Governing Factors:

  1. A main fleet action will decide the war in the Pacific.

  2. Our fleet, on taking the offensive, will be at least 25% superior to that of the enemy.

  3. The enemy will hold his main fleet within his defensive line and endeavor, during preliminary operations, with his lesser craft (old gun ships and torpedo, mine and bomb craft) and land forces to "wear down" our fleet to an extent where he believes he may reasonably risk a main fleet action.

  4. Fleet fighting units, being comparatively unreplaceable in war, must be husbanded for action against enemy fleet units.

  5. Operations preliminary to a fleet action must be carried out by (as far as possible) the minimum naval forces and those of least fleet value in fleet action.

  6. Marine forces of reduction, occupation and defense must be of such strength and composition (so far as maybe compatible with the conditions under which they must operate) as to require the least possible naval support.

  7. An offensive projection into the enemy's strategic front must be made in a series of well defined and rapid moves (sea objectives) in order to afford the battle fleet the greatest protection for the greatest portion of the time. (Long-drawn-out operations, with the fleet and its base subject to close attack by the enemy light forces, are to be avoided).

  8. A sea objective must be more or less isolated and include an area that can be reduced practically simultaneously.


  1. The sea objective should include an anchorage suitable for the fleet, so situated as to facilitate offensive operations against further sea objectives.

  2. Sub-objectives in any sea-objective will be as follows, in order of importance:

    1. Reduction of a base for the fleet;

    2. Reduction of enemy bases;

    3. Reduction of any anchorages which may be used as enemy emergency bases;

    4. Reduction of other areas.


Governing Factors:

  1. The enemy will use land forces freely and by a universal shore resistance in strategic areas gain time and create opportunities for his "wearing down" operations.

  2. The enemy defense of land areas will consist, in general, of a mobile land defense and a mine defense, thus enforcing extensive landing and sweeping operations for their reduction.

  3. The enemy will have ample time in which to prepare his defense.

  4. The main points of enemy resistance will be his own bases and those of greatest value to us.

  5. In the reduction of any island position (island or group) the immediate mission may be any of the following, depending upon the particular strategical situation:

    1. Reduce land masses necessary to control anchorages and landing fields, thus preventing their use by the enemy;

    2. Reduce land masses necessary to control anchorages, landing fields and the passages thereto, thus permitting of their use by our forces;

    3. Reduce entire island or group, for our unrestricted use and entire denial to the enemy for any purpose whatsoever, including observation.


  1. Depending upon weather and sea conditions and enemy resistance, the procedure in the execution of the mission may be:

    1. Land direct on objective from open sea;

    2. Land on land masses controlling a reef passage, thus securing entrance for effecting a landing on objective from reef bound waters.

  2. In landing on any land mass the immediate mission must be to secure and consolidate a "boat-head".

  3. The choice of boat-heads must depend upon the ease and rapidity with which it can be obtained and its position relative to the objectives.

  4. Owing to the restricted area of land masses, the jungle terrain which generally obtains, and the paucity of existing communications, the enemy's main line of resistance and the bulk of his resistance will be practically on the seacoast in all cases.

  5. As a decision is to be reached by a very short advance inland, the enemy defense will consist of a closely linked and intricate obstacle and strongpoint system in the back beach jungle.

  6. The greatest effort of our troops must be put forth at the time of landing.

  7. The forces and weapons provided should be those best suited to beach and jungle combat: close, rapid fighting.

  8. In order to effect a concentration on the enemy, operations must be carried out with surprise and rapidity.

  9. In the defense of bases, the primary object of the defense forces will be to prevent the enemy from damaging property within a certain area (anchorages, port facilities, etc.), not necessarily to destroy enemy craft. The defense required is only that necessary to render an enemy attack so dangerous as to be unreasonable, taking into consideration the conditions under which the enemy is operating.

  10. The base fixed defense must concentrate on good observation, quick communication and rapid, accurate gun-fire: the best fixed defense against all types of sea and air forces.



Governing Factors:

  1. Owing to the restricted ship space available, only articles of the widest use should be included. Articles of special, limited use have no place, provided the necessary service can otherwise be obtained approximately.

  2. Delicate or complicated materiel that cannot reasonably be depended upon to withstand rough handling, exposure to the elements and service by ordinarily trained personnel, should not be included.

  3. Whenever the addition of special materiel is effected, its weight, time-saving qualities and reliability in service should always be considered.

  4. All materiel should be of sizes and dimensions favoring rapid transportation between ship and shore and quick installation on the latter.

  5. Owing to the lack of local resources in the theatre of operations, practically all materiel absolutely necessary for the installation and maintenance of the military forces on shore must be carried on transports.

  6. Owing to the fact that the bulk of troops will be located near the seacoast, that ample small boat transport will be available and that land communications are few and poor, not over 50~o of the land transport usually required need be furnished.

  7. In order to simplify training and supply, the materiel provided should be standard Army, Navy or Marine Corps.

  8. The materiel considered for the advanced base force must be that which we now have or may reasonably be expected to have at the outbreak of hostilities.


Governing Factors:

  1. The greatest fighting (and losses) will occur in the ship-shore belt, and troops suitable and trained for combat in that area must be provided.


  1. In sea operations, where vulnerable, floating troop centers are necessary, specialist organizations (employed only as such) must be cut to the limit. Wherever it is possible troops must be given specialist training for emergencies without withdrawing them from the necessary fighting organizations.

  2. Owing to the conditions obtaining in the theatre of operations, the following specialist training among fighting personnel is particularly necessary:

    Field Engineering: Dock, road and shelter construction, obstacle and trench work, pioneer work, transportation of heavy materiel.

    Communications: All types for linking up isolated and dispersed forces.

    Water Transportation: Motor, sail or car.


Governing Factors:

  1. The number of transports must be cut to the efficient minimum in order to reduce as far as possible the activity of fleet fighting units for their protection.

  2. The loss of one third of any particular floating force should not prevent the complete functioning of the remainder of the force in the performance of its normal task.

  3. Personnel should not be subjected to such conditions on board as would tend to prevent their putting forth their highest effort at the moment of landing.

  4. There must be no wastage in the employment of transports or of troops.

  5. No shifting of troops or materiel between ships on blue water is practicable.

  6. Task forces must be formed before leaving base port and must be embarked as such.

  7. Personnel and materiel best adapted to perform the normal tasks must be provided.


  1. A task unit (in its necessary elements) should not be split up between transports, but an economical use of space obtained by the subtraction or addition of infantry units.

  2. All training in the performance of tasks must be carried out prior to leaving home ports.

Proposed Task Organizations

Advanced Base Force
Force Headquarters Detachment       125
1 Base Defense Brigade   5425
3 Landing Brigades   18075
Total   23625
Base Defense Brigade:
Brigade Headquarters Detachment   25
3 Regiments   5400
Total   5425
Base Defense Regiment:
Headquarters Company:    
  (1) Operations & Intelligence   125
  (2) Fire Command    
  (3) Administration    
Supply Company:    
  (1) Rations    
  (2) Clothing & Equipment    
  (3) Ordnance    
  (4) Transport    
Heavy Gun Company: 4 7-in., tractor   125
Heavy Gun Company: 4 5-in., pedestal   125
Howitzer Company: 4 8-in., tractor   125
Field Gun Company: 6 155-mm., tractor   125
Field Gun Company: 8 75-mm., tractor   125
A-A. Gun Company 12 largest, pedestal   125
Searchlight Company (8 30-36 inch) )   125
Searchlight Company (8 12-18 inch) }  
Searchlight Company (Paraboloids)   )  
Sound Locator Co. (Magnetic Loops)   }   125
Sound Locator Co. (Radio Compasses) }  
Engineer Company   125
Communications (1 large radio set)   }   125
  (2 small radio sets) }  
Air Detachment (8 pursuit)             }   300
  (8 scout-bombers) }  
Total   1800


Landing Brigade:
Brigade Headquarters Detachment       25
3 Regiments       6000
Total:       6025
Landing Regiment:
Headquarters Company:       125
  (1) Operations & Intelligence    
  (2) Pioneers: 4 searchlights 12" & 18"    
  (3) Communications: 1 large radio set, 3 small radio sets    
  (4) Administration    
Supply Company:       125
  (1) Rations  
  (2) Clothing and Equipment  
  (3) Ordnance  
  (4) Transport  
Gun company: 12 37mm., 8 75mm.       125
Machine Gun Company: 30 guns       125
3 Battalions riflemen (500 men each, minimum)       1500
Total:       2000


[B L A N K     P A G E]


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