment of AGF for 1942: (b) Tentative Deployment of USAAF-1942 (Transport, Observation, and Training) ; and tentative Deployment of USAAF Combat Units 1942. Together, these charts comprised "The Tentative Deployment of United States Forces (TEDA). (see AG Regd Docs File: TEDA)

89. The document, informally called TDUN and dated 27 April 1942, consisted of appendices to the earlier report on munitions assignment (GCS 50121, filed with CCS 50/2 in ABC; 400 (2 1742), 1.

90. Min, 17th mtg CCS, 28 Apr 42.

91. (1) Memo, CofS for President, 5 May 42, sub: Increase in Strength of Army, WDCSA 320.2, I, 1942-43. (2) Memo, OCS, Washington, for CGs, AGE, AAF, SOS, ACofS, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and OPD, 19 May 42, no sub, OPD 320.2 BOLERO (5-20-42), 8.

92. Pers ltr, Col Hull, OPD, to Brig Gen Charles L. Bolte, Hq USAFBI, 19 May 42, Tab 57, Book 2, ABC: 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

93. Memo, Wedemeyer for Eisenhower, 4 May 42, sub: Reexamination of Victory Program, Tab Misc, Book 5, Exec 8.

94. Eisenhower's account of the BOLERO trip, 23 30 May 42, with CCS 72 in ABC 381 BOLERO (316-42), 1.

95. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 582. For Mountbatten's visit to Washington, see below, Ch. XI.

96. Notations by Eisenhower, 4 Jun 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

97. Msg, Marshall to CG USAFBI, London, 8 Jun 42, CM-OUT 1697. This directive was repeated in a message dispatched to Iceland on 22 June. See (1) msg, OPD to INDIGO, 22 Jun 42, CM-OUT 5458; (2) notations by Eisenhower, 11 Jun 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

98. The ETO included Finland, Norway, Sweden, the British Isles, and Iceland: a considerable portion of the Continent of Europe, including the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, France, the Low Countries, and Germany as then defined. (See msg, Marshall to CG U.S. Forces, London, INDIGO, and Iceland, 10 Jun 42, CM-OUT 3810 (6/16/42). This message was dated 10 June but actually not sent until 16 June.)

99. Min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 Jun 42.

100. Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Chancy, London, 11 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2543. Chancy served briefly as head of the newly designated command until his departure on 20 June.

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