There can be no questioning the fact that the casualties inflicted upon the enemy in every major engagement exceeded by a tremendous margin those suffered by the American forces. The reasons for this favorable balance have been set forth in the account of each engagement and need no recapitulation. It will bear repeating, however, that enemy sources--prisoner of war interrogations and translations of documents picked up in the field--confirmed and in some cases increased the estimates made by the American commanders after each engagement.
The ending of the campaign, when two Army forces met near the Umasami River after having completed a pincers movement, verified what had been suspected during the final few days of the operation--that the frequent visits of a destroyer force to the neighborhood of Kamimbo Bay had been for the purpose of evacuation rather than for reinforcement. The two Army units had met only scattered opposition.
The number of enemy troops evacuated varies from a highly improbable 13,000 offered as an estimate by a prisoner of war under interrogation by the United States Bombing Survey to a more easily credible 7,000, also submitted as an estimate, given in the Japanese Campaign in the Guadalcanal Area.
The latter source is the authority for the following tabulation, taken from pages 34 and 35:
| ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE LAND FORCES INVOLVED IN THE GUADALCANAL AREA | ||
|---|---|---|
| Units involved | Number of men | |
| Forces present 7 August | 2,900 | |
| Yokosuka 5th Special Naval Landing Force | 150 | |
| Ichiki Unit | 1,750 | |
| 35th Brigade Headquarters and 124th Infantry | 3,090 | |
| 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry | 550 | |
| Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing Force | 500 | |
| Additional arrivals prior to October Battle | 19,990 | |
| October 25--November 13 arrivals | 3,050 | |
| November 14 arrivals | 3,000 | |
| Replacements, October--December | 2,000 | |
| Replacements, January | 700 | |
| Total | 37,680 | |
| Evacuations (including 2,100 normally transferred troops) | 9,100 | |
| Estimated losses in Japanese land forces on Guadalcanal | 28,580 | |
As has been said in the narrative section of this monograph, there was a highly favorable ratio between enemy and American casualty rates. Figures compiled by the Casualty Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps are as follows:
| FIRST MARINE DIVISION | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Nature of casualty | Officers | Enlisted | Total |
| Killed in Action | 30 | 644 | 674 |
| Died of Wounds | 4 | 60 | 64 |
| Missing, Presumed Dead | 3 | 33 | 36 |
| Wounded in Action | 110 | 1852 | 1962 |
| Total | 147 | 2589 | 2736 |
| SECOND MARINE DIVISION | |||
| Killed in Action | 10 | 212 | 222 |
| Died of Wounds | 3 | 28 | 31 |
| Missing, Presumed Dead | 1 | 14 | 15 |
| Wounded in Action | 58 | 874 | 932 |
| Total | 72 | 1128 | 1200 |
| THIRD DEFENSE BATTALION | |||
| Killed in Action | 1 | 6 | 7 |
| Wounded in Action | 7 | 54 | 61 |
| Total | 8 | 60 | 68 |
| FIFTH DEFENSE BATTALION | |||
| Killed in Action | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| NINTH DEFENSE BATTALION | |||
| Wounded in Action | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| FIRST MARINE AIR WING | |||
| Killed in Action | 21 | 9 | 30 |
| Died of Wounds | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Missing, Presumed Dead | 32 | 33 | 65 |
| Wounded in Action | 37 | 49 | 86 |
| Total | 91 | 94 | 185 |
| SECOND MARINE AIR WING | |||
| Killed in Action | 5 | 15 | 20 |
| Died of Wounds | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Missing, Presumed Dead | 18 | 11 | 29 |
| Wounded in Action | 15 | 12 | 27 |
| Total | 41 | 39 | 80 |
| GRAND TOTAL | |||
| Killed in Action | 67 | 887 | 954 |
| Died of Wounds | 11 | 92 | 103 |
| Missing, Presumed Dead | 54 | 91 | 145 |
| Wounded in Action | 227 | 2843 | 3070 |
| Total casualties | 359 | 3913 | 4272 |
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