The Raid on the Marshall
and Gilbert Islands

February 1, 1942

The first offensive operation by Task Forces of the United States Pacific Fleet in the current war took place just 8 weeks after Japan's attack of December 7, 1941, against Pearl Harbor. The intervening period had been one of constant success for the enemy: Manila and Cavite fell on the 2d of January, Bougainville in the Solomons on the 22d, Rabaul and Balikpapan on the 23d.

These advances were the result not only of a matured and well implemented plan of campaign, but of the enemy's ability to exploit the advantages accruing to him from his initial surprise attack. Moreover, commitments in the Atlantic contributed to the defensive role which was forced upon our Pacific Fleet.

Nevertheless, known movements of the enemy were carefully scrutinized, and the disposition of his forces considered in order that offensive action might be launched at the earliest moment.

The situation.

During the first days of January, the pattern of these movements began to indicate that such a moment was approaching. Broadly stated, our own submarine reconnaissance and other intelligence indicated that the Japanese Fourth Fleet1 was based principally on Truk in the Mandates and that it had been reinforced by the Eighth Cruiser Division2 and the Second Carrier Division.3 A large number of enemy submarines were based on the Marshall Islands with the submarine fleet commander reported at Jaluit. However, many of these submarines were operating


in the vicinity of Hawaii and in the eastern Pacific. Also indicative of the trend of events were raids by cruisers, destroyers, and converted merchantmen which had been reported against four islands of the Gilbert group.

One island of this group, Makin, had been occupied by an unopposed force of Japanese as early as December 9th and had subsequently been employed as a base for their four-engined reconnaissance seaplanes. There also were indications that an air base was being developed there.

Thus, while the main Japanese naval units were still being employed against Borneo, the Celebes, and other islands to the west and southwest, there were clear hints that the next area of attack might well be to the southeast of the Mandated area. Such an attack might be launched in the near future against Samoa, where our positions were being reinforced by transports convoyed by Task Force HOW,4 Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, commanding, and Task Force FOX, Rear Admiral Frank I. Fletcher, commanding, or against Suva in the Fijis or Canton Island. Success in any of these operations could jeopardize the northeastern approaches to Australia and be of substantial assistance to any future attack which the enemy might launch against that continent.

It appeared to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who had become Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, on December 17, 1941, that the time had come for a damaging raid against the Marshall Islands before enemy strength was fully assembled in the Mandates. Task Forces, HOW and FOX, which would shortly complete a convoy operation at Samoa, were the logical units to employ in such an operation.

At that time, our information concerning the Marshall and Gilbert Islands was by no means complete. So far as the Marshalls were concerned, it was known that 2 landing fields, each with a hangar capable of housing 20 medium-sized planes, had been constructed on Enybor Island, just north of Jaluit. Camouflaged storehouses and gasoline and fuel-oil storage tanks were adjacent to these fields. On Jaluit, administration buildings and shore batteries were known to have been established along the three-quarter mile water front street, called the Marine Parade. It was also assumed that, given warning, the enemy could concentrate a considerable over-all strength for mutual support.


In order to observe Japanese activities in the area, a shuttle patrol of six Army B-17's and six Navy patrol planes was established between Canton and Suva on the 19th of January.

See chart opposite page 20)

On January 9th Admiral Nimitz directed Admiral Halsey to raid the southern Marshall and northern Gilbert area employing air attack and ship bombardment, the general priority of objectives being: combatant ships; aircraft, particularly those on the ground or water, and tenders; other ships; aircraft supporting installations; fuel tanks, power, and radio installations; troop concentrations; and storehouses. Our task forces were to depart from Samoa on the 25th of January.

These forces were made up as follows:

Task Force HOW, Admiral Halsey commanding (Enterprise flag).

Striking group---
Wotje bombardment group, Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance commanding (Northampton flag):
Northampton, Capt. William D. Chandler.
Salt Lake City, Capt. Ellis M. Zachanas.
Dunlap, Lt. Comdr. Virginius R. Roane.
Maleolap bombardment group, Capt. Thomas M. Shock commanding (Chester flag):
Chester, Captain Shock.
Balch, Commander Charles J. Rend.
Maury, Lt. Comdr. Elmer D. Snare.
Carrier group:
Enterprise, Capt. George D. Murray.
Ralph Talbot, Commander Ralph Earle, Jr.
Blue, Commander Harold N. Williams.
McCall, Commander Frederick Moosbrugger.

Fueling group---
Platte, Capt. Ralph H. Henkle.
Craven, Lt. Comdr. Allen P. Calvert.

Task Force FOX, Admiral Fletcher commanding (Yorktown flag).

Striking group---
Carrier group:
Yorktown, Capt. Elliott Buckmaster.
Hughes, Lt. Comdr. Donald J. Ramsey.
Sims, Lt. Comdr. Willford M. Hyman.
Russell, Lt. Comdr. Glenn R. Hartwig.
Walke, Lt. Comdr. Thomas E. Fraser.


Louisville, Capt. Elliott B. Nixon.
St. Louis, Capt. George A. Rood.

Fueling group---
Sabine, Commander Houston L. Maples.
Mahan, Lt. Comdr. Rodger W. Simpson.

Upon departure from Samoa, these forces were to proceed to the vicinity northeast of Howland Island, for refueling on the 28th of January. On completion of this operation the Platte and the Craven were to proceed to Pearl Harbor, while the Sabine and Mahan, upon completion of the first fueling, were to proceed eastward in time for a second fueling rendezvous at a point about midway on the return trip, at 2000 on February 2d. The Sabine's approach to the second fueling point was to be from the southeastward to avoid possible contact with other units of the task forces during the preceding night.


Task force HOW.

Further details of the plan, as they were later developed, required that the Enterprise launch the main air attack on Kwajalein from latitude 10°00' N. longitude 170°00' E. on February 1st, as near 15 minutes before sunrise at Kwajalein as practical. Simultaneously the bombardment group, composed of the Northampton, Salt Lake City, and Dunlap, was to shell Wotje, and the Chester, Balch, and Maury to shell Maloelap. Fighter planes from the Enterprise were to support the bombardment groups by strafing prior to bombardment. Attacks were to be repeated and other objectives attacked as developments warranted.

Enterprise air group.

The primary objectives for the Enterprise bombing squadrons were to be any ships found at Roi Island; or, if none were found, the planes were to proceed immediately to Kwajalein Island in search of enemy ships and to support the first division of the torpedo squadron. The Enterprise scouting squadron was to make a gliding attack to strafe and drop 100-pound bombs on the air field, planes on the ground, hangars, fuel tanks, and other installations on both Roi and Kwajalein. If suitable objectives survived, a second dive-bombing attack with 500-pound bombs was con-


templated. If suitable targets for a torpedo attack were found or remained after the horizontal and dive-bombing attack had been completed, the Enterprise was to be informed and the second division of the torpedo squadron was to attack with torpedoes. The fighter squadron was to make attacks on the fields at Wotje and Maloelap Island, six planes on each, while six other planes were to fly a combat patrol over the ship. Further attacks by all planes were to be made as conditions warranted.

Wotje bombardment group.

As a result of prior study it was believed that all Japanese shore installations would be found on the island of Wotje and that enemy vessels inside the atoll would probably be in the anchorage immediately to the westward of that island. This did not, however, preclude the possibilities that shore batteries might be located on outlying supporting islands, such as Egmedio, Ene Cherutakku, or Ormed, and that ships might be found using other anchorages, such as Ormed and Christmas Harbor, or attempting to leave or enter the lagoon.

In selecting the point from which to commence the bombardment and the courses to be steered during it, the following factors were given considerations:

(a)Priority of objectives.--Enemy ships were given first priority; they might get underway and move out of range. Aircraft on the ground were obviously important, but these were assigned to the Enterprise fighters. Also, the possibility of being able to bring enemy aircraft under effective fire from ships' guns during the early stages of the bombardment seemed unlikely, as the location of the landing field was unknown. Wind data available for the Marshall Islands showed prevailing winds from northeast to east. If these data were accurate, the necessity for a good east-west runway would have placed the landing field on the north end of the island.5 Shore installations were thus given second priority after ships.

(b) Location and strength of shore batteries.--It was believed that the largest caliber gun likely to be found on Wotje would be 6-inch with a maximum range of 20,000 yards; that the shore batteries would be on the seaward or eastern side of the island; and that enemy fire control would be most accurate on bearings between northeast and southeast


and least accurate to the southward. Batteries might exist, however, on Egmedio, Ene Cherutakku and Ormed Islands.

(c) Range of own batteries.--Our cruisers' 8-inch guns would be effective to 30,000 yards, destroyer 5-inch to 15,000 yards, and cruiser 5-inch (dual purpose) to 12,000 yards. Concerning our 5-inch batteries, however, consideration had to be given to the difference in ranges to the shore line, where enemy batteries probably were located, and to the positions of shore objectives.

(d) Navigational and other conditions involved in the approach.--The sun would rise at 0702, bearing 110°. Cruiser aircraft should be launched as late as possible in order to conserve fuel, but early enough to permit them to be on spotting stations by 0715, yet not so close to Wotje that the flash from the catapult powder charges would alert the enemy. It was also undesirable for our ships to be silhouetted from Wotje on the eastern horizon before our fighters attacked. These considerations, the proximity of Erikub and Maloelap Atolls to the southward of Wotje Atoll, the low-lying nature of all land in these atolls and the fact that rather strong ocean currents were known to exist, all would require exceptional accuracy of navigation during the night.

The foregoing considerations resulted in the decision to approach Wotje from the southeastward, and to arrive at 0715 at a position 20,000 yards from probable shore batteries whence ships at the anchorage would be under direct observation; to maneuver by turn movements on courses to close the range while maintaining broadside fire, firing deliberately with 8-inch partial salvos on enemy ships and at the same time developing the location and strength of the shore batteries; and, finally to shift fire to shore objectives, closing the range, if possible, to permit the cruiser 5-inch to fire effectively. An approach from the southward of Wotje Island, rather than the northward, was selected because this covered Schischmarev Strait, the principal entrance to the lagoon, and the channel to it from Wotje anchorage. Moreover, for fire against shore objectives a position to the southward of Wotje Island was desirable because the major axis of the island is north and south.

Taroa bombardment group.

The attack on Taroa was to be carried out by a task group consisting of the Chester, Balch, and Maury. It was the intention of the group to pass through the initial point, bearing 116°, distant 10 miles from the


center of Taroa Island at 0715, February 1st. The approach was to be made with the Balch as guide, followed by the Chester and Maury at distances of 1,000 yards, on course 236° at a speed of 20 knots. The ships were to continue on that course with the Chester's main battery firing for about 20 minutes. Thereafter, if practicable the group was to close the range to permit effective fire of all 5-inch batteries. The priority of objectives would be as set forth in Admiral Nimitz's order. If any enemy surface vessels were present and attempted to escape, the group was to maneuver to cover the entrance to Enijun Channel.

Task Force FOX.

Admiral Fletcher's orders to his task force required that the striking group, which consisted of the Yorktown, Louisville, and St. Louis, and support, consisting of the destroyers Hughes, Sims, Russell, and Walke proceed in company to latitude 5° N., longitude 175°25' E., arriving at 7 o'clock on the evening of the 31st. From this point the striking group was ordered to proceed at 25 knots on course 270°, while the support was to follow at a speed of advance of 15 knots until rejoining the striking group.

The striking group was to launch an air attack on Jaluit, Makin, and Mili from the Yorktown. The attack was to be launched at latitude 5° N., longitude 171°50' E., after which the Yorktown was to retire eastward at 25 knots on course 090°. The attack was to be executed to strike about 15 minutes prior to sunrise; however, launching times could be advanced to permit attack and recovery of aircraft prior to daylight if weather conditions were propitious.

It was provided that if the support failed to contact the striking group at the expected time and place, support would continue on 270° for about 1 hour unless otherwise directed, and endeavor to locate the Yorktown. This search was not to proceed further west than 172°00' E. Should the search fail to locate any units of the striking group and should no further orders be received, the support was to retire toward latitude 4°40' N., longitude 170°00' W., where it would pick up the fueling group, Sabine and Mahan, and return to Pearl Harbor.


Admiral Halsey's task force proceeded at reduced speed throughout daylight hours of the 31st. Once during that time, there was an alert


when an enemy plane passed 35 miles astern of our rear ship, but it failed to detect the presence of our vessels.

After sunset, cruisers and carrier separated, speed was increased to approximately 30 knots by the carrier and 25 knots by the cruisers and, as the Enterprise came to latitude 10° N., longitude 170° W., the ideal weather and sea conditions which had prevailed throughout the night were still present. At 0443, when the first carrier plane was launched, there was little or no wind and a full moon was still above the horizon.

The position of the Enterprise in respect to the points of attack was as follows:

    Place Bearing from Enterprise Distance in miles
Roi Island 256 154
Kwajalein Island 240 156
Taroa Island 136 106
Wotje Island 156 36

The launching of the first group, which consisted of 36 scout bombers, each carrying one 500- and two 100-pound bombs, was completed and at 0508 nine torpedo bombers and an additional scout bomber were put into the air. All these planes, which were detailed for Kwajalien and Roi Islands in the Kwajalein Atoll, took their departure at 0630 with Comdr. Howard L. Young, the Air Group Commander.

Fifteen minutes later, the planes for Roi were estimated to be 20 miles northeast of the island. From an altitude of 15,000 feet, the tip of the sun could be seen rising above the horizon just as the moon was setting. These conditions should have afforded good visibility at sea level, but the horizon was shrouded in mist so that a small strip of land which was observed at 0653 was not identified as Roi Island until 5 minutes after 7. This was due, also, to our planes being equipped only with small photostatic maps. No ships or other signs of activity were observed.

Attack on Roi Island. (See chart opposite page 34.)

The scouting squadron, which was in a three-division formation, was ordered to attack. At almost the same moment, the air group commander received word from our planes over Kwajalein via the Enterprise that there were numerous ships, including "two carriers" in that area. He immediately detached his bombing squadron to assist in dealing with that situation.


The first division of the scouting squadron began its glide-bombing attack from an altitude of 14,000 feet, 15 miles north of Roi. Because of the paucity of prior information, the selection of targets was left to the discretion of each pilot.

While the first division was approaching the target area, the second circled the island close aboard, in order to open out on the first. During the course of this maneuver, it was seen that enemy fighters, perhaps aroused by the first passage of our planes near the island 20 minutes earlier, were coming in to attack. A considerable amount of antiaircraft fire was rising.

The second division therefore moved on the target area at a higher speed (200 knots) than the first and from an altitude of 10,000 feet. The third division followed closely, and like the others, most of the planes released their 100-pound bombs. Some, in all three divisions, also dropped their 500-pounders.

Meanwhile additional enemy planes had joined those already in the air with the result that numerous individual fights ensued. Our planes succeeded in destroying 3 enemy fighters, while the Japanese were seen to shoot down 2 planes of the scouting squadron, one of which was in flames. In addition, we lost one plane probably to antiaircraft fire and another to causes unknown. This fourth plane was last seen making what appeared to be a controlled, but extremely fast, down-wind landing on the water about a mile north of Roi.

Some of our planes succeeded in making a second attack on the shore installations of the island. When these operations were completed seven of the squadron proceeded to Kwajalein and the balance returned to the Enterprise.

Attack on Kwajalein Island. (See illustration opposite page 34.)

Commencing 0508 nine planes of the torpedo squadron were launched from the Enterprise, each loaded with three 500-pound bombs with 1/100" delayed action fuses. Objectives were combatant ships, valuable surface ships and shore facilities at Kwajalein Island. Weather conditions were good, low scattered clouds at 3,000 feet, three- to four-tenths overcast, unlimited ceiling. Wind was from the east-northeast at 15 knots.

Landfall was made at Kwajalein and attacks were begun against nine cargo ships, two four-engine planes, and a large compound on the island. The first bomb was released at 0658; the last at 0711. Sufficient addi-


tional targets to warrant use of aircraft torpedoes were at anchor in the lagoon and report was so made to the Enterprise via voice radio. The antiaircraft fire met by the torpedo squadron was intense and more accurate than had been expected. No enemy aircraft opposition was encountered. The squadron departed from Kwajalein at 0717 and landed aboard the Enterprise at 0935.

As has already been noted, the Air Group Commander at Roi Island, having received the report of the presence of enemy ships at Kwajalein, ordered the 10 scout bombers which were at Roi to proceed to Kwajalein. At 0705, these bombers began a southward movement down the middle of the lagoon, searching for enemy ships. They arrived off Kwajalein 20 minutes later at an altitude of 14,000 feet.

The light and visibility were sufficient at this time to reveal that the ''two carriers'' previously reported were, in fact, large merchant ships.

As the squadron approached the target area, an umbrella barrage of 3- to 5-inch antiaircraft was sent up, with fuse setting at 10,000 feet. This barrage was directly over the anchorage and was not directed at our approaching planes. At the same time heavy machine-gun fire was noticed, which was an utter waste of ammunition. Although there was some large caliber antiaircraft fire from shore guns, the greatest volume of fire came from an antiaircraft cruiser in a central anchorage position. This cruiser was armed with 12 or more large caliber and numerous small caliber antiaircraft guns, and at least 1 multiple pom-pom.

Because the squadron was cruising in a three-division attack formation and squadron doctrine thoroughly covered the situation, a single signal was all that was necessary to launch the attack. This signal was given at 0727 and the divisions separated and each section chose a target. Normal dive-bombing approaches were used and 500-pound bombs were dropped. In several cases individual pilots, not satisfied with their dive, or observing previous hits on target selected, pulled up and chose another target. As radical evasive action was required to escape the great volume of machine-gun fire, planes became separated and each pilot made his subsequent attacks individually. In these subsequent attacks, glide bombing and strafing were employed against smaller ships, large sea-planes, and the shore installations. No enemy aircraft were encountered in the air.

Having completed this mission, the bombers returned to the Enterprise at 0900.


At 0731, while these planes were over Kwajalein, nine torpedo planes, armed with torpedoes, were launched from the Enterprise and proceeded directly to the island, which due to the carrier's movements, was now on track 245°, distance 180 miles. While en route, these planes were advised that their attack should be initiated from the north and as a consequence, course was altered and the planes arrived off Bigej Channel at about 5 minutes after 9. Antiaircraft fire was immediately encountered at 1,200 feet. The group was in a close echelon of V's at this time.

Several large auxiliaries anchored in parallel lines lying approximately east and west with oilers in the northernmost line, cargo ships and troop transports in the next line were observed. Light vessels of tender type were anchored close in to the island and about a dozen patrol type vessels were maneuvering around the lagoon to the north of the line of oilers.

The pilots were informed that the first plane would take the first large vessel to the east and the other planes were to assume large objectives working toward the west in rotation. The formation, in a right echelon of echelons was then at 500 to 700 feet just passing over the reef bordering the lagoon to the north of Bigej Island. Intense antiaircraft fire from 5- or 3-inch guns and pom-poms was now being encountered. The formation was broken up and the attack initiated. It was necessary to pass over numerous small vessels of the gun boat type and skirt vessels beached along the lagoon. All of these vessels maintained an intense machine-gun fire. Large vessels were using pom-poms as well as 3- or 5-inch antiaircraft guns. Antiaircraft guns along the island or edge of the lagoon were also firing. At about this point a light cruiser was noted limping out of the anchorage toward the south pass. Three planes were ordered to concentrate on the cruiser. Planes were now rapidly closing on the first line of ships. Planes releasing on these targets dropped their torpedoes at about 400 to 500 yards and then zoomed over their targets and retired to the east. Planes with targets in the second line dropped torpedoes after maneuvering over or through the first line and then they, too, retired to the east. The planes concentrating on the cruiser maneuvered to box him in, dropped their torpedoes and retired to the north.

While the enemy antiaircraft fire was intense and sustained, it was haphazardly controlled. It is believed the enemy's antiaircraft inflicted considerable casualties on themselves: the second line of ships firing into the first line and shore guns firing into all ships. It was noted that a vigorous dive on a gun crew dispersed it even though the attacking


plane did not fire. One attempt was made to strafe patrol planes and facilities on Ebeiye Island, but this failed due to a gun jam. All radiomen maintained a vigorous fire with free guns during the approach and the retirement.

A rendezvous was effected about 10 or 15 miles east of Kwajalein Island. While circling for the join-up, it was noted that large caliber shells from shore batteries were falling in the water around the formation. The attack group returned to the ships, arriving at about 1130. Bullet and shrapnel holes were found in three of the returning planes, but no crew members were injured.

All torpedoes appeared to have run satisfactorily; however, one of the torpedoes launched at the cruiser exploded before reaching the ship, probably on a coral head.

Fortunately, in this action Torpedo Squadron SIX encountered no air opposition, but it is certain that their mission would not have been accomplished had they been intercepted by enemy fighters which were in the near vicinity.

Attack on Taroa Island. (See chart opposite page 34.)

Beginning at 0610, five fighter planes, each equipped with a 100-pound bomb, left the Enterprise to carry out strafing attacks on Taroa Island in the Maloelap Atoll. A sixth plane crashed in taking off.

The group reached its goal and observed that a new airfield had just been completed. Its two 5,000-foot runways and installations, compared not unfavorably with that at Ford Island, Pearl Harbor. Had this field been in full operation, the position of the task force might have been seriously jeopardized. Numerous planes were observed on the ground. These and the installations were attacked until a quarter after 7.

During their time over the island, our fighters were attacked by an enemy patrol and considerable antiaircraft fire. Two of the Japanese planes were shot down by Lt. James S. Gray, Jr., and one by Lt. (j.g.) William E. Rawie. It is believed that one enemy plane was destroyed on the ground and that many more would have been put out of action had our planes been provided with incendiary bullets.

All five of our fighters, returned to the Enterprise.

At 0935, nine scout bombers which had landed at 0900, after having taken part in the dawn attack on Kwajalein, were launched for a second attack on Taroa Island. This group was composed of seven planes of


the bombing squadron and two planes of the scouting squadron. At the time of the launching the Enterprise was about 95 miles from the objective. Emergency departure was taken and rendezvous was effected en route. Flying in three three-plane sections, the group climbed until an up-sun position about 30 miles to the southeast of Taroa Island at 19,000 was reached at 1032. At this time, and from this point, a high-speed nose-down approach was commenced directly towards Taroa. The group remained closed up in a modified division V formation (one wing section high and one wing section low) for mutual defense against enemy fighter aircraft, which were reported to be plentiful in the vicinity of the target. When about 6 miles from the target, the sections were released and when almost at the dive point the individual planes of each section were placed in an opened out ABC6 formation in a generally north to north-west direction. Flaps were opened and vertical dives made from 13,000 feet altitude directly over the flying field at Taroa. No fighter opposition and no enemy antiaircraft fire was encountered prior to the attack. The island showed no signs of having been previously bombarded. The hangars and buildings were new, uncamouflaged, undamaged, and the planes were lined up in neat rows. About 12 two-engined bombers were parked in a single row on the edge of the north south runway, 5 fighters were parked in front of the north hangar and 6 fighters were parked at the south end of the north-south runway. Two bombers were parked to the northeast of the runways and were well separated.

The first section leader dropped a ripple salvo of two 100-pound and one 500-pound bombs, aiming at planes parked on the field. His bombs destroyed two large bombers and set two others afire, there being little doubt that the last two were ruined. Three small fighter planes were also seen to catch afire from these bombs. The second plane dropped a 500-pound bomb on the southernmost of two hangars near the field making a direct hit. The hangar must have contained gasoline as it went up in very high flames after the bomb explosion. The hangar was apparently a total loss. This plane then headed for Ollot Island where the pilot attacked what appeared to be radio towers and an administration building or barracks and a small radio station or powerhouse. He dropped two


100-pound bombs in salvo, hitting one corner of the large building and the small house. The third plane dropped one 500-pound and two 100-pound bombs about 20 feet in front of the northern hangar. Three fighter planes in front of the hangar were demolished.

The second section leader dropped one 100-pound bomb from 9,000 feet at planes parked on the field. This bomb hit alongside a large bombing plane, which was demolished and two fighter planes were seen to catch on fire. He then dropped his 500-pound bomb on an oil storage tank to the southeast of the hangars, making a direct hit and setting it on fire. He headed for Ollot Island and dropped a 100-pound bomb on an anti-aircraft gun emplacement there. The bomb explosion was followed by puffs of white smoke, possibly indicating that ammunition was exploding afterward. The second plane of this section dropped all his bombs in the initial dive, but was unable to observe where they hit due to pulling out fairly low. The third plane dropped all his bombs on a T-shaped building that was apparently a barracks or administration building. A direct hit opened the building up about half way down the stem of the T. These two planes then strafed a small boat seen proceeding toward a pier on Ollet. Another plane was attacked by a fighter just after pulling out of the strafing run. He did not have tirne to announce the fact over the radio and was forced to take evasive action by himself. The enemy fighter did not push his attack home, but seemed willing to display the maneuverability of his plane and fire outside of gun range. The pilot was able then to evade him and eventually to make a safe getaway and return to the ship alone undamaged.

The third section leader dropped his 500-pound bomb on the southern hangar making a direct hit. This was the second direct hit with 500-pound bombs on this installation. He then dropped his two 100-pound bombs in salvo at the planes parked on the field. They hit in the middle of the northeast-southwest runway in the vicinity of the planes, but no damage to the planes was apparent. The second plane of this section dropped all his bombs in ripple salvo in the dive, aiming at the northern hangar, but was unable to observe the drops because of pulling out low. No bombs were seen to hit the northern hangar, however. The third plane also unloaded at the northern hangar, but his bombs all dropped between two hangars causing no damage apparent from the air. This third section retired to the northward, and when the section leader was about 6 miles north of the field a fighter dove on him. He escaped


without further incident with no bullet holes in his plane. Here, again, the enemy fighter pilot seemed content to display the greater maneuverability of his plane and did not drive home his attack.

Throughout the attack no antiaircraft fire was encountered, except machine-gun fire after the first section planes entered their dive. All sections dived through the machine-gun fire, but only one small hole in the right aileron of the second section leader's plane was found. Antiaircraft fire from several guns on Taroa and from four or five on Ollot Island was observed after the attack. This fire was rather sporadic and inaccurate at first, each gun apparently trying to select its own target. When the flight leader was about 5 miles on his retiring course, however, the batteries appeared to concentrate on his section and the fire became fairly accurate. The planes had inadvertently put themselves in a position to be enfiladed while joining up on the flight leader. When all planes dove for the water the fire again became very ineffective and ceased when the retiring planes were about 8 miles away. Seven planes returned together; the two that had been attacked by fighters returned singly and joined the group just prior to landing aboard.

At 1015 nine bombing planes were launched for a third attack on the island. This group was composed of eight planes of the bombing squadron and one plane of the scouting squadron. Departure was taken immediately and course set for Taroa.

The group climbed steadily, swinging to the east in order to make an attack out of the sun or down wind (090° true) when about 15 miles off shore on course a little north of Taroa, the attack group levelled off at 13,000 feet gaining speed and then swinging toward the south. Shortly thereafter two two-plane sections of enemy fighters were seen turning toward us. Accordingly, our formation turned (toward Taroa) and went immediately into column thus sacrificing mutual firepower support for better observation of possible targets. This turn placed the enemy fighters broad on our starboard bow, but as our group, in order to gain speed, went into a 200-knot power glide, the enemy held altitude. Presently, they attacked, following our planes down.

Simultaneously, bursts of antiaircraft fire were seen at 10 to 12 thousand feet over the field which was still 7 or 8 miles distant. Course was altered in the hope of confusing the ground batteries which it was thought would soon be brought to bear. However, as our group arrived just


north of the field, we observed that this fire was in the nature of a fixed umbrella, and consequently did not seek out individual targets.

Our planes were now in diving position. Just as they were about to push over, the pilot of plane B-15, the last in column, flew under and ahead of B-12, the next in line. The pilot of B-12 saw that the reason for this maneuver was an enemy fighter on the tail of B-15. B-12 opened fire with his two fixed guns, and shot down the fighter.

The leading planes attacked the hangars and area close by, while those following selected the large bombers on the field. All except B-10 dropped their bombs in ripple salvos on the first dive. During the pull-out the planes were immediately engaged by what must have been a low level fighter patrol. The action broke up into individual dog fights, during which two enemy fighters were shot down. It was during this phase that B-15 was last seen dodging into a cloud with a pursuing enemy fighter. All planes were attacked at least once by fighters and had to make defensive use of the excellent cloud layer at from 2 to 4 thousand feet.

Enemy fighters encountered were types 96, 97, and, in one instance, Zero fighters. The 96 and 97 fighters could outmaneuver our aircraft, including the F4F's (Grumman Fighters), and appeared faster than the SBD's (Douglas Scout Bombers). The F4F's were much faster and had more gun power than the enemy planes, but the pilots of Fighting Squadron Six made no attempts to engage in dog fights as soon as the maneuverability of the enemy fighters became apparent. No information was obtained on the relative performance of the type Zero fighter and the F4F-3.

Attack on Wotje Island. (See chart opposite page 34.)

A group of six fighter planes destined for Wotje Island were launched immediately after the first group which attacked Taroa. All planes were in the air by 0616.

It was anticipated that this island would prove the most fully developed from a military viewpoint. For this reason, the main attack was built around bombardment by the Northampton, Salt Lake City, and Dunlap beginning at 0715.

The first attack by the fighters was unopposed, their second was met by antiaircraft fire. The planes left the island before the beginning of the bombardment.


Later in the day, at 1116, a second group consisting of eight scout bombers, each carrying one 500- and two 100-pound bombs, and nine torpedo planes carrying three 500-pound bombs, were launched, and delivered an attack on the few targets which had survived the bombardment. The airfield and its facilities were completely destroyed while only two of the original eight or nine ships in the harbor could be seen.

See chart opposite page 26)

At 1830 January 31st, the task group consisting of the Northampton, Salt Lake City, and Dunlap, Rear Admiral Spruance commanding, proceeded toward Wotje Island on course 258° true at a speed of 17.3 knots.

At 0620 February 1st, the ships were turned into the wind for launching the aircraft. Just after the cruiser planes were catapulted the presence of our task force was signaled to the shore by a rocket fired from a patrol boat of about 800 tons. The Dunlap was designated to sink the boat which went zigzagging away. Only the bow gun of the destroyer would bear, so she had some difficulty hitting her fleeing, low-freeboard target.

Upon completion of the launching, the planes from the Salt Lake City and Northampton rendezvoused as a unit and proceeded to the north of the island of Wotje. The reconnaissance and photographic planes broke off and headed south to photograph the straits and reconnoiter, passing clockwise around the atoll. At 0653 the antiaircraft guns on the island opened fire on the fighters from the Enterprise and a few minutes later shifted fire to the spotting planes. Spotting stations first were taken up north of the island.

At about 0655 the ships of the task group sighted land on the starboard bow. It consisted of numerous low-lying islands, with the island to the extreme right, Wotje, having what appeared to be two radio towers of medium height and various fire control and lookout masts. Upon closer observation one large ship was seen in the lagoon and within a very few minutes the stacks of about five others came into view. Many of the ships were showing black smoke indicating that they were lighting off. An initial report of "three ships and no shore batteries" was received from the reconnaissance group. Subsequently, it was learned that actually eight ships and five batteries were present. Such incomplete information could have caused disaster.


When the range to Wotje was about 24,000 yards, three large freighter type ships could be seen. The left-hand ship was clearly visible and was the normal target for the Northampton. The Salt Lake City control officer designated the right-hand auxiliary ship for his target.

At the commencement of the bombardment at 0715, 13 minutes after sunrise, the cruisers were in column on course 270°, with the Dunlap screening ahead and having under fire the Japanese patrol vessel. Thereafter, the Dunlap operated independently, sinking the patrol vessel, then searching to the westward for two submarines reported to be standing out of the lagoon, and finally following the cruisers on a northeasterly course, bombarding Wotje Island.

The Northampton opened fire with a full salvo. The control officer on the Salt Lake City had been ordered by his captain to follow the movements of the flagship in either single turret or full salvo fire. About 20 seconds later the Salt Lake City opened with a full salvo, slow fire. After the second salvo, it was observed that the Northampton was firing single-turret salvos, so the Salt Lake City control ordered single turret salvos, slow fire, to economize ammunition.

The targets for our cruisers for the next 55 minutes were cruisers in the lagoon. Target designations against the enemy ships in the harbor partially hidden by high spots of land, some getting underway, and all changing relative positions with his own ship's movement, proved a difficult problem for our control officers. Our air spotter had trouble attaining good spotting positions because of clouds and enemy antiaircraft fire. Rangefinders, due to their varying heights, had different views of the partially hidden ships. The problem of locating target designations was finally solved by giving the plane spotter the best possible description of the target in order to identify it.

An example of the difficulty that confronted Admiral Spruance's Task Group can be shown by relating what happened when an enemy ship was placed under fire at about 0753 by the Salt Lake City.

When one of the Salt Lake City's targets became hidden from view, fire was shifted to a ship of about 4,000 to 5,000 tons which was pouring black smoke from its funnel and obviously trying to escape from the lagoon. The enemy's speed was between 12 and 15 knots. It seemed that this vessel might be either a submarine tender or seaplane tender. Apparently she had three small deck guns which were being fired. In opening on this ship, the Salt Lake City crossed fire with the Northampton who at that


time was shooting at a target farther to the right, but this was believed best in order to prevent the ship's escape. The target maneuvered radically, seeking as often as possible to place an island of the atoll between our cruiser and herself. While behind an island she would often reverse her course. The plane spotter for the Salt Lake City was having difficulty with clouds, so that each time the ship again came into view there would be another rangekeeper set-up necessary. Each time the target got behind an island, fire was checked.

At about 0803, the Salt Lake City and the Northampton reversed course from 270° to 060°, and the target came into clear view. Also, by this time, the plane spotter had obtained good spotting position over the lagoon and sent in satisfactory information on the target maneuvers and spots. Control ordered full 10-gun salvos, but maintained slow fire. The gun range was 15,900 yards. The first salvo landed on in deflection and just over, the spot D 300, left 1 mil. The next was a perfect straddle. The next salvo was a similar straddle. The enemy ship was extremely fortunate to live through those two salvos. The plane observers later reported that it was unbelievable that she was still visible when the splashes cleared away. The next salvo landed 7 mils right but was not spotted. The next was another perfect straddle. The target commenced to go down by the bow; however, she then appeared to steady and hold her own, so the Salt Lake City control officer ordered, "Give her another good one." This fell slightly off to the right in deflection and control ordered, "One more and make it good." No spot was made when this final salvo landed, but the target was perfectly centered in the splashes. Just before this salvo hit, the target commenced to go down rapidly by the bow and when this salvo landed a great flash appeared in the superstructure just below the bridge. The final gun range was 13,850 yards. The target sank at 0812.

During this time return fire from shore batteries and some of the enemy auxiliaries was observed, but their shots landed short of our vessels.

At about 0810 the Northampton and the Salt Lake City shifted their fire to shore objectives on Wotje. The extent and perfection of the camouflage used by the Japanese on their shore installations made spotting from the ships very difficult. Gasoline tanks were painted green and were covered on top with sod. Other installations such as buildings were often painted to resemble sand dunes. Many of these buildings were discovered only because of the shadow they cast in the sunlight.


The distinct handicap under which a task force operates when there is no prior specific information known regarding objectives for bombardment can be shown by relating in some detail the account of the Salt Lake City's shelling of a group of aircraft installations.

A group of buildings, some of which appeared to be hangars, were observed some distance from the beach. Eight buildings, painted to resemble sand dunes, were counted by the spotter with no trouble. However, the director pointer and trainer, with lower powered optics than the spotter, could not pick up any of these buildings through their telescopes. To the right of these sand-colored buildings was a group of smaller buildings painted a deep green. Since the director pointer and trainer were able to see these green buildings, they were ordered to use the left group of the green buildings as a point of aim. An arbitrary spot of left 5 was put on the rangekeeper to cause the shots to fall in this aviation center. But, the rangekeeper operator was not notified that the target had been shifted, and the left 5 was applied to a left deflection accumulated spot remaining from the previous target, so the first salvo landed well to the left of the hangars. There was no observation on that salvo. Another was fired with the same set up and a rich orange flame leaped into the air from among the palm trees to the left of the aviation buildings. Then the error on the rangekeeper was corrected and the next salvo was a little off to the right and another heavy fire was observed to start. The control officer next ordered full 10-gun salvos. The first landed among the aviation buildings followed by another salvo close to the same place, and it is believed considerable damage was done. A spot of right 03 was given, and our shells landed among the green buildings that were being used as the point of aim. The gun range at this time was averaging 11,800 yards. Later reports from the aviators revealed that this salvo did immense damage to industrial plants.

The enemy opened fire at 0721, using guns on one of the ships in the atoll. It was not until 0842, however, that shore batteries began to be effective. At that time shells burst close to the Salt Lake City. The ship increased speed and turned away but shells from two guns, probably 5 inchers, burst just astern. At 0848, the Northampton was straddled but although the enemy continued firing for another hour, his efforts were ineffective.

U.S.S. Enterprise
Attack on the Marshall Islands


U.S.S. Chester
Bombardment of Taroa

At 0852 the flagship ordered "Cease Firing" and the planes from the Northampton and Salt Lake City were ordered to attack the remaining objectives with the two 100-pound bombs that each plane carried.

The task group withdrew and commenced recovering their aircraft at 0955. During recovery one plane from the Salt Lake City crashed into the side of the ship. The Dunlap rescued the pilot and his radio man uninjured and then sank the plane with machine gun and rifle fire.

Rendezvous was made with the Enterprise at 1230 and course of 070° was steered at a speed of 25 knots. At 1335 and again at 1535 the task group opened fire on enemy planes that were making an attack on the Enterprise.

This task force suffered no damage or casualties as a result of enemy action. The 5-inch No. 8 gun on the Salt Lake City was damaged by a shell bursting in the muzzle and a slight bulge was found in gun No. 6 when the 5-inch guns were bore-gauged on February 2d.

See chart opposite)

Four Chester planes were launched at 0600, two for spot and two for reconnaissance. Taroa Island was sighted at 0649, range 28,500 yards.

At 0659, two enemy dive bombers attacked, dropping their bombs well clear. Shore batteries fired at the Chester at 0710. Their location could not be discerned, but the splashes indicated 5- or 6-inch guns. Fighters from the Enterprise could be seen strafing the island.

At 0715, the Chester opened fire with the main battery, using the towers on the northwest corner of the island as the point of aim. No air spot was available as our spotters were under attack. Almost immediately a second attack by enemy dive bombers was made. After 0715 the shore batteries kept the Chester under scattered fire. Suddenly, when the point of aim was shifted to the shore batteries, the range dropped to 12,000 yards, well within the range of shore batteries. The group immediately turned away 30° to open range. Lack of topographical knowledge of the island had thus brought about a potentially dangerous situation. Five additional salvos were fired at the shore batteries apparently silencing one, while the ship was under air attack.

With the Chester still in range of the shore batteries and only two small auxiliaries visible in the lagoon, a left turn was ordered at 0731 to reverse the course. On the new course the main batteries resumed fire on the shore-line batteries, working north toward the hangar and airfields. The Balch was taking the center of the island under effective fire.


Nine minutes later eight twin-engined bombers were seen taking off from the island and a speedy retirement was now in order. Course was changed to 130° and then to 184°, speed was increased to all possible, and the main battery was ordered to cease fire and send personnel to assist the antiaircraft battery.

Until 0900 many dive-bombing and strafing attacks were made on the group, with the Chester being the principal target. The cruiser was able to avoid the bombs by changing courses until 0820 when one 134-pound bomb hit the well deck near the port catapult tower. The narrowest escape from serious damage or sinking came at 0841 when eight bombers dropped 500-pound bombs from 12,000 feet. These fell about 100 yards astern. Thereafter, air attacks slackened. Maximum speed was maintained, but no attempt was made to close the Enterprise since it was necessary to avoid indicating her direction to the enemy. At 1130 the Chester's four aircraft were recovered.

The following damage was inflicted by this task group:

  1. One plane destroyed in dog fight over the island, one probably destroyed by antiaircraft fire.
  2. Three shore batteries and one antiaircraft battery silenced.
  3. Three or four fires started, one probably an oil tank.
  4. Several buildings and one observation tower destroyed.
  5. One radio tower damaged.

Damage and losses sustained by this group:

  1. Casualties--8 killed, 2 seriously injured, 9 injured and 23 slightly injured.
  2. The bomb which hit the Chester, estimated to have weighed 134 pounds, made a hole 9 by 4 feet in the main deck and did much superficial damage to blower screens, ventilation trunks, catapult catwalk, deck stanchions, and practically all light bulkheads in the line of the blast. It also dished in the catapult foundation about 1 foot, seriously damaged the port motor whaleboat, and started a fire in the cork insulation of the exhaust duct from the forward engine room.

The enemy lacked aggressiveness and failed to press their attacks home. In most instances, the dives made against the Chester were at about a 45° angle. Release was high (about 4,000 feet) and recovery was made by an abrupt pull-out with a steep turn. The enemy reluctance to close in for


attack in the face of our (antiaircraft) fire resulted in erratic bombing. A few planes were seen to jettison their bombs at some distance from our ships. Only one determined dive was seen. The enemy came in at 70° or better. His plane pulled out at about a 1,000-foot altitude. This plane scored the only hit. The same plane had previously made a very steep dive that resulted in a near miss. He then pulled out, climbed rapidly, executed a split "S" and returned for his hit.

The enemy dive bombers used cloud concealment at about 8,000 feet altitude very effectively in making their approach.

On all attacks on the Chester's reconnaissance planes, the Japanese fighters maneuvered to gain position directly overhead. They executed a half roll and steep dive. In no instance did they close to effective range. Their pull-outs were high and abrupt, resulting in scattered and inaccurate fire.

Enterprise retirement.

Combat patrols were flown throughout the day, covering the retirement of the Enterprise. During the early afternoon, five twin-engined bombers (some persons who saw the attack insist a sixth plane peeled off from the formation and dropped bombs in the vicinity of the Salt Lake City) were intercepted by the combat patrol. The enemy approach was made from the starboard bow from a position angle of 25°. The planes broke through the clouds, in a glide attack of about 20°. The first range finder range, about 3 seconds after breaking through the clouds, was 3,500 yards, altitude 6,000 feet. The enemy bombs were dropped at about 3,000 to 4,000 feet and the planes passed over the Enterprise at about 1,500 feet after dropping. The planes simultaneously dropped three bombs each, of about 100 to 200 kilograms. The nearest bomb hit about 30 feet from the port side of the Enterprise and it was later found that there were about 13 holes in the gasoline line in the vicinity of this near hit. A great quantity of gasoline from the punctured fuel line sprayed out on the walkway, saturating the rubber mats which burnt like cellophane. One of the enemy bombers peeled off from the formation after passing over the ship and made an effort to either strafe the planes on deck or crash into them; the pilot was either killed or lost control of his plane due to the heavy machine-gun fire, and crashed onto the deck and over the side. His wings struck the tail of one of our planes, damaging it so severely that it was partially stripped and shoved overboard.


At about 1500 a twin-float seaplane was intercepted and the plane was disabled by machine-gun fire. The pilot of the enemy plane attempted to parachute, but crashed into the sea.

In the late afternoon two two-engined medium bombers were discovered making an attack at high altitude (14,000 feet) in level flight, speed 140 knots. These planes were originally sighted on the starboard quarter at a range of more than 50,000 yards. They were tracked all the way to the port quarter, range about 70,000 yards. They then made their approach from the sun and through large scattered clouds. At the time they were sighted coming in, the range finder was unable to get a range due to the smoke gasses. Fire was opened using the set-up obtained from tracking, the position angle when opening fire was about 45°, and slant range 6,500 yards. Two bombs, each weighing 500 pounds or more, were dropped from each plane simultaneously. One of the fighter patrol planes, which was close to the enemy, reported that our shots were short. A spot of Out 500 was applied, and a report was then received that Enterprise guns were on. A long trail of smoke was still visible when the plane disappeared into the clouds. The other enemy bomber was shot down in flames by our fighter plane patrol.

The performance of our ship's antiaircraft batteries, on the occasion of the first attack to which she was exposed, was expectedly erratic; nevertheless, the effectiveness was so negligible as to give rise to grave anxiety. In the case of the first attack on the Enterprise particularly, properly controlled antiaircraft fire should have taken a heavy toll of the attacking planes.

The combat patrol was landed at 1902. Sunset had been at 1845.

Summary of enemy damage.

Ships damaged or sunk:

  Wotje Four or five auxiliary or cargo vessels of 4,000-5,000 tons and three or four small "bird" class. (At 1130, only two ships were visible above water, one beached and badly damaged and the other damaged but still afloat.)
  Kwajalein Two SS sunk--500-pound bomb direct hits.
One large Yawata class--Three 500-pound bomb direct hits. One torpedo.


    One modern CA or CL--Two 500-pound direct hits. One torpedo hit. One possible torpedo hit.
Three large AO's--One had two 500-pound direct hits. Two had one 500-pound direct hits. One had two torpedo hits. One had one torpedo hit.
Two AK's--Damaged by near misses of 500-pound. One sufficiently damaged to require beaching. One torpedo hit.
One PG--Damaged and aground.

Shore installations destroyed or damaged:

  Wotje The entire installation was apparently destroyed. This includes two hangars, fuel oil tanks, gasoline stowage, warehouses, shops, and barracks. Two antiaircraft batteries and all coastal defense guns were silenced or abandoned.
  Taroa Two hangars destroyed, several buildings hit and afire in industrial area; both fuel tanks were ablaze. The radio station on Ollet Island destroyed.
  Roi Two hangars destroyed. Ammunition dump blown up and fuel fire left burning. Radio building demolished. All store and warehouses demolished by explosion resulting from bombing. Fire in town on island east of Roi.
  Kwajalein Large compound received three direct hits.
  Gugegwe Four buildings destroyed.

Enemy planes destroyed:

  Roi Three VF shot down. Six VSB destroyed on ground. One twin-engined bomber destroyed on ground.
  Kwajalein Two PSP (four-engined) destroyed on water.
  Wotje None.
  Taroa Seven VP shot down. Five scout bombers on ground. One twin-engined bomber destroyed on ground. One VP damaged in air.
  At sea Three twin-engined bombers shot down. One twin-float single engine monoplane shot down.


The above totals include 12 vessels and 35 planes confirmed losses. In addition it is considered that between 4 and 7 ships suffered damage of indeterminate degree, at least 2 of which (Wotje) were in a sinking condition, and that an indeterminate number of planes were destroyed or damaged in the hangars and dispersal parks adjacent to the fields at Roi and Taroa.

Summary of our losses.

Casualties to personnel:

  Plane squadrons Killed or missing: Six officers, includes take-off crash, and five enlisted men.
Wounded: Two officers and two enlisted men.
  Enterprise Killed: One enlisted man.
Wounded: One officer and five enlisted men.
  Chester Killed: One officer and seven enlisted men.
Wounded: One officer and 33 enlisted men.

Damage to ships:

  Chester This vessel was struck by a bomb in the well deck between frames 67 and 70 on the port side of the main deck about 14 feet inboard.
  Enterprise This vessel was hit by bomb fragments from a near miss on port quarter. Only superficial damage received although there was some damage to degaussing cable and a gasoline fire was started.

Planes lost or damaged:
    Lost Damaged
  Fighting squadron 0 7
  Torpedo squadron 0 3
  Bombing squadron 1* 11
  Scouting squadron 4* 12

* Shot down or missing.

In addition one fighter plane crashed on take-off and was lost. One scout bomber was damaged on deck. One Salt Lake City reconnaissance plane was damaged during recovery, and was abandoned and sunk.

U.S.S. Northampton and U.S.S. Salt Lake City
Bombardment of Wotje


U.S.S. Yorktown
Attack on Jaluit, Makin, and Mili

See chart opposite)

The Yorktown, Louisville, and St. Louis made their approach to the attack point between the Marshall and Gilbert Islands on course 270° true, speed 25.5 knots. The support force of four destroyers approached on the same course at a speed of 15 knots. This course was held until 0500 on February 1st and was then reversed. Seventeen minutes later the planes for the Jaluit attack were launched from position latitude 5°01' N., longitude 171°48' E., a point 140, 127, and 71 miles respectively from Jaluit, Makin, and Mili. The weather at the time of the launching was high overcast with a large dark bank of clouds and lightning in the direction of Jaluit. The moonlight showing through the clouds was sufficient to give a good horizon for take-off.

Attack on Jaluit Island.

The group consisted of 11 torpedo bombers and 17 scout bombers under the command of Comdr. Curtis S. Smiley, commander of the Yorktown air group. In order to give the scout bombers the maximum radius, it was necessary to use planes without leak-proof fuel tanks. This necessitated some exchange of planes between the scouting and bombing squadrons. The planes were spotted on the flight deck of the Yorktown in order of squadron tactical organization. The first plane in the Jaluit attack group in the spot and to be launched was flown by Lt. Comdr. Robert G. Armstrong. Because of the extremely bad weather the squadron became separated. Since an accurate and complete account of the ensuing events is not available, Lt. Comdr. Armstrong's experience is presented here as typical:

After making a normal run ahead of about 4 minutes, turning running, tail and formation lights on dim, he executed a wide sweeping turn to the right. A majority of the first division of the bombing squadron joined up in loose formation by the time he had completed the turn passing along the starboard side of the Yorktown on a course parallel. A large group of lights were seen at this time, ahead and to the starboard of the track of the ship. Lt. Comdr. Armstrong then made another easy turn to the right and when again alongside the Yorktown he had with him possibly 15 planes in loose formation which he believed to be the entire bombing squadron attack group. One or two additional easy turns were made on the starboard side of the ship to the right, while


awaiting an opportunity to join up with the torpedo squadron, which should have rendezvoused on the port side of the ship. He believed that during this time some planes from the torpedo squadron joined his squadron.

It was then about 10 minutes past the time for departure and, not having sighted the torpedo squadron, he crossed ahead of the Yorktown and made a wide sweeping turn to the left in hope of making contact. He took his formation well ahead of the port side before turning to a course opposite to that of the Yorktown. Lights were seen which were believed to belong to torpedo bombers. At about 0535, not having been able to complete a rendezvous, he took departure for Jaluit, but 5 minutes later, thinking that he saw lights astern which might have been a part or all of the torpedo squadron, he made a wide sweeping turn to the left in the hope of effecting a rendezvous. On completion of this turn, he again set out for the objective, believing that about 22 or 23 planes were in formation. These included a plane on his starboard bow which he later learned was the Yorktown Air Group Commander.

A speed of about 115 knots was maintained in order to conserve the fuel of the torpedo planes with him and those which might be astern, but out of sight. The relatively heavy clouds and the fact that the moon was nearly down made the morning very dark. The horizon was extremely indistinct and it was not possible to avoid or see all of the many thunderstorms in the area. Cruising altitude varied between 400 and 600 feet.

At 0627 Lt. Comdr. Armstrong believed he was near the south tip of Jaluit Atoll. The higher clouds were brightening with the dawn and he decided to climb above the thin overcast in order to avoid detection. He had been using the automatic pilot for about 50 miles, and he now increased the throttle and began to climb at about 300 feet per minute. His plane rose through the thin overcast and plunged immediately into a heavy thunderstorm. Nevertheless he maintained course and climbed for about 2 more minutes through the increasingly heavy rain until he saw two bright flashes which he thought was lightning. He then turned the pilot to descend at about 150 knots, breaking clear of the clouds at 700 feet 3 minutes later. With him were five other planes.

The south tip of Jaluit was sighted about a half mile distant on the starboard bow and a turn to the left away from the land was begun. The planes were then in a clear area about 3 miles wide, dawn having


broken while they were in the thunderstorm. Two large thunderstorms extended in a general northwest-southeast direction for a considerable distance. The leader called on the radio in an attempt to reassemble the group, notifying them he had sighted the south tip of Jaluit, their navigational objective.

He now climbed on a southeast direction for about 7 or 8 minutes. Course was then reversed in order to gain a position over the western part of the atoll, preparatory to commencing the attack. While at about 8,000 feet on this northwest heading, two additional planes were seen flying together about 4,000 feet below. Neither plane heard Lt. Comdr. Armstrong's call by radio, but they did follow astern while the attack was being made.

High winds, which were much stronger from the northeast than had been anticipated, and the clouds below delayed contact with the westward part of the atoll until 0700. Course was then set for the Jaluit anchorage, the bombing objective. Thunderstorms and heavy clouds covering most of the island caused considerable delay in reaching the anchorage and confusion as to the exact location of the harbor. The harbor was finally found with one large merchant or tender type vessel in the middle of the anchorage. The vessel was ablaze at the stern. Other small vessels of the fishing or patrol type were also anchored in the harbor. A clear picture of the scene could not be obtained because of the clouds.

The attack was initiated by the few planes in Lt. Comdr. Armstrong's section at 0725, diving from about 9,000 feet from south to north. He believes that his bomb missed on the port side of the stern of the vessel by about 100 feet. Complete fogging of the windshield and partial fogging of the telescope developed during the dive.

Recovery from the dive was made at high speed towards Kabbenbock Island, inboard of the channel mouth, with a view to strafing any antiaircraft installations which might be there. Approach was made within 1,000 feet at low altitude without seeing any activity. The course was, therefore, changed towards the tip of Enybor Island, which was supposed to have two landing fields. A clearing at the end of the island held a structure which resembled one of our normal dirigible hangars except it was not more than 200 feet in length. In the southwest part of the clearing, about 200 yards inshore, were four or five structures, that were not over 50 feet square and set on 50-foot stilts. In passing, Lt. Comdr.


Armstrong raked these structures with about 100 rounds of .50-caliber machine-gun fire.

He then continued along the atoll with his section in order to destroy seaplane facilities and aircraft on Emidji. At the seaplane base, three small buildings were encountered, presumably hangars, although much too small to hold four-engine patrol planes. Three small L-shaped breakwaters, projected about 50 yards into the lagoon in front of these buildings, and a number of what appeared to be gun emplacements were observed surrounding the buildings. During a fleeting glimpse of the area, Lt. Comdr. Armstrong saw neither guns, personnel, nor gunfire.

There was a small ship, probably 200 feet long, anchored approximately 500 yards off this seaplane base. About 200 rounds of .50-caliber ammunition was fired at this vessel. During his approach Lt. Comdr. Armstrong observed no activity on the vessel; however, he did see that his tracer bullets were passing through the vessel and richocheting from the water on the far side. His plane was about 50 feet off the water and within 200 feet of the vessel before he pulled up and over.

He continued on up the line of islands at about 100 feet altitude and observed nothing except occasional thatched huts among the palm trees. After passing to the north of Agidyen Island, he turned east, flew through a small rainstorm and circled, calling by radio his wing men to join him. When after about 5 minutes they did not join him, he proceeded southward to a point 10 miles east of the south point of the island and encountered a plane section proceeding towards the ship. He began his return to the Yorktown with his section at about 0740.

Six planes and the crews were lost from our Jaluit attack group, due to the adverse weather conditions encountered both en route to and in returning from the mission. Two planes are known to have been forced down. All planes had to bomb from about 1,000 feet because of the restricted visibility; as a result, they were probably subjected to antiaircraft fire.

The following message was received aboard the Yorktown at 0811 from Lt. Harlan T. Johnson:

"This is 5-T-7. 5-T-7 and 5-T-6 are landing at Jaluit. Are landing alongside one of the northwestern islands of Jaluit. That is all."


Several of the returning planes landed aboard the carrier with less than 2 gallons of gas remaining in their tanks.

The damage inflicted by our air group at Jaluit was as follows:

  1. One auxiliary vessel hit by bomb directly on stern and set on fire. This ship stopped immediately and dropped anchor. Later another direct hit was obtained by a torpedo plane dropping a two-bomb salvo. When last observed, the ship was burning fiercely. This vessel was strafed repeatedly.
  2. One auxiliary vessel suffered at least three near bomb hits and repeated strafing attacks. Only superficial damage can be assumed.
  3. One auxiliary vessel under way at sea was subjected to one bombing and strafing attack. The bomb missed; damage by strafing considered negligible.
  4. Other small craft in the harbor were strafed with undetermined results.
  5. Several bombs were dropped in the administrative building and barracks area near the mole on Jabor Island, causing extensive damage. This area was subjected to heavy strafing by .50-caliber and .30-caliber machine-gun fire.
  6. At least two bombs were dropped in the vicinity of Enybor Island land-plane facilities and the area strafed. Damage undetermined.
  7. The buildings indicated as seaplane facilities on Emidji Island were strafed. Damage undetermined.

Attack on Makin Island.

The launching of the Makin attack group was completed at 0544 at latitude 5°00' N., longitude 171°57' E. The group consisted of nine scout bombers, each plane armed with one 500-pound bomb. The island of Makin was sighted at 0630, under a large rain squall. The group, at this time, was flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet. Course was reversed and an altitude of 12,000 feet was gained before the group closed in on the island. Anchored in the harbor were one seaplane tender of about 8,000 tons and two 4-engined seaplanes. It was decided to attack the seaplane tender with all nine 500-pound bombs and then strafe the seaplanes. At 0658 the dive-bombing attack was made and it is believed that two direct hits were scored on the tender and all the other bombs fell within 100 feet. Seven minutes later the two 4-motored seaplanes


were set on fire and the remaining fixed ammunition expended on the tender. A few Japanese were hit in the forward part of the ship during the strafing attack. The tender returned some fire with a small caliber antiaircraft gun.

The only other item of military interest on Makin was a small barge tied up to the government pier. No shore batteries, antiaircraft or gun emplacements were observed.

At 0730 the squadron was rendezvoused and proceeded to the Yorktown, landing aboard at 0815.

One of the Makin planes made a forced landing in the water while circling the carrier during a severe storm. Personnel were recovered by one of the supporting destroyers.

Attack on Mili Atoll.

The five scout bombers composing the Mili attack group were launched at 0604 from position latitude 5°01' N., longitude 172°06' E., and picked up Mili Atoll 30 minutes later when at an altitude of 2,000 feet. The group then climbed to 12,000 feet, taking cover in a bank of clouds along the eastern edge of the Atoll. Absolutely no military targets were visible from this altitude so the group went down to reconnoiter and found only a large barn-shaped structure, probably a storehouse on the island west of Tokawa Island. A section of three planes were ordered to attack the storehouse at 0720 and the second section of two planes to withhold attack until a better target could be found. Due to the low ceiling no bomb hits were seen on the warehouse. After reconnoitering the western area of the atoll, the second section attacked another small warehouse and a storage tank (probably for water). The group rendezvoused over Knox Island and took departure for the Yorktown at 0810, landing aboard about 35 minutes later.

*   *   *

The cruiser Louisville lost one of her reconnaissance planes during the operation. This plane was launched at 0642 to act as an antisubmarine patrol within 5 miles of the carrier. At 1226 the Louisville began recalling the plane by radio, but received no reply.

*   *   *

The attack by Task Force FOX was apparently a complete surprise to the Japanese. No enemy surface units were encountered by the ships of this force. However, a four-engine patrol bomber attacked the sup-


porting destroyers. These had been sent astern with the hope of recovering planes from the Jaluit raid which were overdue. Later another, or possibly the same bomber was shot down by the fighter combat patrol close to the Yorktown.

This bomber was sighted coming out of low clouds at approximately 1,000 feet altitude. The plane, which was of the Kawanishi (French Potez) type, maintained a distance of about 15,000 yards from the carrier. Fire from the Yorktown was withheld in order not to interfere with our fighters making an attack. Presently, the enemy disappeared behind a cloud and two of our fighter planes were seen to follow him. Less than 4 minutes later the enemy plane fell out of the clouds and burned, giving off dense black smoke for about 5 minutes after striking the water. It is believed possible that this bomber was equipped with radar in view of his ability to locate our force in spite of the poor visibility.

It had been intended to return to make another raid on Jaluit the same afternoon. However, the planes were so badly overdue returning that a second raid probably would have necessitated night recovery in the heavy rainstorm then prevailing. The second attack was abandoned.

Later orders were received from Admiral Halsey directing this force to withdraw not later than the ensuing night. The ships then set out for Pearl Harbor, arriving on the 6th of February. Admiral Halsey had entered the day before.

*   *   *


Following this action Admiral Nimitz wrote the following letter to the Secretary of the Navy:
From: Commander In Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: The Secretary of the Navy.  
Subject: Report of action, Marshall-Gilbert Islands raids, by Task Forces "HOW" and "FOX".  

  1. The action in the Marshall-Gilbert Islands raids by our forces is considered to have been well conceived, well planned and brilliantly executed. It is noted that heavy rain interfered with the attack on Jaluit.

  2. The results obtained by both raids were the more noteworthy as the task forces were obliged to make their attack somewhat blindly due to lack of information. The little information that had been obtained was made available as a result of observations by our own submarines.This information, although fairly accurate


as to shipping, was rather meager regarding fortifications, aviation facilities and other defensive installations.
  1. An analysis of the gunnery performances was made after the return of the task forces. The actions against the land and surface objectives were generally excellent. The antiaircraft batteries did not provide satisfactory results. The causes of the poor performance of the antiaircraft battery were masked to some extent by the Mark 18 Mod. 0 and Mod. 1 fuzes. Other causes that contributed were: failure of information to reach battery personnel through faults within the ships, lack of fire discipline under diversified attack, and minor personnel errors associated with inexperience under fire. With the exception of the Mark 18 Mod. 0 and 1 mechanical time fuze and three apparently premature explosions of the Mark 13 MCBD fuze, the material stood the test most satisfactorily. Corrective measures have been instituted for all gunnery faults and failures determined.

  2. Our own losses were small considering the magnitude of the operations. For their excellent performance and execution of their mission, Vice Admiral Halsey was recommended for and awarded, by the President, the Distinguished Service Medal; and Comdr. Miles Browning, his Chief of Staff, was promoted to the temporary rank of captain. Commendations for other personnel participating in the raid and operations connected therewith are being handled in separate correspondence.

s/   C. W. NIMITZ.





Table of Contents * Next Chapter (2)


1 Composition of the Japanese Fourth Fleet: 4 light cruisers, 2 seaplane tenders, a converted seaplane tender, 8 destroyers, 2 submarine tenders, 9 submarines, a minelayer, 8 converted gun boats, 1 survey ship, 2 converted merchantmen.

2 Two cruisers.

3 Soryu, Hiryo, and Desdiv 23.

4 Numbers identifying task forces have been omitted from all Combat Narratives in the interests of security. Navy flag names for the first letter of surnames of commanding officers have been substituted.

5 Actually the axis of the main runway was found to be about 140°-320°, with a much shorter east-west runway at right angles to it and near the center of the island.

6 The ABC formation consists, basically, of three units, each of which may have one or more planes. Distances between units and altitudes of units depend upon circumstances encountered. When attacked from the air the units usually draw together, when under antiaircraft fire they separate. The B unit is particularly mobile, moving between A and C as conditions warrant.

Last updated: August 14, 2002

Transcribed and formatted by Jerry Holden for the HyperWar Foundation