CHAPTER IX

CTF 24: ADMIRAL SMITH


Admiral "Iceberg" Smith, in taking over the command of Task Force TWENTY-FOUR, had a definite advantage over his predecessors because he had first hand knowledge and understanding of the work that lay ahead of him. That is, he was not an "outsider" to the Task Force. He had worked up to the "top of the pile" from within the organization and for this reason was undoubtedly the most logical man to "fleet up" to the command. Although he has intermittently crossed the pages of this story from its beginning, his familiarity with the North Atlantic antedates it by some years. His study of oceanography and ice conditions, and his expeditions in and around the Arctic Circle, Iceland, and Greenland made him well qualified to take command of the Greenland Patrol early in 1941. From that time, as commander until he became Rear Admiral three years later, he built the Greenland Patrol into a smooth running, efficient, and continuously expanding organization. Now being thoroughly familiar with the background and workings of North Atlantic escort, expeditionary, and weather patrol duty, it was only logical that he became Commander Task Force TWENTY-FOUR.

On the 3rd of December 1943 Admiral Smith had a few comments to make with regard to his having become Commander Task Force 24:

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After having seen so many officers come and go here in the Flag Headquarters, and now to arrive here myself, you can imagine how it feels. I relieved Admiral Oldendorf a week ago today and have been spending most of the time getting acquainted. There is, of course, not so much work in operations as there was.1 . . .

My new station has brought a lot more work, as a new assignment usually does. It is pleasant to have a change of scene after being associated for two years or more with ice and snow. This place has never been known for its climate, but it is a great improvement over what has been left.

By the 20th of the month the Admiral seems to have found his bearings, for at this time, among other things, he had straightened out one of the periodic tangles in the revised Combined Plan for the Defense of Newfound1and, and suggested that the Senior Allied Commander in Newfoundland call a meeting to discuss the subject changes as soon as practicable. And on the 30th he requested special outfitting for ships of the EVERGREEN class assigned to the Greenland Patrol --- but there was really nothing new about this procedure for him, except that now he was one step closer to getting it done.2

The War Diary for December 1943 stated that Commander Task Force 24's duties fell under the following headings:

  1. Duties in connection with North Atlantic Trade Convoys.
  2. Duties in connection with operations in the Green1and-Ice1and-Labrador-Canadian Arctic Area.

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  1. Duties in connection with miscellaneous operations in the Newfoundland Area and escort operations between Newfoundland and the United States.3

Task Force 24 at this time was operating under At1antic Fleet Operation Plan No. 1-43 and Commander Task Force 24's Operation Plan No. 4-43. Admiral Smith made his first change in the latter plan on 10 January 1944, when he published Modification No. 1, which caused a number of shifts and alterations. The Jan Mayen HF/DF Station Was added to the Iceland Group as Task Unit 24.4.2. Two new Task Groups were created: 24.6, Ocean Escort Group, under Commander R. L. Horne, USCG, and the Ice Information Detachment, 24.7, under Lieutenant C.A. Barnes, USCGR. The Greenland Patrol, now under the command of Commodore E. G. Rose, USCG, lost her escort units and gained four others: Plane Guard Stations A, and B, Aids to Navigation and Hydrographic Survey. And finally, as far as the task organization was concerned, Naval Operating Base, Argentia now controlled Minesweep Division 25 and Harbor Approaches Patrol Unit. The former job of the Greenland Patrol providing escorts for the protection of shipping to and from the Greenland Area went to the Ocean Escort Group under the operational control of Commander Task Force 24. The Greenland Patrol, besides its other previous jobs, now was used with such other forces as were required in "boarding and examining Spanish and Portuguese fishing

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vessels in Davis Strait and Greenland waters to prevent subversive activities and espionage."4

Although the opportunities for neutral vessels to aid the enemy in Task Force 24 area were few, enemy agents might be expected to use the convenient means of Spanish and Portuguese fishing fleets to obtain information on the movements of United Nations vessels. It was for this reason that the above statement was included in the Operation Plan. Also, on one occasion a radio telephone conversation in Portuguese between two fishing vessels had been monitored. It referred to the sighting of a convoy by one of the fishermen, but the vessels could not be located or identified. Admiral Smith said that, "It was a result of this, and a subsequent warning to a Portuguese fishing vessel inside Greenland territorial waters, that I have had conferences with the Defense Security Officer, St. John's, Newfoundland."5 However he felt that local counter-espionage would be of little avail unless connected with a Wide spread service.

On 22 January Commander Task Force 24 Wrote the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, With regard to the possibilities of the Island of Jan Mayen. High Frequency Direction Finding station had been established there in November 1943, primarily for the Defense of Greenland. The purpose

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of this station was to detect transmissions of possible enemy radio stations in eastern Greenland. It was hoped by the use of this station that they could prevent a repetition of the previous year's incident when a German weather station operated, unknown to our forces, for several months in Eastern Greenland . In considering the other possibilities of the Island Admiral Smith said,

Oceanic islands, even if relatively small like Jan Mayen, often have great military value. The U.S. is already committed to the defense of Iceland, Greenland, and Newfoundland, and Jan Mayen (like these others) belongs geographically to the American continent rather than to the European. The Group Jan Mayen, Iceland, Greenland, and Newfoundland, forms a rampart of natural defenses along the North Atlantic mid-channel line.6

Therefore, it was planned to conduct further surveys of Jan Mayen and recommended that consideration be given to bring it ultimately under United States leased jurisdiction.

Back in June of 1942, the United States Army Air Forces, preparing for the "Bolero" Movement (Trans-Atlantic plane ferrying), requested the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to furnish flight security ships in the Davis and Denmark Straits. Admiral Ingersoll complied through Commander Task Force 24, and since then these ships furnished not only routine weather information but also monitored planes in flight and stood by as rescue craft in case of emergencies.

Because Task Force 24 established and operated stations A and B (in the above straits) officials of the North Atlantic

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Wing requested during the early part of February of 1944 that the weather service already being carried out should be expanded and the number of stations be increased. In view of their proved value and the fact that it was a logical assignment for Task Force 24, Admiral Smith recommended that "Commander Task Force TWENTY-FOUR be authorized to provide additional weather stations with the ships now available, or that may become available under present directives."7

During the first week of March Admiral Smith recommended Captain C .W. Thomas, USCG, for a commendation in connection with the installation of the radio and D/F station on Jan Mayen. The suggested commendation read to the effect that,

As Commanding Officer of the USCGC NORTHLAND, you were called upon to accomplish a mission of installing technical equipment on an isolated island in the far North in the month of November, 1943. On account of stormy seas and biting winds, you were confronted with a task that tested your resourcefulness and ingenuity as well as your seamanship. Largely through your dogged determination and inspiring leadership, the Station was installed in the limited time available, and you were able to return with your snip from the island on the first of December 1943 in safety. By your untiring efforts under adverse conditions, and your energetic performance of duty on this occasion, you have made an outstanding contribution to the war effort in the North Atlantic.8

From this it can be seen that the establishment of this station on Jan Mayan was a difficult undertaking and one worthy of commendation, and from later results, one that

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paid dividends.

About 10 March Admiral Smith conceived a plan by which he could help out both the training and escort situations. After having assigned the TAHOMA and MOHAWK to the Greenland Patrol Commander Task Group 24.6, Ocean Escort Group, was to assign any available units of his group to Commander Task Force 24's Service Group on temporary duty for operation and training. There had been some criticism of Task Force 24's ships spending too much time in "Stateside" ports and, besides helping Argentia, this would tend to counteract that criticism. Besides, at that time there were no ocean going ships in Argentia "since the KIOWA has been temporarily detached."9 Admiral Smith stated that he wanted to use this type of ship to board Spanish and Portuguese fishing vessels in the Grand Banks area, and also to use them in case of an emergency, as for rescue work.

By the 24th of March Admiral Smith was able to inform the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, that the Canadian Joint Service Committee had approved the Combined Plan for the Defense of Newfoundland dated 22 January 1944. (I.E., this was the latest plan to date with all changes and additions approved.) There was however one change not approved when the plan was submitted to him, but this was considered minor and approved by Commander Task Force 24 upon receipt.10

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The Admiral expected the plan, as signed by a11 the Allied Commanders, to be forwarded to him at an early date and at that time he said he would send the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, a copy of this current plan.

It Was apparent that the War in the North Atlantic had, in many respects, reached a "tapering off" stage. On the 5th of April Commander Task Force 24 was concerned with the reduction of material and personnel of Task Force 24 bases in order that they might be transferred to more active theaters of the War. Of course, reductions were being considered in the light of the present minimum operational commitments, and the Admiral was keeping up to date on the combined plans for the Defense of Newfoundland, Iceland, and Greenland as they were modified to fit the changing aspects of the war. He notified the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and the Chief of Naval Operations that:

At Iceland, further reductions in personnel to an enlisted force of approximately 200 are anticipated. In Greenland, no reduction in facilities and personnel is recommended. The installations are relatively minor and never have reached strength to meet operational commitments . . . In Newfoundland, a larger reduction is planned. When the surveys are completed, the recommendations resulting therefrom will be forwarded through the chain of command.11

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The latter would necessarily cut down on Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy availability at Argentia, since they had been only receiving excess repair facilities. Admiral Smith told Admiral King that unless directed otherwise he would inform the necessary British and Canadian authorities of the plans for the reduction in repair facilities. Since the Canadians now had improved facilities at St. John's and Bay Bulls, Newfoundland, a considerable amount of the excess formerly handled at Argentia could now be taken care of in these places.

The Commanders of the Greenland Base Command, the Army Air Forces in Newfoundland, and in Labrador all notified Admiral Smith during the spring that they needed weather information prior to the time they got it from Washington. Also, the two most important operational controls of the North Atlantic Air Wing in Newfoundland asked him to arrange locally to get this much needed information, which at the time they needed it, was unavailable because they lacked the cipher for the weather code. The Admiral felt that if they, and certain Escort Carriers operating in the North Atlantic, could intercept and decipher the weather messages it would greatly facilitate operations. Further more, he felt that "the value of earlier reception of the reports is more important than the possible greater security of the reports.12

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For this reason he requested the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and the Chief of Naval Operations to initiate action with the Chief of the United States Weather Bureau so that Weather ships would carry a code "held in common by need-to-know United States Forces normally operating in the Northwestern Atlantic Area."13 This cipher was eventually changed and made available.

When Admiral Smith was Commander Greenland Patrol he had suggested that the converted fishing trawlers operating under his command be decommissioned and returned to their owners, and that they be replaced by a standard Navy type ship with a single screw. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, eventually made provision for the decommissioning of some of these ships in his letter of 15 April. This stated that four of these trawlers were to be decommissioned before the first of July 1944, and by the end of April Commodore Rose had the operation well under way.

About the first of May there was considerable scuttlebutt to the effect that British and Canadian Forces at Argentia were to be withdrawn. Rear Admiral Murray, RCN, had visited Admiral Smith about the middle of April and had indicated that upon the discontinuance of the SC convoys the British and Canadian escort groups would no longer have occasion to use Argentia. He conveyed the impression that this would also lead to the detachment of the British Naval

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liaison officer and the Maintenance Unit which he commanded.

Relative to this, Smith said:

The anticipated departure of the British units at Argentia in the near future has raised the question of support of the Free French at St. Pierre, M.I. The task involves minor repairs to a total of 7 small craft. It is planned, therefore, to continue this support and cooperation with the Flag Officer Newfoundland Forces, if and when the British depart Argentia.14

The French would be no great problem and if the British and Canadians withdrew from Argentia then there would be almost no problem presented by tapering off in their repair facilities. This fitted in very nicely with the Admiral's plan to reduce personnel and material at the Naval Operating Base, Argentia.

On 4 May 1944, Admiral Smith promulgated his first operational plan as Task Force Commander, and it is particularly notable for its simplicity. This was due largely to the waning operational demands of the war and, as an ancillary reason, the accompanying program of reduction of personnel and material. The Service and Air Groups remained the same as in the past except for the latter's skipper who was now Lieutenant Commander W. I. Swanston, USCG. However, the Iceland Group and the Naval Operating Base, Argentia, both showed definite signs of the cut, the former losing three out of five units, and the latter combining two to form the PLACENTIA BAY Patrol Unit (24.9.7 and 24.9.8 of

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4-43) which was designated 24.9.7. However, the biggest cut, despite Smith's statement that there would be no reduction of facilities in Greenland, was taken by the Greenland Patrol, which lost five out of nine units. The rest of the Task Organization remained about the same, except for the ATLANTIC WEATHER PATROL, which was expanding all the time. The material contained in the body of the plan was similar to previous plans except for the tasks of units that had been eliminated. These, of course, were excluded. The PLACENTIA BAY Patrol was to patrol the bay and "approaches to Argentia Harbor, and operate minesweepers and other units connected with port control, cooperate with United States Army and combined military forces and in the joint defense of Argentia."15

On 10 May Commander Task Force 24 sent one signed and one unsigned copy of the Combined Plan for the Defense of Newfoundland to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. The Senior Canadian Commander, Newfoundland, had stated that the plan had been approved by higher authorities and that it was effective as of 24 April 1944.

The same day Admiral Smith informed Admiral King that the North Atlantic Wing of the A.T.C. which had previously requested additional weather stations in the Atlantic had recently told him that the British Navy planned to establish

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two Atlantic weather stations. One of these stations was within the Western Atlantic area and the other just to the eastward of it. Since the Atlantic Weather Patrol had been assigned to the Atlantic Fleet16, and in view of the significance this Patrol had in connection with post-war aviation and international agreements, it was recommended that all weather stations in the Western Atlantic Area be established and maintained by the United States Atlantic Fleet. Therefore, Admiral Smith suggested that "this subject be referred to the Joint Meteorological Committee and that it reconsider its decision not to establish weather stations recommended"17 in an earlier letter of his on this subject.18

Commander Task Force 24's Operation Order No. 1-44 came out on 19 May and this provided for the establishment of two additional weather stations.19 It also provided for the use of a standard eight-group International Ship Code in conjunction with the regular weather code. Under this order the USS NUCLEUS and USS PALISADE were to establish one station and the USS NOTABLE, by Operation Order 2-44 of two

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days later, was to relieve the ASTERION at another.

During June Admiral Smith seemed to be having difficulties continuously maintaining the Weather Patrol because of the small size and short endurance of the vessels. He anticipated that before the advent of stormy weather in November it would be advisable to relieve these small ships with larger, more seaworthy ones of greater range. About the end of the month he pointed this out to Admiral King, and stated,

If it is considered impracticable to assign frigates of sufficient number to maintain the total of 8 stations, it is requested . . . to permit the retention of the MANHASSETT, BIG HORN and SEA CLOUD. With these three, and additional vessels drawn from escort and Greenland operations, and converted to weather duty, it is hoped to be able to remedy the present unsatisfactory conditions surrounding stations ABLE, BAKER and CHARLIE.20

As was planned early in May, and on the authority of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet directive of 9 June, Smith directed the Commandant of Naval Operating Base, Argentia, on 6 July to use the base as necessary for the support of French Naval Craft at St. Pierre, M.I. The Flag Officer, Newfoundland Forces, was to be the liaison officer regarding operations with the French and requisitions were to go through him. The French were to be treated as if they were a Canadian unit and repairs were to be effected by Royal Navy or Royal Canadian Navy personnel from St.

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John's. Admiral Smith told the Commandant that, "In this connection, whenever matters pertaining to policy arise with Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force, it is desired that they be handled via this command."21

Earlier in the spring of 1944 the Canadians had established a system of classifying the sea areas adjacent to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland in respect to the relative hazard connected with routing shipping in these areas. Due to this method of control the hazard factor was reduced to a minimum. Admiral Smith's operations section had been unofficially using the reports of Canadian authorities concerning the status of these areas in connection with the routing of shipping, and since the Davis Strait Area had been particularly cleared out, the Admiral asked Commander Greenland Patrol's opinion as to the advisability of discontinuing escort operations on the West Coast of Greenland. It was felt that there was so little shipping on the West Coast and the hazard so slight that this would be advisable, so escorts in this area were discontinued.

On 9 July the Chief of Naval Operations received word from Commander Task Force 24 that as of the 4th of June 1944 the Office of Captain "D", Senior British Naval Officer, Argentia, had been discontinued, and that on the 5th of July 1944 the Royal Naval Air Station had also been discontinued at Argentia.

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Greenland Patrol's Operation Order 1-44 had lifted the date for the STORIS and NORTHLAND to clear the pack ice of Northeast Greenland to 1 September 1944. Admiral Smith accordingly notified Commodore Rose that,

Enemy operations, in previous seasons, in Northeast Greenland have indicated that the enemy has postponed his arrival in Northeast Greenland to establish Stations as late in the season as feasible . . . Our own vessels should be sent into the area each year as early as ice conditions permit, and should remain as late as practicable. No calendar date can be set due to the wide fluctuations in ice conditions from year to year. The limiting date to depart Northeast Greenland should depend upon the experience and ability of the respective officers on the spot.22

It was therefore recommended that the Subject operation be amended in order to accord with the above policy before the Summer "Smoking-out" operations got under way.

In connection with the Naval reduction program Admiral Smith pointed out to the Chief of Naval Operations about the last of July that on 15 June Allied Forces in Newfoundland numbered approximately 25,000. Of these, combined United States Forces numbered about l0,000, and the Navy made up 10 percent of the total. Although none of the other Allied Commanders expected any reduction in strength, Commander Task Force 24 stated that by 1 September that the United States Navy would be cut to 5 percent of the total, despite the fact that the Royal Canadian Navy expected an increase

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in their present strength.23

Change No. 1 to Operation Plan 1-44 was sent out on 7 August by Commander Task Force 24 and was mainly concerned with the Weather Patrol. There were no marked changes to the plan, most of them being of a minor nature.

On the 8th of August Commander Task Force 24 notified the Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts that the British unit which had formerly handled supplies for the French Forces putting into Argentia had been withdrawn, and there was no longer an agency there to which supplies could be charged. The question had been taken up with a member of the staff of the Flag Officer Newfoundland Forces who had stated definitely that FONF would not accept the responsibility for materials issued to the French, as it had been anticipated he would. Admiral Smith took measures to rectify this situation.

October of 1944 seems to have been a mouth of somewhat heightened German activity and excitement in and around Greenland. By reconnaissance and other military activity, personnel of Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND discovered an enemy weather unit preparing to establish a weather station on Little Koldeway Island, Greenland. As the result of prompt action the Officers and men of the EASTWIND effected a successful capture of the German party on the 4th of

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October. There were no casualties on either side, and the element of surprise was such that almost all documents and equipment of the enemy were captured intact. There were twelve prisoners taken in all.

Twenty more prisoners of war were captured on 16 October, when the German trawler EXTERNSTEINE, upon which they were the crew, while stuck in floe ice off Shannon Island, Greenland, was captured by EASTWIND and SOUTHWIND. The ship's mission when it left Norway was to establish a weather expedition on Isle de France, Greenland, if possible, and if not, on the next most suitable site, and then return to Norway. As it turned out Isle de France was out of the question because of ice conditions and she had to land the party on Little Koldeway Island, where as stated above it was captured. After EXTERNSTEINE left the weather party it became stuck in the ice where it was spotted by the EASTWIND's plane, and later captured. In his report on interrogation of the prisoners, Major R. A. Fendall, CAC, noted that, "The Captain's failure to scuttle his ship when capture was eminent seemed odd when the Captain of the KEHDINGEN from the previous captured expedition did such a thorough job." He suggested, "The reason might be a growing realization on the part of the officers in the merchant marine that the cause has been lost and nothing would be gained.24

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On the 19th of October Commander Task Force 24 wrote the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the continuation of the watch on Jan Mayen. Because of the enemy activity in Northeast Greenland at this time, it was considered desirable to continue the use of the HF/DF station on Jan Mayen. However, on the cessation of European hostilities the stations equipment was to be returned to the United States unless there was use for it in connection with safe-guarding postwar airplane traffic. Also it was expected that the Norwegian Government in London was going to put in an early request for the buildings which the Navy had put up there. Although the Germans were still attempting to send out weather information from Greenland, the fact that securing the watch had been contemplated was an indication that the tempo of the Atlantic war had slowed down quite appreciably. They had even contemplated taking down the anti-submarine net at Argentia, but it was decided to leave it up until the absolute cessation of submarine activities in the Atlantic.

Also about this time the Air-Sea-Rescue Program was getting under way. Sinkings from U-boats had practically disappeared and a need for the provision of a rescue service for aircraft, which were flying air routes between Newfoundland and Europe in increasing numbers, was becoming apparent. This need grew directly out of the loss of an Army C-54 between Newfoundland and Iceland and a C-47 between Iceland

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and Greenland. All hands on both these planes were lost and the results of attempted rescue operations revealed the need of establishing more effective air-sea rescue facilities. Commander Task Force 24 informed Admiral King that, "Unless directed otherwise, it is planned to coordinate air-sea rescue operations with United States Army air activities and facilities in Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland.25

They Were not long in getting started. The first meeting of the Air-Sea Rescue program was held at Argentia on 28 October 1944. Admiral Smith and the Commanding General, North Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command, met in an attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory plan or coordination by which rescue of aircraft casualties in the North Atlantic could be effected. Although conclusive results were not obtained, it was felt that some progress had been made. It was agreed that a rescue organizational plan be drawn up by Commander Task Force 24 and submitted at a meeting held at the Headquarters of the Commanding General, North Atlantic Division, Army Transport Command, in Manchester, New Hampshire. This was to be done as soon as practicable.

On 29 October the Commanding General, North Atlantic Division of Army Transport Command wrote Admiral Smith submitting details of plans and procedures for a Rescue Control Center. The Commanding General had previously

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requested the assistance of Task Force 24 in cases of his aircraft in distress, and indicated that the volume of North Atlantic Air traffic was sizeable, probably continuing at such proportions indefinitely. Admiral Smith felt that the frigates then reporting for weather and plane guard duty, and the present squadron of VPB-6 at the Naval Air Station, constituted a potent rescue organization.

By 10 November Commander Task Force 24 had enough ships to maintain six full weather stations and two stations as plane guard and rescue ships operating from Iceland and Greenland. These latter two stations were to become full weather stations on the reporting of another ship in the coming month of January. Under the existing system of rotating the duty of weather ships Admiral Smith devised a plan whereby some of the ships that had been on weather duty could be returned to escort duty. If this plan met with the approval of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fieet,26 he intended to release some of the smaller and inadequate cutters at the earliest possible date. The question was to be further taken up with the Atlantic Fleet Weather Central in Norfolk, Virginia.

Atlantic Fleet Operation Plan 1-44 provided for the escorting of Greenland convoys by Task Force 24. During the past months Task Force 24 had often expedited movements of vessels with cargoes destined for United States

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Forces in Newfoundland and Greenland by furnishing escorts from Boston to Argentia and return, also from Boston to Greenland and return. The more direct routing under Task Force 24 escorts resulted in shorter time spent at sea. When escorts were not available, ships proceeded in Canadian convoys from Boston to St. John's via Halifax and Sydney, with ships for Argentia detaching off Placentia Bay. In such instances, ships for Greenland were picked up at St. John's. The reverse was often resorted to when vessels were delivered at St. John's for onward routing under British or Canadian escorts. On 1 December Admiral Smith notified the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, that "Insofar as possible escorts of this Task Force will continue the above practice, unless otherwise directed."27 However, due to priority directives, escorts might not always be available, so the Admiral said, "As soon as information is received from Port Director, Boston, or Commander Service Force, Atlantic Fleet, of proposed sailings to Newfoundland or Greenland from Boston they will be informed as to whether escorts can be made available."28

On 4 December Commander Task Force 24 wrote the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, in connection with the assignment of Greenland Patrol vessels and his letter brings out

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a point of interest concerning the ultimate fate of the German trawler EXTERNSTEINE. He said, "In other correspondence the captured German trawler EXTERNSTEINE has been recommended assigned to the Greenland Patrol. The Commander Greenland Patrol informs me that this does not effect his request for four AGLs contained in basic letter."29

On 11 December Army and Navy representatives came together in Manchester, New Hampshire, for another feting on Air-Sea Rescue operations. At this time they discussed equipment and procedure and eventually arrived at a basic operating agreement.

The remainder of December and 1944 were concerned with routine matters and this gave Admiral Smith an opportunity to take a few bearings on past, present, and future before starting the new and final year of the war in the Atlantic.

Commander Task Force 24 started the year of 1945 off with weather patrol and escort problems. Two corvettes had to be taken from his Escort Group so that he could maintain continuously weather stations six and seven in the Denmark and Davis Straits. (These were formerly Plane Guard Stations A and B). Another ship on weather patrol was soon to have a period of yard availability, and this would necessitate taking a corvette to replace it. This left a total of five escort vessels instead of the eight that were authorized and required. Bearing on this, the Admiral commented, "The

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U-boat situation in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland waters is apparently on the increase at a time when our escorts are decreasing in number."30 Eighteen frigates had been assigned to the weather patrol but by 3 January not all of them had yet reported, and since it really required twenty to man all eight weather stations continuously, Admiral Smith requested that he be permitted to retain two minesweepers still in the weather patrol which were to have been taken off.

Admiral Ingram's comment of 6 January on the Air-Sea Rescue Program indicated further probable reduction of Commander Task Force 24's ships. The Admiral said,

While the fullest cooperation with the U.S. Army and Canadian forces is desired, Air-Sea Rescue by forces other than those of the Greenland Patrol is not a responsibility of the Atlantic Fleet. Assignment of forces to Task Force TWENTY-FOUR is not based upon the need for this service, and commitments should be limited to those within the capacity of the forces presently under your command, with the understanding that they may be further reduced upon the defeat of Germany.31

Toward the latter pert of January the scene shifted to Jan Mayen, from which some civilians sought to collect timber. Commander Task Force 24 thought that since the Admiral Commanding the Iceland Command (ACIC) had in the past denied access to "mercantile and civil traffic" on the island, it would seem to be consistent and desirable to continue to do so, until Germany had been defeated. He thought, "To permit landing in any part of the island by other than authorized military units would . . . compromise the security of the

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HF/DF station of the United States Navy."32 He therefore wrote the Commandant of the Naval Operating Base, Iceland, end told him to inform the military authority having custody of Jan Mayen accordingly.

During the recent past months Task Force 24 had often been requested to assist in the search and rescue of ditched or missing Allied planes within the ocean areas of it's command. However, despite the fact that these requests had been acted on with all available facilities, Admiral Smith felt that efforts had "often fallen short of the desired goal of maximum efficiency with minimum delay, due to a lack of coordination and planning."33 He felt the chief deficiency had been a certain slowness in the exchange of necessary information between the Army and Navy. However, something had been done about this and 0n 12 February he wrote Commander Greenland Patrol that Commander Task Force 24 and the Commanding General of the North Atlantic Division of the Army Transport Command had formulated plans for closer liaison, improved communications, and coordination of their respective forces for search and rescue operations. He said, "the success of these plans is dependent on well integrated, efficient, sector Rescue Groups."34

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As a coordinated movement the Atlantic Weather Patrol ships were continuously patrolling the northern ocean air routes and had been strategically located to effect emergency rescue. "Prompt search by aircraft offers the most promising action, closely supported by the nearest weather station vessel or vessels, to make the actual recovery of survivors."35 The Atlantic Weather Patrol plus the International Ice Patrol both constituted important features in the Air-Sea Rescue Program. Furthermore, they would be almost equally important in the post-war world.

On 20 March Commander Task Force 24 pointed out:

The current operation plan of CTF 24 and the new operation plan now being prepared designate the Jan Mayen HF/DF Station as Task Unit 24.4.2. In view of this fact, it is requested that Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Iceland, formulate and place in effect an operation plan for said unit based on the current situation.36

Shortly thereafter the orders of the Admiral were carried out.

About the end of March the question of the vulnerability of the Naval Operating Facility, Grondal, Greenland to submarine attack was brought up. With regard to this, it was felt that the possibility of enemy attack at Grondal, in the present phase of the war, was considered so small that the risk could be borne without putting up a proposed gun

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installation. Previously, an Army garrison had been charged with the defense of Ivigtut and Grondal, but it had been discontinued in November of 1944 on directive from higher authority. From this it was assumed that the question of defense was maturely considered before the withdrawal of the Army forces. Also from this it can be seen that the war in the Atlantic was in the latter stages of culmination.

April 1st Commander Task Force 24 put out his first operation plan for 1945. About the only difference between 1-44 and 1-45 was that the 1atter had added Task Group 24.8.18 (Greenland Patrol Survey Unit) to the Greenland Patrol, and that the Naval Air Station under Naval Operating Base, Argentia, had become a Naval Air Facility -- no longer being large enough to warrant being called a station.

On 23 April Admiral Smith was still worried about the potentialities of enemy agents aboard foreign fishing vessels. He informed the Chief of Naval Operations that he intended to have the Spanish and Portuguese fishing vessels on the Newfoundland Banks boarded as soon as a vessel was available. However, after 7 May and V-E day this action was no longer necessary.

After the termination of the war in Europe the Air-Sea Rescue program loomed more important than ever. The thousands of tactical planes in Europe had to return to the United States bringing with them all the personnel they could carry. This meant that weather patrol and reports were most

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important as they determined the scheduling and routing of flights from Europe to America. It also meant that the responsibilities of the Air Sea Rescue program continued as before, and the actual work involved had a tendency to increase. Since the beginning of the program only one of the many thousands of planes returning home has gone down with no survivors. That more lives have not been lost is largely attributable to the excellent work of the Atlantic Weather Patrol and the Air-Sea Rescue Program. The spring and summer of 1945 were mainly taken up with the operations of these two programs.

It appears that Admiral Smith established some sort of precedent by following the stepping stone of the Greenland Patrol to the command of Commander Task Force 24, for on 6 August 1945 former Commander Greenland Patrol and now Rear Admiral E. G. Rose, USCG, relieved Admiral Smith as Commander Task Force TWENTY-FOUR so the latter might take over his duties as District Coast Guard Officer of the Third Navel District. Commander Task Force 24 had its fifth generation of Admirals with a happier and far less complicated outlook towards the future.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Admiral Smith's personal letter of 3 December 1943 to Captain Wooldridge.
2. Admiral Smith's personal letter of 3 December 1943 to Admiral J. F. Farley, Jr., USCG.
3. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 002 of 4 January 1944 to CinClant.
4. CTF 24 sec. ser. 0010 Modification No. 1 to Op Plan 4-43 10 January 1944.
5. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0013 of 11 January 1944 to CinClant.
6. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0021 of 22 Jan. 1944 to CinClant.
7. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0033 of about 6 Feb. 1944 to CinClant.
8. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0063 of 3 March 1944 to CinClant.
9. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0073 of 10 March 1944 to CTG 24.6 (c/o DCGO 1ND).
10.

CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0084 of 24 March 1944 to CinClant. This was paragraph 401 which read:

The Senior Naval Officer permanently stationed in Newfoundland will exercise the operational direction of all Allied Naval Forces and Air Forces cooperating with Naval Forces for off-shore defense operations.
 

11. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0096 to CinCUS, CNO, 5 April 1944.
12. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00104 of 14 April 1944 to CNO.
13. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00104 of 14 April 1944 to CNO.
14. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00114 to CinCUS, CNO 2 May 1944.
15. CTF 24 sec. ser. 00115 Op Plan No. 1-44 of 4 May 1944.
16. Cominch ser. 00860 of 15 March 1944.
17. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00125 of 10 May 1944 to CinCUS.
18. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0033 of about 6 February 1944 to CinClant.
19. One at 58° North, 37° West, and the other at 50° North 37° West.
20. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00160 of 29 June 1944 to CinClant.
21. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00168 of 16 July l944 to Comdt. NOB, Argentia.
22. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00184 of 17 July 1944 to ComGreenPat.
23. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00196 of 29 July 1944 to CNO.
24. Comdt. NOB Iceland sec. ltr. ser 0097 of 24 November 1944 to ComGreenPat.
25. CTF 24 conf. ltr. ser. 01047 of 12 October 1944 to CinCUS.
26. Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll was relieved as Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, by Admiral Jonas H. Ingram on 23 November 1944.
27. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00306 of 1 December 1944 to CinCUS.
28. Ibid.
29. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00308 of 4 Dec. 1944 to CinClant.
30. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 009 of 3 Jan. 1945 to CinClant.
31. CinClant conf. ltr. ser. 058 of 6 Jan. 1945 to CTF 24.
32. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0022 of 25 Jan. 1945 to Comdt. NOB, Iceland.
33. CTF 24 conf. ltr. ser. 0170 of 12 Feb. 1945 to ComGreenPat.
34. Ibid.
35. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0164 of 12 Feb. 1945 to Comdt. USCG.
36. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 0071 to Comdt. NOBI, 20 March 1945.

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