This history is based principally upon official Marine Corps records: the reports, diaries, journals, orders, plans, etc., of the units and commands involved in the operations described. Records of the other armed services have been consulted where they were pertinent. On matters pertaining to activities at high strategic levels, the authors consulted the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In order to cover the inevitable gaps and inadequacies that occur in the sources consulted, extensive use has been made of the knowledge of key participants in the actions described. These men, representing all services, have been generous with their time in answering specific queries, in making themselves available for interviews, and in commenting critically on draft manuscripts, not only of this volume but also of preliminary monographs. The historical offices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have made detailed reviews of draft chapters and furnished much material of value to the history. The War History Office of the Defense Agency of Japan has read and commented upon the passages bearing on Japanese operations and provided worthwhile information that has been incorporated into the narrative.
Because this volume deals with the whole of the naval campaign in the Central Pacific, many of the records used relate to more than one of the operations. This is particularly true of the material concerning FORAGER. Such sources have been fully cited in the text and are discussed in relation to the particular operation where they have the most pertinency. All records cited, unless otherwise noted, are on file at, or obtainable through, the Archives of the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.
A number of published works of general interest have been consulted frequently in the writing of this volume. The more important of these are listed below.
Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate, eds. The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944--The Army Air Forces in World War II, v. 4. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950. The Air Force official history covering the period of the Central Pacific campaign. Well documented, the book is a reliable source for the actions of the Seventh Air Force and the attitudes and decisions of its commanders.
Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas--The War in The Pacific--United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960. The Army official history of the operations in the Marianas with considerable detail of the actions of the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisions. It provides a well-reasoned analysis of the Smith against Smith controversy and is particularly useful for its sections on strategic background and planning.
Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love. Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls--The War in the Pacific--United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955. This official Army history necessarily deals with Marine and Navy actions to a large extent with emphasis on the lessons of amphibious warfare learned in the early Central Pacific operations. It provides a good small unit narrative of Army participation in the Makin, Kwajalein, and Eniwetok fighting.
Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl. The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. An essential source for the study of the development of amphibious tactics and techniques and their application in the Pacific in World War II.
Takushiro Hattori. Dai Toa Senso Zenshi [The Complete History of the Greater East
Asia War]. Tokyo: Matsu Publishing Company, 1955. A manuscript translation of this excellent study is available at the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. The author, a ranking staff officer during the war and an historian afterwards, has written a comprehensive history which contains enough detail to provide a useful strategic review from the Japanese viewpoint of every major campaign of the war.
Samuel Eliot Morison. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. v. VII, VIII. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951, 1953. These two volumes by Rear Admiral Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944 and New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944-August 1944, comprise a highly readable account of Navy operations in the Central Pacific. Written with considerable assistance and cooperation from the Navy, the histories are, however, very much the personalized work of the author and are most effective in their descriptions of naval actions and of Japanese operations.
Robert Sherrod. History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952. Although this is an unofficial history, it was written with substantial Marine Corps research support and contains valuable aviation unit historical data unavailable elsewhere. Much of the very readable text is based upon interviews and eyewitness accounts that were not retained for later study.
United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division. The Campaigns of the Pacific War and Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 2 Vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. Together these three volumes give an interesting account of the Japanese side of the war; however, they were prepared too soon after the event and contain many inaccuracies. The books are most useful in providing an understanding of Japanese military thinking through interviews and translations of relevant documents.
The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947. A convenient compilation of the official reports of the chiefs of the armed services issued during and just after the war, which provides an excellent overall review of operations.
LAUNCHING THE CENTRAL PACIFIC OFFENSIVE
Fairly complete sets of the earlier ORANGE plans have been retained by the Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Division, Department of the Navy. Included in this collection are many studies and lectures which aid in tracing the development of Pacific strategy. At the Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Virginia, the World War II Records Division holds the files of the War Plans Division, War Department, which contain an accumulation of drafts of ORANGE Plans submitted between 1923 and 1928. Aside from Major Earl H. Ellis' Operation Plan 712, his "Security of Advanced Bases and Advanced Base Operations," and a collection of tactical plans drawn up during the 1930s, the Archives of the Marine Corps Historical Branch contain little material on the evolution of American strategy.
Copies of the various reports and minutes that show the development of Anglo-American wartime strategy are available in the ABC Files in the World War II Records Division in the Alexandria Federal Record Center. The more important material contained in these files, and similar ones of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been published and analysed in both official and unofficial histories and is more readily obtainable from these sources by private researchers.
Information regarding the status of Marine Corps units and personnel, particularly officers, during the period covered is contained in various tables of organization, station lists, and status sheets for air and ground units held in the Archives of the Historical Branch. Registers of Navy and Marine Corps regular officers and combined lineal lists of Marine Corps officers on active duty, both issued periodically during the war years, are useful sources for personal statistics. Major depository libraries
should hold copies of the registers, which were printed by the Government Printing Office; the Marine Corps Archives has a complete set of the lineal lists which were printed at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.
In the years immediately following the end of the war, former Japanese officials working under the auspices of General MacArthur's headquarters prepared a series of monographs detailing Japanese actions in many Pacific and Asian campaigns and at the various headquarters in the home islands. In the mid-1950s, a number of these original studies were revised and expanded, again by knowledgeable Japanese. The monographs vary considerably in their value, but, on the whole, they are honestly presented and useful in gaining an insight of Japanese planning and operations. The Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, which has a complete file of these studies, has prepared an annotated guide and index, Guide to Japanese Monographs and Japanese Studies on Manchuria 1945-1960 (Washington, 1961), which is an excellent aid in evaluating the individual items.
Since much of the work done on these studies was in response to requests for information on campaigns in which the Army was principally involved, there is less available on the Central Pacific operations than there is on those in the South and Southwest Pacific. Almost all of the monographs of general scope, however, provide useful background information on Japanese war plans as they concerned the Central Pacific.
Books and Periodicals
The first two volumes of this series, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal and Isolation of Rabaul, were useful in reviewing the role of the Marine Corps in the development of amphibious doctrine and in the opening stages of the war. Among a number of books and articles concerning Pacific strategy, the following were the most useful.
FAdm Ernest J. King and Cdr Walter Muir Whitehill. Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record. New York: W. W. Norton Inc., 1949. Admiral King's autobiography covers his entire naval career and gives revealing insights into the character of the man and his contributions to American strategy.
Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942--The War Department--United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953. An excellent background study of the formative stages of Allied strategy in the war.
John Miller, Jr. CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul--The War in the Pacific--United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959. The book provides a companion account to operations in the Central Pacific with particular emphasis on MacArthur's planning.
John Miller, Jr. "The Casablanca Conference and Pacific Strategy," Military Affairs, v. 13, no. 4 (Winter 49). A concise account of the happenings at Casablanca and their effects.
Louis Morton. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years--The War in the Pacific--United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962. Perhaps the best account of American strategy in the Pacific with considerable coverage of its developmental stages.
Louis Morton. "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East," Military Review, v. 29, no. 9 (Dec49). This article contains much of the information on the ORANGE plans that was later developed in the official history cited above.
United States Army, War Department. Handbook on Japanese Military Forces. TM-E 30-480. Washington, 1Oct44. A basic source on the organization and equipment of Japanese land forces with useful detail on weapons characteristics and textbook tactics.
Adm Raymond A. Spruance. "The Victory in the Pacific," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, v. 91, no. 564 (Nov46). An interesting but brief survey of the Pacific war with emphasis upon planning and strategy.
THE GILBERTS OPERATION
Although adequate material is available on the planning of Operation GALVANIC, the action reports of the units involved in the fighting both on Tarawa and Makin set forth only the general progress of the two battles. The message files and unit journals are very helpful in adding necessary detail.
All officers involved in the campaign devoted a great deal of effort to assessing the merits and defects of weapons, tactics, and amphibious techniques. The recommendations of battalion and regimental commanders have been, for the most part, condensed and included in the VAC Action Report and its many enclosures. Other important recommendations concerning naval elements appear in the reports originated by V Amphibious Force and Task Force 53.
As the Gilberts were a testing ground for many amphibious developments, comments comparing actions in later operations with those during GALVANIC occur frequently in Navy and Marine Corps reports. Any study of this operation should include reference to the action reports of higher commanders during subsequent campaigns in the Central Pacific.
While writing the monograph used so extensively in preparing this account of the battle for Tarawa, Captain Stockman sent copies of his preliminary draft to various individuals who had taken part in the operation. Many of these men replied and their comments have been cited throughout this section. Similarly, the draft manuscript of this volume was sent to key participants and to the historical agencies of the other services, and the replies received have been used as applicable in revising the narrative. All such comments are retained in the files of the Marine Corps Historical Archives.
Of particular assistance in writing this section were extensive interviews by the authors with General Shoup, Admiral Hill, and General Julian Smith, who supplemented in this way their written comments on the draft. Admiral Spruance, and his former chief of staff, Admiral Moore, were quite helpful in developing the story of the planning background of the operation.
By no means all of the material uncovered by draft comments and interviews has been used in this book or in the Stockman monograph. The files contain much unpublished information that is of value to the student of the operation, particularly in regard to details of small unit action and the assessment of the accomplishments and character of individuals.
In addition to the Hattori manuscript mentioned previously, two of the Japanese monographs in the series held by the Office of the Chief of Military History have been useful. No. 48, Central Pacific Operations Record, Volume I (Dec41-Aug45), provided some data on the defensive preparations in the area and brief coverage of the operations in the Marianas, and No. 161, Inner South Sea Islands Area Naval Operations, Part I, Gilbert Islands (Nov41-Nov43), concerns the seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls and provides a general review of naval operations in the Central Pacific.
In terms of pertinent captured documents, the Gilberts provided far less material than was the case in many other operations. Few knowledgeable prisoners were taken. As a consequence, it is quite difficult to reconstruct the action from the Japanese viewpoint. Much of the information available on the conduct of the Japanese defense was provided by American intelligence officers who made exhaustive investigations of the ruins of the defensive works on both Makin and Tarawa.
Books and Periodicals
In addition to the works of general interest cited above, the following have been most useful in shedding light on the Gilberts campaign.
Richard W. Johnston. Follow Me! The Story of the Second Marine Division in World War II. New York: Random House, 1948. This work contains some vivid impressions of the fighting on Betio and considerable information on the organization of the division.
Robert Sherrod. Tarawa: The Story of a Battle. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
1944. Considering the handicaps imposed by wartime security, this is perhaps the best account of the battle to be written by a journalist.
LtGen Julian C. Smith. "Tarawa," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 79, no. 11 (Nov53). This story of the 2d Marine Division at Tarawa written by its commanding general is a valuable source for command decisions.
Capt James R. Stockman. The Battle for Tarawa. Washington: Historical Section, Division of Public Information, HQMC, 1947. The official monograph dealing with the Marine Corps role in GALVANIC, this booklet concentrates most of its narrative on the combat action ashore on Betio.
Capt Earl J. Wilson, et al. Betio Beachhead: U.S. Marines' Own Story of the Battle for Tarawa. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945. The combined efforts of several Marine Corps combat correspondents have produced an uneven, though at times colorful, book.
THE MARSHALLS: QUICKENING THE PACE
In general, coverage of the FLINTLOCK operation is more than adequate, but fewer official reports of CATCHPOLE have survived. VAC prepared a detailed account of the Kwajalein landings as did the other major commands that participated in this phase of the Marshalls action. Tactical Group 1 and Task Group 51.11 submitted lengthly accounts of the Eniwetok venture, but the Marine battalions that did the bulk of the fighting provided reports that do not measure up in quality. Unit journals of the 4th Marine Division and Tactical Group 1 are an invaluable source of hourly and daily action and include the substance of most important orders and periodic situation reports.
Piecing together a narrative of the battles for the islands of Eniwetok Atoll is somewhat difficult, for journals and reports of the fighting often do not agree in detail with the reminiscences of those who fought there. Such disagreements have been resolved in this volume in favor of the official records. Where journals and reports are incomplete, interviews and correspondence with participants have provided the information necessary to fill the gaps.
The numerous letters and transcripts of interviews which originated when the draft manuscript of The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo was distributed for review were extremely valuable in the preparation of this account of FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE. In general, the monograph comment file has more detail on small unit action than the similar collection of letters and interviews gathered in the review of the draft of this section. Most of the participants queried during the writing of this volume were senior commanders and staff officers who could provide an informed and critical commentary on the treatment of the overall aspects of the campaign. Of particular use in this review were interviews and correspondence with General Schmidt and Admirals Hill and Moore.
The Office of the Chief of Military History assisted the writing of this section by making available the voluminous notes taken by Lieutenant Colonel S. L. A. Marshall during and immediately after the conquest of the southern part of Kwajalein Atoll. These notes, together with similar material gathered concerning the Makin operation, provide a significant body of detailed information regarding Army actions in the early Central Pacific landings.
Japanese strategy is set forth in the Hattori manuscript and the two monographs, Nos. 48 and 161, previously cited. Another monograph, No. 173, Inner South Seas Islands Area Naval Operations, Part II, Marshall Islands (Dec41-Feb44), describes the efforts to defend the Marshalls against American air attacks and contains a journal with entries from 23 November 1943 to 1 March 1944.
During the course of the fighting, JICPOA received many captured documents, most of them diaries and orders originated in the 1st Amphibious Brigade. This material provides a revealing insight into life on a beleaguered atoll as well as a knowledge of Japanese tactics. Unlike the story of the Gilberts battles, an account of the operations in the Marshalls can
be fleshed out to become two-sided in terms of men who actually did the fighting.
Once again Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphibious War, Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls, and Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls were invaluable sources. Among the other works which provided useful information were:
LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. and LtCol John A. Crown. The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954. This official monograph, which covers the operations in small unit detail, served as the framework for the account presented here.
LtCol S. L. A. Marshall, AUS. Island Victory. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1944. This book gives a vivid and detailed account of the capture of Kwajalein Island by the 7th Infantry Division.
Carl W. Proehl, ed. The Fourth Marine Division in World War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. Like most division histories, this book concentrates on personalities and highlights of action and training and gives the reader a good grasp of the character of the unit and its men.
SAIPAN: THE DECISIVE BATTLE
By this stage in the war, action reports had become quite detailed and informative. The basic accounts of higher headquarters, such as Task Force 51 and Northern Troops and Landing Force, bulge large with appendices and annexes which include reports of general and special staff officers as well as important orders and journals. The records of smaller units are also more comprehensive and uniform and journals of personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics sections provide far more information than any single volume can use, let alone a portion of such a volume. Saipan records are voluminous and sometimes contradictory, but on the whole furnish an excellent basis for an operational narrative. Where conflicts have occurred between the accounts of different reporting levels, the version presented by the unit closest to the action described has generally been the one accepted.
A valuable source of information on the Saipan fighting and the Smith against Smith controversy is the report of the Buckner Board. Included in its many annexes, designated exhibits, are firsthand accounts of the fighting by Army commanders and revealing descriptions of the combat readiness of various elements of the 27th Infantry Division. A copy of this report is available in the files of the World War II Records Division of the Alexandria Federal Record Center.
Unfortunately, almost all of the letters and interview transcripts gathered by Major Hoffman in the preparation of his monograph have been lost. A diligent search of every possible depository where they might have strayed turned up nothing. Since the monograph contains much material based on the missing papers, and many quotes from them, it has been used frequently as a source for the information they contained. Wherever this has occurred, the footnotes clearly indicate it.
The circulation of the draft of this section produced a fair amount of comments from key participants which have been used as appropriate. Admirals Hill and Moore again furnished most useful reviews and added considerably to the authors' understanding of the naval aspects of the campaign. Many officers of the several services addressed themselves in one form or another to a discussion of the relief of General Ralph Smith; none objected to the account in this volume, which has been written after careful examination of both partisan and objective versions occurring in other works.
An interesting source of informal review of General Holland Smith's accounting of the relief is provided in his correspondence with General Vandegrift at that time. These letters, part of a file of personal correspondence with general and flag officers sent and received by the Commandant, are held in Archives of the Historical Branch. General Smith's letters and his public reports concerning the relief are consistent in all important details.
Thousands of documents were captured on Saipan: many were roughly translated there and others were later abstracted by JICPOA. A considerable body of Japanese information in fragmented form is contained in the journals and reports of unit intelligence agencies. Prisoner of war interrogations are also useful, although the majority of the information gained in this way must be checked and rechecked because the prisoner accounts conflict sharply in many instances. The JICPOA translations, and those issued by Admiral Nimitz' headquarters as CinCPac-CinCPOA documents, contain a wealth of military and human interest data which must be researched carefully since the titles of the documents often do not give an accurate clue to the contents. A complete file of these intelligence papers is held by the Operational Archives Branch of the Naval History Division.
Among the Japanese monographs in the series mentioned previously, several give coverage to the Marianas though none particularly concerns Saipan. The most useful include: No. 45, History of the Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section (1941-1945), which gives an overall review of the Pacific War and contains appendices of Army orders and unit designations; No. 49, Central Pacific Operations Record (April-November 1944), which is concerned primarily with operations in the Palau Islands, but discusses activities in the other areas and gives contemporary estimates of the enemy (Allied) situation; and No. 90, The "A-GO" Operations (May-June 1944), which details the buildup of the Combined Fleet and naval air arm prior to the Battle of the Philippine Sea.
Books and Periodicals
In addition to the overall sources, particularly the Crowl Army history and the Morison Navy account, the histories of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions have been helpful in developing the narrative. Other works of value are listed below.
Gen Henry H. Arnold, USAF. Global Mission. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949. The memoirs of the wartime leader of the Army Air Forces provide interesting background on the planning for the Marianas and the establishment of B-29 bases there.
Maj James A. Donovan. "Saipan Tank Battle," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 32, no. 10 (Oct48). The author, executive officer of 1/6 during the battle, gives a highly readable description of the Japanese tank attack.
Maj Carl W. Hoffman. Saipan: The Beginning of the End. Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1950. This official monograph is written in good style and considerable detail and gives adequate coverage to Navy and Army actions.
Gen George C. Kenney, USAF. General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949. MacArthur's air commander gives an inside report of the controversy over Pacific strategy from the Southwest Pacific Area standpoint.
Edmund G. Love. The 27th Infantry Division in World War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949. Longer and far more detailed than the usual division history, this book gives a good insight of the emotional jolt caused by the relief of the division commander and the disparaging remarks published about the unit in the United States.
Robert Sherrod. On to the Westward, War in the Central Pacific. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945. Carrying on from his narrative of Tarawa, the author gives a news correspondent's view of the Marianas fighting.
Gen Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch. Coral and Brass. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1949. Reliable for the personal opinions and actions of General Smith, these memoirs are not too accurate concerning details of unit combat action.
Capt James R. Stockman. "The Taking of Mount Topatchou," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 32, no. 10 (Oct48). Written by an officer of 1/29, this article gives a concise and clear account of the maneuvers and fighting involved in seizing the mountain.
Tadao Yanihara. Pacific Islands Under Japanese Mandate. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940. A mixture of scholarship and propaganda, the book is useful in reviewing the history of Japanese presence in the islands.
THE INEVITABLE CAMPAIGN: TINIAN
Since the command structure for Tinian was basically the same as that for Saipan, although the commanders changed in some cases, many of the reports of higher headquarters cover both operations. Much of this material is contained in separate documents, however, as these reports, particularly that of Task Force 56, were issued in multiple volumes. Like the operation itself, the records of it are models. Following the general practice of the Historical Branch in all of its histories, discrepancies between unit reports were resolved in this volume in favor of the lowest reporting unit. All commands were impressed with the unique features of the operation, particularly the landing across the White Beaches and the logistical setup, and there is much discussion of these in the various reports.
At the end of December 1944, Admiral King's headquarters issued a booklet, CominCh P-007, Amphibious Operations: Invasion of the Marianas, that is a valuable synthesis of reports received from major subordinate commands regarding their part in FORAGER. Equally useful for its account of all three operations, the compilation furnishes an excellent review of the unusual aspects of the assault on Tinian.
The file of comments gathered by Major Hoffman during the writing of the monograph on Tinian have not, like those covering Saipan, disappeared. They are available in the Archives of the Historical Branch for further reference. Senior officers concerned in the planning of the operation made extensive comments on the draft manuscript so that the author could give an accurate picture of discussions leading to the selection of the beaches and also emphasize other features of the operation that elicited the almost universal praise it received. In comments on the draft of this section, many of the same men called attention to their earlier detailed remarks regarding the monograph and limited their review to a discussion of the overall aspects of the campaign as presented here. Many of the veterans of the amphibious development stages of the 1930s evaluated Tinian as a classic or a textbook example for the conduct of an amphibious operation.
The Hattori manuscript and the Japanese monographs previously cited are as useful as background information for Tinian as they are for Saipan and Guam. Many of the documents captured on Saipan furnish considerable information on the troops, weapons, and defensive dispositions on the smaller island. The 4th Marine Division published a file of representive translations of material gathered on Tinian that is an excellent source of information on Japanese operations. JICPOA and CinCPAC-CinCPOA publications of similar material keyed to the island on which it was recovered add another useful source to the body of intelligence available.
Almost all the published sources listed under the Saipan section also concern themselves with Tinian. Admiral Morison's unofficial Navy history is helpful for its account of the naval aspects of the campaign, and Isely and Crowl have a good discussion of amphibious warfare developments. Among the few additional sources consulted were:
Lt John C. Chapin. The Fourth Marine Division in World War II. Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, Aug45. A pamphlet history, this small book highlights the actions of the division which made the assault landing on Tinian.
Major Carl W. Hoffman. The Seizure of Tinian. Washington: Historical Division, 1951. This official monograph drew unsolicited praise from several of officers who commented on the more generalized version of the campaign in this volume. The book provides excellent coverage of the planning phase and small unit detail, sparked by participants' comments, of the fighting ashore.
VICTORY AT GUAM
Although the Guam operation was a cohesive part of FORAGER, it is not particularly
well represented in the reports of the Joint Expeditionary Force and Expeditionary Troops. These records of higher headquarters concern themselves largely with the campaign in the northern islands. As a result, the prime sources for a higher headquarters view of the campaign are the reports of Task Force 53 and the III Amphibious Corps. Both of these are useful but not as detailed as similar accounts by attack force and landing force headquarters at Saipan and Tinian. The 3d Marine Division action report includes concise reports of subordinate units as appendices, but the 1st Brigade report is largely a narrative at brigade level with a journal and file of orders issued attached. Only scattered examples of the war diaries and other records originated by the smaller Marine units on Guam have survived, and the reconstruction of narrative of action draws from dissimilar sources for like units, as the footnotes indicate. On the whole, however, there is enough material available to reconstruct an accurate account.
The circulation of the draft manuscript of the monograph on Guam by Major Lodge, who made a special effort to elicit comment from officers of supporting arms and services, drew a number of detailed replies. Gaps in the small unit reports were readily filled by the information supplied by reviewers. From their comments, it was obvious that many of these men had retained copies of records that they had once originated or prepared. A file of comments concerning the Stockman-Carleton booklet on the Marianas campaign was used freely in the preparation of both the monograph and this section. Perhaps the most useful letters among the many that were received were those from the former commanding officer of the 9th Marines, General Craig, who provided detailed and extensive reviews on several occasions. The comments received on the draft manuscript of this section from senior commanders and staff officers are filed with those occasioned by earlier accounts.
The translations and interrogations of higher intelligence agencies and of the major commands on Guam were primary sources of Japanese information, but the body of information of this type was not as large as it was on Saipan and Tinian. In order to supplement this information, Lieutenant Colonel Takeda, the senior surviving member of the Guam garrison, was queried by the Historical Branch regarding many puzzling gaps in the story of the Japanese defense. His reply to these questions, together with an earlier and briefer account of the activities of the 29th Division which he prepared after his surrender, were used frequently in the preparation of the monograph and this section. Another useful document, filed like the Takeda letters in the Historical Branch Archives, was an extensive history of the campaign prepared by officers of the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force and published in their staff school journal in a series of three articles. A translation of the text of this history written in 1962, was made available to the Historical Branch and it has been used throughout the preparation of this section.
Books and Periodicals
All the overall secondary sources relating to the Marianas campaign and to the assessment of the operations in the Central Pacific were consulted again in writing this account of Guam. In addition, the following were the most useful publications directly related to the operation.
Lt Robert A. Aurthur and Lt Kenneth Cohlmia. The Third Marine Division. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. More compact in format than most division histories, this book is a good source for unit background.
LtCol F. Clay Bridgewater, USA. "Reconnaissance on Guam," The Cavalry Journal, v. LIV, no. 3 (May-Jun45 ). The commanding officer of the 77th Division Reconnaissance Troop tells the story of its training and action.
MajGen Andrew D. Bruce, USA. "Administration, Supply, and Evacuation of the 77th Infantry Division on Guam," Military Review, v. 24, no. 10 (Dec44). The division commander reviews the combat support activities of his unit on Guam with useful comments on the reasons for various command decisions.
Bevan G. Cass, ed. History of the Sixth Marine Division. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. As the predecessor of the
division, the 1st Brigade action is covered in some detail in this volume, but the majority of the book is devoted to the Okinawa campaign.
Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh. Hold High the Torch, A History of the 4th Marines. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1960. An official account of the history of one of the regiments of the 1st Brigade with some detail of its actions on Guam.
1stLt Anthony A. Frances. "The Battle for Banzai Ridge," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 6 (Jun45). A vivid story of the 21st Marines in the fighting for the ridges in the 3d Division beachhead.
Historical Division; War Department. Guam, Operations of the 77th Division (21 July-10 August 1944). Washington, 1946. A monograph covering the Army division action in considerable detail written by the division historian.
Capt Lucius W. Johnson, MC, USN. "Guam--Before December 1941," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 72, no. 3 (Mar46). These recollections by a member of the prewar Navy garrison provide an interesting picture of island life from the American viewpoint.
1stLt Millard Kaufman. "Attack on Guam," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 4 (Apr45). This article is a generalized account of the battle by a former member of the 1st Brigade.
Capt Edwin H. Klein. "The Handling of Supplies on Guam," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 2 (Feb45). A review of supply operations on the island, the article concerns itself with shore party and field depot operations.
Maj Orlan R. Lodge. The Recapture of Guam. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954. This official monograph devotes a chapter to supporting arms and services and is particularly useful for the development of the Japanese side of the campaign.
LtCol Max Myers, USA, ed. Ours to Hold it High: The History of the 77th Infantry Division in World War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947. The story of the Statue of Liberty Division provides a good overall view of the fighting on Guam and helpful information on its training and personnel.
Cdr H. E. Smith, CEC, USN. "I Saw the Morning Break," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 72, no. 3 (Mar46). An eyewitness account of the Guam landing, this article contains vivid descriptive passages.
Laura Thompson. Guam and its People. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947. This book is primarily a sociological history of Guam with emphasis on the prewar years.
Charles O. West, et. al., eds. Second to None! The Story of the 305th Infantry in World War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949. This history is a useful account of the background and actions of the Army regiment that was initially attached to the 1st Brigade.
MajGen Haruo Umezawa, JGSDF, and Col Louis Metzger. "The Defense of Guam," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 48, no. 8 (Aug64). This article is a summary of the Japanese defense of Guam based in large part on the GSDF study used in the writing of this section.