Chapter IV
Coastal Convoys: Atlantic Seaboard, Gulf, Caribbean and Brazil

 

A. SEA FRONTIERS AND JOINT (ARMY-NAVY) COASTAL FRONTIERS

1. A joint Army-Navy war plan to cover the local situation expected to be faced by the U.S. in this war was issued in July 1941 (WPL-46, Annex I, App. I). Pursuant to this plan the Army set up Defense Commands and the Navy set up Naval Coastal Frontier Commands. The two organizations had continuous boundaries and were assigned mutually supporting tasks. During the months prior to 7 December 1941 Army and Navy Commanders in the Coastal Frontiers were designated and joint was plans for each Frontier were prepared, as well as separate Army and Navy plans. These were placed in operation upon the outbreak of war. With the formation of the war organization the construction of patrol and anti-submarine vessels and aircraft got under way. The taking over and conversion of privately owned graft which were suitable for naval use began in 1940.8 84

2. Upon the outbreak of war joint harbor defense plans for mining and netting important harbors and bases were made effective. A few days later, Panama Coastal Frontier was placed under the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, and Caribbean Coastal Frontier under Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.

3. On 20 December 1941 Admiral E. J. King, U.S.N., having been appointed CominCh, assumed command of all Naval Coastal Frontier forces, excluding purely local defense forces, in addition to the command of the United States Fleet.1

4. On 6 February 1942 the Naval Coastal Frontiers were re-constituted as "Sea Frontiers" and some changes in boundaries were effected. The Commanders of Sea Frontiers were then made responsible to CominCh for that portion of their commands comprising ships and aircraft duly allocated as Sea Frontier forces. Local defense forces became responsible to C.N.O. The same month air and surface forces were reassigned among the Sea Frontiers. Fleet aircraft temporarily based ashore were placed under the command of the Sea Frontier Commanders for use in defense against U/Boats and protection of shipping. In addition, on 25 March 1942 a joint agreement was effected between Army and Navy providing for the allocation of a considerable number of Army aircraft to the command of the Sea Frontier Commanders for operation over the sea in the protection of shipping. By November, however, the Navy had obtained enough equipment to take over this task from the Army.1

 

B. INAUGURATION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM

1. The large scale U/Boat invasion of our coastal areas shortly after the declaration of war created immediate need for convoying - the first and best defense against submarines. The coastal patrol system initially in operation had already proven unfruitful, but escorts for an extensive system of coastal convoys were not yet available. As losses mounted in a critical manner, a series of conferences was held between representatives of C&R, the Sea Frontiers, and Port Director of New York. The first concrete proposal for a convoy system was submitted by the Director of Convoy and Routing in his serial 04637 of 9 March 1942 (Op-37-1-MA) under subject of "Suggested Atlantic Coastal Convoy Plan (if and when suitable escorts are available)". Convoys were projected over routes between Aruba, Key West and New York. CominCh then called a conference in the Navy Department for the purpose of

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making further arrangements (CominCh secret 161410 March), and a few days later directed the CinClant and the Sea Frontiers concerned proceed at once with the details (CominCh secret 201305 and 201310 March).501

2. A so-called "Informal Board" consisting of representatives of C&R, CinClant, Eastern, Gulf and Caribbean Sea Frontiers and Port Director New York met in accordance with CominCh's 161410 mentioned above and submitted important changes to C&R's original proposal. The changes included: extension of convoying to the Boston-Halifax route so as to tie in with the North Atlantic Trade Convoys, extension to Trinidad, the construction of a convoy anchorage north of Key West protected by mines, and the use of Guantanamo as an assembly port. This excellent report (undated) of the Informal Board was forwarded to CominCh and C.N.O. by Op-37 in his serial memorandum 06737 of 27 March 1942, and was approved in principal by CominCh serial 00253 of 3 April 1942.501

3. With minor changes this convoy network commenced operation between Norfolk and Key West in the middle of May and was in complete operation to Trinidad early in July.

4. As the result of an important meeting in Washington on 1 August of representatives of Admiralty, NSHQ, ComNavEu, CinClant, all Sea Frontiers, Task Force 24 and C&R, the plan was further modified into its final tightly interlocking form to commence late in August 1942. Convoys were thereby extended to Galveston, the TAWs were replaced by TAG/GKs, the AHs abolished, and the NKs and the important NG run from New York to Guantanamo begun.9 38

5. The following chronological list of first convoys over each main route traces the growth into the final system, which by now was to operate with minor changes in sailing dates and intervals until after VE Day.123 501

Sailed
(1942)
Convoy From To Ships Escorts Superceded
By
14 May KS-500 Norfolk Key West 25 7 NK/KN
15 May Specialb New York Delaware 6 2 NK/KN
15 Maya XB-20 Halifax Boston 10 2 ---
15 May OT-1 Aruba/Curacao Trinidad 3 2 WAT/TAW
17 May TH-1 Trinidad Halifax 3 1 ---
1 July WAT-1 Key West Trinidad 11 5 KG/GAT
5 July HA-1 Halifax Aruba 9 3 ---
6 July SG-1 Sydney Greenland 3 2 ---
11 July PG-1 Panama Guantanamo 12 5 ZG/GZ
16 July TP-1 Trinidad Eastward 12 5 TJ/JT
29 July GM-201 Galveston Pilottown 14 3 HK/KH
27 Aug. NG-300 New York Guantanamo 24 5 ---
28 Aug. NK-500 New York Key West 15 5 ---
29 Aug. TAG-1 Trinidad Guantanamo 30 6 ---
1 Sept. KG-Spec 1 Key West Guantanamo 24 7 ---
3 Sept. KH-400 Key West Galveston 14 5 ---
5 Oct. BRN-1 Rio de Janeiro Trinidad 11 2 JT/TJ
(a) XB-1 sailed 18 March, but XBs did not connect with SC/ONS system until XB-20 and onward.
(b) Daily
(Source: 41, 501)

C. CONTROL OF CONVOY MOVEMENTS

1. C&R was charged with the over-all supervision and general control of movements of regular coastal convoys, particularly matters pertaining to schedules and the policy of releasing ships from the necessity of sailing in convoy in accordance with changes in the U/Boat situation. Up to 10 July 1943 C&R plotted and broadcasted over Washington Fox to all commands at sea

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concerned the daily estimated position, course and speed of all regularly scheduled convoys, as explained in Chapter III, B. Thereafter the broadcasting of all convoys was assumed by the Sea Frontier within whose area the convoys were situated, whereas C&R continued to broadcast all convoys outside the Frontier boundaries. However, first responsibility for diversions within the Sea Frontiers continued throughout to lay with the Frontier Command involved.40 87 118

2. Under the final set-up ComEastSeaFron was charged with the control of the NG/GN and NK/KN Convoys while within that Frontier, ComGulfSeaFron the ZG/GZs. Likewise, each Frontier controlled all other convoys (such as miscellaneous or special convoys) originating in its area, until they passed into the area of another Frontier or into the ocean area, where C&R took over.

 

D. SCHEDULES

1. C&R assumed a leading role in the origination and maintenance of the intricate interlocking system of regular coastal convoys. Full credit is due, however, to the Commanders of the Sea Frontiers and their Port Directors, Convoy Control Officers, Escort Commanders and Convoy Commodores for the efficient execution of the plan. As a result, throughout the war there was virtually no loss of vital ship-days from failure to sail and arrive on schedule.

2. Prior to the time when the system settled down to its final form early in September 1942, the schedule called for sailing intervals as follows: KS/KN every 3 days; TAW/WAT every 3 days at first, then every 4 days; PG/GP about every 6 days; GM/MG every 3 days; and BX/XB approximately every 7 days to synchronize with the changing SC/ONS convoys, with additional irregular sailings if needed.

3. When the final schedule was set in operation at the end of August 1942 the interval was every 4 and 3 days, alternately, over the principal convoy routes, such as NG, GAT, KG and KH, and once a week over NK and ZG routes. NG soon became the key convoy from which the sailings of all other convoys were timed, while the returning GN was timed to make best connections with HX and other ocean convoys.38

4. Thus the entire system can be treated by means of the following narrative of changes in NG. Commencing 19 October 1942 (NG-315) the interval was increased to 4 days, while at the same time (and until January) the speed of odd numbered TAG/GN convoys was declared at 10 knots.47 88. On 23 January 1943 (NG-339) intervals were opened further to 5 days (10 days for KG, ZG and TB), and so remained for the duration of the war with one exception noted below.48 At this time the HX schedule was increased to 10 days, with every other NG sailing one day prior thereto. However, commencing on 1 April 1943 (HX-323) the HX interval was reduced to only 5 days, with every NG sailing one day after. In May 1943 the HX was opened again, but with the prospect of an unsettled situation in the North Atlantic Trade Convoy schedule, no further alterations were made in the coastal system, which was too intricate to permit frequent change, and was already functioning in a satisfactory manner as to interval and size. However, in August 1943 the even numbered NG's were sailed one day later to avoid conflict with the 10-day UGS convoys off Cape Henry, making the interval 4 and 6 days alternately. In December the NG's were returned to 5 days regular and the UGS sailing was delayed one day, again to avoid risk of collision.

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5. While conflicts of NG/GN and NK/KN with the UGS were thus avoided, the fact that the coastal system was not synchronized with the North Atlantic Trade system resulted in spasmodic congestion of sailings out of New York, as well as days of conflict with incoming ocean convoys. It was not until early in October 1944, when HX-312 and subsequent HX were themselves scheduled on the 5 day interval, that the Ocean and Coastal schedules were most efficiently interlocked. The HX schedule was then adjusted at the request of C&R so as to sail two days after the sailing date for the NG. Although further changes were made in the ON, SC, and ONS sailing dates, the synchronization resulted in an ideal arrangement for the ports of New York, Norfolk and Boston, while all the coastal convoys to the south fitted in automatically with the NG's, as shown in Appendices J and K.

6. IN May 1943 the KG/GK interval was reduced from 10 days to 5 days to speed up shipping between the Caribbean and the Gulf.30

7. In June 1944 the ZG/GZ interval was also shortened from 10 to 5 days in order to expedite convoyed shipping passing through the Canal via Guantanamo. No additional escorts were assigned for this purpose, the strength of each convoy being cut in half.91 However, one additional Commodore was required.91

8. In December 1944 the JT/TJ interval was reduced from 10 to 5 days to minimize shipping delays in convoy along the Brazilian coast. With this move the entire coastal system was a uniform 5 day basis, for the first time. Here also reduction of escorts per convoy was acceptable.92 115 120 However, in March the Brazilian convoys were suspended due to the absence of U/Boat threat and the very small number of cargo ships of 8 to 10 knots presenting.93 123

 

E. ROUTES, SPEED AND VOYAGE TIME

1. The diagram appearing in Appendix K sets forth the details of the final system which functioned with only minor changes from September 1942 to VE day. A study of this diagram makes it clear that NG convoys become GAT convoys upon arrival at a rendezvous off Guantanamo. This is accomplished by NG escorts proceeding to Guantanamo with any ships destined for that port, while the principal part of the convoy, consisting of shipping for Caribbean ports, proceeds without interruption, being picked up [by] the new GAT escorts from Guantanamo, who also have brought with them any additional ships from that port. In the same manner, NK convoys after picking up joiners from Norfolk become KH off Key West, although after July 1943 NK's usually dispersed near Key West, the GK convoys then becoming the KH convoys instead. After June 1944, on orders of ComGulfSeaFron (the U/Boat situation permitting), KH assembled at Pilottown, although scheduled by C&R to sail from Galveston.

2. Similarly, TAG becomes GN off Guantanamo, while HK becomes KN and KG, although eventually the KN rendezvous was given up. Careful inspection of the Convoy Time Graphs in Appendix GG, HH, and KK will illustrate how these connections were both scheduled and formed.

3. No rendezvous at sea with a joining convoy are required in any other part of the system, shipping from New York for the Canal, for instance, proceeding in NG, entering Guantanamo and then sailing with GZ the next day.

4. Exact hours, not to mention days, for sailing and arrival are scheduled in nearly all cases to inure a more efficient flow of coastwise

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shipping, and at the same time effect rendezvous, sailings and arrivals during daylight hours as far as possible.

5. The minimum declared speed for inclusion of all coastal convoys was 8 knots, except for the BX/XB which was 7.5 knots. For a short period, however, alternate northbound TAG/GN convoys were declared at 10 knots. Ships declaring 15 knots or more were permitted to sail independently if not carrying more than a specified number of passengers.

6. Standard routes for convoys and stragglers were maintained, with changes to meet requirements.53 135

 

F. ESCORTS AND COMMODORES

1. The number of escort groups and Convoy Commodores required for the final system is set forth in the following table:

Convoy Escort and Commodore Data
Convoy
System
Minim.
Escort
Groups
Interval
(days)
Cycle
days
  Days Under Way     Days in Port   % Upkeep Minim.
Convoy
Commodores
Out Back Total Home Away Total
NG/BN 5 6 25 7 7 14 6 5 11 44 9
NK/KN 4 5 20 6 5 11 7 2 9 45
KG/GK 3 5 15 3 3 6 6 3 9 60 4
KH/HK 3 5 15 2.5 2.5 5 4 6 10 67
GAT/TAG 4 5 20 6 5 11 5 4 9 45 4b
ZG/GZ 3 5 15 4 4 8 5 2 7 47 3
JT/TJc 12a 5 60 16 20 36 16 8 24 40 6
Total 34                   26
(a) Escorts usually relieved at Recife, but number of groups computed on through voyage basis.
(b) Combine with NG and NK.
(c) Brazilian escorts combined with U.S.

2. Task Groups and Units assigned to these convoys follow:

Eastern Sea Frontier:  02.9.1 - .10, inclusive
Gulf Sea Frontier:  03.1.1 - .8, inclusive
Caribbean Sea Frontier:  04.1.1 - .5, inclusive
Panama Sea Frontier:  05.2.1 - .3, inclusive
FOURTH Fleet:  42.2 - .6, inclusive

3. The normal strength of each task unit was 5 vessels, and this was generally the practice for the larger convoys. On 27 October 1944 CominCh authorized the Sea Frontiers to employ less than normal strength in unthreatened areas in order that anti-submarine forces might review increased training and upkeep during the current lull in U/Boat activity. 89

4. It should be noted that NG Commodores continued on with GAT, and TAG Commodores with GN convoys. Likewise, GK Commodores continued with KH, although during the first year or so it was the NK Commodores who continued with the KH.

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G. SHIPPING

1. Prior to the period when tankers were released from convoy (see Section I below), tankers comprised about 33% of all ships in the coastal convoy system. The largest proportion was in the TAG, GN and NK convoys.113

2. The following tables show the number of convoys, ships and escorts and average composition per convoy, arriving over each of the principal routes from the beginning of coastal convoying to and including the last convoys to sail prior to VE Day, as well as casualties to both merchant ships and their escorts, by years:

NG/GH
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942 63 1455 23 309 4.9 0 0 0
1943 150 3524 23 715 4.8 0 0 0
1944 147 3094 21 749 5.1 0 0 0
1945 54 584 11 224 4.1 0 0 0
Total 414 8657 21 1997 4.8 0 0 0

 

NK/KN
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942a 102 2178 21 596 5.8 3 0 1
1943 138 1472 10 589 4.2 2 1 0
1944 144 1142 7 544 3.7 0 0 0
1945 50 217 4 88 1.7 0 0 0
Total 434 5009 12 1817 4.2 5 1 1

(a) Including KS and old KN.

 

HK/KH
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942a 76 1375 18 320 4.2 0 0 0
1943 121 629 5 494 4.0 0 0 0
1944 145 1161 3 548 3.8 0 0 0
1945 51 88 1 86 1.6 0 0 0
Total 393 3253 8 1448 3.7 0 0 0

(a) Including GM/MG and PK/KP.

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GK/KG
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942 39 382 10 187 4.8 0 0 0
1943 121 1409 11 620 5.1 0 0 0
1944 144 1007 7 624 4.3 0 0 0
1945 52 94 2 142 2.7 0 0 0
Total 356 2892 8 1573 4.4 0 0 0

 

TAW/WAT
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
Totala 34 883 26 194 5.7 14 2 2

(a) All arrived in 1942.

 

TAG/GAT
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942a 89 1602 18 397 4.4 15 1 2
1943 151 3348 22 736 4.8 2 0 0
1944 146 2384 16 657 4.5 0 0 0
1945 54 185 3 161 2.9 0 0 0
Total 440 7519 17 1951 4.4 17 1 2

(a) Including TG and original OT/TO between Trinidad and Aruba/Curacao.

 

ZG/GZ
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942a 63 730 11 320 5.1 1 0 1
1943 74 843 11 391 5.3 1 0 1
1944 11 1036 9 504 4.5 0 0 0
1945 46 125 3 96 2.1 0 0 0
Total 294 2734 9 1311 4.4 2 0 2

(a) Including PG/GP, ZC/CZ, CT, CW and CP.

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TJ/JT
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942a 40 485 12 180 4.5 2 0 1
1943b 72 1227 17 387 5.4 14 1 8
1944 73 1121 15 410 5.6 0 0 0
1945 34 102 3 66 1.9 0 0 0
Total 219 2935 13 1043 4.7 16 1 9

(a) Including TP, "Spec. W", "E", "Trinidad" and BRN.
(b) Including BT/TB and TR..

 

TOTAL REGULAR COASTAL CONVOYSa
(Including XB/BX and SG/GS)
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942 654 10,773 16 2,924 4.5 39 4 10
1943 1,010 15,645 15 4,566 4.5 21 3 10
1944 1,057 12,572 12 4,389 4.1 0 0 0
1945 400 2,085 5 1,022 2.6 3 0 0
Total 3,121 41,075 13 12,901 4.1 63 7 20

 

SPECIAL COASTAL CONVOYSa
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942b --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1943 1,978 4,467 2.2 3,086 1.5 6 0 0
1944 2,024 3,243 1.6 2,634 1.3 1 0 0
1945 423 895 2.1 576 1.4 0 0 0
Total 4,425 8,605 1.9 6,296 1.4 7 0 0

 

TOTAL REGULAR & SPECIAL COASTAL CONVOYSa
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942c 654 10,773 16.0 2,924 4.5 39 4 10
1943 2,988 20,112 6.7 7,652 2.6 24 3 8
1944 3,081 15,815 5.1 7,023 2.3 1 0 0
1945 823 2,980 3.6 1,598 2.0 3 0 0
Total 7,546 49,680 6.6 19,197 2.5 67 7 18

(a) For convoys included see Appendices F, G13, H13, and I 1-5 inclusive.
(b) Not tabulated
(c) Excluding special or miscellaneous and other short route convoys (1942 only).

 

H. CASUALTIES

1. The Tables above show that a total of 7,546 regular and special convoys (excluding special convoys in 1942, which were never tabulated) arrived with 49,680 ship and 19,197 escorts throughout the war, an average of 6.6 ships and 2.5 escorts per convoy. Of the nearly 50,000 ships, only 67 were sunk in convoy, 7 sunk in stragglers from convoy and 18 damaged in convoy from enemy action. This is a ratio of 1 ship sunk in convoy for every

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741 ships sailing, a very favorable figure compared with the ratio for the 47,997 ships in trans-Atlantic convoys, 1:174 (Chapter III, C1). Also it should be observed that of the 67 ships sunk in coastal convoy 39 were lost in 1942, 24 in 1943, and only 1 in 1944 and 3 in 1945.

2. The principal convoy casualties from enemy action is shown below, which includes all attacks resulting in 3 or more ship casualties.

Convoy Date of Casualty Sunk in Convoy Damaged Total
TAW 12 13 & 14 Aug. '42 4 1 5
TAW Special (slow) 19 Aug. '42 3 --- 3
TAW 13 17, 18 & 19 Sept. '42 4 --- 4
 
TAG 5 13 Sept. '42 3 --- 3
TAG 18 3 Nov. '42 6a --- 6
TAG 19 7 Nov. '42 2 2 4
 
TB 1 9 Jan. '43 4 --- 4
 
BT 6 9 Mar. '43 3 5 8
BT 14 28 May. '43 1 2 3
BT 18 7 July '43 3 1 4

(a) Between Trinidad and Aruba.

3. The story of independents sunk by U/Boats in the Sea Frontier Areas, however, is a different story, and serves to emphasize the effectiveness of the coastal convoy system and anti-submarine measures. During 1942, of the 1,556 merchant vessels (excluding escorts) lost worldwide by all types of enemy action 512 ships or 33%, were sunk by U/Boats in our four Sea Frontiers, Canadian Coastal Zone and Brazilian Area. As these ships averaged 5,164 gross tons each, here were over 2,600,000 gross tons of coastal shipping sunk in one year - 11% of all the losses from enemy action, worldwide, for the entire war. During 1943, however, while comparable worldwide losses dropped sharply to 562 merchant vessels, only 65, or 12%, were sunk by U/Boat in these same coastal areas, primarily because of convoying and effective attacks on the enemy.

4. Further examination of the near-calamitous events of 1942 shows that the U/Boats commenced concentrated operations in the nearly wide-open and heavily traveled Eastern Sea Frontier early in the year, sinking 85 merchant vessels there before the KS/KN, XB/BX and local convoys commenced on 15 May. With opposition becoming unfortable[?] late in May, the U/Boats promptly shifted attention to the largely unprotected Gulf, Caribbean and Panama Sea Frontiers, sinking 73, 98 and 15 vessels, respectively, before July, the month when regular convoying came into operation in these southern areas. Adding in the destruction accomplished in the Canadian Coastal Zone and Brazilian areas, the enemy demolished 205 merchant-men prior to 15 May, and 120 more up to the first of July, a total of 325 to this date.

5. Thereafter, as is clearly shown in the table below, losses dropped off rapidly, particularly after 1 September when the complete convoy system came into operation, together with more effective surface and air attacks on U/Boats. Only in the Caribbean area did losses continue heavy until December 1942, particularly upon dispersal from convoy east of Trinidad of shipping for the Mediterranean and Persian ports via South Africa, while the long Brazilian coast remained relatively dangerous until after July 1943. Altogether, then, 415 merchant vessels were sunk up to 1 September and 162 thereafter up to the end of 1943 - a total of 577 ships of over 3,000,000 gross tons lost in all

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coastal areas for the full two year period.

6. The Table below states the details.

Independent and Convoyed Merchant Vessels Sunk by U/Boat, By Coastal Areas, Monthly.
(Canadian Coastal Zone; Eastern, Gulf, Caribbean (western portion) and Panama Sea Frontiers; and Brazilian Area; excluding escort vessels.)
1942 CCZ ESF GSF CSF
(West)
BZA BZA All
Areas
Cum.
Total
Jan 12 14 --- --- --- --- 26 26
Feb 6 17 5 19 1 --- 48 74
Mar 6 28 3 12 --- --- 49 123
Apr --- 23 2 10 --- 3 38 161
May 6 5* 41 31 1 3 87 205c
Jun --- 13 22 26 13 3 77 325
Jul 7 3 16* 17* 1* ---* 44 369
Aug 3 --- 3 33 --- 7 46 415
Sep 10 --- 1 24 --- 2 37 452
Oct 3 --- --- 8 --- 1 12 464
Nov 3 --- --- 18 --- 9 30 494
Dec 1 --- --- 5 --- 12 18 512
Total 57 103 93 203 16 40 512a  
 
1943  
Jan --- --- --- 5 --- 3 8 520
Feb --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 522
Mar --- --- 1 6 --- 5 12 534
Apr --- --- 2 1 --- --- 3 537
May --- 1 --- 2 --- 1 4 541
Jun --- 1 --- --- --- 3 4 545
Jul --- 1 --- 5 --- 11 17 562
Aug --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 564
Sep --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 566
Oct --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 568
Nov --- --- --- --- 4 1 5 573
Dec --- 1 1 1 1 --- 4 577
Total 0 4 4 20 5 32 65b  

(a) Average size 5,164 gross tons.
(b) Average size 5,309 gross tons.
(c) To May 15.
* Month in which regular convoys commenced operations in this area.
Source: 109

A general account of sinking appears in Chapter I, C of this history. Charts showing the positions of sinkings and month-to-month narratives may be found in the "U.S. Fleet Anti-Submarine Bulletin". The September 1943 issue details the story of sinkings up to that date in an article titled "Inauguration and History of U.S. Convoy Operations", by FX-3722. The Analysis Section of Tenth Fleet (FX-43) maintains the most authentic, complete and detailed record of every ship sunk during the entire war. This section is compiling a summary of all losses, worldwide, by areas and by causes, up to 16 May 1945.

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I. CHANGES IN POLICY: CONVOYING vs. INDEPENDENTS

1. One of the important matters of policy requiring frequent decisions by Commander Tenth Fleet and C&R was the question of just when and where to order tankers and dry cargo vessels of certain speeds to sail independently instead of in coastal convoy, in the light of the current U/Boat situation. It was fully appreciated that convoying had a retarding effect upon the delivery of cargo and that there was a pressing shortage of bottoms. A scientific appraisal of the comparative values of sailing ships independently or in convoy became available through an exhaustive research by the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group of the Tenth Fleet (ASWORG). Their 29 page Memorandum 44 of 18 December, 1943 entitled "An analysis of the United States Coastal Trade Convoys", based on the period from 14 May to 18 July 1943 (a period which proved to be typical of most periods during the war when all coastwise ships of 8 to 14.5 knots were in convoy) revealed that the over-all retardation factor of convoying was about 31%. In other words, 31% of all ships "employed" in this system would be "gained" if convoy delays in port and at sea were eliminated by sailing all these ships independently. That is to say, only 276 ships would be needed to deliver the same cargo as the 400 ships actually employed in the system, a saving of 124 ships which could be used elsewhere. The principal saving would have been accrued over the NG/GAT routes by reason of the large volume of traffic and long distances, and over the TJ/JT route because of the long distances involved.

2. However, complete or partial suspension of convoying over these routes during periods of U/Boat quiescence would have involved difficulties with the escort vessels, all of which might not be in readiness to resume convoying with full efficiency on the sudden reappearance of U/Boats. As a result none of the coastal convoys were ever suspended (except the TJs as previously stated), even though in many cases late in 1944 and early 1945 no ships presented themselves for convoy. In such cases the escorts sailed alone, with results which appear in the monthly summaries of convoys arriving, (see Appendices G to I inclusive). The low period of convoy traffic was reached in January 1945 when the average size of all regularly scheduled convoys fell to only 3.9 ships and 2.6 escorts, as compared with an all-time peak in November 1942 of 19.1 ships and 4.6 escorts.

3. However, the seemingly conservative policy of sailing all convoys regardless of the number of presenters, was justified in the Eastern Sea Frontier, at least, when the enemy reappeared in some force for a last fling in April 1945. Ships of all speeds were herded back into convoy in that Frontier, bringing the average for the entire coastal system up to 14.1 ships and 3.3 escorts per convoy in the last month of the war. (See Appendix EEE).

4. As the result of appeals from the Army Navy Petroleum Board and W.S.A. there began a long series of orders commencing 24 August 1943, first releasing tankers of higher speeds, then all tankers, then dry cargo vessels of higher speeds (but never below 10 knots) over certain routes during certain periods, then returning partially of fully to convoy as U/Boats appeared. A more detailed account of these developments will be found in the articles "Convoys - Review of the Month" in the United States Fleet Anti-Submarine Bulletins, issues of September, October, November and December 1943; February, March, April, July, September, October, and December 1944.

5. To sum up the high spots, the first move to release ships from regularly scheduled convoys was a conservative one taken in 24 August 1943 when Commander Tenth Fleet (C&R) authorized (but did not order) independent sailing along the Eastern seaboard and East Coast of South America, and in

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the Caribbean and Gulf, of all vessels not carrying aviation gasoline having speeds of 11 knots and over, compared with 14.5 knots previously. Only the slower ships were to continue in convoy.95 104 With the appearance of U/Boats, particularly in the Panama Sea Frontier, this release was cancelled late in November, while all previous directives were summarized in C&R's order of 20 January 1944.96 109 Late in June, however, tankers of all speeds and fast dry cargo vessels were released by C&R,97 114 only to return to convoy on 22 August.98 116 Following the appearance of a U/Boat in the Eastern Sea Frontier which damaged an independent on 12 September, all independent sailings in that area were again suspended, although in the meantime convoy traffic was very small elsewhere.99 Early in October all tankers and dry cargo vessels of 10 to 14.5 knots were again released, this time throughout the system, including FOURTH Fleet area for the first time.100 117 In December ComEastSeaFron proposed discontinuance of NK/KN because of so few presenters, but FX-01 secret 071835 January 1945 signed by Adm. King stated that the time was not appropriate. Finally, on 23 April 1945 all vessels of all speeds were returned to convoy in Eastern Sea Frontier north of 26°N by C&R's secret 232227 April. Thus VE Day arrived with all ships in convoy in Eastern Sea Frontier, but only dry cargo coastwise vessels of 8 to 10 knots in convoy elsewhere.

6. The substantial effects of these changes on the size of convoys and the number of coastwise independents are too involved to attempt to summarize, but may be determined by a study of Appendices G to I, inclusive and Appendix EEE. By and large, the results proved to be satisfactory, in spite of the recognized retardation of the small amount of shipping remaining in convoy.

 

J. CANADIAN CONVOYS (AND SG/GS CONVOYS)

1. Prior to our entry into the war the Canadians had developed a local convoy system based largely on connections with trans-Atlantic convoys, a system which was finally extended into an interlocking network to include the port of Boston, St. John (NB), Halifax, Sydney, Quebec, Cornerbrook, Argentia, St. Johns (NF), Wabana, Botwood, Rigolet, and Goose Bay.

2. That portion of the system of most interest to C&R was, of course, the XB/BX route between Boston and/or Cape Cod Canal and Halifax, crossing the international CHOP line. These 7.5 knot convoys, escorted and Commodored by Canadians, were scheduled primarily as connecting links between U.S. ports and the Canadian end of SC/ONS and HX/ON convoys, and were generally sailed at intervals corresponding  to the ocean convoys, averaging about once a week each way. 125 130 131 132 133 134  The eastbound BX convoys were sailed by Port Director, Boston. Ships plying between New York and Buzzards Bay were sailed independently via Long Island Sound.

3. The first XB was sailed 18 March 1942 and two months later synchronization was made with the North Atlantic Trade Convoys128 (see Chapter IV, B). None of these convoys were sailed between October 1942 and March 1943, as during this period the SC/ONS sailed from and to New York129 (see Appendix M).

4. Throughout the war there were 383 XB/BX convoys comprising 5,649 ships and 1,103 escorts. Of these only 5 were sunk in convoy, 2 damaged and 2 sunk as stragglers, as shown in the table below:

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XB/BX
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942 101 1,414 14 291 2.9 2 1 1
1943 121 2,010 17 399 3.3 0 1 1
1944 110 1,549 14 266 2.4 0 0 0
1945a 51 676 13 147 2.9 3 0 0
Total 383 5,649 15 1,103 2.9 5 2 2

(a) Sailing prior to VE.

5. To facilitate the control of shipping in accordance with the changing U/Boat situation, the Canadian Coastal Zone was divided into a dozen or more areas in each of which shipping was sailed under "closed, restricted, open, or full open" conditions of escort.126 This was known as the "CANCON SYSTEM" (Canadian Control). A series of 45 CANCON dispatches were issued prior to VE Day altering the degree of control in various areas.

6. In February 1945 Eastern Sea Frontier set up a parallel system for local control of shipping in the Gulf of Maine adjoining CANCON area B. This was called the "EASTCON" system.127

7. In addition to the strictly Canadian convoys there were the SG/GS convoys between Sydney or St. Johns, N.F., and Greenland, escorted by U.S. Task Force 24 based at Argentia. These relatively small convoys, sailed once or twice a month each way, are summarized below:

 

SG/GS
  Casualties (Enemy Action)
Arriving Convoys Ships Ships
per
Convoy
Escorts Escorts
per Convoy
Sunk in
Convoy
Sunk as
Straggler
Damaged
1942 33 145 4 90 2.7 2 0 2
1943 46 205 4 164 3.6 2 0 0
1944 36 78 2 84 2.3 0 0 0
1945a 8 14 2 13 1.6 0 0 0
Total 123 442 4 351 2.9 4 0 2

(a) Sailing prior to VE.

8. The sinking by U/Boat of the U.S. transport Dorchester in SG 19 on 3 February 1943 in position 59°N, 49°W involved the heaviest loss of personnel suffered in any U.S. convoy during the war. With 747 passengers aboard there were only 227 survivors. Of those lost 404 were Army personnel. The convoy consisted of 3 ships and 3 Coast Guard escort vessels. Both ships and escorts were heavily iced up, necessitating heaving to to chop ice.

9. Throughout the war close liaison was maintained between C&R and Canadian ship and convoy control authorities through Captain J. G. Mackinlay, RCNVR, first assigned as Op-37-12 with office adjoining that of the Director of C&R, and after April 1942 on the Staff of the Naval Member Canadian Joint Staff (NMCS).

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