Battle Experience: Battle of Leyte Gulf

Preface

This account is based on many and extensive sources. Necessarily there are conflicts in accounts as to the details of time and nature of events. All times indicated are zone minus nine. Every effort has been made to present the essential features of the Second battle of the PHILIPPINES Sea accurately with the information at hand.

Allied invasion of the PHILIPPINES forced the hand of the Japanese High Command. It was evidently decided to make an all-out effort to drive U.S. forces from the PHILIPPINES, even at the risk of a major action. The enemy's audacity was probably bolstered by exaggerated damage claims of Japanese aviators who managed to reach home from strikes on U.S. FORCES engaged in aerial attacks on OKINAWA, FORMOSA and LUZON (10-19 October 1944). The Japanese aviators reported an amazing victory, and Tokyo was quick to claim -- for the fifth or sixth time -- that the naval strength of the United States had been rendered puny. The Japanese may have been sincere in their belief, as it is often difficult if not impossible accurately to estimate damage to distant ships. For example, during the action off FORMOSA, a false impression was made on one of our Task Group Commanders who had seen a Japanese plane fall and make an apparent cloud cover of smoke on one of his distant ships, which caused him to inquire concerning the extent of the ship's damage and possible speed. The reply came back that this was a near miss, the ship had no damage, and could make full power.

These neutralization air attacks by Task Force 38 on Japanese airfields, and strikes against aircraft, surface craft and military installations commenced at dawn on 10 October 1944 on OKINAWA. This Task Force caught the Japanese completely off guard. No serious opposition was encountered and at dawn on 12 October the attack on FORMOSA was commenced. (See Photographic Section I). On October 12 and 13, successful strikes were carried out. Day and night fighters and own ships' anti-aircraft fire succeeded in preventing serious damage to our surface forces until the evening of October 13. The enemy's offensive effort attained respectable proportions on this evening in the form of air attacks on the task groups. Task Group 38.2, being on the northern flank, absorbed most of the effort and the USS Canberra was torpedoed, resulting in the flooding of both engine rooms. During the following evening, Houston was damaged by a similar attack. On 16 October, while under tow, the Houston received a second aircraft torpedo hit, but both ships reached ULITHI.

A series of naval engagements and, in terms of victory, ones which may turn out to be among the decisive battles of modern times, were won by our forces against a three-pronged attack by the Japanese in an attempt to land reinforcements on LEYTE Island and wipe out our covering forces. The various factors and steps in our success were brought about. Behind each there was a reason. It is particularly gratifying to see in these actions how each arm of our naval force -- the submarine, aircraft carrier, battleship, cruiser, destroyer, destroyer escort on down to the PT boats -- was coordinated and contributed magnificently in the defeat of the enemy. In these engagements our surface ships slugged it out with the enemy and our carrier-borne aircraft both intercepted and pursued enemy ships with conspicuous success. Our submarines detected, reported, and effectively attacked approaching and retreating enemy warships.

When Allied troops went ashore at LEYTE ("A" Day, 20 October 1944), reports now indicate that most Japanese heavy surface units were in the Southwest area, and that the carrier fleet was in the Empire. The enemy apparently had decided to join these forces in the Central PHILIPPINES at the earliest practicable moment. Maximum use was to be made of shore-based air.

the over-all picture is now fairly clear from sightings, photographs and information at hand. the entire group of Japanese heavy surface units arrived BRUNEI Bay (NW BORNEO) 21 October 1944 and fueled. Upon departing BRUNEI Bay, this combined force separated into two forces; namely, one force heading northeast detected west of PALAWAN Island, hereinafter called the Central Force, and the other force heading east detected in the SULU Sea, hereinafter called the Southern Force. The Central Force was composed of 5 BBs, 10 CA, 2 CLs

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and 11-12 DDs. This is the Force, minus casualties, which transited SAN BERNARDINO Strait on the night of 24-25 October and attacked our CVEs east of SAMAR.

The Southern Force was composed of 2 BBs, 2 CAs, 7 DDs and 2 possible CLs. This is the force which was engaged by Seventh Fleet units, covering force, in SURIGAO Strait in the very early morning of the 25th.

Evidently at approximately the same time as the Central and Southern Forces departed from BRUNEI Bay, a Northern Force (Carrier Force) sortied southward from the Empire. This force, in two groups, probably consisted of 1 CV, 3 CVLs, 2 XCV-BBs, 5 CAs-CLs, and 10 DDs. This is the force which was spotted for the first time on the evening of the 24th by planes of the Third Fleet, Supporting Force. The Central and Southern Forces had been under heavy aerial attacks by planes of TASK FORCE 38 and indications were that both Forces were heavily damaged, but this new Northern Force contact by two different reports constituted a fresh threat of undetermined strength. The Northern Force was engaged by planes, cruisers and destroyers of the Third fleet on the morning of the 25th.

Two track charts follow: (1) "Japanese Fleet Approaches, 22-24 October 1944", indicates that the ensuing engagements were to be timely, closely-coordinated attacks (page 4); (2) "Three-Pronged Battle of Philippines Sea, 25-26 October 1944:, shows general locations of the Battles of SURIGAO Strait, East of SAMAR (with retiring enemy units under air attack), and East of LUZON (page 5).

Composition of Forces

A. (Battle of Surigao Strait)

OWN FORCES
T.G. 77.2 (R. Ad. Oldendorf, OTC, in Louisville
Battle Line (R. Ad. Weyler in Mississippi)
(a) T.U. 77.2.1 (R. Ad. Weyler)
  Mississippi (F) (OBB)
  Maryland (OBB)
(b) T.U. 77.2.2
  Tennessee (OBB)
  California (OBB)
  Pennsylvania (OBB)
  DesDiv Xray (6 DDs)
Left Flank Force (R. Ad. Oldendorf)
  Louisville (F) (CA)
  Portland (CA)
  Minneapolis (CA)
  Denver (CL)
  Columbia (CL)
  DesRon 56 (9 DDs)
Right Flank Force (R. Ad. BERKEY)
  Phoenix (F) (CL)
  Boise (CL)
  HMAS Shropshire (CA)
  DesDiv 47 plus
     HMAS Arunta
(6 DDs)
ENEMY FORCES
(Probable)
Southern Force (V. Ad. Shapi Nishimura)
First Group:
  BatDiv 2  
  Fuso (BB)
  Yamashiro (BB)
  Mogami (CA-XCV)
DesDiv 4
  Michishio ? (DD)
  Yamagumo ? (DD)
  Asagumo ? (DD)
  Shigure ? (DD)
4 miles astern of above:
Second Group:
  Ashigara ? (CA)
  Kiso ? (CL)
  Kinu or Isuzu ? (CL)
  Unidentified (3-6 DDs)

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Japanese Fleet Approaches--October 22-24, 1944

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Three-Prong Battle of Philippines Sea
October 25-26, 1944

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Composition of Forces (Cont'd)

B. (Battle East of Samar)

OWN FORCES
T.G. 77.4 (R. Ad. T.L. Sprague)
Northernmost Station CarGrp (R. Ad. C.A.F. Sprague)
T.U. 77.4.3
T.U. 77.4.31 (R. Ad. C.A.F. Sprague)
  Fanshaw Bay (F) (CVE)
  St. Lo (CVE)
  Kalinin Bay (CVE)
  White Plains (CVE)
T.U. 77.4.32 (R. Ad. Ofstie)
  Kitkun Bay (F) (CVE)
  Gambier Bay (CVE)
T.U. 77.4.33 (Screen)
  3 DDs  
  4 DEs  
Central Station CarGrp (R. Ad. T.L. Sprague)
T.U. 77.4.1
T.U. 77.4.11 (R. Ad. T.L. Sprague)
  Sangamon (F) (CVE)
  Suwannee (CVE)
  Chenango (CVE)
  Santee (CVE)
T.U. 77.4.12 (R. Ad. G.R. Henderson)
  Saginaw Bay (F) (CVE)
  Petrof Bay (CVE)
T.U. 77.4.13 (Screen)
  3 DDs  
  5 DEs  
Southernmost Station CarGrp (R. Ad. Stump)
T.U. 77.4.2
T.U. 77.4.21 (R. Ad. Stump)
  Natoma Bay (F) (CVE)
  Manila Bay (CVE)
T.U. 77.4.22 (R. Ad. Sample)
  Marcus Island (F) (CVE)
  Kadashan Bay (CVE)
  Savo Island (CVE)
  Ommaney Bay (CVE)
T.U. 77.4.23 (Screen)
  3 DDs  
  5 DEs  
ENEMY FORCES
(Probable)
Central Force (CinC Second Fleet)
(Succeeded in passing SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT)
BatDiv 1
  Yamato (BB)
  Nagato (BB)
BatDiv 3
  Haruna (BB)
  Kongo (BB)
CruDiv 5
  Myoko (CA)
  Haguro (CA)
CruDiv 7
  Suzuya (CA)
  Chikuma (CA)
  Tone (CA)
  Noshiro or Yahagi (CL)
DesRons 2 and 10
  Unidentified (11 DDs)

Planes of TG 38.1 arrived over the retreating enemy at about 1330I/25 and delivered their first attack about 1400I/25.

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Composition of Forces (Cont'd)

C. (Battle East of Luzon)

OWN FORCES
ComTHIRD Fleet -- Ad. W.F. Halsey, Jr.
T.F. 38 (V. Ad. M.A. Mitscher in Lexington
T.G. 38.2 -- R. Ad. Bogan
  Intrepid (F) (CV)
  Cabot (CVL)
  Independence (CVL)
  Iowa (BB)
  New Jersey (FFF) (BB)
  Biloxi (CL)
  Vincennes (CL)
  Miami (CL)
  16 DDs  
25 Oct: Iowa, New Jersey, Biloxi, Vincennes, Miami, DesRon 52 (less 1) detached at 0240 I.
25 Oct: Iowa, New Jersey, Washington, Alabama, Massachusetts, South Dakota, Biloxi, Miami, Vincennes, DesRon 52 (less 1) joined 1055 I.
25 Oct: Iowa, New Jersey, Biloxi, Miami, Vincennes, DesRon 52 (less 1) detached 1600 I.
TG 38.3 -- R. Ad. Sherman
  Essex (F) (CV)
  Lexington (FF) (CV)
  Langley (CVL)
  Massachusetts (BB)
  South Dakota (BB)
  Santa Fe (CL)
  Mobile (CL)
  Reno (CL)
  10 DDs  
25 Oct: Massachusetts, South Dakota, Santa Fe, Mobile, 4 DDs detached 0240 I.
Santa Fe, Mobile, 8 DDs joined 1055 I.
T.G. 38.4 -- R. Ad. Davison
  Franklin (F) (CV)
  Enterprise (CV)
  San Jacinto (CVL)
  Belleau Wood (CVL)
  Washington (BB)
  Alabama (BB)
  New Orleans (CA)
  Wichita (CA)
25 Oct: Washington, Alabama, Wichita, New Orleans, 6 DDs detached 0240 I.
Wichita, New Orleans, 2 DDs joined 1055 I.
TF. 34 -- V. Ad. Lee
25 Oct: Formed at 0240 I.
  Washington (BB)
  Iowa (BB)
  New Jersey (BB)
  Massachusetts (BB)
  South Dakota (BB)
  Alabama (BB)
  Wichita (CA)
  New Orleans (CA)
  Santa Fe (CL)
  Mobile (CL)
  Biloxi (CL)
  Vincennes (CL)
  Miami (CL)
  18 DDs  
25 Oct: Dissolved at 1055 I.
T.G. 34.5 -- R. Ad. Badger
  Iowa (BB)
  New Jersey (BB)
  Biloxi (CL)
  Vincennes (CL)
  Miami (CL)
  8 DDs  
(Dissolved at 0700 I, 27 Oct.)
ENEMY FORCES
(Probable)
Northern Force
  Zuikaku (CV)
Cardiv 3
  Chitose (CVL)
  Chiyoda (CVL)
  Zuiho (CVL)
CarDiv 4
  Ise (XCV-BB)
  Hyuga (XCV-BB)
  Nachi ? (CA)
  Tama (CL)
  Kiso (CL)
  Abukuma (CL)
  Oyodo ? (CL)
  6-10 DDs  

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Results of Battle

OWN FORCES   ENEMY FORCES
Surigao Strait
Sunk   Damaged   Sunk   Damaged
None     1 DD - A.W. Grant   2 BBs -
 

1 CA -

5 DDs -

Fuso
Yamashiro

Mogami (XCVS)

Michishio
Shigure
   (or Nowake)
Yamagumo
Asagumo
(Unidentified)

  1 CA -

1 CL -

2 DDs -

Ashigara

Kinu (or Isuzu)

(Unidentified)

East of Samar
Sunk   Damaged   Sunk   Damaged
2 CVEs -
 

2 DDs -
 

1 DE -

Gambier Bay
St. Lo

Hoel
Johnston

Roberts

  6 CVEs -
 
 
 
 
 

1 DD -

1 DE -

Kalinin Bay
Fanshaw Bay
White Plains
Sangamon
Suwannee Santee

Heermann

Dennis

  3 CAs -
 
 

3 CAs
(by SS)
 
 

1 CL -
 

1 DD -

Suzuya
Chikuma
Kumano

Atago
Maya 10/23
Haguro 10/24
(or Myoko)

Noshiro 10/26
(or Yahagi)

Unidentified

  4 BBs -
 
 
 

4 CAs -
 
 
 

1 CL -

6 DDs -

Yamato
Musashi (sunk?)
Kongo
Nagato

Takao
Chokai
Tone
Aoba

Unidentified

Unidentified

East of Luzon
Sunk   Damaged   Sunk   Damaged
None     1 CV -

1 CVL -

Franklin

Belleau Wood

  1 CV -

3 CVLs -
 
 

1 CL -

2 DDs -

Zuikaku

Chitose
Chiyoda
Zuiho

Nagara (by SS)

Unidentified

  2 BBs -
 
 

1 CA -

3 CLs -
 
 

3 DDs -

Ise
(or Hyuga (XCV)
Unidentified (XCV)

Unidentified

Oyodo Unidentified (sunk?)
Unidentified (sunk?)

Unidentified

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Box Score

Japanese ships from all forces estimated sunk in the PHILIPPINES action 23-27 October 1944.

Ship   Action
BB Fuso   Sunk 10/25 in SURIGAO STS.
BB Yamashiro   Sunk 10/25 in SURIGAO STS.
CV Zuikaku   Sunk 10/25 east of LUZON
CVL Chitose   Sunk 10/25 east of LUZON
CVL Chiyoda   Sunk 10/25 east of LUZON
CVL Zuiho   Sunk 10/25 east of LUZON
CA Atago   Sunk 10/23 by Sub
CA Maya   Sunk 10/23 by Sub
CA Haguro   Sunk 10/24 in SIBUYAN SEA
CA Mogami   Sunk 10/25 in SURIGAO STS.
CA Suzuya   Sunk 10/25 east of SAMAR
CA Chikuma   Sunk 10/25 east of SAMAR
*CL Noshiro   Sunk 10/26 in SIBUYAN SEA
*CL Nagara   Sunk 10/25 by Sub
DD Michishio   Sunk 10/25 in SURIGAO STS.
DD Shigure or Nowake   Sunk 10/25 in SURIGAO STS.
DD Yamagumo   Sunk 10/25 in SURIGAO STS.
DD Asagumo   Sunk 10/25 in SURIGAO STS.

* Ships of the class are known to have been sunk, but the identification of the units is subject to question.

Time Table
23-27 October 1944

23 October
(Between 0630-0730)
  1. Enemy Central Force attacked by submarines off PALAWAN.
    (CAs Atago,: Maya sunk; Takao turned back.)

24 October
  1. Enemy Central Force, minus 3 CAs, entered SIBUYAN Sea, attacked by 3rd Fleet carrier-based aircraft.
    (Musashi (BB) damaged; Haguro (CA) sunk.)

  2. Heavy Enemy land-based air attack on 3rd Fleet.
    (USS Princeton (CVL) sunk.)

25 October
(Morning)
  1. At 0500 Enemy Southern Force met by 7th Fleet in SURIGAO STRAIT.
    (Eight enemy ships sunk.)

  2. At 0700 Enemy Central Force met by Light Forces of 7th Fleet, East of SAMAR ISLAND.
    (Two Enemy CAs sunk plus other damage. Our losses: 2 CVEs -- Gambier Bay and Saint Lo; 2 DDs -- Hoel, Johnston; 1 DE -- Roberts)

  3. Enemy Carrier Force (Northern Force) met by units of 3rd Fleet East of Luzon.
    (All enemy carriers (4) destroyed.)

25 October
(Afternoon and Evening)
  1. At 1300 Enemy Central Force under attack by 3rd Fleet aircraft East of SAMAR.
    (2 Enemy CAs sunk.)

    Late that night 3rd Fleet surface force sank crippled CL or DD in SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT.

  2. Late on 25th one of our subs sank a Natori Class Cruiser (possibly the Nagaro) of the Enemy Carrier Force (Northern Force) retiring towards empire.

26 and 27 October
  1. Retiring Enemy (Central Force) under air attack by 3rd Fleet aircraft, after passing through SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT and scattering. (Believed Noshiro (CL) and probably one CA destroyed.)

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Preliminary Events

Commander Task Force 77 (Covering Force) Reports:

1. Some discussion of conditions preliminary to the joining in action of major naval forces is deemed necessary in order that the action may be viewed in proper perspective. During the month of September, carrier-based aircraft of the Third Fleet had made extensive raids on main enemy airbases throughout the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, with the attacks concentrated on the group of airfields in the vicinity of MANILA, SAN FERNANDO, and LAOAG. These raids by the Third Fleet, under the command of Admiral HALSEY, were most effective in destroying large numbers of enemy aircraft. Starting about 10 October, and continuing through about 20 October, Third Fleet carrier forces delivered destructive and extensive raids on enemy airbases and shipping in the NORTHERN LUZON, FORMOSA, and LOOCHOO ISLAND [Ryukyu Islands] area. These Third Fleet raids, in addition to destroying large amounts of shipping, were effective in destroying large numbers of enemy aircraft and in drawing effective enemy aircraft strength away from the PHILIPPINE area and toward the FORMOSA area.

2. In the meantime, the Third and Seventh Amphibious Forces, covered by surface forces and carrier-based aircraft of the Seventh Fleet, moved north from NEW GUINEA bases to effect a landing on the island of LEYTE. The landing operations were initiated on 17 October when the outpost islands of SULUAN and HOMONHON were seized by a light amphibious group under the command of Rear Admiral STRUBLE, supported by a part of the CVEs and by battleships, cruisers, and destroyers of Task Group 77.2. Minesweeping was commenced immediately to clear the mine barrier thought to exist between DINAGAT ISLAND and HOMONHON ISLAND. The following day a landing was effected on DINAGAT ISLAND and the eastern entrance to LEYTE GULF was effectively secured. Minesweeping was continued and beach reconnaissance completed by underwater demolition teams by 19 October.

3. Early in the morning of 20 October, the amphibious forces moved through the swept channel between HOMONHON and DINAGAT ISLANDS and landed U.S. Army troops of the Tenth and twenty-fourth Corps in two beach areas -- one near TACLOBAN and one near DULAG -- under cover of heavy fire from our surface ships and air bombardment by aircraft from the CVEs of Task Group 77.4. The landings were made exactly on schedule at 1000 Item, 20 October, and progress ashore was satisfactory. Army troops ashore continued to advance for the next three days under strong air and surface ship support, making satisfactory progress against Japanese positions. By 20 October, the third Fleet, under Admiral HALSEY, had moved into supporting positions and his carrier Task Groups continued to bomb and strafe enemy bases in CENTRAL and SOUTHERN LUZON and the VISAYAS. There was no immediate enemy reaction, other than relatively light air attack, to our landing on the island of LEYTE. The enemy air attack, however, gradually increased in intensity despite continued bombardment of his air bases by our air forces.

4. In order that early warning might be had of the approach of any hostile naval forces, submarines had been stationed to guard BRUNEI BAY, BALABAC STRAIT, MINDORO STRAIT, VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE, and to the westward of LUZON off MANILA and northward thereof. Air search from MOROTAI ISLAND, extending from BALABAC STRAIT to VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE, were extended to a radius of 1000 miles, while carrier Task Forces of the Third Fleet and air searches by Central Pacific forces from PALAU and SAIPAN were depended upon to give early information of the approach of enemy forces east of the PHILIPPINES.

5. At 0200, I/23, a submarine reported a radar contact on three battleships southwestward of PALAWAN ISLAND on position latitude 08-20N, longitude 116-20E, course 040 degrees, speed 15 knots. At 0300, I/23, a submarine reported a force of 11 combat ships in position latitude 08-47N, longitude 116-37E on course 039, at speed of 15 knots. At 0340, I/23, the submarine Bream reported a force of at least two heavy cruisers and several destroyers in position latitude 14-05N, longitude 119-43E, speed 10 knots and on a course directed for the VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE, and reported one hit on an Aoba class heavy cruiser. At 0630, I/23, the submarine Darter in position latitude 09-24N, longitude 117-11E, reported 3 battleships, 4 CAs, and three other vessels, and also reported obtaining four torpedo hits in one Atago CA and damaging another Atago class CA. At 0700, I/23, the submarine Dace, in position latitude 9-29N, longitude 117-20E, reported a total of 11 ships, including 3 BB, 2 CA, one CV and many unidentified CA, CL, DD, and reported getting four hits in a Kongo class BB. It was later determined that the attack of these two submarines resulted in the sinking of the heavy cruisers Atago and Maya, and the damaging of the heavy cruiser Takao. The U.S.S. Darter, in the heat of pursuit, subsequently grounded on BOMBAY shoal and had to be abandoned.

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6. From the foregoing reports it was realized that large Japanese naval forces were on the move and it was estimated that the Northern Force could arrive at CORON BAY about 2000, I/23, and the large force moving northeast through the PALAWAN PASSAGE could arrive at CORON BAY about 0100, I/24. It was believed that the Japanese might refuel in the vicinity of CORON BAY, and it was now felt fairly certain that they would attempt an attack on our naval forces off LEYTE, probably through SOUTHERN SURIGAO STRAIT. At 2130, I/23, the submarine Angler in position latitude 13-00N, longitude 119-30E, reported 15 to 20 ships, including three probable battleships, on an easterly course at a speed of 18 knots.

7. Presumably based on these excellent submarine reports, Commander third Fleet directed three reinforced air searches to be made by his fast carrier groups on the early morning of the 24th; one to cover the MANILA, VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE, and SIBUYAN SEA areas; one to cover SOUTHERN VISAYAS and CENTRAL SULU SEA area. these searches were successful in locating large enemy forces, and at 0840, I/24, an enemy force reported to consist of 4 BB, 8 CA, and 13 DD was reported just south of MINDORO ISLAND, moving northeastward into the TABLAS STRAIT. At 0904, I/24, aircraft reported a force consisting of 2 BB, 1 CA, and 4 DD in position latitude 08-55N, longitude 121-50E, course northeast, speed 15 knots, and claimed four bomb hits on each of the battleships and rocket hits on the DDs. These two enemy forces will henceforth be referred to as the Central Force and the Southern Force.

8. The Southern Force was again reported by aircraft and attacked at 1000, I/24, in approximately the same position and on the same course as before (See Photographic Section II.) At 1155, I/24, a MOROTAI search plane in position latitude 09-30N, longitude 120-30E, reported 3 CA, 4 DD on course southeast, at speed 10 knots. The morning attacks on the enemy Southern Force had been delivered by the reinforced search group of aircraft of Task Group 38.4, which shortly after 1000, I/24, stated it was moving north to effect concentration with the remainder of Task Force 38, northeast of SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT, and would be out of range of the Southern Force.

9. As reported by Third Fleet aircraft, the enemy's Central Force continued to move northeastward through TABLAS STRAIT and at 1200, I/24, a total of 25-27 combatant ships of this force were reported north to TABLAS ISLAND moving on a general easterly course. Aircraft from Task Force 38 struck at this enemy force between 1430 and 1500I in a position in the SIBUYAN SEA about 30 miles north of SIBUYAN ISLAND. (See Photographic Section III.) The force was reported to consist of a total of 4 BB, 8 to 9 CA, 2 CL, and 12 or 13 DD. Aircraft reports indicated that the enemy force had been severely damaged and was badly disorganized. Nevertheless, aircraft at 1925, I/24, reported substantially this same force moving on a course of 120 degrees towards the northern tip of MASBATE ISLAND and again at 2030, I/24, aircraft reported the same enemy force just north of MASBATE ISLAND on an easterly course, evidently bound for SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT.

10. Commencing with first light and throughout the day of the 24th, enemy aircraft attacked our naval forces off LEYTE at steadily increasing intensity. By morning of the 24th, it was evident that we were faced with two large Japanese naval forces. One, the Central Force, moving eastward towards SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT, and the other, the Southern Force, moving northeastward towards the MINDANAO SEA, while a third force, henceforth referred to as the Northern Force, consisting of 2 CV, 1 CVL, 1 BB-XCVS, 3 BB-CA, 5 CA-CL, and 6 DD, was reported by aircraft at 1640, I/24, in position 18-10N, 125-30E, course southwest, speed 15 knots.

11. By early afternoon of the 24th, it was felt definitely that the enemy intended to attack our naval forces covering the landing at LEYTE ISLAND, and disposition were made accordingly. Thirty PT boats in ten groups of three each were stationed as reconnaissance and attack groups as follows: three groups between SOUTHEAST BOHOL and CAMIGUIN ISLAND, and SIPACA POINT on MINDANAO. The remainder covered the southern entrance to SURIGAO STRAIT and JINATUAN PASSAGE, and the passage between MINDANAO and SOUTHERN DINAGAT ISLAND, with orders to remain south of latitude 10-10N and to report and attack enemy forces sighted. Task Group 77.2, under Rear Admiral OLDENDORF, consisting of 6 OBB, 4 CA, 4 CL, and 24 DD, took up initial station in latitude 10-34N, longitude 125-19E, in a position to guard both the southern and eastern entrances of LEYTE GULF, with orders to attack and destroy any enemy forces attempting to enter the gulf. The carriers of Task Group 77.4 with their escorts were disposed about fifty miles to the eastward of HOMONHON ISLAND in three Task Units within mutually supporting distance and from north to south as follows: 77.4.3; 77.4.1; 77.4.2.

12. In addition to these forces, destroyer pickets were stationed in the southern and eastern entrances to SURIGAO STRAITS to give early warning of enemy approaches. A late afternoon air search to the westward in the MINDANAO SEA to a

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distance of about 100 miles from the southern entrance of SURIGAO STRAIT failed to disclose the presence of enemy forces. Searches by night Catalina over the MINDANAO SEA were not productive of reports of enemy sightings. Commander Task Group 73.7 (the Black Cats) was also ordered to conduct a night search to the northward of LEYTE GULF and eastward of SAMAR. Commander Task Group 77.4 was directed to run a search at daybreak for enemy surface ships to the northward covering sector 340 degrees to 030 degrees for distance of 135 miles, point of origin SULUAN ISLAND.

 

Commander THIRD Fleet (Supporting Force) reports in part:

1. On 23 October 1944, from the multiplicity of sighting reports it was evident that the landings on LEYTE had provoked a violent reaction, and that the enemy was preparing to make a major stand of some sort in the PHILIPPINES. The enemy intent was not clear, but his reported naval movements on the 23rd definitely constituted an immediate threat. Commander Third Fleet decided to initiate carrier searches to obtain earliest information of any enemy movement toward LEYTE.

2. After nearly two weeks of intensive operations against OKINAWA, FORMOSA and LUZON, all of the carrier groups needed re-arming except for torpedoes and for the AP and SAP bombs habitually reserved for use against combatant ships. One group, Task Group 38.1, had been started toward ULITHI on 23 October; task groups 38.2, 38.3 and 38.4 were immediately available.

3. On the night of 23-24 October, Task Groups 38.2, 38.3 and 38.4 were moved in close to the PHILIPPINE coast preliminary to launching searches. Task Group 38.3 was placed east of POLILLLO ISLAND to cover the west coast of LUZON; Task Group 38.2 was placed close to SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS; and Task Group 38.4 was sent to the vicinity of SURIGAO STRAITS.

4. At dawn 24 October, search teams each consisting of Hellcats and Helldivers, were launched to cover the west coast of LUZON and the SULU SEA and its approaches. The weather was favorable for search and strike operations. At 0846 (24th) Task Group 38.1 was ordered to put about and proceed toward a fueling rendezvous with Task Units 30.8.4 and 30.8.8 in latitude 15N, longitude 130E at 0700 (25th).

5. At 0810 (24th), search planes from Task Group 38.2 sighted the Center Force in latitude 12-14N, longitude 121-32E on course 015, speed 18. This force was in 2 groups. The composition of the first group was reported as 2 BBs, 3 or 4 CAs or CLs, and 6 DDs. The second group was reported to contain 2 BBs, 3 or 4 CAs or CLs and 7 DDs. The Commander Third Fleet intercepted the search plane report on VHF search frequency, and at 0822 originated an urgent despatch to CTF 38, CTG 38.3 and CTF 38.4 and the usual information addressees, giving the contact, composition, course and speed. This was followed at 0827 by urgent despatch instructing Task Group 38.3 and Task Group 38.4 to concentrate toward Task Group 38.2 at best speed and to strike this force.

6. At 0905 (24th), the Task Group 38.4 search intercepted and attacked a force of 2 BBs, 1 CA, 4 DDs at latitude 08-55N, longitude 121-50E, southwest of NEGROS. The search team reported two bomb hits in each BB, rocket hits on CA and 2 DDs, and heavy strafing of 2 other DDs. It was decided to adhere to the decision to have Task Group 38.4 close Task Group 38.2 and to shift target to the Center Force on the assumption that SEVENTH Fleet forces could take care of the smaller Southern Force.

7. Analysis subsequent to the operation indicates that the Center Force contained 5 BBs, 7 CAs, 1 CL and 13 DDs. Reports of 2 to 3 additional CLs cannot be reconciled.

8. The enemy reacted by launching a vicious air attack against Task Group 38.3. Prior to the enemy attack, our forces shot down 40 planes. About 100 planes were shot down around task group 38.3, but the Princeton was hit hard. Task Group 38.3 was delayed in complying with the order to concentrate by recovery of search and attack groups and by efforts to assist the Princeton. Birmingham, Morrison, and Irwin, while assisting Princeton, were badly damaged when the Princeton's after magazines blew up. Later in the day, in order to be free to move toward the enemy Northern Force, Princeton was sunk (See Photographic Section IV.), and Birmingham, Morrison, Gatling and Irwin were sent to ULITHI for repairs and for hospitalization of the wounded.

9. At this time it was evident that the Japanese navy was making a major effort, whether for direct attack or transporting troops, or both, was not apparent. If this was to be an all-out attack by the Japanese fleet, there was one piece missing in the puzzle--the carriers. They were believed to have been in the Empire; and there had been sightings which indicated that replenishment measures might have been taken for some important movement from Empire waters. Although our submarines stationed in Empire waters had not reported a carrier force, it was felt that they were sure to be employed in some manner in any operation as great as that revealed on the morning of the 24th. Consequently, a search to the north by our carrier planes was ordered, and at 1640 (Item) a search plane from Task Group 38.3 reported a force at latitude 18-10N, longitude 125-30E, course 210, speed 15, (the Northern Force).

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10. Amplifying reports of this Northern force varied. CTF 38 listed the force as 3 CVs, 3 to 4 CA and 6 DDs at latitude 18-10N longitude 125-20E, course 210, speed 15, and stated that one of the enemy carriers was an Ise class. Later CTF 38 reported that pilots who had had a good look reported 2 Shokaku CVs, 1 CVL, 3 CLs and 3 DDs on course 270, speed 15 at latitude 18-25N, longitude 125-28E at 1640 Item, while at latitude 18-10N, longitude 125-30E were 4 BBs or CAs, 5 cruisers, 6 DDs on course 210, speed 15 at 1540 (Item). One of the BBs was reported to have a flight deck aft. At 1600 (Item) 2 DDs were reported by a carrier search plane at latitude 19-40N, longitude 123-00E, course 240, speed 12. Commander Third Fleet concluded that the Northern Force was disposed in two groups, estimated to contain a total of at least 17 ships and possibly as many as 24 ships.

11. A curious point was apparent from the contact reports of the three forces: They were all proceeding at deliberate speed and it was inferred that there was a pre-determined focus of geographical location and time. The movements indicated that a carefully worked-out coordinated Japanese plan was in motion, with 25 October as the earliest date of concerted action.

12. Throughout the day (24th) carrier strikes had been launched against the Center Force and all reports indicated that the Center Force was being effective and heavily damaged. (See Photographic Section III.) In the face of these continued strikes the Center Force kept coming with a determination that commanded respect. By dusk the following damage had been reported: at least 4 and probably 5 DDs torpedoed and bombed, 1 probably sunk; a minimum of 3 CAs torpedoed, and other bombed; 1 CL sunk; 1 DD sunk; 1 DD probably sunk, and 4 damaged.

13. Task Group 38.2 made a total of 146 sorties, dropped 23 tons of bombs and 23 torpedoes, reporting the BB Yamato damaged by 3 torpedo hits; another Yamato BB (possibly same one) damaged by 1 torpedo hit and 2 bombs; 1 Nagato BB hit by torpedo and 1 bomb; 1 Kongo BB hit by 2 torpedoes and 6 bombs; 1 CA, Mogami, possibly sunk by torpedo hit; 1 CA, Nachi, hit by 1 torpedo; 1 CA, Tone, hit by 1 torpedo. Task Group 38.3 reported 1 BB badly hit, 2 others damaged, and 4 CAs and [?] CLs damaged in the Center Force. Task Group 38.4 reported 1 BB (Musashi ?) hit by torpedo, on fire, down at the bow and probably sunk; 1 Yamato BB, 1 to 3 torpedoes, 2 bomb hits; 1 Kongo BB, 1 bomb hit; 1 cruiser damaged; 1 CL sunk; 1 DD sunk; 1 DD probably sunk; 4 DDs damaged. Some details of the foregoing information were not available at dusk but flash reports indicated beyond a doubt, that the Center Force had been badly mauled with all of its BBs and most of its CAs tremendously reduced in fighting power and life.

14. Although the Center Force continued to move forward, the Commander THIRD Fleet decided that this enemy force must be blindly obeying an Imperial command to do or die, but with battle efficiency greatly impaired by torpedo hits, bomb hits, topside damage, fires, and casualties. From long experience with the Japanese, their blind adherence to plan, and their inability to readjust disturbed plans, the Commander THIRD Fleet had long ago adopted a policy of attacking first. The Southern and Center Forces had been under heavy and persistent air attacks while proceeding through inland waters in daylight. Japanese doggedness was admitted, and Commander THIRD Fleet recognized the possibility that the Center Force might plod through SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS and on to attack LEYTE forces a la GUADALCANAL. The Commander THIRD Fleet was convinced that the Center Force was so heavily damaged that it could not win a decision, while the possible maximum strength of the Northern Force, as reported by CTF 38, constituted a fresh and powerful threat. It was decided that earliest possible attack on the powerful Northern (Carrier) Force was essential for breaking up the enemy plan and retaining the initiative.

15. The alternatives were to:

  1. Divide the forces, leaving TF 34 to block SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS while the carriers, with light screens, attacked the Northern Force;

  2. Maintain integrity of our own entire striking strength concentrated off SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS;

  3. Strike the Northern Force with all of our own striking strength concentrated.

(a) was rejected; the potential strength of the undamaged Northern Force was too great to leave unmolested, and requiring TF 34 to engage the Center Force while at the same time exposed to attack by land-based and possibly carrier-based air attack was not sound. This alternative spread our strength and risked unprofitable damage in detail.

(b) was rejected because it permitted the Northern Force to function as planned unmolested, and because destruction of Japanese carrier forces would mean much to future operations.

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(c) was adopted; it maintained the integrity of the BLUE striking fleet; it afforded best possibility of surprise and destruction of enemy carrier force. It was particularly sound and necessary if the strength of the Northern Force proved to be the maximum reported. It was recognized that the Center Force might sortie and inflict some damage, but its fighting power was considered too seriously impaired to win a decision. Finally, it was calculated that THIRD Fleet forces could return in time to reverse any advantage that the Center Force might gain and Commander third Fleet was firmly convinced that (c) would contribute most to the over-all PHILIPPINES campaign even if a temporarily tight situation existed at LEYTE.

16. It was a hard decision to make, and having made it, Commander THIRD Fleet was gravely concerned until he received word that the Center Force had given up in the face of the valiant efforts of the SEVENTH Fleet CVE Groups.

17. At 2022 (24th) Task Groups 38.2, 38.3 and 38.4 were given orders to assemble and make night run toward Northern Force preparatory to dawn attack. The Japanese know how to shuttle from carrier-to-target-to-airfield and all of Commander THIRD Fleet plans had for weeks been predicated on denying the enemy that advantage by closing promptly.

18. At 2030 and 2145 (24th) the Center Force was snooped by an Independence VF(N) north of MASBATE on various course and trailing much oil.

19. During the run north care was taken not to over-run the daylight circle of the Northern Force, as to do so would place the Northern Force between Task Force 38 and LEYTE. By daylight, Task Force 34 was formed up ahead of the carrier groups to provide for coordinated air and surface attack on the Northern Force.

20. Dawn searches were launched and strike groups put in the air ready to hit as soon as contact was made. The Northern Force was located in latitude 18-37N, longitude 126-45E at 0730 (Item) on course 180, speed 20, and the first strikes proceeded at once.

Plans

BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT

CTG 77.2 comments:

For a number of days prior to the SURIGAO STRAIT action many reports had been received concerning the movements of Japanese surface forces. It was understood that the Japanese were putting into effect a plan for the relief of the PHILIPPINES and that enemy surface forces were probably about to attack our forces in LEYTE GULF. Mindful of the Japanese activities in the VISAYAN AREA, Commander Task Group 77.2 had decided on 24 October that it would be wise to take precautionary dispositions in the vicinity of LEYTE GULF with particular emphasis on SURIGAO STRAIT, south, and had issued a directive to his forces directing them to take stations with light forces initially located on an east-west line four miles east of TAYTAY POINT, on course east, speed 5 knots, and with heavy forces plus destroyer screen located to the northwestward in Area DRUM south of latitude 10°-46'N. This was equivalent to a battle disposition of the A-1 type (see USF-10A). The directive for Task Group 77.2 to remain in area south of latitude 10°-46'N. Had come originally from Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, who had evidently clearly visualized the enemy capabilities.

Large enemy forces had been reported and bombed in the SIBUYAN SEA by THIRD Fleet on 24 October in late afternoon, and large enemy forces had been reported and bombed by Task Group 38.4 in the SULU SEA southwest of NEGROS the same day. It was apparent that either of these forces could, if it so desired, reach LEYTE GULF by early the next morning.

At 1513 on 24 October, Commander Task Group 77.2 received the following orders from Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN:

BE READY FOR NIGHT BATTLE. JAP FORCE ESTIMATED 2 BB, 4 CA, 4 CL, 10 DD REPORTED TO BE UNDER ATTACK IN EASTERN SULU SEA BY OUR CARRIER PLANES ON 24 OCT. JAPS ABLE TO ARRIVE LEYTE GULF TONIGHT. MAKE ALL READY FOR NIGHT BATTLE. CTG 77.2 REINFORCE BY TG 77.3. PTs IN MAXIMUM NUMBER FROM CTG 70.1 TO BE STATIONED LOWER SURIGAO STRAIT AND STAY SOUTH OF 10-10 NORTH DURING DARKNESS.

These orders were supplemented by a later message:

PRIOR TO DARKNESS PLACE BOATS IN SECTIONS OF 2 or 3 BOATS EACH AS FOLLOWS: PANAON - SW TIP. SOUTH OF MADILAO POINT. SOUTH OF LIMASAWA ISLAND. 2 OF THE SECTIONS WILL PATROL BETWEEN AGIO POINT BOHOL PAST CAMIGUIN ISLAND TO SEPAO POINT MINDANAO. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EACH SECTION LEADER REPORTS CONTACTS. Wachapreague AND OTHER SECTION LEADERS MUST RELAY THESE REPORTS TO CODLIVER. FROM OYSTER BAY, 21 BOATS PLACED AS FOLLOWS: PANAON ISLAND - SE TIP. BELAA POINT MINDANAO. 6 SECTIONS IN SURIGAO STRAIT. ONE SECTION OFF SUMINON ISLAND. ONE MEDCHART OFF KANHATIC POINT DINAGAT ISLAND. 2

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OFF KANIHAAN ISLAND. ONE SE AMAGUSAN POINT. Wachapreague WILL INFORM LCI-S LAST STATION. AFTER MAKING REPORT OF CONTACT, SECTIONS WILL ATTACK INDEPENDENTLY.

When the above message was received, the concept of the Battle Plan had already been formulated by CTG 77.2, and it was therefore speedily drawn up and issued as follows:

General Situation. Jap air and surface forces appear to be gathering westward in VISAYAS for offensive strike on area of LEYTE. Air attacks have been made all day on our surface forces in LEYTE GULF. Enemy striking group of at least 2 BB, 4 CA, 4 CL, 10 DD may attack tonight after 1900.

General Plan. Our force will attack by torpedo and destroy by gunfire at moderate ranges Japan surface forces trying to enter LEYTE GULF thru SURIGAO STRAIT East or South.

Battleline. Rear Adm. WEYLER Bat Div 3 less New Mexico, Idaho 4 less Colorado, 2 plus DDs as named repel or destroy Jap battleline by gunfire, fast closing to moderate range of from 17,000-20,000 yards. CruDivs 4 less Indianapolis plus Minneapolis, 12 less Cleveland and Montpelier plus DDs as named -- left flank forces -- defend left flank of own battleline. Strike battleline of enemy, Rear Adm. BERKEY CruDiv 15 less Nashville, Shropshire (R.N. Cruiser), DesDiv 47 -- Right Flank Force -- defend right flank of own battleline. Attack battleline of enemy. X-ray battle disposition used like A-2 in USG-10A. (See page 78-16). BBs in first station Lat 30-35 (E. of HUNTUNGAN POINT) Longitude 125-16E and steaming at 5 knots in easterly direction. BBs should turn at Longitude 125-27E and, unless otherwise directed, operate within these limits of longitude with DD screen as needed. Stations on battleline will be kept by flank forces. Before battleline engagement, torpedoes may be fired.

Be on the lookout for enemy torpedoes, remembering possibility of going thru Jap torpedo waters before attack. Primary voice designated channel A to be used -- 3845 kilocycles. As secondary voice designated channel B use 3980 kilocycles. For CW communications use 575 kilocycles. Use -9 time. CTG 77.2 with left flank force in Louisville.

It will be noted that this plan covered possible entrance not only to SURIGAO STRAIT, south, but also to SURIGAO STRAIT, east. This was because it was felt by Commander Task Group 77.2 that the latter was almost as probable as the former and that if the enemy was willing to hazard his forces in action in SURIGAO STRAIT, south, he would be just as willing to hazard his forces in SURIGAO STRAIT, East. How accurate this forecast was has been proven by events!

So soon as his plan had been formulated, Commander Task Group 77.2 called a conference of the Commander of the Right Flank Forces, Rear Admiral R.S. BERKEY, U.S. Navy, and the Commander of the Battleline, Rear Admiral G.L. WEYLER, U.S. Navy, to discuss the plan in detail.

THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PERSONAL
CONFERENCES AND FREE DISCUSSIONS.

It was pointed out that the amount of A.P. ammunition in all battleships was low and that there was likewise a shortage of ammunition of all types throughout the force. It was therefore essential that the battleships fire at ranges where their percentage of hits and their fire effect would both be high. This was settled on as between 17,000 and 20,000 yards. Likewise, it was pointed out that it appeared as if a wonderful opportunity for using the torpedoes in the offensive role for which they had been designed would be presented, and it was emphasized that each such opportunity would be immediately acted upon. The necessity for the destroyers keeping to the sides of the straits in attacking and in retiring was stressed because it was thought that the enemy radar would probably be ineffective against the land, and because it was feared that any of our destroyer units retiring towards own battleline might be fired on by our own forces. This in fact occurred. Both Admirals were very enthusiastic about the plans and were thoroughly indoctrinated as to the Commander's policies. There can be no doubt but that such conferences are often vital to the success of any operation and should be held before any important action whenever practicable.

 

BATTLE EAST OF SAMAR

Commander Task Group 74.4 (was also CTU 74.4.3) comments:

1. When the enemy attack by his southern force through SURIGAO STRAITS developed, the question of the whereabouts of the enemy northern component (Center Force) became even larger and more formidable. This unit had never been assigned

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Type "A" Battle Disposition for Small Task Forces
A-2
Light Forces Equally Divided


Figure 8.

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any responsibility for covering the exit of SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS, either by reconnaissance or by force, and in the absence of any information that this exit was no longer blocked, it was logical to assume that our northern flank could not be exposed without ample warning.

2. Had this T.U. had any reason to suspect that an enemy sortie could be made through SAN BERNARDINO Straits undetected by other U.S. forces, a search to the northwest would have been launched from a more easterly position, and it is probable that a direct surface action could have been avoided.

 

BATTLE EAST OF LUZON.

Under PRELIMINARY EVENTS it was pointed out that Commander THIRD Fleet had decided to adopt the third alternative, (c); namely, "Strike the Northern Force with all of our own striking strength concentrated." Also, repeating, this PLAN or alternative was adopted because it maintained the integrity of the BLUE striking fleet, and it offered best possibility of surprise and destruction of enemy carrier force. it was particularly sound and necessary if the strength of the Northern Force proved to be the maximum reported. It was recognized that the Center Force might sortie and inflict some damage, but its fighting power was considered too seriously impaired to win a decision. Finally, it was calculated that the THIRD Fleet Forces could return in time to reverse any advantage that the Center Force might gain and Commander THIRD Fleet was firmly convinced that (c) would contribute most to the overall PHILIPPINES campaign even if a temporarily tight situation existed at LEYTE.

it was a hard decision to make, and having made it, Commander THIRD Fleet was gravely concerned until he received word that the Center Force had given up in the face of the valiant efforts of the SEVENTH Fleet CVE groups.

At 2022 Task Groups 38.2, 38.3 and 38.4 were given orders to assemble and make night run toward Northern Force preparatory to dawn attack. The Jap knows how to shuttle from carrier-to-target-to-airfield and all of Commander THIRD Fleet plans had for weeks been predicated on denying the enemy that advantage by closing promptly.

Narrative

Battle of Surigao Strait

Commander Task Force 77 summarizes briefly:

1. About 0030I/25 PT boats between BOHOL and CAMIGUIN sighted, reported, and delivered an attack against a fast approaching enemy force on a course for SURIGAO STRAIT. At 0123I/25 PT boats at the southern entrance to SURIGAO STRAIT reported strong enemy forces moving north at high speed in two groups (see page 78-18), the first group consisting of 6 to 8 ships including several heavy units, and a second group about four miles astern of the first group and composed of about 8 ships. As the enemy moved north, PTs drove into the attack, but, so far as can be determined, without effecting any material damage. Our Surface forces closed the enemy to form a semi-circle around the northern end of the strait -- battleships in the center, cruisers and destroyers equally divided on each flank.

2. The action was opened at 0305I/25 by a destroyer torpedo attack delivered by picket destroyers, and torpedo attacks from both east and west against the enemy heavy ships by our destroyer attack groups. This was an excellently executed night torpedo attack by sections of three destroyers each. The torpedoes were seen to hit, the enemy column was slowed and many explosions noted. The destroyer attack was completed about 0400I/25 and at 0405I/25 our PT's and cruisers on easterly courses opened fire simultaneously at range of sixteen to seventeen thousand yards. By 0445I/25 the remaining enemy had turned away and was in flight, hotly pursued by our surface forces. A few of his units were successful in escaping westward through southern SURIGAO STRAIT. (See page 78-19).

3. from the best information presently available, it is believed that the enemy's southern force which moved into SURIGAO STRAIT, commanded by Vice Admiral Shapi Nishimura, was organized as follows:

First Group -- Batdiv 2  
  Fuso, Yamashiro
Mogami
2 BB
1 CA-XCVS
  Desdiv 4  
  Michishio, Yamagumo
Asagumo, Shigure
4 DD
About four miles astern of the above:

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SEQUENCE OF CONTACTS AND REPORTS OF
ENEMY SHIPS ATTEMPTING ENTRY OF LEYTE
GULF NIGHT OF 24-25 Oct. 1944

[78-18]

TRACK CHART
of
NIGHT ACTION
SURIGAO STRAIT
Night of Oct. 24-25, 1944

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Second Group -    
  Ashigara
Kiso, Kinu or Isuzu
Unidentified
1 CA
2 CL
6 DD

4. Of the first group, only the damaged Mogami is thought to have escaped the early morning action. In this action also the Ashigara (CA) and two DDs of the second group were damaged, and the damaged Ashigara was probably sunk by aircraft of Task Unit 77.4.2 south of PANAON Island about 0857I/25, while between 0750 and 0841 the damaged Mogami and several destroyers were further damaged by air attack at the entrance to SOGOD Bay.

 

As experienced by Cruiser of Left Flank (CO Denver reports):

1. A Japanese force, believed composed of 2 BB's, 2 CA's, 2 CL's and 10 DD's, was engaged and decisively defeated in SURIGAO STRAIT in the early morning of 25 October by a Task Group under the tactical command of Rear Admiral J.B. Oldendorf, U.S. Navy, this ship being a unit under Rear Admiral R.W. Hayler in the left flank forces of the above Task Group. Vice Admiral T. C. Kincaid commanded the force.

2. Submarine and plane sightings throughout the 23rd and 24th showed the enemy to be concentrating in the MINDORO area for what could only mean an attempt in strength to destroy our fleet units protecting LEYTE Gulf and thus cut off and annihilate our land forces on LEYTE and nearby islands.

3. Soon after 0100 on the 25th, contacts from PT boats stationed at the southern entrance reported sightings of several ships entering the straits from the southwest between CAMIGUIN and BOHOL Islands.

4. As the enemy ships, disposed in two columns, one leading the other by about 4 miles, proceeded north, attacks were made by our PT boats and picket destroyers with several torpedo hits claimed. Many amplifying reports were made by these ships to the O.T.C. During the three hours which intervened between their first contact and the time of commencing gunfire by Admiral Oldendorf's forces deployed at the north end of the strait.

5. Tactically the situation could hardly have been more unfavorable for the enemy. He ran a gauntlet of our PT boats and destroyers in order to arrive at the northern end, to find on first contact his "T" capped by a superior force already deployed. It must be assumed that from his plane observations during the previous days he had accurate knowledge of the composition of the forces opposing him.

6. Almost from the time of commence firing at 0350 the enemy ships appeared to observers in this ship to be a continual mass of flame and explosions, with the exception of two which appeared to CIC to countermarch and escape at high speed to the southward.

7. After daylight, the forces of the left flank made a sweep down the channel to polish off the cripples and sank what appeared to be a Katori class cruiser with her bow missing. observed also were four other ships sinking which could not be identified because of the heavy oil smoke and flames surrounding them. (See Photographic Section V.) This sweep was discontinued when word was received that an enemy force of 4 BB's, 8 CA's, and several DD's had been sighted off Samar, attacking our CVE's. If this second force had entered SURIGAO Strait east at the same time that force one was coming up the southern strait the battle might have taken a disastrous turn since all our ships were low on ammunition, this ship having entered the action with only 1200 rounds of A.P. Such may have been the enemy's intent, changed by the fight put up by the CVE's. But regardless of his intent, the desperate effort to destroy our naval forces in LEYTE Gulf was frustrated and his fleet was dealt a crushing blow.

 

As experienced by Cruiser of Right Flank (CO Boise reports):

1. Earlier in the day (24th), about 30 PT boats of Task Group 70.1 were ordered south and deployed so as to observe the southern approaches to SURIGAO Strait, with orders to report and attack with torpedoes if the enemy appeared. These units were on station by early evening. At 2310 PT 127 made contact with and reported an enemy force 10 miles off the southeast tip of BOHOL Island. Later, at 0040 25 October, this same boat reported two contacts bearing 310°T, distance 10 miles from CAMIGUIN Island. A third PT contact at 0123 reported by Wachapreague placed the enemy bearing 140°T, distance 18 miles from TAANOAN Point. These contacts indicated that an enemy force was approaching SURIGAO Strait. This was made certain when a fourth report, this time by PT 13 at 0202, placed the enemy off the southern end of PANAON Island and standing up the strait. The enemy force appeared to be composed of at least two very large targets and several smaller ones.

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2. Boise's first radar contact with the enemy was made at 0252, bearing 164°T, range 47,900 yards. A track was immediately established and the plot from 0252 on is shown on page 21B. At 0254 a second contact was made with a force astern of the initial contact about 4000 yards. From the radar screen there appeared to be two columns of three or four ships each, with a large ship in the lead of each column. (The ships astern of column leaders did not separate on the screen until several minutes later). Prior to contact, own forces deployed for battle had patrolled on an east-west line at the northern exit of SURIGAO Strait. After contact, destroyers headed down channel to attack with torpedoes. Their attacks commenced at about 0300 and continued intermittently until about 0400. Several hits were reported.

3. The gunnery phase of the battle was fought in the classic style of the formal battleline engagement. By 0350 the enemy van was well within range and OTC ordered commence firing, the battleline opening up at about 0350. Boise opened fire on order from Commander Right flank forces (CTG 77.3) at 0351 with main battery to starboard on the largest target in the van, range 18,100 yards, bearing 053°T. A steady rate of fire was maintained and many hits were observed on the target. The enemy continued to advance up the Strait at first, but by 0400 all units appeared to be veering off to the west and south; the enemy was being heavily hit. At about 0401, shell splashes were observed near HMAS Shropshire. The splashes were all short initially, then all overs. A few moments later, several salvos were heard passing directly over Boise. Boise ceased firing on order at 0410 with target bearing 154°T, range 12,800 yards, having expended 439 rounds of 6"/47 calibre armor-piercing projectiles. Shortly after commence firing, fires were seen to break out on several of the targets, some of an apparently serious magnitude. At 0420 orders were received from Commander Task Group 77.2 to resume fire. However, no suitable targets were within effective gun range of Right Flank cruisers. The target (battleship) which had been the object of our fire was by this time apparently retiring down the Strait and rapidly drawing out of range. All other enemy units also appeared to be in full retreat down the Strait.

 

As experienced by Destroyer of Right flank (CO Daly reports):

1. Shortly after sunset our own forces formed battle disposition A-2, U.S.F. 10A, with light forces on both bows in the van of the battleline axis 135 (T), deployment course 225 (T). Task Group 77.3 occupied the van position to starboard of the fleet axis, with cruisers on the 14,000-yard circle. DesDiv 47 occupied a position 8,000 yards ahead of the cruisers. This group of destroyers was divided into two attack groups: Section I -- Hutchins, Daly, Bache. Section II -- HMAS Arunta, Killen, Beale.

2. The entire force maneuvered at slow speeds, fleet center in vicinity of Latitude 10°34'N., Longitude 125°19'E. The entrance from the strait to LEYTE GULF was completely blocked. Thirty PT boats were stationed in ten groups of three each at the southern entrance of SURIGAO STRAIT, operating south of Latitude 10°17'N.

3. The weather during the early part of the night was far too beautiful to serve our purpose. The moon shone brightly with visibility to at least 8,000 yards; light breezes were blowing, and the sea was calm. Fortunately, before the enemy arrived the moon had set. Local squalls visited the area, bringing low overcast clouds and a dark black night. Zero visibility was interrupted only by intermittent vivid flashes of lightning which transpired around us.

4. Commencing at 0920, when they reported an enemy force ten miles southeast of BOHOL ISLAND, contact reports were received regularly from the PT boats. At 0132 they reported the enemy force nine miles southwest of PANAON ISLAND, and at about 0240 five miles west of KANIHAAN ISLAND steaming north at twenty knots. Numerous star shells and occasional sweeping searchlight beams could be seen over the southern horizon from this vessel, indicating that the PT boats were harassing the enemy.

5. Ships of DesRon 54 started south, down SURIGAO STRAIT, about 0230. Remey, McGowan, and Melvin steamed down the eastern shore. Monssen and McDermut steamed down the western shore, passing near ships of DesDiv 47 which were at that time three miles due east of HUNUNDAYAN. The eastern group executed the first torpedo attack of the battle, followed by the two ships west about 0310, and commenced retirement to the north at high speed. A large explosion was seen to the southeastward by Daly personnel at 0316; this explosion was probably a result of the torpedo attack by DesRon 54.

6. Daly made radar contact on the enemy force at 0248 from a position two miles east of HINUMDAYA. (See page 78-22). At time of first plots, Daly's position was Latitude 10°21.3'N., Longitude 125°16'47"E. Enemy bearing was 164 (T), range 30,400 yards, with several targets on a

[78-21]

U.S.S. Daly
Battle of Surigao Strait

October 25, 1944

[78-22]

northerly course at 17 knots. Contact was reported to CTG 77.3 on the task group common circuit, 2748 KCs.

7. DesDiv 47 turned and started south in column at 0307, speed 15 knots. HMAS Arunta was directed to lead her group eastward to attack, and at 0314 Arunta, Killen and Beale commenced approach for torpedo attack on course 140 (T) at 25 knots, laying funnel smoke during approach. The Arunta's attack unit fired torpedoes at 0327 from a position about 7,000 yards on the port bow of the enemy formation and then reversed course, retiring to the northwest.

8. At 0321 Hutchins, Daly and Bache increased speed to 25 knots on course 180 (T) and commenced approach for torpedo attack, laying funnel smoke. We passed Monssen and McDermut close aboard to starboard as they retired to northwest at high speed.

9. Leading enemy ships were bearing 115 (T) at 13,000 yards. Only the van units could be seen on the short range PPI scope at this time. There appeared to be four large ships in an approximate line of bearing normal to their course, 010 (T). The enemy was attempting to illuminate this attack unit with starshells, but all stars burst short until 0326 when one bright greenish star burst a thousand yards broad on Daly's starboard bow. Hutchins turned left to 050 (T). Daly and Bache followed in her wake, all three ships standing by to fire a half salvo of torpedoes to starboard.

10. Seen on the SG radar PPI, the enemy disposition consisted of two groups of ships: Four large ships abreast, interval about 500 yards, were out ahead. Two thousand yards astern was a second group of three large ships (the largest pips on the radar scope), formed on a line of bearing normal to the course, 010 (T), interval about 500 yards. One (or more) smaller targets was a few hundred yards west of these ships. Evaluator's original estimate of the enemy force was nine ships in this northern group.

11. At 0329 Hutchins altered course left to 000 (T) and fired five torpedoes to starboard. Daly followed in her wake. At 0330 two torpedoes crossed Daly's bow, the closest not more than 50 yards ahead, from starboard to port, on approximately course 280 (T). The wakes of these torpedoes could be seen forming as they approached. Bubbles were just rising as Daly's bridge crossed torpedo track number two with the water still sizzling. A light trail of smoke could be seen rising from the bubbles. Bubbles from torpedo track number one were rising just forward of the stem at the same moment. Both of these torpedoes were first detected by underwater sound equipment. They were too close, however, to permit evasive maneuvers.

12. Hutchins reversed course to the left after firing torpedoes. Daly held course and at 0332 fired five torpedoes to starboard, using as target an enemy ship of the second group (largest pip visible on SG radar), bearing 099 (T), 10,700 yards, course 010 (T), speed 16 knots; torpedo course 055 (T), speed 27 knots, depth six feet. After firing, reversed course to left, Bache fired five torpedoes to starboard at 0335 and followed in Daly's wake. Stopped funnel smoke at 0338.

13. Main battery trained on enemy vessel in vicinity of second enemy group, a relatively small pip. Commenced firing to port at 0341 on this target, bearing 025 (T), range 11,000 yards. Target appeared to have reversed course, making 16 knots. Small bursts could be seen at the target as salvos landed. FD and SG radars indicated salvos were hitting. Checked fire at 0344 as Hutchins turned left to cross our bows.

14. At 0344 three large explosions, unmistakably torpedo hits, in quick succession were observed by all bridge personnel and repair parties bearing about 045 (T). Each explosion was a round ball or dull orange flame which subsided and disappeared almost immediately. The ship which was hit by these torpedoes immediately opened fire with major and minor calibre guns, frantically throwing steel through 360°, and initiating general gun action between both forces.

15. It is certain that these three torpedo hits were made by Daly's torpedoes fired at 0332, twelve minutes before, for the following reasons:

  1. radar plot shows a large target in Daly's torpedo water at a range of 10,800 yards from point of firing, the exact distance a 27-knot torpedo will travel in twelve minutes. Subsequent plots reveal that this target decelerated and was making only 2 knots at 0400.

  2. Hutchins' torpedo course was 120 (T). She fired at a different target to southeastward three minutes prior to launching of our torpedoes.

    Bache apparently fired at same target as Daly but three minutes later, so that her torpedoes could not have arrived at point of contact at 0344. It is entirely possible that she also registered hits.

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  1. DesRon 54 conducted first attack with "torpedoes away" prior to 0320, since the last destroyers of that group to attack (Monssen and McDermut) passed Daly to westward on retirement course at that time. From PPI tracing their firing range was close to 7,000 yards, so that their torpedoes hit long before 0344.

  2. Section III (Arunta, Beale, Killen) launched torpedoes at 0327 at a range of 6500-7000 yards. Their torpedoes reached their marks within the maximum time of 9 minutes or prior to 0336.

  3. Torpedoes fired by DesRon 56 were fired after 0350. In addition, these ships were on the eastern flank and there would be little chance of seeing torpedo hits on the other sides of large enemy ships from our western position. Our TBS log shows that these ships were ordered to fire a half salvo at 0348 with "standby to fire" at 0354.

16. Daly resumed gunfire to starboard on first gun target at 0347 after turning left in Hutchins' wake to 050 (T). Further hits were observed on radar scopes but no further visual results noted other than small flashes at target, apparently caused by projectile impact. Resumed laying funnel smoke.

17. At 0352 checked fire and changed course left to 310 (T). Cruisers of TG 77.3 opened fire on enemy, firing north to south. Daly shifted to new target bearing 032 (T), 7,500 yards, and commenced firing at 0355. Target was hit on the first salvo. Tracers could be followed into the hull of this vessel. On the third salvo this target exploded and burst into flames. Bache also took this target under fire and the continued salvos of both destroyers continually hitting in rapid succession brought results which were gratifying to see. The light from the fires and explosions positively identified this ship as a heavy cruiser. Our fire forced the enemy to turn away. Target angle on opening fire was 045 (T), changing slowly to 160 (T). After the first explosion, target flashed two large searchlights and fired a red very star. It continued to be hit repeatedly by Daly and Bache. Debris flew into the air as each salvo hit. After it burst into flames, this target was taken under fire by BLUE heavy units to the north, and it is certain that it never escaped. Through descriptions of this target by bridge and director personnel, particularly through description given by rangefinder operator, it has been established that this target was a Furutaka class heavy cruiser. Since we were clearing the area in order not to foul the range of our battleships and cruisers, it was necessary to cease firing on this cruiser and shift to a target farther north.

18. At 0402 picked up a large enemy ship bearing 043 (T), 11,000 yards, our third and last gunfire target, and commenced firing at 0403. Changed course right to 330 (T) and increased speed to 30 knots. This ship had apparently been firing at our group for some time with its secondary battery. In the lightning flashes at least three salvos, which were only from 50-100 yards over in range, were seen to land midway between Hutchins and Daly. Some salvos were also heard by director crews and after 40 MM and 20 MM battery crews, passing overhead. No "shorts" were observed.

19. Immediately after we opened fire on this ship, a salvo with one tracer was fired at us. It was definitely on in deflection for it gave the sensation of standing in center-field waiting for a fly-ball which will land in one's glove. Fortunately this salvo passed overhead, landing from 200-300 yards over.

20. This enemy vessel was a heavy cruiser or battleship for it was firing major calibre guns at our heavy units to the northward and was under heavy fire from our ships. It is certain that its escape was impossible.

21. It is possible, from the fact that three or more successive salvos landed midway between Hutchins and Daly, that the enemy has some type of fire control radar and that he experienced a bleeding or convergence of pips from our two ships.

22. At 0405 ceased firing and proceeded on northerly course past BLUE forces which were advancing southward toward the disintegrating enemy. At 0425 slowed to 20 knots and at 0431 slowed to 15 knots, operating several miles north of CABUGAY GRANDE ISLAND. Enemy ships which were still afloat and retreating in a damaged condition were sunk one after another by our battleships, cruisers and destroyers. This job was completed shortly after daylight.

23. At 0509 formed anti-aircraft disposition with Task Group 77.3 and steamed southward toward KANIHAAN ISLAND. At daylight seven heavy pillars of billowing black smoke could be seen on the horizon ahead. One by one these pillars of smoke disappeared as the ships from which they originated sank under the gunfire of our ships. (See Photographic Section V.) Hundreds of survivors were reported in the water, almost all of whom refused to be rescued and were left to their fate.

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24. No enemy ships remaining by 0730. Task Group 77.3 reversed course to northward, retiring from SURIGAO STRAIT. Increased speed to 27 knots.

25. At 0744 enemy aircraft were reported approaching, and at 0811 fifteen Japanese dive-bombers (VALS attacked the force five miles east of HIBUSON ISLAND. The planes were driven away by gunfire after at least four had been shot down. Daly expended 33 rounds of 5"/38 AAC ammunition but the planes were at all times at maximum range and results were negative.

26. Task Groups replenished fuel and ammunition in LEYTE GULF during the day in preparation for an anticipated enemy surface attack on LEYTE GULF on the night of 25 October. This threat, presented by strong enemy surface force operating east of SAMAR ISLAND, did not materialize.

Battle East of Samar

Commander Task Force 77 summarizes briefly:

1. At 063I/25 [sic] aircraft anti-submarine patrol of Task Unit 77.4.3 (Northern CVE Group) reported many enemy battleships, cruisers, and destroyers on a southerly course about 15 miles north and westward of the Task Unit. The first news of this enemy force was received on board the flagship about 0724I/25 when Commander Task Unit 77.4.3 reported that he was under gunfire attack by four battleships, eight CAs and many destroyers, at a range of about 30,000 yards. This was the first indication that the enemy's Central Force had succeeded in passing through SAN BERNARDINO Straits. Up to this time, from information available to Commander SEVENTH Fleet, it was assumed that THIRD Fleet forces were guarding the SAN BERNARDINO Straits in position to intercept and destroy any enemy forces attempting to come through. To confirm this assumption, Commander SEVENTH Fleet had sent a despatch to the Commander THIRD Fleet asking if he was guarding the SAN BERNARDINO Straits. Reply was not received until after the enemy surface forces were attacking our Northern CVE Group.

2. At this point, the situation appeared very critical. Our surface combatant forces were deep in the southern part of SURIGAO Strait after the battle of the early morning, and after five days of almost continuous bombardment of shore objectives and fighting a naval action, they were exceedingly short of ammunition and fuel. Moreover, the destroyers had expended almost all their torpedoes. Nevertheless, all of our available surface forces were ordered to concentrate at eastern entrance LEYTE Gulf, preparatory to moving to the support of the retiring CVEs, and an urgent call for assistance was sent to Commander THIRD Fleet. All aircraft were recalled from support missions and were directed against the enemy's Central Force attacking our CVEs. Task Units 77.4.1 and 77.4.2 moved northward to support of Task Unit 77.4.3 and the enemy was hit with every conceivable form of plane attack, including dummy torpedo runs by planes without torpedoes.

3. At about 0730, in response to orders to cover a retirement of the northern carrier task Unit, two destroyers -- Hoel and Johnston -- and the Roberts (DE) reversed and delivered a daylight half-salvo torpedo attack against the enemy battleships at a range under 10,000 yards, then turned and delivered the other half salvo against enemy heavy cruisers at a range of about 7,000 yards. After one of the most gallant and heroic acts of the war, all three ships were sunk, although the Hoel continued to withstand concentrated enemy fire for about one hour before finally sinking. As a result of continuing air action by our CVEs and the destroyer attack, the enemy momentarily turned away and several of his ships were seen to be hit and in trouble.

4. The enemy, however, resumed the action and about 0900I/25 the Gambier Bay was badly hit, dropped astern, and later blew up and sank as a result of enemy shell fire. (See Photographic Section VI.) The Saint Lo was sunk about 1050I/25 as a result of an enemy dive bomber crashing into the flight deck and starting a tremendous fire. This fire caused several violent explosions on the ship and the Saint Lo sank without further enemy action. (See Photographic Section VII.) At 1255I/25 the enemy force turned away and commenced retirement towards SAN BERNARDINO Strait on a course of 105 and speeds of 15 to 20 knots, leaving several damaged ships behind. Throughout the morning and continuing into the afternoon, our CVEs were the primary target of incessant and strong enemy air attack. As a result of these attacks and of enemy surface gunfire, many of our CVEs were severely damaged and were unable to land or service their planes. In this extremity, the partially completed TACLOBAN airfield was put into use and CVE planes were skillfully landed on that partially completed airfield, serviced, and returned to the attack, thus saving many planes and pilots who would otherwise have been lost due to water landings. it is remarkable that in these landings on an unknown and ill-kept field no serious injuries were sustained by our air personnel, which speaks very highly for their skill.

5. Planes of Task Group 38.1 arrived over the retreating enemy at about 1330I/25 and delivered their first attack about 1400I/25. As

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the enemy continued to retreat northward, they were continually attacked and harassed by the planes of 38.1 and by the planes of the CVE Force. The enemy's remaining forces consisting of about 14 ships, including his four battleships, were last reported entering SAN BERNARDINO Straits at 2200I/25, leaving several cripples far to the rear. These were finished off the next day by the forces of Task Force 38. Except for the pursuit phase, this ended the Battle of LEYTE Gulf in which the enemy's major fleet was decisively defeated with heavy loss.

 

CTU 77.4.3 (Unit of Northernmost Station CarGrp) reports:

1. On the morning of 25 October TU 77.4.3 was operating off the east coast of SAMAR providing routine support for the LEYTE Landing forces, when it was surprised and attacked by a major part of the Japanese Fleet.

WAR INSTRUCTIONS, (F.T.P. 143(A)), PAR. 233 (f), STATES IN PART, "A FORCE SURPRISED IS AT LEAST PARTIALLY DISORGANIZED AND DEMORALIZED AND HAS DIFFICULTY IN REGAINING THE INITIATIVE AND COORDINATING AND CONCENTRATING ITS PHYSICAL STRENGTH. IT FOLLOWS NATURALLY THAT OUR OWN COMMANDERS MUST NOT BE SURPRISED."

In the running fight which followed, this unit, while escaping what seemed certain annihilation, lost two of its six CVEs and three of its seven screening vessels. No vessel of this Task Unit escaped undamaged.

2. For about two and one half hours this group was under constant attack, endeavoring to outrun an enemy vastly superior in speed and armament and to avoid a constant and increasing threat of encirclement by the enemy's heavy cruisers on the left, his destroyers on the right, and his main body astern. (See pages 78-27, 28) In this effort some benefit of concealment was derived from the scattered showers that prevailed during the morning, and more from the use of smoke. Nevertheless, until the moment when the enemy broke off and retired to the north there appeared only one possible outcome of the encounter -- complete annihilation.

3. The first indication of untoward events was the report at 0646 of automatic AA fire, bearing 300°, distance about 15 miles. Seven minutes later a large enemy fleet, believed at the time to have consisted of 4 BB, 8 CA-CL, and at least 8 DD, was sighted, bearing 298°, distance about 17 miles. No report of radar contact was made prior to the visual sighting.

4. Almost immediately after being sighted the enemy opened fire. The first shells fell close about the S.B. Roberts and in a short time the CVEs were under fire. At 0655 carriers were ordered to launch all available planes and the unit took launching course eastward into the wind. Launching completed, the disposition continued to the east and southeast at maximum speed, making smoke for concealment. At 0701 the screen was ordered to lay a smoke screen astern of the carriers.

5. At 0705 CTU 77.4.3 broadcast a contact report and requested assistance.

6. From the time of the first fall of shot throughout the launching of planes and for the next two hours and one half the unit was steadily under fire from the main batteries of Japanese BB, CA and DD. To avoid the effects of the smoke, the enemy advanced two heavy cruisers up the port quarter of the disposition, and under continuous pressure from these ships this unit was slowly forced around from its original easterly course until it was heading for LEYTE Gulf. On this course the relative wind was such that the smoke lay in an east-west line. With all CVEs making heavy black smoke and with the escorts making both funnel and chemical smoke on the starboard quarter of the disposition, vision of both forces was largely obscured. This fact, with the failure of the Japanese to close the range more rapidly, was largely responsible for saving the Task Unit from complete destruction.

7. Prior to 0800 the Task Unit was under fire from BB astern and CA on the port quarter. As the course was altered slowly to westward, most of the firing was from the cruisers coming up to port, with infrequent salvos from the heavy ships astern and from DD's who for a time were advanced on our starboard quarter.

By 0740 the CAs bearing 300°T had closed the range to 24,000 yards, and the screen commander was ordered to launch a torpedo attack. As a consequence of this attack one DD and one DE were not seen again and another DD was so damaged that it was later sunk by the enemy while slowing to repair damage. Due to the heavy smoke the course of this attack and the results obtained could not be observed.

9. As the enemy ships advanced to within effective range, the CVEs and the screen took them under 5-inch fire. Such of our splashes as could

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T.U. 77.4.3 Track Chart
Battle East of Samar
25 October 1944

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Composite Plot of
TU 77.4.1, 77.4.2, 77.4.3 Tracks
Battle East of Samar
25 October 1944

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be observed were directed at the heavy cruisers to port, and this, considering the circumstances, seemed remarkable both in rate of fire and accuracy, being well on in deflection and good although tending to be slightly under in range.

10. As the Japanese cruisers gained on the port flank the Task Unit was forced continually to veer to the right toward the shoreline. In this process, and consequent to individual maneuvers and differences of speed, the disposition became scattered out along the southwesterly course line with White Plains, Kitkun Bay and Fanshaw Bay in the lead. As a result, the heaviest fire was directed on the other CVEs and the screen and many near misses and straddles were observed.

11. At 0754 a vessel of the screen reported torpedoes approaching the carriers from the starboard quarter.

TIMELY WARNING OF APPROACHING TORPEDOES HAS SAVED SHIPS.

12. At 0756 three destroyers of the Fletcher Class were sighted on the horizon to southward. Informed by searchlight that we were under surface attack, these DD's first stood to the eastward toward the enemy, then turned and disappeared on a southerly course. They did not enter the affray.

13. Throughout this period the planes of this Task Group attacked the enemy ships and additional fighters were catapulted to aid by strafing. From about 0900 planes from TU 77.4.1 and TU 77.4.2, which had returned from their support missions, assisted planes of this group. Considerable damage was inflicted on the enemy by these attacks.

14. At 0759 a bomb or shell hit followed by flames was seen on the bridge structure of one of the heavy cruisers, but the fire was shortlived and the enemy did not appear seriously hurt.

15. Shortly after 0800 the leading cruiser to port commenced a turn away from the CVE formation. Any hopes of respite that were raised by this maneuver were quickly dispelled as she continued the turn through 360° and fell in astern of her consort. The fire of these ships continued undiminished in intensity and as they continued to gain they shifted their aim to the leading ships. From this time on, Kitkun Bay and Fanshaw Bay were under heavy surface fire and were repeatedly straddled. Salvos with red and blue dye were used by these cruisers to stop their splashes.

DYE-LOADED SHELLS ARE FREQUENTLY USED BY JAPANESE.

16. About 0805 there was a submarine alarm cumulating in a supposed sighting. No torpedoes were observed and it is not believed that there was a submarine present.

17. At 0820 Gambier Bay reported that she had been hard hit and was proceeding on one engine. Under continuous fire she dropped steadily astern and disappeared in the smoke. Pilots later reported seeing her being shelled at point blank range, and first reports from survivors indicate that she sank at 0900 as a result of many 8-inch hits from six CAs which closed a final range of 2,000 yards.

18. The two cruisers to port had by now forged ahead clear of the drift of the smoke from the CVEs, and at 0826 two DEs were ordered to cross from right to left and lay their smoke on the port bow of the disposition.

SMOKE SCREENS ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST OPTICALLY-CONTROLLED GUNFIRE.

19. At 0902 Dennis (DE-405) reported being hit below the waterline and main battery out of commission.

20. About this time, in the hope of disrupting the enemy fire and of slowing down the cruisers who were now threatening to turn the CVEs back to the northward toward main enemy disposition, ComCardiv 26 ordered the TBMs who had expended their bombs to make dummy torpedo runs on the enemy ships. The effectiveness of this ruse is not known.

THE GRAVENESS OF THE SITUATION IS EMPHASIZED BY THESE HEROIC ACTS.

21. At 0924 the enemy cruisers, now at a range of only 10,500 yards, ceased fire, countermarched in column to the left and retired to the northeast. This Task Unit immediately slowed to 15 knots.

22. One minute later the alarm was broadcast by the OTC over TBS of many torpedoes approaching astern. Field of vision in this direction was limited to about 1000 yards by smoke from one of our DEs but no wakes were seen from Kitkun Bay and air observers reported that torpedoes were stopping short of the disposition. CAs to port had obviously fired this torpedo salvo.

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23. The surviving CVEs and four escorts continued on a southwesterly course and made preparations for launching further air attacks on the retiring enemy.

24. No further attack by surface units was experienced, but reports of bogies over the next half hour culminated in scattered but determined attack by enemy dive bombers. (See Photographic Section VII.) At 1050 Kitkun Bay suffered minor damages and a small gasoline fire when a TONY Made a suicide dive through the catwalk on the port side forward. About five minutes later St. Lo (ex-Midway) was dive bombed by a plane which, hit by AA, flamed as it passed across the deck and splashed on her port beam. A burst of fire was seen on board St. Lo, caused either by the bomb explosion or by parts from the burning plane; it died down rapidly but was followed in the next few minutes by a series of extremely heavy explosions which threw smoke and debris high into the air and by violent flames showing from the hangar deck. When last seen, personnel were abandoning ship over the starboard side forward. At 1114 the surviving ships of the screen were ordered to stand by St. Lo to pick up survivors and from this time the CVEs proceeded without a screen.

25. Kitkun Bay was subject to a further attack at 1120 when a JUDY carrying a heavy bomb dove into the water just off the bow, throwing tons of water and considerable shrapnel over the bridge and the forward part of the ship.

26. Shortly after this attack, the Kitkun Bay launched 4 TBM with the torpedoes remaining on board to strike the retiring Japanese Fleet. A little later radio contact was established with the first fast carrier striking group who were vectored toward the enemy.

27. What remained of task unit 77.4.3 -- Fanshaw Bay, White Plains, Kalinin Bay and Kitkun Bay -- retired south and southeast throughout the afternoon, recovering aircraft as practicable, and headed for an evening rendezvous that had been arranged with TU 77.4.1. This latter unit was within TBS range when at 1938 a single skunk was observed closing the formation from the quarter. Identification proving impossible, request was made to CTU 77.4.1 for screening ships to investigate the contact. At 2050 three destroyers assigned to this task were closely approaching the contact when it disappeared. One DD reported sighting a conning tower and attacking with depth charges, after which contact was not again made.

28. Enemy snoopers were overhead during the early part of the night and one was shot down by the destroyers investigating the previously mentioned contact. No attack on this unit developed, however, and without further incident the four CVEs accompanied by a "borrowed" screen departed LEYTE Area.

 

CTU 77.4.2 (Southernmost Station CarGrp) reports:

At 0814 TU 77.4.3 reported his position as 11° 34' N, 126° 25' E and changing course to 205°T. Also "We have been straddled for last half hour"; "We have not been hit yet, their shooting is very bad". TU 77.4.2 at 0800 was at 11° 13' N, 126° 49' E (11° 13.5' N, 126° 32.5' E) on course 160°T, speed 17 knots except when into wind launching aircraft which required a heading to the northeast. The enemy force was between the two Task Units, at a position estimated to be abaft the port beam of TU 77.4.3 and on the starboard quarter of TU 77.4.2. ComDesDiv 94 (Captain Reynolds) in Haggard, with the Hailey and Franks took position about 3 miles astern of the carriers to intercept any light forces in the van of the enemy's main force attempting to attack. When shell fire fell near our DDs, CTU 77.4.2 ordered them to close the formation. The five DEs took station ahead of carriers for screening. The enemy was estimated to be about 20 to 25 miles astern, closing at the rate of 1000 yards every ten minutes, speed 30 knots. Enemy shell fire was reported falling short of the destroyers at 0817.

2. At 0833 changed course to 037°T to launch Strike No. 2 and land 6 VT from TU 77.4.3. The launching and landing was completed by 0844 when course was changed to 140° T. Strike No. 2 consisted of 8 VF and 16 VT, the latter loaded with torpedoes. At 0834 a pilot observing in the air reported that TU 77.4.3 on southerly course was on bearing about 300°T distance 17 to 19 miles from this unit, that cruisers were firing off TU 77.4.3's port quarter, and that a battleship and two heavy cruisers were astern of TU 77.4.2 about 20 miles with another battleship 30 miles astern. At 0841 this Task Unit was again taken under shell fire by heavy enemy ships astern. This fact and the Task Unit position, 11° 13' N, 126° 52' E. were reported to CTG 77.4 and CTG 77. CTU 77.4.2 estimated the shells to be 8-inch. Shells straddled the destroyers astern the formation with no hits. An enemy plane was reported to the west. A VT from this unit attacked a submarine NW of and 20 miles distance from TU 77.4.3.

[78-30]

3. At 0855 Strike No. 1 initiated its attack on the enemy. Part of this flight attacked 2 heavy cruisers and 1 light cruiser, which had TU 77.4.3 under close fire, and successfully scored two torpedo hits, one on each of the heavy cruisers. The balance of Strike No. 1 supported by Strike No. 2 attacked the two heavy cruisers and one battleship directly astern of Task Unit 77.4.2, obtaining two torpedo hits on one of the heavy cruisers.

4. The main weight of this attack struck the enemy between 0910 and 0930. At 0924 the nearest ship had closed to sixteen miles, shell fire was coming closer to the CVEs (a salvo falling about 1700 yards astern), and enemy masts were observed on the horizon. Unprecedented valor was displayed by the pilots in executing attacks against these heavy combatant ships. FMs were the only support for the VT as they persistently attacked. Evaluated reports and photos indicate that two torpedo hits on a heavy cruiser (Tone Class) and one torpedo hit on a battleship (Kongo) were scored in these important first two strikes. The effect of the attacks caused the enemy to circle immediately and discontinue gunfire on this Task Unit. CTU 77.4.3 states in a subsequent dispatch that the enemy at about this time turned away from bombarding his unit for no apparent reason. It is believed these attacks were responsible to a great extent for the enemy turning away and discontinuing fire at least temporarily.

5. The enemy ships at this time were too close for this unit to risk turning into the wind, which was from 049°T, 7 knots. Consequently, a decision was reached by CTU 77.4.2 to launch the third strike of 12 VT, one of which carried o torpedo, the balance 4 - 500# SAP bombs each, and 8 VF on course 120°T. As the CVE catapult tables call for 22 knots of apparent wind down the catapult for launching a heavily loaded VT, such a decision was somewhat risky but the launch went off without casualty at 0935 with 20 knots of apparent wind 20° on the port bow. The radar screen showed that this Task Unit was opening the range from the enemy ships which evidently were taking evasive action during the attacks of Strikes 1 and 2. Strike No. 3 immediately threw its weight against the enemy and the resultant three bomb hits on the previously twice torpedoed heavy cruisers are believed to have forced upon the enemy unit commander the decision to discontinue further attacks on TU 77.4.2. One heavy cruiser was subsequently observed by pilots to retire to the west and the battleship to the north at extremely slow speed, with a badly damaged destroyer close by.

6. In the meantime, while the Third strike was attacking, the Task Unit changed course at 0945 to 050°T into the wind to land Strike No. 1. For the next hour bogeys were picked up on the radar and two BETTYS were reported sighted 12 miles to the northwest. Interception was not accomplished. However, at 1045 one JILL carrying a bomb or torpedo was shot down 20 miles to the southwest. The Combat Air Patrol during this period pursued numerous reported bogeys, evidently snoopers covering the Jap fleet.

7. At 1051 CTU 77.4.3 reported that he was under heavy air attacks and also that elements of the Jap fleet were closing again. The attacking Jap planes were reported by CTU 77.4.3 to have hit three of his CVEs. No further report was received at the time as to whether the elements of the fleet closed TU 77.4.3. Subsequent radio interceptions at 1325 and later dispatches indicated that the fleet did not close again.

8. At 1115 Strike No. 4 was launched, consisting of 19 VF and 37 VT of which 11 carried torpedoes and the balance SAP and GP bombs. This large strike effectively hit the main Jap force which was about 45 to 55 miles on bearing 305°T from this Task Unit. Pilots reported the position of the enemy's main force as 11° 43' N, 126° 13' E with a crippled battleship and heavy cruiser 20 to 30 miles to the east of the main force. This information and positions were immediately sent to CTG 77.4 and CTF 77. Pilots further reported the enemy to be on course 225°, which indicates he might have started to run back against our forces prior to this large strike arriving. On the other hand it is highly possible he was engaged in evasive maneuvers and his base course was confusing to the pilots. In either case, after being attacked by this strike any indication that the enemy considered returning to the south was eliminated and there was no doubt as to his heading, which was north, at top speed. The damage inflicted during this attack is estimated to have included several bomb hits on a heavy cruiser, a bomb hit and a torpedo hit on a battleship, and continued effective strafing attacks on the escorting destroyers.

9. At 1200 TU 7.4.2 was at 11° 12' N, 127° 02' E (11° 11.3' N, 126° 57' E) on course 120°T. A reported was received from pilots at 1230 that several hundred survivors, evidently from a ship of TU 77.4.3 were in the water in the vicinity of 11° 12' N, 126° 30' E. This information was immediately sent to CTF 77 and subsequently a rescue unit was dispatched from LEYTE Gulf. At the same time radar picked up a large group of

[78-31]

friendly planes approaching this disposition from the northeast and subsequently voice communications were established over VHF with these planes which were from CVs of Task Group 38.1. The flight leader requested latest position of the Jap fleet. CIC on the flagship Natoma Bay gave these planes a vector commencing at 1255 and continued to direct this appreciated support until the flight leader "tallyhoed" the main enemy force at 1302. The result of their attack is not known.

10. By this time Strike No. 5 was ready to be launched by TU 77.4.2. Up to this time a total of 80 VT and 55 VF had been launched against the enemy's force by this Task Unit and all available SAP bombs and torpedoes expended. By 1331 Strike No. 5 consisting of 11 VT armed with GP bombs and rockets and 8 VF was airborne and after the fleeing enemy. CSA for CTF 77 sent the following voice transmission to CTG 77.4 at this time: "Appears Jap force seriously weakened. Keep striking". Pilots of the Task Unit reported 1 heavy cruiser dead in water and sinking, 1 battleship dead in water, with 1 destroyer in comparable condition at about 11° 25' N, 126° 33' E. This was reported to CTF 77 and CTG 77.4 at 1458. During this period base course of the Task Unit was 120°T but when conducting air operations course was to the northeast, resulting in a mean almost dead easterly track. This heading was maintained to reduce danger of enemy air attacks interfering with our operations against the enemy.

11. The last strike for the day was launched commencing at 1508 and consisting of 26 VT and 24 VF. The VF carried 250-lb. GP bombs and the VT 500-lb. GP bombs and rockets with instructions to attack the light units of the Jap force. Upon completion of launching, several bombers (SB2Cs) from TG 38.1 were landed along with the Task Unit's returning flights, including Strike No. 5. Pilots reported that the Jap main force was at 12° 05' N, 125° 45' E on a northerly course at 1420 when they executed their attack. One cruiser was reported lagging behind damaged. The results of Strike No. 5 are unknown but it is felt that it must have been primarily harassing due to the loadings which were all that were available and the small number of planes. The position of the enemy and composition, which was reported to be three battleships, three heavy cruisers and seven destroyers, was forwarded immediately to the higher echelons (at 1538). (See page 78-33.) At this time a second attack group from TG 38.1 was picked up on the radar and reported four enemy ships, one a battleship or heavy cruiser dead in the water in the vicinity of the previously reported cripples, thereby confirming the effectiveness of the CVE strikes. Part of this attack group attacked the cripples at 1550 and the balance, on being given the position of the retiring main enemy force, proceeded after them. The results of their attacks are not known.

12. CTU 77.4.2 decided to alter course to the west at this time in order to render aid in recovery of personnel in the water and, if practicable, send the three destroyers on a night attack to finish off the cripples. At 1549 course was 290°T and subsequently changed to 250°T at 1617. However, at 1632 the appearance of a large group of bogeys on the radar screen bearing 310° distance 70 miles on course 130 necessitated a reevaluation of the immediate situation. At this time a pilot reported the main enemy force at 12° 30' N, 125° 25' E course 310° speed 18. This position was passed to CTF 77 and CTG 77.4. Upon receipt of further information confirming CIC's report that the bogey consisted of 30 or more enemy planes, CTU 77.4.2 ordered the Task Unit to change course into the wind and launch VF. The current airborne CAP were already on vector toward the incoming raid. By 1650 28 VF had been launched, subsequently followed by 12 more. It was not too late to launch any more strikes and no better use for the VF could be foreseen. At 1705 the Task Unit turned from 050°T out of the wind to course 120°T and formed disposition 5V for defense against air attack. With Fighter Director Control in CIC on the flagship, interception of an estimated 25 to 35 enemy fighter bombers stacked at altitudes from 17,000 feet down to 1,000 feet was successfully accomplished with the initial "tallyho" occurring at exactly 1700, distance 35 miles from the formation. In the ensuing aerial engagement 16 enemy planes were confirmed as shot down, an estimated ten additional planes damaged, and the attack completely and adroitly broken up by the excellent combination of teamwork and skill between the VF pilots and CIC personnel. No enemy planes came within 17 miles of the formation. The value of this successful interception is the more significant as reports from the other Task Units indicated the enemy air force was executing suicidal air attacks where possible.

13. At 1734 CTU 77.4.2 sent his last contact report on the enemy for the day: "Our last strike hit Jap force at 1723, position 12° 35' N, 125° 32' E, course 300, speed 10 knots. Results still unknown." This position placed the Jap force off northeast coast of SAMAR heading for SAN BERNARDINO Straits. Subsequently pilots landing from this strike at 1825 stated that the force appeared to consist of four battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and seven destroyers, with two battleships trailing oil and seemingly in trouble, three destroyers and one light cruiser lagging behind and one heavy cruiser apparently damaged.

[78-32]

Probable Formation of Jap Fleet
East of Samar
25 Oct. 1944 - 1500 ITEM

[78-33]

14. Recovery of Strike No. 6 and the CAP was commenced at 1808 on course 080°. The last plane was landed aboard by 1831, including the dusk CAP, and course was set at 210°T, speed 15 knots, zig-zagging using Plan #6. Upon receipt of information that a special surface rescue group had sortied from LEYTE Gulf to pick up the previously mentioned survivors, and in view of the information that the heavy surface units of TF 38 were enroute south to intercept any cripples, CTU 77.4.2 abandoned his previous intentions of heading to the west and set course to the southwest to close CTG 77.4.

 

As experienced by CVE of Northern-most Station CarGrp -- CO Kalinin Bay reports:

1. A plane on anti-submarine patrol from U.S.S. Kitkun Bay reported to the OTC a task force composed of four enemy battleships, six cruisers, and numerous destroyers bearing 270° (T), a distance 20 miles from this formation at 0654. The pilot of the plane definitely identified the task force as enemy. This information was conveyed to this ship over the Inter-fighter Director Net (37.6 mcs.). Immediately after this report excited Japanese voices were heard over the IFD Net. A frequency test was made and it was found that the Japanese were directly on 37.6. mcs. On orders from the OTC, General Quarters was sounded at 0658 and speed increased to flank.

2. Acting in pursuance to orders all available aircraft were launched, the pilots having been instructed to attack the Japanese task force and proceed to the TACLOBAN airstrip, LEYTE, to re-arm and re-gas. By 0725 we had launched three TBM-1C's loaded with 500-lb. GP bombs and 8-5" rockets, six TBM-1C's loaded with 10 100-lb. GP bombs and 8-5" rockets, one TBM-1C loaded only with service load ammunition, and ten FM-2's with full service load ammunition, all planes having been previously loaded in accordance with the scheduled mis