The Marianas--GUAM

PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK

Guam is the southernmost of the Marianas Group and is also the largest, being 34½ miles long and ranging from 5 to 9 miles in width, with an area of 228 square miles. The shore line varies from high cliffs to coral beaches, with the northern half a high plateau and the southern half sloping east and west from a mountain ridge running north and south along its western side. The island is entirely surrounded by a reef formed of limestone, except for a number of small harbors and bays, making landings by tracked

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CLOSE AFTER A TERRIFIC NAVAL BOMBARDMENT THAT SMASHED JAP SHORE POSITIONS, MARINE AND COAST GUARDSMEN HIT THE BEACHES OF GUAM

MARINE AND COAST GUARDSMEN HIT THE BEACHES OF GUAM

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vehicles practicable only along the western coast. Apra Harbor is the only sheltered anchorage of any size. The native population in 1940 was 22,290 mostly chamorros, with Agana the largest town. After its capture by the Japanese in 1941 the beach areas from Tumon Bay to Taipi Point had been fortified, and two airfields had been built on Orote Point, Japanese army personnel numbered 13,000 and naval units totaled 5,000. Task Force 53, one of the components of Task Force 51, was assigned to the capture of Guam ana consisted of some 207 vessels ranging from battleships to tugs, many of which had participated in the assault on Saipan. In the assault on Guam 56,537 troops were employed, 19,423 being Army and 37,292 Marines. Task Force 53 originally assembled and trained for the Marianas operation in the Guadalcanal areas. After staging at Kwajalein, the Task Force sailed for the Marianas between 9 and 12 June. It was originally planned that Task Force 53 would act as a floating reserve during the Saipan landing and would land on Guam on 18 June, but the unexpectedly severe resistance on Saipan required the landing of part of its forces there, so that 18 June was cancelled as WILLIAM Day. For the next ten days, until the conclusion of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and the end of the Japanese threat to our amphibious forces, Task Force 53 retired and advanced in an area 150 to 300 miles east of Saipan, acting as a reserve for the troops ashore on Saipan, and yet in a position to clear the area should an enemy attack develop. As the campaign ashore on Saipan drew to a successful close, the reserve units of Task Force 53 returned to Eniwetok for additional preparation and planning. The new WILLIAM Day was then set for 21 July. The delay resulted in keeping troops aboard ship for as many as 50 days with only brief times ashore so that their combat efficiency suffered somewhat as a result. Surface bombardment had begun on 16 June when it was anticipated that the landing would take place on 18 June but was discontinued after an hour on receipt of orders cancelling W-day. It is doubtful whether this firing was of any material assistance to our forces when they landed over a month later, but having made our intentions clear, it was necessary to see to that the Japanese on Guam had no opportunity to capitalize on this knowledge. Our ships first neutralized and then knocked out practically all the enemy anti-aircraft batteries on Guam and as the tempo of our air activity rose, practically all enemy artillery on the island was destroyed. The total results were much better than could have been achieved by the two day bombardment originally planned. Not a single piece of enemy artillery was brought to bear on the transports when the landing finally took place. After two anti-shipping sweeps, one on 27 June and one of 30 June-1 July, Guam was under constant surface bombardment until the landing on 21 July, This was coordinated with air strikes from Task Force 58, the carrier planes striking one end of the island while the cruisers fired on the other. This bombardment soon had its effect. The surface ships encountered no return fire at any time, and anti-aircraft fire was silenced after the second day. LCI(G)'s furnished close-in support, approaching within a few yards of the reef and raking enemy trenches, pillboxes and possible machine gun emplacements, thus keeping down enemy fire on the underwater demolition teams and at the same time pointing out enemy positions for the fire of heavier ships. The underwater demolition teams began their work on the night of the 17th,

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COAST GUARD-MANNED LANDING BARGES STRIKE AT THE BEACHES NEAR GUAM

COAST GUARD-MANNED LANDING BARGES STRIKE AT THE BEACHES NEAR GUAM

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destroying natural and artificial obstacles on the landing beaches. These were mainly palm log cribs filled with coral, or wire cages filled with cemented coral and spaced about 5 feet apart. Over 640 of these obstacles were destroyed on Asan Beach and 300 removed from Agat Beach, all of them being blown up with hand-placed charges. The fact that the June bombardment of Guam had revealed the beaches on which we proposed to land, left no advantage in trying to conceal these operations and it was therefore possible to do much work by daylight. The delay in the date of our landing gave the enemy time to improve his beach defenses, but also provided additional time for underwater demolitions.

CONDITION OF BEACHES

The Guam beaches were less suited to unloading than those at Saipan. The reef edge was 200 to 500 yards offshore, and there were no passages through to the beach. All landing craft had to be unloaded at the outer edge of the reef. The Agat beaches were especially difficult as the water over the reef was too deep for trucks to operate even at low tide. The reef at the Asan Beaches was dry at low tide, and trucks could then run out to its edge, reducing the burden on the tracked vehicles. Later, as the troops advanced on Orote Peninsula, the underwater demolition teams prepared Dadi Beach to the north of Agat and it became the chief unloading beach, and after the assault phase, the only point outside Apra Harbor used for unloading. Troops and supplies were brought to the edge of the reef in landing craft for transfer. Moorings were placed off the reef to which pontoon barges and causeways could be secured. When on the 29th, it became possible to use Apra Harbor for unloading, LCVP shallow-water minesweepers entered and began to sweep for mines. They were supplemented by YMS's on the 30th and that afternoon the Appalachian entered the harbor. She was followed next day by the Indianapolis. Two units of garrison shipping entered the harbor and began unloading on 31 July. Artillery for the support of troop movements was put ashore with remarkable rapidity, that of the 3rd Marine Division reaching the Asan Beaches by 1300 of the 21st and by the end of the 22nd a total of three battalions of 155 mm howitzers, one battalion of 155 mm guns, and two battalions of 105 mm guns were ashore, in addition to the 3rd Division and Brigade Artillery.

PRE-LANDING AIR ATTACK

The pre-landing air attack took place from 0715 to 0815 on 21 July. During this time, 312 planes dropped, 124 tons of bombs on the landing and flanking beaches. These attacks were made simultaneously with naval gunfire for the first time in Pacific amphibious operations. As the ships approached the beaches 32 F6F's from Carrier Divisions 22 and 24 went into action dropping depth charges and straffing along the beaches. These were followed by more fighters which straffed directly behind the beaches. Immediately following the troop landings, another strike was made by 24 fighters armed with rockets and by 24 torpedo planes with 100 pound G.P. bombs covering the area from 1,500 to 2,500 yards inland, where enemy mortar and artillery positions were to be expected. This assisted the first wave to obtain cover. Throughout the morning, repeated air strikes continued on assigned areas away from the landing beaches in attempts to immobilize

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USS Sterope (AK-96)

USS Sterope (AK-96)

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the enemy. In order that attacks should he directed effectively at most worthwhile targets, much advance preparation was required. A large proportion of the pilots were thoroughly briefed before the operation on the entire air support plan, the methods of close support of troops, and the ground plan of attack.

ASSAULT AND CAPTURE OF GUAM

While the bombardment was under way the assault ships were making their second voyage from Eniwetok to Guam. The tractor groups sailed for Guam on 15 July and the transports two days later. By the afternoon of 20 July the various components of the landing force were in position and approaching the island on schedule. During the night of 20-21 July, the transports steamed around the southern tip and moved into their assigned positions off the landing beaches. The operations on 21 July took place almost wholly as planned. The 3rd Marine Division, the Northern Transport Group, (T.G. 53.3) was to go ashore on Red, Green, and Blue Beaches at Asan, north of Apra Harbor. Beaches Yellow and White, at Agat, were designated for the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the 77th Infantry in the Southern Transport Group (T.G. 53.4). Two Coast Guard manned LST's (Nos. 70 and 207) were included in Tractor Group Three (T.G. 53.3.6) and LST-71 flagship of Defense Group Two of the Southern Attack Group under Lt. Comdr. P. E. Miner, USCGR, was also Coast Guard manned. The AK Cor Caroli (AK-91) of Garrison Group Pour of the Southern Group had a Coast Guard complement. Other wholly Coast Guard manned ships were Aquarius (AK-16), Centaurus (AKA-17) Sterope (AK-96) and Tupelo (AN-56). With fire support ships already at work, the LST's moved into their initial areas off the beaches and, to seaward of them, the transports began debarking troops. The LST's began launching LVT's at 0730 and they were dispatched from the line of departure at 0800. H-hour was set for 0830 and the first wave landed on the Asan Beaches at 0829 and at Agat at 0832. After landing the first wave, the LVT's returned to the edge of the reef where troops and supplies were transferred from landing craft, the troops wading ashore from the edge of the reef at some places with supplies being floated on improvised rafts. By 1130 the entire 3rd Marine Division was ashore with all essential equipment, having landed in 24 waves. On the southern beaches the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was landed by 1100 and the 305th Combat Team of the 77th came ashore in the afternoon. Due to the heavy preparatory bombardment enemy opposition was relatively light, with mortar fire causing some casualties but not greatly hindering the landings.

GROUND OPERATIONS

The most serious opposition was encountered in the area around Apra Harbor, where enemy mortar and artillery fire from the high ground commanding the beaches, was neutralized by air and naval support and aggressive action on the part of the troops. The basic movement of the first stage was one of encircling Apra Harbor, the 3rd Marine Division in the north holding its initial beachhead against determined counter-attacks, with little advance until the capture of Cabras Island on the 23rd which brought the northern side of Apra Harbor under our

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AMERICAN INVADERS WADE THROUGH A GOLDEN, SHALLOW SURF TO HIT A BEACH NEAR GUAM

AMERICAN INVADERS WADE THROUGH A GOLDEN, SHALLOW SURF TO HIT A BEACH NEAR GUAM

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control. The ground commanding the beachhead in the Agat sector was rapidly secured and the Marine Brigade launched a vigorous attack on Orate Peninsula on the 26th. This attack went on against stubborn resistance through dense undergrowth and jungle for 3 days until the capture of the Peninsula on the 29th. This gave us control of Apra Harbor and completed the first period of the assault operation. In the second stage our forces pushed across Guam to the eastern coast, and then northward where the Japanese continued to retire, after leaving the beachhead, until organized enemy resistance finally ceased. The 3rd Marine and 77th Army Division began the northward attack on the 31st, securing the Agana-Pago Road that day and cutting the island in two. Only scattered enemy opposition was encountered in the advance to the north. The enemy employed road blocks, and isolated strong defensive positions were also encountered, but by 9 August, the northern coast was reached and all organized resistance was declared at an end next day. The elimination of the remaining pockets of Japanese resistance was a long and difficult task because of the tenacity and stubbornness of the defenders and the exceedingly rough terrain. This is indicated by the fact that on 10 August, the total enemy dead was 10,971 with 86 prisoners, whereas by 9 September, a total of 15,651 had been killed and 194 prisoners taken. Through 14 November, the total had grown to 17,238 killed and 463 captured. During this period LCI(G)'s carried parties along the coasts and operated against small bodies of the enemy hidden in caves and on beaches. The casualties suffered by our forces were 1,289 killed, 5,648 wounded, and 148 missing in action or a total of 7,085.

COAST GUARD MANNED LST UNDER FIRE

One Coast Guard manned LST (No. 24) arrived off Guam after the island had been under heavy air and naval bombardment for many days. A part of our LST flotilla had carried assault units which were unloaded for the first wave. Later came other LST's loaded with trucks and bulldozers which sat a few miles off the beachhead at Agat and waited. Within a few days, when the Marines had things well in hand as far as the beachhead was concerned, these were ordered in. The big bow doors were opened at the edge of the reef, a quarter of a mile from shore, and there was a steady parade of vehicles into the shallow water. Suddenly there was a tremendous explosion to the immediate left, followed by four more explosions each closer to the ship. Someone shouted "We are under fire." General quarters was sounded and the LST started withdrawing, but the Japanese had established their range and began to lay down a steady barrage of fire. The shells were passing immediately overhead and it would be only a matter of minutes when they would land right on the LST. It took 17 minutes to get off the reef and all the time the Jap shells were landing just astern. One LST to the right, which moved out a little faster actually backed into the stream of fire. The Coast Guard manned LST finally got out with one casualty, a Seabee who was wounded by shrapnel. Much of the credit for the escape goes to the LCI gunboats, some of them moving in at top speed and pouring a terrific stream of automatic gunfire onto the shore. This drew the Jap fire away from the LST and the

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OPERATIONS CHART OF TINIAN

OPERATIONS CHART OF TINIAN

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LCI then followed in the withdrawal. Later cruisers and destroyers knocked out the Jap batteries. With the unloading done the LST took a survey party around to the other side of the island. Here they contacted some 2,000 natives who had escaped from a Japanese Concentration camp after their guards had fled. Many were sick and wounded and they took about 200 of the worst cases aboard.

LST-207 IN ASSAULT ON GUAM

The Coast Guard manned LST-207 departed Eniwetok Atoll on 15 July, 1944 with Tractor Group Three and proceeded uneventfully until the 21st. Approaching the LVT launching area at 0651 on that date the LST's boats departed to assist in forming assault waves and directing LVT's to the beach. The LST arrived in the launching area at 0731, 4,000 yards from Asan Beach, and discharged all 17 LVT's within six minutes. These included 4 armored amphibious tanks (LVT(A)) assigned to cover Adelup Point, 1 amphibious tractor (LVT-1) to be used as repair tractor and wrecker, and 12 amphibious tractors (LVT-2), each carrying 20 Marine assault troops of the Third Battalion, Third Marines. Six of these 12 tractors were armored and formed part of the first assault wave on Beach Red One, assigned to proceed inland 100 yards through Japanese beach defenses and disembark troops; three of. the remaining six tractors, being unarmored were in the second assault wave assigned to disembark troops at the beach's edge and to liquidate beach defenses; and the three unarmored tractors, or LVT-2's formed a portion of the third assault wave assigned to disembark troops 100 yards inland and support troops disembarked in the first wave. All the Marine troops were disembarked under cover of heavy naval bombardment and no enemy air resistance was encountered. Shortly afterward LST-207 got under way in convoy, returning to stand off Asan Beach on the 23rd while the Seabee unit launched 4 pontoon barges for duty with the USS Crescent City. On the 24th she beached on Asan Beach and began unloading vehicles. On the 25th a Marine working party unleaded the ship's cargo. On the next day as unloading continued, four bursts of Japanese mortar fire landed in the water about 800 yards distant but no damage was done. On the 28th the LST proceeded toward the Marshall Islands after unloading was completed.

Cor Caroli OFF OROTE PENINSULA DURING BATTLE

The Coast Guard manned Cor Caroli (AK-91) arrived at 0725 on the 28th in the outer transport area of Agat Bay, Guam, and at 1140 proceeded to the inner transport area where she stood by to discharge cargo. While the vessel was hove to, about 1,000 yards south of Orote Peninsula and Neyo Island, the battle of Orote Peninsula was taking place. The bombardment of the peninsula by our battleships, cruisers, and aircraft continued throughout the afternoon and night of both the 28th and 29th. The Cor Caroli was exposed to possible sniper and battery fire of the Japanese on Orote Peninsula, but suffered no damage, although a splash from a medium caliber shell landed 200 yards from the ship's bow. On the second day of the battle the vessel moved to an anchorage&frac;34; mile from Apoaca Point, Agat Bay, and discharged cargo from that time through the rest of the month. On the 1st of August she had to vacate the anchorage for a vessel with a higher priority cargo

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DAILY PROGRESS-TINIAN PHASE

EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS, TASK FORCE 56
DAILY PROGRESS-TINIAN PHASE

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when only half discharged and after cruising in the inner transport area off Agat Bay until the 9th, she moored to two buoys in Apra Harbor and resumed discharging until the 12th when unloading was completed. On the 15th she got under way as part of T.U. 53.18.8 bound for Eniwetok.

The Marianas--TINIAN

DECLINING ENEMY STRENGTH

On 12 July, 1944 the commander of the Joint Expeditionary Force directed Rear Admiral H. W. Hill, commander of Group Two, Amphibious Forces Pacific, to assume command of the Tinian Attack Force, Task Force 52 (new) and J-day, the day for the assault on Tinian, was designated as 24 July. The Battle of the Philippine Sea had resulted in such damage to the Japanese Fleet, that the possibility of further threats from major enemy surface forces during the period of assault was considered negligible and Task Force 58 was adequate to prevent a serious attack. No worthwhile attacks by enemy planes had been made in the Marianas area since 8 July. Enemy air bases at Guam, Rota and Pagan, had been effectively neutralized. Further planned strikes on enemy bases to the north and south were expected to curtail long range air strikes on our forces. The Japanese defense forces on Tinian itself had been subjected to aerial and naval bombardment since 11 June and their effectiveness had been impaired. Tinian Island lies 2&frac;34; miles southwest of Saipan and is 10½ miles long and a maximum of 5 miles wide, with an area of 48 square miles. The island is a basaltic plateau, broken into a number of terraces, separated by sharp, steep drops. A ridge extends north and south near its east side and the eastern slopes are steep, while the western slopes are moderate and gentle. In the southern part are many caves and ravines. A fringing reef, which extends a short distance from the shoreline, runs along most of the coast. There is only one small harbor at Tinian Town on the southern part of the west coast. In the north end of the island, near Ushi Point, was located a large air field with considerable repair facilities, while two new airstrips were under construction near Gurguan Point on the west. There were about 18,000 civilians on the island and military forces totaling 8,950 men, with a Home Guard unit of about 3,500 in addition. While Tinian had been heavily fortified with coastal defense, anti-aircraft and machine guns, nearly all the coastal defense and many anti-aircraft guns had been destroyed before the landing. The strongest defenses were in the vicinity of Tinian Town where the best landing beaches existed.

PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK

Task Force 52 consisted of 214 vessels of which 174 were in the amphibious groups, 16 in the Carrier Support Group and 24 in the Fire Support Group. Most of the features of the assault on Tinian followed the general pattern of previous amphibious operations. However, its proximity to newly won Saipan made the operation principally a shore to shore movement. The artillery support available from Saipan made a landing on the northern

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MARINES UNLOAD OIL DRUMS FROM A COAST GUARD-MANNED TANK LIGHTER AND ROLL THEM THROUGH THE SURF AND ONTO THE BEACH OF TINIAN ISLAND, MARIANAS

MARINES UNLOAD OIL DRUMS FROM A COAST GUARD-MANNED TANK LIGHTER

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part of Tinian desirable, and though the choice was very limited, Beaches White-1 and White-2 on the northwest coast were finally selected. Preparations to cover the possibility of bad weather included about 30 tons of varied supplies for delivery by parachute drop and the possible employment of aircraft for delivery of some 100 tons of supplies daily after capture of the Ushi Point airfield. Because of the small area of mineable waters adjacent to the coast, minesweeping operations were of a minor nature and the only mines discovered were in Asiga Bay off Yellow Beaches on the east coast. Prior to the operations for the capture of Tinian, continuous air bombardment of that island had been conducted through the Saipan operation, all aircraft not required at Saipan being diverted to Tinian. Beginning about 15 July the intensity of the daily airstrikes was steadily increased. The XXIV Corps Artillery began a deliberate long range bombardment from Saipan, intensified after 8 July when Saipan was secured. The preparatory bombardment, including naval and aerial, delivered prior to the landings on Tinian exceeded in duration and destructiveness any previous assault preparation of the war in the Pacific. The island was divided into a northern and southern half with aerial bombing and naval gunfire alternating daily. The results were not as complete as had been hoped for because most defenses were dug in. Heavy bombardment by ships of the Fire Support Group, aerial strikes and a continuation of artillery fire were made on J minus one day (23 July). The area around Tinian was divided into five fire support sectors and counter battery and neutralization fires were conducted on the high ground north of Tinian Town and also during beach reconnaissance and minesweeping operations. Because of a squall which scattered the boats carrying the explosives, an attempt to conduct demolition work on White Beach-2, during the night of 23-24 July, in order to destroy anti-boat mines and blast boulders flanking the beach, was unsuccessful.

LANDING ON TINIAN

Movements of all vessels and craft from Saipan to Tinian on J-day, 24 July, were executed without incident. LVT's loaded with the assault troops, 75 mm howitzer artillery, and equipment were launched from LST's and the assault waves were formed. H-hour scheduled at 0730 was delayed ten minutes but otherwise the assault troops landed as planned, and by afternoon all troops of the 4th Marine Division were ashore and the landing of the 2nd Marine Division had commenced. By nightfall a secure beachhead had been won, with very light casualties to the assault troops. The Colorado and Norman Scott suffered severe personnel casualties when they were taken under fire earlier on J-day by an enemy shore battery which had not previously been detected. At this same time the first wave was about 2,000 yards from the beach off Tinian Town when intense enemy mortar and artillery fire broke out. The waves continued shoreward for about 1,000 yards more, then, on a prearranged signal, counter marched and returned seaward. No casualties were reported. Another approach was made about 0900 and reversed when about 4,000 to 5,000 yards from the beach. At 1105 troops from the area off Tinian Town proceeded to the transport areas off White Beaches and commenced to land late that afternoon. It was evident that surprise as to the location of the assault had been achieved as a captured battle plan revealed

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THE YANKS HIT CAPE SANSAPOR FROM COAST GUARD-MANNED LST

THE YANKS HIT CAPE SANSAPOR FROM COAST GUARD-MANNED LST

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that the Japanese had expected our main landing on the Tinian Town beaches, with the Asiga Bay beaches a second choice and White-2 a third choice. The Coast Guard manned APA's Cambria and Cavalier were among the vessels of the Assault Transport Group to arrive off White Beaches at 0600 and immediately commence preparations for landing. The first wave of assault craft landed on White Beach-1 at 0742 and on White Beach-2 at 0750. A total of 17 LVT(A)'s and 26 LVT's was used in the initial assault. The landings were opposed by sporadic rifle and some machine gun fire and numerous land mines and booby traps were encountered. By 1000 the Marines had advanced inland 500 yards and closed the gap between the two beaches. Efforts were made to prepare the beaches for the earliest possible landing of maximum quantities of supplies and equipment during the existing good weather, as even a moderate swell would seriously interfere with unloading on the exposed beaches. The large boulders and other obstructions on Beach White-2 were blasted and antiboat mines cleared. Two pontoon causeway piers were towed from Saipan. Early in the morning the Cambria moved in close to the landing beaches to evacuate some 255 wounded.

CAPTURE OF TINIAN

On the 25th the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions expanded their beachhead and on the following days swept rapidly down the island. Mount Lasso and Wihi Point airfield were captured on the third day and by the evening of the 27th the airfield had been reconditioned and was operational for our own planes. Tinian Town was captured on the seventh day. The enemy made his last stand in the cliffs and high ground in the extreme southeastern portion of the island. On 1 August, nine days after the landing, the island was declared secure. Our casualties were 290 killed, 1,515 wounded and 24 missing. 5,546 Japanese had been buried and 404 prisoners taken, 254 Japanese and 150 Koreans. 13,262 civilians had been interned of whom 5,297 were Japanese, 2,694 Koreans and 4,471 unclassified. The capture of Tinian was an eminently satisfactory amphibious operation, despite the limited time for preparation of detailed plans after their issue. The assault troops were expeditiously landed on narrow beaches and the vital supply situation coped with under difficult circumstances.

COAST GUARDSMAN'S DESCRIPTION OF TINIAN LANDING

The following is a description of the Tinian landing' by a Coast Guardsman: "On 24 July, 1944 about five a.m. two battlewagons and a cruiser began laying down a heavy barrage on the island of Tinian. For the Japs the 39 day death watch had ended. As fighter and bomber planes followed the naval shelling dark rings of anti-aircraft fire puffed up from the squared-off fields. All during the previous day, LST's had been loaded at Saipan with Marines from the Second and Fourth Divisions. At six o'clock on J-day, the LST's moved in from the outer harbor and prepared to disgorge their load of amphibious tanks and tractors. A half an hour later all hell broke loose. As the warships poured broadside after broadside into Tinian, heavy artillery from Saipan opened up, looped over the narrow channel into the heart of her sister island. LCI's moved in ahead of the churning amphibious tanks. Like a line of indestructible infantry, the LCI's moved steadily into the beach side by side, firing

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PELELIU ISLAND

WESTERN CAROLINES OPERATION
PELELIU ISLAND

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every second of the way. Over the deafening barrage, you could hear the sharp rip of their rockets, like the sound of tearing canvas.

"By H-hour the island, rocking now on its very foundations, was completely wrapped in the gray haze of shell fire. But even under this crushing bombardment, there were Japs still very much alive to meet the invaders. Snipers crouched in the grey, jagged coral reef. Machine gunners peered out from heavily barricaded dugouts. The beaches were mined. Most of the casualties occurred from snipers and machine gun fire or from land mines. Off shore in a Coast Guard landing barge acting as a control vessel, rifle fire pinged all around us, but we saw only one shell splash within a hundred yards.

"By eight o'clock, all the first waves of assault troop had landed, and when we came ashore in the early afternoon bulldozers were already making clearings above the beaches. Men were beginning to dig in back of the coral for the night. Typical of the tenacity of the Jap is the fact that eight hours after H-hour, one line had been secured, about 1,000 yards inland, yet only a few feet to the left of the beachhead, Marines were still routing Japs out of coral caves and dugouts with carbines and flame throwers. The enemy dead who sprawled over the coral that fringed the beach, wore gloves and had their ears stuffed with cotton.

"During the late afternoon and evening, additional supplies and personnel were brought ashore. Throughout the night warships shelled inland. The expected counter-attack, upon which the Japs were counting heavily, started after dark and lasted until July 25th. Jap mortar and artillery fire was heavy but the beachheads held."

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