MarCorpsSchools logo



No. 8 in a Series of
Amphibious Operations


For Instructional Purposes Only.





June, 1948.

"Amphibious Operations--Intelligence" is approved and published for instructional purposes in the Marine Corps Schools.

All previous editions of Phib-8 should be destroyed.

Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Assistant Commandant.



This pamphlet treats of the intelligence requirements for amphibious operations and the sources and agencies used to procure this intelligence. The detailed analysis of the technical aspects of the subject is omitted, since this pamphlet is concerned only with the setting for of general principles and doctrine relating to intelligence in amphibious operations.

Additional material will be found in "Combat Intelligence" (MCS 3-1) and "Guide for Reconnaissance of Landing Areas" (MCS 1944).

The publications of the Amphibious Operations Series apply to the G-(W) Tables of Organization unless otherwise indicated.




Section 1
  Paragraph Page
Introduction       1         1    
General   2     1  
Section 2
Initial Requirements   3     3  
Additional Requirements   4     5  
Coordination of Planning   5     6  
The Intelligence Plan   6     7  
Collecting Agencies and Sources of Information   7     8  
Operational Aids   8     11  
Dissemination of Intelligence   9     13  
The Intelligence Annex   10     14  
Standing Operating Procedure   11     15  
Section 3
General   12     17  
Special Collecting Agencies and Sources   13     17  
Dissemination of Intelligence   14     18  
Section 4
General   15     20  
Organization   16     22  
Training   17     23  
Employment   18     24  
Section 5
Security   19     27  
Propaganda and Psychological Warfare   20     28  
1--General Outline for a Study of the Theater       30  
2--Form for an Estimate of Enemy Situation       35  
3--Form for an Intelligence Plan       37  
4--Forms for an Intelligence Annex       39  
5--Sample Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure       43  
6--Guide for Amphibious Patrols       51  
  Figure Page
How sketches are drawn (amphibious patrols)   1     59  


Section 1

1. Introduction.--a. During the amphibious training conducted by the Marine Corps between World War I and the beginning of World War II, it became evident that the sources and collecting agencies of intelligence, normally used by ground forces, would have to be improved upon and expanded in order to meet certain requirements peculiar to an amphibious operation. It was found that, although the principles of intelligence remained the same, new methods and techniques would have to be developed and perfected before an amphibious operation could be put into effect with any reasonable expectation of success.

b. Continuous experimental work and diligent training resulted in the intelligence sources and agencies available at the present time. Joint exercises with the fleet, during the period from 1923 to 1941, solved many of the intricate problems which would have proved costly if overlooked. During these joint exercises, considerable effort was devoted to the training and developing of efficient amphibious reconnaissance patrols. Selected personnel, after receiving training in amphibious patrolling, were transported to the problem area in surface and sub-surface craft and then transferred to rubber boats in which they paddled ashore and carried out the assigned reconnaissance mission. This early training was largely responsible for the successful conduct of Marine amphibious reconnaissance patrols in the Pacific during World War II.

c. Further developments in electronics, aerial photography, improvements in maps and charts, and improved facilities of ground, naval, and air forces, during World War II and up to the present time, have resulted in a more thorough, accurate, and timely system of collecting and disseminating enemy information and intelligence during the planning and execution of an amphibious operation. The continuous research and training in collecting and reporting information for amphibious operations has eliminated a great number of uncertainties that endangered the success of these operations in the past.

2. General.--a. The basic aims of amphibious intelligence are: (1) to secure and disseminate the maximum detailed information on beaches and enemy defenses in the vicinity of the selected landing area or areas; and (2) to maintain a continuous estimate of the enemy situation on land, sea, and air.


b. Intelligence requirements for an amphibious operation are usually far greater in number and more detailed in nature than those needed for normal operations over land masses because of the complexity of amphibious operations as a whole. Terrain and weather conditions often play a more critical part in amphibious operations than in normal land operations. Planning must be more detailed in more advanced in point of time. The strict security measures, the lack of contact with the enemy before landing, and the limitations on communications while enroute to the objective area will necessitate the employment of some sources and collecting agencies not ordinarily used. Some information can be obtained only by employing effective measures requiring certain specialized techniques not normally required in land warfare.

c. Amphibious intelligence planning must envisage the employment of specialized units form the landing force, the Navy, and the Air Forces, and must give careful consideration to the capabilities and limitations of these units as collection agencies.

d. Since an amphibious operation is by nature a joint operation, all intelligence material of common interest must be procured jointly. All echelons have a common interest in matters such as landing beaches and their approaches, defensive positions on the beaches, enemy coast defense and antiaircraft guns, air fields and their defenses, weather conditions, visibility factors, underwater obstacles, bars, currents, tides, surf, and other hazards to landing. Unified action eliminates costly duplication of effort and utilizes the combined collecting facilities of the land, sea, and air components.

e. In preparation for joint operations, the production of intelligence from all sources must be carefully planned and integrated at theater level to prevent incomplete coverage, needless duplication of effort, and lack of security. The search for information must be continuous; and the process of producing and disseminating intelligence must be expedited. Timeliness is the most critical factor.

f. The landing force and lower echelons must necessarily receive most of the intelligence material for their initial planning from higher echelons which have the organic means to procure the data.


Section 2
Intelligence Planning

3. Initial Requirements.--a. When the Landing Force Commander receives a directive or order that calls for an amphibious landing, his intelligence officer will make an immediate study of all available data dealing with the objective. This will include a thorough study of all intelligence material furnished by higher headquarters along with the examination of maps, hydrographic charts, sailing directions, tables of tides and currents, nautical almanacs, Naval Intelligence Monographs, War Department surveys, War Department and Naval Intelligence reports, pertinent Air Force publications and documents, atlases, reports by civilian travelers, and all available photographs of the area in question.

b. Standard publications containing general and detailed information on a theater of operations are issued by the following agencies:

c. One single source will seldom contain all the necessary detailed data. Therefore, it is important to consult all publications to make certain that no small bit of coverage has been overlooked. In some instances, the information from one source may conflict with that of another. In such cases it will\ be necessary to determine which is the most reliable source, or if that is not feasible, which source provides information that agrees with what has been previously obtained. It is also important to check the information in the written material and on maps and charts against the available aerial photographs. This is necessary in order to guard against misstatements and misinterpretations of older information. The aerial photographs must be the latest and best available.


d. After a careful analysis of all available information, the intelligence officer will prepare for the commander a comprehensive estimate of the enemy situation (see Appendix 2). This estimate is prepared from a careful study, evaluation, and analysis of the composition, strength, combat efficiency, armament, dispositions, supply and mobility of the enemy forces; and the hydrography, terrain, meteorology, and civil populace of the objective area. The conclusions drawn from a consideration of these factors are the courses of action which the enemy is physically capable of adopting and which, if adopted, will interfere with the accomplishment of our mission. The estimate of the enemy situation for an amphibious operation (planning phase) may be divided into three parts as follows:

This estimate, when submitted to the commander, will afford the basis for the announcement of the essential elements of information on which intelligence planning will be based. As new information becomes available during the planning phase, supplementary estimates, special reports, intelligence summaries, and a detailed study of the theater of operations will be prepared and disseminated promptly.


4. Additional Requirements.--a. Immediately following the announcement of the essential elements of information and thereafter, until just before H-hour, the additional information needed must be collected, evaluated, interpreted, and disseminated. The details of the program for the production of this necessary intelligence must be regulated by such factors as the importance of secrecy in order to retain the element of surprise, the availability of special collecting agencies, the need for early dissemination of intelligence, and similar basic considerations. For these reasons, the times at which information of certain types is to be collected and the agencies to be utilized in such collection must be carefully planned and coordinated. Some information can be gathered early; some must wait for the last moment. The characteristics and capabilities of some collecting agencies make their use appropriate only in the relatively early stages of the intelligence program; others must await the approach of D-day, or even the time after the initial waves have landed.

b. In general, the additional information usually needed and required for the preparation and execution of an amphibious operation includes:


c. Prior to embarkation, the intelligence officer must give careful consideration to the advisability of dividing his intelligence personnel between at least two different ships. This precaution is necessary in order to be assured of continued intelligence functioning even though the command ship may be lost to enemy action while enroute to the objective.

d. After embarkation and during the approach to the objective area, the Landing Force Intelligence Officer will work in close harmony with the Attack Force Intelligence Officer and the Target Information Officer of the Fire Support Coordination Center. While aboard the Command Ship, the Landing Force Intelligence Officer will continue to collate, evaluate, and interpret information received from all sources by maintenance of a situation map, the section journal, work sheet, and enemy order of battle record. He will continue to prepare and disseminate special intelligence reports as warranted by the information received. The receipt of certain information may necessitate modifying the intelligence plan and require the issuing of supplementary intelligence annexes.

e. During the movement to the objective phase, while the expedition is enroute to the target, the procurement of intelligence continues to the full limit of the available collecting agencies. This ,means that new, additional information such as maps, aerial photos, amphibious patrol reports, underwater demolition team reports, enemy order of battle, and other special reports may become available for delivery to the different echelons after leaving the rendezvous or rehearsal area. All commanders are vitally interested in obtaining last-minute information as to changes in dispositions, emplacements, movement, identification, and strength of the enemy as well as latest information on the characteristics of the landing beaches, obstacles to be encountered, and other enemy activity in the vicinity of the beaches. All late intelligence must be delivered as expeditiously as possible and ways and means must be found to accomplish this without endangering security.

5. Coordination of Planning.--In order to insure complete understanding and singleness of purpose and to minimize duplication of effort, it is necessary that the planning in all echelons concerned be coordinated between the participating services. It is important that the intelligence officers of the corresponding staffs of the different echelons and services assemble at the earliest practicable moment, and maintain close liaison thereafter, in order to discuss their mutual problems and to come to a common understanding as to what information is needed, who will procure it, and how and when it will be disseminated. This will include matters such as maps and charts, detailed


hydrographic and terrain studies, beach studies, aerial photographs, mosaics, blow-ups, shoreline sketches, overlays, terrain models, and any other form of graphic representation that might clarify a particular aspect of the situation. Any subject on which there might be conflicting information must be discussed and settled jointly so as to avoid variation in the material issued to troops and amphibious forces. Maximum efficiency in intelligence functioning can be maintained only so long as this whole-hearted cooperation exists between the different services as well as between the different echelons.

6. The Intelligence Plan.--a. As in ordinary land warfare, the intelligence plan is a plan, prepared by the intelligence officer, for the collection of additional enemy information. The prescribed forms for the intelligence plan are included in Appendix 3. It is imperative that the landing force commander put into execution a detailed intelligence plan for the procurement of specifically needed information at the earliest possible moment after receipt of the mission from higher headquarters. The intelligence officer will attack this problem by systematic planning to insure that essential missions will not be overlooked and that conflicts and unnecessary duplication will be avoided. After a logical and orderly analysis of the Essential Elements of Information, the Intelligence Officer must set forth in [plan form the actual means, methods, and units which are to be used to answer the commander's questions. Not having the organic means in the Landing Force to procure the desired information, during the planning phase, it will be necessary to prepare and submit the necessary, detailed requests to higher headquarters. Concurrently, subordinate planning agencies will be given all available intelligence to the end that they can plan their action at the same time. Further, the lower echelons will be informed of the measures being taken to implement the intelligence plan, such as scheduled photographic-reconnaissance sorties, in order to remove the need for submission of unnecessary requests. For the planning phase, the Landing Force intelligence plan will include preparing a detailed request to higher headquarters for adequate, periodic photo coverage (aerial and submarine) after careful analysis of the essential elements of information. Likewise, if the services of an amphibious patrol appear desirable and necessary, a detailed request and recommendation must be prepared and submitted to higher headquarters.

b. The intelligence plans of all echelons will provide for the continuous and systematic search for information throughout the period from the receipt of the mission to the consolidation of the beachhead. This provision is necessary because of the restrictions of radio silence during the movement to the objective phase and the likelihood that command


and control will be difficult during the landing and assault phase until the beachhead is gained. Collecting agencies such as the division or corps air observers attached to carriers so as to be on station prior to and during the landing, cannot easily be given reconnaissance missions after sailing. Therefore, reconnaissance missions, based on a comprehensive plan, must be given to all intelligence agencies before commencement of the movement to the objective phase. These will include specific orders to other organic agencies concerning the collection of essential information immediately following the initial landing. Such orders will be incorporated into the intelligence annex which is a part of the operation plan or order.

c. Since aerial photographic reconnaissance is one of the most useful collecting agencies in amphibious intelligence, the plan normally will include preparing requests for the dropping of photographs to be taken periodically throughout the air assaults on the objective area, to the command ships of attack force and landing force commanders. Rapid interpretation of these photos will provide corroborative and new information up to the last day before landing. Photographs should be dropped to all units to include divisions for their own interpretations, rather than forcing them to depend on joint interpretation aboard carriers concerned. This is important, for the maximum in interpretational efficiency can be obtained in a given echelon only from excellent interpreters organic within and serving as a part of that echelon. Only then do they look at the photographs through the eyes of the commander of that echelon, searching for the answers to those questions which are uppermost in the commander's mind.

7. Collecting Agencies and Source of Information.--Although many of the collecting agencies employed in an amphibious operation are not organic within the Landing Force, the intelligence officer must have a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of all collecting agencies and sources of information available to higher echelons, in order that he will fully understand just what assistance he can expect or request. The agencies and sources usually employed in an amphibious operation includes:

a. Departmental intelligence.--Intelligence information indispensable to the planning phase of an amphibious operation, such as may be obtained from maps, photographs, studies of theaters of operation, hydrographic charts, sailing directions, tide and current tables, nautical almanacs, atlases, reports of interviews with travelers and natives, radio intercept service, and other methods ordinarily beyond the scope of available agencies in the field, is usually furnished by higher headquarters along with the initial directive. The agencies which


disseminate departmental intelligence to the field forces when required are outlined in paragraph 3.b. (See Appendix 1, Outline of a Study of the Theater).

b. Aerial reconnaissance.--(1) Aircraft perform a vital role in amphibious reconnaissance. This is especially true in the early phases when long-range aerial observation and photographic reconnaissance may be the only sources of additional information. Such reconnaissance can be performed under cover of normal bombing missions or other routine flights. The earliest possible photographing of the coastline and the adjacent water and land areas is highly desirable. In submitting requests to higher headquarters regarding aerial photographs and aerial observation, the lower echelons must clearly state exactly what is wanted and when it is desired in order that the results expected may be obtained.

(2) Photographic intelligence is most reliable and is by far the most productive reconnaissance source of intelligence during the planning phase of an amphibious operation. Aerial photographs possess certain definite advantages when compared to other basic intelligence sources. Photographs provide positive evidence as opposed to the indefinite indications or inferences of other sources; they furnish the most intensive and comprehensive coverage possible and they provide information of a current nature. The value of photographic intelligence, however, is limited in direct proportion to the knowledge and experience of the interpreter and the actual conditions existing at the target at the time of taking the photographs.

(3) Experiences of the war in the Pacific, during World War II, have proved conclusively that aerial photography is a primary source from which amphibious intelligence is produced. For example, consider the combat intelligence problem presented in the case of Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll, which the Second Marine Division seized after a bloody four-day assault, 20-23 November 1943. Here was a tiny island objective two miles long and but a half mile wide, strongly occupied and thoroughly organized for defense, which offered no possibility for the landing of amphibious reconnaissance patrols. Obviously, the only source by which current information concerning the tactical dispositions, defense works, and weapons of the enemy forces located in the objective area could be obtained was the aerial photograph. By far the greatest share of the vital tactical intelligence available to the troops who took Tarawa was furnished through aerial photographic intelligence. In this particular operation it was found that the information furnished by thorough interpretation of aerial photographs was not only accurate but was more than 90 percent complete.


c. Amphibious patrols.--Amphibious reconnaissance patrols are landed on hostile shores in order to secure information of the enemy, of the terrain, of hydrography, and for the purpose of deception. They are primarily concerned with hydrographic data, the area adjoining the shoreline, strength of beach defenses, and enemy reserves and their routes of approach to the landing beaches. When properly employed, the amphibious patrol can secure information of the enemy and terrain not otherwise available to the commander. (See Section 4).

d. Surface and subsurface reconnaissance.--Cruisers, destroyers, motor torpedo boats, landing craft, rubber boats, and submarines may be assigned by the Navy to reconnoiter the areas selected for operations, and such additional areas as may be desirable in order to confuse the enemy as to the point of selected landing. This may be executed by the Navy alone or in conjunction with reconnaissance patrols furnished by the landing force. Small surface craft and submarines can accomplish the following:

e. Former residents.--Persons who have formerly resided for several years in the objective area are usually an excellent source of information. Such persons, when their services are available, should be contacted without delay and carefully interviewed with the assistance of maps, charts, and photographs. Caution must be exercised in all relations with informants. There must be a thorough investigation of the background of each subject. Matters such as nationality, loyalty, education, social and political connections, and the date


of informant's last visit to the objective area must be included in the investigation. The information received must be carefully evaluated before it is acted upon.

f. Other informed persons.--Other persons having local knowledge of the objective area such as experts who have made a study of the area, mariners familiar with the area, and available prisoners of war who have knowledge of the area are valuable sources of information and should be interviewed whenever possible.

g. Agents.--Secret agents such as coast watchers, equipped with radio facilities, and other persons assigned special espionage missions by higher headquarters are usually excellent sources of information.

h. Subversive elements ashore.--Valuable assistance may sometimes be obtained through friendly civilian agencies or natives located in the objective area. It will be necessary, of course, to establish the reliability of the source and make necessary arrangements for setting up and protecting a suitable communication system.

i. Raids in force.--When the tactical situation permits and the need for information is urgent, it may be necessary to resort to the use of a raid in force on the objective area, or the adjacent area, for the purpose of capturing prisoners and documents and otherwise gaining information.

j. Underwater demolition teams.--Normally, these teams are employed three to four days prior to the main landing to make a final check on the hydrographic information derived from other sources and to destroy or remove obstacles to landing and cannot, therefore, provide information early enough to be of use in the planning phase. There is another feasible and profitable use for these highly trained personnel, however, and that is to employ them during the planning phase, in the manner of an amphibious reconnaissance patrol. For example, during the planning phase of the Palau Operation, World War II, UDT personnel were successfully employed to good advantage in reconnoitering the beaches at Anagaur Island and Peleliu Island.

8. Operational Aids.--The intelligence officer will make every effort to procure operational aids in sufficient numbers to provide adequate assistance to all planning agencies within the Landing Force during the planning phase. Additional operational aids must be procured for later distribution to all assault echelons in order to provide assistance in instructing the troops after embarkation and while enroute to the objective. The essential and most useful operational aids include the following:


a. Maps and charts---Accurate maps and charts, brought up to date and corrected from late aerial photo coverage.

b. Terrain models (Relief maps).---Relief maps of selected landing beaches, and terrain immediately inland are especially valuable for the instruction of assault troops in connection with the location of their beaches, enemy defenses, and terrain within their zones of action. For best results relief maps should be three-dimensional, gridded, approximately 1:5,000 in scale with at least a 2:1 exaggeration in vertical relief, and as complete in detail as the scale permits. It is desirable to provide at least one model for each assault battalion.

c. Photo surface models.--A photo surface model is a photograph printed on a molded plastic relief model of the area photographed. It serves all the purposes of a conventional relief map and has the advantage of being distributable in large numbers. Command ships are equipped to produce, within 24 hours of the receipt of the negatives, photo surface models of any area photographed. Similar equipment is normally available at the theater headquarters.

d. Shoreline sketches and photos.--Accurate sketches of sections of shoreline selected for a landing offer considerable assistance in locating landing beaches on unfamiliar shores. Shoreline photos taken from low-flying aircraft or from submarine and properly annotated are even more helpful than the shoreline sketches, in that they are more exact and more realistic. The photos or sketches should be given wide dissemination to platoon leaders and boat group commanders for orientation while enroute to the target.

e. Beach studies.--A complete written study of all possible landing beaches, in as much detail as possible, should be made available during planning and selection of beaches.

f. Surface photographs.--A study of available still photographs taken from the ground or from seaward, showing local views of the objective area, and properly annotated as to the exact location and time of exposure, offer excellent information as to the characteristics and nature of the terrain, beaches, and offshore conditions.

g. Aerial photographs.--Of all the operational aids available, aerial photographs undoubtedly offer the most assistance in the study of and planning for an amphibious operation. Aerial photos are the basis for preparing accurate terrain maps and correcting existing maps and charts. Because of the wide variety and possibilities of aerial photography, the latest information of the terrain and enemy is made available through expert interpretation of aerial


photographs. Aerial photos needed for study and distribution include selected prints properly annotated, vertical and oblique views, annotated mosaics, stereo pairs, continuous strip photos, color transparencies, sonne strips, and moving pictures.

h. Vectographs.--This operational aid is the result of a special process whereby the two images of the aerial photo stereo pair are superimposed with slight offset. The print or projection on a screen, when viewed with polarized glasses, offers an excellent study of the terrain in relief.

i. Anaglyphs.--An anaglyph is similar to a vectograph except that it depends upon color contrast instead of polarization to secure stereoscopic impression. The anaglyph is viewed with colored glasses, red and green, instead of the polarized glasses.

j. Delineoscope.--By projecting slides, sketches, or photos on a screen, the delineoscope assists materially in group instruction or group briefing.

9. Dissemination of Intelligence.--a. It is of the utmost importance that intelligence be properly and quickly disseminated in accordance with its urgency and by a means appropriate to the time available. Early information is of vital importance for the planning of amphibious operations. Subordinate planning agencies must have early access to all pertinent and available intelligence of the enemy and the area of projected operations if they are to plan concurrently with the higher headquarters.

b. During the planning phase the Landing Force Intelligence Officer will use every means at his disposal to disseminate intelligence as rapidly as possible to all planning agencies of the lower echelons. Methods of dissemination include personal contact, radio, officer messenger, conferences with all intelligence officers, and intelligence documents and reports. Documents and reports used for the dissemination of intelligence include:

c. Once the expedition is underway the dissemination of intelligence becomes increasingly difficult and it is therefore extremely important to insist on early dissemination of all available intelligence prior to embarkation. In almost


every case radio silence will be in effect and it will be necessary to rely on visual signal, airplane drop, ship's boats, and dispatch vessels for the dissemination of intelligence.

d. After the final leg of the voyage has commenced, all the troops must be thoroughly instructed in such details as the location of their landing beaches, enemy defenses, and the terrain within their zones of action. The operational aids listed in paragraph 8 are necessary in such indoctrination and will be given timely distribution for such purposes.

e. In some cases friendly ports are touched enroute to the target; it will be convenient to arrange ahead of time for delivery, at such ports, of last-minute information to include late photo coverage, additional maps and sketches, late patrol reports, etc.

f. One method of furnishing assault troop commanders with last-minute information regarding landing beaches, beach defenses, beach exits, etc., is to assign qualified observers from each echelon to the underwater demolition teams. These observers can be returned to their parent organization by dispatch vessel on D-l day and report their findings to their respective commanding officers. Another method is to disseminate by dispatch vessel last-minute target information as compiled by the target information component of the Fire Support Coordination Center aboard the command ship. During the movement to the objective, information is posted on the Target Information Map based on reports received from the bombardment ships and aircraft in the Advance Force. Assault commanders, including battalion landing team commanders are vitally interested in target information pertaining to their particular zones of action and every effort must be made to furnish this information right up to H-hour.

10. The Intelligence Annex.--a. The intelligence annex, as prepared by the amphibious intelligence officer, follows the standard form prescribed in basic instructions on Combat Intelligence. (See Staff Handbook, MCS, 1947; form for intelligence annex included as Appendix 4 to this pamphlet). It differs from the ordinary intelligence annex in that it will be necessary to include several additional appendices because of the vast amount of detail which must be promulgated during the planning phase of an amphibious operation. The annex is considered a part of the operation plan to which it pertains and it accompanies that document. In order to permit subordinate planning agencies to plan concurrently with the higher headquarters, the appendices and early drafts of this annex may be distributed as soon as prepared, and in advance of the final draft of the operation plan. Supplementary annexes may be issued up to the last day of the movement to the objective phase, but will include only additional instructions and changes in instructions previously issued. When the


situation changes to an extent which requires a change in the operation plan, the publishing of a new intelligence annex becomes necessary.

b. The intelligence annex for an amphibious operation usually includes:

11. Standing Operating Procedure.--a. During the training period and prior to the receipt of orders concerning a specific amphibious mission, a landing force intelligence standing operating procedure is prepared to cover those features of intelligence which are subject to standardization without loss in effectiveness. (See Appendix 5). It is prepared in accordance with policies promulgated by the theater commander and is issued to all subordinate echelons. Because of the difficulties encountered in communication and control during the landing and assault phase of an amphibious operation, it is essential that all reasonable emergencies be anticipated.

b. Items peculiar to an amphibious operation normally covered by an intelligence standing operating procedure include:



Section 3
Intelligence Functioning During Landing and Assault Phase and Subsequent Phases

12. General.--a. During the ship-to-shore movement, the collection of information from the various sources organic to the landing force is difficult because of communication limitations. In addition to the reports from assault troops, the Landing Force Commander must accordingly rely on information furnished by supporting aircraft and supporting surface craft. The amount of information received will depend on the degree of cooperation that these agencies display and the indoctrination they have received. It is therefore incumbent upon the intelligence officer to utilize every means at his disposal for gathering the necessary information for his commander during this critical phase of the operation. It must be understood by the collecting agencies that all information will be sent back to the command ship by the most rapid means available.

b. Until the Landing Force command is established ashore, the intelligence officer will continue to collate, evaluate, and interpret information from all sources. The commander must be kept informed of the enemy situation at all times. The intelligence officer will keep close check on that part of the intelligence plan being executed and be prepared to recommend changes, additions, and revisions that appear advisable. He will see that approved changes, additions or revisions are issued to the agencies concerned as expeditiously as possible.

13. Special Collecting Agencies and Sources.--a. Special effort must be made to gather information of the enemy from all available sources and agencies as quickly as possible. The information must then be evaluated, interpreted, and disseminated as intelligence to the commander and all units concerned. The collecting agencies and sources of information available to the Landing Force Intelligence Officer, while operating aboard the command ship, include the following:


b. Continuing reconnaissance by the landing force when ashore does not differ essentially from normal reconnaissance measures taken in any ground operation, except that added consideration must be given to certain essential elements which may effect continuing naval participation in the landing and subsequent operations ashore. Throughout the operation the intelligence officer will continue to exploit these available collecting agencies and sources of information peculiar to amphibious operations. The special agencies and sources available during operations ashore include:

14. Dissemination of Intelligence.--a. During the ship-to-shore movement, the dissemination of intelligence from the command ship to the assault echelons becomes a difficult


problem. Lack of physical contact with the ground forces ashore requires the intelligence officer to arrange for special means whereby the dissemination of intelligence can be expedited. The speed with which information is received, recorded, evaluated and disseminated as intelligence to the commanders concerned depends on the efficiency and adequacy of the communication system employed. Therefore, whenever practicable, the intelligence officer will make prior arrangements for the following special methods of dissemination:

b. After all landing force echelons have been established ashore, the dissemination of intelligence follows routine procedure as in normal land warfare. The Landing Force Intelligence Officer will, however, maintain close liaison with the Attack Force Intelligence Officer and request air drop service by carrier aircraft or helicopters until photographic service has been established ashore.


Section 4
Amphibious Patrols

15. General.--In amphibious operations, as in conventional land warfare, it is necessary to utilize every possible agency to collect information needed by the commander. Lack of contact with the enemy during the planning phase of an amphibious operation limits positive means of obtaining information to aerial or surface (naval) photography and amphibious reconnaissance patrolling. The effectiveness of aerial photography is sometimes greatly reduced because of poor weather conditions and thick vegetation in the objective area. It then becomes necessary to rely almost entirely on the amphibious patrol for positive information.

a. Historical.-- (1) In the early history of amphibious warfare, the amphibious reconnaissance patrol as an aid to tactical planning for a contested landing was not widely employed. Julius Caesar sent officers of his staff to observe prospective landing beaches from seaward but they did not actually land. During the Middle Ages and Renaissance, if any information was gathered, it was done by means of secret agents and espionage.

(2) Amphibious patrols reappeared in recent times during the Napoleonic wars. Prior to the British expedition against the French in Egypt in 1801, a patrol of two officers was sent ashore at Aboukir Bay to reconnoiter for the projected landing. In the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, the landing beaches at Port Arthur were not scouted by the Japanese on the pessimistic premise that to do so would divulge the location of the forthcoming landing. The possibility of an undetected reconnaissance was apparently not considered. In the only major amphibious operation of World War I, the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915, no effort was made to reconnoiter the beaches physically prior to the main landing. However, two amphibious patrols were undertaken later in the operation for the purpose of gathering information about the flanks of the Anzac beachhead. One of these patrols accomplished its mission with no casualties while the other was detected during landing and destroyed by rifle fire.

(3) It is apparent, therefore, that the extensive and successful use of the amphibious reconnaissance patrol in World War II was mainly the result of modern theory and technique, stemming largely from recent technological developments such as the submarine, the inflatable rubber boat, radio communication, and radar. These developments, together with high-speed naval transports capable of covering considerable distance during the hours of darkness, made the


physical reconnaissance of a defended shore a practical and necessary source of information for the amphibious operation. One of the first examples of a modern amphibious reconnaissance patrol was conducted by the U. S. Marine Corps in February, 1940, during the annual Fleet Marine Force maneuvers. In this exercise, the force designated to land on the defended island of Vieques sent a patrol ashore prior to the landing which successfully located the defenses of the landing area without being detected by the defending force. This patrol consisted of a battalion S-2 and three scouts. It was transported into the area by submarine and went ashore and returned under cover of darkness in one rubber boat.

(4) In January, 1942, the Observer Group, Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, was organized. This was a small group of officers and men activated for the purpose of studying and developing the technique of amphibious patrolling pioneered at Vieques. In September, 1942, this group was transferred to the west coast where it became an organic part of the Pacific Fleet and was organized into a company of three reconnaissance platoons and a headquarters platoon. In the course of further experiments and training in California, this unit not only perfected its technique but produced a training film on the subject and trained two Army companies in amphibious patrolling. These two Army companies later performed successful missions in the Aleutians and led subsequent Army development in this field. This first amphibious reconnaissance company was regarded as a top-level instrument to be employed as a medium for obtaining intelligence information during the Pacific Fleet planning for the prosecution of that overall Pacific campaign. It was soon discovered that the usefulness of this type of reconnaissance was such as to make almost continual employment of the unit desirable. This however was beyond the capabilities of so small a force. Natural expansion followed. The level of command was altered and the end of the war found the Marine Corps using a complete series of highly trained units for this specialized reconnaissance duty. Each of the two amphibious corps in the Pacific initially contained organic amphibious reconnaissance units, enabling each to collect information for forthcoming landings with its own agencies. In addition, each marine division had its organic reconnaissance company, particularly trained for amphibious patrolling as well as for normal land warfare missions.

(5) Experience has shown that the patrolling of small heavily-garrisoned areas does not as a rule warrant the risk involved. Large land masses, on the other hand, offer excellent patrolling opportunities. Well-planned, aggressive patrolling was found to be feasible. Amphibious patrols, composed of highly trained personnel, secured valuable detailed information usually unobtainable by other agencies. For


example, during the campaign in the Solomon Islands, the I Marine Amphibious Corps employed amphibious patrols on several occasions with excellent results. In 1943, patrols were sent into New Georgia Island, Choiseul Island, Treasury Island Island, Shortland Island, and Bougainville Island and in each case the patrols returned with valuable information, having accomplished their mission without the loss of a single man. These and other examples, such as the successful employment of amphibious patrols by the First Marine Division prior to its landing on Cape Gloucester, New Britain, on December 26, 1943, and the employment of amphibious patrols by the V Amphibious Corps at Tinian Island in July, 1944, prove conclusively that when properly employed, the amphibious patrol can secure information of the enemy and terrain not otherwise available to the commander.

b. Principles.--In planning for the employment of amphibious patrols, careful consideration must be given to the following basic principles:

16. Organization.--a. The size of an amphibious reconnaissance patrol will be limited to the minimum number of men and boats capable of accomplishing the assigned mission. Therefore, the size of patrols which are to land will vary from two or three men to a reconnaissance company, depending upon the nature of the mission, known enemy dispositions, and the configuration of the terrain. The smaller the patrol and the fewer the boats, the greater will be the chances of escaping discovery.

b. Personnel assigned to amphibious reconnaissance patrols will normally be selected from assigned reconnaissance battalions or organic companies as organized in a Marine


division. At the close of World War II, the Division Reconnaissance Company consisted of five officers and 104 enlisted men, plus four naval personnel. This company was organized into a company headquarters and three reconnaissance platoons. Each platoon consisted of a platoon headquarters and three squads of seven men each. Such an organization permits the boating of one complete squad in one standard 7-man rubber boat. In addition, the company can be operationally embarked in an APD or submarine.

17. Training.--a. Amphibious patrol personnel must be specially selected and trained. The elements and principles of scouting and patrolling as well as combat intelligence must be sufficiently instilled in them to become instinctive. The aggressive type of action involved, combined with the strain of maintaining secrecy, will necessitate exceptionally high physical condition and agility. All individuals must have confidence in their ability to handle themselves with ease in water. It is important that photographers be trained with and operate with amphibious patrols.

b. Additional training is necessitated by several factors. Included is the necessity for maintaining a particularly high degree of security, the technique of entering hostile territory from the sea, the seeking of unusual information concerning terrain and hydrography, and the difficulty of communications. All patrol personnel must be trained to handle small boats on the sea at night. They must spend sufficient time in this practice to enable them to estimate such factors as current, wind, speed, and direction without difficulty. They should be able to swim with their equipment and weapons. They must be thoroughly trained in accurate estimation, recognition and factual reporting. Training groups, when time permits, should be given liberty to handle, experiment with, and select special equipment in order to further initiative. Training in scouting and patrolling must be constant and varied with new problems. There must be special training in jungle warfare, arctic and antarctic warfare, mountain warfare, etc., depending on the theater of operations. All men should be required to pass the naval night visual test.

c. In order to obtain full benefit of the amphibious training, the personnel select must be extremely well grounded in tactics, weapons, map and aerial photograph reading, sketching, scouting, patrolling, observation, and swimming. With this as a basis they should be taught the following:


18. Employment.--a. When certain essential information is lacking or it becomes necessary to confirm and amplify information received from other sources, amphibious patrols can be employed to gather hydrographic data, report meteor-logical conditions, examine beaches and terrain, locate enemy installations, determine enemy strength, capture enemy prisoners, and make demonstrations to effect deceptions. Patrols so employed must be given simple missions capable of accomplishment and of sufficient importance to warrant the risk involved. The equipment and weapons of such a group must be light and easy to carry. It must be remembered that as a general rule, amphibious patrols confine their activities to the acquisition of information and fight only in self-defense. Every effort must be made to avoid disclosing their presence to the enemy. (See Appendix 6, Guide for Amphibious Patrols).

b. Amphibious patrols can be employed to collect the following specific information:




Section 5
Counterintelligence Measures

19. Security.--During the planning phase of an amphibious operation it is of vital importance to maintain a high standard of security. This is also true of planning in a normal land operation but in amphibious planning the principle of security requires even more consideration. Unlike the situation in land warfare, where the opposing forces are in contact, the amphibious forces are at some distance from the enemy, usually separated by an extensive body of water. It is obvious then that-the amphibious planner is in a better position to take advantage of the important element of surprise. When the proper steps are taken to maintain secrecy the enemy can only guess as to where and when he will be attacked. In order to be assured of obtaining the greatest degree of surprise it therefore follows that the amphibious planner must provide for strict security measures. Careful prior consideration must be given to the institution of adequate security measures to prevent leakage of information to unauthorized persons. The necessary measures include:

a. Secret planning room.--A suitable space in the headquarters, over which a guard is placed and within which all related maps, photographs, charts, studies, plans and orders are kept, must be established at the very beginning of the planning phase of an amphibious operation. Thereafter, all staff work connected with the pending operation should be conducted only in the secret planning room, or rooms, so established. Passes to the planning room should be provided by the commander of each unit, especially in higher echelons, in order to limit the number of his staff authorized to know the highly classified information involved. As the need arises, in view of lower-echelon planning, lower unit commanders and other interested officers will be given access to the necessary intelligence. Officers and men below battalion staffs must not be appraised of the details of the operation and of their destination until after embarkation, or until they have embarked from the final rehearsal area. Every effort, no matter how small, is worthwhile in attempting to maintain security in this manner.

b. Careful dissemination of intelligence.--Great care must be taken not to withhold any item of intelligence needed by the different headquarters but, for reasons of security, care must also be taken not to permit unnecessary dissemination of intelligence. Limited quantities of maps, charts, reports, aerial photographs, and other intelligence material sufficient for planning only, should be distributed early down to and including commanders of battalion landing teams. An adequate


supply of intelligence material must be delivered to each headquarters prior to loading ship, but wide distribution must not be permitted until after the embarkation phase.

c. Precautionary measures.--Other necessary steps to prevent valuable information from falling into the hands of the enemy include:

20. Propaganda and Psychological Warfare.--Although the application and use of propaganda and psychological warfare is a function of higher headquarters, elements of the Landing Force may be called upon to assist in planning and disseminating information of this type. The Landing Force commander is free to suggest or request additional measures as needed in this type of warfare. Some of the means applicable to an amphibious assault include:

a. Dropping cleverly phrased leaflets on the objective area during preliminary naval and aerial bombardment in order to lower troop morale and thereby reduce enemy combat efficiency.

b. Dropping leaflets in the objective area for the purpose of instructing civilians to clear certain areas or to collect at specified safety zones.

c. After landing and during operations ashore, use of a loudspeaker system from naval vessels offshore, from aircraft, or from motor vehicles ashore, utilizing recordings, language personnel and prisoner of war volunteers, for the purpose of inducing enemy troops to surrender.


d. Continue distribution of leaflets to enemy troops and civilian inhabitants throughout the operation, by means of air drop or special artillery and mortar shells.


Appendix 1
General Outline for a Study of the Theater

1. Maps and Charts.

  1. List all available maps and charts. Maps may be obtained through such agencies as Army Map Service, Office of Naval Intelligence, Marine Corps Schools, etc. Charts may be obtained through the Hydrographic Office and U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.

2. Location and Strategic Importance.

  1. Geographical coordinates and description of location of area.

  2. Geographic, political, economic, strategic importance of area.

  3. Table of distances from key point in subject area to key points in surrounding areas.

3. History and Government.

  1. Historical sketch of the background and influence of foreign countries on the locality concerned.

  2. Political divisions of the territory.

  3. Administration and administrative control.

  4. Police system in administrative control.

  5. Judicial system.

4. Population.

  1. Characteristics and numbers:

      Total population of subject area.
      Temperament, physical appearance, racial groups, tradition and customs, attitude towards foreign nationals and authority, intelligence, and physical endurance.

  2. Language:.

      Principal language groups.
      Official language.
      Native dialects.

  3. Education:

      Scope of literacy.
      Educational system and facilities; types of schools, educational program, subjects emphasized, compulsory attendance.
      Language taught.


5. Economic Conditions.

  1. Finance:

      Amount and source of income.
      Currency system and value of the various standard units as compared to corresponding U. S. currency.
      Government budget.
      Principal banks.

  2. Industry:

    1. Agriculture.

        Land area cultivated.
        Principal products raised.
    2. Manufacturing.

        Manufacturing areas and important industrial cities.
    3. Fisheries.

        Extent of commercial fishing, number and types of vessels.
        Number of persons in fishing industry. Major fishing ports.
    4. Mining.

        Primary centers of mining, principal companies, extent of workings, and figures of production.
        Manpower used.

    5. Forestry.

        Extent of forested areas and forest resources.
        Logging and marketing systems.
        Amount and type exported, types of trees, uses of lumber.
  3. Commerce:

        Foreign trade.
        Percentage of production in exports.
      Exports and Imports.
        Principal commodities and markets.

6. Cities and Towns.


7. Meteorological Conditions.

    Meteorological Table.
  1. Climate:

      Type, general description and seasonal changes.
      Various climatic regions.

  2. Temperature:

      Annual range at various meteorological stations and localities.
      Seasonal changes.

  3. Winds and Rains:

      Variation and amount of precipitation.
      Seasonal distribution.
      Periods of storms, and typhoons.
      Prevailing winds, velocity, and periods.
  4. Visibility:

      Periods and zones of fogs and mist.
      Cloudy seasons.
      Percentage of overcast skies.

8. Tides and Currents.

  1. Tides:

      Type, period, range.
  2. Currents:

      Course and speed of tidal streams and currents.

9. Hydrography.

  1. General:

      Length of coastline and general description.
      Description of adjacent islands.
      Favorable landing areas.
      Good harbors.
  2. Specific areas:

      Detailed description of coasts, fringing reefs, rocks, and other natural underwater obstructions.
      Depths of water.
      Nature of bottom.
      Sea and surf conditions.
      Best bays and harbors, and their facilities.
  3. Rivers:

      Location and courses of main rivers; also length, width, and depth.


10. Topography.

  1. General:

      Nature of terrain, relief, and drainage.
      Description and location of cliffs, marshes, swamps, dense brush, and water areas.
  2. Specific relief regions.

  3. Vegetation:

      Location and types of forests and vegetation regions.

11. Transportation and Communications.

  1. Roads:

      Description of road network including route followed, adjacent terrain, access to favorable beaches, character and extent of first- and second-class roads and trails, general conditions of roads affected by weather, mileage, construction and improvement, bridges, and tunnels.
  2. Railroads.

      Description of principal railway network including secondary and connecting lines.
      Character of roadbed and gauge of railroad.
  3. Canals.

      Location, depth, width.
  4. Lakes.

      Size, location, and depth.
  5. Radio.

      Location and description of radio networks, broadcasting stations.
      Ranges and types of radios.
  6. Telephone, telegraph, and cable.

      Description of fixed lines and networks including official and private systems, total number of stations, the kind and condition of equipment.
  7. Postal Service.

      Mail routes and extent of service.
      Number and location of post offices.
  8. Commercial Aviation.

      Airline connections, routes traveled.
      Commercial fields and airports.

12. Utilities.


13. Military and Naval Supplies.

  1. Food.

      Stocks available, surplus, seasonal variations.
  2. Fuels.

      Normal supply of oil, gasoline, coal, etc., location of stock existing.
  3. Water.

      Sources and quantity of fresh water.
  4. Labor.

      Available manpower, skilled and unskilled.
      Endurance and efficiency.
  5. Engineer Supplies.

      Lumber--amount available.
      Quantity and source of sand, gravel, stone, and coral.
  6. Naval building and repair.

      Location and description of drydocks, repair and machine shops, etc.
      Condition of equipment.
      Harbors, including location, type, size, and clearance.

14. Sanitation.

  1. General.

      Health conditions.
      Prevalent diseases and health hazards.
      Disposal of waste.
      Precautions taken for disease control.
  2. Hospitals.

      Medical supplies and hospital facilities.

15. Miscellaneous.

  1. Military Forces.

      Identification, strength, composition, disposition, morale, training.
  2. Airfields.

      Location and description.
      Suitable sites and description.
  3. Naval Bases.

      Location and description. Suitable sites and description.


Appendix 2
Form for an Estimate of Enemy Situation1

File Notations
Issuing Unit
Place of Issue
Hour and date of issue

Maps, Charts, Photos: (Those needed for an understanding of the estimate.)


    1. Composition.
    2. Numerical Strength.
    3. Combat Efficiency.
    4. Arms and Armament.
    5. Dispositions.
    6. Supply.
    7. Time and Space.
    8. Reinforcements.
    9. Assistance to be expected from neighboring troops.

    1. Hydrography.
    2. Terrain.
    3. Weather.
    4. Other Factors. (Civilian people, enemy doctrine, etc.

    1. Enemy Capabilities.--An enumeration of courses of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of the mission of the command.
    2. (1) A statement of the relative probabilities of the adoption of the foregoing courses of action when such a statement can be justified.
      (2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above2.



1. Omit subheading when those are not applicable. By elimination of subheadings dealing with hydrography this form may be used for operations ashore.

2. This justification usually must consist of definite information of enemy dispositions which favor one or more capabilities and militate against others. Under exceptional circumstances, even though the enemy dispositions may not favor any particular capability, a thorough knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine, recent performances, national psychology, and the character and mentality of the hostile commander may justify an indication of priority. The basis for indicating a priority must be clearly stated. When the enemy dispositions do not favor any capability, the mere fact that G-2 thinks he would adopt a certain line of action if he were in the place of the enemy, or that the terrain favors a certain capability, is insufficient justification.


Appendix 3
Forms for an Intelligence Plan

Intelligence Plan
(Plan for Collection of Enemy Information)

Period: 1200, 17 March to 0600, 18 March
Essential Elements of Information Indications:
(Analysis of Essential Elements
Agency or Other Source
Specific Orders to Agency or Other Request Hour and Destination of Information Remarks
1. Determine if the enemy will attack prior to 0600, 18 March. (a) Active hostile patrolling in areas "x", "y", and "z." 2d Bn Reconnoiter area "x" for hostile patrolling. CP as obtained; area limits on overlay.
    3d Bn Reconnoiter area "y" for hostile patrolling. CP as obtained; area limits on overlay
    Rcn Plat Reconnoiter area "z" for hostile patrolling. CP as obtained; area limits on overlay
  (b) Movement of enemy troops on trail from "m" to "n." 1st Bn Investigate trail 300 yds west of "m," report any hostile movement thereon. CP neg every hr to 0600; pos as obtained.
    Aviation Request: Visual reconnaissance every 2 hrs until darkness trail from "m" to "n." CP flash.
    Rcn Plat Investigate trail 400 yrds east of "n," report any hostile movement thereon. CP neg every hr to 0600; pos as obtained.
  (c),(d), etc. listing all pertinent indications until the analysis of the EEI is complete, then analyzing all other EEI in like manner.   Continue, writing orders and requests for each indication.  


Abbreviated Intelligence Plan

Period: 1200, 17 March to 0-600, 18 March
Essential Elements of Information Indications
(Analysis of Essential)
Elements of Information
Agencies to be employed
1st Bn 2d Bn 3d Bn Aviation Rcn
         Time to be reported
1. Determine if the enemy will attack prior to 0600, 18 March. (a) Active hostile patrolling in areas "x," "y," and "z."   X X   X       CP as obtd.
  (b) Movement of enemy troops on trail from "m" to "n." X     X X       CP neg very hr to 0600, pos as obtained
  (c) Registration of hostile mortar and artillery fire on our position. C C C   C       CP flash.
  (d) Location of hostile supporting weapons in areas: "o", "p," and "q."       X         CP as obtd.
  (e), (f), etc. listing all pertinent indications until the analysis of the EEI is complete, then analyzing all other EEI in like manner.                  


Appendix 4
Form for an Intelligence Annex

File Notations
  Issuing Unit
Place of issue
Hour and date of issue
  Annex__________ To Operation Order__________

Maps, Charts, Photos: (Those needed for an understanding of the annex.)

  1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.--Refer to G-2 Reports for details. Details should cover factors listed in Estimate of Enemy Situation.


  3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS-- (To include areas to be observed, specific information desired, and time and destination of reports.)3.

    1. Requests to higher and supporting units.

      1. Aerial reconnaissance. (Visual and photographic.) Include areas, localities, and objects to be photographed, with relative importance of objectives in each area; state direction, angle, type, overlap, altitude or scale of photographs, and number of prints desired.
      2. Submarine reconnaissance. (Visual and photographic.
      3. Offshore reconnaissance by surface craft.

      4. Amphibious reconnaissance.
      5. Hydrographic reconnaissance by underwater demolition teams (UDT's).
    2. Orders to subordinate units.

      1. Infantry.



      1. Air. (When attached.)
      2. Artillery.
      3. Tanks.
      4. Reconnaissance units.
      5. Radio intelligence units.
      6. Engineers.
      7. Other subordinate or attached units.
    1. Instructions pertaining to two or more subordinate units, such as routine instructions to report all identifications, gas concentrations, discovery of biological warfare, etc.


    1. Prisoners, deserters, and other persons; location of sorting and examining stations; manner of sending prisoners to the rear and the extent of delay permitted at lower headquarters; special reports and classification of prisoners desired.

    2. Documents and captured materiel.

      1. Provisions for collecting documents; manner of sending to the rear, with delay permissible at lower headquarters for examination or use.

      2. Particular kind of materiel required for examination; manner of obtaining materiel (through intelligence personnel with troops or from salvage officers) and manner of sending to the rear.

  2. MAPS, CHARTS, RELIEF MODELS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS.--List maps, charts, relief models, and photographs (both vertical and oblique) that will be supplied, with number of each class to each unit (when not covered by regulations); designate official map to be used for all map references and overlays; instructions concerning special requisitions and distribution.

  3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.--Include details on countermeasures to be taken such as secrecy discipline, censorship, press, concealment, preparation and use of documents and signal communications, psychological warfare, propaganda and counterpropaganda; any change from standing instructions concerning special requisitions and distribution, or of special interest to the command.


    1. Period to be covered by routine reports and distribution.



    1. Special reports required from subordinate units (information to be sent, time to be made, etc.

    2. Agencies to be used in making reports (message centers, messengers, radio, telegraph, telephone, etc.

    3. Distribution of routine and special reports from higher headquarters.

    4. Distribution of G-2 situation maps (usually the same as routine reports.

    5. Periodic or special conferences of intelligence officers; who is to attend, time and place of meeting.

  BY COMMAND OF____________________
____________________, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

____________________, USMC
ACofS, G-2



1. Many items listed are capable of inclusion in standing operation procedure, and when so covered need not be included in the annex. Omit any subheading under which there is nothing to be directed or requested.

2. The essential elements of information consist of that information of the enemy, of the terrain not under our control, or of meteorological conditions in territory held by the enemy, which a commander needs in order to make a sound decision, conduct a maneuver, avoid surprise, or formulate the details of a plan. They include questions relating to enemy capabilities, other intelligence specifically desired by the commander, and information requested by other units.


3. Subparagraph a. includes a brief general statement of requests submitted to higher, adjacent, and supporting units, in order that lower echelons may be informed as to the general plan of collecting information. The detailed requests may be included in an appendix. Subparagraph b. contains detailed instructions to subordinate and attached units, a separate subparagraph of each unit to be employed in collecting information.

4. Appendices usually distributed with the intelligence annex or separately are:

  1. G-2 Situation Map or Overlay.

  2. Signs and countersigns.

  3. Beach and terrain studies, beach sketches, and intelligence maps.

  4. Air photo interpretation reports.

  5. Special studies.

  6. Target information lists.

  7. Distribution plan for maps, charts, relief models, and photos.

  8. Detailed instructions to selected observers, from several subordinate units, when they are to accompany underwater demolition teams or some other special observation mission.

  9. Special Censorship Instructions.


Appendix 5

Sample Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure

NUMBER ...........................2-45
__________ Marine Division.
In the Field.
1 January, 1945.

Intelligence Standing
Operating Procedure.


    1. The Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) prescribed herein applies in all cases except as modified or amplified in intelligence annexes for specific operations. SOP's of subordinate units will be in conformity with and in furtherance of this procedure.


    1. All combat units have the continuing duty of securing all possible information of the enemy and terrain, and of reporting this information to higher and affected adjacent commands promptly. This duty involves the initiation of active measures to acquire information and the dissemination of that information after it is acquired. In the absence of positive information pertinent negative information will be reported.

    2. All information forwarded to division will include time and place observed and by which unit, patrol or OP.

    3. Information listed as the Essential Elements of Information (EEI) for a particular operation or phase of an operation must be the first and especial concern of every unit.

    4. Information pertaining to the following topics is regarded as vital.

      1. HYDROGRAPHY.--(Assault units). Height of surf, location of reefs, bars, shoals, or other natural or man-made underwater obstacles interfering with landing craft; extent and conditions of beaches and routes inland therefrom, including obstacles.

      2. Terrain.--Important errors or omissions in available maps; restrictions of movement of foot units and vehicles caused by relief, vegetation, or nature of the soil.


      1. TROOPS.--First contact; location; flanks; strength; identifications.

      2. MOVEMENTS.--Size; composition and nature of units involved; direction and rate of movement.

      3. ATTITUDE.--Indications whether enemy forces are aggressive, defensive, delaying or retreating.

      4. WEAPONS & ARTILLERY.--Nature of weapon; location; caliber; intensity of fire; areas under fire; classification of fire; and types of ammunition. Report any movement or change in location.

      5. DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS.--Pillboxes; blockhouses; bunkers; trenches, antitank traps, obstacles, and ditches; land mines; booby traps; demolitions; and caves. Describe nature indicating location, time and extent. Endeavor to determine main defensive organization, including supporting positions.

      6. CHEMICALS--Type; method of projection; area contaminated; immediate action taken by enemy troops.

      7. TANKS OR MECHANIZED FORCES.--Type; number; activity; location; direction of movement; speed. Indicate ability to keep under observation.

      8. AIRCRAFT.--Type; number; location; direction of flight; activity; altitude.

      9. ENEMY RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES.--Composition and disposition of enemy forces involved; nature of their activities.

      10. ALL INSTALLATIONS & ESTABLISHMENTS.--Location; nature and activity of troops in vicinity. Report especially locations of enemy CP's, OP's, and supply dumps.

    1. Regiments and battalions will establish observation posts as necessary in order to adequately cover sectors. Report to division G-2 by the most rapid means available the location of OP's, indicating sectors covered by each.


    1. Flash reports will be made in event of:
      1. Enemy tank or mechanized attack.
      2. Hostile aircraft.
      3. Paratroop attack.


      1. Chemical attack.
      2. Discovery of bacteria warfare.
      All intelligence personnel will be thoroughly familiarized with the system of flash and warning messages as set out in the Division Communications SOP.
    1. Special reports will be made of any urgent information, even though it is incomplete. Details will be sent when obtained.

    2. Daily periodic reports as of 1600 will reach Division by 1800. Lower units which are unable to submit daily periodic report promptly will forward a situation summary (see Form 19, FM 101-5) by dispatch at 1600. In such cases the daily periodic reports will be forwarded to the Division CP by the most expeditious means to supplement the dispatch summary.

    3. Special agencies.--Reports as indicated will be made by the following agencies:

      1. Medical personnel.--Report number and identification of enemy wounded and forward any information obtained and documents found on them to G-2 immediately.

      2. Division Signal Officer.--Report any marked increase or decrease in enemy radio traffic and contents of any messages intercepted. Check on own communications discipline and report violations. Report capture of enemy communications equipment.

      3. Division Engineer.--Report condition of roads, bridges and any change in existing maps. Inspect and correct any deficiency noted in camouflage discipline.

      4. Aviation (when attached).--Report any hostile troop concentrations, troop movements, artillery positions, front lines and fixed installation. Have all photographs marked to show: (1) date, hour, location; (2) north; (3) altitude of plane; (4) focal length of camera, in case of verticals; also include flight plan for the photo mission.

    4. The division G-2 periodic report will be issued to regiments and separate units each evening when practicable, covering the period 1800 to 1800.


    1. Prisoners constitute one of the most valuable sources of information regarding the enemy. Before each operation ,officers and men must be instructed in


      the importance of taking as many prisoners as possible. It is expressly forbidden to kill, injure or mistreat any person who endeavors to give himself up as a POW. Humane treatment as prescribed by the Rules of Land Warfare (FM 27-10) must be accorded at all times. Officers will be responsible for the observance of these instructions within their command.

    1. While operations are in progress, all non-allied personnel, regardless of connection with the Japanese military, will be considered POW's until examination by Division determines their exact status.

    2. POW's will be disarmed, segregated by rank and status (officers, NCO's, enlisted men and civilians), and searched. They will be allowed to keep helmets, clothing, gas masks, identification tags and insignia of rank. Prisoner of war tags will be filled out, giving essential information about the POW. Articles and papers found on each POW will be placed in a separate bundle, properly identified and transmitted in the custody of the guard accompanying the prisoner.

    3. Interrogation of POW's by battalions or regiments will be limited to brief tactical information of immediate importance to the unit concerned. They will then be expedited under guard to Division POW collection station for final interrogation and evacuation. POW's with important tactical information should always be expedited to Division intelligence officer.

    4. Wounded POW's will be given adequate medical treatment and cleared through normal channels. Regiments will designate aid stations for wounded POW's. Attending medical officers will report to G-2 through channels any information voluntarily obtained from wounded POW's.

    5. Enemy dead.--Where circumstances permit, all units will remove identifications and documents from enemy dead and forward them (see para. 5. b.) to intelligence sections. Regimental commanders will report as accurately as possible to division G-2 daily the number of enemy dead in their areas.




      and books. "Materiel" includes all types of weapons and ammunition therefor, all types of communications equipment, radar and direction finders, aircraft, vehicles, machinery of whatever nature, outer clothing, gas masks, rank insignia, ship's fittings and equipment, and other articles which may have intelligence value.

    1. All captured documents and materiel which can be transported by means then available will be turned in to battalion, regimental or division intelligence sections, marked with the time and place of capture and, if desired, with the name and organization of the finder. All captured currency is the property of the U.S. Government and must be turned in.

    2. Unit commanders will be responsible for placing under guard caches of documents and materiel not readily transportable or part of a permanent installation, and for notifying appropriate intelligence sections. Name plates on enemy equipment will not be removed except by intelligence personnel in cases where the equipment is too large to be moved. Details of the equipment will then be forwarded with the name plates.

    3. Intelligence personnel will, whenever practicable, accompany assault troops for the express purpose of collecting enemy documents and materiel immediately upon the reduction of enemy positions. When intelligence personnel are not available for this duty, specially designated non-intelligence personnel will be assigned.

    4. G-2 will furnish intelligence and other authorized personnel with "Examiner" cards which will permit the holder to examine captured enemy positions and equipment and enemy dead for articles of intelligence value. Intelligence personnel will be provided with necessary gear for securing and stowing captured materials to be forwarded to rear echelons.

    5. Language intelligence personnel attached to lower echelons will:

      1. Sort out and translate only such documents as are of immediate value and vital importance to the unit involved.

      2. Forward all other documents of any intelligence value by the most expeditious means to such place as designated by division.


      1. Personnel who find enemy materiel or scattered enemy documents in areas where no qualified intelligence personnel are available will take such documents or materiel to the nearest intelligence section at the earliest possible time.

      2. Intelligence personnel designated by G-2 will be authorized to inspect and release to finders as souvenirs, documents and materiel which are obviously of no intelligence, materiel or training value. All such items must bear the imprint of stamps issued by G-2 and be initialed by authorized intelligence personnel. Release of such material as souvenirs will be in accordance with current instructions from higher authority. In case any of these items are subjected by higher echelon to quotas requested for training purposes, they may not be released until the quota is filled.

      3. Civilian property, whether from private persons, homes or civilian shops or warehouses, will be turned over to authorized civil affairs officers for administration, and will not be released as souvenirs.

      4. The purchase, sale or exchange of captured documents or items of captured material which have not been properly passed as souvenirs is prohibited.

      5. Unit commanders are responsible for inspecting the persons and gear of members of their command upon reembarkation from combat for captured documents and materiel which are not stamped as inspected and released. Military police or other personnel will be assigned to the beach for this purpose. When deemed advisable, G-2 will station authorized intelligence personnel on beaches or other selected places for the purpose of examining such materials and stamping that which may be released.

      6. Instructions concerning the importance and handling of captured documents and materiel will be issued to all personnel within or attached to this division prior to each new operation. All unit commanders will be held responsible for compliance with these instructions.



    1. All ground operations will be so conducted as to provide maximum concealment from air and ground observations. This applies particularly to the establishment and operation of CP's. Dispersion is essential.

    2. Within combat areas, the utmost care will be taken to observe blackout regulations.

    3. Operation orders, overlays, marked maps, SOP's, SOI's and other compromising material will not be taken forward of battalion CP's. Orders for specific operations, however, may require that such material not be taken forward of regimental CP's.

    4. No diaries will be kept by any personnel.

    5. Commanders will assure themselves that the following records are destroyed when capture is imminent:

      1. SOPs.
      2. SOI's.
      3. Code books.
      4. Orders, operation & overlays.
      5. All other registered publications and compromising materials.
    6. All personnel will be instructed before each new operation that if captured they will give only their own name, rank and serial number.

    7. Individuals in the combat area will not carry any identifying cards, letters or unauthorized unit insignia. Members of patrols and front-line troops will be carefully questioned and inspected to ascertain that they do not carry any material with them which would be of intelligence value to the enemy if captured.

    8. All personnel will be thoroughly instructed in sign and countersign procedure.

    9. All personnel will be alerted to the possible use of biological warfare by the enemy and warned against the consumption of captured foodstuff and liquors, particularly alcohol, or the drinking of water which has not been declared safe by medical personnel.

    10. All division photographic activities are under the supervision of G-2. Only the holders of OFFICIAL photographers' identification permits are authorized to take still or moving pictures during an operation. Disposition of photographs by Division will be in accordance with current instructions from higher authority.


    1. All classified material will be accorded the treatment required for its type. No carelessness in this respect must be permitted.

    2. All existing censorship regulations remain in effect in the combat zone.

    3. Unit commanders will be responsible for such additional counterintelligence measures as may be necessary to insure secrecy within their units.

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,          
Chief of Staff.                  



Appendix 6
Guide for Amphibious Patrols

1. Specific Missions for Amphibious Patrols.--Amphibious patrols are landed on hostile shores in order to accomplish any of the following missions: gather hydrographic data, study meteorological conditions, examine terrain, locate enemy installations, determine enemy strength, capture enemy prisoners, make demonstrations to effect deceptions.

  1. Hydrographic data.--

    1. Data to be gathered.--
      1. Depth of water along shoreline.--A landing force commander must know the depths of water over which landing boats must pass. Sketches should be drawn at different stages of the tide to show the 1-fathom depth line along the approaches to the beach and the distance from the water's edge at which boats varying in draft would ground.
      2. Nature of bottom.--Scouts should study the nature of the sea bottom to a depth of 1 fathom at lowest low water and determine if it is sand, shell, shingle, rock, mud, gravel, smooth rock, jagged rock, etc.
      3. Presence of underwater obstacles.--Both natural and artificial obstacles should be spotted on a sketch or map, indicating type and construction.
      4. Sea and surf conditions.--The character of the sea and surf will vary greatly under different conditions of tide, wind, and weather. Measurements should be taken and recorded as to the height of waves from crest to trough; the angle at which surf strikes the beach; the strength, speed, and direction of currents and undertows, and the number of lines of breakers.
    2. Means of gathering data.--The most positive means available to a patrol in securing hydrographic data are:
      1. Wading and swimming.--This is a difficult assignment along a shore occupied by the enemy. Two-men patrols, with one man on shore to estimate distances, have worked to advantage. The man in the water must know the height of various parts of his body and be skilled in the use of the plumb line. He must be careful to make a thorough study of the general profile or slope of the underwater approach, no matter what information is already available. Positions of sand bars and other obstacles are often materially shifted overnight by a single storm.
      2. Drifting in small boats or life preservers.--Currents and undertows can be best measured by these means.
      3. Dragging a weighted line from small boats.--Underwater obstacles may be located in this way.


  1. Meteorological conditions.--Meteorological conditions have much to do with the success of a landing. Patrols should, make careful notes on direction of prevailing winds, prevalence of clouds, fogs and mists, range in temperatures, etc.

  2. Terrain.--Amphibious patrols must make a complete study of the terrain not only from the land warfare point of view but also with special regard for the factors that would affect a landing operation. This must be done for the following:

    1. Landing beach.--

      1. Location.--The geographic coordinates of the beach limits should be calculated. In addition, azimuth bearings and distances should be measured from the beach to the tactical objective and to the major geographical features in the general vicinity.
      2. Landmarks.--Landmarks or characteristics which serve to identify the landing areas should be described and azimuth bearings and distances figured from beach to landmark.
      3. Physical description of the beach.--The following points should be covered: width at mean low water and mean high water, at various places along the beach, in yards; length, in yards; portions of beach not suitable for landing operations; nature of surface stating texture (fine or coarse sand, gravel, mud flat, etc.) and practicability of traversing (foot troops, tanks and other tracked and wheeled vehicles); effect of tide on surface (does beach become hard and packed at low water?); possible use of beach for a landing strip; vegetation; location, type, and extent of natural and artificial obstacles (cliffs, marshes, swamps, dense brush, water areas, etc., plus booby traps, barbed wire areas, mine fields, ambushes, etc.); location of structural facilities available, particularly piers and jetties for unloading supplies; routes of exit.
    2. Immediate and adjacent beach terrain.--The following features of this terrain should be described:

      1. Cover.--Data should be furnished to give direction and distance from water line to nearest point where cover and concealment can be obtained from hostile fire and view.
      2. Vegetation.--Notes should be made*on season colors for use in camouflage.
      3. Landmarks.--Features identifying the terrain should be described and spotted on maps and sketches. Elevations and contour lines should also be drawn in.
      4. Transport communications.--The ground communication network in the area should be studied to show for each road and trail its type, width, carrying capacity (in different weather for different vehicles), and drainage (depth and nature of ditches along road). An analysis should be made


        of the rockiness, bearing quality and hardness of the ground surface in the area, with particular emphasis on the off-road and off-trail movement of men and vehicles and the practicability of building new roads.

      1. Location of structural facilities available.--Once a beachhead is established certain structural facilities may be available to the landing force. These may include buildings, bridges, campsites, water supplies, communications (telephone and telegraph lines, radio stations, etc.), landing areas (those suitable for plane or glider landings or for landing of airborne troops and supplies by parachute) and airfield sites.
      2. Location, type, and extent of natural and artificial obstacles.
  1. Location of enemy installations.--A landing area where the defender has strongly organized the available beaches should be avoided if the mission can be carried out elsewhere. It is essential that these defensive installations be located and identified. This should be done at as late a date as possible prior to the actual landing. Defense installations will include the following:

    1. Obstacles.--Obstacles may be in the water or on shore. In the water there may be booms, barriers, nets, wire, etc. Along the shore there may be static installations such as mustard gas, barbed wire entanglements, mines, booby traps, tank traps, etc.
    2. Beach defenses.--Beach defenses may include infantry weapons, artillery, antiaircraft batteries, trenches, pillboxes, searchlights, underground shelters, and troop concentrations.
  2. Enemy strength.--All information possible about the location, composition, and disposition of enemy troops, aviation and naval strength is desired. In addition, it is important to know where the enemy general or local reserves are situated and the speed with which these reserves can be thrown into action.

  3. Capture enemy prisoners.--Small patrols may be put ashore with specific instructions to capture prisoners for interrogation. One feasible method is for the patrol to land secretly, ambush a sentinel or two-man patrol and give a very distinct signal to the motor landing boat lying offshore out of sight. The boat should then come in at full throttle, remove patrol and prisoners, and put to sea rapidly.

  4. Make demonstrations.--Demonstrations may be conducted in connection with reconnaissance to cause the enemy to disclose his strength and dispositions, artillery positions, barrages, gassed areas, etc.


2. Recording of Information Gained.--

  1. Form used in issuing instructions to patrols.--Table 1 is a suggested form for use in outlining to an amphibious patrol the information that should be collected concerning the landing area in question. The majority of information gained can be recorded on photographs, maps, or sketches in plan and panorama carefully drawn to scale. It is strongly recommended that, whenever possible, photographers be trained with and operate with the division reconnaissance company. Highly trained photographers, operating with waterproof camera and film, can undoubtedly secure a pictorial record of a landing area in much less time and far superior in accuracy than could ever be expected of even the most expert sketcher. Such information as has no geographical character should be entered in a notebook.

  2. How sketches are drawn.--When patrols must operate without the assistance of a photographer it will be necessary to sketch the area. Sketches should be as accurate and in as much detail as circumstances permit. The scale employed should be large, preferably 1 inch to 200 yards, and should be clearly indicated on the sketch. In addition sketch should show the hour, day, month, and year when it was drawn. (See figure 1).





To. _________________________ Effective _________________________ 194___
Maps: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Report all information of the enemy and important facts about the terrain with particular attention to the items checked below: Special Instructions

1. Beach Approaches.
  1. Vertical difference between high and low tide (in feet).
  2. Location of water line at high and low tide.
  3. Location of 6-foot depth line at high and low tide.
  4. Location of line offshore at which surf first breaks.
  5. Height of waves from crest to trough (in feet).
  6. Angle at which surf strikes beach.
  7. Number of lines of breakers.
  8. Strength, speed, and direction of:
    1. Currents.
    2. Undertows.


  1. Nature of bottom.
    1. Texture.
    2. Can bottom be traversed from 6-foot depth line by:
      1. Foot troops?
      2. Wheeled vehicles?
      3. Tracked vehicles?
  2. Obstacles (show depth of water over each at high and low tide).
    1. Natural.
    2. Artificial.
  3. Structural facilities.
  4. Enemy defenses.

2. Beach Terrain.

  1. Location (geographical coordinates).
  2. Length and width (in yards) of beach suitable for landing.
  3. Length and width (in yards) of beach not suitable for landing (show in RED).
  4. Distance from water line to nearest cover and concealment.
  5. Nature of surface.
    1. Texture.
    2. Can beach be traversed by:
      1. Foot troops?
      2. Wheeled vehicles?
      3. Tracked vehicles?
    3. Is beach hard and packed at low water?
    4. Can beach be used as airfield ?
    5. Vegetation.
  6. Structural facilities.
  7. Routes of exit and nature of each.
  8. Obstacles.
    1. Natural.
    2. Artificial.
  9. Enemy defenses.

3. Inland Terrain.

  1. Landmarks (elevation and geographical coordinates).


  1. Nature of Surface.
    1. Texture.
    2. Vegetation.
  2. Structural facilities.
  3. Contour lines to a minimum distance inland of 500 yards.
  4. Roads, trails, etc.
  5. Obstacles.
    1. Natural.
    2. Artificial.
  6. Enemy defenses.

By command of ____________________
Chief of Staff            



Figure 1.--How sketches are drawn. (Amphibious patrols).
Figure 1.--How sketches are drawn. (Amphibious patrols).

Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation