Chapter I
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Before it entered World War II, the United States committed itself to defend the entire land area of the Western Hemisphere against military attack from the Old World.1 In the course of planning for this purpose, the United States Government defined the hemisphere as including all of the land masses of North and South America plus Greenland, Bermuda, and the Falklands (but not Iceland or the Azores) in the Atlantic area, and all islands east of the 180th meridian and all of the Aleutians in the Pacific. The armed power of the United States did not prevent minor enemy invasions of New World territory, as the Germans in Greenland and the Japanese in the Aleutians were to demonstrate. But its forces were strong enough by late 1941 to make a sustained attack on the hemisphere an unprofitable venture for hostile powers.

The commitment to defend the whole hemisphere by force was a new departure in the military policy of the United States, although it was a natural outgrowth of American policy and practice under the Monroe Doctrine. It was also a natural extension of the primary mission of the armed forces defense of the homeland. For more than a century the possibility of a serious attack across continental land frontiers had been exceedingly remote, and until the late 1930's an effective attack by land-based air power was impracticable. Therefore, the Army had concentrated after World War I on protecting the continental United States against attack by sea and against coastal invasion backed by sea power. It was almost equally concerned with the defense of the Panama Canal Zone and Oahu, as the principal outlying bastions for continental defense.


By the late 1930's a rapid increase in the range and striking power of military aircraft introduced a new and potentially serious threat to New World security, a development that coincided with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the secret and formidable preparation of the German nation for war. It was this coincidence that gave birth to the policy of hemisphere defense after Hitler made clear his power and his warlike intent during the Munich crisis of September 1938. The United States decided that as soon as possible it had to have the means to forestall the establishment of any hostile air base or other military installation on Western Hemisphere territory from which its continental area or the Panama Canal could be threatened or attacked. To prevent the establishment of enemy bases remained the essence of hemisphere defense during the prewar period of American military preparation from late 1938 to December 1941.

Whatever the United States did for hemisphere defense, it did primarily to safeguard its own national security and interests. As a senior general put it, "In the formulation of all these plans, the vital interests of the United States must be uppermost in our minds."2 The over-all purpose of the new policy, an Army planner noted, was to "deny an enemy bases from which he might launch military operations against any of the democratic nations of this hemisphere"; but its basic design was "to reduce to a minimum the likelihood of accepting war upon our own territory."3 All of the measures planned and taken in the name of hemisphere defense, including those taken during 1941 for the salvation of Great Britain and the British lifeline across the North Atlantic, had the fundamental objective of promoting the security of the United States itself.

The basic threat to national security, as conceived by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull from late 1937 onward, was the increasing probability that Germany in combination with Japan might achieve domination over the land masses of the Eastern Hemisphere, wreck the British Commonwealth of Nations, and eventually and almost inevitably threaten the Western Hemisphere with military attack and conquest. The Munich "settlement" gave reality to this specter. Nazi Germany acquired a superior military position for launching an offensive war, and the League of Nations henceforth became completely ineffectual as an instrument for preventing a general war in the Eastern Hemisphere. The amoral leadership of Hitler together with the tremendous lead of Germany over


the democratic nations in rearmament made it appear probable by early 1939 that Germany would soon launch an offensive war of unpredictable dimensions.

On the other side of Eurasia, Japan had been engaged since 1937 in the conquest of China, and increasingly the Japanese Government was succumbing to the control of war lords who aimed at Japanese domination of all East Asia and Indonesia. Between 1938 and 1941 these developments made for a constant and serious threat of war between Japan and the United States, though not for a serious Japanese threat to territory in the Western Hemisphere. During the prewar period Army planners believed it in the realm of possibility only that Japan could establish bases in the Aleutians or western Alaska, in outer islands of the Hawaiian group, or in islands southwest of Hawaii and east of the 180th meridian. That Japanese aircraft carriers might launch hit-and-run attacks on Hawaii or Panama they considered a more likely possibility. Since the United States after 1937 kept the bulk of its naval strength in the Pacific, the Army and the government generally tended to discount these dangers, and hemisphere defense came to mean very largely Atlantic defense against the menace of Nazi Germany.

President Roosevelt and the military planners foresaw in 1939 that the greatest danger to the United States and to the rest of the hemisphere would be the defeat of France and Great Britain with the surrender or destruction of their naval power. Widespread German influence in Latin America, much of it clandestine and subversive in intent, constituted a more nebulous danger but a serious weakness in the American position. The smashing German victories of 1939 and 1940 naturally bolstered this influence. After France's defeat in June 1940, the Germans planned two specific operations which, if successfully carried out, would have required much more vigorous measures than were actually put into effect. The Germans planned to invade Great Britain and to sweep through Spain in order to capture Gibraltar and Northwest Africa. Hitler's decision to postpone these operations until he had conquered the Soviet Union greatly eased the Atlantic situation in 1941, but did not dissipate American concern for hemisphere defense until Germany lost its ability to shift its major war effort from east to west in 1942. The German threat that had most to do with drawing the United States into World War II was the air and sea attack on Great Britain and its North Atlantic lifeline, which in 1941 shifted the military focus of the United States toward the northeast and into the Battle of the Atlantic.

In defense planning, after World War II began in September 1939, the United States assumed that Hitler had embarked on a calculated scheme of


world conquest; and in 1941 it assumed that Germany and Japan were acting in close military concert. These were the safe and proper assumptions for military planning. Actually, the Germans and Japanese became associates rather than partners in conquest and did not act in close military concert either before or after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Whatever schemes for world conquest Hitler may have had in mind, he never spelled out more than Old World domination (except in what he construed as Japan's proper sphere) and appropriate revenge against the United States for supporting his enemies by such tactics as a bombardment of New York City. Known Japanese plans for conquest were also limited to the Eastern Hemisphere, but unlike Hitler the Japanese, in furtherance of their plans, felt ready in 1941 to challenge the military power of the United States. After the Japanese unleashed their attack, and notwithstanding its unanticipated scope and violence, the United States Government decided that Hitler and German military superiority still posed the greater danger to the national security and to the whole Western way of life, and it reaffirmed the decision made in early 1941 that if the nation were drawn into the war it should strive to defeat Germany first.4

The seriousness of the German threat in 1940 led the United States, for the first time in its history, to seek and enter into close military relations with most of the other Western Hemisphere nations. Generally, the other American nations were as aware as the United States of the Nazi menace to democracy, and Canada had almost immediately joined with Great Britain in the war. Inter-American solidarity in World War I furnished some precedents for wartime collaboration, but not for the military staff agreements and defense boards of World War II, or for the extensive deployment of United States forces throughout the hemisphere that occurred between 1939 and 1945. In view of the preponderant strength of the United States and its very recent abandonment of intervention, the other American nations entered into these military ties with an understandable concern for their own national sovereignty and interests.

Military relations with Canada differed from those with the Latin American nations, not only because Canada became a belligerent in September 1939 but also because Canada had not participated in the earlier Pan American gatherings that formulated the basic principles for association with the nations to the south. The close military contacts that developed with Canada


in 1940 and 1941 were also tied in with the growing military intimacy of the United States and Great Britain. Thus the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, was an immediate outgrowth of the destroyer-base negotiation with the British in August 1940, and joint war plan ABC-22 with Canada was based in large measure on the strategy developed jointly in the Anglo-American staff conversations of early 1941. On the other hand, the prewar and wartime association of the United States and Canada naturally reflected the tradition of the long-unguarded frontier, the economic and demographic intimacy of the two nations, and the precedent of joint boards and commissions created for various purposes during the preceding decades of the twentieth century.5

In the area of Latin America, the key to fulfillment of measures for defense was the success of the United States both before and after Pearl Harbor in staying within the bounds of its prewar political commitments, which collectively comprised the Good Neighbor policy. By 1938 national policy was against further territorial expansion in the New World, and the United States had ceased its political and military interventions in certain Caribbean countries and foresworn intervention for any purpose in any American nation. In general the United States had also committed itself not to "play favorites" among the American nations. On the other hand, to have any reality, hemisphere defense required the availability of existing or the development of new military bases. In its military planning the United States therefore assumed that when necessary its forces could use existing military bases and essential supporting facilities in other American nations and in colonial territories of the European powers. Until Pearl Harbor the United States as a matter of policy avoided either the lease or outright acquisition of new base sites in other American nations, and at least in theory avoided exclusive acquisition and use of new bases anywhere in the hemisphere except within its own territory. After Pearl Harbor it carefully avoided any use of military bases that could fairly be construed as an infringement on the sovereignty of other New World nations.

A fundamental of the policy and defense plans of the United States has been that potential Old World enemies must not obtain control over any territory in the Western Hemisphere, either by force or by negotiation. In Army usage before and during World War II the Monroe Doctrine meant just that and nothing more. Germany's victory in the west in 1940


naturally made this a problem of great moment, and the United States prepared to take any necessary steps to prevent British, French, Dutch, and Danish possessions from falling into German hands or under German control. To avoid any pretext for military attack, the United States also opposed the defense of French, Dutch, and Danish possessions by friendly belligerents, and insisted that these lands should be defended as necessary by United States or Latin American forces. After the destroyer-base exchange the United States also assumed a major share of the responsibility for defending British North Atlantic and Caribbean territories.

As for the territory of the Latin American nations, the United States pledged itself in military staff agreements negotiated in 1940 to employ its forces to assist in defeating any external attack by the armed forces of a non-American state or internal attack supported by a non-American state, if the recognized government of the nation concerned asked for such assistance. While the larger Latin nations had sizable military establishments, these were not equipped or trained to meet an Old World enemy force in strength. Nor did the United States have the means to help equip and train their forces sufficiently or in time to handle major threats from abroad. Therefore, prewar plans for hemisphere defense had to assume that United States forces would be required to defend the Latin American area against major overseas attacks. The large movement of trained Canadian forces to Great Britain made a similar assumption necessary for the northern reaches of the hemisphere. Acting on these assumptions, the United States in military negotiations with other American nations before Pearl Harbor had as its main objectives obtaining assured access to existing military base facilities, and receiving warning of impending enemy attacks in time to allow United States forces to reach threatened areas.

The leaders of the United States Army realized during the prewar years that even under the most auspicious circumstances the Army was ill prepared for any large-scale operations. With only a nucleus of trained and equipped troops, the Army undertook in 1940 to develop a large strategic reserve of units that for the most part would not be ready for even limited action before late 1941. Given this situation Army planning continued to be dominated by the idea of maintaining a perimeter defense of the citadel, the continental United States. Until 1939 the defense perimeter followed the continental shore line and was supported by strong but distant outposts in Panama and Hawaii. With military expansion and in accordance with the new policy of hemisphere defense, the defensive perimeter was extended from the citadel. By mid-1941 it included Greenland, Newfoundland, Bermuda,


Puerto Rico, and Trinidad along the Atlantic front and Alaska and Oahu and the Canal Zone along the Pacific. Army planners wanted to project the perimeter southward to include the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific and the eastern tip of Brazil in the Atlantic. They believed that with this further extension the perimeter could be held by a minimum number of combat forces and that no enemy could establish a base for major operations in the Western Hemisphere without first capturing one or more strong-points in the perimeter.

As long as the United States Navy kept the bulk of its fleet in the eastern Pacific, neither Japan nor any other nation had the capability of establishing a hostile base from which to launch a major operation against the hemisphere's Pacific front, and Nazi Germany with all of its military might could not act similarly in the northern Atlantic as long as the British Fleet was in being and based on the British Isles. In October 1940 the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, described the naval aspects of hemisphere defense as "fundamental," and said: "As long as the British fleet remains undefeated and England holds out, the Western Hemisphere is in little danger of direct attack." But, he added, "the situation would become radically changed" if the British Fleet were sunk or surrendered.6

If Britain fell and the British Fleet were lost, it was more than conceivable that the hemisphere might be invaded from the northeast via Newfoundland and the St. Lawrence estuary. This was the threat that aroused the interest of President Roosevelt in acquiring bases for United States forces in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland; it was a matter discussed at the first meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States; and it remained a threat covered by Army expeditionary force plans in 1940 and 1941.

Partly because both British and American naval power was stationed so far away, the Army was most concerned during the prewar period with the situation in the Caribbean area and in eastern South America. The Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico were the Atlantic approaches to the Panama Canal, and also to the "soft underbelly" of the United States itself--its unprotected Gulf coast. Furthermore, two prime strategic materials--oil and bauxite--originated around these seas and traveled through them. After June 1940 the presence in this area of French colonies loyal to the Vichy Government added to the Army's concern.

In South America the bulge of Brazil, closer to Africa than to the nearest


of the Antilles, was the one point in the hemisphere vulnerable to large-scale air attack or invasion. Northeast Brazil was undefended, inaccessible to existing Brazilian Army forces, and beyond the range of United States air power based in the Caribbean area. Even if Britain survived, it seemed to Army planners that this position must be defended by United States forces if German forces moved into western Africa. Furthermore, they held, the effective defense of this one position would ensure the whole southern Atlantic front against external attack and reassure all of the Latin American nations against any serious threat from abroad. It was in order to make this position defensible that the Army arranged with Pan American Airways to construct two chains of airfields leading from the United States to eastern Brazil. But it could not persuade the Brazilians to request United States Army defenders for the area.

Germany's smashing victories in western Europe in the spring of 1940 had the immediate effect of re-emphasizing hemisphere defense as the basic military policy of the United States. On 23 May President Roosevelt and his principal advisers decided that the nation must avoid war with Japan and concentrate on what they called the "South American situation." Eastern Brazil was the most immediate cause for anxiety, and during the following weekend the President and the Army and Navy engaged in hurried planning for a possible expeditionary force to that area. Actually, the services were then unready to carry out any such plan, but they quickly prepared a more comprehensive one for defending the hemisphere on all fronts. This plan, RAINBOW 4, remained the basic guide for American military action until the spring of 1941. In June 1940, after France fell, the President and his principal military advisers confirmed their determination to avoid war or offensive action in the Pacific, ruled out intervention in the European war, and decided that the nation must concentrate on mobilizing its manpower and economic strength for hemisphere defense. Underlying these decisions was a grave doubt that Great Britain could survive through 1940.

The first breach in the June decisions on national strategy was the agreement with Great Britain to exchange destroyers for bases, concluded on 2 September. During September Army and Navy leaders as well as the President acquired a conviction that Great Britain could hold out at least six months more, and that even if the British Fleet was surrendered in the spring of 1941 it would take the Germans six additional months to make it useful. Therefore, Germany could not launch a major attack across the Atlantic before the autumn of 1941, and by then the United States expected to have a trained and equipped army of 1,400,000 men as well as greater naval


strength. While eventually Germany might muster the strength to challenge the United States, a transatlantic invasion of the hemisphere by German forces within the next two or three years appeared improbable, even if coordinated with a Japanese offensive in the Pacific. With the bounds of neutrality already broken by the destroyer-base exchange, and with a much more optimistic outlook than in June, the United States Government from September onward charted a new course of much greater aid to Great Britain. Eventually and inevitably this new course disrupted plans for a perimeter defense of the hemisphere, as plotted in RAINBOW 4.

While Germany stayed its military hand in the autumn and winter of 1940, the United States reached new decisions on national policy. These reaffirmed a defensive posture in the Pacific and concentration on the Atlantic and European situations. But the new policy went much further: it assumed the salvation of Great Britain and the British Fleet, and it contemplated American entry into the European war to defeat Germany. By December 1940 the civilian and military leaders of the War and Navy Departments were convinced that the United States must eventually enter the war against Germany to save itself, and that to save itself it had to save Great Britain. They also agreed that the eventual "big act" in getting into the war would be the one undertaken by United States forces to help protect the North Atlantic seaway to Great Britain.7 President Roosevelt matched these convictions with his conception of lend-lease. In effect, the new orientation of national policy made Great Britain the pivot of measures for defending the nation and the hemisphere during 1941. It also brought the United States Navy into the midst of Atlantic action.

Although the Army was the more active service in preparations for continental and hemisphere defense before 1941, it had actually been playing a secondary role behind a first-line screen of naval power. The Navy much more than the Army kept its eyes on the Pacific, where its main strength lay and where it assumed its main task would be if war came. Nevertheless, as the Army recognized, throughout the prewar years the Navy in conjunction with British naval power was carrying out its primary mission of providing the nation with a first line of defense at a distance. Army leaders were also well aware during these years that only the Navy had a force in being ready for war.

After September 1939 the principal task of the Navy in the immediate defense of the hemisphere was to maintain a neutrality patrol in Atlantic


waters to persuade belligerent warships, and especially German vessels, to keep away from American shores. The Navy gradually extended this patrol outward into the Atlantic, and the destroyer exchange, though temporarily weakening the patrol, provided new and improved bases for supporting its operations. Then, in January 1941, President Roosevelt authorized the Navy to prepare for the larger role in the Atlantic of helping to escort American aid to Britain. While the Navy was getting ready for this task, the United States and Great Britain agreed in staff conversations on the course of action they would follow if the United States entered the war, and Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act. But when the Navy in April came up with a forthright escort scheme in its Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 1, President Roosevelt after some indecision ordered a more circumscribed line of action that confined American naval operations to the western half of the Atlantic and to measures short of escort duty. Even so, it seemed to Army and Navy leaders in the spring of 1941 that the nation was on the brink of open war.

Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June helped to postpone war in the Atlantic and to precipitate it in the Pacific. Intelligence of the impending German thrust eastward was one of the factors influencing the decision of President Roosevelt to send American troops to Iceland, and their arrival furnished a justification for escort operations by the United States Navy to the longitude of Iceland. Then in September and October came the "shooting war" and more open naval collaboration with Great Britain under the Navy's Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5.

Whether these successive Navy plans of 1941 were really measures for hemisphere defense was a bone of contention for isolationists then as it has been for some of Mr. Roosevelt's critics since. Granted that the broadening military operations of the United States in the North Atlantic were steps toward the defeat of Hitler's Germany, they were also genuine and effective defense measures, and their dual purpose should be recognized. Certainly under these plans and the associated plans of the Army the United States took its most effective action for Atlantic and hemisphere defense during 1941.

The Army played only a secondary role in the vigorous measures of mid and late 1941 for saving Great Britain and its North Atlantic lifeline. Execution of these measures meant that the Army could not carry out other plans for defense in the areas for which it had previously felt so much concern, the Caribbean and South America. On the other hand, with the North Atlantic increasingly secured and the Germans heavily engaged in the Soviet Union, new Army defense steps to the south had less urgency than before mid-1941. Thereafter the Army tried to keep the number of combat troops


sent into the Caribbean area to a bare minimum, and, beyond the Caribbean, it wished only to establish an air reconnaissance base southwest of Panama and send minimum defense forces to the eastern bulge of Brazil.

The position of President Roosevelt toward hemisphere defense after the spring of 1940 is somewhat difficult to determine from his addresses and other remarks. As a rule, his intimate conversations with advisers were not recorded. From his known remarks and actions it is apparent that after the summer of 1940 Mr. Roosevelt did not feel any acute concern about the possibility of a major military attack on the hemisphere for several years to come. There is no question about the President's detestation of Hitler and the Nazis, nor about his appreciation of how great the threat to the United States would be if Germany secured a dominating position in the Eastern Hemisphere. Nor is there any question about Mr. Roosevelt's determination to use all courses of action that American public opinion would support to stop Hitler.

One of these courses was an appeal to the traditional American doctrine of freedom of the seas. As early as October 1940, the President and Secretary of State Hull had emphasized in public addresses how essential friendly control of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans was to hemisphere defense. In January 1941 the President began to stress freedom of the seas rather than hemisphere defense as a rallying ground for military preparedness. He also took the position that there should be no "aggressors" peace. Furthermore, he believed that saving Great Britain alone was not enough, because the strength and security of Britain depended upon the continued support of the rest of the British Empire and its sea communications everywhere. In one of his most revealing utterances the President wrote:

A nationally known advertising man wrote me the other day . . . to suggest that we tell the truth, i.e., that we are not concerned with the affairs of the British Empire but are concerned with our own safety, the security of our own trade, the future of our own crops, the integrity of our own continent, and the lives of our own children in the next generation.

That, I think, is a pretty good line to take because it happens to be true and it is on that line itself that we must, for all the above purely selfish reasons, prevent at almost any hazard the Axis domination of the world.8

The President's expressed goals clearly called for a larger effort in 1941 than the nation needed to make for the immediate defense of the hemisphere. They also called for a different sort of effort from that which Army planners


advocated, as illustrated in discussions about Iceland and the Azores. From the planners' viewpoint it was not necessary nor even desirable to garrison either as a military outpost for the hemisphere; from the President's point of view, both were essential guardians of Atlantic seaways, which had to be controlled to save Britain, and he was convinced that Britain's salvation was an essential to hemisphere and national security.

Until late 1941 the President was apparently more reluctant about getting into the war than were some of his principal advisers. He kept his ears tuned sensitively to American public opinion and opinion polls, and to judge from the public opinion polls Mr. Roosevelt never let the actions of the United States get very far out of step with the opinion of the majority of its people. Several of the President's advisers thought that he lagged behind the majority; and perhaps there was much truth in the remark of a distinguished English observer who wrote him: "I have been so struck by the way you have led public opinion by allowing it to get ahead of you."9 American opinion remained heavily opposed to any declaration of war until the attack on Pearl Harbor. But in 1940 and 1941 a majority indorsed every action taken in the name of hemisphere defense or freedom of the seas, including the support of Great Britain and military operations in the North Atlantic. The public also approved the action, urged by the President and taken by Congress on 13 November 1941, repealing prohibitions against arming American merchant ships and against allowing them to enter war zones. By that action Congress ended the apparent ambiguity and undercover character of Atlantic operations during the preceding months of 1941 and set the stage for war with Germany.

Then, before a full state of war could develop in the Atlantic, Japan struck in the Pacific. The Japanese Government wanted to convert the nations and colonial areas of eastern Asia and Indonesia into subservient tributaries of Japan, and the war in Europe seemed to provide a golden opportunity for conquest. The Japanese might have been willing to create their so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by negotiation, but they were not willing to limit their objective. When Great Britain and the United States and the other nations involved decided not to capitulate, Japan cast the die for war.

Until the summer of 1941 new Army measures for defense in the Pacific lagged behind Atlantic preparations. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson among others did not believe that Japan would go to war as long as Britain remained undefeated. Alarms in January and July 1941 produced some strengthening of Oahu's Army air defenses and a more rapid garrisoning of


Alaska. Since the Army's primary mission in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama was the guarding of naval bases and installations, the Navy had the chief voice in determining where Army Pacific reinforcements should go until August 1941. Then, under the impulse of a new design to contain Japan by air power, the reinforcement of the Philippines instead of hemisphere outposts became the goal. As a result some of Hawaii's newly acquired air strength was shifted to the Far East, and the movement of modern aircraft to Alaska was further postponed. The decision to reinforce the Philippines broke through the perimeter concept in the Pacific as the defense of Iceland and Great Britain had broken through it in the Atlantic. The Japanese attacked just as this reinforcement was getting under way.

A glance at the distribution of troops in mid-1942 shows that in the first few months after Pearl Harbor continental and hemisphere defense plans continued to provide the main guides to the actual deployment of Army ground and air forces, despite a large movement of forces to the Southwest Pacific and smaller movements to the British Isles and Iceland. At the beginning of July 1942, when the Army had about 800,000 officers and men assigned to active theaters and defense commands, Western Hemisphere garrisons and commands contained about three-fourths of this strength, divided about equally between defense commands in the continental United States and overseas outposts within the hemisphere. In other words, the Army did not begin to move the bulk of its ready forces across the oceans until after the nation and its outposts were reasonably secure. After 1942 the principal task of Army defenders within the hemisphere was to guard outposts that now became bases for the support of overseas offensives.10

The focus of Army planning had begun to shift from hemisphere defense to future operations outside the hemisphere long before, in late 1940 and early 1941. During 1941 military men moved somewhat more slowly than political leaders toward the new strategy, partly because the former were more aware than the latter of minimum defense needs and partly because military leaders were painfully aware of the unreadiness of most of the Army until late 1941 for offensive action. Indeed there was a remarkable coincidence between the Army's readiness for limited offensive action and the outbreak of full-scale war. Enough forces were ready in December 1941 so that Army planning and action could turn quickly and naturally to launching operations overseas that would obviate the need for hemisphere defense at home.


Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (Forword/Preface) * Next Chapter (2)


1. This introductory chapter is a somewhat shortened version of the concluding chapter of the companion volume of this subseries, Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1960). It is included here to provide a broader setting for the account that follows of the specific plans and measures for defending the continental United States and its outposts during World War II.

2. Memo, CG Third Army for WPD, 8 June 40, WPD 4175-II.

3. Memo for Rcd, Lt Col Jonathan W. Anderson, WPD 4175-2.

4. See Louis Morton, "Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II," Study I in Department of the Army, Command Decisions (Washington, 1960).

5. Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), contains the fullest description of the prewar and wartime association of the two nations.

6. Resume of conversation between Gen Marshall and Gen Nicolas Delgado, CofS Paraguayan Army, 31 Oct 40, WPD 4385-I.

7. Diary of Henry L. Stimson, entry of 16 Dec 40, examined at Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.

8. Pers Ltr, President Roosevelt to Senator Josiah W. Bailey, 13 May 41, in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, edited by Elliott Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), II, 1154.

9. Pers Ltr, 3 Jun 41, Roosevelt Papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

10. For graphic presentations of the distribution of Army forces among tactical commands in late 1941 and 1942, see charts 1, 2, and 3 in Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953) (hereafter referred to as Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42).

Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation