THE BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF, OCTOBER 1944. STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL ANALYSIS. VOLUME 1. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS UNTIL 0719 OCTOBER 17TH, 1944 INCLUDING BATTLE OFF FORMOSA

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An in-depth study of the preliminary phases was deemed necessary to an understanding of the developments leading to the Allied victory at Leyte Gulf. This volume provides such an analytical examination. Based on Allied and Japanese data, it scrutinizes the initial moves in this engagement, including reconnaissance and deployments, then proceeds to a particularized account of the opening actions from 9 October to the morning of 17 October 1944. Notable is the treatment of the forays in the Ryukyu and off Formosa, which served the strategic purpose of incapacitating Japanese air power and preventing the use of Formosa and its air potential in the struggle for Leyte. Here are demonstrated the capabilities of Allied carrier based aircraft opposing Japanese land-based air forces.
THE BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF

OCTOBER 1944

STRATEGICAL

AND

TACTICAL ANALYSIS

VOLUME I

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

UNTIL 0719 OCTOBER 17TH, 1944

INCLUDING BATTLE OFF FORMOSA
By

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Commodore Bates, for his part, checked and evaluated the above
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ranking American officers who participated in the battle or in its
planning, wrote the manuscript, and prepared all analyses and
comments, resulting therefrom.
FOREWORD

This analysis of the preliminary phases, including the Battle of Formosa, of the Battle for Leyte Gulf was prepared by the Naval War College. It is based on information from both Allied and Japanese sources which is wider and more complete than that available to writers on this subject up to this time. It endeavors to maintain at all times, the viewpoints of the commanders of the units involved on both sides.

Complete information from all sources was not available to this analysis. This was especially true of Japanese Army and Navy land-based aircraft in the Philippines, of Japanese Army aircraft in Formosa, and of Japanese submarine operations and dispositions. It was also true concerning the thought processes which motivated certain of the Japanese senior commanders, notably CinC, Combined Fleet, since few reports of this action by such senior officers have been discovered. All known sources of such information in the United States and in Japan were examined but with only limited success. New facts and circumstances, therefore, may come to light from time to time which may change some of the analyses produced herein.

In view of the critical nature of this analysis an effort has been made in certain important situations to place the critic in the position of the commander in order to obtain the latter's point of view. In employing this system it is realized that although the critic can often succeed in placing himself sufficiently near the position of the commander for any practical purposes, in many instances he may not succeed in doing so.

Because of the nature of the Allied victory at Leyte Gulf and the numerous controversies which have arisen concerning it, as complete a study as possible of the preliminary phases has been provided.

These preliminary phases and, especially the Battle of Formosa, were a real test of the capabilities of Allied carrier-based aircraft versus Japanese land-based aircraft and of the existing Allied and Japanese concepts concerning the employment of these weapons. It was also a test of the combat ability of the various commanders on both sides. The pages of history have invariably revealed defects in command in similar situations, and it would have been surprising had such defects not appeared in these operations.

This battle reaffirmed the lesson so often forgotten - that the test of battle is the only test which proves the combat ability of
commanders. The ability or lack of ability of the various commanders in the art of war became apparent. Valor alone was shown to be insufficient, for valor is not an attribute of only one race, but is an attribute and a heritage of many races. The indispensable qualification for command, the art of war, was shown to be the ability in combat to apply the science of war to active military situations.

The present senior officers of the Navy are well aware of the reasons for changes in established doctrines and in the development of new ones. But this cannot necessarily be said of the commanders of the future, who very probably will be inexperienced in command in war.

Finally, all comments and criticisms are designed to be constructive. By indicating what appear to be sound and unsound decisions, and the apparent reasons for arriving at them, it is hoped to provoke earnest thought among prospective commanders and thus to improve professional judgment in command.
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   Area Force to destroy TF 38 using
   full strength
   Fails to complete preparations for
   attack on October 12th
(a) Operations of CG FOURTH Air Army
   Plans attack TF 35 in cooperation with
   Commander FIFTH Base Air Force
(4) Operations on October 13th
(a) Operations of CinC, Combined Fleet
Receives claims of damage inflicted on enemy
Receives Commander SIXTH Base Air Force dispatch (0314) directing aircraft of CARDIV's TF38 and FOUR prepare move to Formosa
Discussion
Receives OY10 and OY13 contact report on two Allied carrier task groups east of Formosa
 learns Naval General Staff reduced claims to two enemy ships sunk, two moderately damaged
Receives third, 1040, contact report on Allied carrier task group
 learns that planes (43) from Kyushu and Philippines (170) have departed to attack
General air offensive ordered
Discussion
Learns "M" Force claims damage on TF 38
Learns "M" Force to attack next day
Learns Philippine attack group has returned to base without attacking
CinC, Combined Fleet's probable estimate of damage to TF 38
Receives CoDS Combined Fleet estimate "more than six ships sunk or afire"
Final probable estimate
Learns submarine I-45 had departed Kure for sea

(b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force
Learns planes CARDIV's THREE and FOUR to be sent Formosa
1) Operations of Commander FIRST
Striking Force
2) Operations of Commander Main Force
3) Operations of Commander SECOND
Striking Force

(c) Operations of the Base Air Forces,
October 13th
1) Operations of Commander SIXTH
Base Air Force
Estimates situation
Orders, 0314, all units except TF 38
Force Kyushu to prepare to deploy Formosa and attack TF 38 from there
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Receives "T" Force attack plan 333-334
Launches air searches 334
Receives 0710 and 0713 contact reports from one plane on TF 38 334-335
Learns of Allied air attacks on Formosa 335
Receives Naval General Staff estimate of "T" Force attack preceding day 336
Receives additional contact reports "T" Force search planes (4) depart 336
Kancovs
Learns that Commander SEVENTH Base Air Force was transferring to Kyushu 337-338
(260 planes) and CARDIV's THREE and FOUR (172 planes)
"T" Force (38 planes) departed 1300-1410 Kyushu to attack TF 38 338
Learns Philippine plans to assist 339
Situation as of mid-afternoon 339-340
"T" Force attacks TF 38 341-345
Damages FRANKLIN; torpedoes CANBERRA 341-343
Re-estimates situation 344
Decides order general attack 344
Learns "T" Force claims of damage 345
Learns that 444 planes will attack TF 38 on following day 345-346
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Allied Planes (250) strike Formosa at 0715 348-349
Receives contact reports on two carrier task groups off Formosa and one RDF fix 349
Learns that B-29's (100) from China bases have hit Takao 349
Discussion on intelligence 350
Receives CoSF Dispatch directing SECOND Striking Force to sortie 350
Discussion 350-352
First attack wave Kyushu based planes attack TF 38 and claims damaging four carriers (actually damaged HANCOCK only) 353
May have received three additional contact reports 1300, 1630 and 1650 on Allied carrier task groups
Issues 1808 special victory dispatch claiming defeat of TF 38
Receives 2035 dispatch from CofS claiming very heavy sinkings of Allied carriers
Discussion
Leaves second attack wave Kyushu based planes fails locate enemy
Receives reports third attack wave Kyushu based planes sank one carrier, one light carrier, one escort carrier, one battleship, one heavy cruiser, probably sank one light carrier, one battleship, two light cruisers damaging one battleship.
(Actually torpedoed HOUSTON only)
Receives CofS FIRST Striking Force dispatch 2250, advising that force being directed complete battle preparations by evening October 15th
(b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force
Receives orders directing SECOND Striking Force sortie
Orders units not ordered sortie to join Main Force
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force
Leaves of B-29 attacks on Formosa
Orders ARISUMA and HAYASHIMO to Manila
Lawlyers depart 1600
Receives Cinc, Combined Fleet's victory dispatch
Receives Cinc, Combined Fleet's dispatch 2005 indicating TF 38 had lost nine to thirteen carriers
Believes it exaggerated and correctly decides invasion Philippines inevitable
Discussion
Orders his command complete battle preparations by evening October 15th
(2) Operations of Commander Main Force
Receives units from SECOND Striking Force
(3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force

(c) Operations of the Base Air Forces October 14th.

   Receives information composition TF 38 from allied carrier pilot. Launches morning searches. Receives information about Allied attacks on Formosa.
   Receives two contact reports, 0750 and 0840 on carrier task groups, and one 0728 RDF Fix, 0900.
   Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla
   Attack Plan employing 444 planes.
   Learns of Allied attack on Aparri. Contacts TG 38.4 off Manila.
   Discussion receives 1245 CinC, Combined Fleet sortie orders to SECOND Striking Force.
   Japanese ordered recover downed pilots.
   Third wave general attack (52 planes) departs Kanoya 1250.
   First wave general attack (112 planes) departs Okinawa 1330.
   Joined by Kanoya planes (20 planes).
   Second wave general attack (225 planes) departs Okinawa 1430.
   Establishes position TF 38.
   Learns, 1430, of 3-29 attack on Formosa.
   First attack wave attacks TG 38.2 and 38.3.

Weather conditions.
Receives claims of damage, two hits on two carriers TG 38.2, two carriers 38.3 (HANCOCK received one bomb hit).

Discussion of attack technique.
Estimates situation.
Receives 1630 contact reports on carrier task group (BB's, CV's and DD's) but no location given.
Second general attack wave, except for seventeen torpedo planes, fails to make contact. Torpedo planes attack TG 38.3 claiming hit on two cruisers. Actually no damage.

Received 1850 additional contact report on carrier task group (one carrier, one escort carrier, one battleship, several destroyers); no location given.

Discussion of contacts 375

"T" Force attacks 1330 TG 38.1
Issues orders for following days

"T" Force attacks 2024 HOUSTON group

Receives revised estimate COFS, Combined Fleet of "T" Force damage on TF 38 October 12th, 13th

Discussion 377

(2) Operation of Commander FIFTH Fase

Air Force
Prepares to attack TF 38
Learns of attack on Aparri
Discussion

Receives 1055 contact report on two surface ships
Learns FOURTH Air Army unable attack

(d) Operations of CG FOURTH Air Army

Operations on October 15th

(a) Operations of CINC, Combined Fleet
Receives 0900 contact report on four carriers (TG 38.3) bearing 086°(T) distant 240 miles from Manila
Discussion CINC, Combined Fleet's reaction
Receives 0930 contact report eleven ships (TG 38.3) bearing 086°(T) distant 260 miles Takao
Learns of Allied attack on Manila and of damage claimed

Learns of attack 1040 by Luzon planes on TF 38.4 Claims direct hit on battleship or cruiser. (Actually FRANKLIN hit with slight damage)
Learns that 0930 contact included two carriers
Receives composite estimate 1600 which showed probability of but two carriers off Formosa
Receives additional contact report of four carriers bearing 065°(T) distant 600 miles from Manila.
Now estimates two carriers off Formosa, eight off Luzon - total ten carriers.
Air group attacks 1600 enemy (TG 38.1) and claims hit carrier. (Actually no hits made.)
Learns results of attack 1530 (TG 38.4) by planes of FIFTH Base Air Force and FOURTH Air Army; claimed one large carrier sunk, two carriers afire, one cruiser damaged.
Learns that reconnaissance had discovered in Admiralty Islands, four carriers (including two large carriers, one escort carrier) three battleships, four cruisers, thirteen destroyers, twenty transports.

Discussion
Receives CofS, Combined Fleet Dispatch claiming great success.
Receives information that the I-45, I-54, I-56 had departed Inland Sea for operations against TF 38.

(b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force
Fuels his command.
Receives Cinc, Combined Fleet dispatch advising his command of imminent destruction of TF 38.

(2) Operations of Commander Main Force

(3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force

Passes O730 Bungo Suido with SECOND Striking Force less DESDIV TWENTY-ONE.
Is contacted O746 by BESUGO, DESDIV TWENTY-ONE passes 1030 Bungo Suido.
Is contacted 1107 by BESUGO, both contacts unknown to Commander SECOND Striking Force.

(c) Operations of the Base Air Forces on October 15th
(1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force
Reorganizes his command.
Numerous searches are launched
Discussion
Receives contact report 0400 on carrier task group (four carriers) bearing 060°(T), 240 miles from Manila (TG 38.4)
Fails to receive contact report 0630 on carrier task group (five carriers, three battleships) bearing 210°(T), 120 miles from Miyako (TG 38.1)
Receives report of Formosa plane attack (0900) on carrier dead in water
Receives contact report 0930 eleven ships, destroyers, trailing oil (TG 38.3)
Learns Manila attacked 1025 by eighty enemy aircraft
Learns, 11/7, planes from Philippines had direct hit on battleship or cruiser
Learns that group contacted 0630 had two carriers among eleven ships
Orders all air forces on Formosa to attack above group
Fails to receive contact report 1130 on carrier task group (one large carrier, one medium carrier, one small carrier) (TG 38.1)
Receives report indicating one rather than two carriers in the two carrier group
Receives additional contact report on carrier task group (four carriers bearing 060°(T) distant 600 miles from Manila
Estimates two carriers off Formosa, eight off Luzon; total ten carriers
Learns attack group returns to base because of engine trouble
Discussion
Learns Philippine planes had attacked (1845-1800) task group NE of Manila sinking one carrier, setting afire two carriers, damaging one cruiser
Learns of attack by Okinawa planes on TG 38.1, claims damage unknown
Issues orders for following day (1855)
Learns "T" Force on Kyushu fails attack
Receives CINC, Combined Fleet's orders
to carry on general offensive
Directs forces on Formosa to be ready
on 30 minutes notice after 0600
(2) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base
Air Force
Receives contact report on four car-
riers bearing 0609(T) distant 240
miles from Manila (TG 38.4)
Launches air attack (0930) against
TG 38.4
Manila attacked
Receives report attack on TG 38.4
scores direct hit on battleship
or cruiser
Receives various contact reports
Launches second air attack 1400 against
TG 38.4
Receives contact report 1500 (four
carriers) bearing 0559(T) distant
600 miles from Manila
Now knows of eight carriers off Luzon
possibly three carriers off Manila
Learns second air attack had sunk one
carrier and set flight decks afire
two carriers, damaged one cruiser
Learns Commander TWENTY-SIXTH Air
Flotilla crash dive plane into
carrier thus starting KAMIFAZE units
Launches two additional attacks which
fail to make contact
Receives order continue general
offensive
(d) Operations of CG FOURTH Air Army
(7) Operations on October 16th
(a) Operations of CINC, Combined Fleet
Estimates the situation
Receives contact reports by flying boat on
three separate Allied task groups; also
receives preceding day's reports (a), 0830,
of five carriers bearing 2109(T) distant
120 miles from Miyako (b) 1125, three
carriers and (c) 2107, search planes had
made no contact other than 1125 contact
Discussion
Decides transfer headquarters from Shin-
chiku to Takao

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Receives intelligence dispatch from Imperial General Headquarters warning against (a) attacks by China based air forces on Formosa and Luzon and (b) intensification of Allied submarine activity.

Receives (a) contact report 0920 of two carriers, four battleships SE of Formosa and two battleships, four cruisers, five to six destroyers near 0920 group (b) contact report of four carriers about 600 miles NE Manila (TG 38.1) and (c) contact report 1030 of seven carriers, seven battleships, ten cruisers and destroyers SE of Formosa. Now confronted by at least thirteen carriers.

Re-estimates situation and issues dispatch advising possible counter-attack and directing (1) base air force destroy enemy (2) SECOND Striking Force cooperate with air force operations and (3) submarine units attack enemy.

Discussion this dispatch.

Receives CofS, Combined Fleet dispatch (1226) to Commander SECOND Striking Force.

Learns B-29's are attacking Formosa.

Receives CofS, Combined Fleet directive (1405) to Commander FIRST Striking Force to prepare to sortie and also receives CofS explanatory dispatch.

Discussion these dispatches.

Learns that attack group (107 planes) from Formosa had attacked two carrier task group damaging one carrier, one battleship.

Receives Imperial General Headquarters exaggerated announcement 1730 reporting "eleven carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, one destroyer sunk, six carriers, two battleships, four cruisers, eleven others damaged".

Receives CofS, Combined Fleet dispatch to Commander SECOND Striking Force directing him, if unable make night attack, to retire to Sea.

Discussion this dispatch.
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force

Continues preparations for battle
Receives information Cinc, Combined Fleet has shifted headquarters to Takao
Presumably receives contact reports
Receives CofS, Combined Fleet explanatory dispatch stating plan send FIRST Striking Force to decisive battle with TF 38
Decides dispatch confused
Issues instructions expediting preparations sortie
Cinc, Combined Fleet fails to send oilers to Brunei Bay

(2) Operations of Commander Main Force

(3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force

Issues composite intelligence report
Continues present operations
Refuels destroyers
Receives dispatch warning of attacks by China based air forces on Formosa, Luzon and warning against submarines
Sights Allied fighters, discontinues fueling
Revises (1450) to north
Learns more than six carriers operating east of Formosa
DESDIV TWENTY-ONE sights carrier planes
Receives CofS, Combined Fleet intelligence dispatch concerning location of enemy forces
Practices radio deception using USH10
Receives Cinc, Combined Fleet dispatch advising present situation and directing him cooperate with air force operations

Is attacked with torpedoes 2021 by SKATE but attack not observed
DESDIV TWENTY-ONE rejoins
Contacts SKATE and attacks (ineffective)
HATSUBARU becomes lost in shower
Receives instructions retire Mako if enemy carrier groups intact and night attack impossible
Discussion this dispatch

(c) Operations of the Base Air Forces,
October 16th

(1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force

Receives contact reports by flying boat on three separate Allied task groups. Also receives reports (a) 0830, October 15th, five carriers bearing 210°(T) distant 120 miles Miyako Jima (b) 1125, three carriers (one large carrier, one medium carrier, one small carrier) due east Geran Bt, Formosa

Searches depart

Attack group (ninety-nine planes) departs Kyushu

Estimates situation and issues instructions to SIXTH Base Air Force to regroup, attack and advance full-strength to Formosa for SHO Operation decisive battle

Discussion this order

Acts to replenish aircraft on Formosa

Receives contact report 0820 two carriers, four battleships, and nearby two battleships, four cruisers, five destroyers (TG 30.3),

Orders this force attacked

Presumably learns of four carriers 600 miles NE of Manila

Discussion present situation

Receives contact report 1030 seven carriers, seven battleships, ten cruisers, destroyers SE of Formosa

Estimates situation

Learns Kyushu attack group (ninety-nine planes) had failed attack and had returned base

Learns Formosa attack group (107 planes) has departed

Receives orders Cinc, Combined Fleet to clarify situation, concentrate strength destroy enemy

Receives report B-29's over Formosa B-29's attacked by certain fighters

Discussion change in objective from carriers to B-29's

Becomes concerned over eleven carriers reported south of Okinawa

-xxvii-
Alerts SIXTH Base Air Force to possibility moving forces from Formosa to Okinawa in order better attack TF 38
Presumably learns "T" Force (28 planes) departs 1340 to attack two carrier group
Learns of attack by 70 Formosa planes, out of 102 plane group on two carrier group. Damaged one carrier and one battleship. Actually damaged HOUSTON only
Presumably learns 1430 Philippines (22 plane) attack group had failed to locate target and had returned to base
Receives Imperial Ground Headquarters exaggerated announcement that Japanese had sunk and damaged many Allied ships
Learns "T" Force had returned to base without attacking
Orders night searches
Learns 2030 that afternoon searches had failed to locate enemy
Issues 2117 orders for next day operations
Learns of impending bad weather
Learns that about three-quarters of "T" Force has been lost since October 10th

(2) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force
Receives three contact reports on Allied carrier task groups off Formosa and Manila
Learns that CINC, Combined Fleet shifts headquarters from Shinhuku to Takao
Receives order to clarify situation, concentrate strength and destroy enemy
Learns unit of THIRD Base Air Force ordered to him for duty
Launches, in cooperation with CG FOURTH Air Army, small strike which fails to find target
Weather conditions worsening
(a) Operations of CG FOURTH Air Army
   Receives three contact reports on
   Allied carrier task groups off
   Formosa and Manila
   Makes plans for employment reinforcements,
   expected arrive from Japan, China
   (b) Operations until 0719 October 17th.
   (a) Operations of CINC, Combined Fleet
      Awaits results of night and early morning
      searches
   (b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force
      (1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking
          Force
      (2) Operations of Commander Main Force
      (3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking
          Force
   (c) Operations of Base Air Forces until 0719
       October 17th
      (1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base
          Air Force
         Conducts continuous night searches
         Searches negative
         Launches morning searches
      (2) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base
          Air Force
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      (1) Composition of Forces
         (a) Mobile Force
            (1) Main Force
            (2) SECOND Striking Force
            (3) FIRST Striking Force
         (b) SIXTH Base Air Force
         (c) Advance Expeditionary Force
         (d) South-west Area Force
         (e) Anti-Submarine Patrol
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      (3) Discussion
   (b) Southern Army
      (1) Composition of Forces
         (a) FOURTH Area Army
         (b) FOURTH Air Army
CHAPTER IV

(2) Assigned Tasks
(3) Discussion
(h) Japanese Plan
(1) General Summary

EPILOGUE

* * *

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October 17th, Battle for Leyte Gulf

APPENDIX II Organization of Japanese Forces at O719,
October 17th, Battle for Leyte Gulf

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ALL TIMES IN THIS ANALYSIS, EXCEPT ALLIED DISPATCH TIMES
ARE ZONE TIME (−9)

ALLIED DISPATCH TIMES ARE GREENWICH CIVIL TIME
PRINCIPAL COMMANDERS

ALLIED

(a) Southwest Pacific Area.

Commander Southwest Pacific Area (COMSWESPAC)

Chief of Staff

Commander Allied Air Force SOWESPAC (COMAIRSWESPAC)

Chief of Staff

Commander Allied Naval Forces SOWESPAC (CANNFSWESPAC)

Chief of Staff

Commander SEVENTH FLEET (COMSEVENTHFLT)

Chief of Staff

Commanding General SIXTH Army

Chief of Staff

Commander Central Philippine Attack Force (CTF 77)

Chief of Staff

Commander Bombardment and Fire Support Group (CTG 77.2)

Chief of Staff

General MacArthur, Douglas A., USA

Lt. General Sutherland, Richard K., USA

Lt. General Kenney, George C., (AC) USA

Brigadier General Beebe, Hoyden E., (AC), USA

Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Thomas C., USN

Commodore Schaeffer, Valentine H., USN

Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Thomas C., USN

Commodore Schaeffer, Valentine H., USN

Lt. General Kruger, Walter, USA

Brigadier General Decker, George H., USA

Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Thomas C., USN

Commodore Schaeffer, Valentine H., USN

Rear Admiral Oldendorf, Jesse E., USN

Captain Bates, Richard W., USN

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COMMANDER ESCORT CARRIER GROUP (CTG 77.4)

Chief of Staff

COMMANDER NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE (CTF 78)

Chief of Staff

COMMANDER PALO ATTACK GROUP (CTG 78.1)

Chief of Staff

COMMANDER SAN RICARDO ATTACK GROUP (CTG 78.2)

Chief of Staff

COMMANDER SOUTHERN ATTACK FORCE (CTF 79)

Chief of Staff

COMMANDER ATTACK GROUP ABLE (CTG 79.1)

Chief of Staff

COMMANDER ATTACK GROUP BAKER (CTG 79.2)

Chief of Staff

COMMANDER SUBMARINES SEVENTH FLEET

Chief of Staff

Rear Admiral Sprague, Thomas L., USN

Captain Carson, Joseph M., USN

Rear Admiral Barbey, Daniel E., USN

Commodore Noble, Albert G., USN

Rear Admiral Barbey, Daniel E., USN

Commodore Noble, Albert G., USN

Rear Admiral Fechteler, William M., USN

Captain Sprague, Albert T., Jr., USN

Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Theodore S., USN

Commodore Powell, Paulus P., USN

Rear Admiral Conolly, Richard L., USN

Captain Moore, Walter E., USN

Rear Admiral Royal, Forrest B., USN

Captain Bugen, 'sul F., USN

Rear Admiral Christie, Ralph W., USN

Captain Nichols, Philip G., USN
(b) Pacific Ocean Areas.

CINC Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC)

Chief of Staff

Commander Western Pacific Task Forces

Chief of Staff

Commander THIRD Fleet (COMTHIRDFLT)

Chief of Staff

Commander FIRST Carrier Task Force (CTF 38)

Chief of Staff

Commander Forward Area Central Pacific Task Force (CTF 57)

Chief of Staff

Commander Shore-Based Air Force Forward Area (CTF 59)

Chief of Staff

Commander Submarines Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC) (CTF 17)

Chief of Staff

Rear Admiral Christie, Ralph W., USN

Captain Nichols, Philip G., USN

Admiral Nimitz, Chester W., USN

Vice Admiral Morison, Charles H., USN

Admiral Halsey, William F., USN

Rear Admiral Carney, Robert H., USN

Admiral Halsey, William F., USN

Rear Admiral Carney, Robert B., USN

Vice Admiral Mitscher, Marc A., USN

Commodore Burke, Arleigh A., USN

Vice Admiral Hoover, John H., USN

Captain Scull, Herbert M., USN

Major General Hale, Willis H., (AC), USA

Colonel Carr, Lawrence J., (AC), USA

Vice Admiral Lockwood, Charles A., USN

Commodore Cowles, Merrill, USN
(c) China-Burma-India Area.

CG Army Forces CBI

Chief of Staff

CG FOURTEENTH Air Force

Chief of Staff

CG TWENTIETH Bomber Command

Chief of Staff

General Stilwell,
Joseph W., USA

Brigadier General
Cannon, Robert M., USA

Major General
Chennault, Claire L.,
(AC), USA

Brigadier General
Glenn, Edgar E., USA

Major General LeMay,
Curtis E., (AC), USA

Brigadier General
Upston, John E., USA

JAPANESE

Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet

Chief of Staff

Commander Mobile Force

Chief of Staff

Commander Mobile Force Main Force

Chief of Staff

Commander FIRST Striking Force

Chief of Staff

Admiral Toyoda, Soemu,
IJN

Rear Admiral Kusaka,
Ryunosuke, IJN

Vice Admiral Ozawa,
Jisaburo, IJN

Rear Admiral Furumura,
Keizo, IJN

Vice Admiral Ozawa,
Jisaburo, IJN

Rear Admiral Furumura,
Keizo, IJN

Vice Admiral Kurita,
Takeo, IJN

Rear Admiral Koyanagi,
Tomiji, IJN
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Commander SECOND Striking Force

Chief of Staff

Commander Advance Expeditionary Force

Commander Southwest Area Force

Chief of Staff

Commander THIRD Southern Expeditionary Fleet (Philippines Force)

Chief of Staff

Commander FIFTH Base Air Force

Chief of Staff

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force

Chief of Staff

Cinc Southern Army

CG FOURTH Air Army

Vice Admiral Shima, Kiyohide, IJN

Rear Admiral Matsumoto, Takeshi, IJN

Vice Admiral Miwa, Shigeyoshi, IJN

Vice Admiral Mikawa, Gunichi, IJN

Rear Admiral Mishio, Hideshiko, IJN

Vice Admiral Mikawa, Gunichi, IJN

Rear Admiral Mishio, Hideshiko, IJN

Vice Admiral Teraoka, Kimpai, IJN

Captain Odahara, Toshihiko, IJN

Vice Admiral Fukudome, Shigeru, IJN

Rear Admiral Sugimoto, Shie, IJN

Field Marshal Terauchi, Hisaichi, IJA

Lt. General Tominaga, Kyuji, IJA
INTRODUCTION

The Battle for Leyte Gulf is an action of great interest to students of Naval History for several reasons. It was the first occasion in which Japanese and Allied naval and air forces had engaged in a colossal fleet battle, wherein the entire Japanese Navy supported by Army Air Forces in the Philippines and Formosa engaged the major portion of the Allied Naval and Air Forces in the central and south Pacific theaters with both ships and planes; it was fought in a series of more or less independent but nevertheless closely related actions; it embraced the sixteen days between October 10th, when the Allied carrier task forces struck Okinawa, and October 26th, when the Japanese Fleet finally retired, badly defeated, from battle; it highlighted clearly the problems of command arising from coordinated operations between theater commanders as well as between independent commanders wherein one of those theater or independent commanders is in a supporting role to the other; it was an outstanding tactical and strategic victory for the Allies.

This analysis is concerned with the preliminary phases of the battle commencing with the air strikes by Allied carrier task forces (TF 38) against the Makui Shoto on October 16th and ending with the O'19, October 17th, contact report by Japanese lookouts on Sulu Island on Allied surface forces entering Leyte Gulf. The principal operations during this time were the air strikes by TF 38 against Formosa on October 12th, 13th, and 14th to be known in this analysis as the Battle off Formosa, but known by the Japanese as the Battle of Formosa.

The battle resulted from operations connected with the seizure by the Allies of the Leyte-Western Samar Area of the Philippines and the subsequent efforts by the Japanese to prevent these operations from being successful.

Prior to moving into the Philippines, the original Allied Plan called for the completion (a) by Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC) of STALEMATE II, which involved the capture of Peleliu, Angaur, Ulithi and Yape, and (b) by Commander Southwest Pacific Area (COMSOWESPAC) of INTERLUDE, which involved the capture of Morotai, and of CHAMOON, which involved the capture of Talaud.

* CINCPAC Joint Staff Study, STALEMATE II, July 14th, 1944.
** Director of Naval Records and History, Letter to President, Naval War College, December 18th, 1950.
However, before STALEMATE II and INTERLUDE could be effected, Commander THIRD Fleet, (COMTHIRDFLT) in making carrier-based air strikes on Mindanao preliminary to these operations, noted an unexpected weakness of enemy air resistance on that island. This prompted him to make additional air strikes into the central Philippines. These additional air strikes, made on September 12th and 13th, disclosed a similar weakness in air resistance in the central Philippines. As a consequence, at 1200, September 13th, he recommended by dispatch to CINCPOA, that STALEMATE II be cancelled, and that KING II, the capture of Leyte, which had been scheduled for December 20th, be inaugurated immediately.* CINCPOA, at 1647, replied that Phase I of STALEMATE II, which involved the capture of Peleliu and Angaur, would be carried out as planned, but that consideration was being given to the abandonment of that portion of Phase II which involved the capture of Yap.** CINCPOA also notified COMGOWESPAC of COMTHIRDFLT's proposals. On September 13th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised COMGOWESPAC that they considered the KING II Operation "highly desirable and that it would both advance the progress of the war by many months and simplify arrangements for further operations."*** At 1000, September 14th, CINCPOA informed COMINCH, who informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among other items, that he thought that the capture of Yap was probably no longer necessary and inferred acceptance of an early movement into Leyte.****

Also on September 14th, COMGOWESPAC concurring that Yap should be bypassed, but stated that more information concerning current air actions was necessary before he could make a final decision.***** This message was received in Washington at 0330, Eastern Daylight Time (zone 4) September 14th.

On September 15th, COMGOWESPAC advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in view of the latest report from COMTHIRDFLT concerning air operations in the Philippines, he (COMGOWESPAC) was ready to initiate KING II at once with target date of October 20th.****** This message was received in Washington at 2128, Eastern Daylight Time, September 14th.

* COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 130300, September 1944, to CINCPOA info COMGOWESPAC and COMINCH.
** CINCPOA Dispatch 130747, September 1944, to COMTHIRDFLT info COMGOWESPAC and COMINCH.
*** Joint Chiefs of Staff Dispatch No. 24, September 13th, 1944, to COMGOWESPAC.
**** CINCPOA Dispatch 140101, September 1944 to COMINCH.
***** COMGOWESPAC Dispatch C17907, September 14th, 1944 to Joint Chiefs of Staff.
****** COMGOWESPAC Dispatch No. C17744, September 1944 to Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On September 15th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were at Quebec attending the Octagon Conference, approved and advanced KING II, from December 20th to October 20th.* This message was received in Washington at 2327, Eastern Daylight Time, September 14th.

The landings, therefore, on Peleliu and Morotai, took place on September 15th as scheduled, and the operation for the capture of Angaur, followed on September 17th. Meanwhile, COMTHIRDPCTF decided to go ahead with the seizure of Ulithi, which, while included in Phase II of STALEMATE II, was apparently but lightly defended. All of the above operations were highly successful. Morotai fell on September 15th with negligible resistance, Angaur, on September 20th and Ulithi, on September 23rd with no resistance whatsoever, and Peleliu, on October 15th after a very bloody and costly operation.

Up to this time the Japanese had been steadily defeated by Allied forces, both in the western central Pacific and in the southwestern Pacific, with the consequent loss of vital strategic areas. With their great defeat in June in the First Battle of the Philippine Sea, and with the ensuing loss of the Marianas they had finally realized that the time had come to take a firm stand. They had therefore planned a series of defensive operations, known as the "SO" (Victory) operations, which were designed to deny to the Allies a foothold in the "last ditch" island chain bastion of the Japanese Empire. This bastion extended from the Empire through the Nansei Shoto, Formosa, and the Philippines and, on occasions, included the Bonin Islands. The Japanese clearly perceived that should this bastion be broken at any important place, such as the Philippines, industrial Japan and the resources of the southern areas would be forever separated. They divided this major area into four specific areas and prepared plans which prescribed the action to be taken should the Allies attempt landing operations within any of these lesser areas. These four areas were (a) the Philippines (termed SHO One), (b) the Formosa, Nansei Shoto, southern Kyushu area (termed SHO Two), (c) the Kyushu, Shikoku and Honshu area, which on occasion embraced areas around the Bovins (termed SHO Three), and the Hokkaido area (termed SHO Four). These plans, which were quite complete, provided for "holding this line right where it was by committing all of the Navy and as much of the Army and air strength as could be made available into a finish fight."** Each plan was to be an all-out effort.

With the commencement of the Allied air strikes against the Nansei Shoto, Formosa and northern Luzon, the Japanese did not activate the SHO operations. Instead, as will be discussed later, they activated the base air forces only and endeavored to defeat the Allied carrier force by land-based air power alone. These countermeasures culminated in the Battle off Formosa.

* Joint Chiefs of Staff Dispatch Octagon 31A to COMCICSPAC, CINCPAC.
** Campaigns of the Pacific War, USSBS Naval Analysis Division, 1946, page 281.
A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE PRELIMINARY PHASES OF THE BATTLE FOR
LEYTE GULF INCLUDING THE BATTLE OFF FORMOSA

The directive of the Joint Chief of Staff to COMSOWESPAC and CINCPOA on September 15th put into effect the Allied plan for the capture of Leyte commencing on October 20th. This plan required that large amphibious forces be assembled in Manus, Admiralty Islands, and Hollandia, New Guinea, under COMSOWESPAC, and strong carrier forces in the Western Pacific largely based at Ulithi, Manus and Saipan, under CINCPOA. These forces were to be supported by (a) powerful land-based air forces operating from the recently captured Mariamas, Palau, Morotai, Biak, northern Solomons, and from bases located at Darwin, Australia, in China, and in certain of the Netherlands Indier, (b) powerful submarine forces operating along the Japanese line of communications from Japan to the Netherlands Indies.

Although the Allies had planned their operations with secrecy, the Japanese, through their knowledge of Allied operations and through certain intelligence information, had formed a fairly accurate opinion as to when the Allies would move into the southern Philippines. They had not only established this time as during or after the last ten days in October, but, in addition, had forecast that such landing operations would be preceded by vast carrier-based air strikes to destroy the Japanese air strength in southern Kyushu, Hansel Shoto, Formosa, and the Philippines.

The Japanese planned to defeat the Allied operations by the employment of (a) land-based air power, (b) a powerful surface force (FIRST Striking Force) operating out of Lingko-Singapore, (c) a carrier task force (Main Force) and a light surface force (SECOND Striking Force), both operating out of the Inland Sea, and (d) by submarine forces operating in the objective area.

The Allied plan became effective, insofar as the Japanese were concerned, October 10th, for, on that date, TF 38, consisting of four task groups (TG's 38.1, 38.2, 38.3, and 38.4) struck Okinawa. The Japanese had expected an attack by carrier-based planes in this area at this time and had not only alerted the area to this possibility but had retired their principal air attack force—the "7" Force—from southern Kyushu to more secure bases in order to protect it from the impending attack. Despite the fact that American air attacks were expected, this attack found the Japanese CinC Combined Fleet at Shinchiku, Formosa, instead of at his headquarters near Tokyo.

(1) Operations on October 10th at Hansel Shoto.

The American attack consisted primarily of four large successive air strikes preceded by a fighter sweep and supported by
several aerial searches. A total of 1398 sorties were made for all purposes.

This attack caused considerable destruction to Japanese planes, facilities and shipping. The Japanese admitted losing thirty-six naval planes, including five search planes, on Okinawa alone, and also admitted losing all army planes in the objective area. The Americans, on the other hand, lost twenty-one planes from all causes.

As a result of this attack on Okinawa, the Japanese alerted SHO One and SHO Two for the Base Air Forces only, and ordered (a) all operational planes of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR to prepare for land-based operations, (b) the SECOND Striking Force to prepare to sortie, and (c) the SIXTH Base Air Force to destroy the enemy.

As a result of numerous searches, the Japanese succeeded on this date in making contact at 1533 on one three-carrier task group, and at 1540 on another two-carrier task group, which groups were roughly forty miles apart. The Japanese were unable to exploit these contacts.

While TF 36 was making the above strikes, the first unit of the Allied amphibious forces, the minesweeping group, departed Manus for Leyte.

During this time the Allied submarines sank several merchant ships. The Japanese submarines were generally in port and the few at sea made no contacts.

(2) Operations on October 11th against Aparri, Luzon.

COMTHIRDMFLT on this date fueled TF 36 and launched one search of eight planes and an afternoon air attack of sixty-three planes against Aparri. The attack on Aparri, which gained surprise, was successful, destroying by American claims, since Japanese reports are not available, fifteen Japanese planes and damaging facilities. The Americans lost seven planes, of which six were operational losses. The search was negative.

While TF 36 was accomplishing the above, Tractor Groups ABLE and BAKER of the Southern Attack Force of the amphibious forces departed Manus for Leyte.

During this day the Japanese received a number of reports locating the task groups of TF 36 with reasonable accuracy. Since these locations were generally in the direction of the Philippines, the Japanese cancelled the sortie alert for the SECOND Striking Force, and ordered certain submarines to sea to attack TF 36 off Formosa. The first submarine did not depart on this mission until two days later.

The Allied submarines, on this date, made several contacts on convoys and sank several merchant ships. The Japanese submarines were generally in port and the few at sea made no contacts.
(3) Operations on October 12th, 13th and 14th (Battle off Formosa).

(a) Operations on October 12th.

COMFHULPLT on this day commenced his operations against Formosa. The American attack, as on October 10th, consisted primarily of four large successive air strikes preceded by a fighter sweep and supported by several small air searches. A total of 1378 sorties were made for all purposes.

This attack did not effect surprise, since the Japanese had been alerted. The American pilots met determined air opposition but achieved very successful results. They lost in this attack forty-eight planes from all causes.

As a consequence of this attack, the Japanese activated SHO One and SHO Two for the Base Air Forces only. This was a serious deviation from the SHO plans for the Combined Fleet, which plans called for the retirement of the principal air forces from the objective area during the earlier phases of carrier attacks so that they would be available for the simultaneous all-out attack of all forces. Such simultaneous employment of all forces, both surface and air, including land and carrier-based aircraft, was to be used only against an Allied landing at the time of landing.

In addition to this, the Japanese placed the operational aircraft of CAGDIV's Three and Four and the entire fighter strength of the China Air Fleet under the operational command of their Base Air Force Commander in Formosa. They also attacked TF 38 with their "T" Force (11C1 attack planes) and claimed ten ships set afire, of which four (carriers) sank. The Japanese lost in this attack some forty-two planes. However, they believed, because of these claims, that their land-based aircraft was effective against TF 38. Actually, no ship of TF 38 received any damage whatsoever.

A lloyd submarines made some merchant ship contacts and torpedoed one destroyer. Japanese submarines at sea made no important contacts.

During this day the San Ricardo Attack Group of the Northern Attack Force departed Manus for Leyte and the Dinagat Attack Group departed Hollandia for Leyte.

(b) Operations on October 13th.

COMFHULPLT successfully attacked Formosa in a manner similar to that of the preceding day excepting that he launched three, rather than four, successive air strikes, supported by several limited air searches. A total of 974 sorties were made.

TF 38 lost twelve planes in these attacks.

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During the day the Japanese transferred the operational aircraft of CARIVI's THREE and FOUR to Formosa. This practically insured that those planes would not be returned to the carriers.

Also during the day the Japanese High Command evaluated the proceeding day's attack on TF 38 by the "T" Force as "two enemy ships sunk; two moderately damaged." This was well below the original estimate.

The Japanese made numerous contacts on the task groups of TF 38 throughout the day. During the day they launched a 170-plane attack group composed of both Army and Navy planes from the Philippines to attack the American task force, but the attack was not made. At evening twilight the "T" Force (forty-three planes) attacked TG's 38.1 and 38.4 and claimed having sunk three carriers, one battleship, one cruiser, and having damaged two carriers. The Japanese High Command evaluated this attack as "six ships sunk or set afire." Actually they had torpedoed the CANBERRA and had inflicted slight damage to the FRANKLIN. The Japanese admitted losing in this attack, from various causes, twenty out of the forty-three planes. Because of the reported success of this attack and because of the American attacks on Formosa, the Japanese decided to launch a general air offensive on the following day against TF 38. Meanwhile, COMAIRPAC decided to save the CANBERRA, formed a protective group, the CANBERRA Group, to escort it to safety, and covered it with three task groups. He ordered the fourth task group, TG 38.4 to attack northern Luzon.

During the day the Pala Attack Group, the Harbor Entrance Patrol Group, and certain units of the invasion Attack Group, all of the Northern Attack Force, plus the Close Covering Group of the Philippines Attack Force, departed Hollandia for Leyte.

The Allied submarines conducted a number of merchant ships and sank several Japanese submarines at sea, made no important contacts. One submarine departed 71's 1.3 sea for operations against TF 38.

(a) Operations on October 14th.

On this day COMAIRPAC attacked Formosa with three out of four task groups but made only one strike. This strike, consisting of 246 planes, was designed to reduce the possibility of effective air attack against the CANBERRA Group which he had designated as TG 30.6. At this same time the Luzon task group, TG 38.4, attacked Aparri with twenty-four planes. A similar attack against Lauag failed because of bad weather.

Upon completion of the strike on Formosa, TG's 38.2 and 38.3 retired towards their fueling rendezvous. TG 38.1 remained to cover TG 30.6.

During and because of the attack, TF 38 lost (a) on Formosa, twenty-three planes, and (b) on Aparri, six planes.
Meanwhile Formosa was attacked about midday by 106 B-29s of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command operating from China. These B-29s did considerable damage in the Takao area losing two planes operationally.

The Japanese maintained contact on TF 38 throughout the day. Commencing in the late forenoon, planes to assist in the general attack commenced departing their bases. In addition the SECOND Striking Force was ordered to sea to destroy enemy ships which might be crippled by the general attack. Including the reconnaissance planes a total of 360 planes were launched by the Japanese for a daylight attack against TF 38.

Some of these planes, in poor weather, attacked TG's 38.2 and 38.3 inflicting slight damage on HANCOCK. However, many units failed to make contact.

An additional fifty-two planes of the "T" Force were launched for a dusk attack. These planes struck TG 38.1 as scheduled and caused sinking one large carrier, one small carrier, one escort carrier, one battleship, one heavy cruiser. Most claims were made by Army pilots. Actually the only damage done was the torpedoing of the HOUSTON, CONTREFFLIT decided to save the HOUSTON, and formed a protective group, the HOUSTON Group, to escort it to safety.

The Japanese, in a revised estimate of damage inflicted by "T" Force on October 12th and 13th, claimed having sunk (a) October 12th, six to eight carriers, and (b) October 13th, three to five carriers. This was a total of from nine to thirteen carriers.

During this day Attack Groups ABLE and BAKER of TF 79 departed Manus for Leyte.

The Allied submarines on this date made a number of contacts on merchant shipping and sank several ships. Japanese submarines at sea made no important contacts.

(d) Summary:

CTF 38 believed that he had destroyed in the Battle off Formosa 655 Japanese planes in the air, on the ground or in the water. Japanese data indicates a probability that they lost 492 planes, including 100 Army planes of all types. In addition there was heavy damage to shipping and aircraft facilities but records available as to the nature and magnitude of this damage provide meager information.

(4) Operations on October 15th.

The Japanese on this date commenced a series of broadcasts wherein they claimed the destruction of virtually all of the THIRD Fleet.
At this same time COMTHIRDELEMT received word that the Japanese believed TP 38 to be retiring because of their air attacks and had ordered carriers and surface vessels operating in cooperation with the base air forces to destroy the enemy. COMTHIRDELEMT decided to comply with his basic instructions to "destroy major portion of the enemy fleet" and, employing TG 30.2 as a lure, endeavored to obtain a fleet action. At the same time he advised COMCOWKSPAC that no fast carriers would be available to support KING II until further notice. He ordered TG's 38.7 and 38.3 to complete fueling and then to assume a covering position over the retiring forces and to launch searches on the following morning.

Meanwhile CONKINCENTLEMT decided to proceed with KING II, CINCPAC redispersed his submarines to provide reconnaissance, and CTG 30.3 closed the HOUSTON Group and merged with it making it a composite TG 30.2.

On this day CTG 38.4 attacked Luzon (Manila area) and claimed having destroyed forty-four planes. The Japanese counter-attacked and thought that in two attacks they had sunk one carrier, set fire to two carriers, and hit one battleship and one cruiser. Actually, the only damage they had done was to damage slightly the FRANKLIN. In making these attacks, the Japanese lost an additional fifty-six planes.

The American submarine NESUGO on this date made contact at 0746 on what she reported later as three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser (it was actually two heavy cruisers and four destroyers) passing through Bungo Suido, and at 1107 on one heavy cruiser and one destroyer (actually three destroyers) also passing through Bungo Suido. These two contacts composed the SECOND STRIKING FORCE. The Commanding Officer NESUGO, owing to the fact that it was necessary to remain submerged, did not make any contact reports until 1914. The Japanese submarines at sea made no important contacts. Three of them departed this date from the Inland Sea for operations against TF 38.

The Japanese made a number of vital contacts on Allied task forces throughout the day which, when evaluated with the results of the attacks by Philippine planes on TG 38.4, showed that there were two carriers off Formosa and more than six off Luzon, or a total of at least eight carriers.

Also on this day the Japanese learned, quite incorrectly, through reconnaissance that there were four carriers, three battleships, four cruisers, thirteen destroyers, and twenty transports anchored in Admiralty Islands. This reassured them as to the prospects of an immediate landing even though eight carriers had been observed off Formosa-Luzon.

During this day the Fleet Flagship Unit departed Hollandia for Leyte.
(5) Operations on October 16th.

COMTHIRDPVT continued preparations for fleet action. TG's 38.2 and 38.3 had arrived at their morning rendezvous at Latitude 22°.00'N, Longitude 120°.00'E and had launched morning air searches from the BUNKER HILL, HANCOCK and ESSEX. At about noon, since the morning searches were negative, COMTHIRDPVT decided that the possibility of fleet action requiring all task groups of TF 38 was remote. He therefore issued instructions to certain of the carrier task groups directing them to carry out operations against the Philippines. However, during the afternoon his air searches contacted at 1825 the SECOND Striking Force (two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and seven destroyers) which they reported as two battleships, one light cruiser and seven destroyers.

COMTHIRDPVT received this report in such a garbled form that he lost one hour and thirty-five minutes in clarifying it. This saved the SECOND Striking Force from air attack.

Meanwhile COMTHIRDPVT directed TG 38.1 to proceed to support TG 38.2 and 38.3, but later cancelled these orders and directed TG 38.1, who had fueled, to proceed to Latitude 21°.00'N, Longitude 127°.00'E where he was to launch a search to the west and northwest the following morning. He also directed the INDEPENDENCE to launch night air searches to the northward to pick up the enemy, but the search was ineffective.

His fourth task group, TG 38.4, fueled and received replacement aircraft and pilots and then headed for a strike position off central Luzon for the following morning.

TG 30.3 continued on towards Ulithi.

On the morning of this day the Japanese CINC, Combined Fleet learned that there were not less than twelve carriers in the Formosa-Luzon area, of which six were off Formosa and six off Luzon. In view of this unsatisfactory situation he shifted his headquarters from Shinchiku to Takao. At Takao he received other reports which showed thirteen rather than twelve carriers. This indicated that the base air forces had failed in their efforts to destroy the American carrier force. However, despite this, the Japanese ordered the FIRST Striking Force to prepare for sorties from Lingga for possible action against TF 38.

Meanwhile the Japanese launched a seventy-plane dusk attack against TG 30.3, of which twenty-seven planes were reported shot down. This attack torpedoed the HOUSTON for the second time.

During the early evening Japanese Imperial Headquarters advised, in a grossly exaggerated report, that the Japanese forces were continuing to pursue the fleeing enemy task force, that they had sunk eleven carriers, two battleships, three cruisers and one destroyer and
had damaged six carriers, two battleships, four cruisers and twelve ships of undetermined type.

During the day fifty-nine B-29's of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command operating from China attacked southwestern Formosa, doing considerable damage.

Also during this day the Cruiser Unit of the Flagship Group, and Reinforcement Group ONE departed Hollandia separately for Leyte.

The Allied submarines made a number of contacts on small enemy units such as destroyers. The BESUGO damaged the SUZUTSUKI with torpedoes. Japanese submarines at sea made no important contacts.

(6) Operations until 0719 October 17th.

During the early morning of the 17th, and until 0719, the Japanese were engaged primarily in reorganizing their shattered air forces and in endeavoring, by night searches, to regain contact on TF 38. However, their searches were all negative, which may have convinced them that TF 38 was in fact retiring. Actually, the searches were poor and failed to discover the three task groups (TG's 38.1, 38.2, and 38.3) which were in the area searched.

Meanwhile, COMFIFTHFLT, in view of the fact that his intelligence indicated that there was little probability of a fleet action since only limited forces had been observed and these were without carriers, decided to go ahead with his covering responsibilities for KING II and commenced preparing directives in accordance with this decision.

At this same time, SEVENTH Fleet naval forces were approaching the entrance to Leyte Gulf. At 0719, October 17th, the Division Attack Group, the Minesweeping Group and the Escort Carrier Group were in position to seize Sulu Island.
CHAPTER I

STRATEGIC AREA

(a) GENERAL DISCUSSION

The strategic area involved in both the combat and support operations for the capture of the Island of Leyte, Philippine Islands extended roughly from the Inland Sea in Japan southward to northern Australia and from the Marianas, Palau, and Admiralty Islands westward to the eastern shores of the Asiatic continent.

The strategic area involved in the actual combat operations generally embraced the Philippine Islands, the water surrounding them, the two east-west water routes through them and the air space over the islands and the waters contiguous thereto.

The Philippine Islands consist of some 7000 islands stretching approximately 1150 miles north and south and some 680 miles east and west. They lie as a barrier between the east coast of Asia and the Pacific. The northernmost tip of Luzon is less than 200 miles from Formosa while the southern coast of Mindanao is forty-three miles north of the Island of Kaviol, Netherlands East Indies. The northern coast of Luzon is only 405 miles from Hong Kong.

The absolute necessity of controlling this area and the sea areas to the westward was apparent to the Japanese before the start of the war, for it was clear to them that whoever controlled the Philippines controlled those areas of the South China Sea within range of Philippine-based fighter aircraft. A prime reason for the war, from the Japanese viewpoint, was the necessity for improving the Japanese economy by obtaining the vast natural resources of Southeast Asia, called the Southern Resources Area. This had necessitated not only the seizure of the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya and Burma, which were the principal sources of vital strategic materials, but also the keeping open of the sea lanes from these areas to the homeland itself. These two requirements had necessitated the capture of the Philippines also.**

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* A considerable portion of the information contained in this chapter was obtained from United States Coast Pilot, Philippine Islands, Parts I and II, Third Edition 1939; from Naval War College Strategic Area Study of Southeast Asia, August 1st, 1950.

** The Campaigns of the Pacific War, USSBS Naval Analysis Division, 1946, page 3; also Summary Report (Pacific War, USSBS, July 1st 1946, pages 1 and 2.
If this was so at the commencement of the war, how much more was it so in October 1944? At this time, the Japanese were in serious straits. Owing to the operations of Allied submarines and of Allied carrier and shore-based aircraft, these sea lanes were becoming less and less secure. This had affected both the Japanese economy and the Japanese military machine with a creeping paralysis. The Japanese realized that should the Philippines-Formosa-Mandai Shoto line be pierced, these lines of communication would be completely severed.*

Shortage of oil alone had already had a serious effect on the division of Japanese naval forces at a most inopportune time. Owing to the fact that the Japanese oil stocks in the Empire were very low, it had become necessary to base the principal units of the Combined Fleet at Lingga Anchorage, Netherlands East Indies, where there was an abundance of oil. However, this could not be done with the Japanese carrier forces at this time because there was a shortage of carrier pilots and of replacement aircraft. Until these pilots had completed their training and the replacement aircraft could be obtained, the carrier force would have to remain in the Empire. CINCPAC, Combined Fleet was therefore forced to divide his fleet so that the carrier forces remained in the Inland Sea while the heavy surface forces based at Lingga.* As a consequence, these two principal forces were at the time of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, roughly 2500 miles apart.

Therefore, in order that the lines of communication might be held open, it became vitally necessary for the Japanese to continue to hold the strategic area of the Philippines.

To the Allies, the capture of the Philippines would be an important step in the conquest of Japan. Here the two prongs of the Central Pacific forces and the Southwest Pacific forces would come together to provide a base suitable to support later operations either against the China coast, or directly toward Japan itself. The Allies realized that possession of the Philippines would not only completely cut off Japan from her southern sources of material, but would isolate the remaining Japanese garrisons in Southeast Asia. They further realized that re-occupation of the islands by American forces was necessary if the pledge of independence made to the Filipinos prior to the war was to be observed.

It should be clear then that, as the holding of the Philippines was of the utmost importance to the Japanese, and as its seizure by the Allies was part of the Allied strategic plan, the strategic area of the Philippines was destined to become one of the major battle areas of the war.

* The Campaign in the Pacific War, USSBS, July 1st 1946, Chapter XII, page 200.
The location of the principal Japanese and Allied naval and air forces relative to Sulu Island at the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf was, in air miles, as follows:

- Peleliu Island, Palau Islands (A) 555
- Manus Island, Admiralty Islands (A) 1430
- Hollandia, New Guinea (A) 1200
- Formosa (J) 750
- Ulithi Islands (A) 825
- Biak Island, Netherlands East Indies (A) 920
- Morotai Island, Netherlands East Indies (A) 620
- Lingga Anchorage, Netherlands East Indies (J) 1430
- Bungo Suido (NE of Kyushu) Japan (J) 1375
- Manila, Luzon Island, Philippine Islands (J) 375
- Darwin, Australia (A) 1410
- Saipan, Marianas Islands (A) 1200

(A) American
(J) Japanese

(b) LEYTE GULF

Leyte Gulf is bounded on the west by Leyte Island; on the north by Samar Island and on the south by the northern tip of Dinagat Island and the northern entrance to Surigao Strait. It is roughly a square forty miles on a side and is of moderate depth ranging from fifty to seventy fathoms at its center. To the north and west, its ten fathom curve is within one to three miles of the beach.

To the northwest from the Gulf are San Pedro Bay and San Juanico Strait, which separate Leyte from Samar. The Bay, which is actually a portion of Leyte Gulf is about eleven miles across at its entrance, is shallow and encumbered by many islets, reefs and shoals. The Strait, which connects the Bay with the Samar Sea north of Leyte, is about twelve miles in length and one-quarter to one-half miles in width, narrowing in two places to 200 yards. It varies in depth averaging between five and fifteen fathoms. Due to its width and its shoals, it can accommodate only minor vessels and small craft.

There are two channels into the Gulf from the Pacific. The northeast channel between Samar Island and Homonhon Island is nine miles wide with depths of at least nine fathoms. Rip-tides and overfalls are present. The southeast channel, also known as Surigao Strait East, which is the preferable channel, is fifteen miles wide with depths generally of twenty fathoms or more.
(c) PASSAGES THROUGH THE PHILIPPINES

The two principal passes from the South China Sea into the Pacific Ocean through the Philippines are: (1) Northern Route and (2) Southern Route. Both of these routes are suitable for large ships, although each has areas of restricted waters too narrow to permit passage of formations other than column.

(1) Northern Route

Ships using this route generally enter the Sibuyan Sea either north or south of Mindoro. Entering north of Mindoro the route passes through Verde Island Passage and south of Marinduque Island. Entering south of Mindoro, the route transits Tahlas Strait. After passing through the Sibuyan Sea the route passes between Masbate and Burias where the Pass (Masbate Pass) has a minimum width of seven miles; thence north of Ticao, and through Ticao Pass into the southern entrance of San Bernardino Strait. The southern entrance of this strait is the most restricted area on the route. This is because the strait entrance has three channels; one between Luzon and Capul Island; one between Capul Island and Dalupiri Island and one between Dalupiri Island and Samar. The usual pass is between Luzon and Capul Island. Waters in the strait, as elsewhere along the route, are deep but during the northeast monsoon, usually beginning in October, heavy seas and rip-tides are encountered.

(2) Southern Route

In traversing the southern route, vessels may enter the Sulu Sea either north or south of Palawan. In the south the principal channel is through Balabac Strait passing just south of Balabac Island thence through Masbate Channel into the Sulu Sea. In the north the principal channel is through Mindoro Strait which is divided into two wide passes; through Apo East or West Pass and into the Sulu Sea. Thence, the route enters the Mindanao Sea through a fifteen mile opening south of Negros Island and passes eastward through that sea to the southern entrance of Surigao Strait. This entrance is the narrowest part of the strait, being nine miles from the southeast coast of Panaon Island to the nearest tip of Mindanao. The Strait runs approximately thirty-five miles north to Hiburon Island which divides the north entrance into Leyte Gulf into two passes. The pass between Leyte and Hiburon Island is about twelve miles in width; that between Hiburon and Dinagat is three miles. Surigao Strait is deep with the shores on either side steep-to. During the period of the northeast monsoon, winds in the strait may be strong, but usually cease during the night. With such a wind, rain is frequent. In general there is no very bad weather in Surigao Strait. The characteristic of this strait will be discussed more fully during the study of the Battle of Surigao Strait.

CONFIDENTIAL
(d) WEATHER

Weather in the Philippine area is predominantly maritime in character and primarily affected by three different air currents. During the months of March, April and often February and May, the trade wind carries a moderate breeze from the east. This is associated with generally fair weather and clear skies although thunderstorms are frequent. For six months, from May to October, the trade wind is displaced by the south-west monsoon which is a deflection of the southern hemisphere trade winds. This is the season of cloudy weather and rain, although most of the rain is dissipated on the west side of the Philippines and relatively little reaches the east coast. It is also the season for typhoons. During October the southwest monsoon gives way to the stronger and more constant northeast monsoon which prevails from November until early March. This wind brings cooler temperatures, the annual minimum ranging from 61°F to 65°F. It also brings rain to the east coast with maximum rainfall at Leyte and Samar occurring during November - March. The transition period between the two monsoons is of about two weeks duration.

(1) Typhoons

A weather element having significant influence in the Philippine area is the occurrence of typhoons. Although they may be encountered throughout the year, most of these storms appear during the period of the southwest monsoon from May to November, with September being the month of most frequent typhoons followed by October and November. Winds can attain a velocity of 70-150 knots, and these storms are accompanied by violent seas, heavy rain and very heavy surf. In October, as many as three pass over the Philippines while in November as many as two may do so. Frequently, such storms forming either in the China Sea or in the western Pacific may recurve so as to pass clear of the islands, but their effect in high winds and surf can seriously interfere with operations.

Since practically all typhoons which affect Philippine weather move toward the islands from the southeast, shipping moving from western Pacific bases should have warning of the existence of a typhoon approaching the Philippines in sufficient time to modify plans as necessary.

(2) Weather In October

The month of October is one of variable weather on the east coast of the Philippines. Until the northeast monsoon develops, the equatorial front, lying across Mindanao, will produce cloudy overcast skies with frequent showers and poor visibility. As this front is moved southward by the strengthening of the northwest monsoon, weather will be partly cloudy with scattered showers and good visibility. During the latter part of the period, the rainy season may commence on the east coast, brought on by the moist air of the northeast monsoon. About twenty days with rain are usual in the Leyte area, causing an average
of nine inches of rainfall during the month. There are almost no clear
days in the Leyte area during October; about twenty being cloudy and
only eight partly cloudy. In general, visibility is good. (See Plate I)

(3) Winds In October

Except during the typhoon or storm conditions, winds along the
east coast in October are light and variable. Sea and land breezes pre-
vail with frequent early morning calms. Operations from small carriers
are difficult at times due to lack of wind. The most probable wind is
northeasterly.
CHAPTER II

ALLIED ARRANGEMENTS

(a) ALLIED COMMAND RELATIONS (PlATE II)

(1) General Discussion

The entire Pacific area had been designated as an area of U.S.
strategic responsibility. This area had been divided into three large
areas: The Southwest Pacific, the Southeast Pacific and the Pacific
Ocean; the latter being further subdivided into the North, Central
and South Pacific areas. **

The boundary between the Southwest Pacific area and the Pacific
Ocean area was the same as it had been when originally established in
1942 with the exception that the modification made in July, 1942 in
connection with the seizure of Guadalcanal still remained. The original
boundary ran from Cape Kani (Luichow Peninsula) south to Latitude
20°-00'N; thence east to Longitude 130°-00'E; thence south to the Equator;
thence east to Longitude 165°-00'E; south to Latitude 10°-00'S; southwest-
erly to Latitude 17°-00'S, Longitude 160°-00'E; thence south. The
Guadalcanal modification changed the boundary 165°-00'E to 159°-00'E.***

(a) Pacific Ocean Area (POA)

The Pacific Ocean area was under the command of a Commander-
in-Chief, CINCPAC, who had been assigned basic tasks on April 3rd, 1942
as follows:**

(1) Hold the inland positions between United States and
Southwest Pacific area necessary for security of line of communications
between these regions and for supporting naval, air and amphibious
operations against Japanese forces.

(2) Support operations of forces in Southwest Pacific area.

** The time of receipt of many Allied dispatches has been generally un-
available to this analysis. Often the time of receipt is known for
one command but is not known for other commands. In order to com-
penate for this, it has been assumed from an average time of receipt
of a number of important dispatches that, unless otherwise stated,
important dispatches concerning operations were received by action
addressees in one half hour. Such assumed times of receipt are indi-
cated by the phrase "at about." While this assumption may seem
somewhat generous, a study of this analysis will show that the result
of later receipt (such as one hour or more) would have caused little
or no change in the basic study.

*** SECONA V Letter (SC) 126-3(28), April 20th, 1942, Enclosure (B).
**** SECONA V Letter (SC) 126-3(28), April 20th, 1942, Annex to Enclosure
(A), as modified by SECONA V Letter, Serial 029100A, July 1942.
(3) Contain Japanese forces within the Pacific Theater.

(4) Support the defense of the continent of North America.

(5) Protect essential sea and air communications.

(6) Prepare for execution of major amphibious offensives against positions held by Japan initially to be launched from South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas.

In connection with the above, he was ordered to exercise direct command of the combined armed forces in the North and Central Pacific areas.* The Battle for Leyte Gulf was fought almost entirely in the Southwest Pacific area in a position due west of the Central Pacific area. Pacific Ocean Area forces engaged in the battle entered the Southwest Pacific area from the Central Pacific in accordance with coordination agreements between COMSOWESPA and CINCPAC. These Central Pacific forces remained under the direct command of CINCPAC.

CINCPAC was Admiral Chester W. Nimitz who on May 8th, 1942 had assumed command of all land, sea and air forces in the Pacific Ocean Area except the land defenses of New Zealand.** His headquarters were at Pearl Harbor.

(b) Southwest Pacific Area (SOWESPA)

The Southwest Pacific area was under the command of a Supreme Commander, COMSOWESPA, who had on April 3rd, 1942 - in the same dispatch which had assigned tasks to CINCPAC - been assigned basic tasks as follows:

(1) Hold the key military regions of Australia as bases for future offensive action against Japan and in order to check Japanese conquest in his area.

(2) Check enemy advance toward Australia and its essential lines of communication by destruction of enemy combatant troops and supply ships, aircraft and bases in Eastern Malaysia and New Guinea, Bismarck, Solomons Islands region.

(3) Exert economic pressure on enemy by destruction of shipping transporting materials to Japan.

(4) Maintain our position in the Philippines.

* COMNCH Dispatch 031905, April, 1942, to CINCPAC.

** War Diary CINCPAC, May 1942.
(5) Protect communications within Southwest Pacific area and its close approaches.

(6) Route shipping in that area.

(7) Support operations of friendly forces in Pacific Ocean area and Indian theater.

(8) Prepare to take the offensive.

It will be observed that the basic tasks assigned CINCPAC in April 1942, while still applicable in 1944, were in the process of becoming obsolete, and that those assigned COMSOWESPAC were, in fact, obsolete. It is not clear why the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not assign to both CINCPAC and COMSOWESPAC new basic tasks more suitable to the strategic situation which existed in the Pacific in the early fall of 1944. The Joint Staff Planners and the Joint War Plans Committee were fully aware of this need and had recommended new basic tasks as early as February 1944 but the original directives remained unchanged at the time of the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

COMSOWESPAC was General Douglas MacArthur, who had assumed command of that area on April 18th, 1942. His headquarters were at Hollandia, New Guinea.

The Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area (COMSOWESPAC) had organized his theater forces into a number of components: naval, air and ground, each under a commander who reported directly to him. He had as his naval commander a United States naval officer,** designated Commander Allied Naval Forces Southwest Pacific Area, who was vested with all powers customarily granted to the Commanders-in-Chief of Fleets. Under this commander were all of the naval forces of the Allied Nations in the Southwest Pacific area.*** He had as his air commander an officer of the Air Corps, U.S. Army,*** who was designated Commander Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area. This officer commanded all of the land-based air forces attached to SOWESPAC. As his ground commander, he had a general officer of the Australian Army,**** who was designated Commander Allied Land Forces, Southwest Pacific Area. This officer, however, unlike the commanders of Allied Naval Forces and Allied Air Forces, did not command all land forces in the theater. The U.S. SIXTH

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* Joint Chiefs of Staff 732, Joint Planning Staff Report "Modification in Basic Directives to Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area and to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas," February 25th, 1944.
** Vice Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN.
*** SECNAV Letter (SC) 16-3(28), April 20th, 1942, page 1.
**** Lieut. General George C. Kenney (AC), USA.
***** General Sir Thomas Blamey.
Army, the U.S. EIGHTH Army, and the Australian FIRST Army all reported directly to the Supreme Commander who, in fact, also acted as Commander Allied Land Forces of the theater.

It is of interest that when task forces attached to CINCPAC or to COMSOWSPAC operated outside their respective areas, coordination with forces in the new operating area was to be affected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as appropriate.*

The command of combined operations with Australian forces was as follows: If carrier units were involved, the senior American naval officer would be in command because of the nature of carrier operations; otherwise, when the naval forces of the two powers were operating together and no carrier operations were involved, the senior officer of either power would be in command.** For this reason, at the Battle of Surigao Strait, an Australian officer led one of the Allied destroyer attacks. No Australian ships were with the Pacific Fleet carrier task forces which supported COMSOWSPAC’s operations.

(c) China-Burma-India Area (CBI)

The China-Burma-India Area designation was used only by the U.S. Army, and did not represent a single theater. Actually, the CBI area covered three separate theater commands:***

(1) The China Theater under the command of a Supreme Commander**** who, as the Head of State, was given no tasks. His Chief of Staff was General J. J. Stilwell, USA.

(2) The Southeast Asia Command under a Supreme Commander,***** who operated under the British Chiefs of Staff. His Deputy Commander was General J. W. Stilwell, USA.

(3) The India Command under a Commander in Chief,****** who was responsible to the Government of India.

U.S. Forces in the CBI Area were commanded by General Stilwell as Commanding General, U.S. Forces, CBI, directly under the

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* SIXNAV Letter (SC) A16-3(28), April 20th, 1942, Enclosure (A).
** War Diary CINCPAC, April 16th, 1942.
*** Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 1943-1945, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1951, para. 18.
**** Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.
***** Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.
****** General Claude Auchinleck, British Army.
American Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were, however, under the operational control of the respective theater commanders.* Thus, in China, U.S. Forces were under the command of General Stilwell as Commanding General, U.S. Forces, CHI, and under the operational control of the Generalissimo and his Chief of Staff, General Stilwell.

In China the FOURTEENTH Air Force and the TWENTIETH Bomber Command represented American combatant forces operating in that theater. The primary objective of the FOURTEENTH Air Force was tactical support of Chinese ground forces.** However, the Generalissimo permitted the Commanding General, FOURTEENTH Air Force*** almost complete freedom in target selection.**

The primary objective of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command was the destruction of Japanese military and industrial systems by strategic bombardment and mining.**** In accomplishing this objective, the TWENTIETH Bomber Command operated directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and not under the Generalissimo, nor under the C.G., U.S. Army Forces, CHI. The coordination of its activities with other forces is discussed under "Coordination of Operations with Adjacent Theater Commander."

There was also operating within the China Theater an organization known as Naval Group, China.***** This group, in October 1944, operated directly under COMCHIN. It accomplished many and varied tasks in the prosecution of the war. During the Battle for Leyte Gulf it was employed by Pacific naval commanders as a liaison agency to disseminate information, and to coordinate requests for cooperation from the China Theater. It was also employed to disseminate to interested naval commanders in the Pacific important contacts and intelligence information gathered by Allied units operating in China.******

On October 25th, General Stilwell was relieved in China by Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA, and the U.S. Army designation of CHI was changed from one to two geographical areas: China and

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* Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 1943-1945, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951, para. 20.
** Director, USAF Library Division, Air University, Letter, November 8th, 1950, to President, Naval War College.
*** Major General Claire L. Chennault (AC), USA.
**** The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan - Military Analysis Division, Army and Army Air Service, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Final Report, September 1st, 1946.
***** Commanded by Commodore M. E. Miles, USN.
****** COMCHINPHCHINA Letter Serial 9020, June 1st, 1945. (Operations of U.S. Naval Group China.)
Burma-India. Major General Eddyomayer became Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China, and Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, China, while Major General Daniel I. Sultan, USA, became Commanding General, U.S. Forces, Burma-India.

Although the command setup for the CBI area seems reasonably clear, it did not, in fact, operate well, for the various Allied Commanders were so closely interlocked as to cause considerable confusion in the mind of the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, CBI, who stated ... "The command setup is a Chinese puzzle with (the various Allied commanders), and me interwoven and mixed beyond recognition."

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Such were the command organisations for the Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and China-Burma-India Areas in October 1944.

On September 8th, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued their directive for the capture of Leyte. This capture was to be accomplished by COMSOWESPAC, who was to be supported by CINCPOA. The latter was directed to "furnish necessary fleet support and augment assault shipping for the Southwest Pacific Operations."

COMSOWESPAC and CINCPOA were to arrange for coordination and mutual support.

The plan for the capture of the Leyte Gulf - Surigao Strait area had long been considered by COMSOWESPAC, and had been given the title KING II. COMSOWESPAC, in his Warning Instructions Number 5, had stated the mission as follows:

KING II - Seize control of the Leyte Gulf - Surigao Strait area and establish major air, naval, and logistics bases for the support of subsequent operations to reoccupy the Philippines. Target date—December 20th, 1944.***

In the Joint Chiefs of Staff's dispatch directing the capture of Leyte, COMSOWESPAC was directed among other things: To occupy the Leyte-Surigao area with a target date of December 20th, 1944; to seize and develop bases and install forces in the Central Philippines to support a further advance directly to Formosa by Pacific Ocean Area Forces, target date - March 1st, 1945, or to seize Luzon - target date - February 20th, 1945.**

** Joint Chiefs of Staff Dispatch WAR 27648, September 8th, 1944 to COMSOWESPAC and CINCPOA.
*** COMSOWESPAC Warning Instructions Number 5, August 31st, 1944.

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On September 15th, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the target date for Leyte-Surigao operation be advanced to October 20th.**

COMSOUTHESPAC then, on September 21st, 1944, issued his "Operations Instructions Number 70" wherein he directed that:

"Forces of the Southwest Pacific, covered and supported by the Third Fleet, will continue the offensive to re-occupy the Philippines by seizing and occupying objectives in the Leyte and Western Samar area, and will establish their naval, air and logistic facilities for the support of subsequent operations. Target date--October 20th, 1944."**

(2) Chain of Command within SOWESPAC (Plate II)

COMSOUTHESPAC, by agreement among the Allied Powers, was not eligible, as Supreme Commander, to command directly any national force.*** This did not prevent him from directly commanding the joint forces engaged in the Leyte operation, which he did. In this, he filled the role of a joint task force commander. As Supreme Commander, COMSOUTHESPAC designated Allied Naval Forces, SOWESPAC Area, Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC Area and the SIXTH Army as the components of the joint force to execute the Leyte campaign. In his Operations Instructions Number 70 he directed that Commanders of Allied Naval and Air Forces submit their plans for general support of the operation to the Supreme Commander. He further directed that "For the coordination of planning, the Commander Allied Naval and Air Forces will cause their respective chief support commanders to report to the Commanding General SIXTH U.S. Army who is charged with the coordination of plans,"*** and also that the Commanding General SIXTH U.S. Army present the Supreme Commander with a brief of the coordinated plan of operations.**

This method of obtaining coordination of planning by employing the commander of one unilateral service to coordinate the plans of the other services on the same echelon of command is not considered advisable as it may lead to too much emphasis on the requirements of the coordinating command.

It will be observed that this was an unusual situation and was not in complete accord with the approved procedures in effect in October 1944 for the joint action of the Army and the Navy. Normally, the plans of the commanders of the Allied Army, Navy, and Air Forces would have been coordinated and executed by a Joint Task Force Commander, who would have exercised unified command under the Supreme Commander. However,

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** Joint Chiefs of Staff Dispatch 156748, September 1944, to CINCPAC and COMSOUTHESPAC.
*** COMSOUTHESPAC Operations Instructions Number 70, September 21st, 1944.
COMSOWESPAC did not desire to set up such a task force commander, but preferred to retain such command himself. He appears to have felt that he could obtain equally satisfactory results by omitting the Joint Task Force Commander and by operating directly with the Commanders of the Allied Naval and Air Forces and with the Commanding General SIXTH Army whom he elevated to the same echelon of command as the above Commanders Allied Naval and Air Forces. In order to accomplish proper coordination he not only issued detailed "Operations Instructions" to his forces, but he also designated the SIXTH Army as a unit separate from his Allied Land Forces.\* Although this system operated satisfactorily because of the characters of the commanders concerned, it is not recommended as standard procedure.

It seems clear that, except for particular situations, it would be wiser to establish a Joint Task Force Commander who would not only coordinate the basic plans of those components of the Army, Navy and Air Forces which were involved in this operation, but who would also be in command in the objective area and would be empowered to make decisions concerning the unilateral services under his command.**

As it was, Commander Allied Naval Forces, for reasons of his own, felt that it was advisable for him to assume command of the Central Philippines Attack Force (TF 77). By so doing he not only became involved in the tactical operations in the objective area, but he also assumed command responsibilities on three separate echelons viz., Commander Allied Naval Forces, Commander SEVENTH Fleet, and Commander Central Philippines Attack Force (TF 77). While this assumption of tactical command by Commander Allied Naval Forces was not necessarily unsound, it could have resulted in his becoming too engrossed in the tactical details of the operation as to overlook possibly his basic responsibilities as Commander Allied Naval Forces SOWESPAC. Would it not have been wiser in keeping with his command responsibilities had he designated his next in command - in this case TF 79 - to command TF 77 while he retained command of Allied Naval Forces SOWESPAC and the SEVENTH Fleet?

Actually, although not so designated, the Commander of the Central Philippines Attack Force was in fact a joint task force commander during the amphibious movement and landing. For COMSOWESPAC directed in part that:

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\* COMSOWESPAC Operations Instructions Number 79, September 21st, 1944.
\*\* Joint Action Armed Forces, September 1951, Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Chapter 3, Section 2, Sub-section 5 - Joint Task Force.
"During the amphibious movement and landing, the CommanderNaval Attack Forces is in command of the amphibious operations; his command continues until the landing forces are established ashore."

It is of interest that after 1723 October 18th, COMSOWESpac in the NASHVILLE was in the same task group with the Commander Central Philippines Attack Force.

3) Coordination of Operations with Adjacent Theater Commanders

(a) COMSOWESpac and CINCPAC

The coordination and mutual support ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Leyte operation was accomplished in two ways. First, CINCPAC's Plans Officer** in conference with COMSOWESpac's Assistant Chief of Staff*** for Operations (9-3) agreed on September 21st, 1944, on a plan of operations for the THIRD Fleet commencing at D-10.**** This was approved by COMSOWESpac on September 25th. Actually, as this plan of operations discussed also the employment of land-based naval bombers from Palau, it is presumed that this agreement covered the Western Pacific Task Forces***** more than it did the THIRD Fleet, which was a part of the Western Pacific Task Forces. Secondly, CINCPAC in his Operation Plan S-44, directed that "necessary measures for detailed coordination of operations between the Western Pacific Task Forces and forces of the Southwest Pacific will be arranged by their respective commanders."****** This was accomplished at Hollandia, New Guinea, during the period September 28th to October 1st, where the Commander Western Pacific Task Forces (Commander THIRD Fleet) completed his conferences with COMSOWESpac and Commander SEVENTH Fleet, and made plans for the employment of Western Pacific Task Forces in support of NIKI.*****

In paragraph two - the general plan paragraph of the above mentioned Operation Plan S-44 - CINCPAC directed that "forces of the Pacific Ocean Area will cover and support forces of the Southwest Pacific Area."******

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* COMSOWESpac Operations Instructions Number 70, para. 3(x) 4.
** Rear Admiral Forrest Sherman, USA.
*** Major General S.J. Chamberlin, USA.
**** Memorandum, September 21st, 1944, from Rear Admiral Forrest Sherman, USA and Major General Joseph Chamberlin, USA to COMSOWESpac and CINCPAC on Coordination of Operations.
***** The Western Pacific Task Forces were those Pacific Ocean Area forces in the Western Pacific which were operating under the command of Admiral N.C. Halsey, USA and consisted essentially of the THIRD Fleet also commanded by Admiral Halsey, USA and the Forward Area, Central Pacific, commanded by Vice Admiral J.H. Hoover, USA.
****** CINCPAC Operation Plan S-44, Serial 50505, September 27th, 1944.
******* War Diary CINCPAC, October 1944.
seem quite clear from this general plan paragraph that CINCPAC's objective for the general effort of the whole force was a double one embracing both "protection" and "support." He also directed in paragraph three - the task assignment paragraph - that the Western Pacific Task Forces were to destroy enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine area. This was a "destruction" objective, which limited the destruction to those enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine area. He further directed in the same paragraph, but under sub-paragraph X-ray, that "in case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offer or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task." This was also a "destruction" objective, but here the destruction objective was no longer limited to naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine area, but instead, enemy naval and air forces almost anywhere, so long as their destruction contributed to the protection and support of the Southwest Pacific area, automatically became proper targets for the action of the Western Pacific Task Forces.

That this is a correct interpretation of CINCPAC's views is clear for in CINCPAC's report of his operations during October 1944 he stated very definitely:

"An understanding of the operations off Formosa during the middle of October requires that the basic task assigned the THIRD Fleet be kept in mind. That task, as already mentioned, was to create an opportunity to engage and destroy major portions of the enemy fleet. A secondary object was the destruction of enemy aircraft, and temporary neutralization of Formosa as a base for staging Japanese aircraft to the Philippines."**

It is significant that Commander THIRD Fleet, (COMTHIRDFLT) in his Operation Order, placed the "destruction of enemy fleet" objective in his general plan paragraph as the primary effort to be accomplished by his whole force.***

COMTHIRDFLT also in his Operation Order 21-44, stated in part that, after fueling on October 19th, his four carrier task groups which composed TF 38 would join off Sama: "From where all groups (would) support landing operations Leyte as later directed, and as coordinated by Commander SEVENTH Fleet."*** (COMSEVENTHFLT)

This was in accordance with the agreement entered into by CINCPAC and COMSOWESAC through their respective planners, wherein it was agreed that the THIRD Fleet, including the four carrier groups, would cover and

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* CINCPAC Operation Plan 8-44, Serial 01661, September 27th, 1944.
** Operations in the Pacific Ocean areas, October 1944, CINCPAC-CINCPAC, May 31st, 1945.
*** COMTHIRDFLT Operation Order 21-44, Dispatch 031690, October 1944.
support the KING II Operation by certain definite action prior to and
during D day, and that "Beginning on D+1, and thereafter, will operate
in strategic support of the (KING II) Operation affecting strikes as
the situation at the time requires."*

Nothing in CINCPOA's Operation Plan 3-44 or in CONTHIRDPAC's
Operation Order 21-44 required that Commander THIRD Fleet obtain the con-
currence of COMSONESPAC in executing any of his operations or of even
advising him as to a change in plans. This omission is particularly
important when "the destruction of the enemy fleet objective" referred
above, is considered. For, by issuing this directive without, at the
same time, requiring that the Commander Western Pacific Task Forces ob-
tain the concurrence of the Commander of the forces being covered and sup-
ported, or, at the very least, inform that Commander of his change in
plans, CINCPOA made possible a breakdown of that detailed coordination
necessary for the success of an operation of the scope of KING II. Did
he not thereby jeopardize the integrity of the Allied basic plan by making
it possible for his supporting and covering forces to be drawn away from
their basic role and, thereby, allow other powerful enemy forces to in-
terfere with the SONESPAC operations? The ideas here expressed are not
now. Years ago the British naval historian, Corbett, expressed a simi-
lar idea when he said the "paramount function (of a covering force) is to
prevent interference with the actual combined operations - that is, the
landing, support and supply of the Army."**

This was not the first occasion when CINCPOA had employed this
"destruction of the enemy fleet" objective as an objective which might
well supersede the originally assigned protection and support objec-
tives as promulgated in paragraph two. He had issued exactly the same in-
nstructions, word for word, to his Commander Western Pacific Task Forces
in his Operation Plan for the occupation of the Ulithi-Palau line pro-
mulgated some two months earlier.*** But there was a marked difference
in these two operations. Not only were the operations for the seizure
of the Ulithi-Palau line much smaller in scope than were the operations
for the seizure of Leyte and the strategic implications of failure far
less, but (and this is vital), the former operation was completely under
CINCPOA with limited assistance necessary from COMSONESPAC, whereas the
latter operation was under COMSONESPAC with great assistance necessary
from CINCPOA, under whom was the fast carrier task force. In consider-
ing the Ulithi-Palau operation, it is apparent that the possibility of
destroying a major portion of the enemy fleet, when weighed against the

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* Memorandum September 21st, 1944 from Rear Admiral Forrest Sherman,
USN, and Major General Joseph Chamberlin, USA, to COMSONESPAC and
CINCPOA on Coordination of Operations.
** Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian S. Corbett, pub-
*** CINCPOA Operation Plan 6-44, Serial COM53, July 21st, 1944.

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possibility of failure of the seizure operations, offered a calculated risk which, if successful, could improve considerably the Allied situation in the Western Pacific. Even if the seizure operations failed, it is quite likely that the Allied strategic plan will not have been seriously affected thereby, although the timetable for its various phases probably would have been upset. Can the same remarks be made concerning the effect that Allied failure in the Leyte operation might have had on Allied strategy in the Pacific?

In the plans for the employment of the Western Pacific Task Forces in support of KING II, the Commander Western Pacific Task Forces operating in the SOWSPAC area in support of COMSOWSPAC, was not under the orders of CONSONESPAC even to the remotest degree. He was at all times under CINCPAC. In a similar fashion the Commander Allied Naval Forces SOWSPAC was under CONSONESPAC and not under the orders of CINCPAC or of CINCPAC's Commander Western Pacific Task Forces.

This command situation has been highly criticized as having been responsible for the near disaster to the Allied arms which occurred during the battle of October 25th. It has been strongly suggested in some circles that this might have been avoided had Commander Western Pacific Task Forces been ordered to report to CONSONESPAC through Commander Allied Naval Forces SOWSPAC. This is not considered to have been the correct solution since the "covering" responsibilities of Commander Western Pacific Task Forces embraced operations over vast geographic areas which were often far removed from the areas of his "support" responsibilities. Although it is realized that political as well as personal factors probably prevented a proper solution it is believed that a possible solution would have been to have had CONSONESPAC report to CINCPAC for this operation. In such case CINCPAC could well have designated CONSONESPAC as the joint task force commander, supported by and covered by Commander Western Pacific Task Forces. The activities of both commanders would then have been coordinated by a mutual superior who could require close collaboration in the accomplishment of the tasks incident to all operations involved in the entire Western Pacific during that period. Under such a command setup only a single strategic commander would have been responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staffs for the prosecution of this complex and crucial phase of the war. For the proper strategic control of those wide spread operations it would have been most advantageous for CINCPAC to have exercised this command from Guam rather than Pearl Harbor, even if this had required the setting-up of temporary advanced operation headquarters.

(b) CONSONESPAC and CBI (Plate II)

No formal agreement existed between CONSONESPAC and the CG F.S. Army Forces in the CBI Theater, concerning the coordination of the
CBI operations with the KING II Operation.* Nevertheless, it should be
pointed out that the Southeast Asia Command, of which certain of the
U.S. Forces in the CBI Theater were, at times, a part, was concerned
with the KING II Operation, and had planned operations in its own area
which were designed to provide considerable diversionary support to
COMSOUTHSPAC. These planned operations were to consist of (1) air attacks
on the Japanese lines of communication from Bangkok, Siam, to Moulmein,
Burma, (2) an air attack on the Rangoon area, (3) increased ground and
air operations in Burma, (4) and, finally, by a British naval bombard-
ment and carrier strike against the Nicobar Islands, which lie just north
of Sumatra.** This latter operation was designed to mislead the enemy
into thinking that landings were imminent.*** These arrangements appear
to have been made as follows: The United States made a request through
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, on Great Britain to carry out operations
as feasible in support of KING II.**** The British Chiefs of Staff
then directed the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) Southeast Asia to com-
ply; that commander determined what supporting operations he could
accomplish and advised COMSOUTHSPAC of his plans. COMSOUTHSPAC in turn
advised his interested commanders by dispatch.

The Southeast Asia Command carried out all of the above planned
operations with the exception of items two, the air attack on the Rangoon
area, which operation does not appear to have been undertaken. The attack
on the Nicobar Islands which occurred between October 17th and 21st was a
"sustained operation with attacks lasting for more than three days."
Actually, in the opinion of the SAC, these diversionary operations were
ineffective for Japanese reaction was slight, and instead of holding the
fleet in the Lingga-Singapore area, the Japanese departed for Brunei Bay
and the Battle for Leyte Gulf.***** This opinion of SAC was correct for
the Japanese realized that the operations were diversionary.*****

However, as the only operations with which this study is concerned
are (a) the air operations in direct support of KING II, conducted by
the U.S. Army Forces in the CBI Theater, and, in particular, by the

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* Office of Chief of Military History Letter, February 20th, 1951, to
President, Naval War College, signed by Orlando Ward, Major General,
U.S. Army, Chief of Military History.
** COMSOUTHSPAC Dispatch 151655 October 1944 to CINCPAC, COMPHIBDEL,
CTF 77 and CC 6th Army.
*** Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Southeast Asia, 1943-1945, London: His Majesty’s Station-
ery Office 1951, para. 293.
**** Ibid, paras. 290-293, inclusive.
***** War Diary DESRON 1, October 1st-31st, ‘44, NCS Document 161838,
NA 11739.
FOURTEENTH Air Force, and (b) the air operations, in the same theater, conducted by the TWENTIETH Bomber Command, further reference to the Southeast Asia Command will be omitted.

In connection with these air operations, it should be noted that the CG, U.S. Army Forces in the CBI Theater* was advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as early as September 18th, 1944, of the imminence of KING II.** He was also advised that CINCPAC, whose Western Pacific Task Forces would be operating off the Nansei Shoto, Formosa, and the Philippines, in support of KING II, would request him by radio for air support from the CBI bases.*** Therefore, it should be clear that a cooperation and coordination channel did exist from that date forward.

The FOURTEENTH Air Force, commanded by Major General Claire L. Chennault, U.S. Army, was under the operational control of the CG, U.S. Army Forces in the CBI, who kept his CBI command abreast of CINCPAC's wishes regarding KING II.**

The TWENTIETH Bomber Command, on the other hand, operated directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the CG, U.S. Army Air Forces in Washington. The CG, U.S. Army Air Forces advised the interested commanders on September 23rd, 1944, that operations of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command in support of KING II, would be directed by the Headquarters of the TWENTIETH Air Force in Washington in the same manner that strategic operations were directed. He further advised that coordination would be affected as follows: (a) local coordination to prevent conflict between the operations of the TWENTIETH Air Force and the FOURTEENTH Air Force, and which consisted largely of an exchange of flight information, would be the responsibility of the CG, U.S. Army Forces in the CBI; (b) coordination with COMSOWESPACE would be accomplished by direct exchange of information between COMSOWESPACE and the Headquarters TWENTIETH Air Force; and (c) coordination with the THIRD Fleet (TF 38) in the Formosa area was to be accomplished through the Deputy Commander of the TWENTIETH Air Force in the POA.***

As a consequence of these instructions, the CG, U.S. Army Forces in the CBI made certain coordinating arrangements which followed the above instructions closely, with the principal exception that he designated the CG, FOURTEENTH Air Force as the coordinating agency of

* General Joseph W. Stillwell, USA.
** Office of Chief of Military History Letter, February 6th, 1951, to President, Naval War College, signed by Orlando Ward, Major General, USA, Chief of Military History.
*** CG, Army Air Forces Dispatch WACX 38332, September 29th, 1944, to COMSOWESPACE, CINCPAC, CG, U.S. Army Forces CBI, Deputy Commander CBI Theater, CG, TWENTIETH Bomber Command.
the CBI Theater, and directed that officer to coordinate his air strikes with those of CINCPAC, COMSOWESPACE, and the TWENTIETH Bomber Command.* That the CO, U.S. Army Forces in the CBI Theater felt a heavy responsibility for the coordination of his air strikes is apparent from his unpublished diaries for October 14th and 15th, 1944, which show that he not only took a personal interest in the TWENTIETH Bomber Command's activities, but in fact, visited certain of that command's airfields to witness the departure of the bombing groups, and, in addition, studied the photographic results of the bombings.**

(4) Air Coordination

The air situation was highly confused, for operating in support of the same amphibious landing operation were five distinct air organizations over which there was no single commander. These air organizations operated through cooperation and coordination. They were: (1) Certain air components of the Army Air Forces (FOURTEENTH Air Force) operating from China bases; (2) the TWENTIETH Bomber Command - portion of the TWENTIETH Air Force - also operating from China bases; (3) certain air components of the Western Pacific Task Forces which included the carrier-based aircraft of the THIRD Fleet, and the land-based aircraft of the Forward Area, Central Pacific; (4) certain air components of the Allied Air Forces SOWESPACE, and (5) the carrier-based aircraft of the SEVENTH Fleet, which were based in the escort carriers, and the anti-submarine aircraft of the SEVENTH Fleet. Actually, the air components in (4) and (5) were under COMSOWESPACE, but, even here, as will be shown later, these groups operated under separate task force commanders and had no over-all commander in the objective area, at least prior to the arrival of COMSOWESPACE in that area on October 20th.

(5) Summation

In summation then, it is clear that the command situation for the Leyte operation left much to be desired. Although unity of command existed within SOWESPACE, this unity of command was on occasion more illusionary than real. It was in the person of COMSOWESPACE who did not exercise such command except possibly after he had arrived in the objective area off Leyte. Instead, he delegated the coordination of all plans to the Commanding General, SIXTH Army and the execution of these plans to the cooperative and coordinated command of the commanders of his Army, Navy and Air Forces.

* CO, U.S. Army Forces Dispatch CRA 15561 GM-IM-2850, October 3rd, 1944, to U.S. Army Chief of Staff.
** Office of Chief of Military History, Letter, February 6th, 1951 to President, Naval War College, signed by Orlando Ward, Major General, USA, Chief of Military History.
COMSOWESPACE commanded only two. The air components of the Western Pacific Task Forces, and of the FOURTEENTH Air Force based in China, operated under their respective force commanders and supported the Leyte operation through cooperation and coordination only, as did the air components of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command, which operated from China bases, but under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There was no separate joint task force organization set up for this operation. Instead, the theater commander appears to have assumed direct command of all forces of SOWESPACE engaged in the Leyte operation in addition to his over-all responsibilities as theater commander. Also, his theater Navy and Air Force commanders assumed corresponding tactical command of their own forces involved in the operation in addition to their theater responsibilities. The Commanding General, SIXTH Army, unlike the Navy and Air Force component commanders in the Leyte operation, had no theater responsibilities beyond command of the SIXTH Army; the over-all theater command of ground forces remained a function of COMSOWESPACE.

Finally, the introduction of an overriding objective for the Commander Western Pacific Task Forces - the destruction of a major portion of the Japanese Fleet - in lieu of destroying enemy naval forces in or threatening the Philippine area, - made possible a breakdown of the agreed coordination between these two commanders, for the protection and support of the SOWESPACE area.

(2) INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIED NAVAL COMMANDER

(1) The Allied Naval Commander did not believe that major elements of the Japanese Fleet would be involved in opposition to the Allied landings at Leyte. He believed this because he considered that the damage recently dealt Japanese aircraft, and the coverage now possible for American reconnaissance planes would force the Japanese to withdraw what fleet units were within the Manila Bay sector to safer harbors in the direction of Lingga and the Empire.

In all fairness it should be pointed out here that this conclusion as to Japanese intentions was not peculiar to the Allied Naval Commander alone, but was also the opinion of COMSOWESPACE and the Commander Allied Air Forces, SOWESPACE. This is clearly shown as follows: (c) On September 24th which he later confirmed on October 4th, Commander Allied Air Forces SOWESPACE stated:** "It is believed that the whole of the waters of the Philippines will be hazardous for the movement of enemy major elements of the Japanese Fleet and fleet action is less likely than ever." (b) October 15th COMSOWESPACE in his Intelligence Summary on that date stated ... "As to the Navy, while it may more in strength in and out of protected stations in home or adjacent waters, it is doubtful

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* COMSOWESPACE AREA Operation Plan 13-44, Serial 00022A, September 26th, 1944, Annex M, brought up to date by CTF 77 Dispatch 160611, October 1944. ** Annex 3 to Operations Instructions No. 71 Headquarters Allied Air Forces SOWESPACE, September 24th, 1944 corrected to October 4th, 1944 by Operations Instructions 71/1.
if it will seek any issue beyond the cover of land-based airplanes.

(c) ComWespac's Headquarters, among other things, advised COMWESPAC by dispatch on October 18th that, on October 15th, the Japanese First Striking Force was in the Singapore-Brunel area (actually it was in the Singapore-Lingga area), and that owing to the assignment of tankers and their rendezvous in the Pescadores, a sortie by the First Striking Force to the north was indicated rather than an eastward entry into Philippine waters.

(d) October 21st ComWespac in its Intelligence Summary for this date, stated: (1) Enemy Air - Forward Area (Northern Luzon, Formosa, Namsel Shoko). Defeated in the air, harassment and limited defense only remains. (2) Enemy Naval Units - No apparent intent to interfere with our Leyte landings.

(e) October 22nd Commander Allied Air Forces SOWESPAC, referring to the Third Fleet's devastating air attacks on the Namsel Shoko, Formosa, Luzon areas, and particularly to his attacks on Manila and on the shipping there, stated: .. "It must be recorded again that, in spite of extreme provocation, the Japanese Fleet did not appear during these memorable days. With helpless though not indifferent eyes, it saw the enactment of another phase in the smashing of the Japanese merchant marine.

All of the above indicates that the Allied Commanders in SOWESPAC were operating on the basis of enemy intentions, rather than on the basis of enemy capabilities, for the Japanese reacted with their entire fleet, and with major elements of their air force, and made an eastward entry into the Philippines. In fact, Shō One, which was the all-out defense of the Philippines, had been activated four days earlier (at 1732, October 18th, 1944) and, at the very time the latter two estimates were being made, the Japanese Fleet was well on route to contest the landings.

* Intelligence Summary, Headquarters Allied Air Forces SOWESPACAREA, Serial 245, October 15th, 1944, paragraph 4.
** GHQ, SWESPAC Dispatch 171536, October 1944 to COMWESPAC (in NASHVILLE).
*** Intelligence Summary No. 20, Periodic Summary of Enemy Trends, GHQ, SOWESPACAREA Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, October 21st, 1944.
**** Intelligence Summary, Headquarters Allied Air Forces SOWESPACAREA, Serial 246, October 22nd, 1944.
***** CINCPAC Combined Fleet Despord 366 (181732), FIRST Striking Force Battle Report, October 16th-28th, 1944, SHO Operations (including the Battle off the Philippines), WDC Document 161641.
****** As an indication of this generally accepted erroneous trend of thought, Captain Raymond D. Trabuck, USN, in G-3 GHQ SOWESPAC on October 4th, 1944 prepared an intelligence memorandum which forecast that (a) Japanese naval reaction would be limited to Tokyo Express runs by light surface forces from Brunel Bay, assisted by diversionary operations in the South China Sea by heavy units of the First Striking Force and (b) the enemy carrier strength would probably operate in the East China Sea-Empire area in defense of the homeland, and therefore could be dismissed from calculation as kept out of KING II operations by the Third Fleet.
(2) (a) He believed, on September 26th, the time he issued his basic plan, that the Japanese Fleet was deployed about as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BB</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>CVL</th>
<th>CVE</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>DD</th>
<th>SS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empire and Northern Japan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Borneo-Philippines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore-Lingga</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These estimates were correct as regards the total number and distribution of light carriers (CVL);** they were correct as regards the total number of the heavy cruisers (CA),*** they were incorrect as regards their distribution. Actually, there were twelve heavy cruisers in the Lingga-Singapore area, and but two in the Empire.**** They were correct as regards the total number of battleships, if the ISE and HYUGA, battleship carriers (BB/XCV), are carried as battleships.*****

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* The five light carriers which the Japanese Fleet possessed at this time were ZUIHO, CHITOSE, CHIYODA, KYUHO and HOSHO. They were all located in the Inland Sea area of Japan proper on September 26th.
** Tabular Records of Japanese carriers, WDC Document 160377, NA 11792.
*** Tabular Records of Japanese cruisers, WDC Document 160623, NA 11764; and Summary of Merit Reports for Warships and Special Service Ships, June 1st - November 30th, 1944, Navy Board of Merit, WDC Document 160936, NA 11720; War Diary CRUDIV 16, September 1944, WDC Document 160162, NA 11775; War Diary TONE, September 1944, WDC Document 160144, NA 11841; War Diary TAKAO, September 1944, WDC Document 160141, NA 11839; War Diary CHIKUMA, September 1944, WDC Document 160165, NA 11852.
**** Sources covering the distribution of Japanese heavy cruiser strength as of September 26th are the same as listed in the preceding footnote. Specific data are lacking with respect to the location on this date of ATAGO, MAYA, CHOKAI, MYOKO, and MOGAMI; however, since other ships of the same units were definitely placed in the Lingga-Singapore area, engaged in joint battle training and maneuvers of the FIRST Striking Force the presumption is that these five ships were also in the same area.
***** Summary of Merit Reports for Warships and Special Service Ships, June 1st - November 30th, 1944, Navy Board of Merit, WDC Document 160966, NA 12040; Revisions of Wartime Organization Imperial Navy, 1942-1945, FIRST Section, Naval General Staff, WDC Document (microfilm) 216766, entry of September 10th, 1944, recording the reactivation of RADIV 2 (YAMASHIRO and FUSO).
Certainly these ships never carried carrier type planes in combat. However, it seems possible that they did carry seaplanes on occasions, but did not do so in this operation. The estimates were somewhat incorrect as regards distribution of these battleships. The four battleships reported in the Empire on September 26th had, by that date, been reduced to two—the YI and HYUGA.** The other two battleships, the FUSO and YUMASHIRO had departed for Lingga on September 23rd.*** The estimates were incorrect as regards the number of first-line carriers, as at this time there were but three first-line carriers operative. These were the ZUIKAKU, AMAGI and UNRYU.**** Perhaps CTF 77 had included in his estimates the new carrier KATSURAGI and SHINOKO which had not as yet been completed,***** and the converted carrier (CVL) JUNYO. All first-line carriers were in the Empire.****** The estimates were partially correct as regards the escort carriers (CVE) both in numbers and distribution. However, there were but two escort carriers remaining in the Japanese Navy. These were the KAIYO and SHINYO. Of these escort carriers, the KAIYO was in the Empire; the SHINYO was in the Lingga-Singapore area.******* The estimates were almost correct as regards the number of light cruisers (CL). However, there were eleven instead of ten light cruisers at this time.******** The distribution was incorrect as the light cruisers reported in the North Borneo-Philippines area were, in fact, in

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* Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of the War, compiled by Shizuo Fukui, Administrative Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, April 25th, 1947.

** Summary of Merit Reports for Warships and Special Service Ships, June 1st - November 30th, 1944, Navy Board of Merit, WDC Document 160886, NA 12040.

*** Summary of Merit Reports for Warships and Special Service Ships, June 1st - November 30th, 1944, Navy Board of Merit, WDC Document 160886, NA 12040; War Diary DESRON 10, September 1944, WDC Document 160985A.

**** Tabular Records of Japanese carriers, WDC Document 160677, NA 11732.

***** Table showing Construction, Launching, and Commissioning dates of Japanese carriers, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, IPS Document No. 8263, Records of International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

****** Tabular Records of Japanese carriers, WDC Document 160677, NA 11732; also War Diary FIRST Surface Escort Force, September 1944, WDC Document 16119, NA 11609.

******* Summary of Merit Reports for Warships and Special Service Ships, June 1st - November 30th, 1944, Navy Board of Merit, WDC Document 160886, NA 12040; War Diary CRUDIV 16, September 1944, WDC Document 160986, NA 11730.

-25-
the Lingga-Singapore area.* The estimates were almost correct as regards the destroyers in the Lingga-Singapore area, as there were seventeen destroyers there rather than sixteen, but were incorrect as regards both the Empire and the N. Borneo-Philippines area.** There were thirty-one destroyers in the Empire at this time rather than sixteen, and there were six destroyers in the N. Borneo-Philippines rather than eight.*** The estimates were considerably in error as regards the submarines. There were actually thirty submarines in the Empire, five in the N. Borneo-Philippines area, and four in the Lingga-Singapore area.**** Perhaps twenty-old submarines employed for training purposes only in the Inland Sea were included in CHF 77's estimate.*****

(b) His opinion as to the location of these ships seems to have undergone some changes by October 16th, 1944, which was one day prior to the Allied landing on Sulu Island, for on that date he stated in a dispatch to the THIRD and SEVENTH Fleets that he believed the Japanese carriers were concentrated in the Empire, and that the bulk of battleships and heavy cruisers were apparently in the South China Sea area.******

This was a very loose estimate at the correctness of the estimate was

* Summary of Imitation Reports for Warships and Special Service Ships, June 1st - November 30th, 1944, Navy Board of Ordnance, WDC Document 160966, NA 12040, War Diary C-77DIV 16, September 1944, WDC Document 167120, NA 11760. (These sources do not contain specific data with respect to the location of CHF 77 on September 26th. However, since she was flagship of Cruising Fleet at this date, she was presumably in Japanese waters. War Diary C-77DIV for October establishes that the ship was in drydock at Yokosuka on October 1st.)

** Tabular Records of Japanese Destroyers, WDC Documents 160620, 160621, NA 11960, and 160666; War Diary DESRON 10, September 1944, WDC Document 160640-A; War Diary DESRON 11, September 1944, WDC Document 167110, NA 12712; War Diary DESRON 30, September 1944, WDC Document 167117, NA 11690; War Diary DESRON 27, September 1944, WDC Document 167117, NA 11796; War Diary DESRON 3, September 1944, WDC Document 167117, NA 12703; War Diary FIRST Surface Escort Force, September 1st, WDC Document 167119, NA 11690; War Diary THIRD Surface Escort Force, September 14th, WDC Document 167119, NA 11698; War Diary NO. 16, September 1944, WDC Document 160966, NA 11760.


***** OCEAN, 3TH/7TH Dispatch 16011, October 1 to THIRD and SEVENTH Fleets.
dependent on the interpretation of the words "bulk" and "South China Sea." Actually, all battleships, except the ISE and HYUGA, and all heavy cruisers, except the NACHI and ASHIGARA, were in the Lingga-Singapore Area.* The light forces remained as of the September 28th estimate.

(c) It is of interest that some days later - October 20th - CINCPAC had made an estimate which indicated that the following ships were operational and were distributed as follows:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BB</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>BR/XCV</th>
<th>JVL</th>
<th>CVE</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>DD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empire-Formosa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This estimate was considerably less correct than CTF 77's, for, on October 18th the entire First Striking Force had left the Lingga-Singapore area for Brunei Bay, North Borneo, arriving there at 1210, October 20th. It was incorrect as regards the first-line carriers, as at this time there were only four. One of these was the KATSURAGI which was commissioned on October 15th, 1944.*** It is not known what effect, if any, this incorrect estimate had on CTF 77 or Commander THIRD FLEET. (COMTHIRDFL).

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*** Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of the War, compiled by Shizuo Fukui, Administrative Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, April 28th, 1947.
Actually, the distribution of Japanese surface forces at this
time (October 20th), was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BB</th>
<th>CV/XXV</th>
<th>BB/XXV</th>
<th>CVL</th>
<th>CVE</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>DD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) He believed it possible that a fast task force might strike the
Allied supply lines taking full advantage of darkness, surprise and land-
based air. This was a correct estimate which, although it failed to ma-
terialize, in no way lessens its accuracy. The Japanese orders were
that "If it is possible to discern the movements of the enemy supply
force the Main Force will come down upon the enemy supply force and
annihilate it completely."

(4) He knew that the Japanese had fifty-two operational airfields
with a radius of 360 miles from Takuohan of which he classified twenty-
one as major air bases. He also knew that there were numerous runways
in the area which could be used for emergency landings and probably for
staging. This estimate appears to have been reasonably correct. There
were approximately sixty operational airfields of which about twelve were
major air bases. These twelve were located as follows: Four at Luzon,
two at Cebu, two at Negros, one at Zambales, three at Mindanao.

(5) He believed that there would not be many concentrations of air-
craft south of the Manila area. However, he felt that the Japanese
would attempt to build up garrisons on several of the fields in the
Visayas, notably at Cebu, Bacolod, Dumaguete, La Carlota and Iloilo.
He felt also that they would be stationed in strength at Zambales,
Mindanao, with small units at Davao and in the Cagayan Del Monte
region. As of October 16th he estimated that these aircraft would be

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** Tabular Records Japanese Naval Vessels.**
** Mobile Force Operations Order No. 76, August 10th, 1944, ATIS
Document No. 39, Part I, April 23rd, 1946 (NACLI Documents).**
** Imperial Headquarters Directive 435, July 28th, 1944, WDC 21672S
(Microfilm) also Naval Air Operations in the Philippines Area,
1942-1945, Historical Section 6-2, GHQ, FEC, ATIS, August 1947,
also Documents from file kept by Lieutenant Colonel Katsumo Sato
FOURTH Air Army, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm
HS-7, Agreement probably made late summer 1944, also Philippine
Air Operations, Phase II, Vol. 46, from records of Colonel
Matsumoto, F.J.A., First Demobilization Board, October 1946."
located as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immediate Area of Operation</th>
<th>Twin Engine VF</th>
<th>YB</th>
<th>VT</th>
<th>Float Planes</th>
<th>Firing Boats</th>
<th>Reccon</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visayas</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Philippines 422

He estimated that the Formosan air strength was 230 aircraft of all types and that not more than 100 of these aircraft would be drawn on for the defense of the Philippines. These estimates as to aircraft strength and location were generally inaccurate. A detailed analysis of the data available indicates that as of the morning of October 17th, planes available to Commander FIFTH Base Air Force in the Philippines totalled 145; to CG, FOURTH Air Army in the Philippines 235, or a total of 360 planes in the Philippines. ** At this same time there were 250 operational planes under the command of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force in Formosa.***

The estimate as to the number of planes in Formosa which would be drawn on for the defense of the Philippines was also inaccurate. On October 18th, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force issued his SHO One attack organization order which provided for the advance to the Philippines of 330 aircraft.****

(6) He estimated that, owing to American air attacks on Japanese airfields in the Philippine-Dutch East Indies areas, and in fuel dumps in the same areas, the Japanese would be seriously handicapped in forming large scale air attacks against American forces. This was a reasonably correct estimate. However, it did not take into consideration the Japanese capability of launching Kamikaze plane attacks against American

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* CONSEQUENTLY Dispatch 160611, October 1944 to THIRD and SEVENTH Fleets.
** See Composition of Forces and Tasks Assigned, Chapter 111, part (r).
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, Department of the Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-22, Item E.

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combat shipping, but this was a capability generally overlooked by all American commanders at this time. At least there is no mention of this capability in the basic plans of the principal commanders.

(7) He believed that the Japanese air reaction in the initial phase of the K.N. II Operation would be moderate not to exceed a total of seventy to eighty fighters and bombers in the air. He expected that shipping would be subjected to torpedo and bomber attacks with the first few days’ attacks limited to small night and pre-dawn harassing raids by small groups of from four to six planes. This was a reasonably correct estimate. Prior to D day, bombing attacks were made but seven times, employing only a limited number of planes. After D day these attacks increased in frequency and intensity, but it is doubtful that at any time as many as eighty planes were in the air over Leyte.

(8) He expected no reinforcement of air strength from Japan, East Indies, Hainan Island or French Indo-China, nor did he expect any air attacks from carrier-based aircraft. This estimate was incorrect for strong reinforcements were flown in to all areas. This was basic to the SHO Plan. It was incorrect as regards no carrier air strikes against surface forces as there was one carrier-based air strike against TF 38. It was correct as regards no carrier-based air strikes against occupying forces.

(9) He believed that a minimum of sixty PT boats were based in the central and southern Philippine Islands, and that numerous other armored craft, such as Hayabusa boats, were also in the area. He further believed that these craft would be employed offensively against Allied shipping, as well as defensively in the protection of reinforcement barges run. He believed that the Japanese had in the Visayan area a total of fifty special large barges, 200 Type "A" barges, and 300 small barges. On October 16th, his opinion as to the locations of these small craft became somewhat more specific for on that date he estimated that there were approximately thirty-five PT boats and five Hayabusa boats in the east Leyte coastal area.

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* COMSEVENTHFLT Dispatch 160611, October 1944 to THIRD and SEVENTH Fleets.
** Action Report COMCHRDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Bombardment and Capture of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, October 16th-24th, 1944, Serial 00147, November 5th, 1944.
*** CTG 70.1 Operation Plan 2-44, October 5th, 1944, Annex D.
It is difficult to comment on this estimate since Japanese data available to this study on the strength and disposition of small attack craft is very inconclusive. It is known however, that during July and August plans were formulated to construct "Special Sea Attack Unit" bases at Davao, Tacloban, Saramanyi, Zamboanga, Lamon Bay and Batangas, for suicide boats, Type A midget submarines and one-man torpedoes. However, work on the Davao and Zamboanga bases was discontinued during October, while the Tacloban base, which was still under construction on October 16th, was lost to the enemy on October 20th.*

(10) He estimated that the Leyte ground forces consisted of 18,000 men deployed in part, as follows: Tacloban 4,000; Bulusan 5,000;** He estimated that there were in Surigao Peninsula, 1,200; Islands of Leyte Gulf, 300; and Samar, 5,000 men. He also estimated that, in view of the present large concentrations in the vicinity of Cebu (approximately 5,000 men), there was a possibility that substantial numbers of these troops might be employed to reinforce the Leyte garrisons.** Actually, there were about 16,000 troops on Leyte at the time of the Allied landing.***

(11) He had reason to believe that some of the principal minefields were located as follows:

(a) Verde Island Passage - Western approach possibly mined.

(b) Balabac Strait - All channels mined except the main channel south of Mangarey Great Reef.

(c) Sun Bernardino Strait - probably mined.

(d) Between Candaul Island, Samar, and Suluan Island; between Homonhon Island and Dinagat Island; and between North Mindanao and South Dinagat Island; also possible mines between Suluan and Homonhon Island.

(e) Tacloban - Approaches probably mined.

(f) Surigao - Approaches probably mined.

Although information concerning whether or not mines were actually located in the above areas has been difficult to obtain, it is known that chemical horn type mines were discovered during minesweeping operations.

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** COMSOUTHRECAM Dispatch 150611, October 1944 to THIRD and SEVENTH Fleets.
October 17th-20th, between Sulu Island and Candulu Island, and between Dinagat Island and Homonhon Island.*

(a) ALLIED LAND AND TENDER BASED AIRCRAFT

Allied land and tender based aircraft involved in the Leyte Campaign operated under five separate commands from bases in three theaters of operation: SOWESPAC, POA, and CBI. Coordination was obtained by mutual cooperation.

(1) Southwest Pacific Area

There were two land and tender based air commands under COMSOWESPAC notably the Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, commanded by Lieutenant General G.C. Kenney, (AC), USA and the Anti-submarine Group (TG 70.2) commanded by Rear Admiral F.D. Wagner, USN, under CONSEVENTHFILT.

(a) Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC

This command comprised the land and tender based aviation of the Southwest Pacific area less TG 70.2. Its headquarters were at Hollandia. Its major subordinate command was the Far Eastern Air Forces also commanded by Lieutenant General G.C. Kenney, and composed of the FIFTH and THIRTEENTH U.S. Army Air Forces. Headquarters of the Far Eastern Air Forces was at Hollandia with a rear echelon at Brisbane.

The components of Allied Air Forces were:

(1) FIFTH Air Force under Major General E.C. Whitehead, (AC), USA with headquarters at Owi, one of the Schouten Islands south of Biak.

(2) THIRTEENTH Air Force under Major General St. Clair Streett, (AC), USA, with headquarters at Noumea until about November 1st when they would move to Morotai.**

(3) Northern Solomons Air Group (TG 70.9) under Major General R.J. Mitchell, USMC, with headquarters at Torokina in Southern Bougainville.

(4) Royal Australian Air Force Command under Air Vice Marshal W.O. Bostock, RAAF, with headquarters at Brisbane.

(b) Naval Air Force, SEVENTH Fleet (TF 73) under Rear Admiral F.D. Wagner, USN, embarked in CHURCHUCK (AV-7) at Manus.

* Letter from Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval School Navy Warfare, Yorktown, Virginia, Serial 820, undated, but probably June 7th, 1942, to President, Naval War College.
** Letter of Instructions No. 7, Headquarters, 13th Air Forces, October 1st, 1944.
On October 17th, Allied Air Forces, SOWEPAC, numbered 2889 aircraft of various types. (Tables 1-5 incl.)

The capabilities of these aircraft varied considerably and therefore will be considered under their two basic employments; (a) those employed for tactical support and defense in the objective area and consisting generally of fighter and light and medium bomber types, and (b) those employed for long-range bombing, or for search and reconnaissance and consisting generally of patrol planes and long-range bombers.

Under Employment (a) there were available:

(1) As fighters, the P-38, P-40 and P-47. Of these the P-38 had the greatest range. It had a maximum combat radius with external tanks of 586 miles.*

(2) As medium bombers, the B-25, which was at Morotai, had an estimated bombing radius of 391 miles, while the A-20 had an estimated bombing radius of 274 miles.*

Under Employment (b) there were available:

(1) As long-range bombers and search planes, Army Air Force B-24's and Navy PB4Y-1's, which latter was the Navy version of the B-24. These planes had a normal cruising radius of 1000 miles, which, in the case of the PB4Y-1, could be extended to 1100 miles, its extreme radius. When these planes were employed on bombing missions this radius, in view of the added bomb load, was reduced in general to about 825 miles.** Both the B-24 and the PB4Y-1 were heavily armed with twelve .50 caliber guns and were well protected with armor and self-sealing tanks.***

(2) As long-range bombers and search planes of lesser range capabilities than b(1) above, Navy PB-5's and PV-1's, also Army Air Force B-25's. The PB-5's, which were seaplanes, were slow (about 125 knots),**** had a cruising radius of 700 miles and were somewhat weakly armed with two .50 caliber and three .30 caliber guns. However, they were well protected with armor and self-sealing tanks.*

The PV-1 was about twenty knots faster, and the B-26 was about forty knots faster than the PH-5. Both the PV-1 and the B-26 had a normal cruising radius of about 600 miles, were heavily armed and were well protected with armor and self-sealing tanks. The PV-1 was armed

* Comparative Performance and Characteristics, Representative Enemy and Allied Aircraft, TAC Manual No. 2, October 1943.
** Air Evaluation Board, SOWEPAC; Leyte Campaign.
*** Airplane Characteristics published by Naval War College, July 1944.
**** Airplane Characterization published by Naval War College, June 1942.
with seven .50 caliber and two .30 caliber guns; the B-25 with nine .50 caliber.*

All of these types were equipped with radar. Of the Navy Patrol aircraft the PBY-1 and PBV-3 types had the best radar equipment with an average range expectancy on a medium sized ship of about 40-45 miles.** The PV-1 and PBY-5 types were equipped with radar with an expectancy on a similar target of about 32-35 miles.** Of the Army Air Force types the radar of the B-24 had a maximum reliable range on a medium sized ship of about 40 miles while that of the B-25 was about 50 miles.***

On October 4th, the various air bases on Morotai commenced becoming operational and therefore, aircraft units were promptly moved into those bases which were ready. The first squadron to be moved into Morotai was from the EIGHTH Fighter Group, which was the only complete air group on Morotai at the time of the Allied attack on Sulam Island, 0719 October 17th. This squadron arrived on October 4th. It was followed on October 6th by a Night Fighter Squadron from the same group.**** However, arrangements were then underway to receive (a) the three Navy squadrons - VP9's 101, 116 (composed of PBY-1's) and 148 (composed of PV-1's) - which were scheduled to arrive from Biak on the following day, October 18th, (b) the THIRTY-FIFTH Fighter Group (P-47's) and the THIRTY-EIGHTH Bomb Group (B-26's) which had commenced arriving on October 17th but which did not complete their movements until after October 21st and (c) the FIFTH Bomb Group (B-24's) and the 307th Bomb Group (B-24's) which were scheduled to arrive shortly from Noemfoor, but for which shipping arrangements were not made until the last week in October.*****

In addition to Morotai, which was 640 miles from Leyte, Commander Allied Air Forces, SWWSPAC had available only three other bases within 1000 miles of Leyte:

- Sansapor = 900 miles
- Noemfoor = 950 miles
- Biak = 980 miles

* Comparative Performance and Characteristics, Representative Enemy and Allied Aircraft, TAIC Manual No. 2, October 1944.
** Aero 56(a), BuAer, December 1945.
*** Chief, Bureau Aeronautics Letters, Serial 19112, February 27th, 1951, and Serial 87556, June 12th, 1951 to President, Naval War College.
**** Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, First Endorsement, December 20th, 1951 on President, Naval War College Letter, November 28th, 1951.
From the foregoing, it is clear that with the air bases available to him, Commander Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, could not provide air defense or close air support in the objective area before the establishment of air bases in or closer to that area. That Commander Allied Air Forces, was fully aware of this fact is shown from his comments made on the campaign plan as early as July 1944:

"The distance between Sansapor, Morotai, Saragani (a small island 20 miles south of Mindanao) and Leyte all have the common factor of being too great for effective air support from one to the other. It seems to me that the majority of our problems can be solved by relying on land-based aviation and placing it in the proper position to cover all operations."

He then recommended the establishment of bases at Talaud, Saragani, and the Del Monte area of Mindanao in order to place his land-based aircraft in position to support the Leyte operation.

He further stated that he "considered it unwise to rely on carrier units completely accomplishing required support" because, among other reasons, "enemy air, surface, and subsurface action and the physical limitations of carriers creates a constant uncertainty in the maintenance of this type of cover."

Why Commander Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, persisted in the belief that carrier operations, at least against the Japanese held islands, were uncertain in their ability to maintain required support is not understood. Such ideas were not in accordance with the Navy's concepts and were not in accordance with the facts established through the several preceding years of the Pacific war. The Navy had confidence at this time that landing operations could be entirely supported by carrier-based aircraft and had as demonstrated in numerous previous operations in the Pacific of which the most notable was the seizure of the Mariana in June 1944 and the most recent, the seizure of Pelilion, Angaur and Ulithi in September of the same year.

That CONSWESPAC supported this Navy view seems clear, for, as has been pointed out earlier, he agreed on September 14th and 15th to CHIRBAM's recommendations to proceed with the Leyte operation two months ahead of time. In doing this, he, of course, realized fully that his close air support would necessarily be supplied entirely by

** CONSWESPAC Dispatch CX 17697, September 14th, 1944 to Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPOA; also CONSWESPAC Dispatch C 17744, September 15th, 1944 to Joint Chiefs of Staff.
carrier-based aircraft until such time as airfields could be made available in the objective area.

It should be noted here that the plan for airfield construction called for Tacloban Field to be ready by October 25th with parking area for two fighter groups and one night fighter squadron and for a strip at Dulag with thirty-six hardstands by November 4th.

(1) FIFTH Air Force (Table 1)

The FIFTH Air Force was designated by Commander Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC as the Air Assault Force. In addition to this, and augmented by the THIRTEENTH Air Force, it was to continue its neutralizing attacks against the bypassed areas of Borneo, New Guinea and Celebes and was to utilize its Morotai based P-38 aircraft in attacks against targets in Mindanao.** These operations were to continue until such time as the CG, FIFTH Air Force was able to move his air forces into the Leyte area at which time the CG, THIRTEENTH Air Force would assume the above neutralizing duties.

Consequent with the availability of facilities, CG, FIFTH Air Force planned to establish at Leyte two P-38 fighter groups and one night fighter squadron by October 25th, to be followed by additional units including one medium bomb group plus one squadron, and three Navy tender-based PB4Y squadrons by November 4th.***

However, due to unforeseen circumstances the airfield construction schedule could not be maintained.

"The condition of the fields when seized, poor soil, torrential rains, inadequate road nets, and the scarcity of construction materials were the principal factors which necessitated making a new construction schedule."**** The Tacloban strip was actually completed to 5000 feet on October 31st with no dispersals; by November 4th only 600 feet had been subgraded at Dulag.*****

As a result of the delay, the first movement of land-based aircraft into the objective area did not take place until October 27th.

* Headquarters, Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, Operations Instructions No. 71, September 24th, 1944.
** Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, Operations Report No. 23, October 14th-20th, 1944.
*** CG, FIFTH Air Force Operations Instructions No. 6, September 24th, 1944.
**** Air Evaluation Board, SOWESPAC, Leyte Campaign, June 1945, Section VII, page 269.
**TABLE 1**

**ALLIED AIR FORCES SOWESPAC**

17 October, 1944

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Data for this table was obtained from the following sources:

1. Letter from Director, Historical Division, Air University Library, February 20th, 1951
2. Air Evaluation Board, Leyte Campaign, June 1945
3. 34th Troop Carrier Wing Operations Summary No. 1, October 12th, 1944
4. 34th SOEESPAC, 6-3 Journal, October 1944
when thirty-four P-38's of the FORTY-NINTH Fighter Group arrived from Morotai, of which one crashed on landing. By October 30th only twenty P-38's remained available at Leyte; on October 31st there were augmented by forty more P-38's and six P-61 night fighters from Morotai.*

Inasmuch as the movement of land-based air into the objective area did not commence until after the time of the three naval actions under consideration, land-based air operations from Leyte had no effect on the battle for Leyte Gulf and will not be considered further in this study.

The plan for employment of these units at Leyte did, however, have a possible effect on the operation of long-range, land-based aircraft from established Northern New Guinea bases.

As has been indicated, Morotai was the only base available from which long-range aircraft could operate beyond Leyte, i.e., to the north and west of the objective area. It was also the only base from which short-range aircraft, fighters and light and medium bombers, could be staged into Leyte. This latter requirement necessitated the presence of 162 aircraft at Morotai ready to fly in to Leyte by October 26th. Additional aircraft were needed to provide local air defense. At that time there were three strips on Morotai, but only a total of sixty-three dispersals.** It would appear that congestion at Morotai accounted for the "difficulties of basing a sufficient number of heavy bombers at Morotai*** rather than the fact that "Morotai (was) not developed sufficiently to be used by B-24's except in emergency."**** Actually, two squadrons of Navy PBY aircraft, the Navy designation of the B-24, had been conducting search operations from Morotai from October 19th.

On October 4th, Commander Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, had added to the mission of CQ, FIFTH Air Force: "Commencing D-10, maintain neutralization of hostile air forces and shipping in the Mindanao area south of 05°-45'N. When heavy bombers are established on Morotai, extend neutralization to the Visayan area, exclusive of Leyte and Samar. Upon departure of escort carriers, extend neutralization to include Leyte and Samar."*****

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* Air Evaluation Board, SOWESPAC, Leyte Campaign, June 1945, Section II.
*** Extract from Special Report on the Battle of the Philippine waters, A-3, PACAF; also Air Evaluation Board, SOWESPAC, Leyte Campaign, June 1945, page 282.
***** Commander Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, Revised Operations Instructions No. 71/1, October 4th, 1944.
The inability of the CG, FIFTH Air Force to effect complete neutralization of the Visayan area early in the campaign was due in part (a) to a lack of sufficient bases within range and (b) to the congestion of bases by aircraft awaiting transfer to Leyte. In addition, the Morotai bases were employed by certain B-24's which were staged into that area from Noemfoor on October 24th for attacks on the Japanese Southern Force on October 25th and 26th. These operations, however, which will be discussed later were only staging operations with all ground support provided by the ground crews at Noemfoor. The actual transfer of these B-24 units to Morotai was not accomplished until some time during the last week in October, or perhaps even later.

This lack of bases to permit proper initial positioning of the land-based air units had, in effect, been accepted by COMSOWESPAC as an initial condition but it seems clear that he expected early employment of the Leyte fields by Allied aircraft. The reason that this did not occur seems to have been due, in part, to faulty intelligence and, in part, to unusual weather. Prior to the landing, Allied Intelligence indicated that the Tacloban Strip was an all-weather strip.** However, this was discovered to be untrue for "the passage of three typhoons in the period October 17th to November 8th, with their attendant copious rainfalls, caused a breakdown in construction plans and the inundation of proposed and existing airstrip sites."*** Until these conditions could be at least partially rectified, not only were land-based aircraft prevented from operating in the objective area, but also, long-range aircraft, other than reconnaissance aircraft, were prevented from using Morotai for more than staging purposes; thus seriously injuring the ability of the CG, FIFTH Air Force to neutralize vital areas north and west of Leyte.

(2) THIRTEENTH Air Force (Table 2)

The THIRTEENTH Air Force was designated as a supporting air force. It's primary task was support of the operations of the FIFTH Air Force as requested by the CG, FIFTH Air Force.*** It was not directly involved in the Battle for Leyte Gulf but rather in relieving the FIFTH Air Force of responsibilities in the rear areas so that Air Force moved into the objective area. Consequently, its operations will be dropped from further treatment in this analysis.

(3) Northern Solomon Air Group (Table 3)

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** Air Evaluation Board, SOWESPAC, Leyte Campaign, June 1945, page 261.
*** Commander Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, Operations Instructions No. 71, September 24th, 1944.
### TABLE 2

**THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE**

**ALLIED AIR FORCES SWESPAC**

17 October, 1944

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Data for this table was obtained from the following sources:

1. Letter from Director, Historical Division, Air University Library, February 20th, 1951.
3. GHQ, SWESPAC, G-3 Journal, October 1944.
5. 33d AAF Letter of Instructions No. 1, October 1st, 1944.
### TABLE 3
ALLIED AIR FORCES SOWESPAC
17 October, 1944

Aircraft - Northern Solomons

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>VF</th>
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<th>Sbd</th>
<th>PBV</th>
<th>PV</th>
<th>PBY</th>
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#### Aircraft
Northern Solomons
TOTALS

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Data for this table was obtained from the following sources:
(1) War Diary, COMAIRNORSOLS, October 17th, 1944.

**NOTE:**
Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC Operations Instructions No. 71, Annex 8, September 24th, 1944 gave a projected availability for October 17th as follows:

- **VF** - 172
- **VF/VS** - 158
- **VR** - 24
### TABLE 4

**RAAF Command**

**ALLIED AIR FORCES SOWESPAC**

**17 October, 1944**

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Data for this table was obtained from the following sources:

1. GHQ, SOWESPAC, G-3 Journal, October 1944.
2. 13th USAAF Letter of Instructions No. 2, October 5th, 1944.

**NOTE:** Information available indicates the number and type of RAFC squadrons. The figures in this table are based on the following aircraft squadron complements:

- B/F and B'rang = 18
- all other
  - VF = 25
  - VB(L) = 18
  - VP, VS(M), VB(H) = 12
(4) Royal Australian Air Force Command (Table 4)

These two components of the Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAF, were concerned with operations in the rear areas to protect existing bases and destroy enemy forces in by-passed areas.* Except for their part in the Allied plan for land-based air reconnaissance which is discussed in a later section they took no part in the Battle for Leyte Gulf and will be dropped from further discussion.

(5) Naval Air Force, SEVENTH Fleet (TF 73) (Table 5)

Commander Naval Air Force, SEVENTH Fleet (CTF 73) was directed by CONSEVENTHFLT to "conduct supporting operations under control of Commander Allied Air Force"** who in turn directed him to "release to the operational control of the FIFTH Air Force all shore and tender-based aircraft operating within the FIFTH Air Force Areas of Responsibility."*** In practice some of the units operated under the CO, FIFTH Air Force, while others received their orders from CTF 73. Thus the Commander Fleet Air Wing SEVENTEEN, at Morotai, received direct daily orders from the CO, FIFTH Air Force to carry out the effective search plan using the PB4Y-1 aircraft of VPB 101 and 115,*** while other naval air units in the area operated under CTF 73 orders. Commander Allied Air Forces later stated: "There were times during the Leyte Campaign...when Admiral Wagner received instructions direct from my headquarters for some of his units, while others had been released to the control of the Commanding General of the FIFTH or THIRTEENTH Air Forces."****

In addition to the planned utilization of land-based aircraft of Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAF, for support and defense in the objective area and for neutralization and isolation of the battlefield, there were plans for deployment of naval aircraft units to provide extended search and reconnaissance in support of the operation.

In addition to the movement of land-based search units from Alco Woendi (Blak) to Morotai, the plan provided for the movement into Leyte of tender-based units at the earliest possible time. To support these units two small tenders (AVP class) were designated. At 0719, October 17th, SAN CARLOS (AVP 81) with CFM-10 embarked was en route Leyte in company with CTG 77.2. HALF MOON (AVP 26) was at Palau scheduled to

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* Commander Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAF, Operations Instructions No. 71, September 24th, 1944.
** Commander Allied Naval Forces, SOWESPAF, Operation Plan 12-44.
*** CO, FIFTH Air Force Fragmentary Field Orders, October 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL

depart for Leyte on October 18th in company with CTF 77. Two PB4Y-2 squadrons (VPB 33 and VPB 34) were at Mis Noendy awaiting call to Leyte when so directed by CTF 77. These units were to conduct day and night searches, night bombing missions, and rescue operations as directed by the CG, FIFTH Air Force.**

One Navy PV squadron, VPB 130, was also designated to move into Leyte about November 4th (D+15) to conduct offensive reconnaissance missions as directed by CG, FIFTH Air Force.**

This planned employment of search aircraft appears sound. It placed the long-range PB4Y's in the most advanced position available to Commander Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, in order to extend their range to the maximum. Likewise the employment of tender-based units in Leyte Gulf would permit further extension of searches and demonstrates the correct utilization of this type of aircraft. The actual employment of these aircraft in search operations will be considered in a subsequent section.

(2) Pacific Ocean Area (Plate II)

There were two land and tender-based air commands operating in the Central Pacific in support of the Leyte Campaign. These were:

(a) The Shore-Based Air Force, Forward Area, Central Pacific (TF 59), commanded by the CG, SEVENTH Air Force, Major General W.H. Hale (AC) USA, and,

(b) The Search, Reconnaissance and Photographic Command (TG 30.6), commanded by the Commander Fleet Air Wing ONE (CPAW-1), Commodore D. Ketcham, USN.

(a) Shore-Based Air Force, Forward Area, Central Pacific (TF 59) (Table 6)

This force, which had its headquarters at Saipan, was composed of those Army Air Force and Marine Air Units which were operating in the Forward Area. Its units were based on Saipan, Tinian, Guam and Palau. Its mission was to attack enemy forces and bases, and defend Allied bases in order to consolidate and extend the U.S. position in the Central Pacific.**

The Shore-Based Air Force, Forward Area, was a component of the Forward Area, Central Pacific Task Force (TF 57), commanded by Commander Task Force FIFTY-SEVEN, Vice Admiral J.H. Hoover, USN. It had been placed under Commander Western Pacific Task Force by CINCPAC prior to

* COMAIRSEVENTHFLT Operation Plan 3-44, October 15th, 1944.
** COMVFAAREA, CINCPAC Operation Plan 7-44, Serial 001-77, October 1st, 1944.

-40-
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<th>Base</th>
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</table>

* Tenders were at Morotai, TANGIER (AV), ORCA (AVP), SAN PABLO (AVP); at Manus, CURRITUCK (AV) at Hollandia, HERON (AVP); at Palau, HALF MOON (AVP), en route Leyte, SAN CARLOS (AVP).

** 15 FV en route from Kaneohe Oahu not included.

Data for this table was obtained from the following sources:

1. War Diary CVAIRING 17, October 1944.
2. War Diaries VPS 11, 29, 33, 34, 52, 101, 115, 146, October 1944.
3. War Diaries TANGIER, SAN PABLO, ORCA, HERON, October 1944.
4. War Diary CVAIRSEVENTHFLT, October 1944.
### TABLE 6

**SHORE-BASED AIR FORCE, FORWARD AREA, CENTRAL PACIFIC (TF 59)**

17 October, 1944

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>VF</th>
<th>VF(N)</th>
<th>VTB</th>
<th>WB(H)</th>
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Data for this table was obtained from the following sources:

1. War Diary, Commander Forward Area, Central Pacific (TF 57), October 1944.
2. War Diaries, Marine Air Groups 11, 21, October 1944.
3. War Diary, 2nd Marine Air Wing, October 1944.
4. War Diary, Island Commander, Guam, October 1944.
5. War Diary, 4th Marine Base Defense Air Wing, October 1944.
6. War Diary, Garrison Air Force, Western Carolines (TG 59.6), October 1944.
7. War Diaries, VMF 114, 122, 215, 217, 225, 321; VMTB 131, 134, 242;
   VMF(N) 541, VMB 253, 952, October 1944.
the Palau operation. It remained in that relation until October 23rd when it reverted to the direct command of CINCPOA. This reversion was based on previously determined plans, and was not a result of the changing situation.

During the preliminary actions preceding the Battle for Leyte Gulf, Commander Forward Area, Central Pacific, (CTF 57) was directed by COMTHIRDPLT to accomplish two tasks:*

(a) On October 15th and again on October 16th he was directed to neutralize enemy air activity at Yap to prevent the enemy from observing the THIRD Fleet base at Ulithi.

(b) On October 16th he was directed to make maximum air effort against the Bonins to interdict enemy air operations in that area.

In compliance with these directives the Boins were bombed by Fifty-nine B-24's during the period October 15th-19th. Yap was attacked by four B-24's as well as Marine F4U's during the same period.**

At 0719, October 17th, the Shore-Based Air Force, Central Pacific, had a total of 456 aircraft. The types and locations of the aircraft were as indicated in Table 6.

Of the bases available to the command, only the newly acquired Peleliu base was within effective striking range of Leyte, and this effective striking range applied to the B-24's only. All other aircraft were under range. Peleliu was 580 miles from the Leyte area and was therefore only about half the distance from the Marianas to Leyte. However, its airfield at this time was suitable for small aircraft only, and was therefore in use by types designed to provide air defense, air support of the military operations underway, and local air patrol, rather than by heavy bombers. In order to compensate for this inadequacy, a heavy bomber field was under construction on Angaur, another island of the Palau group which was six miles south of Peleliu. As soon as this field was ready, it was planned to move the 494th Bomb Group (H) from Saipan to Angaur in order to conduct neutralization operations in the Bisol area of the Philippines.***

In line with this plan, two squadrons of the 494th Bomb Group arrived at Angaur on October 20th, and twenty-eight B-24's by October 24th.

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* Letter of Instructions, Serial 00096, August 18th, 1944, from CINCPOA to COMTHIRDPLT.
** War Diaries, COMTHIRDPLT and CTF 57, October 1944.
*** War Diary, CINCPOA, October 1944.
**** Air Evaluation Board, SOWESPAC, Leyte Campaign, June 1945, and CAF, SOWESPAC, Operation Plan 13-44, Annex "R".
On October 25th these aircraft were alerted by CTF 59 for possible action against enemy fleet units. Although the enemy was well within range and threatening other Allied forces, none of these aircraft were directed to attack units of the central Japanese force. This matter will be commented on later under the actions on October 28th. Except for this, inasmuch as none of the aircraft of the Shore-Based Air Force, Central Pacific, took part in the Battle for Leyte Gulf, they will be dropped from further discussion.

(b) Search, Reconnaissance and Photographic Command (TG 30.5), (Table 7).

On October 2nd, under authority of CINCPAC,** COMTHIRDFLT removed the Navy land and tender-based aircraft from TF 59 and formed it into a new task group, TG 30.5. He operated this group directly during the Leyte operation, and assigned it the tasks "to conduct long-range search... and to intercept and destroy enemy search aircraft in vicinity of Task Force 38 on October 8th and 9th, and again on October 11th as practicable."***

At 0719, October 17th, the Task Group Commander was embarked in the HAMLIN (AV-15) anchored at Ulithi. He had available the squadrons and tenders of Fleet Air Wing ONE, a total of 191 patrol planes, which were distributed as indicated in Table 7.

Of the types of patrol planes available two were seaplanes, the PB2M-3 and PB2Y-3; two were landplanes, the PB4Y-1 and PV-1; and one was amphibian, the PSY-5A.

The seaplanes were relatively slow. The PSY's had weak defensive armament consisting of two .50 calibre and three .30 calibre guns. The PB2M's and PB2Y's were better armed than the PSY's and had eight .50 calibre guns.**** All three seaplanes were well protected with self-sealing fuel tanks. The practical patrol radii were as follows:

PB2M-700 miles, PB2Y and PB2M-900 miles.

The characteristics of the two landplane types have been discussed previously under land and tender-based aircraft SOWSPAC area; these same types also operated in the Central Pacific area.

---

* War Diary, Commander Garrison Air Force, Western Carolinies, October 1944.
** CINCPAC, Operation Plan 8-44, Serial 000861, September 27th, 1944.
*** COMTHIRDFLT, Operation Order 21-44, Dispatch 031500, October 1944, also Action Report COMPAIRWING ONE, September 10th-October 15th, 1944, Serial 0005, December 8th, 1944.
**** Comparative Performance and Characteristics, Representative Enemy and Allied Aircraft, TAIC Manual No. 2, October 1944.
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* Includes detachments at Saipan, Guam, Tarawa, Makin, and Roi for Search and Rescue duties.

Tenders were at Kossol Passage, CHANDLEUR (AV), POCOMOKI (AV), MACKINAC (AVP), YAKUTAT (AVP): at Saipan, KENNETH WHITING (AV), COOS BAY (AVP), SHELIKOP (AVP); at Ulithi, HAMLIN (AV), CASCO (AVP), ONSLOW (AVP).

Data for this table was obtained from the following sources:
(1) War Diaries, VPS 102, 116, 117, 4, 16, 17, 18, 21, 24, 150, 151, 202, 216, WD-4, VH-1.
(2) Action Report, Commander Fleet Air Wing ONE, September 10th-October 18th, 1944, Serial 0053, February 8th, 1944.
(3) War Diaries, MACKINAC, KENNETH WHITING, HAMLIN, CHANDLEUR, COOS BAY, ONSLOW, SHELIKOP, YAKUTAT, CASCO, October 1944.
CTG 30.5's most advanced bases toward the Empire were at Tinian and Saipan. These bases were 1260 miles from Honshu, 1230 miles from Okinawa, and 1390 miles from Luzon. An additional base, Kossol Passage, Palau, which was 795 miles southeast of Saipan, 1170 miles southwest of Okinawa, and 480 miles east of the Mindanao coast, was available as a seaplane base. The searches made by CTG 30.5 will be discussed under "Allied Search and Reconnaissance."

As has been noted, CTG 30.5 had been assigned, in addition to his search task, a protection objective. He was directed to intercept and destroy enemy search aircraft in the vicinity of TF 38 in order to protect that force. He accomplished this as follows: From Patrol Squadron 116 based at Tinian he launched, in addition to the regular search aircraft, three PB4Y-1 planes on October 8th, and five PB4Y-1 planes on October 9th. These aircraft, patrolling in the vicinity of TF 38, made no contacts with enemy aircraft. However, on October 9th, they discovered and unsuccessfully attacked an enemy picket boat in the general vicinity of TF 38's track, and on October 10th they sank this picket boat by an attack made by four patrol planes from Patrol Squadrons 102 and 116. In addition, in order to increase protection to TF 38, he increased the regular patrols of Patrol Squadrons 102, 116, and 117 from Tinian, in some cases to 1150 miles, which was an extreme range for PB4Y-1 aircraft. One of these patrols from Patrol Squadron 102 shot down an enemy patrol plane on October 9th some 225 miles northeast of TF 38. The regular patrol of Patrol Squadron 113 shot down two more enemy patrol planes on October 11th.** Whether or not special screening aircraft were launched on October 11th is not known; on that day TF 38 fueled approximately 1050 miles west northwest of Tinian.

In addition to these flights, the patrol plane (PBW) searches from Palau, which were normally limited to a radius of 800 miles, were extended to 775 miles on October 8th to provide additional cover for TF 38, which, at noon on that day, was bearing 017°(N), distant 660 miles from Palau. The additional area swept by this extended search was to the westward of TF 38. On the following day (October 9th) three of these PBW searches were extended to give a three-hour patrol along a line between Latitude 17°-00'N; Longitude 130°-00'W; and Latitude 19°-00'N; Longitude 133°-00'W.*** This line ran roughly NE-SW with its northeast end approximately 170 miles southwest of TF 38, and was nearly perpendicular to TF 38's track. Why this patrol line was so chosen is not understood for does it not appear that the principal danger to TF 38, as viewed from Palau, was from enemy search planes operating out of Luzon? In such case should not the patrol line, to cover adequately the northwesterly movement of TF 38,

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*War Diary, COMTHRDPLT, October 9th, 1944.
**War Diaries, VPB 116 and VPB 102, October 9th and 10th, 1944.
***War Diary, VPB 216, October 1944.
have been in a NW-SE line rather than in a NE-SW line? Naturally, in view
of this strange orientation, the Palau extended patrol afforded slight,
if any, protection to TF 38. These searches made no contacts during
this period.

It seems probable that the Commanding Officer VPB 216, who was con-
ducting these searches, was not informed concerning the movements of TF
38 at this time since he was not on the distribution list for CTF 38's
OpPlan. This points out the fact that a commander who orders a subordin-
ate to accomplish a task should insure that said subordinate is provided
with whatever information appears necessary for the proper accomplishment
of the task, and it further points out the fact that any subordinate com-
mander, who is given such an assignment should make every effort to obtain
whatever information he considers necessary. Whether or not Commanding
Officer VPB 216 endeavored to obtain such information is not known.

This utilization of land-based aircraft to screen a carrier force
against detection by enemy land-based air reconnaissance is sound. How-
ever, care must be exercised that the screen operate similarly to regular
patrols lest the enemy be alerted to unusual activity in the area. Where
practicable regular patrols should already be in the area, and should show
the same aggressive intent to shoot down enemy patrols as do the screen-
ing aircraft. The Japanese presumably had, at this time, only limited in-
formation regarding American air reconnaissance to the north and west of
the Marianas, and evidently considered it unimportant because, when one
of their patrol planes was shot down by Patrol Squadron 102 on October
9th, they did not realize that this had been accomplished by an American
patrol plane, and consequently alerted the naval units in the Nansei
Shoto and on Kyushu Island against a possible attack by a carrier task
force.*

The use of long-range aircraft as a screen to protect surface forces
against detection is recognized in current tactical instructions. The
present objectives of an anti-reconnaissance airborne screen are delina-
ted as: (1) aggressive: destruction of enemy picket boats and/or recon-
naissance aircraft in the vicinity of prospective surface operations;
(2) information: detection of enemy long-range air strikes.**

On October 13th CTG 30.5 was directed by COMTHIRDFLT to assume an
additional task, that of providing air coverage for TG 30.2, which had

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944, Second
Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of
the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104; also Detailed Action
Report Okinawa (Okinawa) Detachment 901st Naval Air Group October 10th,
1944, WDC Document 160369, NA 12366.
** Long-Range Air Reconnaissance and Scouting Instructions, United States
Fleets (USF-11) 1946, paras, 750 and 751.
### Table 8
FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE CHINA
17 October, 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VF (H)</th>
<th>VB (H)</th>
<th>RECCO</th>
<th>TC</th>
<th>TOTAL Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P40 P38 P51 P47 Tot</td>
<td>P81 B25 P21</td>
<td>LAB B24 Tot</td>
<td>F5 P40 I-51 Tot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avail</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oper</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>42</td>
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FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE CHINA

(NOT COMMITTED TO GROUND DEFENSE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VF (H)</th>
<th>VB (H)</th>
<th>TOTAL Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P40 P38 P51 Tot</td>
<td>B25 B24 Tot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avail</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oper</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for these tables was obtained from the following sources:
(1) AAF Form 34, Weekly Status and Operations Report forwarded by Director, Library Division, Air University, November 8th, 1950.
(2) AAF Form 34, Weekly Status and Operations Report forwarded by Director, Library Division, Air University, February 23rd, 1951.
been ordered to depart Saipan C100, October 14th and rendezvous with TG 30.3 on October 16th.* TG 30.3 was then retiring with the damaged CANBERRA from off Formosa toward Ulithi. CTG 30.5 also received orders to cover the movement of TG 30.3.** Actually, except for a single PBY flight on October 16th, which provided some coverage at the extreme range of 1150 miles from its base at Tinian,*** TG 30.3 did not receive such cover until it came within range of Palau-based PB4M aircraft on October 21st. This was because all other Allied air bases were out of effective range at the time.

(3) China-Burma-India Area (Plate II)

There were two land-based air commands operating in support of the Philippine Campaign from the China-Burma-India Theater:

(a) FOURTEENTH Air Force, commanded by Major General Claire L. Chennault, (AC), USA.

(b) TWENTIETH Bomber Command, commanded by Major General Curtis L. LeMay (AC), USA.

(a) FOURTEENTH Air Force (Table 8)

This command comprised the USAAF units, plus one Chinese-American composite Wing based in China. It operated under CG, U.S. Army Forces, CBI.**** Its primary task was to support Chinese ground operations against the Japanese, and to this task all but four of its air groups were committed. The latter four air groups were available to support the operations of COMCOWESPACE. These air groups were one heavy bomb group (B-24), one medium bomb group, and two fighter groups.

The availability of bases for operations of the FOURTEENTH Air Force in support of KIO II was in doubt at the time of the formulation of plans. As late as September 23rd there had to be two plans, depending on whether or not the East China bases at Kwelin and Liuchow had been taken by the advancing Japanese. If these bases were available, CG, U.S. Army Forces, CBI, planned to:*****

(1) Employ one heavy bomber group against shipping and enemy airfields in the Formosa area, although the attacks on airfields would be restricted by lack of effective fighter cover at that range.

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* War Diary, PENSACOLA, October 13th, 1944.
** COMHIFLT, Dispatch 131904, October 1944.
*** War Diary, WPB 102, October 16th, 1944.
**** General Joseph W. Stilwell, USA.

CONFIDENTIAL.
(2) In addition, he would make limited night attacks in the Luzon area and conduct sea reconnaissance within 870 miles of Kwolin.

If these bases were lost, he planned to employ the heavy bomber group against air installations and shipping within 870 miles of Kunming, including Hainan, the Gulf of Tonkin, and Hong Kong.*

Actually, the Kwolin base which had been evacuated on September 15th,** was not regained and was not available to support the FOURTEENTH Air Force; the base at Luichow, some eighty miles to the southwest, remained available until November 7th. However, whereas the were three bomber fields and one fighter field at Kwolin, there was only one single field at Luichow.*** This one remaining East China Base, about 300 miles west northwest of Hong Kong, had to provide facilities for units operating in support of ground troops as well as long-range units; in mid-October, it supported one medium bomber squadron, one fighter squadron, one and a half tactical reconnaissance squadrons, as well as Forward Detachment, 308th Bomb Group (Heavy) (main B-24's). The remaining B-24's which were available to support KIANG II had no base closer than the Kunming area, some 680 miles west, northwest of Hong Kong, and 1000 miles west of Formosa. Consequently, although the FOURTEENTH Air Force totaled some 512 aircraft, of which 236 were not committed to direct support of Chinese ground forces (see Table No. 9 for distribution of types), all but the B-24 type were prevented by range limitations from conducting operations beyond the coast of China and, due to the very limited base facilities available in East China, only a few B-24's could be operated beyond the coastal areas.

A further drastic limitation on operations of the FOURTEENTH Air Force was enforced by logistic deficiencies, particularly aviation gasoline. It had conducted operations above its logistic capabilities in August and September in an effort to slow the Japanese ground advance toward its bases. Consequently, operations during October were of necessity reduced one-third to one-half.****

As a result of these conditions, CG, FOURTEENTH Air Force, did not adhere to either plan of employment, but instead, employed a combination of the two, operating as follows:

(a) On October 1st - 5th, and 13th - 15th, inclusive, he made daily armed sea sweeps along the China Coast to a distance of about

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** "Way of a Fighter" by Claire Lee Chennault, New York, 1944.
**** Director, Library Division, USAF History, Air University Letter, November 9th, 1950 to President, Naval War College.
100 miles off shore, and stretching from south of Hainan to Formosa.

(b) On October 5th and 9th, employing three B-24's, he laid mines in the Yangtze River, and on October 16th, employing twenty-five B-24's escorted by fighters, he attacked White Cloud Airfields at Canton.

(a) On October 16th he launched an air strike consisting of twenty-eight B-24's, eight B-25's, twenty-nine P-51's, and twenty-one P-40's, against docks and shipping at Hong Kong. Many excellent shipping targets were discovered, presumably because much of the Japanese shipping in the South China Sea had taken refuge there from the THIRD Fleet and B-29 attacks on Formosa. CG, FOURTEENTH Air Force, claimed having sunk or damaged by this air strike approximately 40,000 tons of shipping. Although he realized that twice that amount of shipping remained undamaged, he was unable, due to the gasoline shortage, to launch a second air strike.

(d) Also, on October 16th, he commenced daily long-range reconnaissance of the South China Sea as requested by CINCPAC, employing four B-24's per day from Liuchow. Details of this reconnaissance will be covered under "Allied Air Search and Reconnaissance."

Enough naval contacts made by the South China Sea reconnaissance started on October 19th and also by fourteen USAAF armed sea sweeps were reported to CINCPAC through a naval liaison unit of Naval Group China, located at FOURTEENTH USAAF headquarters. CINCPAC in turn passed these contacts to COMTHIRDFLT and other interested commands.

Because of logistic difficulties and a lack of bases, he was prevented from providing, other than the above-mentioned reconnaissance, effective direct support to the Leyte Campaign such as might have been gained by attacks on Formosa and Luzon. Unfortunately, the timing of the KNEI II Operation coincided with the southward drive of Japanese land forces in China which, together with logistic obstacles, endangered the entire operating position of the FOURTEENTH Air Force. Accordingly, except for the reconnaissance operations, the activities of this force will be dropped from further discussion.

(b) TWENTIETH Bomber Command (Table 9)

This command comprised the USAAF B-29's operating in Asia. It operated under CG, TWENTIETH Air Force, which in turn operated directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Coordination of its operations with those of theatre forces has been noted in COMSOUTHSPAC and CBI, (page 18).

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* Letter from Director, Library Division, USAF History, Air University, November 2nd, 1950, to President, Naval War College.
** General H.H. Arnold (AC), USA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FWD Base</th>
<th>Avail</th>
<th>Oper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haining</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwanghan</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>Kunglai</td>
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<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pengshan</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>142</strong></td>
<td><strong>118</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for this table was obtained from the following sources:

1. Ltr from Director, Library Division, Air University, November 8th, 1950.
2. Ltr from Director, Library Division, Air University, February 23rd, 1951.
3. TWENTIETH Bomber Command, Tactical Mission Reports Nos. 10, 11, and 12, October 14th, 16th and 17th, 1944.
The objective of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command was, at this time, the destruction of heavy industry, oil installations, aircraft plants, naval installations, and transportation within occupied China and Japan, through strategic bombardment and strategic mining. * Its efforts were diverted from this objective to provide support for the KING II Operation.

From its main base in India its forces were deployed to forward bases in the Chengtu area of Central China whence they took off on their strikes. At the time of the initial Leyte landing, October 17th, there was a total of 140 B-29 aircraft in this command. These planes were allocated to forward bases as indicated in Table 9.

The B-29 aircraft had a maximum patrol radius without bombs of 1250 miles at cruising speed of 250 knots, or 1800 miles at 170 knots. With a 12,300 pound bomb load, these figures were reduced to 930 miles and 1385 miles respectively. The B-29 was heavily armed with one 20mm and ten .50 caliber guns, and carried armor and self-sealing tanks. **

The Chengtu area of China, whence the B-29's operated, was 935 miles from Formosa, 1230 miles from Luzon, and 1285 miles from Okinawa.

The plan for supporting operations of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command called for maximum strikes on Formosa in coordination with the carrier strikes of the THIRD Fleet. The THIRD Fleet strikes were scheduled for October 12th and 13th; the B-29's were scheduled to strike on October 11th and 14th. Owing to adverse weather, the strike on October 11th was cancelled. *** On October 15th CINCPAC, in view of the possibilities of a fleet action between the THIRD Fleet and enemy surface units, requested TWENTIETH Bomber Command to exert maximum effort against the enemy air forces based on Formosa until the situation clarified. **** As a result, two additional strikes were scheduled against Formosa for October 16th and 17th. *****

The primary targets selected for these strikes were:

Okayama Aircraft Repair and Assembly Plant, Hitto Airbase and Arsenal, and the Einanano Aircraft Depot.******

* The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan - Military Analysis Division, Army and Army Air Section, USASB Final Report, September 1st, 1946.
** Airplane Characteristics published by Naval War College, July 1944.
*** Director, Library Division, USAF History, Air University Letter, November 8th, 1950, to President, Naval War College.
**** CINCPAC Dispatch 150851, October 1944, to Deputy Commander 20th Air Force and COMNAVCHINA.
***** CINCPAC Dispatch 152207, October 1944 to COMMANDFLT.
These targets were selected as facilities which served the dual role of bases for staging aircraft into the Philippines and of assembly, repair, and modification of combat aircraft. It was believed that their destruction would not only eliminate the bases and the aircraft located there, but with the loss of important repair and assembly facilities, would cause an immediate reduction in the enemy's combat air strength. It was also believed that extensive damage to plant and tools might take four to six months to replace.

Secondary targets included the harbor installations at Takao and installations on the China Coast.

On October 14th, 130 B-29’s took off from advanced China bases and between 1230 and 1430 attacked Formosa, Pescadores and China as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>No. Planes Striking</th>
<th>Tons of Bombs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Okayama, Formosa</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>651.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichu Airfield, Formosa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakashu Is., Pescadores</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naamai Is., China Coast</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatow, China</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hongyoung, China</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Okayama was the primary target. However, some aircraft for various reasons were unable to reach this primary target, and therefore hit other targets of considerably less importance. No airborne interception was encountered. Anti-aircraft fire was meager and inaccurate. Three aircraft received minor damage in this strike, and two were lost operationally.

On October 16th, a photo reconnaissance of Takao by B-29's indicated that two battleships plus fifteen other ships were there at 1500. This was incorrect since no battleships were in the area.

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** Headquarters 20th Bomber Command, Report of Operations, October 14th, 16th, 17th, October 28th, 1944.**
** Tactical Mission Report No. 10, 20th Bomber Command, October 28th, 1944.**
** COMNAVCHINA Dispatch 151831, October 1944 to CINCPAC and CONTRADMIL.**
Two days later, on October 15th, another strike on Formosa was made as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>No. Planes Striking</th>
<th>Tons of Bombs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Okayama, Formosa</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>208.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naioo Airport, Formosa</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>159.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takao Harbor, Formosa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Targets of Opportunity:

| Formosa and China Coast | 14 | 75.5 |

In this strike some weak enemy airborne opposition was encountered. A total of fifty-one attacks were made by enemy interceptors which resulted in damage to two B-29's. Three enemy aircraft were claimed shot down, and three more probably destroyed. No B-29's were lost, although two aircraft received minor damage from anti-aircraft fire.

A third attack was made on Formosa on the following day, October 17th, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>No. Planes Striking</th>
<th>Tons of Bombs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ebinasho Air Depot</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takao</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amoy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This strike was opposed by an estimated twenty-two enemy aircraft encountered over the targets. Eight of these aircraft were claimed shot down and seven damaged. Three B-29's were damaged by anti-aircraft fire; one was lost operationally.

As a result of these three strikes, Commander TWENTIETH Bomber Command claimed that the following major damage had been inflicted on Formosan targets:

* TACTICAL MISSION REPORTS Nos. 11 and 12, 20th Bomber Command, October 28th, 1944.
Okayama - Eighty buildings destroyed and eighteen damaged at the aircraft assembly plant and at the airfield. In addition, photographic coverage showed that a total of 116 aircraft at the plant and the field had been destroyed or damaged. Some of this destruction had been accomplished by the Third Fleet strikes of October 12th and 13th. In the neighborhood villages, sixty-eight houses were destroyed, and more than fifty damaged.

Toshein - One warehouse and one barge damaged.

Takao - Two warehouses damaged; six or seven railroad tracks in marshalling yards destroyed, two ships damaged, and two probably damaged.

Taichu Airfield - Two aircraft damaged, and two possibly damaged; one hangar and one barracks building probably damaged.

Ndote Airfield - One aircraft destroyed; fourteen buildings damaged.

Einan Air Depot - No damage assessment made due to cloud cover.

These three strikes were the extent of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command attack effort in support of the occupation of Leyte. In addition, B-29 photographic aircraft reconnoitered airfield installations on Formosa and Luzon at the request of COMOWSPAC.*

The B-29's on both attack and reconnaissance missions reported naval and shipping targets sighted to COMNAVCHINA who in turn forwarded the information to CINCPOA and COMTHIRDFLT. This information as received by COMTHIRDFLT is noted under the operations of that commander.

It should be noted that, while the Lingga-Singapore area was within range of the B-29 reconnaissance aircraft operating from bases in India-Ceylon, such reconnaissance was not made. Apparently, it was not requested of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command,* and instead, available photographic B-29's were employed over Formosa and Luzon. Had an effective reconnaissance of the Lingga-Singapore area been made, it would have indicated the numbers and types of Japanese warships in that area and would have alerted the Allied forces to their movements subsequent to the landings at Leyte.

(c) ALLIED AIR SEARCH AND RECONNAISSANCE

Allied air search plans for the Leyte operation envisaged land-based search operations from all three theaters: SOWESPAC, POA, and CBI.

* Director, Library Division, USAF History, Air University Letter, November 8th, 1950, to President, Naval War College.
The objective of all of the searches was to prevent the undetected approach of enemy naval forces toward the objective area or toward forces involved in the operation.

(1) Southwest Pacific Area

The air search plan of SWPAC called for a progressive extension of coverage toward and beyond the Philippines as bases became available. In addition to searches from Darwin, northward through the Timor and Banda Seas and from Emirau and Admiralties bases to the north, searches to the northwest would be made first from Owil, Schouten Islands and then, when ready, from Morotai. These searches, made by the longest ranged aircraft available (PB4Y), were designed to provide flank protection to the objective area and the communications thereto. Further coverage to the north and northeast of Leyte would be provided by tender-based seaplanes from Leyte as soon as practical and would close the gap between Northern Luzon and the western extremity of Central Pacific searches. The Leyte searches were scheduled to commence about D+2 day (October 22nd).

At the time of the beginning of deployment of the forces toward Leyte in early October, Search Plan EZM was in effect. This plan remained effective until October 19th. It required sector searches as shown on Diagram 2 and as indicated in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Search Areas</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Darwin</td>
<td>320T-330T</td>
<td>825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>330T-333T</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>339T-350T</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>359T-038T</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emirau</td>
<td>318T-054T</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiralties</td>
<td>294T-360T</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owl</td>
<td>280T-338T</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The plan called for the sectors from Darwin to be covered by the RAAF. Among the RAAF squadrons based at Darwin were one PB4Y, one B-24, one B-25, and one Boomerang. In addition there was one USAAF heavy bomb group (350th) with fifty-one B-24's.

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COMAIRSEVENTHFLT Operation Plan 8-44, Serial 000156, October 15th, 1944.

** Wa- Diary, COMAIRSEVENTHFLT, October 1944.
At Emirau in the Solomons the search was conducted by COMAIRPNGSOLS. He had available at Emirau, New Zealand Squadron THREE with seventeen PV-1's and VPB-146 with twelve PV-1's. On October 15th, VPB-146 was relieved by VPB-137. COMAIRPNGSOLS also conducted the search from Manus in the Admiralties. Based in the Admiralties was a portion of VPB-52 flying SBY's, and VPB-146 with twelve PV-1's. On October 15th, VPB-130 with fifteen PV-1's arrived at Manus from Hawaii and on October 16th, VPB-146 departed Manus for Owl on route to Morotai.

At Owl, Commander Fleet Air Wing SEVENTEEN who conducted the search under CO, FIFTH Air Force had available VPB-101 with twelve PB4Y-1's, and VPB-115 with sixteen PB4Y's. These two squadrons moved up to Morotai on October 18th.

As noted in the above table, the Owl searches were extended from 1000 to 1100 miles commencing on October 16th. This search was also extended on that date to include inland Philippine waters.*

It is apparent that there were available ample numbers of aircraft to carry out the search plan. Actually not all of the squadrons involved in the search had that mission only to perform. The RAAF was also engaged in missions to destroy enemy forces and installations in its area of responsibility which entailed not only attack missions but also anti-submarine operations, search and rescue, and air blockade in the Banda Sea.** COMAIRPNGSOLS, had similar responsibilities in his area.

In addition to the coverage provided by Search Plan EASY there were three other types of operations conducted by Allied Air Forces, SOWSPAC, which in some degree augmented the regular reconnaissance.

Local anti-submarine patrols were conducted from several of the bases. In most cases these were in areas also covered by long-range reconnaissance as in the case of the anti-submarine patrols conducted by VPB-11 from Morotai, and by VPB-33 and 34 from Biak with the seaplanes operating from a base located at Nias Woondi Island prior to their movement to Leyte. A detachment of VPB-52 based on the HENSON (AVP 2) at Hollandia patrolled a sea area off the New Guinea coast to about seventy miles commencing on October 9th until October 22nd when the detachment moved to Biak (Nias Woondi) to continue ASW patrols.*** These patrols were designed to provide anti-submarine protection to units at or in the vicinity of the bases. Two types of night operations were also conducted by Allied Air Forces SOWSPAC which provided greater augmentation to the daylight long-range reconnaissance than did the anti-submarine patrols.

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* War Diary, VPB-115, October 16th, 1944.
** Commander Allied Air Forces, SOWSPAC, Operations Instructions No. 71, September 24th, 1944.
*** War Diary, VPB-52, October 1944.
(a) VPF-29 based in the TANIER (AV A) at Morotai conducted nightly armed reconnaissance (Blackcat) patrols in the Celebes Sea area. These patrols reached northwest to North Borneo, the Sulu Archipelago, and the Zamboanga Peninsula of Mindanao. Two sorties per night were flown until October 10th and thereafter three.** These flights did not give complete coverage of the Celebes Sea but concentrated on anticipated centers of Japanese shipping activities based on current intelligence.

(b) USAF B-24's of the SIXTY-THIRD Squadron (FIFTY-SECOND Bomb Group (H)) of the FIFTH Air Force based at Biak conducted armed and unarmed night reconnaissance of the Sulu and Central Philippine area. The routes assigned varied. Thus on the nights of October 13th, 14th and 16th armed reconnaissance of the Davao area of Mindanao was made. On the night of October 16th two B-24's carried out unarmed reconnaissance of the Mindanao Sea; two more conducted a similar reconnaissance of the Sibuyan Sea area including Negros and Panay; while a fifth unarmed aircraft covered the Camote Group and a part of the east coast of Luzon. On the following night October 17th, similar reconnaissance was made of the Sibuyan and Mindanao Seas.***

It should be noted that these operations were not designed to strengthen directly the protection afforded by search plan EASY. Except for the anti-submarine patrols and for certain night searches commencing October 16th, these operations were in implementation of the directive to "Intensify neutralization of the Western Visayan and Mindanao areas"... and to destroy "hostile naval and air forces and shipping in the Celebes Sea...denying use of naval facilities in the Sulu Archipelago to the Japanese and protecting the western flank of the operation."**** It should be clear that in conducting reconnaissance to find suitable targets, some additional reconnaissance protection was basically called for due to the operation. This was due to the fact that; (a) the night operations provided some additional coverage of areas which under Search Plan EASY were covered only in daylight, and (b) the flights by B-24's through the Visayan covered areas which were not otherwise covered.

However, these operations were not sufficiently dense nor so planned as to preclude the undetected approach of enemy forces into the area.

On October 16th, CTICPA requested that 10TH/WESTPAC make maximum practicable air reconnaissance of Surigao and San Bernardino Straits beginning on October 16th.***** This was to provide security for the THIRD Fleet which was then anticipating a fleet action in the waters southeast of Formosa. 34, FIFTH Air Force was directed to provide this special

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** War Diary, VPF-29, October 1944.
*** Periodic Reports, A-2, 5th Bomber Command, October 1944.
**** Allied Air Forces, 10TH/WESTPAC, Operating Instructions No. 71, September 24th, 1944.
***** CEPAC Dispatch 150341, October 1944 to CEPAC.
reconnaissance.* As a consequence this latter commander directed that
Sector Five of Search Plan EASY be extended to include coverage of both
straits commencing on October 16th. In addition, five B-24's of
SIXTY-THIRD Squadron, FIFTH Air Force, carried out unarmed reconnaissance
of the western approaches to the straits during the night of October 16th-
17th as previously indicated. No important contacts were reported by
these aircraft.**

(2) Pacific Ocean Area

The air search plan employed by Pacific Ocean area units was
a responsibility of Commander Task Group 30.x under CMCHIRDPLT.***
Searches were conducted by land planes from Tinian and by seaplanes from
Saipan and Kossol Passage, Palau. There were also searches from Eniwetok
and Kwajalein, but as they had no bearing on the operation they will not
be discussed. The plan in effect during the Leyte operation required
sector searches as shown on Diagram B and is indicated in the following
table:****

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Search Areas</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tinian-Saipan</td>
<td>245-272T</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>272-353T</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>353-063T</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>060-230T</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>500-360T</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were nine 1000-mile sectors and three 800-mile sectors. These
were covered by PB4Y-1 aircraft of VPB-102, 116 and 117***** based at
Tinian, with a total of forty-five aircraft. Of the seven 600-mile sectors
from Saipan, three or four (the number varied from day to day) were
covered by tender-based PB4Y-1's of VBP-4 assisted prior to October 6th
by the PB4Y's of VBP-10. These were fourteen of the former and fifteen
of the latter.****** The remaining three or four sectors were covered by
PV-1 aircraft of VBP-150 and VBP-151. The seven shorter 400-mile Tinian
searches were conducted by VBP-150 and 151 which two squadrons had a total
of thirty-one PV-1 aircraft.******* From Kossol Passage, Palau, the six

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* Commander Allied Air Forces, SWPA, Dispatches 152004 and
  152300, October 1944 to CG, FIFTH Air Force.
** Periodic Reports, A-2, 5th Bomber Command, October 1944.
*** CMCHIRDPLT, Operation Order 21-44, Dispatch 031600, October 1944.
**** CMCHIRDPLT, CHINPAC Operation 'Ian 6-44, Serial 000489, August
  18th, 1944.
***** War Diaries, VBP-102, 116, 117, October 1944.
****** War Diaries, VBP-4 and 10, October 1944.
******* War Diaries, VBP-150 and 151, October 1944.
600-mile sectors were covered by tender-based FBM-3's of VFP-202 and 216 with twenty-nine FBM's until October 21st when VFB-202 was relieved by VFB-21 and thereafter by VFB-21 and 216 with thirty FBM's. *

As in SOWESPAC, the Central Pacific searches were conducted in daylight. On specific occasions the radius of patrols was extended. As has been noted, the Palau and Tinian searches were extended on October 8th and 9th to 775 and 1150 miles respectively to provide an airborne screen for TF 38 approaching Okinawa. Also, in compliance with an order from CINCPAC, ** the three Tinian sectors between 272°(T) and 299°(T) were extended on October 16th to 1150 miles to search for units of the Japanese Fleet which had sorted to attack cripples of the THIRD Fleet. This extended search also was no contacts.***

(3) China-Burma-India Area

Search by China-based aircraft was commenced on October 16th by request of CINCPAC made the previous day.**** This search was conducted by B-24 type aircraft of the 308th Bomb Group, FOURTEENTH USAF, based at Luichow.***** CINCPAC's request was for daily reconnaissances to detect movement of enemy naval forces toward the THIRD Fleet's area of operation.**** The THIRD Fleet was at that time operating east of Luzon and southeast of Formosa.

The search was designed to cover that area of the South China Sea bounded on the west by a line between Camranh Bay and Hailing Island (about midway on the China coast between Hainan and Hong Kong) and on the east by the Lingayen Peninsula, Luzon.****** It consisted of two courses each flown by one B-24 every twelve hours, thus requiring four sorties per day. The courses as shown on Diagram 4 were as follows:******

East Course - Luichow to Hailing Island, thence southeast to a point sixty miles northwest of Lingayen, south for sixty miles, southwest for 150 miles, thence northwest to the China coast and Luichow.

West Course - Luichow to Hailing Island, thence south 515 miles passing to the west of Paracel Reefs, then 170 miles northeast, then northward to the China coast and Luichow passing to the east of the reefs.

This search continued throughout October without change. The day search planes departed Luichow about 0800; the night search planes about 2000.*****

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* War Diaries, VFP-21, 202, and 216, October 1944.
** CINCPAC, Dispatch 150136, October 1944 to COMAIRWIN (CTG 30.5).
*** War Diary, VFP-116, October 1944.
**** CINCPAC, Dispatch 151230, October 1944 to COMNAVORPCHINA.
***** Director, Library Division, USAF History, Air University Letter, November 8th, 1950 to President, Naval War College.
****** COMNAVORPCHINA, Dispatch 160925, October 1944.

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Contacts made by these search aircraft were broadcast while airborne on a frequency which was provided to CINCPAC, and post flight summaries were forwarded by 38th Bomb Group to Headquarters, FOURTEENTH Air Force where they were passed to interested commands at sea by a Navy liaison unit at that headquarters.

In considering the effectiveness of the land-based air search plan which was in effect on October 17th the following might be noted:

(a) In the SOWESPAC there were adequate numbers of aircraft but their operation was impeded by the lack of forward bases. From Biak an 1100-mile radius fell nearly 200 miles short of Brunei Bay and the Palawan Pass approach to the Philippines while to the north it extended only as far as San Bernardino Pass at its extremity. That this shortcoming was apparent to the commanders concerned is evident from the early movement of search aircraft to the newly established base at Morotai from where searches commenced on October 10th. The effectiveness of the new search plan, FOX, then inaugurated will be discussed in a later chapter.

(b) The search plan employed in PCA was of sufficient density to provide warning of an approach of a major enemy force toward the Marianas and Palaus. Due to the limitation of range and numbers of aircraft, however, an air search could not be devised which would provide a high probability of detection of an enemy force approaching Luzon from the Empire. Taking the shortest course from the Inland Sea to Luzon such a force would make its entire passage beyond the range of Marianas based search aircraft.

(c) Warning of an approach to the Philippines direct from the Empire could be gained by employment of an appropriate search from Leyte. The early establishment of such a search by tender-based aircraft from Leyte was included in the plans for the operation and will be discussed in a later chapter.

(d) The search plan employed by FOURTEENTH Air Force was not similar to any type of air search in use by the Navy at that time. The reasoning upon which this plan was based is not available to this study.

CINCPAC's request of October 15th had specified daily reconnaissance of the South China Sea north of the line Camranh Bay - Lingayen to detect possible movement toward the THIRD Fleet's position by enemy fleet units. It would seem that the most likely route of such units would be through Luzon Strait and that, on the basis of available intelligence, the origin of such a movement would be the Lingga-Singapore area. However, it is

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* CINNAVORPCHINA, Dispatch 160985, October 1944.
** Director, Library Division, USAF History, Air University, Letter, November 8th, 1950, to President, Naval War College.
apparent that the search provided only a relatively low probability of detection of a major enemy force which might move toward Luzon Strait from the south.

The operation of the four flights per day flown by the FOURTEENTH Air Force in reconnaissance from October 16th through October 31st required the authorization by CG, U.S. Forces, CIN, of 500 tons of POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants) supplies from theater stocks. Might this not have been better expended in maintaining a barrier patrol across the South China Sea? Navy doctrine current at the time provided for search by patrol to disclose the passage across a geographic line. Such a patrol could have been maintained by using five flights per day for a radar detection range of sixty miles, or with eight daily flights for a detection range of forty miles.

(e) As has been pointed out previously in this chapter under "Allied Land and Tender-Based Aircraft" Section (3) "China, Burma, India Area" no provisions were made for reconnaissance of the Lingga-Singapore area, although available intelligence indicated the probable presence there of heavy units, less carriers, of the enemy fleet. Only B-29's of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command, based in Ceylon, could have provided this reconnaissance (as they did for the Lingayen operation later). Such reconnaissance apparently was not requested.

Why this was so is not understood for the obtaining of continuous information concerning the movements of Japanese major forces was of paramount importance to the Allied commanders at this time. Perhaps once again, the conviction that major elements of the Japanese Fleet would not be involved in opposition to the Allied landings at Leyte caused the Allied commanders to forego this essential reconnaissance.

(f) The TWENTIETH Bomber Command made only limited visible and photographic reconnaissance. This reconnaissance was generally made while en route to designated targets or in connection with obtaining target information for scheduled attacks. It should be pointed out here that the employment of the B-29's against Formosa was merely a temporary diversion from their basic employment against targets in China and Japan and was for KIKO II only.

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* Director, Library Division, USAF History, Air University, November 8th, 1950, to President, Naval War College.

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(a) ALLIED DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES (Diagram B)

(1) SEVENTH Fleet.

The deployment of the Allied naval forces of the SEVENTH Fleet prior to the Battle for Leyte Gulf was in furtherance of COMSOWSPAC'S Plan, KING II, for the seizure by amphibious assault of positions in the Leyte area. Deployment was effected commencing in early October, primarily from bases at Manus in the Admiralty Islands and from Hollandia, New Guinea.

Naval forces involved in the deployment consisted of a Central Philippine Attack Force (TF 77), commanded by CTF 77,* which attack force included gunfire support ships (TG 77.2), close air support carriers (TG 77.4), minesweepers (TG 77.5), a beach demolition group (TG 77.6), a close covering group (TG 77.3), a flagship group (TG 77.1), two amphibious forces (TF 78 and TF 79) and a service group (TG 77.7), two submarine forces (TF 71, TF 72), a motor torpedo boat group (TF 70.1) and tender and shore-based aircraft (TF 73).

These naval forces proceeded towards Leyte Gulf in more or less widely separated groups. This was due in part to speed differentials, in part to different points of departure, and in part to a difference in the planned arrival time in the objective area. For example, the bombardment group was scheduled to arrive in the objective area on D-3 day, whereas the transports were to arrive on D day. When in the vicinity of Allied air bases such as Manus, Hollandia, Peleliu and Biak, these naval forces were under the cover of land-based aircraft. However, as the planes operating from these land bases covered limited search areas, it is apparent that large areas between the points of departure and the points of destination of the Allied naval forces were left entirely unsearched. When not near such Allied air bases the Allied naval forces were forced to rely for air cover on carrier-based aircraft if available, otherwise they proceeded without any air cover whatsoever except that provided by their ship-based planes. This method was particularly applicable to certain of the task groups required to accomplish the preliminary operations - notably the minesweeping groups and those groups required in the operations for the capture of Suluo and designated areas on Dinagat and Henson.** It also applied to the Landing Craft Movement Group of TF 79.*** These groups proceeded without carrier-based air cover, excepting at those times generally near the objective area, when they were in the vicinity of the escort carriers. This was because the speeds of the various types of ships employed varied so markedly as to necessitate each task group sorting at a different rate. This insured (a) that each group proceeded at its best speed, and (b) that concentration was effected prior to arrival within the objective area.

* Vise Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN.
** COMSOWSPAC 4 Operation Plan 2-44, Serial 0008, October 5th, 1944.
*** War Diary DESRON 54 (CTG 79.11.3), October 17th, 1944.
The carrier-based aircraft available were solely within the escort carriers. For this reason, a carrier group consisting of two escort carriers and two destroyer escorts was made available to the Northern Attack Force (TF 79), another of similar composition to the Southern Attack Force (TF 78), and a third to the First Reinforcement Group (TG 78.6). This insured that the major transport groups were given some air cover. In addition to the Transport Group, three other task groups, TG’s 77.7, 77.6 and 77.8 which proceeded together, had ample air cover. This air cover was provided by the remaining twelve carriers of the escort carrier group (TG 77.4).

While there was some danger in moving forces to the objective area without adequate air or anti-submarine defense, it seems wise to point out that COMTHIRDFLT had been conducting heavy air strikes in the Formosa-Luzon area and the TWENTIETH Bomber Command had also been attacking Formosa so that the danger of effective air attack on the SEVENTH Fleet advance forces had been seriously reduced. Also, submarine action during September and early October in the approach areas between the points of departure and the objective area had been almost negligible, with but one submarine having been definitely located in the area. This was the Japanese submarine (I-304) which was sunk by the SAMUEL D. MILES (DE), at Ulithi, October 3rd, in position bearing 307° (T), distant eighty-five miles from Peleliu, Palau. Another Japanese submarine (RO 41) was known to have been operating on this date off Morotai since the SHELTON (DE) was torpedoed at 0808 October 3rd in Latitude 02°-32'N, Longitude 129°-13'E by submarine action. However, this position was well clear of the TF 77 movement routes to Leyte Gulf.

The Allied deployment of the principal forces and groups was effected as follows:

(a) The minesweeper group (TG 77.5) sorted first. This group departed Manus at 0808, October 10th, maintained a speed of advance of 9.5 knots (which was slightly more than the correct sustained speed for YMS and caused some straggling), rendezvoused on schedule at OCGO, October 15th, ninety miles west of Point ART (Latitude 07°-04'N, Longitude 133°-00'E) with the fueling group, completed fueling.
by 1642,* then joined the Dinagat Attack Group (TG 78.4) and headed with
that command toward the objective area. The weather now became bad with
heavy rainfall and low visibility.

At 0141 October 17th, Sweep Unit ONE, consisting of HOWEY (F),
SOUTHD. HAMILTON, LONG, HOWARD, PALMER, CHANDLER, PREBLE, and SANDS,
was detached and, with TG 78.4, proceeded ahead toward Leyte Gulf.**

At 0432 Sweep Unit TWO, consisting of the minesweepers ZEAL, TURKIN,
TUMULT, VELOCITY, and SCOUT,*** and at 0546 Sweep Unit THREE, consist-
ing of the minesweepers REQUISITE, PURSUIT, REVENGE, SAGE, and SENTRY,
proceeded independently.**** At 0719 October 17th these units were
approaching the entrance to Leyte Gulf.

Meanwhile, the remaining units of TG 77.5, which were YMS min-
swerpers, less five YMS which had struggled because of the relatively
high speed and bad weather,***** were some thirty or forty miles from
Leyte.

(*) The Dinagat Attack Group (TG 78.4), less the Dinagat
Bombardment Unit (TU 78.4.3, also titled TU 77.2.3), sortied from
Hollanda at 1300, October 12th, maintained a speed of advance of about
thirteen knots, and at 0600, October 15th, rendezvoused ninety miles
west of Point ART with Fueling Group (TU 77.7.1) and with TG 77.5.******
At 1642, TG 78.4 completed fueling and in company with TG 77.5 headed
for Dinagat Island.******

At 0141 October 17th, TG 78.4, less TU 78.4.3, accompanied by
Sweep Unit ONE, departed the remaining ships of TG 77.5 and at speeds
varying from twenty to twenty-six knots headed for the eastern entrance
to Leyte Gulf.

At 0640, HOWEY, HAMILTON, LONG, and SOUTHD. took station ahead
of TU 78.4.1 (Black Beach ONE Unit) and headed for the approaches to
Black Beach ONE on northern Dinagat Island. At the same time TU 78.4.2,
consisting of LONG, ROSS, BISSELL, and HERBERT, proceeded toward the
entrance to Leyte Gulf to await minesweepers from Black Beach THREE
on Sulu Island. This unit was to capture Black Beach TWO on southern
Honomhon Island.

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* War Diary ASHTABULA, October 15th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 78.4, Report of Dinagat Group, Serial 0016,
undated, page 2.
*** War Diary VELOCITY, October 17th, 1944.
**** War Diary SAGE, October 17th, 1944.
***** Action Report CTG 77.5, Minesweeping Operations in Surigao
Strait and Leyte Gulf, Serial 011, October 29th, 1944.
****** Action Report Amphibious Group 9 (CTG 78.4), Serial 0018,
October 1944, Enclosure (B).

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At 0600, TU 78.4.1 formed column astern of the minesweepers, in
order as follows: STAG, GALLUN, HUGHES (F), WARD, SCHUY, PILLY, and
ARIADNE. At 0635, the minesweepers commenced sweeping acoustic and
moored mines to forty feet.

(c) 1) The Bombardment and Fire Support Group (TG 77.2),
accompanied by the Escort Carrier Group (TG 77.3), plus TUs 77.4.14,
77.4.24 and 77.4.34 and the Beach Demolition Group (TU 77.6), sortied
Manus at 0600, October 12th, maintained a speed of advance of about
fifteen knots, and at 0600 October 14th, in the fueling area about
ninety miles west of Point ARE, rendezvoused with the Fueling Unit
(TU 77.7.1), consisting of the others CARRANAC, ASHTANILA and SALMUNIL,
with their escorts. At 1400 CTO 77.2, who was to be in command of the
advance force from D-3 to D day, detached the Bombardment Unit
(TU 77.4.2) to provide covering forces; the operations against Black
Beach and on northern Mindan Island, Black Beach and on southern
Monernon Island and Black Beach on Salum Island.** At 1400,
when fueling was completed, TUs 77.2, 77.4 and 77.6 headed for the
objective area.*** At 1700 CTO 77.2 detached the Escort Carrier Group
(TG 77.4) to proceed independently to the objective area.** About this
time he received an intelligence report from Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(Hollandia) which gave the latest information concerning the enemy and
which provided an agenda to Annex MILF of Emperor 13-44. Most of the
information therein has already been mentioned under "Information
Available to the Allied Commander." It provided no changes which
materially affected his plans. At 0710, October 17th, TG 77.4 was
bearing 134°(T), distant forty-five miles from Salum Island, and TG
77.2 was bearing 129°(T), distant 115 miles from Salum Island.

(2) Although the weather forecast from Hollandia and
elsewhere gave good weather indications in the Leyte area, this was
not in fact the case. Instead of the good sea and air conditions which
were being predicted, the exact opposite was the case on October 16th
and continued through the 17th. The ceiling was zero, the seas rough,
the rain heavy. CTO 77.2 now had to determine whether to proceed
according to plan or whether to recommend that D day be delayed. He
studied the weather information and boldly decided to proceed.***

This was an important and correct decision for the major Allied
forces were underway, and considerable confusion might have resulted
had it been necessary to recommend a delay.

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* War Diary CHUDIV 2 (TG 77.2), October 12th, 1944.
* Action Report CHUDIV 12 (TU 78.4.3), Report of Bombardment and
  Support of Landing on Salum Island, etc., Serial 0149, November
  2nd, 1944.
*** Action Report, CTO 77.7, Capture of Leyte Island, Serial 00147,
  November 5th, 1944, page 8.
*** Ibid, page 41.

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As the hours passed the weather continued bad. By 0200 the following morning (October 17th) the winds had increased to thirty-four knots, the seas were choppy and rising and the visibility was impaired by frequent rain squalls.

(3) After TU 78.4.4 had been detached, it proceeded at twenty-six knots on route to the objective area. At about 0436, October 17th, in accordance with orders from CTG 78.4, CTU 78.4.4 detached the RSSS to join TU 78.4.1 (Black Beach ONE Unit), and the RUTHERFORD to join TU 78.4.2 (Black Beach TWO Unit). At about 0500 he was joined by the minesweepers HOWARD, PALMER, CHANDLER, and the high speed transports SANDS and CROSBY. At about 0550 in accordance with orders from CTG 78.4 he detached the COLUMBIA and BRYANT to remain outside the 100 fathom curve and support CTU 78.4.1. The units which remained under his direct command, i.e., DEREVER, A.W. GRANT, HOWARD, PALMER, CHANDLER, SANDS, and CROSBY, composed TU 78.4.4 (Black Beach THREE Unit). TU 78.4.3 now became TU 78.4.4 as well.

As CTU 78.4.4 he now commenced operations to capture Suluan Island. At 0605 the A.W. GRANT, leading the SANDS and CROSBY, fell in column astern of the minesweepers, while the DAVENPORT remained outside the 100 fathom curve. At 0610 the minesweepers commenced sweeping the approach channel for acoustic mines and moored mines to forty feet. The weather was bad and had been increasingly ugly since 0105. The waves were increasing in size and the visibility was decaying making minesweeping operations difficult. However, Suluan Island was somewhat protected by Henan Island to the westward. At 0640 Suluan Island was sighted for the first time. This was ten minutes before the Japanese on Suluan Island sighted TU 78.4.4. At 0710 the sweep was completed. No mines were discovered.

At 0719 October 17th, TU 78.4.4 was closing Suluan Island and was preparing to disembark the landing forces.

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* Action Report of Bombardment and Support of Suluan Island by TU 78.4.4 and of the Evening Operations by TU 78.4.3, October 17th, 1944., Serial O149, November 2nd, 1944.
*** War Diary HOWARD, October 17th, 1944.
**** War Diary PALMER, October 17th, 1944.
***** War Diary ZUKAKU, October, 1944, WDC Document 161636, NA 12260.
(d) The Northern Attack Force (TF 78) sortied in two major groups:

(1) The Palo Attack Group (TG 78.1), plus the LST's and LSM's of the San Ricardo Attack Group (TG 78.2), the Close Covering Group (TG 77.3), Harbor Entrance Control Group (TG 78.6), certain units of the Panam Attack Group (TG 78.3), sortied from Hollandia at 1600, October 13th, and headed for Point PeT,** (Latitude 02° 46'N, Longitude 136° 46'E). It rendezvoused with the KITKUN BAY and its escorts DENNIS and BULMER at 1919 the same day.***

(2) The San Ricardo Attack Group (TG 78.2), less its LST's and LSM's, plus the GAMBIA BAY, sortied from Manus at 1425, October 12th, and headed for Point PeT.****

At 1200, October 15th, these two major groups rendezvoused at Point PeT to form TF 78.***** TF 78 then headed for the objective area. At 0719 October 17th this force was bearing 123° (T), distant 400 miles from Sulaun Island.

(e) The Southern Attack Force (TF 79) sortied from Manus as follows:

(1) The Landing Craft Movement Group consisting of TG 79.1's Tractor Group ABLE and TG 79.2's Tractor Group BAK.1, sortied from Manus Harbor on October 11th. Tractor Group ABLE, consisting of LST Unit (TG 79.6), Control Unit (TG 79.7), and LCI Unit (TU 79.7.1) sortied at about 0830, ***** and Tractor Group BAKER (TG 79.8), consisting of LST-LSM Transport Unit (TU 79.6.1), and LCI Unit (TU 79.6.2) sortied at 1047.******

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* Action Report CTU 79.1.8, Serial 0114, November 6th, 1944.
** War Diary KITKUN BAY, October 15th, 1944.
*** War Diary FRESNOE, October 12th, 1944.
**** War Diary FAYETTE, October 12th, 1944.
***** COMDESBON 54 Movement Plan 1-44, October 11th, 1944
Annex C; also War Diary COMDESBON 54, October 11th, 1944.
****** War Diary LCI(L) Flotilla 14 (CTG 79.6), October 11th, 1944.
Groups ABLE and BAKER were screened by DesRon 54 (TU 79.11.3). After sorting, the Landing Craft Movement Group headed for a rendezvous with certain units of Fueling Group (TU 77.7.1) which rendezvous was effected at 0700, October 17th. At 0719 these groups were bearing 110º(T) distant 665 miles from Sula Island.

(2) Attack Group ABLE, less Tractor Group ABLE, plus TU 77.4.14, sorted from Manus at about 0700, October 14th, and headed for fueling rendezvous on October 15th in vicinity Point ART. At 0719 October 17th this group was bearing 110º(T) distant 665 miles from Sula Island.

(3) Attack Group BAKER, less Tractor Group BAKER, sorted from Manus at 0930, October 14th, and in company with Attack Group ABLE, but ten miles astern, also headed for the fueling rendezvous on October 15th in vicinity of Point ART. At 0719 October 17th this group was bearing 110º(T) distant 665 miles from Sula Island.

(f) (1) The Fleet Flagship Unit (TU 77.1.1) of the Flagship Group (TU 77.1), Central Philippines Attack Force (TF 77), departed from Hollandia at 0622, October 15th, and headed for a rendezvous with TF 79*** in Latitude 03º10'N, Longitude 130º50'E at 1200, October 16th.

At about 1115 CONSEVENTHFLTLTR, who was also CTF 77 and who was in the WASATCH with this unit, received CONTHIRDFLT's dispatch wherein he announced that he was preparing for fleet action and would be unable to provide fast carrier support for KING II until further notice.***** Although he must have been expecting such a message, as he was generally in familiar with the developing situation, it necessarily presented a new problem which required immediate action as it challenged the whole KING II Operation. Since CONSEVENTHFLTLTR had been at sea for about five hours and as CONOSWESPAC was still at Hollandia, CONSEVENTHFLTLTR had then to decide, without consultation with CONOSWESPAC, whether to proceed with the KING II Operation or whether to recommission CONOSWESPAC that the operation be delayed until either the fleet action had been decided on or until the fast carrier support was once more available. He decided to continue the operation and so advised CONTHIRDFLT and CONOSWESPAC.***** In this same message he directed CTF 77.4 to strike the western Visayas on October 17th, 18th and 19th in lieu of TF 38.

CONSEVENTHFLTLTR made this decision on the following considerations:

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** War Diary COMDESRON 54, October 11th, 1944.
*** War Diary COMTRANSDIV 38 (CTU 73.3.3) October 14th, 1944.
**** War Diary CAMBRIA, October 14th, 1944.
***** War Diary WASATCH, October 15th, 1944.
***** CONTHIRDFLT Dispatch 150149 October 1944 to CINCPAC and CONOSWESPAC.
****** CONSEVENTHFLTLTR Dispatch 151042 October 1944 to CONTHIRDFLT, CONOSWESPAC, CINCPAC, etc.
(a) that the opinion stated in his OpPlan* that there would be no major elements of the Japanese Fleet involved in opposition to the Allied landings at Leyte still obtained, (b) that this fleet action was expected to occur in the waters north of the Philippines and was not expected to embrace units of the SEVENTH Fleet, (c) that he had adequate forces to effect a landing at Leyte Gulf without direct support from the THIRD Fleet and (d) that he did not consider the situation sufficiently dangerous to warrant any change in plans at this time. He still had about thirty hours in which to make a final decision and he therefore continued on to await more information on the developing situation.** This action by CONSEVENTHFLT was not blind adherence to plan, but appears instead to have been a calculated risk which was based on the information available to him, on his analysis of enemy capabilities at this time, and on the dictates of his own judgment guided by the known views of his superiors. While it is true that many of the units of TF 77 were proceeding towards Leyte Gulf in week, separated detachments and therefore presented inviting targets for raiding operations by Japanese surface and striking forces and while it is true that CINCPAC had indicated a possibility of strong enemy forces debuching through Sipingao Strait or through San Bernardino Strait,*** the decision by CONSEVENTHFLT is considered to have been correct. It was properly made by him as it was a naval decision and was within his competence as the CONSEVENTHFLT.

At 2030, October 16th, the Fleet Flagship Unit joined TF 79 and continued on with that force toward the objective area.**** At 0719 October 17th this unit was bearing 118°17'T) distant 885 miles from Sulu Island.

(f) (2) The Cruiser Unit (TF 77.1.2) of the Flagship Group (TG 77.1), Central Philippines Attack Force, departed Hollandia at 11b, October 16, and headed for a rendezvous with TF 79.***** COMSOWESPAC with the Commander Allied Air Forces SOWESPAC was in the NASHVILLE.***** At 0719 October 17th this unit was bearing 126°(T) distant 860 miles from Sulu Island.

At about 1115 on the preceding day (October 16th) COMSOWESPAC received COMTHIRDFLT's dispatch***** wherein he stated that except for todays Luzon strike he would be unable to provide fast carrier support for KING II until further notice.

* CANPSOWESPAC Operation Plan 13-44, Serial 00022A, September 25th, 1944, Annex M.
*** CINCPAC Dispatch 1bu36, October 1944 to COMSOWESPAC.
**** War Diary NASATCH, October 16th, 1944.
***** War Diary NASHVILLE, October 16th, 1944.
****** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 1bu49, October 1944 to CINCPAC and COMSOWESPAC.

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What considerations passed through his mind when he received this dispatch are not available to this study. However, it appears that he took no direct action but instead awaited action by his naval commander. Needless to say, the decision of that commander to proceed with the KING II Operation appears to have been received with satisfaction. The fact that CO SEVENTHFLT's decision was so received shows that a high level of mutual understanding had been achieved between the theater commander and his naval commander.

(g) Reinforcement Group ONE (TG 78.8) sortied from Hollandia at about 0700, October 16th. Upon sorties it rendezvoused at 1810 with Escort Carrier Unit (TU 77.4.24) at Point Curb, and headed for the objective area, maintaining an average speed of between 9.5 and 10.5 knots.* At 0719 October 17th this group was bearing 130°(T) distant 930 miles from Sulu Island.

(h) Reinforcement Group TWO (TG 78.7) and Reinforcement Group THREE (TG 78.4) remained at anchor at Hollandia.

(2) Other SEVENTH Fleet Forces

(a) Motor Torpedo Boat Group

The Motor Torpedo Boat Group (TU's 70.1.3 and 70.1.6) sortied from Mios Island, Woendi, Shouten Islands at 1430 October 6th and headed for Kossel Passage, Palau where they arrived at 1644, October 13th. At 0719, October 17th, they were at anchor in Kossel Passage.** (While other motor torpedo boat units were dispersed throughout the area they had no effect on the operations connected with the Battle for Leyte Gulf and will therefore be omitted).

(b) Submarine Force SEVENTH Fleet

During Operation KING II the submarines of the SEVENTH Fleet were generally concerned with the following objectives which, while worded differently, were similar in substance to those assigned the submarines of the Pacific Fleet.

(1) The protection of Allied operations by the maintenance of an offensive reconnaissance line across the enemy's most probable line of advance.

* Action Report, Reinforcement Group 1, Leyte Island (CTG 78.6), Serial 0154, October 31st, 1944.
** War Diaries WACHAPREJUE, WILLOUGHBY, OYSTER BAY, HALF-MOON, and MTB Squadrons 7, 12, 21, 33 and 36, October 1944.
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(2) The maintenance of morale and aviation efficiency by providing life-guard submarines to recover downed flyers.

(3) The protection of Allied operations by the employment of patrols stationed in strategic locations.

(4) The improvement of naval operations through the obtaining of weather data and the forwarding of weather reports based thereon.*

Although these objectives are listed in the order shown by COMSEVENTHFLT, there were occasions when each of the objectives had priorities over the others and therefore it can be assumed that the above listing is not necessarily in order of importance. Actually, it is doubtful if there were, in fact, four objectives, for does it not seem reasonable to assume that objectives (1) and (3) are one and the same objective, i.e., the protection of Allied operations by intercepting, reporting, and destroying enemy forces approaching the area of operations?

The COMSEVENTHFLT, insofar as the Leyte operation was concerned, received his directives directly from COMCINCPAC and, in turn, issued his own directives directly to his Commander Submarines Raising West Australia (CTF-71)*** and his Commander Submarines Basing East Australia (CTF-72)***, as shown in Plate II. He appears to have completely bypassed his Commander Submarines SEVENTH Fleet. Why this was so remains unclear for on February 16th, 1944,**** in accordance with orders from COMINCH,***** the submarines of the Southwest Pacific Theater were reportedly organized under Commander Submarines SEVENTH Fleet with one subordinate task force commander, all under the operational control of COMSEVENTHFLT.****** Under this organization the submarines were to be employed as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT with the concurrence of COMCINCPAC.******* Actually reorganization had not been made fully effective by October 1944 for reasons not available to this study,******** but possibly because COMSEVENTHFLT,

** Rear Admiral Ralph W. Christie, USN.
*** Captain John M. Heine, USN.
**** History, United States Naval Administration in World War II, Submarine Command, no date nor serial, microfilm A-22020.
***** COMINCH Letter Serial 00107, January 12th, 1944 to CINCPAC and COMSEVENTHFLT.
****** War Diary CTF 71, October 1944, Enclosure (A); also Vice Admiral James Lea, USN Letter February 3rd, 1952 to Commodore R. W. Bates, USN(Ret) Head of World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College.
in view of the fact that his Commander Submarines SEVENTH Fleet was also CTF 71, had decided that he could facilitate operations if he operated his west coast and east coast submarines independently of one another. It is of interest that this decision was very similar to the decision which he had made earlier with relation to the command of the Philippines Attack force and which has been commented on previously under "Chain of Command within SOWESTPAC."

The Submarines of TF 71 when on patrol were assigned to one of two operational groups:

(a) TG 71.1, which was composed entirely of United States submarines and operated generally in the Northern sectors of the Southwest Pacific Theater.***

(b) TG 71.7, which was composed entirely of British and Netherlands submarines and operated generally just north of the Malay Barrier in the Flores and Java Seas.**

The submarines of TF 72, which force was composed entirely of American submarines, were operated, when on patrol, as one task group, (TG 72.1). These submarines were engaged entirely in special missions to the Philippines which consisted, in general, of supplying and evacuating coast watchers, weather observers and aircraft spotters, and, on occasions, guerrilla forces. While on these missions the submarines were authorized to destroy important enemy forces encountered when accomplishment of mission or the special missions were not jeopardized thereby. They were also directed to make immediate contact reports of major enemy forces encountered. Since but three submarines, NARWAL, TACITUS and CERO performed any missions during October 1944, and since none of these submarines made any contacts or reports which affected KINU II, further discussion of TF 72 will be dropped.

The operations of submarines by COWESTPAC differed somewhat from that by CNOCPAC. As will be shown later, under Submarine Force Pacific Fleet, CNOCPAC divided the Western Pacific north of the Philippines into large patrol areas each of which he designated by a name such as BARU WARGUS. He subdivided each of the large patrol areas into a number of sub areas each of which was also designated by a name. He did this so that he might rotate the submarines within a large patrol area from one sub area to another. Such rotation was called "a rotating patrol."****

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* TG 71.1 Operation Plan A-44, September 1st, 1944.
** TG 71.7 Operation Plan A-44, September 10th, 1944.
**** CTF 72 OpOrd S04-44, Serial O0213, October 2nd, 1944 and CTF 72 OpOrd S05-44, Serial O0216, October 3rd, 1944.
CONSOWESTAC also divided his water areas into large patrol areas, but did not subdivide them. He did not employ a "rotating patrol" but, instead, stationed his submarines in one or more of these large patrol areas as required by the dynamics of the situation. He designated his patrol areas by numbers and letters rather than by names, but retained CINCPAC's names to the patrol areas east of the Philippines which CINCPAC had temporarily established for the previous operation, STALEMATE II, the capture of Pescadores, Anguar, Yap and Ulithi, which had occurred during September 1944.

CONSOWESTAC patrol designations are shown in Plate III as A2 to A8, B2 to B9, C1 to C4, D1 to D7, E1, E2, E4, E5, E6, E8, F1 to F8, G1 to G9, F1 and F2. CINCPAC patrol area designation for the areas to the east of the Philippines are also shown on the same plate as WOODLOT, NAVLE GROVE, FLOWER BED, CORN FIELD, ORIAR PATCH, FISH BONE and VINEYARD.

It will be remembered that the dividing line between Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) and Southwest Pacific (CONSOWESTAC) had been set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Latitude 10°00'N. This line had been somewhat artificial and had prevented the fullest exploitation of Luzon Strait by submarines of either command.** With the importance of this area increasing and the Philippine operations in the offing, that portion of Luzon Strait lying between Latitude 20°00'N and Latitude 10°30'N and between Hainan Island and Longitude 120°00'E had been temporarily given by mutual agreement between the theater commanders to CONSOWESTAC on May 22nd, 1944.***** This gave CONSOWESTAC control of the entire strait, likewise at the same time, presumably to more effectively support the STALEMATE II Operation, that portion of the Southwest Pacific lying between the east Philippine coast and Longitude 120°00'E and between Latitude 10°30'N and Latitude 07°30'N had been temporarily given to CONSOWESTAC, also by mutual agreement between the theater commanders.******

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** PACIFIC Letter 16CL-44, Addendum No. 2.
*** CONSOWESTAC had additional patrol areas designated A1, A8, B1 located between Hainan east coast to Longitude 121°00'E between Latitude 20°00'N down to Latitude 18°30'N and (1) which was formed in the west at Longitude 121°00'E to north coast of Luzon and east coast of Philippines eastward to Longitude 130°00'E between Latitude 20°00'N down to Latitude 07°30'N. However, an CINCPAC area designation absorbed most of these areas they, as well as areas E3, E8, E7 and F9, which are located south of the Malay Barrier, have been left off Plate III.
***** CONSOWESTAC Dispatch 2200Z, May 1944 to CINCPAC.
Since KING II was entirely a Southwest Pacific operation, though
supported throughout by the THIRD Fleet, CINCPAC on September 27th recom-
mended to COMSOWESPAC that the area south of 18°30'N, presently being
patrolled by FOA submarines, be returned to COMOWESPAC.* COMSOWESPAC
concurred in this proposal and suggested that the transfer be made ef-
fective on the same date that CINCPAC's Standard Operating Procedure No.
ONE (SOP-1) which explained CINCPAC's system of zone classification,
became effective.** CINCPAC agreed and ordered his SOP-1 effective 2400,
October 4th.***

This SOP-1 which is explained later under Submarine Force Pacific
Fleet, governed the operations of aircraft, surface ships and submarines
notably within Submarine Patrol Zones, Air Surface Zones, Joint Zones and
Blind Bombing Zones.

The zone classification system employed by COMSOWESPAC was practi-
cally the same as that prescribed in SOP-1, differing only in that the
SOWESPAC submarines were protected in transmitting SOWESPAC Blind Bombing
Zones by a system of safety lanes classified as Joint Zones which extend-
ed fifteen miles each side of a fixed route whereas CINCPAC's submarines
were protected by a moving haven established by a submarine notice which
automatically extended an area thirty miles ahead, sixty miles behind and
fifteen miles on each side of the estimated track given and which moved
with the submarine.**** This, similarly was an important consideration,
for if it not clear that had it been otherwise, particularly in the border
areas between SOWESPAC and FOA, considerable confusion between surface and
submarine forces might otherwise have resulted.

The classification of submarine zones in SOWESPAC was a responsi-
bility of COMSOWESPAC through his CONSEVENTHFLTL.***** How this was ac-
complished throughout October 1944 is depicted on Plate IV.

Since the areas WOODLOT, FISH POND, BRIAR PATCH, CORN FIELD, FLOWER
BED and MAPLE GROVE were to remain under CINCPAC until October 4th,
CINCPAC in his Zone Notice #33 classified these areas as air surface
zones commencing 2100, October 1st and classified the unnamed area be-
tween BRIAR PATCH and FISH POND and the east coast of the Philippines, a

* CINCPAC Dispatch 272014, September 1944 to COMSOWESPAC info COMINCH,
  CONTHIRDLT, CONSEVENTHFLTL, COMSUBPAC, CTF 71 and 72.
** CONSEVENTHFLTL Dispatch 061943, October 1944 to CINCPAC.
* Separate CONSEVENTHFLTL Dispatch 300246 September 1944 to CINCPAC.
*** CINCPAC Dispatch 022114, October 1944 to COMSOWESPAC.
**** CINCPAC Standard Operating Procedure SOP-1, Serial SOP-1, September
  16th, 1944; Operations Instruction Number 69, SOWESPAC, September
  19th, 1944; Submarine Operational History, World War II, prepared

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## SUBMARINE OPERATING AREA CLASSIFICATIONS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC & ADJACENT CENTRAL PACIFIC

OCTOBER 8 - 31, 1944

(See Plans 1 to 7 for Annexes)

### OPERATING ZONE A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

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In view of the fact that Allied forces would be operating in the area between WOODLOT, BRIAR PATCH, FISH POND and the east coast of the Philippine Islands, COMSUBSPAC made plans to reclassify this area. He informed CINCPOA of these new plans on or prior to October 15th. For on this date, CINCPOA informed his command that COMSUBSPAC had made this area an air surface zone effective 2000, October 15th, and had made the area between WOODLOT, BRIAR PATCH and the east coast of the Philippine Islands north of Latitude 14°N a joint zone effective 0001, October 15th.**

Since the patrol area east of the Philippine Islands during the latter part of September and early October continued to be his responsibility, CINCPOA stationed the submarine PARCHE in San Bernardino Strait, the submarine DRUM in Surigao Strait and designated the operating areas as submarine patrol zones. He advised COMSUBSPAC that the PARCHE and DRUM would start retiring from these stations on October 15th unless COMSUBSPAC desired that they withdraw earlier.*** He also advised COMSUBSPAC that, although CUMTHRDMTLT required no lifeguard submarines in these straits, he (CINCPOA) believed that it was desirable that the straits be guarded against exit by enemy forces until our surface forces were in the vicinity.***

CINCPOA's reason for suggesting October 15th seems to have been the fact that since TF 38 would be fueling on that date to the eastward of Luzon and, on the following day, would commence the planned air strikes against Luzon and the Visayas, he desired to remove his submarines from positions where their activities might cause them to be attacked by our planes. Such an attack was possible because San Bernardino Strait and Surigao Strait after 2000, October 15th were located in air surface zones.

COMSUBSPAC considered CINCPOA's departure date of October 15th as too late and so advised CINCPOA, for at 2030, October 12th the PARCHE, and presumably the DRUM, received orders from COMSUBSPAC to be north of Latitude 18°30'N prior to 0000, October 15th.**** Once these submarines had departed, COMSUBSPAC planned to leave the eastern exits to San Bernardino Strait and to Surigao Straits unguarded despite CINCPOA's

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* CINCPOA Dispatch 302162, September 1944 to COMTHIRDFLT, COMSUBSPAC info COMINCH, COMSUBSPAC, CONSEVENTHFLT, CTF 71 and 72.
** CINCPOA Dispatch 132225, October 1944 to COMTHIRDFLT, COMSUBSPAC, info COMINCH, COMSUBSPAC, CTF 71, 72 and 77 (Repeat restrictions promulgated for SOWSPAC area).
*** CINCPOA Dispatch 022100, October 1944 to COMSUBSPAC info COMTHIRDFLT, COMCAP, COMSUBSPAC, CONSEVENTHFLT, CTF 71 and 72.
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recommendation to the contrary. His reason for this, although now no longer stated specifically, can be found in his plans for the employment of TF 71 submarines for KUNG II. These plans and those of his subordinates in compliance with them were as follows:

(a) CANISOWNSPAC in his Operation Plan directed CTF 71 and CTF 72 as follows:

While continuing present missions to the fullest extent practicable, station strong offensive and reconnaissance patrols and lifeguard submarines in accordance with instructions to be issued by COMSEVENTHFLT. In general, operations will be conducted to interdict and report enemy surface forces in the approaches to our movement routes and objective area.

(b) In amplification of this directive COMSEVENTHFLT on October 5th directed CTF 71 and CTF 72 to execute the following tasks in support of the operations of the THIRD Fleet and the Central Philippines Attack Force. These tasks were in general:

(1) To maintain strong patrols in the western entrances to the Celebes and Sulu Seas and in Makassar Strait.

(2) To maintain strong patrols off the Hainan-Luzon area in coordination with COMSUBPAC.

(3) To give prompt and early warning of movements of enemy forces, particularly major units approaching from the Brunei-Singapore area.

(4) To station one lifeguard submarine off Cape Bolinao, Luzon and one off Subic Bay, Luzon on October 16th and 17th; and one lifeguard submarine off Coroan Island, Visayas on October 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th. During this time there was also one lifeguard submarine off Balikpapan, Borneo. This station had been patrolled since September 25th.

(5) To provide weather reports.

In issuing these instructions to CTF 71 (who was based at Perth, Australia) and to CTF 72 (who was based at Brisbane, Australia) COMSEVENTHFLT also advised them that COMSUBPAC "was maintaining strong patrols on Formosa-Luzon line and off Sasebo, Kyushu with particular emphasis on covering movements of enemy carriers," and further directed

* CANISOWNSPAC Operation Plan 12-44, Serial 0019A, September 25th, 1944, page 4, paragraph h.
** COMSEVENTHFLT Dispatch 09026, October 1944 to CTF 71 and CTF 72.
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CTF 71 to report promptly his prospective deployment in support of this operation.

Generally at this time the submarines in Luzon Strait were operating against merchant shipping and made no real attempt to block Luzon Strait until October 10th when they were ordered to do so by dispatch.** Likewise, the submarines operating off Saaso were engaged principally against enemy merchant shipping whereas the submarines off Bungo Suido were those assigned the responsibility for covering the enemy carriers in the Inland Sea.***

The directives issued by CANFSOWESPAC, as stated in paragraph (a) above, and by COMSEVENTHFLT as stated in (b) above plus the Informative Annex on Submarine Operations attached to CANFSOWESPAC OpPlan 13-44 are confusing, as they are in disagreement. In the first place COMSOWESPAC's major objective at this time was the gaining of the command of the Leyte-Surigao Strait area and the establishment there of major air, naval and logistic bases for the support of subsequent operations.*** In reference (a) CANFSOWESPAC called for one objective in support of this basic objective. This was the protection of the THIRD Fleet and the Central Philippines Attack Force during KING II by the employment of strong offensive and reconnaissance patrols.

In reference (b) COMSEVENTHFLT gave two protection objectives in support of the operations of the THIRD Fleet and the Central Philippines Attack Force. These objectives should properly accomplish CANFSOWESPAC's protection objective. What were these two objectives? One was protection by maintaining strong patrols in the western entrances to the Celebes and Sulu Seas and in Makassar Strait; the other was protection by maintaining strong patrols in the Hainan-Luzon area in coordination with COMSUBPAC. But would the accomplishment of these objectives, accomplish CANFSOWESPAC's objective? It would appear not, for CANFSOWESPAC desired that his objective be accomplished by interdicting and reporting enemy surface forces in the approaches to the Allied movement routes and the objective area. But, COMSEVENTHFLT, on the other hand directed that his objectives be accomplished by giving prompt and early warning of enemy forces, particularly major units approaching from the Brunei-Singapore area.

This negative view is supported by Annex H to CANFSOWESPAC Operation Plan 13-44 which states, for information, that these protection objectives were to be accomplished by the maintenance of a submarine offensive reconnaissance line across the enemy's most probable line of advance, and by submarine patrols stationed in strategic locations.

* CTF 17 Dispatch 150931, October 1944 to all Submarines.
** CTF 17 Operation Order 328-44, Serial 00847, September 25th, 1944 to CTG 17.7.
*** COMSOWESPAC Operations Instructions Number 70, September 21st, 1944.
The problem in CTF 71's mind was how to reconcile "in the approaches" which means relatively nearby, and "early" which means relatively far away.* Does not an offensive reconnaissance line across the enemy's most probable line of advance also give an impression of distance? And does not the maintenance of strong patrols in the Hainan-Luzon area do likewise?

CTF 71 was concerned with that portion of his directive from COM SEVENTHFLT which stated "particularly major units approaching from the Brunei-Singapore area." Did this mean that submarines were to be stationed so as to intercept these forces? If so, where, for since Brunei was in Borneo, and Singapore was at the southern tip of the Malayan Peninsula, there was a minimum distance of some 700 miles of South China Sea between them.

CTF 71 was also concerned with CANF/OWESPAC's desire that submarine operations against shipping be continued at the fullest extent practicable.* For all of these operations required submarines. But, where were these submarines? Although he commanded thirty-six American submarines, six of these submarines were returning to base at Fremantle after having completed their patrols; one, the GERO was an route to Mios Woendi, (it arrived there on October 13th) and twelve others were in port at Fremantle undergoing overhaul with the earliest readiness for sea for any submarine, October 13th. Thus, he had available for immediate operations only seventeen American submarines, of which four were required for lifeguard duty. All seventeen submarines were on patrol station or were en route there.** In general, the mission of these submarines was "to destroy enemy shipping and to deny the enemy use of vital traffic lanes by the employment of unrestricted submarine warfare."***

He commanded, in addition, ten British and four Netherlands submarines. Of these submarines, three British were returning to base at Fremantle after completing their patrols, and two British and three Netherlands submarines were in port at Fremantle undergoing overhaul with the earliest readiness for sea of any submarine, October 15th. Thus, he had available for immediate operations, three British and one Netherlands submarines already on station and two British submarines on route to their patrol stations - a total of five British and one Netherlands submarines. These submarines were not available for any and all duties within SOWESPAC, but were instead, because of limited cruising radius, restricted to operations in the southern part of that area and generally in the area just

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* Rear Admiral Murray J. Tichenor, USN(Ret), Operations Officer, TF 71 during KING II, Statement February 3rd, 1952 to Commodore R.W. Bates, USN(Ret), Head of World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College.
** War Diary CTF 71, October 1944.
*** CTG 71.1 Operation Orders to Submarines Concerned.
north of the Malay barrier in the Flores and Java Seas, although HMS SINDAR was in Sunda Strait. The Netherlands submarines were to be employed on special missions to maintain communications with the Netherlands East Indies.**

Students of submarine operations may wonder why CTF 71 did not advance the date of completion of some of his submarines which he had known, at least since September 25th, 1944, might be required for KING II, or, failing that, why he did not employ some of his submarines returning from patrol, even though without torpedoes, to assist in covering enemy movements. He may have been affected by his intelligence which had forecast that no major elements of the Japanese Fleet would be involved in opposition to the Allied landings at Leyte and therefore, he felt it was not necessary to consider seriously the possible movement of enemy forces into the objective area. However, the most likely answer appears to have been that COMSEVENTHFLT's delay in issuing directives - he delayed from September 25th until October 9th, approximately two weeks - upset CTF 71's plans so that he was unable to revise his base overhauls which were operated on a very tight schedule.***

He solved his problem and informed CTF 77 (Commander Philippine Attack Force) that he planned to deploy his submarines for the period October 15th to October 25th as follows:**** (Plate V).

(a) One pack of two submarines (BREAM and RATON) off west central Luzon.

(b) One submarine south of and one submarine north of Scarborough Shoal. (RAY was assigned to one of these stations but suffered an operational casualty on October 14th and returned to base).

(c) Two submarines (ROCK and BERGALL) south of Paracel Reef.

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** War Diary CTF 71, October 1944.
*** Rear Admiral Murray J. Tichenor, USN(Ret.), Operations Officer, TF 71 during KING II, Statement February 7th, 1952, to Commodore R.W. Bates, USN(Ret.), Head of World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College.
**** CTF 71 Letter, Serial 003248, November 17th, 1944 to CTF 77; CTF 71 Dispatch 101426, October 1944 to COMSEVENTHFLT and COMSOWESPAC. (The names of the submarines concerned were not listed in these references but have been included here for clarity. The names were obtained from Dispatch orders.)
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(d) One pack of two submarines (PL. KILL and ANGLER) in the vicinity of Cape Calavite.

(a) One submarine (DARTER) in the southern approaches to Palawan Passage.

(f) One submarine (BACK) in the western approaches to Balabac Strait.

(c) One submarine (HMS HAMMERHEAD) covering the southwestern approaches to Dranai Bay.

(h) One submarine (GUITARRO) in the Sulu Sea.

(i) One submarine in the western Celebes Sea. (No submarine was assigned to this station)

(j) One submarine (HMS TANTIYY) in lower Makassar Strait.

(k) Two submarines (HMS STOIC and HMG ZWAARDSCH) in Java Sea.

(l) One submarine (HMS STURDY) in the lower Gulf of Bani.

(m) Two submarines (S.RNARD and RATFISH) en route, via Karimata Strait, patrol station Northwest of Borneo to arrive on station about the 13th and 21st of October.

(n) One Submarine (BONEFISH) on lifeguard station off Cape Bolinao from October 16th to October 18th.

(o) One submarine (COP) on lifeguard station off Subic Bay from October 16th to October 18th.

(p) One submarine (LAPON) on lifeguard station off Coron Island from October 16th to October 20th.

(q) One submarine (PADILE) on lifeguard station off Balikpapan.

The arrival at this disposition of submarines as follows:

(a) He was ordered to maintain strong patrols in the western entrances to the Sulu and Celebes Seas. These entrances were, from the south, Balabac Strait, Lintasan Strait, Mindoro Strait and Verde Island Passage. He decided to place one submarine off Balabac Strait (which was reported as having been mined by the Japanese),* none in

* CAMECOSTAC Operation Plan 13-14, Serial 66022A, September 28th, 1944, Annex M.
Limapacan Strait, two off Cape Calavite (vicinity Mindoro Strait), none in Verde Island Passage (the western approach to which was reported as possibly mined by the Japanese), and one in the southern approaches to Palawan Passage; a total of four submarines.

In implementation of this plan he directed the Commanding Officer of the DARTER, who was the commander of the coordinated attack group (wolf pack) composed of the DARTER and the DACE which had been on anti-shipping patrol in Area A6, to coordinate the patrol of his group so that the southern approaches to Palawan Passage and the western approaches to Balabac Strait were effectively covered, and he directed the BLUEGILL and ANGLER which were on anti-shipping patrol in the Sulau Sea and which had planned to station off Cape Calavite, to proceed to Area A4. He suggested to the Commanding Officer, BLUEGILL who was the commander of this coordinated attack group (wolf pack), that he take station north and south of Lubang Island in order to obtain "southwest coverage approaches to Manila Bay" and advised him that "early advice movement of submarine ships important."

By covering the southern approaches to Palawan Channel CTF 71 hoped to provide increased cover for the western entrances to Limapacan and Mindoro Straits against enemy approaches from the southwest. He did this because he realized that Dangerous Ground presented a navigational hazard which forces shipping northerly bound either through the short route via Palawan Channel, or through the much longer route (roughly 300 miles longer) to the westward around Dangerous Ground and because the stationing of the BLUEGILL and ANGLER north and south of Lubang Island left Mindoro Strait without any coverage whatsoever.

These assignments were not sound as they were not strong patrols and did not effectively cover the straits. The thought that CARPSONESPAC and CONSENTIMIT meant by "strong patrols" that the straits be effectively covered is derived from the fact that (1) interdiction means, "the prevention or hindrance by any means of enemy use of an area or route," and (2) prompt and early warning cannot be achieved if enemy forces may pass without detection. A study of the charts shows that to cover effectively the western entrances, a minimum of two submarines were required.

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* CARPSONESPAC Operation Plan 13-44, Serial 00027A, September 25th, 1944, Annex M.
** CTF 71 Dispatch 290822, September 1944 to CTF 71.5 for DACE and DARTER.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 110804, October 1944 to CTF 71.1.
**** CTF 71.1 Operation Order 155-44, September 15th, 1944 to ANGLER and CTF 71.1 Operation Order 135-44, September 17th, 1944 to BLUEGILL; CTF dispatch 110804, October 1944 to BLUEGILL and ANGLER.
***** Dictionary of United States Military Terms, Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1950.
at Palabac Strait, one at Limapacan Strait, two at Mindoro Strait and one at Verde Island Passage - a total of six submarines. Had this been done no submarines would have been required in the southern approaches to Palawan Channel for the purpose of effectively covering the western entrances to the Sulu and Celebes Seas. On the other hand, as will be pointed out later, a submarine located in the southern approaches to Palawan Channel would assist in providing prompt and early warning of enemy forces headed northward towards Limapacan and Mindoro Straits and Verde Island Passage.

(b) He was ordered to maintain a strong patrol in Makassar Strait. He directed H.M.S. TANTALUS, which was on route to Area F7 in Makassar Strait, that at dark, October 17th, she was to proceed to patrol that area south of Latitude 2° 00'S until further orders, and was to advise as early as possible of any enemy combatant vessel contacts.*

This assignment also was not sound as it was not a strong patrol, and not only did not effectively cover the southern deep-water, unmineable channel between Ambon Island and Cape Williams which at this point was about fifty-five miles wide, but permitted the submarine to operate as far south as 5° 00'S thus providing only limited security against enemy forces. Does it not seem that it would have been wiser to have covered the northern deep-water, unmineable channel between Tanjung Mangkalihat and North Watcher Island which was also about fifty-five miles wide? Is it not clear that if sufficient submarines were stationed here they could prevent any enemy forces passing through without detection, whereas the same submarines, if stationed in the southern channel, could not do so as enemy forces might be able to pass through Borneo Bank? Were not these submarines available in H.M.S. STOIC and H.M.S. STURDY?

A study of the chart shows that a minimum of three submarines was required in either one of these locations.

(c) He was ordered, in coordination with COMSUBPAC to maintain strong patrols in the Palawan-Luzon area. He did not comply with this directive and did not station any patrols in this area. This appears to have been because:

(1) The distance between these islands was 550 miles and required many submarines if the task was to be adequately accomplished.

(2) CTF 17 had been operating submarines in this area for some time and, at the present time (October 10th) had ten submarines operating in the Luzon Strait area which would provide some cover for Luzon Strait westward for many miles. CTF 71's daily submarine plot for October shows that he was familiar with the movement of most of these TV-17 submarines.

* H.M.S. TANTALUS Dispatch, October 1944 to CTF 11 and 71, 1 (24L/2).
(3) He did not have sufficient submarines available to provide the submarines necessary if he was to accomplish his other objectives.

(d) He was ordered to give prompt and early warning of movements of enemy forces, particularly major units approaching from the Brunei-Singapore area.

He decided that he would take only limited action regarding forces approaching from this area. A study of the chart shows that a minimum of five submarines were required to patrol effectively the seas between Anambas Islands and South Natuna Islands, and one between South Natuna Islands and Borneo coast. However, the latter area was reported mined and Allied submarines were directed to remain clear of the channels. This was the logical position to station submarines to intercept forces moving north from Singapore. He did not station any submarines here since he could not spare these submarines if he was to accomplish his other objectives, although it is evident that had he removed some of his submarines from anti-shipping missions he would have had sufficient submarines for this purpose. He did, however, station one submarine, the HAMMERHEAD, to cover the southwestern approaches to Brunei Bay. Why he did not direct this submarine to cover the entrance to Brunei Bay is not known. Certainly there were other approaches to Brunei which could well have been employed by enemy forces. These instructions were given to the HAMMERHEAD because CTF 71 had decided that the most probable route of enemy forces from Singapore would be from the southwest. This, of course, was unwise as a chart study will indicate that enemy forces were equally capable of approaching Brunei Bay from the west and northwest.

It should be noted here that, although CTF 71 did not effectively cover any of the western entrances to the Celebes and Sulu Seas, in fact he left some of these entrances wide open - did not effectively cover Makassar Strait, and did not station any patrols in the Natuna-Luzon area, his action in not doing so was with the approval of COMSO WJSTAC, as well as of CONSEVENTFLOT and CTF 77, for his original dispatch of October 10th giving his submarine dispositions was forwarded by COMSO/WTAC to CINCPAC without change. Why COMSO/WTAC approved this disposition is not clear for it should have been apparent to him that the submarines, as located, could not have been fully effective. Perhaps he realized that, with the limited submarines available to CTF 71 and with

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* CTF 71.1 Operation Order 145-44, October 26, 1944 to UBH.
** Rear Admiral Murray J. Tichenor, RN(Ret), Operations Officer, TF 71 during KING II, Statement February 3rd, 1952, to Commodore R.W. Bates, USN(Ret), Head of World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 110004, October 1944 to CTF 71.1.
**** COMSO/WTAC Dispatch 111346, October 1944 to CINCPAC.
the several requirements still to be completed, better coverage could not be expected, and that a calculated risk would have to be taken. Perhaps he was also affected by his intelligence which had forecast that no major elements of the Japanese Fleet would be involved in opposition to the Allied landings at Leyte."

That CTF 71 gave considerable weight to his orders concerning "continuing present missions to the fullest extent practicable" is apparent when the locations of seven of the eight American submarines remaining are studied. The BREAM and RATON in Areas A3 and A7 off West Central Luzon;** the ROCK and the BERCALL off the coast of Annam (he advised the ROCK about the enemy's usual trade routes and indicated BERCALL was operating on trade routes nearby);*** the GUITARRO in the Sulu Sea (he advised the GUITARRO that Japanese shipping driven out of Manila by the Allied air strikes would probably pass east of Palawan Island);**** the CORNAJ which was directed to operate in Areas D4 and D7,***** and the BASSWOOD which was directed to operate in Areas D5 and D6;******* were primarily engaged in anti-merchant ship operations. After October 16th, the ROCK and BERCALL were assigned additional duty as lifeguard submarines******* for China based (Luichow) planes which were searching the South China Sea north of the Camranh Bay-Lingayan line.

This is also apparent when a study of the orders to the British and Netherlands submarines are considered. HMS STOIC******** in Area E5 (Java Sea), and HMS STURDY******** in Area G7 (Gulf of Tonkin) were on anti-shipping patrols, HMS STORM******** which was on route to relieve the STURDY was to continue the anti-shipping patrols, and the HMS ZWAARDVISCH was on anti-shipping patrol in Area K8 (Java Sea).**********
HMS 1A. TALUS was en route to anti-shipping patrol vicinity south Anambas Islands.*

CTF 71 assigned submarines to lifeguard duty as follows:

(a) The BONEFISH was directed to station off Cape Bolinao commencing dawn, October 16th** and continuing through October 18th.

(b) The COD was directed to station off Subic Bay commencing dawn, October 16th*** and continuing through October 18th.

(c) The LAPON was directed to station just south of Coron Island commencing dawn, October 16th and continuing through October 20th.****

(d) The PADDLE was directed to proceed immediately to station off Balikpapan where she arrived October 7th.*****

(e) All of these submarines were on station as above indicated, at 0719, October 17th.

The following submarines which were retiring from the area had all been on anti-shipping patrols.******

(a) CTF 71.1 BAYA, BECUNA, HAWKBILL, CAVALLA, HOE, FLASHER and CERO.*******

(b) CTF 71.7 HMS SEA ROVER, HMS SPITF and HMS TELAMUCHUS.

The preceding analysis of the deployment of the submarines in the SOWESPAC area shows that they were too few in number and too loosely dispersed to accomplish adequately their assigned objectives with relation to operation KING II while at the same time continuing present operations i.e., anti-shipping patrols. There was a reluctance in SOWESPAC, and, as will be shown later in FOA also, to limit submarine anti-shipping operations in order to support KING II more effectively. This seems to have been due primarily to the belief that major elements of the Japanese fleet would not be involved in opposition to the Allied landings at Leyte. It may also have been due, in part, to the fact that the mark of success of a submarine commanding officer was often "tonnage of shipping sunk" and he was decorated accordingly. Naturally, many submarine commanding officers did not view with favor those assignments which tended to remove them from the anti-shipping field. In this they

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* War Diary CTF 71, Daily Dispositions Submarines based western Australia.
** CTF 71 Dispatch 110856, October 1944 to BONEFISH.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 110858, October 1944 to COD.
**** CTF 71 Dispatch 110821, October 1944 to LAPON.
***** CTF 71 Dispatch 061038, October 1944 to CTF 71.1 (Z4L); War Patrol Report PADDLE, Report of SIXTH War Patrol, Serial 018, November 1st, 1944.
****** War Diary CTF 71, October 1944.
******* CERO transferred October 16th 1944 from TF 71 to TF 72.
JAPANESE NAVAL & MERCHANT SHIP LOSSES*  
EFFECTED BY T.F. 71 SUBMARINES  
IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC-SOUTH OF LAT. 18°-30' N.  
OCTOBER 1944

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| OCTOBER | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | TOTAL |
|---------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|         |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |

*Sinkings include all merchant ships of 500 or more gross tons and all naval ships.
(Prepared by Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee) February 1947.
were often supported by the division, squadron and force commanders, who believed that the correct employment of submarines was against shipping, and not in direct support of fleet operations."

This then was the background of the submarine operations in the Southwestern Pacific undertaken by CTF 71 and CTF 72 in support of KING II.

The operations of the SCWESPAC submarines up to 0719, October 17th, 1944 will be discussed as groups assigned to a particular area or as individual submarines depending upon which arrangement appears the more desirable, and will be discussed chronologically as presented in CTF 71's dispatch\textsuperscript{**} wherein he advised COMSEVENTHFLT, as to the disposition of TF 71 submarines. Contacts on shipping will be indicated only if made after October 8th and only if important - in general over 500 tons. (Plate VI).

In discussing these operations the following considerations have been guiding factors:

(1) Effective average contact ranges.\textsuperscript{***}
(a) On independent merchant ships.
(1) Radar.
   (a) Surface - six miles.
   (b) Submerged - none.
(2) Periscope - five miles.
(3) Sonar - Q8/J7K, two and one-half miles.
       JP, three and three-quarter miles.
(b) On escorted combatant ships.
(1) Radar.
   (a) Surface - ten miles.
   (b) Submerged - none.
(2) Periscope - six miles.
(3) Sonar - Q8/J7K, five and one-half miles.
       JP, seven and one-half miles.

(a) BREAM and RATON:

These submarines, with the GUTARRO, formed a coordinated attack group (wolf pack) which had been ordered to patrol Areas A3 and A7.\textsuperscript{****} They proceeded independently, patrolling against enemy shipping en route. They made no important contacts. At 0719 October 17th (Diagram 1) the BREAM, in Makassar Strait, was bearing 356°(T) distant eighty-five miles from Cape William and, therefore, was about 1000 miles from her

\textsuperscript{*} Submarine Patrol Reports and conversations with various submarine staff and commanding officers.
\textsuperscript{**} CTF 71 Dispatch 101426 October 1944 to COMSEVENTHFLT.
\textsuperscript{***} Submarine Warfare Instructions, USF-9 Navy Department 1946, page 16-5, paragraph 1604.
\textsuperscript{****} CTF 71 Dispatch 020906 October 1944 to CTG 71.1, 71.7 (24L/2).
patrol station, while the Raton in the Sulu Sea was bearing 100°(T) distant seventy-nine miles from the southern tip of Coron Island and, therefore, was about 250 miles from her patrol station. The Guitarrco was detached to independent duty from this group on October 14th and will be discussed separately.

(b) RAY:

This submarine was patrolling Area A4, as the junior ship of a coordinated attack group, consisting of the COD and the RAY. On October 11th she was directed by CTF 71 to proceed at dark October 14th to Area A7. As this area embraces Scarborough Reef, it is assumed that the RAY was to occupy either the station north or the station south of that reef. She was advised in the same dispatch that early advice movements of enemy combatant ships was extremely important.

On October 11th at 0330 she sighted one destroyer off Cape Calavite which she avoided, and on October 12th in the same area, she sighted at 1315, one cargo ship, the Toko Maru, with two destroyer escorts. She succeeded in sinking the TOKO MARU with torpedoes at 1439.

On October 14th, while en route to A7 she suffered an operational casualty and was ordered to proceed to Mios Woendi for repairs.

(c) ROCK and BERGALL:

These two submarines were on anti-shipping patrol off Cape Batangan and Cape Varella respectively where they had been operating since late September. They made but one important contact. This was made by the BERGALL at 0915, October 13th, when she intercepted a convoy of one oiler, one cargo ship and two patrol craft escort. She succeeded at 1004 in sinking, with torpedoes, the cargo ship which was the SHINCHO MARU.

On October 16th the ROCK and BERGALL were directed by CTF 71 to

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* CTF 71 Dispatch 270456 September 1944 to CTG 71.1 (ZL).
** CTF 71 Dispatch 110318 October 1944 to CTG 71.1 (ZL).
**** CTF 71 Dispatch 110313 October 1944 to CTG 71.1 (ZL).
***** CTF 71 Dispatch 26481 and 281048 September 1944 to CTG 71.1 (ZL).

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patrol a line from Cape Varella to North Danger Shoal; the ROCK to patrol to the eastward of 112°-00'E, the BLUESOAR to the eastward thereof. Several hours later they were further directed to act, in a sense, as a lifeguard for Chinese based search planes which would be searching daily the sea areas north of a line through Latitude 11°-55'N, Longitude 100°-07'E, and Latitude 16°-30'N and Longitude 120°-00'E.**

At 0715, October 17th, the ROCK was bearing 111°-07', distant 130 miles from Cape Varella; the BLUESOAR was bearing 099°-07', distant ninety miles from the same cape.

(d) BLUESOAR and ANGLER:

These submarines had been operating independently on anti-shipping patrols in the Sulu Sea since early October.*** On October 11th they were directed by dispatch to form a coordinated attack group (wolf pack) under the Commanding Officer, BLUESOAR, and to proceed after dark October 14th, to Area A4. They were advised that early advice movements of combatant units important. CTF 71 suggested in this dispatch that they cover the southwest approaches to Manila by taking stations north and south of Lubang Island.****

In accordance with this directive the wolf pack commander directed the ANGLER to patrol between Lubang Island and Cape Malapye on October 16th through daylight on the 18th. He advised the Commanding Officer, ANGLER that the BLUESOAR would patrol a NW-SE line from the NW coast of Lubang Island to the northern boundary of Area A4, also through daylight on the 18th. To further advised the Commanding Officer, ANGLER that the two submarines would exchange stations on the night of the 18th and would exchange stations every fourth night thereafter.*****

The BLUESOAR made no surface contacts of consequence. The ANGLER made three. The first ANGLER contact was made at 0645, October 11th when she encountered a convoy of one oiler, one cargo ship with one escort entering Puerto Princesa, Palawan. She was unable to close the convoy and it escaped.****** The second ANGLER contact was made at 0740, October 14th, when she encountered off the west coast of Panama Island a convoy of two transports, one cargo ship escorted by one destroyer escort.

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* CTF 71 Dispatch 170405, October 1944 to CTF 71.1.
** CTF 71 Dispatch 170656, October 1944 to CTF 71.1 (24L).
*** CTF 71.1 Operation Order 133-44, September 15th, 1944, to ANGLER and CTF 71.1 Operation Order 155-44, September 17th, 1944 to BLUESOAR.
**** CTF 71 Dispatch 110607, October 1944 to CTF 71.1 (24L).
***** CTF 71 Dispatch 141207, October 1944 to CTF 71.1 (24L).
****** War Patrol Report ANGLER, Report of FIFTH War Patrol, Serial 010, November 9th, 1944.
and one trawler type. She sank the transport MARU MARU with torpedoes. The third ANGLER contact was made on October 16th on a Japanese hospital ship which was passing through Calavite Passage en route Manila.**

At 0719, October 17th, the BLUEGILL was bearing 325° (T), distant forty-seven miles from Cape Calavite and the ANGLER was bearing 270° (T), distant five miles from Cape Calavite.

(a) DACE and DARTER:

The DACE and DARTER had been operating as a coordinated attack group (wolf pack) in Area B in October 10th under the command of the Commanding Officer, DABLER. At about 2330, October 11th, the wolf pack commander received a dispatch from CTF 71 which directed him to cover effectively the southern approaches to Palawan Passage and the western approaches to Balabac Strait.*** In compliance with this dispatch, at 0300, October 12th, he directed the Commanding Officer DACE by voice to cover Balabac Strait while he, in the DARTER, covered Palawan Passage at the northern limit of Area B.****

At 0719, October 12th, the DARTER contacted a convoy of three oilers, one transport, three cargo ships escorting two destroyers heading south in Palawan Passage. She attacked at 1024 with torpedoes and claimed having damaged two of the oilers.***** DARTER, in turn, was bombed unsuccessfully by air strikes. At 0448 DARTER surfaced and made contact report to DACE and CTF 71. She lost the convoy throughout October 13th, but relocated it through contact report from DACE. Both submarines followed the convoy throughout the night of October 13th-14th and at 0202, October 14th, DACE attacked with torpedoes. She succeeded in sinking the cargo ships NITTSU MARU and KIRYO MARU.***** The DARTER and DACE continued trailing this convoy until about 0100, October 15th when the wolf pack commander discontinued further action, as his operations had forced his submarines from their designated stations. He directed the DACE to return to her patrol station off Balabac Strait while he, with the DARTER, returned to his station in southern Palawan Passage and commenced patrolling east of Royal Captain Shcal. His decision to discontinue further action was correct for he had been ordered to cover effectively certain areas and this could not be done if he permitted himself to be drawn away from his objective by the pursuance of merchant targets, even though important.

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** War Patrol Report ANGLER, Report of FIFTH War Patrol, Serial O10, November 9th, 1944.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 110504 October 1944 to CTF 71.

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At 0719, October 17th, DAG2 was bearing 245°(T) distant twenty miles from southern tip Balabac Island. No information is available as to the location of the DANTER at this time as her records were lost but it is presumed that she was on station.

(f) HAMMERHEAD

The HAMMERHEAD had been on anti-shipping patrols in Areas D4 and D7 since September 20th. On October 11th at 2200 while in Area D4 she received a dispatch directing her to cover the southwestern approaches to Brunei Bay.** She immediately proceeded towards Brunei Bay and arrived on station at 0547, October 13th. As will be shown on Diagram "H" the Commanding Officer chose to patrol an area of D7 which averaged about ninety miles from the entrance to Brunei Bay. Why he assumed such a position instead of closing Brunei Bay more closely is not clear. Would he not have been in a far more effective position had he patrolled a station about forty miles due west of Pulau Kuraman Light where he could cover not only the southwest but also the west approaches? Would not such a position have been more in keeping with the spirit of his directive?

During this period the HAMMERHEAD made no contacts. At 0719 October 17th she was bearing 285°(T) distant seventy miles from Pulau Kuraman Light, in the entrance to Brunei Bay.

(g) GUITARRO:

This submarine was en route to her patrol station having departed Fremantle on October 8th. She was to be part of a coordinated attack group (wolf pack) with the BREAM and RAYON which was to operate in Areas A3 and A7. However, on October 14th she was detached from this duty by CTF 71 by dispatch and ordered to anti-shipping patrol in the Sulu Sea south of Latitude 11°00'N.*** In this same dispatch CTF 71 advised the Commanding Officer, GUITARRO that he expected that the Allied air strikes on Manila would probably scatter Japanese shipping down the east coast of Palawan.

During the period of this report the GUITARRO was en route to her new station but made no contacts of consequence. At 0719, October 17th, she was bearing 338°(T) distant seventy-five miles from Cape William.

(h) TANTIVY:

This submarine departed Fremantle October 9th with orders to

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** CTF 71.1 Order 127-44, September 8th, 1944 to HAMMERHEAD.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 140501, October 1944 to CTF 71.1 (Z4L).
patrol Area F7. On October 16th, while still on route, the Commanding Officer, TANTIVY, received dispatch orders from CTF 71 directing him to proceed at dark on October 17th and restricting his patrol of F7 (Makasar Strait) to the area south of Latitude 2°-GO'S. CTF 71 also directed the Commanding Officer TANTIVY to report as soon as practicable any contacts on enemy combatant ships. During this period the TANTIVY made no contacts.

At 0719, October 17th she was still on route and was about nine miles south of Lombok Strait.

(1) STOIC and ZWAARDVISCH:

These two submarines were on anti-shipping patrol in the Java Sea and were assigned Areas E6*** and E8**** respectively. The ZWAARDVISCH arrived on station October 3rd; the STOIC on October 12th.

During this period no contacts were made by either submarine. No information is available as to the exact location of these submarines; however, CTF 71's daily submarine plot for October 1044 locates these submarines in about the center of their respective areas from day to day.

(3) STUNDY:

This submarine, since about October 5th, had been on anti-shipping patrol in Area C7 and had been operating in Boni Gulf between Saleior Island and Tioro Strait where she was ordered to remain until dark October 14th.*** However, she appears to have received orders to remain in this patrol area for sometime longer, for CTF 71's daily plot for October shows her on station until sometime on October 17th. She seems to have made no important contacts during her patrol.

(k) GURKHA and BATFISH:

These two submarines were proceeding independently to their respective patrol stations. The GURKHA, which had departed Fremantle on October 8th, was en route to Areas D4 - D7;**** the BATFISH, which had departed Fremantle October 8th, was en route to Areas D5 - D6.

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* CTF 71 Dispatch 181229, October 1944 to CTG 71.1, CTG 71.7 (24L/2).
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 031026, October 1944 to CTG 71.1, CTG 71.7 (24L/2).
**** CTF 71 Dispatch 260910, September 1944 to CTG 71.1, CTG 71.7 (24L/2).
***** CTF 71 Dispatch 240724, September 1944 to CTG 71.1, CTG 71.7 (24L/2).
****** CTF 71 Dispatch 091238 and 081102, October 1944 to CTG 71.1, CTG 71.7 (24L/2).

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They had not arrived on station by 0719 October 1941. They made no important contacts.

(1) Lifeguard Submarines:

(1) BONEFISH

This submarine had been operating with the FLASHER and LAPON as part of a coordinated attack group (wolf pack) in Area A3. The wolf pack had been covering the approaches to Manila with reconnaissance as their primary task. The wolf pack was dissolved at about 1900, October 11th, when the FLASHER departed for her base at Fremantle.

At 2247 October 11th, the Commanding Officer, BONEFISH received a dispatch from CTF 71 assigning him a lifeguard station off Cape Bolinao from dawn, October 10th, through October 18th. He assumed his lifeguard station at 0538, October 10th.

Contacts were made as follows:

(a) At 0935, October 10th, the BONEFISH contacted a large convoy of one oiler and eight cargo ships, escorted by four escorts. She attacked in coordination with the LAPON, and considered that she had damaged two cargo ships with torpedoes.

(b) At 1427, October 11th, she sighted a large convoy of ten ships escorted by five escorts but was unable to reach an attack position.

(c) At 1107, October 14th, she contacted two cargo ships. At 1206, she sank the PUSHIMI MARU with torpedoes.

During her period of lifeguard duty until 0719, October 17th, she received no lifeguard calls.

At 0719, October 17th, she was bearing 330°T, distant twenty-three miles from Cape Bolinao.

(2) COD

The COD, with the HAY, composed a coordinated attack group (wolf pack) which had been on anti-shipping patrol in Area A4 since

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** CTF 71 Dispatch 110856, October 1944 to BONEFISH.
**** CTF 71.1 Operation Order 134-44 September 17th, 1944, to COD.

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early October.

On October 11th, the Commanding Officer, COD received a dispatch from CTF 71 directing him, at dusk, October 14th, to proceed to Area A3 and assume lifeguard duties off Subic Bay on October 16th through October 18th.*

We assumed the lifeguard station as ordered, but received no lifeguard calls and made no contacts on any important Japanese shipping.

At 0719, October 17th, 1944 the COD was bearing 288°(T) distant twenty-eight miles from Sampaloc Point at the entrance to Subic Bay.

(3) LAPON

This submarine had been operating with the PLASHER and BONFISH as part of a coordinated attack group (wolf pack) in Area A3. The wolf pack had been covering the approaches to Manila with reconnaissance as their primary task.** The wolf pack was dissolved at about 1000, October 11th, when the PLASHER departed for her base at Fremantle.

At 0400, October 12th, the Commanding Officer, LAPON received a dispatch from CTF 71 assigning him a lifeguard station off south end of Coron Island in the Sulu Sea from dawn, October 16th, through October 20th.*** The LAPON patrolled north of Scarborough Shoal until 1837 October 14th when she commenced adjusting her position toward her lifeguard station arriving at that station 0717, October 16th.

Contacts were made as follows: At 1113, October 10th, the LAPON contacted, off Cape Bolinao, a large convoy of two oiler and eight cargo ships, escorted by four escorts. She attacked in coordination with the BONFISH. At 1230 she sank the cargo ship YUMI MARU**** with torpedoes.

During her period of lifeguard duty until 0719, October 17th, she received no lifeguard calls.

At 0719, October 17th, she was bearing 104°(T) distant twenty-five miles from south end Coron Island.

(4) PADDLE

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* CTF 71 Dispatch 110628, October 1944 to COD.
** War Patrol Report, PLASHER, Report of FOURTH War Patrol Serial 051, October 26th, 1944.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 110b21, October 1944 to LAPON.
This submarine was on route her patrol areas F1, F2 and F3* when on
October 6th CTF 71 directed her to lifeguard station-off Balikpapan.**
She arrived on her new station, October 7th.

She received but three calls for lifeguard services from October 7th
to 0719 October 17th, 1944. That was, one call on October 8th and two
calls on October 10th. However, no rescue were accomplished nor any
surface contacts of any importance encountered.

At 0719, October 17th, she was bearing 045°(T) distant 170 miles
from Balikpapan.

(m) Submarines Retiring From The Area.

While not mentioned in CTF 71's dispatch concerning the planned
disposition of his submarines, two submarines, the HAWKHILL and BONN, 
while retiring from the area made a contact on Japanese merchant shipping
on October 9th.

These two submarines at 1525 that date, encountered a large convoy
about 100 miles west of Mindoro Strait. This convoy consisted of twelve
cargo ships, oilers and transports with three P.C. types as escorts.
The two submarines attacked with torpedoes and, although they claimed
sinking two oilers and one cargo ship, they actually sank but one cargo
ship, the TAIKUMA MARU.***

The HAWKHILL also sighted a small convoy on October 10th off Cape
Calavite, but was unable to attack because of enemy planes.

(n) Summary.

It will be observed that CTF 71 did not completely accomplish
the assignments of submarines which he had promised COMSEVENTHFLT.
Actually, he failed to assign submarines to Scarborough Shoal although
the RAY may be considered as one of the two submarines promised; he fail-
ed also to assign one to the western Celebes Sea.

CTF 71's decision not to man these stations was due to the limited
number of submarines available to him and to the relative lack of im-
portance of these stations. Actually these unoccupied stations would
have been of little value in giving prompt and early information concern-
ing the movement of enemy forces; they would, however, have been of some-
what more value in anti-shipping operations.

CTF 71 also failed to insure that certain submarines which he had
promised would be on station on October 15th were on station on that date.
Among these were the EREAM, RATON, GUITARRO, and TANTIVY. Instead, he
retained the routine anti-shipping instructions "Exploit traffic lanes

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* CTF 71 Dispatch 031209 October 1944 to CTG 71.1, CTG 71.3 (24L/2).
** CTF 71 Dispatch 061038 October 1944 to CTG 71.1 (24L).
*** Japanese Naval and Merchant losses by U.S. Submarines During World War
and focal points en route to, and from areas, ** in the orders of the BREAM, RATON, GUITARRO, and probably of the TANTIVY, without at the same time designating a date on which to arrive on station.

CTF 71 did not advise COMSEVENTHFLT of this omission. While it was not important in this case that this be done, as these submarines were not intended to occupy stations vital to the success of the operation, nevertheless it seems wise to point out here that, at the very least, the immediate superior in the chain of command should be promptly advised when a planned operation cannot be made effective.

(3) Pacific Ocean Area Forces: (Diagram B)

While COMSOWESPAC was deploying his naval forces for the Leyte Operation, CINCPOA was also deploying his naval forces and was, in part, already accomplishing the "cover and support of the Southwest Pacific" objectives, which he had accepted as his general plan for KING II. He had assigned contributory tasks to all of his forces. These forces embraced the (a) Western Pacific Task Forces, (b) Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, (c) North Pacific Force, (d) South Pacific Force, (e) Marshall-Gilberts Force, (f) Service Force, Pacific Fleet, (g) Air Force, Pacific Fleet, and (h) The Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas. ** However, of these forces, only Task Force 38 of the Western Pacific Task Forces, certain submarines of the Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, and certain units of the Service Force contributed directly to the Battle for Leyte Gulf; the others will be dropped from further discussion except the shore-based Air Force, Central Pacific, which was a sub-force of the Western Pacific Task Forces. This shore-based air force has been discussed previously under the Comandant Forces. The Service Force will not be discussed separately and will be included where necessary under the Combatant Forces.

The deployment of these naval forces and their accomplishments in support of COMSOWESPAC's objectives up to 0719, October 17th, 1944, was as follows:

(a) Task Force 38

TF 38, which had been operating in support of the operations for the seizure of the southern islands of the Palau group by POA forces, and for the seizure of Morotai by SOWESPAC forces, upon completion of its objectives in the above operations, returned, as necessary, to Manus, Saipan, and Ulithi, or remained at sea. Here it rearmed, replenished, and completed plans for the next phase of operations which was strategic support for the seizure of the Leyte-Samar area by Southwest Pacific area forces. ** TG 38.1 went to Manus; TG 38.2 first went to Saipan and later to Ulithi, where it arrived at 0752, October 1st; *** TG 38.3 went to

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* CTF 71.1 Operation Orders 141-44, October 5th, to RATON; 137-44, September 29th, to BREAM; and 143-44, October 7th, to GUITARRO.
** CINCPOA-CINCPOA Operation Plan 8-44, Serial 000851, September 27th, 1944.
**** War Diary BUNKER HILL, October 1st, 1944.
Ulithi. During this time TG 38.4, which had reamed and replenished at Manus prior to sorting from there September 24th, remained at sea.

COMTFFl directed these groups to sortie at such time as to effect rendezvous with each other at 1700, October 7th, 1944, in Latitude 15° 30' N; Longitude 138° 30' E, and thus form TF 38. This rendezvous point was about 300 miles north of Ulithi. He further directed that, after rendezvousing, TF 38 was to fuel from the fueling group, and then to commence operations against Okinawa. In accordance with this directive, the task groups of TF 38 operated as follows:

(a) At 1117 October 2nd, TG 38.1 sortied from Seeadler Harbor, Manus Island, and headed in a northwesterly direction for the designated rendezvous.

(b) At 1630 October 6th, TG 38.2 less the BUNKER HILL and at 1730, TG 38.3 less the RENO, BIRMINGHAM, DENOCH, and NEALY sortied from Ulithi and headed in a northerly direction for the designated rendezvous. COMTFFl in the NEW JERSEY was in TG 38.2; CTF 38 in the LEXINGTON was in TG 38.3. The BUNKER HILL, RENO, BIRMINGHAM, DONCH and NEALY sorted at 0604 October 7th and headed for a rendezvous with CTF 38.

(c) Meanwhile, TG 38.4, which, from September 27th to October 8th, had been providing air cover for the forces which had landed on Peleliu and Angaur in the execution of STALEMATE II, had been operating to the westward of the Palau Islands. At 1702 October 6th, this task group headed in a northeasterly direction for the designated rendezvous.

Sometime after 1400 October 7th, the task groups commenced rendezvousing and at 1700 in formation 38 the reformed TF 38 headed for the designated rendezvous with the fueling group, TG 30.3 consisting, in part, at this time, of nine oilers, with their necessary escorts.

** Action Report CTG 34.4, Operations against Okinawa Jima, Formosa, Luzon, Philippine Islands, Visayas Philippine Islands in support of the occupation of Leyte, Philippine Islands October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 00233, November 16th, 1944.
*** COMTFFl Operation Order 21-44 Dispatch 051800, October 1944.
**** War Diary CONFl, October 2nd, 1944.
***** War Diary INTEPID, October 6th, 1944.
****** War Diary CTG 34.4, October 5th, 1944.
******* War Dairies of PLATTE, GUADALUPE, TANATYE, CARLAS, SABINE, MISSISSIPPIAN, ROYCES, SAUCATTUCK, SACHRI, October 8th, 1944.

COMMENDATION

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Rendezvous was affected at O600, October 8th, 1944, in the vicinity of Latitude 19°-00'N, Longitude 139°-00'E and fueling was commenced immediately. Owing to heavy swells and moderately rough seas because of the effects of a passing typhoon, the fueling operation was prolonged until 1955. At this time TF 38 was reformed and headed for Latitude 21°-00'N, Longitude 137°-00'E preparatory to commencing high speed run on Okinawa.

The movements of TF 38 at this time were covered, in part, by limited patrol plane searches from Palau and from Tinian conducted by CTG 30.5 (COMAIRWING ONZ), for, as has been pointed out under operations of TF 17, the submarines which were to be on station off the eastern entrance to the Inland Sea (Rungo Suido) on October 10th, did not arrive there until October 12th, and of the two to be off Tokyo Bay, but one was on station. Thus, for two days, COMTHIRDEFLT appears to have operated on the incorrect premise that Allied submarines were on station in the Japanese area, and that his northern flank was therefore covered. His movements were also covered by gunfire attack commencing at 0421, October 9th on Marcus Island. This attack, which was made by TG 30.2 (a cruiser-destroyer force) commanded by Rear Admiral Allan B. Smith, U. S. Navy, was intended to operate as a diversion, but, although the attack was successfully accomplished, its diversionary effect was completely negative. In fact, the Japanese gave it no more than passing attention.

In this connection, it is of interest that the only apparent diversion at this time was caused by the shooting down, at O456, October 9th, 1944, by a Japanese patrol plane of VP-102 based at Tinian as has been pointed out previously. This plane was shot down in a position 880 miles southeast of the southern tip of Kyushu Island, and about 225 miles northeast of TF 38, which, at this time, was on route to its launching position off Okinawa. The Japanese pilot failed to advise that he was engaging an Allied patrol plane. The Commander Sasebo Naval District, noting the plane’s disappearance, and concluding that it had been destroyed by an American carrier task force in the vicinity, awakened to possible Allied action against Kyushu Island and Nansei Shoto. So promptly

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- War Diaries of FLATOE, GUADALUPE, SANTA FE, MARIBA, SABINE, MISSISSINWA, MECHEM, SAUGATUCK, CACHE, October 8th, 1944.
- CINCPAC Dispatch 26236, September 1944 to COMTHIRDEFLT.
- War Patrol Reports, BESUGO, Serial O27, November 4th, 1944; GABILAN, Serial O31, November 13th, 1944 to RNQUL, Serial 038, November 28th, 1944.
- War Patrol Report SHA DEVIL, Report of FIRST War Patrol, no file, no serial, no date, but presumed to be October or November, 1944.
alerted the naval units in those areas, directing them to tighten their air raid alerts, especially at dawn, in order to minimize damage by enemy attack. This shows clearly how often destiny may hinge on the most unexpected developments.

CHTFIDFLT advised CINCPAC at this time that if the passing typhoon should create a golden opportunity to strike the Ryukyus area, he had an alternate plan to strike that area in lieu of Okinawa. It is of interest to note that such an attack would not have been the golden opportunity conceived by CHTFIDFLT for the Japanese in that area were alerted to the possibility of such an air strike and were prepared to resist it.

At 1200, October 5th, TF 38 was in Latitude 20°51'N, Longitude 136°00'W. At 1336 it was on course 360°(T), speed twenty-three knots.

(1) Attack on the Sansei Shoto, October 10th:

At 0538, October 10th, in a mean position bearing about 143°(T), distant approximately 150 miles southeast of the southern tip of Okinawa, TF 38 commenced launching its attack. The flying conditions were excellent with surface winds from the northeast of thirteen to eighteen knots. Cumulus clouds covering from 2/10 to 5/10 of the sky were present, with an average base of 3,000 feet and an average top of 5,000 feet. The visibility was unrestricted. Sunrise was at 0526.

The attack was, in general, a fighter sweep, followed by four major air strikes (ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE and DOG). In addition, several small fighter sweeps and several small air strikes and air searches were made on certain specific targets - notably on Amami O Shima and the Daito Shima to the east, Kume Shima and Kuroto Islet to the west, and Miyako Jima to the southwest. The fighter sweep was designed to gain command of the air over Okinawa. It encountered little enemy opposition over that island.
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In the above strikes TF 38 commenced launching planes on combat missions as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>VF</th>
<th>VP</th>
<th>VB</th>
<th>VT</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>(a) 0548</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 0630</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 0745</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 1015</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) 1222</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Miscellaneous Strikes and Searches</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Total Sorties:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1386*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The armament consisted, in general, of bombs and rockets for all planes, although in some cases, the torpedo planes were armed with torpedoes rather than with bombs.

These strikes were highly successful. The Japanese lost, according to CTF 38, eighty-eight aircraft destroyed on the ground or in the water, and twenty-three destroyed in the air - a total of ill aircraft. Also, many small ships were claimed sunk, destroyed, or damaged. Among these were one submarine depot ship (JIRGEI), one mine sweeper, one destroyer escort, one small escort vessel, two 100-foot mine craft, four midget submarines, four medium cargo ships, and numerous smaller craft. Considerable destruction was reported at Naha City, Naha Airfield, Itomoto, Yontan San, Yonttan Seach, Uten Ko, and Ko Shima.** This damage was confirmed to a degree by the Japanese.***

The American claims here appear to have been somewhat underestimated in regard to sinkings of Japanese small craft and the destruction of Japanese facilities, for the Japanese admitted losing one submarine depot

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* Action Reports HAST, ORMEY, PORTERBURY, CUMBERLAND, HOCHEMILL, MACCOCO, ESSEX, LEXINGTON, KINGSTON, FRANKLIN, SAN JACINTO, ENTERPRISE; also aircraft Action Reports Air Groups 7, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 31, Attacks on Nansen Shot, October 10th, 1944.
*** War Diary 25th Air Flotilla, October 1944; also 26th Air Flotilla Dispatches 11/110 and 11/200 October 1944, MDC Document 150137, NA 12279.

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ship, twelve torpedo boats, two midget submarines, four non-military ships, aggregating 11,100 tons, and numerous powered sailing craft. They appear somewhat excessive in regard to Japanese planes destroyed, for the Japanese reported losing thirty-one naval planes on the ground and in the air over Okinawa and five naval patrol planes at sea on search missions, a total of thirty-six naval planes. The Japanese also reported that all army fighter planes—number unknown—were believed destroyed in interception or on the ground.

No Japanese reports are available concerning their air losses in the lesser islands of the Mansei Shoto.

In making these strikes, TF 38 lost eight VF, one VF(N), six VB and six VT, of which at least six were jettisoned. This coincides closely with the Japanese claims of twelve American planes shot down. TF 38 had five pilots and four aircrewmen lost or missing. In addition, the life-guard submarine STEVLET, off southeast Okinawa, recovered four pilots and two aircrewmen.

Besides making the above strikes, CTF 38 made three limited searches by VP and VB/VT planes to a radius of 275 miles. One search (six VP—three VB) from the HUNST, departing at 0605 and returning at 1027, covered the sector between 250°(T) and 280°(T), including Miyako Jima and Ishikagai Jima; a second search and attack group (seventeen VF—six VB—six VT) from the HANCOCK, departing at 0550 and returning at 1010, covered the sector between 340°(T) to 030°(T) including Amami O Shima; a third search (five VP—five VB) from the LEXINGTON, departing at 1258 and returning about 1720, covered the sector between 010°(T) and 080°(T), including Minami Daito Shima. These searches were reasonably effective, especially that at Miyako Jima, where considerable Japanese installations, both air and ground, were discovered, and a large number of planes and some shipping were destroyed. It appears, however, that the morning searches were designed to search only the vicinity of the less important

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October—December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104, pages 4 and 5.
** War Diary 26th Air Flotilla, October 1944; also 26th Air Flotilla Dispatches 102302 and 110135, October 1944, WDC Document 160137, NA 12270.
*** Aircraft Action Reports Air Group 7, 5, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 44.
**** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 11, forwarded by HORNET, Serial 0031, November 5th, 1944.
***** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 7, forwarded by HANCOCK, Serial 0100, November 5th, 1944.
****** Action Report LEXINGTON, Attacks on Mansei Shoto Group, October 10th, 1944, Serial 0281, November 7th, 1944.

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islands of the Nansui Shoto, and were not designed to discover any major portion of the enemy fleet, the destruction of which would have accomplished the primary task of TF 38, as assigned by CINCPAC.* It is possible that the afternoon search by the LEXINGTON planes was made for this latter purpose, but the sector searched (115° - 060°(T)), the radius of the search - 275 miles - and the armament of the search planes - two 500 pound bombs - would indicate otherwise. Would it not have been wiser had CTF 38, or COMTHIRDEFLT who was in company, made a dawn search to at least 350 miles covering a sector of about 270°(T) clockwise through about 065°(T), in order to guard against surprise, and in order to discover any movement of a "major portion of the enemy fleet" within the search area? Such a search would have reached to within fifty miles of the northeast tip of Formosa, and would have covered the eastern half of the East China Sea, up to within fifty miles of the southern tip of Kyushu Island. Sufficient planes were available within TF 38 to have made this search, and in addition, to have accomplished the planned operations. Such a dawn search would not necessarily have disclosed prematurely the presence of naval aircraft or the carrier force in the area since the air strikes against Okinawa were dawn air strikes and therefore would strike Okinawa long before the search planes had reached the outer limits of their searches.

It seems well to point out, at this time, that it is a well known strategic consideration that if it is desired to bring an enemy fleet into a vulnerable position, something that the enemy values must be threatened or captured. Such an operation might cause the enemy to expose his fleet in order to remove the threat or to recapture the valued positions. It would appear as if the Nansui Shoto and in particular, Okinawa, might well have been such a vulnerable position. Although the Japanese did not, in fact, react with their fleet, they did at 0925, October 10th, alert the shore-based air forces for the defense of the Formosa-Nansui Shoto-Southern Kyushu area (SHO Two), and at 1204 they alerted, in addition, the shore-based air forces for the defense of the Philippines (SHO One). They also moved aircraft in strength into Southern Kyushu and ordered the operational air strength of CAR DIV'S THREE and FOUR to prepare for land-based air operations.**

In view of the obvious importance of the Nansui Shoto to the defense of the Japanese Empire, would it not have been wise therefore had CTF 38, or COMTHIRDEFLT who was in company, directed a similar search in the afternoon to discover whether the attack on the Nansui Shoto had

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* CINCPAC-CINCPAC's Operation Plan No. 44, Serial WOLOML, September 27th, 1944.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944
   Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947
   Department of the Army Historical Division File No. J-6, JS-104,
   pages 4 and 5.
forced the enemy carrier forces believed to be in the Empire, but which
might well have been in the Nansel Shoto area, to take offensive action
against TF 38, and have thereby created the opportunity for the destruc-
tion of a major portion of the enemy fleet desired by CINCPOA in his basic
orders to the Commander Western Pacific Task Forces? Was not such an
offensive action by Japanese carrier forces operating in conjunction with
land-based planes from the Nansel Shoto a distinct and dangerous enemy
capability?

The above comments, and the comments on the lack of an adequate
dawn search, are of particular importance when it is remembered that
CONTUHDLT had previously disagreed with CINCPOA's disposition of TF 17
submarines, because in his opinion, they were not properly located to
prevent the sortie of the Japanese carrier force without discovery.
Since CINCPOA did not change this unsatisfactory disposition, it is pre-
sumed that CONTUHDLT continued to feel that his northern flank was not
adequately protected.

The fact that the Japanese did not plan to engage TF 38 with their
carrier force unsupported by their battleship force, which, at the time
was roughly 2500 miles away in the Lingga-Singapore area, but instead,
planned to employ their carrier planes from land bases,** does not in any
way weaken the strength of this comment, for this Japanese plan was not
available to CONTUHDLT or CTF 38 at this time.

Perhaps CONTUHDLT had received certain intelligence, not available
to this study, which indicated that the Japanese surface forces did not
intend to sortie from the Empire at this time, and therefore thought that
it was not necessary to extend his search to the eastern half of the East
China Sea. Perhaps he was influenced by the opinion not only of COPSEVENTH
FLOT, but also of CONWESPTAC, that major elements of the Japanese Combined
Fleet would not be involved in opposition to the Allied landings at Leyte.
In this connection it seems important to point out that complete reliance
should not normally be placed on intelligence received, because such in-
formation is not always complete, is often inaccurate, and is frequently
misleading. Although Allied intelligence was known to be generally excel-
 lent, it was not always so and should not have been relied on fully since,
by so doing, the commander might find himself placing too much reliance
on its usual accuracy, and unconsciously basing his plans and operations
on enemy intentions, rather than enemy capabilities.

Throughout the day the task groups of TF 38 maintained, in general,
a combat air patrol (CAP) over each task group of about twelve VF planes,

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* CINCPAC-CINCPOA's Operation Plan 8-44, Serial 000881, September
  27th, 1944.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944,
  Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947,
  Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-8, JS-104,
  pages 4 and 5.
and a snooper anti-submarine patrol (SNASF) of about four VF - four VT planes, although toward evening TG 38.2 increased its CAP to about twenty-seven planes.

Upon completion of the operations against the Mansei Shoto, and after recovering Strike Group DGQ about 1745, CTF 36 then headed on course of 190°(T) at twenty-five knots towards his designated rendezvous with the Fueling Group - Latitude 20°00'N. Longitude 128°00'W. Sunset was at 1758.

(2) Attack on Aperri Airfield, Luzon, P.I., October 11th (D-9)

Throughout the night of October 10th-11th several bogies appeared on the radar screens, but although night fighters were vectored out, they failed to make contact.

At 0600, TF 38 rendezvoused with the Fueling Group. Sunrise was at 0619. At about 0700 TF 38 commenced fueling, taking both aviation gasoline and fuel oil from twelve oilers. Three tankers were assigned to each task group. Fueling conditions were good. CTF 38 set the fueling course at 260°(T). This was in the direction of northeastern Luzon and was designed to deceive the enemy as to the next objective.

At about 1240, CTF 38 commenced launching an air strike of twenty-nine VF - four VF(P) from CTG 38.1, and of twenty-six VF - two VF(P) from TG 38.4 - a total of fifty-five VF - six VF(P), against the Japanese airfield at Aperri, Luzon, P.I., bearing about 255°(T) distant about 323 miles from mean position of the task force. Twenty-two of these planes were armed with rockets. Flying conditions were good. Cumulus clouds covered 3/10 of the sky. Visibility was fifteen miles. The wind was northeasterly, twelve - fifteen knots. The sea was slight. This strike, which hit at 1415, and was unopposed, was highly effective, and according to CTF 38, destroyed fifteen enemy aircraft on the ground, as well as fuel dumps and several buildings.

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* War Diary NEW JERSEY October 10th, 1944.
** War Diaries, SEEBEC, PANAMET, TAPPAHANNOCK, MANATEE, MISSISSINNEA, SABINE, GUADALUPE, PLATTE, NECHES, SCHUYLILL, ESCAMBIA and CHIKASKIA, October 11th, 1944.
*** War Diary CONTZERFLS, October 11th, 1944.
**** Action Reports NASP, HORNET, COWPENS, MONTEREY, FRANKLIN, BELLEAU WOOD; also Aircraft Action Reports Aircraft Groups 11, 15, 14, 21, 22, 28. Attacks on Mansei Shoto, October 10th, 1944.
One VF and pilot were lost in this strike. Also, three VF and three VT were jettisoned as a result of a deck crash of a returning fighter.

At 1402 the Commanding Officer, BUNKER HILL - Latitude 19° 45' N, Longitude 126° 40' E - launched an air search of eight VF, armed with one 500-pound general purpose bomb each to search the sector 270° - 300° to a distance of 250 miles. This search which covered both the Balintang Channel and the Bashi Channel, and which returned on board at 1731, was designed to discover whether any Japanese shipping was in the area of search, as it was through a nearby area that CTF 38 planned to approach Formosa. The search was negative. However, it did shoot down one two-engine land bomber at about 1600. Except for the above extremely limited search, no searches were made by CTF 30 on October 11th.

During the afternoon the escort carriers NASSAU, STEAMER BAY and SITKOH BAY, which were with the fueling group, transferred thirty-six VF, four VF(N), seven VB and fourteen VT to the carriers of TF 38; also three replacement pilots and eleven aircrews.

Throughout the day the task groups of TF 38 maintained, in general, a combat air patrol over each task group of about eight VF planes, and a seaplane anti-submarine patrol of about four VF - four VB/VT planes, although TG 38.1 maintained a CAP of twenty VF. During the day and evening hours the CAP shot down three enemy land attack aircraft, one within twenty-five miles of the task force. Sunset was at 1816; evening twilight ended at 1940.

Fueling of the task force was completed at 1748. After recovering planes at 1722 the fleet course was changed radically through a distance of 320°, and fleet speed was increased radically from the fueling speed of twelve knots to the approach speed of twenty-four knots. This headed the task force toward the Formosa launching position.

After sunset, numerous bogeys appeared on the screens of the various task groups. However, none approached closer than fourteen miles. Although night fighters were vectored out, no enemy planes were shot down.

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War Diary COMPENS, October 11th, 1944.
** War Diary INDEPENDENCE, October 11th, 1944.
*** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 8, forwarded by BUNKER HILL, Serial US04, October 30th, 1944.
**** War Diaries RUDYERD BAY, NEMENYA BAY, NASSAU, STEAMER BAY, and SITKOH BAY, October 11th, 1944.
***** War Diary TAPPANNOCK, October 11th, 1944.
****** War Diary CONTMIRDFLT, October 11th, 1944.
It seemed clear, at this time, at least to the Commanding Officer of the CABOT, that the Japanese had located TF 38 within acceptable limits, for he reported, "several bogies shadowed our disposition and our approach was detected." This was a correct analysis, for the Japanese had contacted TF 38 during the night and early morning and realized that Formosa might be attacked.

(3) Battle off Formosa, October 2th, 13th and 14th:
(known by Japanese as Battle of Formosa)

(a) Operations on October 12th:

As TF 38 proceeded towards Formosa in formation SW axis 360°(T) with order of task groups from north to south: TG 38.2, TU 38.3, TG 38.1 and TG 38.4, radar contacts indicated that the force was being continuously shadowed.*** As a consequence, CTF 38 felt that "the enemy knew we were coming."**** In this he was correct, for at 0340 a general air raid alert was ordered throughout Formosa.** CTF 38 appears to have expected a dawn air attack upon his task force. However, TF 38 arrived on schedule in its launching position about fifty - ninety miles east of Formosa, and, as the dawn attack by the enemy did not develop, it commenced launching its initial attack at 0544 without any interference whatsoever. Sunrise was at 0647.

The flying conditions were average with surface winds from the northeast of sixteen to twenty-seven knots. Cumulus clouds covering 2/10 of the sky prevailed throughout the day, excepting during the afternoon from 1200 to 1600 when these clouds covered 7/10 of the sky. The visibility was about fifteen miles; the sea was slight.***** Over the target weather conditions were generally good in southern Formosa, and generally had in northern Formosa, with a cold front approaching from west.******* As in the NansoI Shoto attacks, this attack was, in general,

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* War Diary CABOT, October 11th, 1944.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Air Action October 12th, Department of Army Historical Division File 8-5, JS-104.
*** Action Report CTG 38.4, Operations against Okinawa Jima, Formosa, Luzon, Philippine Islands, Visayas Philippine Islands in support of the occupation of Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 00265, November 16th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTF 38, Summary of TF 38 Operations, August 29th - October 30th, 1944, Serial 00605, November 3rd, 1944.
****** War Diary BUNKER HILL, October 11th, 1944.

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a dawn fighter sweep followed by four major air strikes, (ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE and DOG), although two additional mid-morning fighter sweeps and two small air searches were interposed between the above strikes. The dawn fighter sweep was designed to gain command of the air over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands; the mid-morning fighter sweeps were designed to reduce the enemy air opposition for succeeding strikes, and to increase the destruction wrought by the preceding strikes in certain designated areas, notably northern Formosa, Matsuyama Airfield, Takao shipping, Faito Airfield, Kagi Airfield, Kure and other ground installations, and other targets in the same area.

In the above strikes TF 38 commenced launching planes on combat missions as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 0644 Fighter Sweep:</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199 VF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 VF(P)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 0800 Strike ARISE:</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106 VF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 VF(P)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107 VB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 VT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 0800 Strike BAKER:</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 VF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 VF(P)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 VB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 VT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 1050 Strike CHARLIE:</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114 VF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 VF(P)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 VB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77 VT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) 1315 Strike DOG:</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119 VF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 VF(P)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 VB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62 VT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Miscellaneous Strikes and Searches:</td>
<td>1378*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 VF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 VF(P)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 VB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 VF(K)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Total Sorties and Searches:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1378*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The armament consisted, generally, of bombs and rockets, although, in a limited number of cases, the torpedo planes were armed with torpedoes rather than with bombs.

Surprise was not achieved. As has been pointed out earlier, this was primarily due to the fact that the attacks on the Nansui Shoto had caused the Japanese to alert their base air forces for both the SHO One and SHO Two Operations. It may have also been due to the fact that as early as October 4th the Japanese had received intelligence that the American Navy was planning to isolate the Philippines by a big carrier

* Action Reports WASP, HORNET, MONTEREY, INTREPID, BUNKER HILL, HANCOCK, ESSEX, LEXINGTON, PRINCETON, FRANKLIN, SAN JACINTO, ENTERPRISE; also Aircraft Action Reports Air Groups 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 31, Attacks on Nansui Shoto, October 10th, 1944.
air attack on Formosa, and that this attack was to be supported by the American FOURTEENTH and TWENTIETH Air Forces, operating from China bases.*

The attack on Aparri, which, with the fueling course towards northeastern Luzon, COMTHIRDPF assumed to be diversion to confuse the enemy as to his next target and to indicate that it was Luzon, failed, for the American planes were met by large numbers of enemy planes and determined air opposition, as well as by strong anti-aircraft fire.***
The Japanese had gone on a general air raid alert at 0340.****

Despite this opposition the American planes pressed home their attacks, and achieved very successful results, albeit with considerably higher losses than were received in the Nansel Shoto operation. Plane losses received by TF 38 from all causes were: twenty VF, two VF(F), three VF(N), fourteen VB, nine VA, or a total of forty-eight planes, some of which were jettisoned. The life-guard submarine SAILFISH, off southwest Formosa, recovered six pilots and five aircrewmen; the TRIGGER, off northeast Formosa recovered one pilot.***** Other pilots and aircrewmen were recovered by TF 38. Personal losses were heavy, a total of twenty-nine pilots and twenty-one aircrewmen being counted lost or missing.******

The attack on Formosa was the third of a series of air strikes against Japanese power in the Nansel Shoto, Formosa and northern Luzon areas, which strikes as has been pointed out previously, were designed to provide support to the forthcoming operations by COMOWESPAC for the seizure of Leyte Island. Formosa was recognized as a very powerful bastion, and serious opposition to air attacks was expected.****** Might it not have been preferable, therefore, had COMTHIRDPF postponed fueling, and, instead, attacked Formosa on October 11th rather than Aparri? By attacking Aparri with nothing but fighters, and by remaining

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* Material for Situation Estimates, First Section, Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC 218764 (microfilm).
**** Air Action, October 12th, Department of Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
****** Action Reports, WASP, HORNET, COMPENS, INTREPID, BUNKER HILL, HANCOCK, ESSEX, LEXINGTON, LANGLEY, FRANKLIN, ENTERPRISE, BELLEAU WOOD; also Aircraft Action Reports Air Groups 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 44, Attacks on Nansel Shoto, October 10th, 1944.
******* CTF 58 Operation Order 11-44, Serial 00020, October 1st, 1944.
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in the fueling area throughout daylight on the 11th—which fueling area was bearing about 075°(T), distant about 320 miles from Aparri and about 110°(T), distant about 370 miles from Garan B1, the southern extremity of Formosa—COMTHIRDFLT indicated to the Japanese, who knew the location of TF 38 with reasonable accuracy, that his next attack might well be on Formosa rather than on Luzon. In addition, the day’s delay occasioned by the fueling and the fighter strikes on Aparri on October 11th, gave the Japanese an additional day to appraise the situation and to determine whether these carrier strikes were, in effect, nothing but raids, seriously destructive it is true, but still raids, or whether they were the vanguard of an amphibious operation designed to seize some vital area of the Nansai Shoto-Formosa-Philippine Island chain.

This view is supported by Japanese records which state that there were no special air alerts on Formosa during October 11th, but there was a special air alert on Formosa at 0334 October 12th.**

Thet COMTHIRDFLT also concurs with this view is clear, for he wrote later: "The fundamental mistake was mine: I should have struck Formosa first; not only was it stronger, but it had been alerted by the Nansai Shoto strikes."*** Evidently, in the opinion of COMTHIRDFLT, the fueling on the 11th, which was ordered in the basic plan, could have been postponed without seriously affecting his freedom of action. This opinion is borne out by a study of the cruising radii of the principal ships of TF 38. The CL’s and CA’s had the lowest cruising radii of the principal ships. Allowing for a 40% fuel reserve, and assuming that the general operating speed of the task groups was twenty-five knots, these cruisers had a cruising endurance of at least four and one-half days. This would have permitted continuous operations throughout the 12th, with refueling probably necessary on the 13th. Actually, the general operating speed of the task groups was somewhat less than twenty-five knots, with a consequent increase in cruising radii. The destroyers, probably the WICHITA, would in general have required one refueling from the combatant ships during this time. Aviation gasoline, while important, was not a governing factor.

In addition to the above strikes, CTF 38 made two limited searches. One search by four VF and three VB planes from the ESSEX, departing at

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* CONWESFAC Dispatch 111258, October 1944, to Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160264, NA 12546.

** Detailed Action Report No. 1, Kobi Naval Air Group, October 12th, 1944, WDC Document 169498.


**** War Service Fuel Consumption of U.S. Naval Surface Vessels, MTP 216 September 1st, 1945.

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0653 and returning aboard at 1138, covered the sector between 050°(T) and 080°(T), to a distance of 275 miles. The objectives of this search were (a) the discovery of any enemy shipping and (b) the reconnotering of Miyako Jima. The search was negative, excepting that one additional new airfield was discovered on Miyako Jima.∗ One land attack plane was shot down at 0825 and one two-engine land bomber at 0940.∗ The other search by two VF(N) planes from the HANCOCK, departing at 0700 and returning aboard at 1150, covered the sector 220°(T) to 250°(T), to a distance of 250 miles.** The objective of this search was the discovery of enemy shipping. No shipping was found.

Why COMTHIRDFLT did not consider it advisable to make any protective searches to discover whether or not his operations had enticed the Japanese carrier force out of the Inland Sea, is not clear. Perhaps he felt that submarine reconnaissance would keep him advised as to enemy movements from the Empire - and particularly from the Inland Sea, but this is doubtful as he had previously indicated to CINCPAC the necessity for increasing the submarines in the Empire areas to insure advanced information concerning any enemy sorties. Perhaps he thought that searches by American planes from Saipan would screen him. However, diagram "H" shows that the POA submarines before October 12th were not strategically located to discover, with reasonable effectiveness, the movements of Japanese naval forces toward Formosa, and, in addition, shows that the limiting radius of the Saipan based searches was roughly 200 miles short of Okinawa, thus leaving a vast area of navigable water between Kyushu and Formosa entirely unsearched by American aircraft. Perhaps he expected to hear of enemy movements from CINCPAC whose intelligence in the past had been surprisingly accurate. But here again there was danger, for no one could foretell when the enemy might succeed in operating in secrecy. Even though the operation appeared to be proceeding according to plan, was there not reason to view the unfolding situation with intelligent suspicion? Was it not an enemy capability to have moved his carriers secretly into the area whence his planes, operating in conjunction with the Formosa based planes, might have operated directly from the carriers against TF 38, or indirectly by staging through Formosa fields?

Throughout the day TF 38 maintained, in general, a combat air patrol (CAP) over each task group of twelve to sixteen VF and a squadron anti-submarine patrol (SMASP) of about four VF - four VT planes. The CAP

∗ Aircraft Action Report Air Group 15, Forwarded by ESSEX, Serial 024, November 3rd, 1944.
claimed having shot down near the force a total of fifteen planes of various types.**

On numerous occasions during daylight hours, the various task groups contacted enemy aircraft by radar, showing clearly that TF 38 was being continuously snooped by enemy planes. Although a number of these spotters were shot down, the enemy persisted in continuing the snooping operations.** While all of the reasons for this may not have been entirely clear to CTF 38, or to COMINCHFLY, one reason became obvious as night fell, for commencing at about 1906 and continuing steadily through most of the night, the Japanese launched numerous torpedo plane raids, as well as harassing operations, against the task groups of TF 38, concentrating mostly on TG 38.2 which was northermost, and therefore nearest Formosa. These raids employed both "window*** and "flares" to confuse the task groups.**** Many of the raids closed to within gunfire range of the screen, but were driven off without succeeding in making a single torpedo hit or accomplishing any material damage whatsoever.

By midnight TG 38.2 had destroyed nine enemy planes by AA fire,***** TG 38.3 one,****** and TG 38.4 two******* - a total of twelve planes. This was a modest estimate for the Japanese admitted losing forty-two planes.******** It is assumed that the larger portion of these forty-two

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* Operational Summaries of Carrier Strikes, COMINCHFLY, Serial 0074, October 27th, 1944.
** Action Reports CTF 38.1, Serial 001,1 December 1944; CTF 38.3, Serial 0091, December 8th, 1944; CTF 38.4, Serial 00263, November 16th, 1944 and War Diary COMINCHFLY (CTF 38.2), October 12th, 1944.
*** Window is the name for strips of frequency-cut foil, wire or bars, usually dropped from planes or expelled from shells or rockets as a radar countermeasure. (Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, June 1950).
**** Action Report CTF 38.4, Operations Against Okinawa Jima, Formosa, Luzon, Philippine Islands, Visaya Philippine Islands in support of the occupation of Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 00203, November 16th, 1944.
****** Action Report MOBILK, Carrier Air Strikes on Formosa and the Pescadores, and Enemy Air Attacks on Task Force 38, October 12th-13th, 1944, Serial 0025, October 21st, 1944.
******* Action Report GRIDLEY, Serial 027, October 26th, 1944; also Action Report BAGLEY, Serial 054, October 31st, 1944.
******** Detailed Action Report No. 6, 708th Attack Unit, 762nd Air Group; Searches and Patrols of "Pa" (Shinchiku) Sector, October 1st-17th, 1944, WDC Document 100579, NA 12297; also memorandums notes of Captain Runko Shiba, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm NS-22, Item B.

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planes were unable to return to base because of gunfire damage or operational failures and crashed at sea beyond the range of visibility of TF 38. The Japanese admitted the loss of fifty-seven planes during the attacks on Formosa.

Despite (a) the strong initial opposition encountered at Formosa (although this opposition fell off markedly during the day as a result of the American air strikes), (b) the probable flying in of replacements during the night which would increase the Japanese defensive power, and (c) the fact that the location of his command was not only accurately known to the Japanese, but was even now under continued night torpedo attack, COTHIRDPLT made preparations to continue the planned attacks on the following day. That this decision was correct is evident, for the primary objective of the air strikes against Formosa was the denial of that base as a staging point to Japanese aircraft. Such aircraft presently there, or such aircraft which might be moved there from northern bases, or even from the Empire, must be prevented from proceeding south to interfere with the Allied landings at Leyte. Should this objective be successfully accomplished, the interference with the Leyte landings would necessarily be heavily reduced. COTHIRDPLT hoped to accomplish this by the destruction of enemy aircraft, aircraft and port facilities, ground installations, and shipping.** This was in accordance with his directive from CINCPAC which stated, in part, "Advisable inflict lasting damage on installations and port facilities in Formosa."***

From reports of his pilots COTHIRDPLT was aware that his strikes that day had been extremely successful, but he was also aware that despite this success, the above objective had only been partially accomplished. He realized that there was much more to be done, and determined that, unless his losses through night air attacks became unacceptable, which was extremely unlikely, continuity on the 13th of strikes similar to those made on the 12th, gave the best prospects for accomplishing his objective.

(5) Operations on October 13th:

After midnight the enemy maintained air pressure on TF 38, but did not attack. However, all groups were constantly tracked until about 0430 as shown by the numerous contacts on the radar screens. Although the absence of enemy air attack may have been partially due to the employment of maneuver and to the employment of smoke screens, it was most probably due to the fact that the Japanese had expanded their

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* War Diary COTHIRDPLT, October 12th, 1944; also Action Report CTG 38.4 Operations Against Okinawa Jima, Formosa, Luzon, Philippine Islands, Visayas Philippine Islands in support of the occupation of Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 00263, November 16th, 1944, page 7.
** COTHIRDPLT Operation Order 21-44, Dispatch 031600, October 1944.
*** CINCPAC Dispatch 060543, October 1944 to COTHIRDPLT.

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maximum power in the many attacks made prior to midnight. As an indica-
tion of the Japanese method of harassing a task group, CTG 38.4 stated, "that between 1850 the preceding evening and 0400 October 13th, his task
group had been subjected to a total of 47 raids, consisting of enemy
snooper search and attack planes. He further reported that about twenty
of these raids had closed to gunfire range of the screen, always coming
in singly and breaking off when fired upon. No enemy plane got inside
the screen."* Such operations kept the task force at general quarters
throughout most of the night, and were effective in increasing the fatigue
of all hands, but particularly of the gun crews, fire control, ship con-
trol, and the combat intelligence center parties.

TF 33 arrived on schedule in its mean dawn launching position about
seventy miles bearing about 110°(T) from Saikoo Road, Formosa. As no
dawn attack by the enemy developed, CTF 38 commenced launching his ini-
tial attack at about 0614 without enemy interference. Sunrise was at
0644.

The flying conditions were average with surface winds from the north-
east of about twenty-eight knots. Cumulus clouds covering about 4/10 of
the sky prevailed throughout the day, excepting during the afternoon from
1200 to 1800 when these clouds covered 8/10 of the sky. The visibility
was about fifteen miles; the sea was moderate, with increasing swells
from the northeast.** Over the target weather conditions were generally
good, although a weak to moderate cold front passed northwest to south-
east over Formosa, and obscured the target for several hours during its
passage. Very low ceiling and heavy squalls covered northern Formosa in
the afternoon.

As in the previous day's attack, this attack was, in general, a
dawn fighter sweep followed by air strikes. On this day there were but
three air strikes (ABLE, BAKER and CHARLIE). However, there were, in
addition, two small air searches interposed between the above strikes
and two early afternoon fighter sweeps. The dawn fighter sweep was
designed to gain command of the air over certain Formosa airfields. TG
38.1 was to gain command over Haito and Takao airfields; TG 38.2 over
Shinchiku airfield and Kii-run Bay; TG 38.3 over the airfields of northern
Formosa, and also over the Pescadores Islands; and TG 38.4 over Okayama

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* Action Report CTG 38.4, Operations Against Okinawa, IJima, Formosa,
Luzon, Philippine Islands, Visayas Philippine Islands in support,
of the occupation of Leyte, Philippine Islands October 7th-21st,
1944, Serial 00263, November 16th, 1944.

** Action Report BELLEAU WOOD, Action Against Nansei Shoto, Formosa,
Luzon and the Visayas, Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st, 1944,
Serial 0170, November 3rd, 1944.

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and Peito airfields. The succeeding air strikes and sweeps were designed to increase the destruction wrought on the preceding day on the ground installations of the more important airfields, notably Peito, Okayama, Binanang, Peito, Zagi, and Toko Seaplane Base, as well as others in the strike area. One important Formosa target was the power plants at Lake Jitsugetsutan. Also, the installations in the Pescadores Islands and the installations on Miyako Jima and Ishigaki Jima, where it was thought that air reinforcements from the Empire might be assembling. Actually, no build-up was observed on these fields.

In the above strikes TF 38 commenced launching planes on combat missions as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 0614 Fighter Sweep:</td>
<td>134 VF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 0731 Strike Attack:</td>
<td>97 VF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 0900 Strike RAFEKA:</td>
<td>82 VF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 1100 Strike CARILIS:</td>
<td>132 VF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Miscellaneous Strikes and Searches:</td>
<td>20 VF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Total Sorties and Searches:</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The armament consisted generally of bombs and rockets, although on one strike four torpedo planes from the ESSEX were armed with torpedoes instead of bombs. These torpedoes were to be employed against the dam at Lake Jitsugetsutan, but unfortunately this lake could not be found by this strike, and the torpedoes were employed unsuccessfully against some lesser target.

Naturally, as on the strikes of the previous day, surprise was not achieved, although the opposition was less than expected. Although there had been some reinforcement of Japanese air overnight, the American planes pressed home their attacks, and once again achieved successful results. However, in view of the numerous airfields, most of which had not been known to CTG 38 previous to his strikes on October 12th, it was "found
impossible to destroy all aircraft and neutralize all air installations."
In the TG 36.3 area alone there were at least fifteen airfields instead
of the four indicated in the intelligence material available prior to
the operation.

Plane losses received by TF 38 from all causes were: six VF, five
VB, one VT, or a total of twelve planes, some of which were jettisoned.
The lifeguard submarine SAILFISH, off Southwest Formosa, recovered one
pilot who had been shot down the previous day.** Other pilots and air-
crewmen were recovered by TF 38. Personnel losses were a total of nine
pilots and four aircrewmen being counted as lost or missing.***

The two air searches were designed to discover whether any enemy
shipping or presumably any enemy task forces were in the areas searched.
The forenoon search, composed of six VF, one VF(F) and six VB planes
from the WASP, was scheduled to search the Hashi Channel,**** but for
reasons not explained, was diverted as an attack group to Batan Island
where the installations on Basco Airfield were successfully attacked.
This search and attack group departed at 0753 and returned at 1330.*****
The afternoon search, composed of five VF, six VB, from the FRANKLIN,
searched the sector 060°(T)-090°(T), to a distance of 275 miles, with
negative results. One two-engine land bomber was shot down at 1640.******
This search departed at 1536 and returned at 1730.

Other than these two extremely limited searches, CONTINENTAL made
no protective air searches whatsoever.

Throughout the day TF 38 maintained, in general, a combat air
patrol (CAP) over each task group of eight VF to fourteen VF and a
snooper anti-submarine patrol (SNASP) over each task group of from two
VF - two VI planes to four VF - four VI planes. The CAP claimed having

* Action Report TF 38.3, Report of Battle of Formosa, Serial 0091,
December 6th, 1944.
** War Patrol Report SAILFISH, Report of TWELTH War Patrol, Serial
97, December 11th, 1944.
*** Action Reports WASP, HONNET, PORTER, INTERRUED, BUNKER HILL,
HANCOCK, CAVALIER, INDEPENDENCE, ESSEX, LEXINGTON, PRINCETON,
FRANKLIN, ENTERPRISE, BELLEAU WOOD, also Aircraft Action Reports,
Air Groups 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 27, 28, 29,
Attacks on Formosa, October 13th, 1944.
**** CTF 38 Operation Order 11-44, Serial 00020, October 1st, 1944.
***** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 14, Forwarded by WASP, Serial
0114, November 6th, 1944.
****** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 13, Forwarded by FRANKLIN,
Serial 077, November 8th, 1944.
shot down near the force a total of twenty-one enemy planes of various types.**

CTF 38 had scheduled four air strikes, but during the late fore-
noon he directed that no planes were to be launched after 1400.*** This
forced the task group commanders to cancel the fourth strike (DOG). CTF
38 appears to have ordered the 1400 deadline because he realized (a)
that his position was well known to the Japanese who had scooped him all
day and (b) that Japanese air reaction against his task force was a very
strong capability, and he did not wish to be caught recovering his planes
at dusk.**** In this connection, it should be pointed out that the aver-
age time in the air of his various strikes was about four hours, although
some flights were as long as five hours. Since sunset was at 1825 and
since evening twilight ended at about 1945, there was a period between
sunset and darkness of about seventy-four minutes wherein his task force
would be particularly vulnerable to Japanese air attack. His estimate
of the situation was correct, for as evening twilight was falling TG's
38.1 and 38.4 were attacked by Japanese torpedo planes. The hour chosen
by the Japanese was excellent for "it was difficult to spot the attackers
but not so difficult for them to spot surface targets."***** In the case
of TG 38.1, the Japanese planes flew low and there was no radar warning
before they were discovered visually by the WICHITA. The attack was
made by eight land-attack planes attacking simultaneously. Although the task
-group succeeded in shooting down by AA fire six of those planes, one of
them, at 1835, succeeded in torpedoing the CANBERRA, effectively disab-
iling her by flooding both engineering spaces and the after firerooms.**** This
plane was shot down by AA fire. The attack on TG 38.4 on the other hand
was conducted by torpedo planes of the land-attack and land-bomber type.
Ten of those planes attacked, generally in pairs, over a forty minute
period. Five planes were shot down by AA fire, and one by AA fire and
an ENTERPRISE fighter, before they had accomplished any serious damage.
They succeeded, however, in penetrating the screen and in launching
torpedoes at the FRANKLIN and the SAN JACINTO.***** All torpedoes missed.
However, one of those torpedo planes at 1831 in attempting to crash the

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* Operational Summary of Carrier Strikes, COMINCHITA, Serial
  0071, October 27th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 38.3, Report of Battle of Formosa, Serial
  001, December 31st, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 38.1, Operations Against Okinawa, Formosa,
  Northern Luzon, Leyte and the Japanese Fleet, October 2nd-29th,
  1944, Serial 00161, December 15th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTG 38.4, Operations Against Okinawa Jima, Formosa,
  Luzon, Philippines Islands, and the occupation of Leyte, Philippine Islands in support
  of the occupation of Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st,
  1944, Serial 00283, November 16th, 1944, page 9.

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FRANKLIN slid across the flight deck doing superficial damage. In the
above two attacks CTG 38.1 and CTG 38.4 believed that they had destroyed
by AA fire thirteen enemy planes. Actually the Japanese reported los-
ing twenty planes. Four of the seven (twenty-thirteen) additional
Japanese planes lost were shot down by the ENTERPRISE CAP, the remaining
three were lost apparently due to battle damage.

The torpedoing of the CANBERRA was reported to COMTHIRDFLT at 1042,
and immediately presented a new, but certainly not unexpected situation
to that commander. He immediately re-estimated the situation. It was
clear that two principal courses of action presented themselves: (a)
he could endeavor to save the CANBERRA, or (b) he would have to sink the
CANBERRA as she had no means of propulsion. The basic consideration
was, of course, whether salvage operations would make it necessary to
cancel or to reduce his scheduled air strikes against Luzon and the
Visayas in support of COMINCHESPA's scheduled operations so seriously as
to make the net result unacceptable. He decided that he would endeavor
to save the CANBERRA and at the same time carry out the scheduled air
strikes. He reasoned as follows: (a) his basic plan called for the
retirement of TF 36 during the night and the following day to the
fueling area, where it was to be re-fueled on October 15th, then for
carrier strikes by TG's 38.2, 38.3, and 38.4 against Luzon on October
16th and 17th, and by TG 38.1 against the Visayas on the same dates.
Since he had re-fueled but two days before, there was sufficient fuel
available within his task force to permit several more days of twenty-
five knot combat operations; (b) should he have good fortune it would
require about one day to tow the CANBERRA out of the more effective
areas of Japanese aircraft operations, (at the time of torpedoing she
was bearing 104° T), distant ninety miles from Seikoo Road, Formosa,
and in twenty-four hours at four and one-half knots she should have
doubled that distance). During this time TF 36 would be required for
counterbombing those newly airfields from which aircraft might be em-
ployed against the CANBERRA. This included Formosa and northern Luzon
airfields; (c) own submarines presented no problem, since the zone

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* Action Report FRANKLIN, Operations Against the Enemy at
  Nansei Shoto, Formosa and the Philippine Islands, October
  7th-21st, 1944, Serial 0039, October 31st, 1944, Part II,
  page 4.

** Operational Summaries of Carrier Strikes COMTHIRDFLT, Serial
  0074, October 27th, 1944.

*** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December
  1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October
  1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5,
  J3-164.

War Instructions, U.S. Navy, 1934, FTP 143, Para. 18174.

**** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 101139, October 1944 to CINCPAC.
classifications for operations in CONVOY COLLEGE had been extended through October 16th; (d) there were sufficient escort aircraft carriers within TG 30.8 the fueling group to provide adequate air cover over TG 30.3. He could divert these escort carriers to intercept TG 30.3 and act as air cover for that force.** Once these escort carriers had joined - about October 16th - they would release the covering task groups of TF 38; (e) he could assign a new fueling rendezvous for CTG 30.8, the fueling group; and (f) if the situation improved on the following day he could divert to their fueling rendezvous those task groups not required to protect the CANBERRA.

In making this decision to save the CANBERRA, it should be clear that CTHIRDPLT felt fully confident of his ability to carry out his remaining basic objectives - the destruction of aircraft and air installations on Luzon and in the Visayas - on the dates scheduled in his Operational Plan 21-44.*** In view of his apparent ability at this time to carry out his scheduled air strikes in support of CONOWESPAK's planned operations, his decision to modify his basic plan, in order to salvage the CANBERRA, is considered sound.

At 1010 he designated a new fueling rendezvous to TG 30.8.**** At 1919, in accordance with his protection of the CANBERRA objective, he directed CTY 38 to sweep Formosa on the morning of October 14th with three task groups, instead of retiring as planned, and on the same day to sweep the airfields at Aperri and Lasag on northern Luzon, in order to prevent concentration and heavy counter-attack by Japanese air.***** CTY 38 designated TG's 38.1, 38.2 and 38.3 for the Formosa attack and TG 38.4 for the Luzon attack.******

CTHIRDPLT at 2000 directed CTY 57 (Commander Forward Area) to form a task group to be known as TG 30.2, consisting of CRUDIV FIVE (CHICAGO, SALT LAKE CITY, HIBARIN), and six destroyers (CASE, ILASIN, CUMMINGS, DUNHILL, FOWKES and WAINING).****** to dispatch it to escort the CANBERRA.******* This was effected at Saipan at 2200.******** He also directed the tug JUNSE, which was standing by at 2200, to relieve the WITCHA, which, at 2210, had taken the CANBERRA in tow and had headed on course 133°(7) towards Latitude 17°00'N, Longitude 130°00'W. Meanwhile,
CTF 38 had directed COMCHUDIV THIRTEEN, with CRUDIV THIRTEEN (SANTA Fe, Mobile, Birmingham), plus DESDIV One Hundred (Corgnell, C.Perton, Ingersoll, Knapp), all from TG 38.3, to screen the WICHITA and CANBERRA® which he commenced doing at 2100. Prior to this time this was being accomplished temporarily by the CONNOR and the BURNS alone. At 2152 the SELL relieved the CONNOR, which rejoined TG 38.1.

In accordance with the above instructions, CTF 38, with TG's 38.1, 38.2, and 38.3, remained in the operating area off Formosa to cover the retiring CANBERRA Group, while at 2204 TG 38.4 headed, on course 187°(T), speed nineteen, to its dawn launching position off northern Luzon.***

None of these task groups were attacked nor annoyed during the remainder of the night. The reason for this was (a) that all Japanese planes available had been employed in the early evening attacks and (b) because the Japanese considered it unnecessary to trail TF 38 since the success of their evening attacks, resulting in damaged ships, indicated that TF 38 would still be in the Formosa area at dawn.****

(c) Operations on October 14th:

TF 38, less TG 38.4, in accordance with instructions from COMTHIRDFLT, operated in an area about 120 miles to the eastward of Formosa, and remained in a covering position in the vicinity of the CANBERRA Group. It continued to operate throughout the remainder of the night without being shadowed or harassed by Japanese planes. At 0023 COMTHIRDFLT directed CTG 38.2 and CTG 38.3, upon completion of the afternoon strike, to proceed toward the rendezvous originally planned for the October 15th fueling.***** At the same time he directed CTG 33.1 to protect TG 30.3. At 0630 COMTHIRDFLT designated the CANBERRA Group as TG 30.3,****** and composed it as follows: COMCHUDIV THIRTEEN, CRUDIV THIRTEEN, CABOT, WICHITA, CANBERRA, DESDIV ONE HUNDRED, plus THE SULLIVANS and the STEPHEN POTTER.******

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* War Diary COMTHIRDFLT, October 15th, 1944.
** Action Report FRANKLIN, Operations against the Enemy at Namsei Shoto, Formosa, and Philippine Islands, October 7th-31st, 1944, Serial 0033, October 31st, 1944, Enclosure (B), page 4.
**** Commander SI SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 131923, October 1944, to SIXTH Base Air Force MDC Document 160259 NA 12592.
***** Action Report CTG 38.1, Operations Against Okinawa, Formosa, northern Luzon, Leyte and the Japanese Fleet, October 2nd-29th, 1944, Serial 00101, December 16th, 1944; also COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 131528, October 1944 to CTF 38.
****** Action Report SANTA FE, period October 13th-17th, 1944, Serial 0082, October 29th, 1944.
At 0304 he directed CTG 30.5 to provide air coverage with land-based air for TG 30.3 when practicable and to make a daily report of the position of that task group. Due to the distance of TG 30.3 from friendly air bases it would be several days before such air cover could be provided.

Sometime later, CINCPOA warned CTF 38 that a Japanese air attack on TF 38 was probable, and at 0643 CTF 38 so advised TF 38. CTG 38.1 then, at 0655, notified CTF 38 and COMTHIRDELF that, after the departure of TG's 38.2 and 38.3, he would be unable to protect the CANBERRA during the expected evening twilight Japanese air attacks. This statement of CTG 38.1 had considerable merit, for if it is not clear that if the entire task force was unable to prevent an effective attack on one of its highly maneuverable task groups, how could one task group alone be expected to prevent such an attack against a slow speed (four and one-half knot) formation, which had no freedom of maneuver whatsoever, and which was still within effective range of Japanese land-based aircraft?

Neither COMTHIRDELF nor CTF 38 appear to have replied to CTG 38.1, or to have made any changes in their plans. In discussing this reaction, it must be accepted as a fact that both Commanders were fully cognizant of the situation which the departure of TG's 38.2 and 38.3 would make with relation to the defense of TG 30.3, and of the serious problem which would confront CTG 38.1. Why then did COMTHIRDELF persist in his salvage operations? It seems clear (a) that he was determined at this time to carry out his basic objectives as directed in his Operation Plan 21-44, and (b) that, in view of the destruction to enemy facilities in the Nanwa Sho and in Formosa, and in further view of the evident enemy air weakness in northern Luzon, as discovered in his strikes on that area on October 11th, he assumed that these objectives could be carried out successfully with lesser forces than originally scheduled. Based on the analysis to date, this seems to have been a reasonable assumption.

It also seems clear that he fully realized that he might have additional ships torpedoed within TG's 38.1 and 38.3, and might even lose the CANBERRA. On the other hand, it is likely that he hoped that this would be more of a possibility than a probability, because of several factors, among which were (a) the additional destruction which he hoped would be accomplished on Formosa by his forenoon air strikes, and by the strike of the B-29's of the China based TWELFTH Bomber Command also scheduled for that day, and (b) the defense which he hoped to obtain.

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* COMTHIRDELF Dispatch 131004, October 1944 to CTG's 30.2, 30.3, 30.6.
* Action Report CTG 38.1, Operations Against Okinawa, Formosa, Northern Luzon, Leyte and the Japanese Fleet, October 2nd-28th, 1944, Serial 00101, December 15th, 1944; also COMTHIRDELF Dispatch 131028, October 1944 to CTF 38.
* Director, Library Division, U.S. Army History, Air University Letter, November 5th, 1950, to President, Naval War College.
from the AA fire of both TG's 38.1 and 30.3, and from the planes of TG
38.1 and from the CAGFT, which latter carrier he had already designated,
at 0039, as part of TG 30.3."

Whatever may have been his reasons, it seems clear that at this
time he felt that his decision was acceptable. That this decision was a
courageous one is obvious, for TG 30.3 was within easy range of Japanese
land-based planes of almost every type, and CTF 36.1 could expect that
its position was known to the enemy at all times.

(1) Operations of TG's 38.1, 38.2, 38.3 and 30.3

off Formosa:

At 0632 TG 30.3 changed course to 120°(T). At
about 0640, CTF 33 commenced launching his planes from TG's 38.1, 38.2 and
38.3 against Formosa without enemy interference. The targets selected
were Okayama, Hieto, Nafukyo, Shinkoku, Farenku, Taen, Matsuyama, and
other lesser airfields and installations which presented suitable targets.
Sunrise was at 0647.

The flying conditions in the vicinity of the task force were about
average, with cloudy to overcast skies and broken high, medium, and low
clouds. The ceiling at time of launching was 2500 feet, which increased
to unlimited later in the day. The visibility was good, with intermittent
light showers. The wind was north-eastnly, about twenty-five knots, de-
creasing as the day passed. The sea was rough with moderate swells.**

This attack differed from the attacks of previous days, in that it
consisted of but one strike. This strike was designed to increase the
destruction already accomplished on the airfields and installations of
Formosa, and to destroy any Japanese aircraft encountered, in order to
reduce the possibility of effective air attacks being delivered against
TG 30.3. The strike was made by 146 VF and 100 VB.

The armament consisted of bombs and rockets. Very little opposition
was encountered. The weather over the target was generally satisfactory,
but the visibility over the ground was bad in a number of important areas,
because the Japanese employed brush fires and smoke pots to obscure the
targets.***

Plane losses received by TG's 38.1, 38.2 and 38.3 from all causes
were: sixteen VF, one VF(N), five VB, and one VT, or a total of twenty-
three planes, of which nine were jettisoned. Eleven pilots and one

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* War Diary STEPHEN POTTER, October 14th, 1944.
** Action Report CANOL, Air Cover for TG 30.3 from October 14th-19th,
1944, Serial 063, October 16th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTF 36.1, Operations against Okinawa, Formosa,
Northern Luzon, Leyte and the Japanese Fleet, October 2nd-29th,
1944, Serial 0010, December 18th, 1944.
aircrewman were counted as lost or missing. No pilots or aircrewmen were recovered by submarines on this day.

Throughout the day TF 38 maintained, in general, a combat air patrol (CAP) over each task group of from twelve VF in TG 38.2 to twenty in TG's 38.1 and 38.3. It also maintained a snooper anti-submarine patrol (SAS/SP) over each task group ranging from eight VF in TG 38.1 to four VF in TG 38.3, and to eight VF - eight VB/VT in TG 38.2.

This CAP and SAS/SP were necessary, for the various task groups were being constantly trailed by Japanese planes throughout most of the day. These snooping activities were rather limited in intensity during the forenoon, but increased in intensity during the afternoon. The CAP claimed having shot down near the force a total of seventy-six planes of various types.

During the day, as during the previous day, COLUMBIA made no protective air searches whatsoever, presumably relying on intelligence from CINCPAC and from the Allied submarines to alert him in case of danger.

At 1100, in accordance with orders previously issued by COLUMBIA, the CABOT, THE SULLIVANS, and the STEPHEN POTTER were detached from TG 38.2 and ordered to join TG 30.3, which was accomplished at 1544. The HOUSTON was also detached from TG 38.2 and directed to join TG 38.1, which she accomplished at 1620. With the reporting of the SULLIVANS and the STEPHEN POTTER to TG 30.3, the DNL and BUNS were detached from that group and directed to return to TG 38.1. The CABOT, meanwhile, at 1420, had launched patrols to relieve the TG 38.1 CAP over TG 30.3. These CARCT patrols consisted of eight VF for CAP and four VF - four VT as SAS/SP.

At 1130 TG's 38.2 and 38.3 departed the Formosa area for the fueling rendezvous with TG 30.3, course 135°(T), speed twenty-four knots. The defense of TG 30.3, in addition to that provided by TG 30.3 itself, was full entirely on CIC 30.3, who maintained his task group in an area about forty miles to the northeast of TG 30.3. Why he chose such an area is not understood, for doing it not seem logical that he should have taken station in the direction of the principal enemy air bases, and therefore to the northeast of TG 30.3, in order to cover adequately that group.

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* War Diary, Various ships involved, October 14th, 1944.

** Operational Summary of Carrier Strikes, COLUMBIA, Serial C74, October 27th, 1944.

*** War Diary STEPHEN POTTER, October 14th, 1944.

**** Action Report CABOT, Air Cover for TG 30.3 from October 14th-15th, 1944, Serial C13, October 16th, 1944.


****** War Diary LANGLEY, October 14th, 1944.
From both Formosa and the Kansai Shoto. Also, should he not have been much nearer TG 30.3?

Commencing at about 1500 and continuing until about 2330, all task groups in the Formosa area, including TG's 38.2 and 38.3, were subjected to continuing air attacks from Japanese planes which, despite the numerous attacks on Formosa, were in considerable strength. All CAP's and S/NAP's were thoroughly occupied in driving off these attacks during daylight hours, and were, in general, highly successful in accomplishing this objective. CTF 38 believed that TG 38 had destroyed 15 AA gun-fire with a total of twenty-one planes.*

All task groups, with the single exception of TG 38.1, succeeded in driving away enemy planes which closed the various task groups, although the HANCOCK in TG 38.2 received slight damage at 1830 from a 250 kilogram bomb. TG 38.1 was heavily attacked at 1835 (sunset was at 1922) by numerous two-engine land bombers carrying torpedoes. Although the task group succeeded in shooting down ten enemy planes, the light cruiser HOUSTON was, at 1941, torpedoned amidships,** which resulted in the flooding of both firerooms and the forward engine room. At 1912 she reported that all power was lost and that she had a seven degree list to port.*** In view of the many conflicting reports which he received from her repair parties, which indicated that she could not be saved, the Commanding Officer advised CTG 38.1 at 1933 that, as she was breaking up, he planned to abandon her. CTG 38.1 concurred in this view, stating, "If you are breaking up, abandon ship."****

The personnel of the HOUSTON, at 1940, started abandoning ship by life raft floater net, and b. simply jumping overboard.***** The Commanding Officer, at 2007, did not consider that she could be towed and so reported to CTG 38.1.***** CTG 38.1 then ordered COMSPO DIV NINETY-THREE in the ROYD with the GRAYSON and CONELL to expedite getting personnel off the HOUSTON, and to sink her with torpedoes when personnel were clear.****** The position of the HOUSTON at this time was bearing 164° (T), distant 150 miles from Soloao Bay, Formosa; 207' (T), distant 148 miles from Miyako Jima; and 027° (T), distant 288 miles from Aparrri, Luzon.

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* Operational Summary of Carrier Strikes COMFIRMDFT, Serial O074, October 27th, 1944.
*** War Diary CTG 38.1, October 14th, 1944.
***** War Diary CONNELL, October 14th, 1944.
****** War Diary ROYD, October 14th, 1944.

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Then, at 2015, the Commanding Officer, HOUeTON, signalled that he desired a tow. At 2030 the Commanding Officer, HOUeTON, decided she could be saved and ordered the abandonment discontinued. At 2054, CTG 38.1 directed COMCRUDIV TEN in the BOSTON to tow the HOUeTON out of the area. Thirty-three officers and 743 men who were later picked up by the three destroyers, had abandoned ship by this time.

COMTHIRDFLT now re-estimated the situation. He was confronted with a situation somewhat similar to that which he had faced on the previous evening when the CANBERRA was torpedoed. However, tonight's situation was the more serious, in that he now had two damaged cruisers instead of one, and therefore he had to decide (a) whether "to sink the two crippled cruisers and withdraw the fleet," or (b) whether "to endeavor to tow the cripples to safety."*

Once again the basic consideration should have been, of course, whether salvage operations would make it necessary to cancel or to reduce so seriously his scheduled air strikes against Luzon and the Visayas, in support of COMGHEESPAC's scheduled operations, as to make the net result unacceptable.

In this case COMTHIRDFLT decided to save both cruisers** He stated that he planned to accomplish this by assuming the offensive and attacking the Japanese airfields in Luzon, because these airfields were the probable source of the most effective Japanese air attacks, since Formosa and Okinawa would soon be out of effective range.*** He makes no reference in any of the materials available to this study of the necessity for carrying out his basic objectives as directed in his Operation Plan 21-44 and of the necessity for striking Luzon and the Visayas in furtherance of those basic objectives.

It would appear from the above reasoning that COMTHIRDFLT had temporarily modified his basic plan; had therefore cancelled temporarily further air operations in support of those objectives and had adopted instead a protective objective for CTG 38.1 - notably the salvaging of the CANBERRA and HOUeTON. This is not believed to have been the case. Rather, it would appear from the dispatches which he issued early the following morning, that he had determined to carry out his basic objectives and would therefore strike Luzon and the Visayas with heavy air strikes as soon as fueled, and that he felt that he could easily accomplish these basic objectives as well as salvage the CANBERRA and

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* Action Report COMCRUDIV TEN, October 2nd-29th, 1944, Serial 002, October 29th, 1944, page 8.
** War Diary HOUeTON, October 14th, 1944.
*** War Diary, COMTHIRDFLT, October 14th, 1944.
HOUSTON because the air strikes which would protect the damaged cruisers would also accomplish the basic objectives. He appears to have reasoned about as follows: (a) Owing to his commitments with regard to the CANTERBERY and HOUSTON Groups, he would not be able to carry out the full air strikes planned against Luzon and the Visayas for October 16th. He had planned, on that date, to strike Luzon with TG's 38.2, 38.3, and 38.4, and the Visayas (Leyte, Cebu, Negros) with TG 38.1.* From a chart analysis he could see that no more would still be able to strike the Visayas on October 16th as planned with one task group (TG 38.2), but would not be able to strike Luzon as planned with three task groups. Instead, one task group (TG 39.2), would be available for those latter strikes. However, he realized that TG 38.1, to strike Luzon, would be late for its fueling rendezvous, could be made ready for an additional strike on Luzon on the following day, October 15th. He reasoned that these strikes, plus the effective non-scheduled air strikes he had just completed against Formosa with TG's 38.1, 38.2 and 38.3, and against Aparri with TG 38.4, were the equivalent of the planned strikes, and therefore by executing them he would be effectively carrying out his air operations in support of his basic objectives. (b) He realized that TG 38 was somewhat low on fuel, but he was compensating for this at the present time by dispatching TG's 38.2 and 38.3 to fuel on the following morning, October 15th. He realized further that prior to the air operations in the Philippine area he would have to fuel TG's 38.1 and 38.4 also. From a chart analysis he was satisfied that this could be effectively completed by about noon on October 15th, at which time he would have available all four carrier task groups, not only fully fueled, but with their aircraft and pilot losses generally replaced by replacements from his fueling group, TG 38.6. (c) Finally, he estimated that his HOUSTON Group and his CANTERBERY Group would merge on the following day at about 1200 at which time they would be roughly 100 miles from Sibuyan Bay, Formosa. He seems to have felt that, although this position was within range of Japanese land-based aircraft from Formosa, northern Luzon and Sakishima Gunto, these ranges were steadily increasing and therefore, unless the Japanese struck by air sometime on the 16th, the HOUSTON and CANTERBERY Groups would be effectively clear of air attack from Japanese land bases by early morning on the 17th. Meanwhile, he planned to continue to employ TG 38.1 as cover for the HOUSTON and CANTERBERY until early afternoon, October 16th, when he planned to detach it to its fueling rendezvous.

It seems clear that COMINCH was able to carry out effectively either the scheduled air strikes, or their equivalent, against Luzon and the Visayas in sufficient time to support adequately COMSPEAC's planned operations. His decision, therefore, to modify his basic plan to the extent of salvaging the CANTERBERY and the HOUSTON is considered sound.

* BF 36 Operation Order 11-44, Serial 00070, October 1st, 1944.
At 2102, COMMANDER directed CTG 38.1 to remain in vicinity HOUSTON and BOSTON.

At 2135 he directed the fleet under PAWNEE to rendezvous with the HOUSTON Group at dawn October 16th, to then relieve the BOSTON which was to rejoin TG 38.1.

At 2320, the BOSTON arrived, took the HOUSTON in tow and commenced withdrawal from the combat area. She endeavored to steer course 150° (T), but owing to difficulties with the HOUSTON was not able to steer this course at all. She made good an average speed of about two and one-half knots. The position of the HOUSTON at this time was bearing 104°(T), distant 150 miles from Seikoo Bay, Formosa.

The HOUSTON Group now consisted of the damaged HOUSTON in tow of the BOSTON, and screened by COWELL and BOYD. The GRAYSON remained behind to continue the search for survivors. Meanwhile, COMMANDER assigned the SAN DIEGO, OAKLAND, MARSHALL and MILLER from TG 38.7 to TG 38.1, as replacements for the above salvage ships.

(2) Operations of TG 38.4 on October 14th

At 0600, when in launching position about 120 miles northeast of Aparri, CTG 38.4 launched a fighter sweep against the airfields at Aparri and at Lagad. The Aparri strike and the Laoag strike each consisted of twenty-three VF, one VF(P) — a total of forty-six VF, two VF(P). The armament consisted, in some cases, of rockets. Sunrise was at 0647.

The flying conditions were average to poor. The wind was from the northeast, twenty-six knots at time of launching planes, and diminished to about twenty knots at sundown. The ceiling, which was unlimited at dawn, fell to about 1000 feet during the day, and rose to 6000 feet at sunup. The sky coverage varied from 3/10 to overcast, the latter occurring during the forenoon and early afternoon. The average visibility

* COMMANDER dispatch 141202, October 1944, to CTG 38.1.
** COMMANDER dispatch 141233, October 1944, to PAWNEE.
*** Action Report CONCRUDIV 10, October 2nd-29th, 1944, Serial 0022, October 29th, 1944, page 8.
**** War Diary HOUSTON, October 14th-15th, 1944.
***** Action Report CTG 38.1, Operations Against Okinawa, Formosa, Northern Luzon, Leyte and the Japanese Fleet, October 2nd-29th, 1944, Serial 00101, December 16th, 1944.
****** Action Reports, FRANKLIN, SAN JACINTO, ENTERPRISE, HELLENA WOOD, Action October 7th-24th, 1944.
was about eight miles. The sea was moderate with a moderate swell. There were frequent rain squalls over Aparri; and Laoag was so closed in by bad weather that the planes of the SAN JACINTO and ENTERPRISE were unable to reach their targets.**

(a) The strike on Aparri was quite successful. It met no opposition, and, according to CTG 38.4, succeeded in destroying five enemy planes on the ground.***

During the day CTG 38.4 maintained a combat air patrol (CAP) of about fourteen VF planes, and a skipper anti-submarine patrol (SNASP) of about four VF - four VT planes.****

There were five or six one-plane bogies on the radar screens of the task force at various times throughout the day. One of these, a two-engine land-bomber was shot down at 0832 by the CAP.*** It is not clear whether or not the Japanese had discovered the location of TG 38.4.

During this date one VF was lost operationally and five VF were jettisoned.

At 1600, CTG 38.4 decided to retire to the fueling rendezvous set for the following morning with the fueling group. He therefore changed course to 140°(T), and speed to eighteen knots.

(3) Summary of Results (Battle off Formosa), October 12th, 13th, and 14th, 1944.*****

CTF 38 believed, from his pilot claims supported in party by photographic coverage, that TF 38 had destroyed:

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* Action Report BELLNAU WOOD, Action Against Nanci Shoto, Formosa, Luzon and the Visayas, Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 0043, November 3rd, 1944.
** War Diary ENTERPRISE, October 14th, 1944; also Action Report SAN JACINTO, Operations against Okinawa Jima, Formosa, Luzon, P.I., and Visayas, P.I., in support of the occupation of Leyte, P.I., October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 0043, October 31st, 1944.
**** Action Reports, FRANKLIN, SAN JACINTO, ENTERPRISE, BELLNAU WOOD, October 7th-24th, 1944.
***** Action Report CTF 38, Summary of TF 38 Operations, August 27th-October 30th, 1944, Serial 00565, November 3rd, 1944; also Operational Summaries of Carrier Strikes, COMINCHFLOT, Serial 0074, October 27th, 1944.

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(a) Enemy aircraft on the ground or on the water - 278 planes.

(b) Enemy aircraft in the air - 377 planes.

These latter comprised 216 shot down over Formosa, 112 shot down near TF 38, forty-six shot down by ship's gunfire, and three shot down by TF 38 aircraft on search.

The above claims add up to a total of 655 Japanese aircraft destroyed. These claims are substantiated to a considerable degree by the records of the SIXTH Base Air Force and post-war interrogations of personnel of the SIXTH Base Air Force. These two sources indicated that admitted Japanese aircraft losses amounted to about 492 aircraft including 100 Army aircraft of all types which Commander SIXTH Base Air Force estimated had been destroyed in these operations. The difference of 163 planes between Allied claims and the Japanese losses is due in part to the lack of completely reliable information from Japanese sources and in part to overoptimistic claims by Allied pilots.

(c) Enemy shipping.***

(1) Sunk:

Four large cargo ships, four medium cargo ships, ten small cargo ships, one medium transport, six submarine chasers, and fifteen sampans, luggers and barges.

* Obtained by subtracting total losses of SIXTH Base Air Force aircraft for October 10th, 11th, 15th and 16th from total losses for period October 10th - October 17th (584 planes); viz., thirty-six at Okinawa October 10th, forty-four off Formosa October 15th and 16th, and seventeen search aircraft lost during this period.


(2) Probably sunk:

One mine sweeper, two small escort ships, three medium cargo ships, three small cargo ships, five submarine chasers, and seven sampans, luggers and barges.

(3) Damaged:

One destroyer, one motor torpedo boat, two large cargo ships, eight medium cargo ships, twenty-two small cargo ships, one large oiler, one large transport, five submarine chasers, twelve SD, and thirty-nine sampans, luggers and barges.

(4) Considerable destruction was wrought at Siko; Eizansho (eleven hangars destroyed or damaged); Garan Ri; Heito; Jitsugetsutan; Kago (eight hangars and three large shops destroyed or damaged); Karenko (one large barracks, one ammunition dump exploded, one large aluminum plant and one large nickel plant damaged); Kato (fuel dump destroyed); Kiiro (one industrial plant, power plant, warehouses, and shipping installations damaged); Kobi (four hangars destroyed or damaged); Koryu, Kizan; Matsuyama (nine buildings and shops damaged); Okayama (four hangars, six shops destroyed or damaged); Perunuro; Shinchiku (four hangars, eight large shops, two large barracks destroyed, two buildings of fuel plant, possible oxygen plant, transformer station, roundhouse and railway yards damaged); Taiiku (three hangars, two barracks, twelve buildings destroyed or damaged); Taiku; Taihoku; Take; Reigaryo (one ammunition dump exploded, three warehouses destroyed); Tanusui (two large warehouses and a number of freight cars destroyed); Toko (hangar damaged); Toshien; Toyohara (three hangars destroyed).*

(e) In respect to losses and damage to enemy shipping, base facilities, etc. by Task Force 38, Japanese records provide but meager information. However, the shipping claims appear to be excessive since the Allied analysis made in 1947 gave as sunk fifteen merchant ships totalling 39,716 tons and one converted cruiser,** while the Japanese analysis made in 1952 gave as sunk seven merchant ships totalling 14,380 tons and two patrol craft, and as damaged two merchant ships totalling 6,263 tons, one small mine layer, and two patrol craft.***

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* Action Report CTF 38, Summary of TF 38 Operations, August 29th–October 30th, 1944, Serial 00506, November 3rd, 1944.
*** The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, Military History Section, Special Staff, GHQ, Far East Command, February 1952.
CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Summary of Air Strikes on Aparri, northern Luzon, October 14th, 1944:

CTG 38.4 believed from his pilots claims supported in part by photographic coverage that TG 38.4 had destroyed:

(a) Enemy aircraft on the ground or on the water - five planes.

(b) Enemy aircraft in the air - one plane.*

(4) Operations on October 15th:

(a) Operations of COMTHIRDFLT:

As a result of his estimate of the situation made the preceding evening, COMTHIRDFLT, in the NEW JERSEY with TG 38.2, which task group was retiring to a fueling rendezvous for the following morning, sent dispatches as follows:

(1) At 0040 to CTG 38.4 wherein he directed that commander to proceed to a striking position off the east coast of Luzon and launch maximum strikes on central Luzon during daylight, October 15th, with the destruction of aircraft and air installations as primary mission.**

(2) At 0110 to CTG 30.3 wherein he advised that commander of the torpedoing of the HOUSTON, and of her midnight position, October 14th, as well as her course and speed. He directed CTG 30.3 to alter course to bring CANBERRA and HOUSTON Groups together as soon as practicable without losing too much distance made good.***

(3) At 0134 to CTG 38.1 wherein he directed that commander to supply one additional CVL and four additional destroyers to TG 30.3. He further directed him to proceed at about 1400, October 15th, with the remainder of TG 38.1 towards his fueling rendezvous, Latitude 16°-30'N, Longitude 128°-30'W, to arrive at 0700 the following morning, where he would be joined by TG 38.4. Then after fueling, both groups were to join TG 38.3 vicinity Latitude 15°-30'N, Longitude 123°-00'E at 0600, October 17th, and were to conduct sustained strikes on Luzon.****

** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 141540, October 1944 to CTG 38.4.
*** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 141610, October 1944 to CTG 30.3.
**** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 141834, October 1944 to CTG 38.1.
(4) At 0140 to CTG 38.4 wherein he directed that commander upon completion of strikes against Luzon to proceed to rendezvous with TG 38.1 and fueling group at Latitude 16°-30'N, Longitude 126°-30'E to arrive 0700 October 16th. After fueling in company with TG 38.1, he was to proceed to Latitude 15°-30'N, Longitude 123°-00'E, to arrive 0600, October 17th where he was to join TG 38.3 and all three groups were to conduct sustained strikes on Luzon.*

(5) At 0230 to CTG 30.8 (Fueling Group) wherein he directed that commander as to the disposition desired of certain of his units in order that the fueling and replenishment schedules designated in the dispatches here listed might be maintained.**

(6) At 0230 to CTF 38 wherein he directed that commander that upon completion of fueling, (a) TG 38.2 was to proceed to vicinity Samar and strike Visayas early October 16th, and continue through the 17th and (b) TG 38.3 was to strike Luzon on October 16th, and, in company with TG's 38.1 and 38.4 on the 17th. He further directed that at dusk October 17th, TG's 38.2 and 38.3 were to proceed to fueling rendezvous Latitude 15°-00'N, Longitude 126°-00'E to arrive 0700 October 18th; that TG's 38.1 and 38.4 were to strike Visayas on October 18th and that CTF 38 was to conform to the schedule in accordance with COMTHIRDFLT's Operation Plan 21-4.***

COMTHIRDFLT must have been satisfied up to this time with the performance of his command. All of his operations had been carried out satisfactorily and heavy damage had been inflicted on the enemy, without any commensurate damage being inflicted on his forces by the enemy. The only damage to his ships was the crippling of the CANBERRA and the HOUSTON by torpedo attack, and he was almost sure that he would succeed in saving these two cruisers. His command was now preparing to carry out the additional operations directed in his Operation Plan 21-4 and in CTF 38's Operation Plan 11-44. His operations were proceeding according to plan.

However, if such were his thoughts they were suddenly changed, for at about 0730 he received CINCPAC's Dispatch**** wherein CINCPAC stated that he had received word that the Japanese believed TF 38 to be retreating because of their air attacks, and had therefore ordered the SECOND Striking Force and the Shore Based Air Forces to carry out annihilation operations as directed. CINCPAC advised that in his opinion the SECOND Striking Force consisted of carriers and surface vessels in the Empire Area. Actually, the SECOND Striking Force consisted of but two CA, one CL, and seven destroyers.

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* COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 141730, October 1944 to CTG 38.4
** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 141730, October 1944 to CTG 30.8
*** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 141730, October 1944 to CTF 38
**** CINCPAC Dispatch 142219, October 1944 to COMTHIRDFLT.
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COMTHIRDFLT now began re-estimating the situation anew, but he appears to have taken no action other than to have observed the developing situation which was far from clear at this time. What was the Japanese plan?

About this time, to quote COMTHIRDFLT, "there was a tremendous campaign of falsehood claiming the destruction of virtually all of the THIRD Fleet."

COMTHIRDFLT now decided that the opportunity had arisen to comply with CINCPOA's basic instructions, "that in case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offer or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task of the Western Pacific Task Forces." He was anxious to have a fleet action; he had powerful forces scarcely damaged, and much superior to any Japanese forces which might be brought against him. How best, therefore, could he bring about the desired fleet action? He decided on deception. He decided that he would endeavor to create in Japanese minds the illusion that his forces had, in fact, been largely destroyed and that except for TG 33.1, which was protecting TG 30.3, and for TG 38.4, which was attacking Luzon, all of his forces had been destroyed.

He therefore, at 1049, commenced preparations. He notified CINCPOA and COMSOWESPAC that he was disposing his forces for fleet action, and that except for the Luzon strike then underway, no fast carriers would be available to support KING III until further notice. In this dispatch he also directed CTG 38.4 to report the Luzon enemy air situation as soon as practicable direct to COMSOWESPACFOR.

In addition to this, at about 1100, he received a dispatch from CINCPOA to COMFAIRWING ONE at Ulithi, advising that commander that there was a suspicion that a Japanese surface force had departed the Empire area in order to destroy the CANBERRA and HOUSTON, and directing that commander to extend his air search to the maximum in order to cover the assumed enemy approach from Bungo Suido to about Latitude 20°-30'N, Longitude 125°-00'E. This dispatch evidently reinforced COMTHIRDFLT's opinion that he could bring about a fleet action.

In accordance with this opinion, he advised all commanders concerned at 1152 that he had information that the enemy believed TF 38

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** CINCPOA Operation Plan 9-44, Serial 0008b1, September 27th, 1944.
*** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 150149, October 1944 to CINCPOA and COMSOWESPAC.
**** CINCPOA Dispatch 150136, October 1944 to COMFAIRWING 1.
beaten, reduced in strength, and therefore retiring. He announced his
decision, "I intend to attack in strength," and gave, in substance, as
his general plan that TG 30.3 would represent the beaten remnant of the
THIRD FLEET, and that other forces would be concentrated, as soon as
fueled, towards reference position Latitude 22°-00' N, Longitude 129°-00'E. *

COMTHIRDFLTL at some time during the late forenoon, directed that
previous orders to CTG's 38.2 and 38.3 to strike the Visayas and Luzon
be canceled. Instead, these two groups were to proceed during the night
to position Latitude 22°-00' N, Longitude 128°-00' E, to arrive at 0400.
From this position they were to launch air searches in an endeavor to
locate the units of the Japanese Fleet reported east of the Nansei Shoto. **

It will be observed that this position was between 300 and 400 miles
from Luzon and Formosa, about 250 miles from Okinawa, and about 725 miles
from Miyako Jima. Thus, as his rendezvous point was beyond the range of
most planes operating out of Luzon and Formosa, he seems to have esti-
mated that his task groups would have no difficulty shooting down any
escapers from these areas. However, his reason for designating a rendez-
vous point so near Okinawa and the Sakishima Group is not understood,
since its danger of discovery from those areas was great. Although those
fields had been heavily hit by his carrier planes on preceding days, ex-
perience had shown that such damage was readily repaired, and in view of
the nearness to the Empire, replacement planes could be quickly flown in.

COMTHIRDFLTL now commenced implementing his decision. At 1156 he
directed CTG 38.3 to transmit urgent dummy messages frequently to create
an appearance of desperation. *** At 1200 he modified previous instruc-
tions issued to CTG 38.1, CTG 38.2 (CRUDIV VIVE and escorts) and to the
fueling group. He directed CTG's 38.1 and 30.2 to a new fueling rendez-
vous for 0600, October 16th, and ordered them to fuel immediately from
TU 30.2, and for CTG 38.1 to obtain replenishment aircraft from the CVE
with that fueling group. Then, upon completion of those fueling and re-
plenishment operations, CTG 38.2 was to report to CTG 38.1 for duty. The
thus augmented TG 38.1 was to join TG's 38.2 and 38.3 at a rendezvous to
be designated. ****

At 1214 he directed CTG 38.4, upon completion of fuel at, on October
16th, to rendezvous with CTG 38 at 0600, October 17th, in latitude 22°-
00'N, Longitude 128°-00' E.

* COMTHIRDFLTL Dispatch 150125 October 1944 to, among others, CTG PA,
CONSBESLAC, and all TG's THIRD FLEET.
** War Diaries, among others, CTG's 38.2, 38.3, HANCOCK and LEXINGTON.
*** COMTHIRDFLTL Dispatch 150256, October 1944.
**** COMTHIRDFLTL Dispatch 150300, October 1944 to CTG's 38.1, 38.2, and
CTU 30.2.
At 1219, in a dispatch wherein he gave instructions to CTG 30.3, he directed CTG 30.5 to provide air cover and to report daily the position of TG 30.3 when practicable.\footnote{COMMFRIC Dispatch 150519, October 1944 to CTG 30.3.}

At about 1300 he received CINCPAC's dispatch\footnote{CINCPAC Dispatch 150531, October 1944 to COMSOWESPAC.} to COMSOWESPAC, wherein CINCPAC minded of the fact that no submarines were on station at the entrances to San Bernardino Strait and Surigaon Strait (they had been removed on October 12th), requested that commander to make the maximum air reconnaissance possible to cover the Pacific Ocean exits from the San Bernar-
dino and Surigaon Straits, commencing daylight, October 15th, and continuing until the situation clarified. This was highly illuminating to him, for, until he had received this dispatch, he most likely expected that the contemplated fleet action was to be with Japanese Empire forces only. Now it was clear that his immediate superior in command, CINCPAC, envisaged other enemy forces, probably those in the Lingga-Singapore area, as possibly entering the action, and endeavoring in conjunction with the Empire Forces, to make a gigantic double envelopment of TF 38.

At 1320 he gave CTG 30.3 (fueling group) directions concerning the activities of that group during the forthcoming operations.\footnote{COMMFRIC Dispatch 150531, October 1944 to CTG 30.3.}

At 1358 he advised CTG's 38.1 and 38.4 that CTG's 38.2 and 38.3 were to arrive at reference position, Latitude 22°00'N, Longitude 120°00'W at 0000, October 16th.\footnote{COMMFRIC Dispatch 150542, October 1944 to CTG 30.3.}

At about 1500 he received COMSEVENTHFLT's dispatch\footnote{COMSEVENTHFLT Dispatch 150543, October 1944 to CTG's 38.1 and 38.4.} wherein that officer: (a) stated that the Central Philippines Attack Force would proceed with the KING II Operations; (b) requested assistance from TF 38 when practicable; and (c) directed CTG 77.4 (Escort Carrier Group) to strike the western Visayas on October 17th, 18th, and 19th with the destruction of enemy aircraft and combatant ships as the primary objective.

This was highly reassuring. It showed him that COMSOWESPAC considered that the preliminary operations already completed in support of KING II had been effectively accomplished, and further indicated that commander's confidence in the ability of the THIRD Fleet, plus the TF 17 submarines to cover adequately his operations in the Philippines.

At 1651 he received CINCPAC's dispatch to the Deputy Commander, TWENTIETH Air Force, requesting maximum action against enemy air forces
in Formosa until the situation cleared up. This message plainly indicated to him the close attention with which CINCPAC was following the developing situation.

From this time until 1930, he received routine traffic as well as continuous Japanese broadcasts concerning their plans to destroy his retreating forces. However, at about 1930 he received an important contact report* from the DESUGO which reported: (a) three heavy cruisers and one light cruiser at 0800 that morning departing Bungo Suido on estimated course 140°(T), estimated speed eighteen knots; and (b) one destroyer and one large ship at 1115 that morning departing Bungo Suido on estimated course 135°(T), estimated speed twenty knots.

At about 2000 he received CINCPAC's dispatch** informing him of the new submarine dispositions which CINCPAC was in the process of making. These dispositions were designed, in part, to provide reconnaissance for the THIRD Fleet against enemy forces which might be closing in. They showed that Luzon Strait was in the process of being blocked; that one submarine in TF 35's probable operating area was retiring from the area, presumably so as not to embarrass TF 38; that the pass between the northeast tip of Formosa and the westernmost island of the Sakashima Gunto was in the process of being blocked; that one submarine was off the northwest tip of Formosa; that two submarines were watching Okinawa, that one submarine was in each of the areas ABANDON, ABNAGE, AMUSE and ABDUCT of the HARU MORGUE; that three submarines were off the southern approaches to Kagasaki-Sasako; that three submarines were guarding Bungo Suido and that two submarines were guarding the southeast approaches to Tokyo Bay.

As a consequence of this dispatch, COTHIRDPLT decided that there were certain sectors which required air coverage additional to submarine reconnaissance. One of these sectors was that embracing Luzon Strait, Formosa and the pass to the northeast of Formosa. This was because the CINCPAC submarines, which were designed to block those sectors, were proceeding to their new positions and might possibly not have completed their blocks in sufficient time to prevent Japanese surface forces passing through their sectors unobserved. Another sector was that between Okinawa and Kiyako Retto where certain of the channels were deep, and where there was no submarine reconnaissance. A third sector was to the northeast where surface forces which had succeeded in passing through Bungo Suido without detection might well attack TF 38 either as a single envelopment or as a double envelopment, employing other surface forces, notably the heavy ships, in the Lingga-Singapore area. In this connection it is necessary here to point out that COTHIRDPLT did not consider that the submarines off Bungo

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* CINCPAC Dispatch 150551, October 1944 to Deputy Commander, 20th Air Force.
** CTG 17.17 (FESUGO) Dispatch 15014, October 1944 to CTG 17 (COMSUFFAC).
*** CINCPAC Dispatch 160932, October 1944 to COTHIRDPLT.
Suicide were adequate in number to insure proper reconnaissance.*

At about 2200 he intercepted a dispatch from CINCPAC to COMNAVGROUP CHINA requesting reconnaissance of South China Sea north of Nampho Bay - Lingayen Line by China-based air for the purpose of detecting the possible movement of enemy fleet units towards area in which THIRD Fleet was operating, and requesting information as to what extent this could be accomplished.** As this was in accordance with a request which he had made on CINCPAC at 1749,*** it must have been gratifying to him to observe that his operations continued to meet with the approval of his immediate superior in command.

He received no further information during the night which caused him to make any change in his plans for fleet action.

(b) Operations of CTG 30.3 on October 15th.

During the remainder of the night, both the CANBERRA Group and the HOUSTON Group continued their retirements from the area.

(1) Operations of HOUSTON Group.

At about 0230, the HOUSTON finally succeeded in steadingy on the base course of 150° (T), speed 4.5 knots. The HOUSTON rode easily and the group headed towards the rendezvous with CTG 30.3.

(2) Operations of CANBERRA Group.

At about 0100, the group was reconnoitered by a low-flying enemy plane. At this same time the tug MUNSEK was contacted by radar, and by 0200 it was in position to take the tow from the WICHITA. However, CTG 30.3 decided to wait until dawn to accomplish the transfer, which was finally accomplished between 0645 and 0715.****

Weather conditions throughout the day were about as follows: high overcast with an unlimited ceiling and with scattered low clouds at 2500.

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* COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 277215, September 1944 to CINCPAC.
** CINCPAC Dispatch 151230, October 1944 to COMNAVGROUP CHINA.
*** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 150849, October 1944 to CINCPAC.
**** Action Report COMCRUDIV 13 (CTG 30.3) - Report THIRD Fleet Salvage Group, October 15th-17th, 1944, Serial 006, October 28th, 1944, page 12.
feet. The ceiling lowered to 9000 feet around 1500. Good visibility and scattered light showers. Fresh to strong northeasternly winds. Moderate swell and rough sea.

At 0714, WICHITA with KNAIP departed TG 30.3 to join CTG 36.1.

At 0745, CTG 30.3 received a directive** from CCMTHIRDPLT which had been originated six and one-half hours earlier directing him to close the HOUSTON Group and to combine with that group. In compliance with these orders, CTG 30.3 changed course to port to close the HOUSTON Group which at the time was bearing COG°(T) 200°, distant twenty-seven miles.

At 0813 WICHITA received CCMTHIRDPLT's dispatch directing her to remain with TG 30.3.**

At 0853 enemy aircraft began to close.

At about 0855, CTG 30.3 received a dispatch from CCMTHIRDPLT wherein CTG 38.1 was directed to send one CVL and four destroyers to reinforce TG 30.3 and then to retire to 1400 to a fueling rendezvous to the eastward.

By 0935, CTG 30.3 had closed to within twelve miles of the HOUSTON Group but the merger was not accomplished until about noon, when the two towing groups took station with the CANBERRA Group operating in a position 2000 yards on the starboard beam of the HOUSTON Group with the guide, after 1230, in the MUNSEW as she was only able to make about 3.5 knots good. Course was set at 130°(T).

At 1635, COMRESIV SIX in WICHITA, with CONTACTS, MILLER, CHARBETTE, KNAIP, BELL and BURNS rejoined TG 30.3 having been designated by CTG 30.3 for this duty in compliance with orders from CCMTHIRDPLT.**

At this time CTG 30.3, in order to facilitate handling of carriers, formed two task units. One was the Towing Unit (TG 30.3.1)*** consisting of the SANTA FE, WIMALKHAL, CANBERRA in tow of MUNSEW, HOUSTON in tow of BOSTON, DESHIV ONE HUNRED (COWSILL, CAPERTON, INGERSOLL) THE SULLIVANS, STEPHEN POTTER, BOYD, COWELL, GRAYSON. The other unit was the Covering Unit (TG 30.3.2)**** consisting of WICHITA, MOBILE, CAPOB, CONROCH, MILLER, CHARBETTE, KNAIP, BELL and BURNS. This unit was to provide air and surface support as desired.

CTG 30.3 directed CTU 30.3.2 to operate to the northward during darkness to provide timely warning of surface attack.

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** Action Report CABOT, Action against Okinawa Jima, Formosa, The Visayas, and Japanese Fleet, Luzon, October 6th-14th and 20th-31st, 1944, Serial C-93, October 31st, 1944.
*** CCMTHIRDPLT Dispatch 111610, October 1944 to CTG 30.3.
**** CTU (30.3.1) was Rear Admiral Laurence T. DuBose, USA.
***** CTU (30.3.2) was Rear Admiral Charles T. Joy, USA.
Although throughout the day several bogies appeared, there were no air attacks and the expected dusk air attack failed to materialize.

The CABOT maintained a CAP of eight VF and a SNASP of four VF-four VT throughout the day. This was reinforced in the late afternoon by a CAP of eight VF and a SNASP of two VF-two VT from the CONPENS. This CAP reported having shot down three enemy planes. No planes nor pilots were lost by either the CABOT or the CONPENS.

At about 1810, CTG 38.1 received a directive from COMTHIRDPFLT directing him to continue retirement towards Ulithi and to carry out the radio deception ordered in a previous dispatch. This required dummy radio transmission of from three to five messages daily.***

(c) Operations of CTG 38.1 on October 15th.

At 0026 TG 38.1, which was operating to the northward of TG 30.3, was reinforced by the arrival of the SAN DIEGO, OAKLAND, MILLER and MARSHALL. This task group now consisted of the WASP, HORNET, CONPENS, MONTEREY, SAN DIEGO, OAKLAND, MILLER, MARSHALL, CHARRETTE, BURNS, BELL, CONNER, MCCALLA, BROWN and IZARD.***

During the forenoon destroyers of the task force fueled from the WASP and HORNET. Also, numerous enemy planes closed the formation, but because of the effective CAP none got close enough to do any damage.***

At 0930 the WICHITA and KNAPP joined.

At 1400 the WICHITA, CONPENS, MILLER, BURNS, BELL, KNAPP, and CHARRETTE, in accordance with orders from COMTHIRDPFLT,*** were detached and ordered to join CTG 30.3. At about 1410 TG 38.1 commenced operating on southwesterly courses, proceeding in a general direction towards fueling rendezvous.****

At about 1600 more enemy planes closed the group, but although most were driven off by the CAP, one or more dive bombers broke through and attacked the carriers. One dive bomber was destroyed by AA fire. No ships were hit.

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* Action Report CACOT, Air Cover for TG 30.3, October 14th-15th, 1944, Serial No. 65, October 18th, 1944.
*** War Diary SAN DIEGO, October 15th, 1944.
**** War Diary OAKLAND, October 15th, 1944.

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During the day, owing to repeated air attacks, a combat air patrol (CAP) of from sixteen to sixty VF and a SHASP of eight VF and four VE/VT was maintained.

At 1612, after planes had been recovered, CTG 38.1 continued retirement on easterly and southeasterly courses toward the 0600 rendezvous (Latitude 21°00'N, Longitude 130°00'W) with the fueling group.* speed twenty-two knots.

CTG 38.1 estimated that his task group had been attacked throughout the day by a total of eighty planes attacking in groups of from two to twenty-five planes. Of these eighty planes, CTG 38.1 believed that his CAP had destroyed about fifty-two and his AA guns one - a total of fifty-three planes. His own losses were three VF and two pilots.**

(d) Operations of CTG's 38.2 and 38.3 on October 15th.

CTG's 38.2 and 38.3 continued on toward their dawn fueling rendezvous. The task groups were shadowed intermittently by enemy aircraft until about 0317 when the last bogie faded from the radar screens.***

At 0956 TG 38.3 rendezvoused with its fueling unit, TU 30.8.2, consisting of the LACKAWANNA, KASASKIA, KENNEBAGO, PECOS, TOMAHAWK, with their escorts. Fueling commenced at 1031 and continued until 1026.****

At 1032 TG 38.2 rendezvoused with its fueling unit, TU 30.8.7, consisting of the CHIKASKIA, SCHUYLKILL, ESCAMBIA with their escorts plus CALIENTE. Fueling commenced at 1123 and continued until 1940 when IOWA completed fueling.*****

During the forenoon CTG's 38.2 and 38.3 received orders from CTF 38 directing them upon completion of fueling, to rendezvous at 0600 on the following day in Latitude 22°00'N, Longitude 128°00'W and to be prepared

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* War Diary CTG 38.1, October 16th, 1944.
** Action Report WASP, Operations against Okinawa Jima, Miyako Jima, Northern Luzon, Formosa, Manila Bay Area, Leyte, Support of Battle of Leyte Gulf, and Enemy Naval Units Western Visayas, October 2nd-27th, 1944, Serial 0040, October 28th, 1944, Enclosure (E) (Executive Officer's Report); also action Report HORNET, Ryuku Islands, Formosa, and Philippine Operations October 2nd-27th, 1944, Serial 0031, October 28th, 1944, Enclosure (E) (Medical Officer's Report).
*** War Diaries CTG 38.3 and LEXINGTON, October 15th, 1944.
**** War Diary CTG 38.2, October 16th, 1944
***** War Diary SCHUYLKILL, October 16th, 1944.
for long-range search and attack on the Japanese Fleet.

Also, during the afternoon, the escort carriers STEAMER BAY, NASSAU, DARNES, and SIKOH BAY, transferred (a) replacement aircraft as follows: to TG 38.2, twelve VF, nineteen VB, three VT, and two VF(N) - total thirty-six planes, and to TG 38.3, thirteen VF, eight VT - total twenty-one planes; a grand total of fifty-seven planes, ** and (b) replacement pilots and aircrews as follows: to TG 38.2, sixteen pilots and fourteen aircrews; to TG 38.3, nine pilots and ten aircrews; *** a grand total of twenty-five pilots and twenty-four aircrews. In return, the STEAMER BAY received eleven "flyable ships" from the BUNKER HILL, LEXINGTON, and INTREPID consisting of five VF, one VB and five VT.

From sunrise to sunset, CTG 38.2 maintained a CAP of twelve VF and a SNASP of four VF - four VB/VT; *** CTG 38.3 a CAP of eight VF and an ASP of four VB/VT. **** TG 38.2 CAP shot down one enemy plane during the night, and TG 38.3 CAP shot down five enemy planes during the day.

No airborne planes nor pilots were lost by either task group, although two VF were jettisoned.

At about 2000, both task groups in formation headed on a mean course 330°(1), speed 23 knots for the morning rendezvous.*****

(e) Operations of TG 38.4 on October 15th.

CTG 38.4 continued on towards his fueling rendezvous - Latitude 19°00'N, Longitude 127°00'W. However, at 0100****** he received a dispatch from COMTHIRFDLT which cancelled his fueling rendezvous for that day, and which directed instead that he proceed immediately to a striking position off the east coast of Luzon and launch maximum strike on central Luzon during daylight, October 15th. This dispatch further directed that his objective was the destruction of enemy aircraft and air installations.*****

***** War Diary COMDESRON 5C, October 15th, 1944.
** War Diaries STEAMER BAY, NASSAU, SIKOH BAY, BARNES, ESSEX, LEXINGTON, PRINCETON, LANGLEY, INTREPID, INDEPENDENCE, BUNKER HILL, HANCOCK, October 15th, 1944.
*** War Diaries STEAMER BAY, NASSAU, SIKOH BAY, CTG 38.3, October 15th, 1944.
**** War Diaries INTREPID, BUNKER HILL, HANCOCK, INDEPENDENCE, October 15th, 1944.
***** War Diary CTG 38.4, October 15th, 1944.
****** War Diary COMDESRON 5C, October 15th, 1944.
******* War Diary BILOXI, October 15th, 1944.
******** COMTHIRFDLT Dispatch 41540, October 1944, to CTG 38.4.
At 0210, in accordance with the above instructions, CTG 38.4 changed course to 230°(T), increased speed to twenty-four knots, and headed for his new launching position. * Sunrise was at 0636.

At 0745 bogies were intercepted closing the formation. The CAP was increased, and an enemy two-engine land-bomber was shot down at 0830.

At 0846, when in position bearing about 045°(T), distant 220 miles from Manila, he launched his initial air strike against the enemy airfields in the Manila area. ** The enemy had been alerted, but the launchings were made without opposition.

The flying conditions were average with surface wind from the east northeast of about fifteen knots. Cumulus clouds covering about 4/10 of the sky prevailed during the forenoon, but this rapidly increased to 9/10 during the afternoon watch, and by sundown (1814) the sky was overcast. The ceiling, which at launching had been unlimited, rapidly lowered so that between 1200 and 1600 it averaged about 8,000 feet, and by sundown it had fallen to 500 feet. The visibility was about fifteen miles, the sea was slight with a slight swell. There was an equatorial front passing through the central Philippines and extending towards Guam. ***

The air attack delivered by CTG 38.4 differed from the air attack of the previous days in that the air strikes in this case were not preceded by a dawn fighter sweep due to the distance from Manila. **** As a consequence, TG 38.4's initial strike was intercepted over Luzon by fifty or sixty enemy interceptors which were destroyed or driven off by the fighter escort which were highly effective. ***** It is significant of the deterioration of the quality of the Japanese pilots that not one of the enemy planes got through to attack the bombers.

The air attack plan called for two air strikes (ABLE and BAKER) (a) Strike ABLE, which was launched at 0846 and recovered between 1300 and 1320, was composed of thirty-three VF, one VP(P), twenty VE, and eighteen VT, a total of seventy-two planes. The fighters were armed with rockets; the bombers with 500 or 1000 pound bombs. The large bombs were carried by the torpedo planes. The attack which struck at

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* Action Report, FRANKLIN, Operations Against the Enemy at Namsai, shoto, Formosa and the Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 0039, October 31st, 1944.
** War Diary CTG 38.4, October 16th, 1944.
*** Action Report BELLEAU WOOD, Action Against Namsai Shoto, Formosa, Luzon and the Visayas, Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 0170, November 3rd, 1944, Appendix One to Enclosure (A), (Aerological Data).

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1025 was successful. Considerable damage was reportedly done to the installations at Nellison Airfield and Nichols Airfield in the Manila area, and numerous enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air and on the ground. In fact, CTG 38.4 claimed having destroyed, in air combat, thirty-six land-type fighters and eight carrier-type fighters. (b) Strike BAKER, which was launched at 1113, consisted of eleven VF, nineteen VB, fifteen VT - a total of forty-five planes. It had been planned to launch Strike BAKER earlier. However, owing to the fact that the carrier task group was subjected to heavy air attacks between 1022 and 1047, during which time the FRANKLIN was hit by a Japanese bomb, it was not possible to do this. Then, owing to a shortage of fighter coverage, Strike BAKER was directed to orbit until the bogy situation had cleared up. Finally, owing to the fact that there was insufficient fuel for its scheduled mission, it was recalled, and landed between 1311 and 1325. During this attack CTG 38.4 claimed having destroyed nineteen enemy planes.

The damage to the FRANKLIN was very light. The bomb landed near the deck edge elevator, and damaged the outboard corner, but the elevator remained in operation. Personnel losses were fortunately slight.

Between the launching of Strikes ABLE and BAKER, and, in fact, at about 1000 CTG 38.4 received an additional dispatch from COMTHIRDFLT. This dispatch, among other things, directed him, upon completion of the above strike, to proceed to the fueling rendezvous - latitude 16°30'N, longitude 125°30'W - to arrive at 0700 the next morning.

At about 1130 CTG 38.4 appears to have received COMTHIRDFLT's dispatch to all Task Force Commanders, wherein COMTHIRDFLT stated: (a) that he was disposing his forces for fleet action and (b), that except for CTG 38.4's Luzon strike no fast carriers would be available to support TINH II until further notice and wherein COMTHIRDFLT directed CTG 38.4 to report the Luzon enemy air situation direct to COMSOWESPAC as soon as possible.

This dispatch must have been quite a surprise to CTG 38.4, for this appears to have been the first information that he had received of the proximity of fleet action. However, it should not have unduly concerned him, for nothing in this dispatch modified his activities against Luzon nor changed his fueling rendezvous.
At 1200, when in Latitude 16°34’N, Longitude 124°21’E, CTF 38.4 headed in a northeasterly direction towards his 0700 fueling rendezvous for the following morning, and recovered both of his air strikes on route. Since he had not accomplished his assigned task of making maximum air strikes against enemy airfields in central Luzon but, instead, had made but one air strike against a limited number of these airfields, his decision to discontinue air strikes against central Luzon and commence his retirement is subject to analysis. He gave as his reason for this decision that the persistent air attacks on his carrier group had forced him to cancel other air strikes. However, does this reason appear adequate when the various facts relating thereto are considered? What are these facts? They are, (a) the distance to the next morning’s fueling rendezvous could have had no effect, for that rendezvous in a direct course (004°(T)) was only 123 miles away with nineteen hours available to reach it; (b) Strike ASLE against Luzon airfields and Japanese aircraft based there had been effective but there were still many targets, notably numerous aircraft at Nailson and Nichols fields as well as thirty to forty medium to large AO’s and AK’s in Manila Harbor and Subic Bay which required destruction; (c) Up to this time, his task groups had been subjected to but one series of attacks, which except for slight damage to the FRANKLIN, had been very ineffective. In fact, but for a single two-engine land-bomber shot down twenty-four miles from the task group at 1247, no enemy aircraft had approached within radar range of the group until more than three hours after Strike BAKER had been launched. Would it not seem that this reaction was considerably less than might have been anticipated by a carrier task group approaching a large well-defended land mass such as Luzon? (d) His decision to recall Strike BAKER, which had been launched at 1113, and to retire was made at about 1200, since from that time onward, the task group was on a northeasterly course on route to its fueling rendezvous. (e) The surface wind direction was east northeast, away from the target area, making it difficult for the group to conduct flight operations and also to close the target. However, since the force of the wind averaged about 18 knots,
it should have been possible to conduct such operations without appreciably increasing the range. But this was not done. Instead, the task group during the day remained beyond the 220 miles from which position Strike ABLE was launched at 0848.*

Does it not seem clear then that had Strike BAKER been landed and resurfaced at 1200 instead of about 1325, and had it been relaunched prior to the recovery of Strike ABLE, there would have been ample time and aircraft to make a second successful strike against the central Luzon area? In this connection, it is important to point out that in addition to the thirty-three VF aircraft in Strike ABLE, there were some seventy VF aircraft available to provide suitable escort for Strike BAKER, and protection for the task group. Why, therefore, CTG 38.4 did not endeavor to accomplish more fully his task assigned is not clear, but it seems highly probable that his decisions were unduly influenced by the bomb damage received by his flagship.

No protective air searches were made by CTG 38.4.

During the early afternoon, CTG 38.4 received CMT/HQFLFT's dispatch directing him, upon completion of fueling on the following day, to rendezvous with TF 38 at 0600, October 17th in Latitude 22°00'00"N, Longitude 128°00'00".

During the retirement, there were no bogies until about 1430, when two very large raids were reported.** The CAP was vectored out, and commencing at about 1515, succeeded in breaking up the raids so that no enemy planes were able to attack the task group. By 1700 the danger was over. At this time the CAP returned, and several of the planes made water landings.***

Planes losses received throughout the day by TG 38.4 from all causes were eleven VF, one VB - a total of twelve planes. Of those planes, five were jettisoned. Pilot personnel losses were a total of two pilots being counted as lost or missing.**** No aircrewmen were lost.

Throughout the day CTG 38.4 maintained, in general, a combat air patrol (CAP) over his task group of from sight to twelve VF, although in the late afternoon the CAP was increased to a maximum of forty-eight fighters at 1700. A SHAB of four VF - four VT was maintained during the afternoon.*****

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** Ibid, page 12.
*** War Diary COMDESRON 6, October 15th, 1944.
**** Naval War College Analysis of Action Reports, Aircraft Action Reports, and War Diaries.
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During the remainder of the night no enemy planes were contacted, and it appeared from this that the task group’s retirement was not trailed by the enemy. This was correct.

(5) Operations on October 16th:

(a) Operations of COMTHIRDMFLT.

COMTHIRDMFLT, in the NEW JERSEY with TG 38.2, took no further action during the early morning of October 16th. His planes were made, his forces were moving in accordance with these plans. He appears to have awaited the day’s events with confidence.

At about 0320 he received word through COMNAVGROUPCHINA that the CG, U.S. Army Forces CBB had authorized the searches in the South China Sea north of Kamran Bay-Lingayon Line as requested by CINCPAC, employing four planes. It is possible that he considered the number of planes employed inadequate.

At about 0400 he received word from COMNAVGROUPCHINA that two battleships plus fifteen other ships had been sighted by a photo-mission of S-29’s at Takao, Formosa at 1600 the preceding day. Although he did not know it, this report was in error — no Japanese battleships were in the area.

At about 0450 he received word from COMNAVGROUPCHINA that the searches would start at 1100.

At about 1000 he received word from CTG 30.3 that TG 30.3 was at 0600 in Latitude 23° 50’N, Longitude 125° 07’E; that the FAWNIE would soon relieve the BOSTON of the tow of the HOUSTON; that the flooding of the HOUSTON was under control; that most of her crew had been taken off, and that the CAMERON was in fair shape with no list.

At about 1116 he felt that the possibility of a fleet action requiring all task groups of TF 38 was remote for, at that time, he directed CTG 38.1 (a) to proceed to a position east of Samar arriving at dawn, October 16th, (b) to strike the Visayas on October 18th and 19th, and (c) at 0600, October 20th to rendezvous with CTG 38.4 and provide direct air support for the Leyte operation on that day. In line

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* COMNAVGROUPCHINA Dispatch 151750, October 1944 to CINCPAC.
** COMNAVGROUPCHINA Dispatch 151831, October 1944 to CINCPAC and COMTHIRDMFLT.
*** COMNAVGROUPCHINA Dispatch 151920, October 1944 to CINCPAC.
**** CTG 30.3 Dispatch 152356, October 1944 to COMTHIRDMFLT.
***** COMTHIRDMFLT Dispatch 160216, October 1944 to CINCPAC.

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with this plan, he, at 1119 notified CTG's 38.1 and 38.4 that at 1200
TG's 38.2 and 38.3 would proceed towards a new rendezvous, Latitude 15°-
30'N, Longitude 125°-30'W to arrive at 0600, October 17th.* In addition,
at 1124, he notified CINCPOA and all Task Forces, THIRD Fleet that his
morning searches had been negative but that daylight Japanese snipers
were active.**

At 1124 COMTHIRDFLT amplified his orders to the task groups of TF
38. He directed TG's 38.2 and 38.3 to operate in the vicinity of Latitu-

de 16°-30'N, Longitude 125°-30'W and be alert to engage the enemy

north of this area, or to reinforce Allied groups to the south. He di-

rected TG 38.1 to fulfill KING II commitments and guard Surigae Strait

on arrival east of Sama; at dawn October 18th, and ordered TG 38.4 to
guard San Bernardino Strait and attack Luzon commencing October 17th.***

This decision to send TG 38.1 to the Visayas and TG 38.4 to Luzon

and to interpose TG's 38.2 and 38.3 in protecting position for TG's 38.1

and 38.4 was sound. No enemy forces in any concentration equal to even

one of his carrier groups had been discovered; no enemy carriers had

been observed, and none had been reported as departing the Empire by

TF 71 submarines nor by CINCPOA intelligence. Only four enemy battle-

ships had been reported and these were apparently old types such as the

Kongo class whereas, in TG's 38.2 and 38.3, he had six modern battle-

ships of the Iowa and South Dakota classes; the advance landings were to

occur in the Leyte area on the following day and, whereas some of the

THIRD Fleet commitments in that area could be handled temporarily by the

escort carriers of SEVENTH Fleet, these carriers had tactical responsi-

bilities (close air support) with the ground forces which might require

all of their carrier-based aircraft.****

At 1146 he directed CTG 38.4 to proceed to strike Luzon commencing
dawn October 17th; to maintain reconnaissance of western approaches to
San Bernardino Strait; to continue strikes on the 18th and 19th to ob-

tain certain photo coverage assigned by CTF 38 Operation Order 11-44 to

TG's 38.2, 38.3 and 38.4; to rendezvous with TG 38.1 at 0600 October

20th in Latitude 11°-20'N, Longitude 112°-20'W and provide direct air

support Leyte operation as ordered; and to be prepared fuel October

21st.*****

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** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 160224, October 1944 to CTG's 38.1 and 38.4.
*** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 160224, October 1944 to CINCPOA, COMINCH,
CONWESPA, all TF's THIRD Fleet, etc.
**** CTF 77.4 Operation Plan 2-44, Serial O0075, October 5th, 1944,
Annex D.
***** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 160246, October 1944 to CTG 38.4.
At 1149 he directed CTG 30.8 (Fueling Group) to be in assigned station at 0800, October 21st to fuel TG's 38.1 and 38.4.

At 1209 he changed the basic fueling area where the tanker pool was maintained to Latitude 18° 30'N, Longitude 130° 00'E.

At 1246 he directed CTG 30.3 that CRUDIV THIRTEEN and DESDIV ONE HUNDRED were to be detached after dark, October 16th, were to proceed to basic fueling area and fuel, then rendezvous with CTF 38 at Latitude 18° 30'N, Longitude 120° 30'W where report for duty with CTG 39.3. He directed COMCRUDIV SIX in WICHITA to assume command TG 30.3 upon departure COMCRUDIV THIRTEEN.

At 1250 it appears to have received word from the FOURTEENTH Air Force that at 0130 that morning one of its planes had contacted an all naval convoy of six to eight ships in Latitude 21° 54'N, Longitude 116° 30'E heading towards Takao and that the planes had sunk one cruiser and probably sunk one destroyer of this convoy. If he did not receive this dispatch at this time, he should have received it from COMAVGRC CHINA at about 1330 and from CINCPAC at about 1600. This claim of damage inflicted by the FOURTEENTH Air Force is not understood since the Japanese do not report any cruisers or destroyers being sunk or even damaged in this area on this date.

Sometimes after 1425 he commenced receiving reports from various search groups which reported that two to three enemy task groups consisting of carriers, battleships, heavy and light cruisers, and destroyers were in the vicinity. Exactly what information he actually received is not clear because his war diary and his action report are almost completely silent in regard to the above contacts, and refer only to a report received about two battleships (BB), one light cruiser (CL) and eight destroyers. However, from the action reports and war

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* COMMIRDPFLT Dispatch 160249, October 1944 to CTG's 30.3, 38.1, 38.4.
** COMMIRDPFLT Dispatch 160309, October 1944 to CTG's 30.7, 30.8, 30.9, 57.14, and CTU 70.8.8.
*** COMMIRDPFLT Dispatch 160346, October 1944 to CTG 30.3.
**** COMNAVUNIT 14th Air Force Dispatch 160326, October, 1944 to COMNAVCHINA.
***** COMNAVCHINA Dispatch 160403, October 1944 to COMMIRDPFLT and CINCPAC.
****** CINCPAC Dispatch 160628, October 1944 to COMMIRDPFLT, COMOWESPAC, etc.
******** War Diary COMMIRDPFLT October 13th, 1944.
diaries of the two task group commanders and of certain of the carriers, as well as from certain dispatches sent by COMTHIRDFLTL to CTG 30.3, it is clear that he received other reports as well. The first reports he received, which reports appeared to come from several search planes, indicated that the enemy were possibly in two principal groups. These were, (a) one large carrier (CV), two battleships (BB), one heavy cruiser (CA), two light cruisers (CL) and eight destroyers (DD), (b) two large carriers (CV), one light carrier (CVA), one light cruiser (CL) and four destroyers (DD). There were indications also that there may have been a third group of unknown composition (possibly two battleships (BB), one light cruiser (CL) and four destroyers (DD)).

The reports, as received, were so garbled as to present to the commander a completely confused picture of the enemy forces. CTG 30.3 states that the enemy's longitude as received was about 200 miles east of the easternmost search sector; the INTREPID records three separate contacts received which varied in position by 840 miles. None of the reports correctly indicated the originating aircraft.

COMTHIRDFLTL was therefore forced to delay his attack until he had obtained sufficient accurate information to warrant his taking offensive action and launching his air groups against one or all of these groups.

Meanwhile, at about 1445, he was advised by COMNAVGRPHINA that the B-29's of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command had made contacts as follows: (a) at 1300 two battleships and eight small ships at Takao, Formosa; and (b) at 1315 one destroyer thirteen miles up the coast from Takao and heading southeast at twenty knots. Contact report (a) was incorrect. There were no battleships in this area at this time.

Since Takao (southeast Formosa) was about 480 miles away and since these Japanese ships would have had no need to run the gauntlet of CTF 17's submarines, COMTHIRDFLTL evidently considered them unimportant at this time, nor did he consult his war diary nor his action report makes any reference to this report.

About 1522 he received a dispatch from CTG 30.3 which reported the HOUSTON torpedoed again in the storm and at about 1600 an amplifying dispatch which among other items reported that the HOUSTON, which at 1400 was in Latitude 20°46'N, Longitude 125°24'E, was still in tow, although the Commanding Officer desired to remove all personnel.

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* War Diary CTG 30.3 October 16th, 1944.
** War Diary INTREPID October 16th, 1944.
*** War Diary CTG 30.2 October 16th, 1944.
**** COMNAVGRPHINA Dispatch 160515, October, 1944 to CINCPOA.
***** CTG 30.3 Dispatch 160522, October 1944 to COMTHIRDFLTL.
****** CTG 30.3 Dispatch 160608, October 1944 to COMTHIRDFLTL.

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COMTHIRDFLT's efforts to obtain accurate information concerning the Japanese surface forces reported by his search planes at 1425, required about one hour and thirty-five minutes, so it was not until about 1600 that he felt confident of their composition and location. He decided, at this time, that the enemy was composed of two surface groups consisting of two carriers (CV), one light carrier (CVL), three light cruisers, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers and that these groups were about 200 miles north of TG 30.3. At 1617 he advised CTG 30.3 to this effect and directed him not to detach CRUDIV THIRTEEN and its escorts that night.**

This evaluation of his contact reports by COMTHIRDFLT was completely in error, but was not the fault of himself or of his staff, but was instead the result of faulty planes to ship communications. Actually, but one contact had been made, and that by one plane only - a BUNKER HILL plane. This plane reported at 1430 having sighted, (a) two battleships, one light cruiser and four destroyers in Latitude 25°-27'N, Longitude 136°-28'E. The battleships were refueling the destroyers astern on course 240° (T). On sighting the BUNKER HILL plane they cast off the destroyers and retired on course 300°(T) and, (b) three destroyers about twenty miles further west on course 030°(T).*** The pilot of the plane, during this time (fifty-five minutes) that he remained in contact with the enemy, endeavored to get an acknowledgement for this contact report, but was unable to do so. He therefore, after leaving the contact and while returning to base, relayed his report via several other planes.

Unfortunately, these relaying planes relayed the contact report so incorrectly as to give COMTHIRDFLT a false impression as to enemy composition and location and caused him to believe that the several relaying planes were reporting original contacts.

Why COMTHIRDFLT believed that there were enemy carriers with the enemy surface forces when none had been reported heretofore is nowhere explained, but it will be remembered that he did not consider that the submarine coverage of the HOP PARADE was adequate.**** Does it not seem highly probable therefore that he felt that these carriers, which had been reported earlier as in the Empire and which had not been reported as departing the Empire, might readily have passed through Songo Suido without detection?

Why then, if he felt that these Japanese groups were composed as stated, and if he was satisfied as to their general location, did he not

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** War Diary CTG 30.3 October 16th, 1944.
*** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 160717, October 1944 to CTG 30.3.
**** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 8, October 16th, 1944 forwarded by BUNKER HILL, Serial 0304, October 30th, 1944.
**** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 272215, September 1944 to CINCPAC.

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launch a powerful air strike against them? The answer was, (a) the Japanese were at least 300 miles away, (b) they had commenced retiring at 1425, and (c) but three hours of daylight remained (end of evening twilight was 1856). This decision not to launch an air strike was correct since, (a) the Striking Force was not being trailed at the time and its course and speed was therefore not known, (b) 300 miles was beyond the maximum effective radius of an American carrier attack group, and (c) night landing operations of attack groups was hazardous, at best because of the lack of proficiency of the air groups in night operations. This latter factor might not have been a deterrent, had (a) and (b) above been more favorable.

That COMTHIRDEFLT was surprised by the strength of those Japanese forces seems evident for at 1645 he cancelled his instructions to CTG 38.1 to proceed to a position east of Samar and directed that commander to Latitude 22°00'N, Longitude 128°00'E. This was the area in which TG's 38.2 and 38.3 were operating and would therefore give him a task force of three carrier task groups once the rendezvous had been effected.

At about 1700 he should have received a dispatch from CONNAVGRCHINA that the B-29's of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command had contacted enemy surface forces as follows: (a) at 1316, one battleship at Latitude 23°00'N, Longitude 119°32'E, course 130°T, (b) at 1346, one unidentified ship in Latitude 23°15'N, Longitude 119°40'E, course 070°T, speed 14.0, and (c) at 1355 four freighters several miles off Tainan, Formosa. If he did not receive this dispatch at this time, he should have received it from CINCPAC at about 1910. Contact (a) was in error since there were no battleships in the area at this time.

By 1732 COMTHIRDEFLT had discovered that his original estimate of the strength of the enemy task groups was in error, for he advised CTG 30.3 to this effect at this time. He also informed CTG 30.3 that the contacts at 1425 as now developed were, one large carrier (CV), two battleships (BB), one heavy cruiser (CA), two light cruisers (CL) and eight destroyers (DD) in Latitude 26°27'N, Longitude 130°28'E on course 260°T, speed 20 knots. He further informed CTG 30.3 that there were no contacts to the north or west of him.

Although the records available to this study do not say so, it seems clear that some few minutes after the BUNKER HILL plane, which had made the contact, had landed on the BUNKER HILL (1709)**** the pilot gave the

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* War Diary COMTHIRDEFLT, October 16th, 1944.
** COMTHIRDEFLT Dispatch 160745, October 1944 to CTG 38.1.
*** CONNAVGRCHINA Dispatch 160668, October 1944 to CINCPAC reencyphered by CINCPAC 160748 to COMTHIRDEFLT.
**** COMTHIRDEFLT Dispatch 160832, October 1944 to CTG 30.3.
***** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 8, October 16th, 1944 forwarded by BUNKER HILL, Serial 0304, October 30th, 1944.
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correct contact report to the Commanding Officer, but in view of the
night search ordered later by COMTHIRDPFLT, it seems reasonable to
assume that COMTHIRDPFLT was not informed.

About 1930 COMTHIRDPFLT, if he was listening in on the Japanese
broadcasts beamed to the U.S. West Coast, probably intercepted a Japanese
statement that they had sunk ten carriers, two battleships, one
destroyer and damaged one battleship, four cruisers and eleven uniden-
tified warships, and that, "the Japanese forces are still in hot pur-
suit of the enemy task force which is fleeing in defeat."

At about 1900 he was advised by CTG 30.3 that he had removed from
the HOUSTON all but 200 of his crew; that the HOUSTON was being towed
with difficulty at about three knots, and that she had a list of about
ten degrees.

At about 1930 he received information from COMNAVGRPCHINA that the
daily search of the South China Sea, which was to commence at 1100, had
been delayed; that the search would be made twice daily at 2000 and at
0800; that each search would now be made by two planes and would make
complete coverage of area, Huling Island (Latitude 21°35'N, Longitude
111°35'E) - Kamranh Bay - Lingayen Gulf - Huling Island.

At about 2013 he directed the INDEPENDENCE to search the sectors
345°-015°N and 245°-285°N to a distance of 300 miles, in order to
locate the enemy force which had been reported there earlier. These
searches were launched at 2147. The reason given for searching the
above sectors is not understood. A study of Diagram II shows that not
one of the afternoon contacts was made in either of these sectors. How-
ever, the diagrams does show that had the enemy continued on course 250°N
(an erroneous course evaluated from the garbled contact reports), speed
twenty knots, from the 1425 position (Latitude 26°02'N, Longitude 130°-
20'W), the northern night search might have discovered him. Actually,
the enemy retired on a northwesterly course which passed north of Amami
Oshima and was well beyond the radius of search.

At about 2030 despite his message to CTG 30.3 that there were no
enemy forces to the west and north of that task group he modified his
orders to CTG 38.1 and ordered that commander to proceed to the vicinity

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* War Diary CINCPAC, October 16th, 1944 Action Summary.
* CTG 30.3 Dispatch 160850, October 1944 to COMTHIRDPFLT.
* COMNAVGRPCHINA Dispatch 160855, October 1944 to CINCPAC.
* War Diary CTG 38.3, October 16th, 1944.
* War Diary INDEPENDENCE, October 16th, 1944.
* War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC 161835, NAIL739, paragraph 102b.

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Latitude 21° 00'N, Longitude 127° 00'E; to arrive at 0600, October 17th; and to launch an air search to the west and northwest at dawn. He further stated that he would remain in the vicinity of Latitude 22° 00'N, Longitude 128° 00'E.**

It seems reasonable to assume that before midnight COMTHIRDFLT had learned the composition of the enemy task force as reported by the BUNKER HILL plane earlier that day, since his War Diary for October 16th reports the composition to have been two battleships (BB), one light cruiser (CL) and eight destroyers (DD).** Since he had received no reports by midnight from his night search being conducted by the INDEPENDENCE, he was reasonably confident that the enemy task group was beyond 300 miles and had therefore retired. However, he appears to have decided to await more conclusive information before changing his plans.

(b) Operations of CTG 30.3 October 16th.

TG 30.3 continued toward Ulithi on course 130° (T) throughout the day. The enemy reconnoitered the task group about 0100 and at intervals thereafter with one plane, but it was not until much later in the day that they took any offensive action.***

The weather conditions showed little improvement over the previous days with the exception that the winds, which had been fresh north-easterly, commenced dropping off. The skies were high overcast with unlimited ceilings and good visibility. There was a moderate sea and swell. On the whole, conditions were average or better.****

At 0403 the PANNEE was contacted and directed to close TG 30.3.1. Owing to difficulties aboard the HOUSTON, no tow transfer operations could be attempted until 0915.*** These operations were finally completed at 1026, but it was not until 1300 that the PANNEE finally got up to her maximum safe towing speed.*****

During the forenoon and early afternoon all HOUSTON's personnel on the destroyers, with the exception of a few who could not be transferred prior to the afternoon air attacks, were transferred to the cruisers.***

At 0743 CTG 30.3 directed CTU 30.3.2 to conduct a search as soon as possible to cover the sector 235°-315°, and to conduct a late afternoon

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* COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 181104, October 1944 to CTG 38.1.
** COMTHIRDFLT War Diary, October 16th, 1944.
*** Action Report COMCRUDIV 13 (CTG 30.3) Report THIRD Fleet Salvage Group October 13th-17th, 1944, Serial 0086, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report CABOT, Air Cover for TG 30.3, October 14th-16th, 1944, Serial 063, October 18th, 1944.
***** War Diary PANNEE, October 16th, 1944.
search through the same sector. The CBOT was designated to conduct the morning search and the CPWNS the afternoon search.

At 0920 the CBOT launched a search through the sector 235°-310°(T) to a distance of 150 miles, to provide early warning of the anticipated sorties of enemy mopping-up units from the Luzon Straits area. The search which returned at 1216 was negative, although it did succeed in shooting down one enemy plane. All planes returned safely.

At 0942 the CBOT which was directing the air operations for both the CBOT and the CPWNS was directed to extend the afternoon search to 200 miles if practicable.

At 1130 COMBRUDIV TEN in the POSTON, in company with the BOYD and GRAYSON, joined to 30.3.2. At 1300 COMBRUDIV TEN assumed command of TU 30.5.4. This unit now consisted of BOSTON, WICHITA, MOBILE, CPWNS, CBOT, MILLER, DUNES, BALL, KNAPP, CHARRETTE, BOYD and GRAYSON.

Commencing at about 1254 several large groups of enemy aircraft were observed on the radar screen. These were an attack group of 107 aircraft from six different air groups operating from Formosa. Further transfer of personnel operations were cancelled and preparations were made to repel an attack. At 1315 a large bogey of from sixty to seventy-five planes, distance about sixty miles was plotted, with a second but smaller, bogey also at sixty miles. The CBOT CAP shot down thirty-two planes of the large bogey; the CPWNS CAP shot down nine of the small bogey. The Japanese admitted losing twenty-seven planes out of seventy which attacked.

At about 1346 TU 30.5.1 was attacked by three enemy torpedo planes. One plane headed for the HOUSTON, and although it was finally destroyed by gunfire it succeeded at 1348, in torpedoing the HOUSTON for the second time, striking the starboard side at about frame 145.

At about 1430 the MOBILE, BOYD and GRAYSON were ordered to rejoin TU 30.5.1 which they effected at 1516.

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* Action Report COMBRUDIV 13 (GTS 30.3) Report THIRD Fleet Salvage Group October 13th-17th, 1944, Serial O006, October 28th, 1944.
** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 20, forwarded by CBOT; Serial 0024, November 1944.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer and SECOND Air Fleet, October 19th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-22, Item E.
**** Action Report CPWNS 1400, October 18th-22nd, October 17th, 1944, Serial 0027, October 17th, 1944.

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At about 1450 CTG 30.5 decided to transfer to the destroyers 300 of the personnel remaining on board the HOUSTON. This left a skeleton crew of about 200 officers and men. Owing to the HOUSTON's yaw and roll, it was necessary to effect the transfer by swimming.  

At 1525 the COWPENS launched a search of four VF, four VT to search the sector 220°-310°(T) to a distance of 180 miles. Why the CABOT found it impracticable to extend the searches to 200 miles is not available to this study, but it is possible the due to the situation earlier, the Commanding Officer, in order to land his planes before darkness found it advisable to limit the late afternoon search to 150 miles. The search returned at 1802. When it is remembered that Japanese air attacks were generally made in strength at dusk, and that sunset was at 1950, this decision seems correct. The results of this search were negative. No planes were lost.  

At 1530 CTG 30.3 received a dispatch from COMTHIRDFLT ordering CHUDIV THIRTEEN and DESDIV ONE HUNDRED to proceed after dark to fueling rendezvous and then to report to CTG 38.3. However, at 1640 he received a dispatch from COMTHIRDFLT which cancelled the above orders and at the same time advised him that an enemy group of two carriers (CV), one light cruiser (CVL), one heavy cruiser (CA) and four destroyers (DD) was about 200 miles to the north of TG 30.3.  

It about 1830 CTG 30.3 was advised by COMTHIRDFLT by dispatch that the new evaluations placed the enemy about 430 miles to the northeast of TG 30.3 and change its composition to one carrier (CV), two battleships (BB), one heavy cruiser (CA), two light cruisers (CL), and eight destroyers (DD). This relieved the tension within the task group as attack, not only by surface ships but by carrier aircraft, had been expected.  

Throughout the forenoon CTG 30.3 maintained a CAP of eight VF and a SKASP of four VF - four VT. However, when the large enemy attack came in the early afternoon, additional planes were scrambled so that at 1400 there were twenty-six fighters over the task group. The maximum fighters were in the air at about 1520. At this time, the CABOT and COWPENS CAP of twenty-six planes was reinforced by sixteen fighters from the BUNKER HILL with CTG 30.2 and the LEXINGTON with CTG 38.3, making a total CAP of forty-two fighters. No additional Japanese planes were observed until about 2300 when a single bopey appeared and commenced reconnoitering the formation. CTG 30.3 continued on towards Ulithi on course 130°(T).  

(c) Operations of CTG 38.1 on October 16th.  

CTG 38.1 continued on course 175°(T) speed fifteen knots towards his designated fueling rendezvous. At 0215 he
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contact TCG's 38.2 and 38.3, who were proceeding to their dawn launching position. At about 0620 he rendezvoused with TCG 30.2 (fueling group) at Latitude 20°27'35"N, Longitude 129°45'35"E and commenced fueling immediately. The fueling group was composed of the UTAH, HANNOCK, PAMANSET, MISSISSINIBWA, and three destroyers.

At 0720, TCG 30.1 was reinforced by TCG 30.2 consisting of the heavy cruisers CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY and the destroyers CASE, CASSIN, CUMINGS, DUNLAP, DOWNES and FANNING, at which time TCG 30.2 was dissolved. TCG 30.1 now consisted of the Wasp, HORNET, MONTEREY, CHESTER, SALT LAKE CITY, PENSACOLA, SAN DIEGO, OAKLAND, IZARD, CONNER, BROWN, MARSHALL, McCALLA, WOODWORTH, DUNLAP, FANNING, CUMINGS, CASE, CASSIN, DOWNES.

At 0730, BARNES (CVE) and its escort, the PARKS joined TCG 30.1.

Also, at 0730, BARNES transferred nine replacement pilots to HORNET. Between 1056 and 1446 she transferred, in addition to the pilots, replacement planes as follows: to HORNET twelve VT, two VT, two VB; to Wasp six VP, three VT, six VB; to MONTEREY three VP. She lost one VP intended for HORNET by a forced landing, although the pilot was recovered.

At 1508, fueling was completed and at 1517 TCG 30.1 headed for Samar in accordance with a directive from COMHINDFLY, received earlier in the afternoon, which directed him to proceed to arrive off Samar, dawn October 18th and strike the Visayas.

However, at about 1710 TCG 30.1 received a dispatch to proceed to Latitude 20°00'N; Longitude 128°00'E at best speed. Therefore, at about 1752, he headed on course 250°(T), speed twenty-four knots. He knew from reports which had been received during the day that Japanese combatant ships were moving along the coasts of China, Formosa and southern Japan that strong elements of the Japanese Combined Fleet were at sea about 250 miles to the northwest and he presumably realized that COMHINDFLY was disposing his forces for action.

* Action Report Wasp and Air Group 14, Operations Against Okinawa Jima, Miyako Jima, Northern Luzon, Formosa, Manila Bay Area, Leyte and Enemy Naval Units Western Visayas, October 2nd-27th, 1944, Serial 0004, October 28th, 1944.
** War Diary MONTEREY, October 16th, 1944.
*** Action Reports various oilers concerned.
**** War Diary BARNES, October 16th, 1944.
***** COMHINDFLY Dispatch 160216, October 1944 to TCG 30.1.
****** COMHINDFLY Dispatch 160745, October 1944 to TCG 30.1.
******* War Diary PENSACOLA, October 16th, 1944.
******** War Diary OAKLAND, October 16th, 1944.
However, at about 0330 CTG 38.1 received another dispatch from COMTHIRDFLT which directed him to proceed to vicinity Latitude 21°-00'N, Longitude 127°-00'E, to arrive at 0500 October 17th, and to launch a search to the west and northwest at dawn. Therefore, in accordance with this second dispatch he, at 0330, headed for the new rendezvous. At 2230 he changed course to 240°(T) and speed to 18.5 knots.

During the day, TG 38.1 maintained CAP of about eight VF and a SNASP of eight VB/VT. No contacts were made.

Two VE from the HORNET were jettisoned.

(d) Operations of CTG's 38.2 and 38.3 on October 16th.

TG's 38.2 and 38.3 arrived at their morning rendezvous on schedule and immediately launched air searches as directed by COMTHIRDFLT.

Flying conditions were generally average. The winds were northerly of moderate to fresh velocity and the sea was moderate.

Both task groups conducted morning and afternoon searches, and TG 38.2 conducted a night search as well. The BUNKER HILL and the HANCOCK conducted the searches from TG 38.2; the ESSEX from TG 38.3.

(1) Forenoon

(a) TG 38.2

(1) At 0800 BUNKER HILL in Latitude 22°-00'N, Longitude 128°-14'E, launched a search of sectors 015°-055°(T) and 335°-355°(T) to a radius of 300 miles. Ten VF and five VB were employed, teams of two VF and one VB searching each ten degree sector. The search, which was recovered at 1036, was negative. One VF was lost, but the pilot was recovered two days later (October 18th) by the submarine SAURY. This search destroyed two Japanese twin-engine land-bombers en route.

(2) At 0700 HANCOCK in Latitude 22°-07'N, Longitude 127°-54'E, launched a search of sector 335°-005°(T) to a distance of 225 miles. Four VF were employed, two VF searching each fifteen degrees. The search, which was recovered at 1036, was negative.

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* COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 161104, October 1944 to CTG 38.1.
** War Diary CHESTER, October 16th, 1944.
*** War Diary SALTim CITY, October 16th, 1944.
**** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 8, forwarded by BUNKER HILL, Serial 0304, October 30th, 1944.
***** Action Report HANCOCK period October 6th-31st, 1944, Serial 0100, November 3rd, 1944.
(b) TG 38.3

(1) At 0600 ESSEX launched a search similar to that conducted by the BUNKER HILL, but this search covered the sector 246°-298°(T). The search, which was recovered at 1036, was negative.

(2) Afternoon:

(a) TG 38.2

(1) At 1225 BUNKER HILL in Latitude 22°-37'N, Longitude 127°-46'E, launched a search similar to the morning search made by the BUNKER HILL and HANCOCK planes and covering the same sectors. This search destroyed seven enemy planes en route. At 1425 in Latitude 28°-37'N, Longitude 130°-26'E, this search contacted a Japanese force which it reported as two battleships (BB) of the KONGO Class; one light cruiser (CL) of the NATORI Class and four destroyers (DD). The battleships were refueling the destroyers astern on course 240°(T). As has been pointed out previously, this report was incorrect, in that the ships reported as battleships were actually heavy cruisers.

It is not clear why the American pilots, both land and carrier based, were constantly reporting battleships in the area when none were present, but it is assumed that the pilots had perhaps been over-briefed. A few minutes after making the first contact the search planes observed three additional destroyers about twenty miles farther west on course 030°(T).

It is of interest that the above contact reports made by the BUNKER HILL search planes were, excepting for the error of identification (battleships for cruisers), very accurate indeed! These ships comprised the Japanese SECOND Striking Force whose departure, at 0730, October 16th from the Empire and its composition (although somewhat incorrect) had been reported by the BESUGO. It was composed of CRUDIV TWO (two heavy cruisers, NACHI, ASHIGARA) and DESDIV ONE (one light cruiser, AYUKUMA and seven destroyers, the SHIHAJUKI and TASHIMI of DESDIV EIGHTEEN, the AKEBONO and USHIRO of DESDIV SEVEN and the WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO and HATSUMI of DESDIV TWENTY-ONE).

As has been pointed out previously under COMTHIRDFLT, this contact report was so seriously garbled in transmission that about one hour and thirty-five minutes were lost in endeavoring to clarify it. This delay

** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 8, Forwarded by BUNKER HILL, Serial 0304, October 30th, 1944.
sired the SECOND Striking Force from heavy damage by carrier-based air
attack because by the time the clarification had been made, it was too
late to launch such attacks.

(b) TG 38.3

(1) At 1233 ESSEX in Latitude 22°42'N,
Longitude 127°23'W, launched a search similar to the morning search em-
ploying the same number of planes and covering the same sectors. The
ESSEX launched at the same time a high speed search of four VF of the
same sectors but to a radius of 200 miles. Both searches, which were re-
covered at 1643, were negative. Two enemy planes were destroyed during
its search operations.*

(3) Night

At 2147 the INDEPENDENCE launched a night
search of seven VT(N) and two VP(N) to search the sectors 345°-016°(T)
and 246°-265°(T) to a radius of 300 -1rs in order to locate the enemy
force which had been reported there earlier. No contacts had been made
by 2400.** This night search was unusual and appears to have been the
first night search of any consequence made against the enemy by American
carrier-based planes in the Western Pacific.

It is to be observed that the pilots on search reported having
destroyed a total of eleven enemy planes during the progress of their
searches. A study of certain of the aircraft action reports relating to
the search shows that some of the search teams had chased enemy planes
which were on courses at right angles to the searching course. In these
chasers, which were not always successful, these search teams had been
forced to operate at full throttle for a long time, and had reached speeds
of 250 knots.† Because it took the search teams away from their proper
position on the search arc, this action may have adversely affected the
efficiency of the search.

While it cannot be flatly stated that such action was incorrect for
the data is not conclusive, nevertheless it can be pointed out that the
objective of pilots on search is usually specifically designated to
them.*** In the above searches the assigned objective was the discover-
ing of enemy surface forces which were in position to attack portions of
the THIRD Fleet, and notably TG 30.3. With such an objective, does it

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* Aircraft Action Report Air Group 15 forwarded by Commander Air Group
15, Serial 024, November 3rd, 1944.
** War Diary CTF 38.3, October 16th, 1944.
*** USS 73 Tactical and Operational Instructions Carrier Aircraft, 1946,
paragraph 307, also USN 741 Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S.
Fleet Aircraft 1944, paragraph 2133.

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not seem correct that the TF 38 search teams should normally not have permitted themselves to be diverted from their basic objective?

Throughout the day TG 38.2 maintained a CAP of twelve VF and a SNASP of four VF - four VE. The CAP shot down four enemy aircraft. An additional CAP of eight VF(E) was launched at 1802 to cover the task groups during the hours of dusk and early darkness. This CAP was recovered at 2244.

Meanwhile, TG 38.3, which was operating nearby, maintained a CAP of about eight VF with a SNASP of four VF - four VT. This CAP shot down three enemy aircraft. Each of the above task groups provided, in addition, fighter cover for TG 30.3 of eight VF during the late afternoon.

Pending return of search planes sometime after midnight the task groups remained in the same general area.

(e) Operations of CTG 38.4 on October 16th.

CTG 38.4 continued on various southeasterly courses, speed eighteen knots until 0652 when he rendezvoused with the fueling group (TU 30.4/6) (CALIENTE, TACANANNA, KASKASKIA and escorts CAPPS and HILTON) in the vicinity of Latitude 16°30'N, Longitude 127°00'W. At 0652 fueling was commenced.

Weather conditions showed a cloudy, about 6/10 overcast sky, with a prevailing wind averaging about eighteen knots from the southeast. The ceiling was unlimited, the visibility about fifteen miles, the sea slight with a slight swell.

At 0730 the escort carrier SITKOH HAY with its escort also rendezvoused with CTG 38.4.

The SITKOH HAY transferred eighteen VF and four VT to the four carriers of the task group.*** Of these planes the SAN JACINTO received five VF and one VT; the BELLEAU WOOD four VF, one VT; the FRANKLIN eight VF, one VT; and the ENTERPRISE c.s. VF, one VT.**** The SITKOH HAY also transferred seventeen pilots and fourteen aircrewmen to the four carriers,*** but no information is available as to their distribution.

The replacement planes were in poor condition, requiring extensive repairs. Likewise, the state of the carrier training of the replacement___

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*** War Diary KASKASKIA, October 16th, 1944.
**** Action Report carriers concerned.
pilots, owing to the fact that they had done little or no carrier landing practice while on the replenishment carrier, was very poor. This was an unhappy situation and one which should have been avoided, since the receipt of such poor planes and pilots as replacements must necessarily have had an adverse effect on the immediate combat efficiency of the various carrier air groups to which they were assigned. Also, it should be clear that poor replacements may have a limiting effect on the Commander's decisions.

During the day, an average CAP of twelve VF and an average SNASP of four VF—four VB was maintained. No contacts were made.

One SAN JACINTO VT and one FRANKLIN VB were jettisoned. The McCOLL, which had suffered a breakdown was temporarily transferred to TU 30.8.5.

At 1828 CTG 38.4 headed on course 235°(T) speed twenty-two knots towards the dawn launching position for strikes against Luzon.

This was in accordance with orders received somewhat earlier in the day from COMTHIRDPFLT which directed him, among other things, to proceed immediately to a strike position off central Luzon; to attack that area commencing at dawn, October 17th; and to maintain reconnaissance of the western approaches to San Bernardino Straits.

(6) Operations on October 17th until 0719.

(a) Operations of COMTHIRDPFLT.

At 0007 COMTHIRDPFLT informed CTG 38.1 that he intended to close that group's 0500 position after landing the night search at about 0230. He directed CTG 38.1, in part, to advise him immediately of the sectors he expected to search at dawn.

At about 0200 he received a dispatch from CINCPOA reporting that the Squate had contacted at 2030 the previous evening in Latitute 28°30'N, Longitude 139°30'E (west of Amami O Shima) three large ships, one destroyer, two destroyer escorts on course 010°(T), speed seventeen knots. It is likely that he had already intercepted this dispatch on the ship to shore circuit some hours before.

COMTHIRDPFLT, who had been keeping a running estimate of the situation, now realized that perhaps there wasn't going to be any fleet action after all. His afternoon search of the previous day had reported only light surface forces within range of TG 30.3. Neither the surface forces

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* Action Report FRANKLIN, Operations against the enemy at Manus, October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 0039, October 31st, 1944.
** War Diary McCOLL, October 16th, 1944.
*** COMTHIRDPFLT Dispatch 160246, October 1944.
**** COMTHIRDPFLT Dispatch 161307, October 1944 to CTG 38.1.
***** CINCPOA Dispatch 161635, October 1944 to COMTHIRDPFLT.
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reported by China-based planes as being in the Takao area or Formosa at sea in the South China Sea on October 15th, nor other surface forces, had been reported by TF 17 submarines either in Luzon Strait or rounding the northern end of Formosa. It seemed clear, therefore, that none of these forces were deploying for fleet action at this time. In addition, TF 17 submarines had not reported any movement of large forces from the Empire. This fact, when considered with other evidence, seemed to support the view that only limited surface forces, and those without carriers, had as yet left the Empire. Finally, the SKATE report, which obviously referred to the surface units his afternoon search had discovered, showed that even this force was retiring. This retirement conception was supported by the night search of 300 miles made by the INDEPENDENCE planes, which search had failed to make any contacts whatsoever. COMTHIRDFLT appears to have received nothing from CINCPAC concerning the movement or projected movement of enemy surface forces. Why, then, did they retire? COMTHIRDFLT felt that the answer was obvious - that the THIRD Fleet had been discovered, which was correct. The THIRD Fleet had been sighted by air search on the 16th, and therefore the surface forces which had been observed by the BUNKER HILL aircraft and by the SHARK (Japanese SECOND Striking Force)* had been directed to retire by the Japanese High Command.** On the other hand, concerning own forces, he realized that at daybreak that day, CTF 77’s advance forces would appear off Leyte to prepare the way for the landing on the 20th.

He was fully aware of the fact that, in endeavoring to save the CANBERRA and HOUSTON, and in preparing for fleet action on October 15th and 16th, he had been unable to complete fully his assigned objective with relation to the Philippine islands. He therefore decided that KING II should now have priority over all other considerations.

This decision to forego TF 38’s operations looking towards fleet action and to return that task force to the objective assigned it, in his basic plan for this phase of KING II, notably the destruction of enemy aircraft and air installations on Luzon and in the Visayas, is considered sound.*** Certainly the enemy forces so far reported were unimportant and could not in any way be considered as a major portion of the enemy fleet. Therefore, COMTHIRDFLT was required by his orders from CINCPAC to return to the other tasks of the basic plan.

At 0719, October 17th, COMTHIRDFLT was preparing new directives for CTF 38 in accordance with the above decision.

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* CINC Combined Fleet Dispatch 161226 to CINC FIFTH Fleet, War Diary DESRON ONE, October 1st-31st, 1944, WDC 161638, NA 11739.
** CofS Combined Fleet Dispatch 161226, October 1944, War Diary DESRON ONE October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
*** COMTHIRDFLT Operation Order 21-44, Dispatch 031600, October, 1944.

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(b) Operations of CTG 30.3 until 0719 October 17th.

CTG 30.3 continued his retirement toward Ulithi.

From 0600 until 0719 he maintained a CAP of eight VF and a SNASP of four VF - four VT.

At 0719 TG 30.3 was bearing 112°(T), distant 500 miles from Garan Bi, Formosa.

(c) Operations of CTG 38.1 until 0719, October 17th.

CTG 38.1 continued on course 240°(T), speed 12.5 knots towards his dawn launching position, in Latitude 21°-30°N, Longitude 127°-00°E.

Weather conditions were as follows: Visibility good with scattered middle and low clouds; light and infrequent showers; wind fresh from the northeast; flying conditions mostly average.

At 0656 CTG 38.1 launched eighteen VF from the WASP to search the sector 260°-360°(T) to a radius of about 300 miles from enemy surface units. At the same time he launched a CAP of twelve VF, also from the WASP.

At 0719 TG 38.1 was bearing 005°(T) distance 620 miles from Okinawa Island.

(d) Operations of CTG's 38.2 and 38.3 until 0719, October 17th.

CTG's 38.2 and 38.3 operated in the vicinity of 22°-00°N, Longitude 126°-00°E until the INDEPENDENCE landed her night search planes, which was accomplished between 0030 and 0100.

The search was negative.

After the recovery of the search planes, these two task groups moved to the southwestward some forty-five miles and then operated.

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October 17th, 1944, Serial 0027, October 17th, 1944
** War Diary CTG 38.1, October 16th, 1944
*** Action Report WASP, Operations against Okinawa Jima, Miyako Jima, Northern Luzon, Formosa, Manila Bay Area, Leyte and Enemy Naval Units Western Visayas, October 2nd-27th, 1944, Serial 0040, October 28th, 1944
**** Action Report INDEPENDENCE, October 1944, Serial 0017, November 2nd, 1944
vicinity of the new reference point (Latitude 21°-25'N, Longitude 127°-25'E) assigned but a short time before by CTF 38.*

At 0658 CTF 38.2 launched eight VF and four VB from the BUNKER HILL to search sector 315°-365°(T), to a radius of 280 miles with the objective of locating enemy forces. Up to 0719 no contacts had been made by the search planes. Flying conditions were good.*

Also at about 0658, CTF 38.3 launched eight VF and four VB from the USS XX to search sector 350°-030°(T), to a radius of 280 miles, also with objective of locating enemy surface forces. Up to 0719 no contacts had been made by the search planes.*

During the period between dawn and 0719, CTF 38.2 was covered with a CAP of twelve VF and a SNASP of four VF - four VB,*** and CTF 38.3 was covered with a CAP of eight VF and a SNASP of eight VF - four VB/VT.+*

At 0719 TG's 38.2 and 38.3 were bearing 005°(T) distant 640 miles from Suluan Island.

(a) Operations of CTF 38.4 until 0719, October 17th.

CTF 38.4 arrived at his dawn launching position and at CG40 he launched four VF(N) from the FRANKLIN to attack Legaspi Airfield.****

Weather conditions were poor over the target (broken clouds with a ceiling of about 2000 feet). Below the clouds the visibility was poor due to haze, mist and rain.*****

At 0650 he launched a fighter sweep of twenty VF to gain command of the air over Clark Field.******

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* War Diary CTF 38.2, October 17th, 1944.
** Action Report BUNKER HILL, (October 7th-26th, 1944, Serial O239, October 27th, 1944, Port II, page 9.
*** Action Report HANCOCK, October 6th-31st, 1944, Serial 0100, November 3rd, 1944, Envelope (A), Annex X.
++++ War Diary CTF 38.4, October 17th, 1944.
++++ Action Report FRANKLIN, Operations against the enemy at Manus, Solomons, Formosa and the Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 0039, October 31st, 1944.
At 0557 he launched two VT to reconnoiter San Bernardino Strait.*

At 0616 he launched Strike ABLE to strike Clark and Mabalacat Airfields.**

At 0700 he launched Strike BAKER to strike Legaspi Airfield.***

In the above strikes planes were launched on combat missions as follows:**

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<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>20 VF</th>
<th>15 VS</th>
<th>15 VT</th>
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<td>Fighter Sweeps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strike ABLE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike BAKER</td>
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<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total sorties</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

During this period from dawn until C/19, CTG 38.4 maintained a CAP of twelve VF and a SNASP of four VF - four VT over the task group.

At 0719 TG 38.4 was bearing 348°(T) distant 270 miles from Suluan Island.

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** Action Report ENTERPRISE Operations Against the Enemy at Nansel Shoto, Formosa, Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st 1944, Serial 0053, October 31st 1944; also Aircraft Action Report Air Group 13, October 17th 1944, forwarded by FRANKLIN, Serial 077, November 6th 1944.
*** Action Reports FRANKLIN and ENTERPRISE; also Aircraft Action Report Air Group 13, October 17th, 1944.
(b) Submarine Force Pacific Fleet

(1) Background of Submarine Operations

During Operation TUNG II the POA submarines were generally concerned with one or more of three principal objectives. Those objectives were:

(a) The protection of Allied operations by intercepting, reporting, and destroying enemy forces approaching the area of operations or retiring therefrom.

(b) The reduction of enemy naval strength by the destruction of enemy merchant and naval shipping.

(c) The maintenance of morale and aviation efficiency by providing lifeguard submarines to recover downed flyers.*

There were, of course, occasions when each of these objectives had priority over the other two, and therefore the above listing is not necessarily in order of importance. However, fundamentally, objective (b) was the basic objective of the POA submarines, and was the one on which they were generally embarked.

These three objectives flowed out of some of the tasks assigned CONSUBPAC early in 1943 by CINCPAC, which tasks were:

(a) To inflict maximum damage to enemy ships and shipping by offensive patrol at focal points.

(b) To plant offensive minelayer in suitable enemy waters, to destroy enemy ships and to force the enemy to adopt countermeasures.

(c) To accomplish other tasks as may be required from time to time by the strategic or tactical situations, or based on intelligence which may come to hand. Such special tasks include supporting naval or land forces by attacks on shipping in threatened areas; reconnaissance; transport of troops for raids on enemy bases or installations; landing of agents for intelligence purposes in enemy held territory; evacuation of armed forces or civilians from enemy held territory; delivery of supplies to armed United States or Allied Forces; or to agents in enemy held territory, as may be necessary or desirable.**

* CINCPAC-CHCPOA, Operation Plan 8-44, Serial 00861, September 27th, 1944.
** CTF 17, Operation Plan 1-43, Serial 0807, June 24th, 1943.
They also flowed from COMSUBPAC's Operation Orders to each of the submarines engaged in KING II.*

In addition to the above specific tasks, COMSUBPAC received extra tasks from CINC PAC from time to time. These tasks were often given by telephone as the two headquarters were nearby, or were given orally at the flag officers' conferences which were held each morning at CINC PAC's headquarters. Requests by fleet and force commanders for the services of submarines for special missions were always made to CINC PAC, and in all cases, it was CINC PAC and not COMSUBPAC who made the decision.**

For the convenience of the PMA submarines operating in the western Pacific Ocean, that ocean was divided into five principal operating areas.*** These were: (Plate VII)

(a) POLAR CIRCUIT - Five water areas adjacent to the eastern shores of Sakhalin Islands.

(b) HIT PARADE - Ten Empire water areas adjacent to the eastern shores of the principal Japanese islands, notably Kyushu, Shikoku and Honshu.

(c) DUNKER'S DERBY - Six water areas in the vicinity of and embracing the Bonin Islands.

(d) MARU MORGUE - Six water areas in the vicinity of and embracing the Nankai Shoto.

(e) CONVOY COLLEGE - Five water areas embracing Luzon Strait and extending to Hainan Island. For KING II, COMSUBPAC was authorized to operate as far south as 16°-30°N. This was done so that the entire Strait might be patrolled by one command, and so that the wolf packs might more effectively attack enemy shipping.****

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* Most of these Operation Orders are not available to this study, but from those available - notably SERGERIUS, SEGUINO, WHALE, SHAPPER, SHOCK, POMFRET, COBA, SKATE, PARCHE, APOCON, TAMBAR, SEA FOX, SSAL, SARCO, RAZORBACK, PIRANHA, SEA DEVIL, GUARDPISH, GREY WHALE, TREPANG, STERLET, TANG, SAILFISH, BISUGO, SAGILAN, KONGKUL and POOGY - the above conclusion was drawn.

** History of the United States Naval Administration in World War II, Submarine Command - forwarded to the Director of Naval History, by Commander Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet, Serial No 1, February 14th, 1946.


**** CINCPAC, Dispatch 272°14, October 1944, to CONTUH DFR.
KING II
PROSPECTIVE DEPLOYMENT
TF 17 SUBMARINES
CINCPOA DISPATCH 20236 AND 270304 SEPTEMBER 1944
TO COM THIRD FLEET

LEGEND
• US SUBMARINES
□ US LIFE GUARD SUBMARINES

Lifeguard submarine positions off Okinawa and Formosa are actually assigned stations for air strikes. Submarine positions off Saipan and Ulithi are those probably anticipated by Com Third Fleet. All other positions are the actual noon positions for October 1st, 1944 of the remaining submarines, except the Escobar, and are not necessarily those anticipated by Com Third Fleet, although they are believed to be reasonable estimates.
(f) Area to the eastward of Luzon. This area, although for a
time under the control of CINCPAC, will be discussed under Submarines,
SOWESPAC.

For the KING II Operation, CINCPAC advised COMTHRDPLT that on Octo-
ber 10th (D-10) SUBPAC submarines would be on station as follows - (a)
three packs of three submarines each, plus SAILFISH in CONVOY COLLEGE,
SAILFISH to be used as lifeguard off southern tip Formosa; (b) one pack
of three submarines off the northeast coast of Formosa; (c) one pack of
three submarines off Bungo Suido in the HIT PARADE, and two submarines
in the southern approaches to Tokyo Bay, also in the HIT PARADE; (d) six
submarines in the NARU MASURE, one of which was to be employed as a
lifeguard submarine at Okinawa - the other five to be placed in inter-
cepting positions to catch ships attempting to escape TF 38's air strikes;
(e) one submarine off the Formosa northwest coast; (f) one submarine in
MINICORS DEFLY patrolling the Bonin Islands; (g) two submarines in the
POLAR CIRCUIT patrolling the Kuriles.* (Plate VIII)

In addition to the above, one pack of three submarines was assigned
to the southern approaches to Yagasaki-Sasebo.**

CINCPAC stated that the above submarine dispositions were designed
both to meet the needs of COMTHRDPLT, and to operate TF 17 submarines in
waters where profitable targets were expected, as well as to avoid
probable mined areas.*

This was not satisfactory to COMTHRDPLT, who informed CINCPAC by
dispatch that the proposed submarine dispositions appeared to leave gaps
through which enemy fleet units could reach favorable positions at sea
without being adequately reported. He also stated that he thought that
the Yokosuka and Sasebo stations were too close under enemy shore-based
air to guarantee sighting and trailing, and suggested that CINCPAC adopt
his original recommendations as the locations therein proposed would
better bolster air searches.***

These original recommendations referred to by COMTHRDPLT had been
submitted by him to CINCPAC by dispatch on September 23rd. In this dis-
patch, COMTHRDPLT had recommended that a reconnaissance line employing
a "ZOC" be established by dawn October 5th, along a line with its center
in Latitude 27°-45'N, Longitude 124°-30'W, with its major axis 090°(T)-
270°(T), and with the distance between submarines fifty miles. A "ZOC"
was three wolf packs of three submarines each, all operating under a ZOC
commander. He also recommended that the maximum number of submarines

* CINCPAC, Dispatch 26231A, September 1944, to COMTHRDPLT.
** CINCPAC, Dispatch 270308, September 1944, to COMTHRDPLT.
*** COMTHRDPLT, Dispatch 272218, September 1944, to CINCPAC.
practicable be assigned HIT PARADE and LARK CORVETE in October and November.*

CINCPOA on September 29th, rejected the above recommendations of CO.THIRDPFLT, stating that he appreciated CO.THIRDPFLT's point of view, but that he (CINCPOA) believed that his own dispositions would most effectively support CO.THIRDPFLT's operations by giving the submarines the best chance to intercept and inflict damage on the enemy.**

Thus it is clear that there was considerable divergence of opinion between CINCPOA and CO.THIRDPFLT concerning the employment of TS 17 submarines in the KIOG II operation.

CINCPOA, on the one hand, was endeavoring to accomplish two objectives at the same time. These objectives were: (1) "the interception, reporting, and destruction of enemy forces approaching the area of operations, or retiring therein,"*** and (2) "the destruction of enemy naval forces and merchant shipping,"**** He believed the enemy carriers were in the Empire. Whether he felt reasonably satisfied, as did CO.COMSPAC, that this carrier force would not sortie from the Empire, or whether he felt that his dispositions were sufficiently dense to insure the discovery of such a sortie is not clear. However, it is clear that he felt that CO.THIRDPFLT's demands were excessive, and that under his own (CINCPOA's) dispositions, CO.THIRDPFLT should be able to operate with perfect freedom of action, and with minimum interference, and therefore the submarines should not be unnecessarily diverted from their continuing destruction objectives. For this reason he desired to place strong submarine forces in those areas where enemy shipping presented the best targets. From the fact that he proposed to station nine submarines in CONVOY COLLEGE, it is clear that he considered that this area was perhaps the most important of all the submarine areas.

CO.THIRDPFLT, on the other hand, considered that his operations should have priority and that the submarines should be assigned, as their basic objective, offensive reconnaissance in support of his operations. He also believed that they should be so positioned as to insure that this would be effectively accomplished. It was for this reason that he wished CINCPOA to assign the maximum number of submarines practically to HIT PARADE and LARK CORVETE, where they might insure that he was not surprised by enemy forces; it was also for this reason that he desired the ZIOO across the east China Sea, and, as will be shown later, it was for this reason that the CONVOY COLLEGE area was omitted in his representations to CINCPOA.

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* CO.THIRDPFLT, Dispatch 230843, September 1944, to CINCPOA.
** CINCPOA, Dispatch 290221, October 1944, to CO.THIRDPFLT.
*** CINCPOAC-CINCPOA Operation Plan 8-44, Serial 0051, September 27th, 1944.
**** CINCPOA, Dispatch 060202, October 1944, to CO.COMSPAC.
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It would appear that COMTHIRDFLT, rather than CINCPAC, was the more correct in his contentions as to the employment of the submarines, for CINCPAC's submarine operations against shipping were of a continuing nature, and while they contributed greatly to ultimate victory, it does not appear that they were so vital at this time as to require equality with the offensive reconnaissance desired by COMTHIRDFLT. It must be remembered, in this connection, that COMTHIRDFLT had been given a directive from CINCPAC which stated that "In case opportunity for destruction of a major portion of the enemy fleet offer or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task of all Pacific Ocean Forces." Is it not agreed that the only way in which he could discover whether or not his operations were creating such a situation was through the prompt receipt of intelligence?

In view of the inability of Allied land-based planes to search the vital Empire areas, COMTHIRDFLT necessarily envisaged this information as being obtained primarily by submarine reconnaissance.

COMTHIRDFLT appeared to have accepted CINCPAC's decision as final, for in his Operation Order 21-44 issued on October 3rd, he stated in the information paragraph, "Submarines of TF 17 and SEVENTH Fleet are supporting this operation by furnishing early information on enemy movements, life-guard service and attacks on enemy shipping."** However, this apparent acceptance was not so in fact, for, on October 5th, he reopened the discussion. He did this because on October 4th, CINCPAC had issued his Zone Notice #35*** wherein he reclassified temporarily submarine areas, by designating area classifications from day to day based on COMTHIRDFLT's proposed movements as promulgated in his October 4th dispatch**** to CINCPAC and CONSEVENTHFLT.

Those temporary area classifications designated as air-surface zones, only those areas where COMTHIRDFLT was expected to operate by plan, and immediately redesignated them as submarine patrol zones when by plan he was expected to be clear of the area.

For definition:

(a) An Air-Surface Zone was a zone wherein both aircraft and surface ships could attack any submarine encountered without inquiry as

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* CINCPAC-CINCPAC Operation Plan 3-44, Serial 000691, September 27th, 1944.
** COMTHIRDFLT Operation Order 21-44 Dispatch 031600, October 1944.
*** CINCPAC Dispatch 050310, October 1944, to COMTHIRDFLT.
**** COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 040250, October 1944, to CINCPAC and CONSEVENTHFLT.

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to its enemy character. American submarines were not permitted to enter an air-surface zone.*

(b) A Submarine Patrol Zone was a zone wherein aircraft were directed not to attack a surface ship (except in an enemy held harbor), unless the visibility was such that the target could be identified beyond possibility of doubt as not a submarine.**

(c) A Joint Zone was a zone in which surface, air and sub-surface craft could operate simultaneously. In joint zones, aircraft were directed not to attack a submarine. They were directed not to attack a surface ship (except in an enemy held harbor), unless the visibility was such that the target could be identified as enemy beyond possibility of doubt. Surface ships were directed to make every effort to establish the identity of any submarine encountered before attacking it. Likewise, submarines were directed not to attack surface ships encountered unless enemy identity was established beyond a possibility of doubt.***

(d) A Blind Bombing Zone was a zone in which aircraft could attack any target encountered without inquiry as to its enemy character, except in a moving Haven established by a Submarine Notice, or in an area of surface ship operations about which they had been notified.****

CINCPACFlt, in reopening the discussion, informed CINCPAC by dispatch***** that he considered "restricting (his) operations by any exact timing of change of area classification was a definite source of danger, as weather and/or tactical situations may, as in the past, require sudden and unannounced shift in truck or timing." He stated that "submarines must be operated as not to interfere with TY 38, when operating offensively," and further stated that he "would prefer, except for life guards and close-in patrols of Surigao and San Bernardino Straits, to see them kept north of 28°00'N and west of 121°00'W during the period October 8th to 10th."

Finally, and, as a new subject, he stated that if the "friendly typhoon" which was racing at the time should create a golden opportunity for striking the Kyushu area, he had an alternate plan for striking that area in lieu of Okinawa.*****

CINCPAC, without referring to the above dispatch, nevertheless appears to have considered that the recommendations contained therein

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** CINCPAC Dispatch 060300, October 1944, to COMNAVGRPCHINA, CINCPACFLT, CTF 17.
**** CINCPACFLT Dispatch 080712, October 1944 to CINCPAC.
### SUBMARINE OPERATING AREA CLASSIFICATIONS

**WESTERN PACIFIC**

**OCTOBER 30th, 1944**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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* Location of the area (10° 15'N, 140° 15'E) not shown on Date VI.

* Area 11 used 01/15/1944 divided at 12/21/44. After that date divided at 12/24/44.

* Area 14 used 01/25/1944 divided at 12/21/44. After that date divided at 12/24/44.
were, in general, valid. For on October 7th he issued his Zone Notice #38 which modified Zone Notice #36. Zone Notice #38, instead of operating on a day to day basis based on COMTHIRDPFLT's planned movements as did Zone Notice #36, operated over a broader period of time. It extended the air surface zones from the completion dates shown on Plate IX to a new completion date of 2400, October 16th. CINCPAC stated this as follows: "All areas listed in Notice #35 will retain their temporary classifications through October 16th" and further stated, "all areas listed in this notice and in Notice #35 revert to submarine patrol zones at 0000, October 14th unless otherwise subsequently directed."

These changes were a considerable relief to COMTHIRDPFLT as he had obviously been concerned lest he be forced to operate in waters where he was liable to submarine attack from friendly forces, and where friendly submarines were liable to attack from TF 38 ships and planes.

CINCPAC also stated, in the same dispatch, that between October 9th through October 16th, (a) that part of the HIT PARADE lying south of 32°-00'N and west of 136°-00'E, (b) the corridor west of 138°-00'E, and (c) areas ABOMIT, ABOMIA and ABANDON of MARU MORGUE, would be Joint ZONE.

Since these areas had been previously designated as submarine patrol zones, COMTHIRDPFLT must have considered this change as favorable, as it clearly increased his freedom of action in the waters southeast of Kyushu.

The above submarine area designations remained in force during the operations of the THIRD Fleet from October 8th until October 14th. On this latter date, in his Submarine Zone Notice #39, he advised both COMTHIRDPFLT and COMSUBPAC (CTP 17) that the restrictions promulgated for the SOWESPAC area were (a) beginning at 2000, October 15th, the area between PASTURE, BRIAR PATCH, FISH FORD and the Philippines would be an air surface zone, and (b) commencing at 0001, October 18th, the area between PASTURE, BRIAR PATCH and the Philippines which lies north of Latitude 14°-00'N, would be a joint zone.*

Likewise on October 14th, in his Submarine Zone Notice #40, CINCPAC directed that those portions of HIT PARADE and CORRIDOR which were joint zones would revert to submarine patrol zones at 2000 that date. He also extended until further notice the air surface designation of the DETAIL section of CONVOY COLLEGE.***

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* CINCPAC Dispatch 073516, October 1944, to COMTHIRDPFLT.
** CINCPAC Dispatch 132226, October 1944, to COMTHIRDPFLT and COMSUBPAC.
*** CINCPAC Dispatch 140432, October 1944, to COMTHIRDPFLT.
On the following day (October 16th), presumably because of the possibility of fleet action, as reported by COMTHIRDFLT, he made two important submarine decisions. These were:

(a) To reclassify the submarine operating areas.

(b) To reassign the submarines.

He reclassified the submarine areas by his Zone Notice #42, effective at 0001, October 16th, as follows:*

(a) Air Surface Zones - KITCHEN, CLOSET, VESTIBULE, area 11-3 east of a line from Latitude 23°-00'N, Longitude 123°-00'E, to 26°-00'N, Longitude 128°-00'E, DETECT, DETAIN and that part of DETECT and DETAIN lying east of Longitude 123°-00'E.

(b) Joint Zones - ABANDON, ABLAZE, ABDUCT, PARLOR, a lane through VESTIBULE fifteen miles either side of a line along Latitude 20°-45'N, and DEPART east of Longitude 123°-00'E.

(c) Submarine Patrol Zones - DUNKERS DEBRY and all areas north and west of those described in (a) and (b).

He reassigned his submarines by dispatch, and advised COMTHIRDFLT of his new submarine dispositions. He stated, in part, as follows:***

(a) That ten submarines (SNOOK, COBA, SHARK, BLACKFISH, SMALDRAGON, ICEFISH, SAILFISH, PARCH, DRUM, SAILFISH), were blocking Luzon Strait between Longitudes 119°-00'E and 121°-00'E.

(b) One submarine (TANG) was off northwest tip of Formosa.

(c) Three submarines (SALMON, SILVERSIDES and TRIGGER) were disposed to the eastward of the northeast tip of Formosa.

(d) Two submarines (STERLET and BUNNYFISH) of the MARU MORGAN were watching Okinawa.

(e) One submarine was in each of ABANDON (BARREL), ABLAZE (SKATE), ABUSK (SEA DOG), and ABDUCT (SAURY).

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* COMTHIRDFLT Dispatch 150149, October 1944, to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC.
** CINCPAC Dispatch 150450, October 1944, to COMTHIRDFLT.
*** CINCPAC Dispatch 150332, October 1944, to COMTHIRDFLT. The names of the submarines concerned were not listed in this dispatch, but have been included here for clarity.
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(f) Three submarines (ESCOLAR, PERCH and CROAKER) were off southern approaches Nagasaki-Sasebo.

(g) Three submarines (BESUGO, GABILAN and RONQUIL) were guarding the Songo Suido.

(h) Two submarines (TREPANG and SEA DRAGON) were guarding the southwest approaches to Tokyo Bay.

He stated also that one submarine (BLACKFIN) in position about Latitude 20°-40°N, Longitude 130°-00°E, was being ordered to retire eastward to 134°-30°E to clear CONTHRED's concentration point, and that two submarines (SEAHORSE and WHALE) in approximate position Latitude 20°-45°N, Longitude 126°-00°E, were retiring west to Longitude 122°-30°E, thence north to Latitude 24°-00°N, Longitude 123°-00°E.

This then was the background of the submarine operations until 0720, October 17th, undertaken by TF 17 in support of KING II.

(2) Operations of SUBPAC (TF 17) Submarines

The operations of the SUBPAC submarines connected with KING II will be discussed under the various groups, such as CONVOY COLLEGE, rather than by individual submarines. As the information concerning orders to the SUBPAC submarines throughout KING II is extremely meager, this analysis must necessarily comment more upon the dispositions from day to day than upon the orders received which resulted in the dispositions.+

(a) CONVOY COLLEGE. As has been pointed out previously, CINCPAC advised CONTHRED that on October 10th there would be ten submarines on station in CONVOY COLLEGE. All submarines so designated were on station.** These were the reduced coordinated attack groups (wolf packs) SNOOK and COBIA; SHARK (Y), BLACKFISH and SAWFISH (Y).

* Information available was obtained from COMSUBPAC; Commanding Officer, Submarine Base, New London, Conn.; Chief of Naval Personnel (for ships logs); Officer-in-Charge, Naval Records Management Centers, Alexandria, Va., and Mechanicsburg, Pa.; Director, Naval Records and History; Submarine Operational History World War II, Submarine Operations in World War II by Theodore Roscoe; and finally by the Patrol Reports of the various submarines. Out of all these sources, only limited and very sketchy information was obtainable concerning the operation plans and orders, and in many cases the dispatch orders had already been destroyed by burning. There were no War Diaries.

** Ships Logs of Submarines concerned.

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and ICEFISH, SEAHORSE (F) and WHALE. These groups were conducting the various rotating patrols of CONVOY COLLEGE as coordinated attack groups rather than as single submarines. The SAILFISH was engaged in lifeguard duties off southwest Formosa for the air strikes on Formosa made on October 12th, 13th, and 14th by TF 38, and on October 14th, 16th, and 17th by the B-29's of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command.* The SAFFISH and ICEFISH were also on lifeguard duties off southwest Formosa, but were there primarily to support the above-mentioned B-29 strikes on the TWENTIETH Bomber Command, rather than those of TF 38. In fact, the ICE- FISH was assigned a station about 100 miles southwest of Formosa commencing October 11th.** The SEAHORSE was on lifeguard duty off Aparri, Luzon, between October 11th and October 14th, to cover the TF 38 air strikes on northern Luzon. Downed airmen were recovered as shown in Table 10.

The submarines in CONVOY COLLEGE were rotated through three areas either by dispatch or by temporary rotation plan. This was done to vary the intensity of action experienced by the submarines, to equalize their attack opportunities and to vary the intensity of enemy air coverage and other anti-submarine activities. The three areas were DESTROY, DETECT, and DELETE. Areas DESTROY and DESTROY were generally waiting areas.*** The rotation was always clockwise, and was made on the 1st, 11th and 21st of each month.

Although the submarines in CONVOY COLLEGE, all of which were on offensive patrol,**** were disposed either by CTF 17, by the wolf pack commanders, or by the individual commanding officers, as the situation dictated, in what was considered to be the most productive section of that area against merchant shipping, the results were highly disappointing as enemy shipping appeared to avoid the Luzon Strait area at this time. (Plate X)

Although a number of contacts were made in the Strait (on October 9th, one tanker by SAILFISH; on October 10th, one transport with three

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**** CTF 17 Operation Order 237-44, Serial 0010, September 3rd, 1944 to CTF 17, Operation Order 327-44, Serial 00845, September 24th, 1944 to SAILFISH.
JAPANESE NAVAL & MERCHANT SHIP LOSSES
EFFECTED BY T.F. 17 SUBMARINES
IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC-NORTH OF LAT. 18° 30' N.
OCTOBER 1944

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*Sinkings include all merchant ships of 5000 or more gross tons and all naval ships
(Prepared by Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee) February 1947
escorts by COBIA at 1216* and by SAILFISH at 1605;** on October 12th, one
destroyer (or minelayer) by WHALE at 0835*** and by BLACKFISH at 2230;****
on October 16th, two small destroyers at 0805 and one net tender at 1001
by SAILFISH and a regaining of contact on the October 10th contact by
the COBIA at 1223;*** only one ship - the tanker TACHI RANA MARU - was sunk.
This sinking was accomplished with torpedoes by the SAWFISH at 0134
October 9th in area DESTROY in position bearing 285°(T), distant 235 miles
from Cape Bojador.***** All other contacts with the exception of that
made by the BLACKFISH at 2130, October 12th, were beyond firing range
and could not be closed for attack. The BLACKFISH, on the other hand,
made two night attacks on the destroyer at close range (3000 yards and
1900 yards), but all torpedoes missed.

A study of Diagram "B" shows that the submarines, while perhaps
being well disposed in depth against normal shipping which operated from
Formosa across Bashi Channel, and down the island chain to Cape Bojador,
Luzon,****** and vice-versa, were not so well disposed for reconnaissance
in support of TF 38 operations. The diagram shows that at 1200, October
10th, Luzon Strait was not completely closed, there being a sixty mile
gap between the COBIA and Caram Bi Point, Formosa. The tracks of the
submarines show that no effort appears to have been made to maintain any
organized reconnaissance of Luzon Strait between October 9th and October
15th. In fact a number of submarines crossed one another's tracks. However,
in the afternoon of October 15th, probably because COMTHIRDJFLT re-
ported fleet action imminent,****** CTF 17 directed that the SAILFISH,
ICKFISH, SAWFISH, FARCHE, DRUM, SEADRAGON, SHARK, BLACKFISH, SNORK and
COBIA were to deploy along a north-south line from the southern tip of
Formosa to Cape Bojador in order to block Luzon Strait against enemy
forces which might attempt to pass through.******* The FARCHE and the
DRUM had arrived in Luzon Strait on this date from patrols in San
Bernardino Strait and Sargac Straits respectively. He directed each of

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* War Patrol Report, COBIA, Report of SECOND War Patrol,
  Serial 035, November 5th, 1944.
** War Patrol Report, SAILFISH, Report of TWELFTH War Patrol,
  Serial 037, December 11th, 1944.
*** War Patrol Report, WHALE, Report of NINTH War Patrol, Serial 017,
  October 30th, 1944.
**** War Patrol Report, BLACKFISH, Report of NINTH War Patrol,
  Serial 001, November 1944.
***** War Patrol Report, SAWFISH, Report of EIGHTH War Patrol,
  Serial 28-44, November 8th, 1944 and War Patrol Report ICEFISH,
****** CTF 17 Operation Order 327-44, Serial 00845, September 24th,
  1944, to SAILFISH.
******* COMTHIRDJFLT Dispatch 150149, October 1944 to CINC
  PAC, COMINCH,
  COMSOWESPAC.
******** War Patrol Report, SAWFISH, Report of EIGHTH War Patrol, Serial
  28-44, November 8th, 1944; also CTF 17 Dispatch 150931, October
  1944 to all submarines concerned.

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the submarines to patrol a rectangle sixty miles east and west, and twenty-one miles north and south. The rectangles were as shown on Diagram "I". He further directed that the lifeguard submarines, SAILFISH, ICEFISH and SAWFISH were to man their rectangles after completing their lifeguard duties. CINCPAC advised COMTHIRDEAF of these new dispositions. The submarines concerned, with the exception of the SAWFISH which was retained on lifeguard duties, promptly moved toward their new positions, and by 1200, October 16th, were in reasonably effective reconnaissance positions, except for a gap of about eighty-five miles between the PARCHE and the SAILFISH. Fortunately, no enemy forces came through this gap at this time. From north to south these submarines were SAILFISH, PARCHE, DRUM, SEADRAGON, SHARK, BLACKFISH, SNOOK, and COBIA. By 0719, October 17th, most of the submarines had readjusted their stations, although the ICEFISH was still readjusting. Their positions now, from north to south, were SAILFISH, PARCHE, DRUM, SEADRAGON, SHARK, BLACKFISH, SNOOK and COBIA. If the SHARK succeeded in getting on station as seems highly probable, this new arrangement also provided a reasonably effective block against enemy forces endeavoring to pass through Luzon Strait, although there was still a gap of about forty-five miles between the SAILFISH and the PARCHE.

In connection with the above, CTF 17 believed that Babuyan Channel directly north of Cape Engano was mined and directed his submarines to avoid this channel. He also directed the COBIA and SAILFISH to stay clear of the mineable waters in the eastern part of their rectangles.

(b) Northwest Coast Formosa

The sole submarine off the northwest coast of Formosa was the TANG which arrived on station on October 10th. The Commanding Officer was directed to operate in Area 11-C, and to join the coordinated attack group (wolf pack) SILVERSTEDS, TRIGGER, and SALMON, also operating in that area, if he so desired, but instead, he chose to operate to the northwest of Formosa. In making this decision he realized that the wolf pack was operating to the northeastward of Formosa, and that the area to the northwestward was vacant. Mindful of the fact that Japanese shipping to and from the Empire passed on either side of Formosa, he wished to place himself in a fruitful area. In this he was successful, for on October 10th he sank the small cargo ship JOSHIU GO, and

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* CTF 17 Dispatch 150991, October 1944 to all submarines concerned.
** CINCPAC Dispatch 150932, October 1944 to COMTHIRDEAF.
*** Location of SHARK not known as SHARK was lost on October 24th, 1944 with all records.
**** CTF 17 Operation Order 326-44, Serial 00341, September 26th, 1944, to TANG.

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TABLE 10
LIFEGUARD SUBMARINES RESCUE AIRMEN
DURING THE PERIOD
October 10th, to 0719, October 17th, 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK FORCE 17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAILFISH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAWFISH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STERLET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIGGER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK FORCE 71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C = Officer  E = Enlisted
on October 11th he sank the even smaller cargo ship CITA MARU.** His location between October 11th and 17th, October 17th, is not entirely known. The TANG was sunk some days later on this patrol, and the only information directly available is the War Patrol Report, prepared from memory about one year later, by her commanding officer, who had been a prisoner of the Japanese until the termination of the war. However, it appears that during this period (October 10th - 0719 October 17th) he operated off northwest Formosa in Formosa Strait, sank no more shipping, and made no important contacts.*

(c) Northeast Coast Formosa

The submarines on station here were a coordinated attack group (wolf pack) of three submarines, the SILVERSIDES, SALMON and TRIGGER,*** which were operating in Area 11-6 to the eastward of Formosa.**

The TRIGGER was designated as lifeguard submarine on October 12th and 13th. She recovered one pilot on October 12th as shown on Table 10. Except for this lifeguard designation, all three submarines were on offensive patrol.

The wolf pack commander stationed his pack directly northeast of Formosa, primarily to intercept enemy shipping which was reportedly moving to and from the Empire along either side of the Nansei Shoto, and along the east or west coasts of Formosa.**

He also chose this location because the best port of Formosa - Kiirun Ko - is in this area, and ships employing this harbor, or fleeting it under 7738 air strikes, might well choose to pass along the east coast of Formosa, thence through Luzon Strait towards Luzon for shelter.

It should be clear that when the above life line of traffic, and the limited number of submarines available for this duty are considered, the location of these submarines was well chosen for the destruction of merchant and naval shipping, and for reconnaissance in support of COMHOSPFL'T's operations (Diagram "B"), although on October 16th there was a gap of forty miles between the SILVERSIDES to the west, and the TRIGGER to the east, (Diagram "H"). These submarines were operating submerged during daylight. However, it is apparent that CTF 17 did not consider that he had closed this area effectively against an expected Japanese fleet sortie,

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*** CTF 17 Operation Order 326-44, Serial 00341, September 24th, 1944, to TANG.
for he had already ordered both the WHALE and SEAHORSE to support the three submarines there, by taking station on the southwest end of the Nansel Shoto. At 0710, as shown in Diagram "I", the SEAHORSE was in position; the WHALE was still on route but making slow headway since she was submerged.

None of the five submarines northeast of Formosa made contact on any Japanese shipping of consequence, whether merchant or naval, during this period. However, they did sight numerous sampans, two small patrol craft, one small schooner and one trawler, none of which were attacked.

(d) WARU MORGUE

The submarines on station in the WARU MORGUE were the SKATE, SAURY, PURRFISH, SEA DOG, SARGE and STERLET. These submarines were operating on offensive patrol. With the exception of the SKATE and the SEA DOG they generally remained submerged during daylight although on October 10th all submarines operated on the surface. They did not operate as units of a coordinated attack group (wolf pack), but instead, operated independently of one another. They were stationed in the WARU MORGUE because considerable enemy shipping passed through these areas on routes between the Empire and South China ports, Philippines, and Indo-China, and CTF 17 considered that the Nansel Shoto, and particularly the WARU MORGUE area, in view of the importance of Okinawa, would be fruitful. He expected enemy ships to attempt to escape CTF 38's air strikes and wished to intercept them.

The submarines in WARU MORGUE were rotated through six areas either by permanent rotation plan or by dispatch. As has been pointed out under CONVOY COLLEGE, this was done to vary the intensity of action experienced by the submarines, to equalize their attack opportunities, and to vary the intensity of enemy air coverage and other anti-submarine activities. The six areas were: ABANDON, ABLAZE, ABDUCT, ABOLISH, ABBRIDGE, and ABUSE. The rotation was always clockwise. It should be mentioned here that the western and southern boundaries to the WARU MORGUE were largely determined by known enemy minefields. While operating in the WARU MORGUE the submarines were directed to stay clear of waters which, by their very nature, might be mined.

** War Patrol Report WHALE, Report of NINTH War Patrol, Serial O17, October 30th, 1944.
*** CTF 17 Operation Order 301-44, Serial 00809, September 6th, 1944, to SKATE.
CINCPAC Dispatch 267316, September 1944 to COMTHIRDEFLT.
***** Ibid, page 85.
****** CTF 17 Operation Order 316-44, Serial 00830, September 12th, 1944, to STERLET.

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On October 10th the SAURY was in area ABANDON; the BURRFISH in ABLAZE; the STERLET in ABDUCT; the SEA DOG in ABOLISH; the BARBEL in ABRIDGE; and the SKATE in ABUSE. At this time, owing to the limited number of submarines available, and to the freedom of action accorded to each submarine in its own area, the MARU MORGUE was necessarily loosely patrolled. However, it was also loosely patrolled due to the fact that, on occasion, CTF 17 ordered the submarines to patrol in a definite part of their areas. As examples, he ordered the SAURY, commencing October 9th, to patrol the eastern edge of area ABANDON, and the BURRFISH to patrol the western part of area ABLAZE.**

Diagram "B" shows that, as a consequence, at noon on October 10th, there were very large gaps between the northernmost submarines, the SKATE and the SAURY (200 miles), and between the northernmost submarines, and those next south, i.e., the SKATE and the BARBEL (75 miles), and the SAURY and the BURRFISH (175 miles). The reason for this is not hard to find. It is clear that the strikes of TF 38 were expected to drive shipping out of the harbors in these southern areas, notably out of Naha and Buckner Bay (Nakagusuku Wan) and out of certain harbors within Amami Guato. The submarines were supposed to be so positioned as to facilitate their accomplishing maximum damage to such shipping.*** Would this not have required that they be as close to Naha and Buckner Bay as possible, consistent with safety against mines and enemy air power? A study of the chart shows that the 100 fathom curve, which at this time was considered the minimum depth for safe operation against mines,**** ran about ten miles from both Naha and Buckner Bay, and that the water deepens rapidly beyond this curve. Submarine commanders consulted stated that the danger from Japanese land-based air power was not great; that they could and did operate safely within close range of such air power.

However, the submarines were not well stationed to be effective. The SEA DOG was about thirty miles from Naha; the STERLET about sixty miles from Buckner Bay. Does it not appear that they might have been positioned more effectively had they closed in to just beyond the 100-fathom curve?

In this connection, it is of interest to note that despite CTF 38's air strikes on October 10th, very little shipping of any consequence was either discovered in - or important harbors or departed the various ports in the area, and therefore no submarines in the MARU MORGUE made any sinkings on that day. In view of this fact, does it not seem somewhat

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*** CINCPAC Dispatch 26270F, September 1944 to COMTHIRDPFlT.
surprising that CTF 17, after CTF 38's air strikes, did not direct some of the submarines in the MARI MORGUE to close the Empire and to operate in the HIT PARADE in support of these submarines there, rather than to have allowed them to operate more or less as usual. Because of the distance between the MARI MORGUE and the HIT PARADE, might it not have been even wiser had he directed the MARI MORGUE submarines to form within the MARI MORGUE a reconnaissance line normal to the main track between the Empire and Okinawa, and thereby offer some protection to CTF 38, which would be operating off Formosa the following day, October 11th, as well as on the 12th and 13th?

Throughout the period October 10th to 0719 October 17th, the submarines in the MARI MORGUE carried out their routine patrols and scheduled rotations. However, on October 15th, CTF 17 directed the PARREL, in ABUSE, to operate along the eastern edge of ABBANDON; the SKATE, in ABBANDON, to patrol a definite station in ABLAZE; (vicinity Latitude 27°-30'N; Longitude 130°-45'W); and the SAURY, in ABLAZE, to patrol a definite station in ADDUCT, and in so doing to patrol close in to Okinawa. He also ordered the BURRFISH which had, by rotation, entered area ABLUSH, to patrol close to Okinawa, until further orders. Why he made these definite assignments, rather than to conform to the usual practice which permitted the submarine commander to operate at discretion within his designated area, is not explained. However, as a float action was expected by CONTURPFLY, it is presumed that CTF 17 ordered the BURRFISH to take station off Naha, and the SAURY to take station off Buckner Bay, in order that they might be in position to report any enemy naval forces leaving or entering either harbor.

It is of interest to note that except for the BARREL in area ABUSE which reported having contacted at 0340, October 13th, a convoy of three AK, one AP and one AO escorted by two destroyers and except for the SKATE which, on October 16th at 2050, reported having made a contact at 2030 (actually the contact was at 1924*) on an enemy task group of three large ships, one destroyer, and two destroyer escorts in Latitude 28°01'N, Longitude 130°45'W on course 010° speed eighteen. None of the submarines in the MARI MORGUE made any contacts of consequence whatsoever on enemy shipping between October 9th and 0719, October 17th, although hospital ship was sighted passing through areas ABLUSH and ABRIDGE on October 9th.

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* War Patrol Report SKATE, Report of SIXTH War Patrol, Serial 082, November 2nd, 1944, CTF 17 Dispatch 150312, October 1944 to All Subs NR 3.
**** SKATE Dispatch 101150, October 1944 to CTF 17.
***** War Patrol Reports of Submarines concerned.

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Attacks were made as follows:

(1) The BAHAMAL made two night surface attacks. On her first attack she fired six torpedoes all of which missed; on her second she fired four torpedoes. She claimed sinking one destroyer with two hits and damaging one oiler with one hit but actually appears to have made no hits whatsoever on the destroyer. No information is available as to whether or not she succeeded in torpedoing the oiler.

(2) The SKATE which was on the surface, fired three torpedoes at her task group by sound. She was unable to fire by sight as a rain squall obscured the targets. She reported hearing one torpedo explosion, but as the Japanese did not report any damage to this group on this day, the torpedoes must have missed.

The contact made by the SKATE was fairly correct since the enemy force consisted of two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and three destroyers. This was the second striking force less DESDIV TWENTY-ONE (three destroyers), and the USS HOI, which had departed Lunga Point at 0700, October 18th; had then headed for the area east of Okinawa but, owing to the strength of the Allied Forces off Formosa, had been diverted to Amami O Shimishima for refueling of destroyers. It arrived at Amami O Shimishima 1700, October 17th.*** This SKATE contact caused CTF 17 some concern for at 0425 October 17th he queried the SKATE as to whether ships contacted were heading northerly.**** This was important information since if true it indicated that perhaps the Japanese were retiring.

(c) Nagasaki - Saucbo

The submarines in the Nagasaki - Saucbo area were the ESCULAR, PORKCHOP, CRAGGER, and GUARDIAN. The first three submarines formed a coordinated attack group (wolf pack), whereas the GUARDIAN was a remnant of a previous wolf pack which had broken up when the other two members returned to Pearl Harbor. All four of these submarines had been directed to patrol in Areas 9 and 12, which areas were to the westward of Yuzhukai. The basic orders for the first three submarines are not available, but COMAIRPACFLT was informed on September 27th that there would be three submarines off Nagasaki - Saucbo.***** This presumes that during CTF 38's strikes on the Maminsho, Formosa, and northern Luzon.

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*** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1943, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-4, JS-104, pages 16, 17; also War Diary DESION 1, October 17th, 1944, NSC Document 191838 NA 11739.
**** CTF 17 Dispatch 103925 October 1944 to COMAIRPAC.
***** CINCPAC Dispatch 270306, September 1944 to COMAIRPAC.
the submarines would be in Area 9. Diagram "B" confirms this presumption. These submarines generally operated submerged during daylight.

Since the ESCOLAR was lost late on October 17th or early October 18th, presumably by striking a mine, her exact locations prior to that time are not known. However, as both the CROAKER and the PERCH were operating just outside the 100-fathom curve (Diagram "B"), it is presumed that the ESCOLAR was also operating in similar waters. All submarines were stationed in the vicinity of the foci of the trade routes moving south from Shimonoseki Suido and from Nagasaki and Sasebo, and remained in those foci until October 18th when they moved, whether by order of CTF 17 because of COMTHIRDFLT's expectation of a fleet action, or by order of the wolf pack commander, into Taushima Strait. This left this vital area completely open to enemy transit by naval as well as merchant shipping.

Fortunately, no enemy naval forces of consequence passed through this area during this time although alternative route Three*** for the sortie of the Japanese Fleet from the Inland Sea passed through Shimonoseki Suido and thence southwest and south through these waters. In view of the fundamental importance to COMTHIRDFLT of information concerning the movements of enemy forces through this area, would it not have been wiser to have left the original three submarines in this vital area and then to have directed other submarines to block the other important passes south from Taushima Strait? Could not the additional submarines required for this purpose have been better employed here than in MARU MORGUE or even in CONVOY COLLEGE? As it was, the prospect of obtaining early vital information concerning the movements of Japanese fleet units was poor indeed.

Great care had to be exercised in operating in this Strait as its waters were known to be mined.** During the period October 9th to 0719, October 17th, only the CROAKER and possibly the ESCOLAR contacted any enemy shipping of consequence. The CROAKER sank a small cargo ship on October 9th with four torpedoes. She claimed sinking a mine sweeper with three torpedoes on October 12th but this claim was disallowed.****

The GUARDFISH commenced her retirement through Area 9 on October 10th.

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On October 13th she departed that area for Midway. She made no important contacts, except on an RO class submarine on October 12th off Yaku Shima.

(f) HIT PARADE

The submarines assigned to the HIT PARADE on October 10th were assigned to two definite areas. These areas were (1) the approaches to Bungo Suido, and (2) the approaches to Tokyo Bay.

(1) The Approaches to Bungo Suido

A coordinated attack group (wolf pack) consisting of three submarines, BESUGO, RONQUI, and GABILAN, was assigned Sections 7 and 8 of the HIT PARADE. The submarines of this attack group were normally assigned stations within these sections by their wolf pack commander (the Commanding Officer, BESUGO).** All submarines, other than those of this group, were removed from this area in order to give the attack group freedom of action.

The BESUGO, RONQUIL, and GABILAN were directed to rendezvous at 0500, October 5th in Latitude 30°00'N, Longitude 160°00'E; to proceed from there at a speed of advance of about thirteen knots along Latitude 30°00'N to Longitude 132°00'E; to then proceed into their designated areas, and to commence conducting offensive patrols not later than sunset (1749) October 9th. They were further directed to conduct their patrols in such a manner as to prevent undetected sortie of enemy task forces through Bungo Suido.***

These orders presented an extremely tight schedule to the wolf pack commander as well as to the submarine commanding officers.**** It was clear, since the distance from the above rendezvous point to Longitude 132°00'W was 1456 miles, and to the eastern boundary of Sections 7 and 8 (Longitude 132°00'W) was 1391 miles, and since the number of hours between 0500, October 5th and sunset (1749), October 9th was 108.3, that unless an average speed of advance of about 13.4 knots was maintained (CTF 17 ordered an average speed of advance of about thirteen knots),*** they could not possibly reach the designated Longitude (132°00'W) by sunset, October 9th. It was also clear that, unless an average speed of about 12.8 knots was maintained, they could not even cross the eastern boundary of their patrol areas by that time.

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*** CTF 17 Operation Order 328-41, Serial 00847, September 25th, 1944, to TG 17.17.
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In addition, it must also have been clear to them that once they had arrived at Longitude 132°-00'E, as directed by CTF 17, they would still be about 160 miles from their assigned stations off Bungo Suido, and would have to make good during the night a speed of advance of about thirteen knots to be in position off the Bungo Suido at sunrise (0613), October 10th. This would satisfy CINCPAC's dispatch of September 26th, wherein he had advised COMTHIRDFLT that on October 10th one pack of three submarines would be off Bungo Suido in the HIT PARADE.

However, the planning was too tight and did not allow for these unusual circumstances, such as heavy weather (Plate 1) and enemy opposition, which should have been anticipated at sea in these areas at this time of the year 1944. The result of this tight planning was that none of the three submarines was on station off Bungo Suido as ordered. The BESUGO and RONQUIL did not arrive on station until early morning, October 11th, and the GABILAN did not arrive there until the forenoon of October 12th.

This inability to be off Bungo Suido at the specified time and date was due to several factors. In the first place the three submarines rendezvoused as planned at about 0415, October 8th, and then proceeded together. However, at 1910, October 6th, the wolf pack commander directed all ships to proceed as previously directed, because he had made a contact on a small enemy patrol boat, and he desired to destroy it. At the same time, because of the tight schedule, he did not wish to delay the RONQUIL and GABILAN. The latter submarines proceeded on, but on October 7th ran into heavy seas which forced them to slow down. The GABILAN stated in her War Patrol Report..."Mounting seas forced us to slow to two engine speed. Looks as if our schedule is shot now."...and the RONQUIL reported on the same date..."Seas increasing during the day. We are near typhoon reported by CONSUTFAC."...That these seas were evidently serious becomes apparent when the following dispatch from CTF 17, transmitted at 2021, October 7th, is considered: "At 0300, October 8th the center of a typhoon will be in Latitude 29°-00'N, Longitude 137°-00'E, moving north northeast at fourteen knots. Hurricane winds and precipitous seas one hundred miles radius."...

Meanwhile, on October 6th, the BESUGO engaged the patrol boat, employing both guns and three torpedoes, but the gunfire was ineffective owing to rough seas, and the torpedoes missed. At 2235, after four hours of battle with no damage to either side, excepting some machine gun hits.

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* CINCPAC Dispatch 262316, September 1944, to COMTHIRDFLT.
***** CTF 17 Dispatch 071121, October 1944, to BESUGO, RONQUIL, GABILAN.

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the Commanding Officer, BESUGO, broke off action because "any further delay meant a day's delay in arriving on station, and that was out of the question. Set course west making four engine speed."**

The BESUGO maintained a higher speed of advance than did either the RONQUIL or GABILAN for, despite the fact that she had lost four hours in the engagement above referred to, and despite the fact that on October 8th she was forced to submerge for about six hours,* she passed both the RONQUIL and GABILAN.

This was due, in part, to the fact that the GABILAN remained submerged for long hours after sighting Japanese aircraft, on both October 8th and October 9th** - actually a total time submergence of about seventeen hours - and to the fact that the RONQUIL, which submerged on October 8th and October 9th for a total of about four hours,*** appears to have run at somewhat slower speed than did the BESUGO. The GABILAN actually was unsuccessfully bombed by a Japanese plane at 0845, October 9th.

The result of these delays was that at sunset October 9th the above three submarines were widely separated. Diagram "B" shows that the BESUGO, which was farthest to the westward, and therefore nearest to Longitude 132°-00'E, was 128 miles due east of that Longitude; the RONQUIL 186 miles due east; and the GABILAN 308 miles due east.

The operations of these submarines will be discussed separately.

(a) BESUGO

On October 10th at 0439, the BESUGO arrived at Longitude 132°-00'E, changed course to north, and entered her patrol area. She dived at dawn and remained submerged during the day. During the night of October 10th-11th she proceeded on northerly courses into the central sector of the approaches to Bungo Suido, arriving there at about 0523 when she submerged. She thereafter patrolled uneventfully until the night of October 12th-13th when she crossed over into the eastern sector of the approaches to the Bungo Suido, and relieved the GABILAN. She conducted patrols in the vicinity of Okino Shima, remaining submerged during daylight. Except for sighting small patrol boats and radar equipped planes, particularly night flying planes, her patrol was uneventful until 0746, October 15th, when, in Latitude 32°-30'N, Longitude 132°-36'E, while submerged, she sighted a task force which she reported.

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as three heavy cruisers (ATAGO, NACHI and AOGA classes), and one light
cruiser (NATOKI class), on course 140°(T), speed eighteen knots. She
endeavored to attack, but was unable to get closer than 7500 yards.*
At about 1107 she sighted in Latitude 32°-34'N, Longitude 132°-39' E a
large ship which she thought was a heavy cruiser, at a range of 14,000
yards, on course 135°(T), speed twenty knots. A destroyer was escorting
the cruiser and was between the BESUGO and the cruiser. Although the
Commanding Officer, BESUGO, considered that he might be able to make an
attack on the destroyer, he attempted none in view of his definite
fear. He did not report the above contacts when they occurred, but instead,
delayed until he had surfaced after dark when he made a contact report
thereon to CTF 17 and to COMTHIRDFLT.*

The 0746 contact was made on the first section of the Japanese
SECOND Striking Force composed of two heavy cruisers (NACHI and
ASHIGARA), one light cruiser (ABUKOA) and four destroyers (AKABONO,
USHIO, SHIRANUI, KASUMI);** the 1107 contact was probably on the second
section of the SECOND Striking Force composed of three destroyers
(WAKABA, HATSUSHIKO, HATSUBARI).*** It is obvious that in both cases the
identification was fairly accurate but the composition was considerably
in error.

During the night the BESUGO crossed over into the western sector of
the approaches to Bungo Suido where she relieved the RONQUIL. She patrolled
the western sector uneventfully, except for sighting numerous enemy planes,
until 2120, October 16th, when she sighted in Latitude 32°-14'N, Longitude
131°-09' E, two unescorted heavy cruisers on a southerly course at
about twenty-two knots, zigzagging. She fired six torpedoes and at 2212
made one hit. She reported that both enemy cruisers had then returned to
port via the Bungo Suido.**** These contacts were not on heavy cruisers
but were instead on the destroyers WAKATSUKI and SUZUTSUKI which had just
passed through Bungo Suido on route to Kagoshima for duty in connection
with 653rd Air Group.***** The Commanding Officer, BESUGO was correct in
claiming one hit, for at 2212 the SUZUTSUKI was torpedoed in the bow
as a consequence of which both destroyers returned to the Inland Sea.*****

* War Patrol Report, BESUGO, Report of FIRST War Patrol, Serial 027,
November 4th, 1944; also, BESUGO Dispatch 161014, October 1944 to
CTF 17.
** War Diary DRESSON 1, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
*** War Patrol Report BEUGO, Report of FIRST War Patrol, Serial 027,
November 4th, 1944, also BESUGO Dispatch 161634 to CTF 17, Infor-
mation COMINCH, COMTHIRDFLT.
**** War Diary 653rd Air Group, October 1944 (Annex covering Operations
of component units) WDC Document 160295, NA 12830; also Tabular
Records of Movements of Destroyers, WDC Document 160320 and
160621, NA 11790.
At 0031, October 17th, the Commanding Officer, BESUGO, reported this contact to CTF 17 and COMTHIRDFLT. The remainder of his patrol until 0719, October 17th, was uneventful.**

(b) RONQUIL

The RONQUIL arrived in her patrol area, which was the western sector of the approaches to Bungo Suido, in the early morning of October 11th, and at 0527 commenced patrolling the northwesterly tip of this sector, covering the trade routes from Bungo Suido to the south. During the 11th and 12th her patrol was uneventful. At 1903, October 12th, she moved into the central sector of the approaches to Bungo Suido and relieved the BESUGO.

During the 13th, 14th and 15th, the RONQUIL made no important contacts, although a number of airplanes and small patrol craft were contacted. During the night of the 16th she crossed over to the eastern sector of the approaches to Bungo Suido and relieved the BESUGO. She remained in this sector in a position about five miles south of Okino Shima throughout the 16th. Except for a number of unimportant contacts, her patrol until 0719, October 17th, 1944, was uneventful.***

(c) GABILAN

The GABILAN arrived in her patrol area, which was the eastern sector of the approaches to Bungo Suido, at about 1200, October 12th, and remained on submerged patrol until about 1849 when she crossed over to the western sector of the approaches to Bungo Suido and relieved the RONQUIL. She arrived in the center of this sector at about 0405, October 13th. During the 13th, 14th, and 15th the GABILAN remained in this sector and made no important contacts. At 0000, October 16th, she crossed over to the center sector of the approaches to Bungo Suido and relieved the RONQUIL. She remained in this sector throughout the 16th. As was the case with the RONQUIL, except for a number of unimportant contacts, her patrol until 0719, October 17th, was uneventful.***

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The above analysis shows that these three submarines were long delayed in arriving on station, and thereby were unable even to attempt to

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** War Patrol Report BESUGO, Report of FIRST War Patrol, Serial 027, November 4th, 1944, also BESUGO Dispatch 161834 to CTF 17, Information COMINCH, COMTHIRDFLT.


close the approaches to Bungo Suido until the forenoon of October 12th. Meanwhile, COMTHIRDFLTL had been striking the Namsi Shoto (Okinawa) on October 10th, northern Luzon (Aparril) on October 11th, and Formosa on October 12th. Each of these great air strikes might have been sufficient cause for the Japanese to have activated their SHO Operations for the defense of the Namsi Shoto, Formosa, Luzon line. COMTHIRDFLTL had been informed that his northern flank would be protected, in part, by TF 17 submarines operating off Bungo Suido commencing October 10th. There is nothing in the record to indicate whether or not COMTHIRDFLTL was informed that Bungo Suido was not closed until October 12th and that even then the closing was of doubtful effectiveness, but it seems highly unlikely.

Diagrams "C" to "I" show that after the submarines had arrived in their assigned stations off Bungo Suido, there were occasions, particularly during daylight hours, when dangerous gaps existed in the patrol line. This was because the submarines normally submerged during daylight, and were therefore, forced to rely on periscope visual contacts only, as their radars at this time, October 1944, were ineffective during submergence. The World War II average reliable daylight range for periscope sightings on independent merchant ships during normal visibility was about five miles and on escorted combatant ships about six miles.*

From the above analysis it is clear that the submarines on station off Bungo Suido were not only insufficient in number to accomplish properly their objectives, but were too loosely coordinated to obtain maximum effectiveness. It also is clear that, in view of the importance of early information concerning the movements of Japanese forces departing Bungo Suido, a minimum of one additional submarine and a maximum of three additional submarines, which would give some defense in depth, were required to cover adequately the approaches to Bungo Suido.

(2) The approaches to Tokyo Bay

(a) While the basic orders assigned the submarines off Tokyo Bay are not available, it is presumed that their objective was the prevention of the undetected sortie of enemy task forces through the approaches to Tokyo Bay. This presumption is based on CINCPAC's dispatch to COMTHIRDFLTL wherein he stated that he had three submarines guarding Bungo Suido and two guarding the approaches to Tokyo Bay.

(b) One Submarine, the SEA DEVIL, was in the approaches to Tokyo Bay, and on October 10th was in excellent position for a single submarine to intercept shipping passing through the channel to the eastward of O Chima. However, one submarine was clearly inadequate to close the approaches to Tokyo Bay. In view of the importance of

* Submarine Warfare Instructions, US Navy Department 1946, page 17-5, paragraph 1604.
reconnaissance information, and the necessity for insuring that any enemy forces passing into or out of the approaches be discovered and reported to CINCPAC and CONTHIRDPFLT, a minimum of three submarines were necessary. This would have permitted two submarines to be stationed to the eastward of O Shima and one submarine to the westward.

The SEA DEVIL made no important contacts until 1216, October 16th, when she contacted a 1500 ton cargo ship - the ISSIN MARU - and fired three torpedoes at her. All torpedoes missed. She remained on patrol until about sunset (1700) October 16th when by direction of CTF 17** she headed for Majuro for refit. She appears to have been relieved by the TAMBOR at 2100, at which time the TAMBOR entered Area 4 of the HIT PARADE.***

(c) The TAMBOR, which was on route to her patrol station in DUNKERS DERBY, received orders at 2100, October 14th to relieve the SEA L'VIL in Area 4 of HIT PARADE some time after sunset, October 16th.*** At the time of relieving, the TAMBOR was about sixty miles from the patrol station occupied by the SEA DEVIL. She was about forty miles from the above station at 0719, October 17th and therefore unable to patrol, even though loosely, the approaches to Tokyo Bay.

(d) The TRSPANG, which had been directly south of Shio Misaki, Honshu, on October 9th, was on route to a station bearing 210°(T) distant about 120 miles from Yokohama. The TRSPANG operated in this area from noon, October 10th until 1701, October 15th, when, having been relieved by the GREENLING she retired to Majuro.****

During her patrol she sighted targets of consequence as follows:
(1) On October 11th, when at 0413 she fired three torpedoes at what she reported were two oilers with a destroyer escort. Although she claimed sinking one oiler she actually sank one landing craft of about 1000 tons.***** She also fired four torpedoes at an LST at 0802. All torpedoes missed.***** (2) On October 12th, when at 1840 she encountered sixty miles from O Shima in Latitude 34°-07'N; Longitude 138°-21'E an

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* Deck Log SEA DEVIL, October 14th, 1944.
** CTF 17 Dispatch 141024, October 1944 to STA DEVIL, GREENLING, TAMBOR.
*** War Patrol Report TAMBOR, Report of TWELFTH War Patrol, Serial 08019, November 30th, 1944; also CTF 17 Dispatch 141029 October 1944 to TAMBOR.
enemy task force of two battleships escorted by two destroyers, on course 215°(T), speed twenty-three knots. She made two night surface attacks, one at 1932, the other at 1935. The 1932 attack was made with six torpedoes. She reported having made one hit in the bow of one of the destroyers, which sank immediately, and one hit on a battleship which promptly headed for Kobe. The 1935 attack was made with four torpedoes all of which missed. She trailed the damaged battleship but lost contact at 0057 the following morning. The identification of those ships was in error for no Japanese battleships were in this area, and Japanese records report no destroyer sunk in this area at this time. Actually the force consisted of the small light cruiser OYODO escorted by the destroyers FUYUTSUKI and SHIKOTSUKI. The FUYUTSUKI was torpedoed but did not sink as the damage was very slight.

(a) The GREENLING, which was on route to her patrol area and which on October 12th, was to eastward of the Bonin Islands, received orders on this date to proceed into the HIT PARADE and take over the duties which had been assigned the TREPANG. The GREENLING was directed to conduct her patrol in waters of one hundred fathoms or greater. She was authorized to pursue shipping into mineable waters. She made but one important contact during the period until 0719, October 17th. This occurred on October 13th when she fired four torpedoes at a medium sized cargo ship. All torpedoes missed.

(b) Summary of HIT PARADE dispositions

The preceding analysis of the operations of the submarines in the HIT PARADE shows that these submarines were too few in number and too loosely disposed to be able to accomplish adequately their assigned objective of preventing the undetected sortie of enemy task forces through Bungo Suido and through the approaches to Tokyo Bay. In addition, Diagrams "B" to "F" show that during the period October 10th, to 0719, October 17th, there were no submarines on station off Kii Suido, the eastern entrance to the Inland Sea. Why this was so is not clear, for the Inland Sea was navigable between Kii Suido and Bungo Suido, the only two passages to the Inland Sea from the Pacific Ocean. Why CTF 17 did not also direct that Kii Suido be patrolled in order to prevent undetected sorties is not explained, but presumably he failed to close this strait either because he had superior intelligence information which indicated that the enemy did not intend to sortie via that strait, or

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** War Diary OYODO, October 1st-20th, 1944, NDC Document 10183b.
*** CTF 17 Dispatch 121853, October 1944 to GREENLING.

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because of a shortage of submarines. But was such a decision sound? It would appear not, for not only is it unwise to rely fully on intelligence information since no matter what its reputation for correctness, it may well be wrong, but also is it not obvious that closing Bungo Suido without, at the same time, closing Kii Suido would not assure the accomplishment of the objective? Actually, the Japanese plans for the SHO Operations provided for sortie from the Inland Sea to the southern areas via one of three routes. One of these routes, discussed previously under Sasebo-Nagasaki, was through Shimomesski Suido, the other two routes were through Bungo Suido and Kii Suido.* (Plate XI) Does it not seem therefore that, in view of the importance to COMINCH REDPLT of information concerning the movements of Japanese Naval Forces through the HIT PARADE, it would have been wiser strategy to have reduced the number of submarines operating in CONVOY CORONADO MARU MORGUE or both and to have increased adequately the number of submarines operating off the above three key exits to the Pacific from the Inland Sea and Tokyo Bay. How also could an undetected sortie of enemy task forces have been prevented with the submarines available to CTF 17 in the western Pacific?

In addition to certain submarines which might have been taken from the MARU MORGUE and CONVOY CORONADO, as above proposed, CTF 17 might also have obtained reinforcements for the HIT PARADE from the POLAR CIRCUIT (APOGON, TIEFISH), from DUNKERS DERBY (SNAPPER, BILLFISH) and from submarines reporting for patrol. The PERMIT off Truk was not available as was on lifeguard duty.

It is of interest that at this time, October 10th, 17 US submarines (GREENLING, SEA FOX, Sайл, TAMBOUR, HALIBUT, HADDOCK, TUNA, ATULE, JALLAB PINTADO)** were en route to their patrol areas where they were to relieve other submarines. While the complete logistics data concerning submarines to be relieved is not available to this study, there is sufficient data available, in Section "J" of the War Patrol Reports, to indicate that a number of these submarines to be relieved (SEAHORSE, WALE, TREPANG, SNAPPER, SAIL DEVIL, GUARDFISH)** would have been able to remain on station some days longer had provision been made, upon their retirement, to refuel and resupply them at Saipan instead of at Midway or Majuro as was actually done. Had Saipan been employed some of these submarines might even have been returned to their patrol areas for a limited number of days if the situation so warranted.

While this overtime employment might have interfered with the over- rail and training programs of these submarines, and therefore might have upset CTF 17's logistics program as well, does it not seem reasonable that the necessity for having correct and early operational intelligence during KINO II should have had priority over all other considerations?

* Chart attached to Commander Mobile Forces Operation Order No. 78, August 10th, 1944, ATIS Document No. 39, Part 7, April 22nd, 1945 (NACH Document).
** War Patrol Reports of Submarines concerned.
(f) ALLIED POSITION AT 0719, OCTOBER 17TH

At 0719, October 17th - the time the Japanese lookout post at Sulu Island made its contact report on the Allied forces entering Leyte Gulf - the various Allied surface forces and groups, less submarines and motor torpedo boats were located in the following positions.

(a) SEVENTH Fleet

(1) Task Force 77

(a) TG 78.4 (Dinagat Attack Group) plus TG 77.5 Minesweeper group were off the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf.

(b) TG 77.2 (Bombardment and Fire Support Group) plus TG 77.6 (Beach Demolition Group) was bearing 128°(T), distant 115 miles from Sulu Island.

(c) TG 77.4 (Escort Carrier Group) was bearing 134°(T), distant forty-five miles from Sulu Island.

(d) TF 78 (Northern Attack Force) plus TU 77.4.34 (Escort Carrier Group) was bearing 123°(T), distant 480 miles from Sulu Island.

(e) TG 79.1's Tractor Group ABLE and TG 79.2's Tractor Group BAKER were bearing 119°(T), distant 480 miles from Sulu Island.

(f) TG 79.1 (Attack Group ABLE) plus TG 79.2 (Attack Group BAKER) plus TU 77.1.1 (Fleet Flagship Unit) plus TU 77.4.14 (Escort Carrier Group) less Tractor Groups ABLE and BAKER were bearing 119°(T), distant 665 miles from Sulu Island.

(g) TU 77.1.2 (Cruiser Unit) was bearing 123°(T), distant 360 miles from Sulu Island.

(h) TG 78.6 Reinforcement Group ONE plus TU 77.4.24 (Escort Carrier Unit) was bearing 130°(T), distant 330 miles from Sulu Island.

(i) TG's 78.7 and 78.8 Reinforcement Groups TWO and THREE were at anchor at Hollandia.

(b) THIRD Fleet

(1) Task Force 38

(a) TG 38.1 was bearing 006°(T), distant 620 miles from Sulu Island.

(b) TG's 38.2 and 38.3 were bearing 006°(T), distant 640 miles from Sulu Island.

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(c) TG 38.4 was bearing 348°(T) distant 270 miles from Sulu Island.

(2) TG 30.3 was bearing 112°(T) distant 300 miles from Garan Bi.

(g) COMPOSITION OF FORCES AND TASKS ASSIGNED (0719, OCTOBER 17TH, 1944)

(a) TF 77 (Central Philippines Attack Force)

(1) Composition of Forces

(a) (1) TG 77.1 Flagship Group*

NASHVILLE 1 CL
AMERICAN, MULLANY, ARNER REED, BUSH 4 DD
1 AGC

(2) TG 77.2 Bombardment and Fire Support Group**

(a) Fire Support Unit NORTH

MISSISSIPPI, WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND 3 OBB
AULICK, CONY, SIGOURNEY 3 DD

(b) Fire Support Unit SOUTH

TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA 3 OBB
LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS 3 CA
HONOLULU, DENVER, COLUMBIA 3 CL
LEUTZER, NEWCOMB, BENNION
HEYWOOD L EDWARDS, RICHARD P LEARY, ROBINSON, ROSS, ALBERT W GRANT,
BRYANT, HALFORD, CLAXTON, THORN,
WELLES 13 DD

(3) TG 77.3 Close Covering Group*

PHOENIX, BOISE 2 CL
SHERWOOD, AUSTRALIA 2 CA
WARRAMUNGA, ARUNTA, BACHE, BALE,
HUTCHINS, DALY, KILLIN 7 DD

* Arrived Leyte Gulf October 26th, 1944.
** Arrived Leyte Gulf October 17th, 1944.
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(4) TG 77.4 Escort Carrier Group*

SANGAMON (22 VF, 9 VT), SUWANNEE (22 VF, 9 VT), CHENANGO (22 VF, 9 VT), SANTHEE (24 VF, 9 VT), NATOMA BAY (19 VF, 12 VT), MANILA BAY (18 VF, 12 VT), MARCUS ISLAND (18 VF, 12 VT), FANSHAW BAY (19 VF, 12 VT), WHITE PLAINS (18 VF, 12 VT), KALININ BAY (18 VF, 12 VT), SAVO ISLAND (18 VF, 12 VT), ST LO (16 VF, 12 VT) 12 CVE

Total aircraft 234 VF, 132 VT = 366

McCORR, TRATHEN, HAZELWOOD, HAGGARD, FRANKS, HAILEY, HOEL, HEBERMANN, JOHNSTON 9 DD
RICHARD M ROWELL, EVERSOLE, COOLBAUGH, OBERRENDER, LORAY WILSON, WALTER C WANN, RAYMOND, SAMUEL B ROBERTS 8 DE

(5) TG 77.5 Mine Sweeping and Hydrographic Group*

SOUTHWARD, CHANDLER, HOWEY, LONG, HAMILTON, HOWARD, PALMER 7 DMS
PREBLE, BREEZE 2 DM
10 AM, 24 YMS, 4 LCPR's, 1 APD

(6) TG 77.6 Beach Demolition Group

11 APD, 7 UDT

(7) TG 77.7 Service Group

BOWERS, WHITEHURST, WILLIAMARTH, WITTER, MANNING 5 DE
4 AO, 4 IX(AO's) 3 AE, 3 AN, 1 AKN, 1 ARL, 1 ARS, 1 AO(W)

(b) TF 78 Northern Attack Force

(1) TG 78.1 Palo Attack Group**

RUSSELL, JOHN RODGERS, MURRAY, HARRISON, McKEE 5 DD
1 AGC, 7 APA, 2 AKA, 3 LSD, 1 AP, 1 AK, 12 LST, 3 LSM, 3 PC, 1 SC, 2 LCI(C), 5 LCI(R), 2 LCI(D), 7 LCI(S), 2 AT, 3 PCE(R)

* Arrived Leyte Gulf October 17th, 1944.
** Arrived Leyte Gulf October 20th, 1944.

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(2) TG 78.2 San Ricardo Attack Group*

(a) FLETCHER, LeVALLETTE, JENKINS, ANDERSON 4 DD
6 APA, 2 AKA, 2 LSD, 2 AP, 14 LST, 9 LSM,
3 PC, 1 SC, 6 LCI(2), 2 LCI(G), 1 ATO

(b) Escorted by TU 77.4.34
KITKUN BAY (16 VF, 12 VT), GAMBIER BAY
(18 VF, 12 VT) 2 CVE

Total aircraft 36 VF, 24 VT -- 60
LENNIS, J.C. BUTLER 2 DE

(3) TG 78.3 Panan Attack Group*

HUGHES, LANG, STACK, SIGSBEE, RINGGOLD,
SHRADER, DASHIELL 7 DD
3 LSI, 1 CM, 2 PC, 2 LCI(G),
2 LCI(S), 1 LCI(D)

(4) TG 78.4 Dinagat Attack Group**

DENVER, COLUMBIA 2 CL
HUGHES, STACK, LANG, ROSS, BRYANT,
ROBINSON. ALBERT W GRANT 7 DD
6 APD, 2 PF

(5) TG 78.5 Harbor Entrance Control Group**

2 PF, 4 LCI

(6) TG 78.6 Reinforcement Group ONE***

(a) MORRIS, HORTON, MUSTIN, STEVENS 4 DD
2 PF, 6 APA, 1 AP, 1 AKA, 32 LST,
6 XAK, 12 LCI, 1 4RL

(b) Escorted by TU 77.4.24
KADASHAN BAY (17 VF, 12 VT), OMMANEY BAY
(18 VF, 12 VT) 2 CVE

Total aircraft 35 VF, 24 VT -- 59
R.M. SUESENS, ABERCROMBIE 2 DE

* Arrived Leyte Gulf October 20th, 1944.
** Arrived Leyte Gulf October 17th, 1944.
*** Arrived Leyte Gulf October 22nd, 1944.
(7) TG 78.7 Reinforcement Group TWO

NICHOLAS, O'BANNON, TAYLOR, HOPEWELL
2 PF, 24 Liberty Ships, 1 PG,
33 LST, 1 AO, 4 T/L, 1 AG(W),
1 AN, 1 ARH, 1 ARS.

(8) TG 78.8 Reinforcement Group THREE

17 Liberty Ships, 3 AKS, 1 AN,
1 APC, 6 LST, 4 PF

(c) TF 79 Southern Attack Force

(1) TG 79.1 Attack Group ABLE

(a) TG 79.3 Transport Group ABLE

ERBEN, WALKER, HALE, ABBOTT, KLJD,
GANSEVOORT, BLACK, CHAUNCY, HRAINE
2 AGC, 11 APA, 2 AP, 2 LSD, 1 LSV,
3 AKA, 1 APH, 1 AK, 12 LCT

(b) Escorted by TU 77.4.14
SAGINAW BAY (18 VF, 12 VT), PETROF BAY
(19 VF, 12 VT)

Total aircraft 36 VF, 24 VT

EDMONDS, R.S. BULL

(c) Tractor Group ABLE

STEMBHEL
31 LST, 3 PCS, 3 SC, 6 LCC, 10 LCI(G),
4 LCI(M), 2 LCI(A), 2 LCI(L)

** Arrived Leyte Gulf October 24th, 1944.
** Arrived Leyte Gulf October 29th, 1944.
*** Arrived Leyte Gulf October 20th, 1944.
(2) TG 79.2 Attack Group BAKER

(a) TG 79.4 Transport Group BAKER

PICKING, SPROSTON, WICKES,
ISHERWOOD, CHARLES J. BADGER,
HALLIGAN, HARADIN, TWIGGS,
MACKDOUGLE, LUCE
1 AGC, 10 APA, 3 AP, 3 AKA,
1 LSV, 3 LSD, 1 AK

(b) TG 79.6 Tractor Group BAKER

REGENCY, MERTZ, MOUSSEN, MOORIND, MCGOWAN, MCNAIR, MBELVIN
24 LST, 6 LSM, 10 LCT, 4 LCI(N),
2 LCI(A), 13 LCI(G), 2 LCI(L) (SAPF),
3 ARS, 1 ARL, 1 ATF

(2) Tasks Assigned

(a) TF 77 (Central Philippines Attack Force)

To transport, protect and establish ashore in the Leyte Gulf - Surigao Strait area, major elements of the SIXTH Army; to arrange or provide a protection for convoys and naval task forces and direct air support for operations in the objective area until relieved by Commander Allied Air Forces; to transport to the objective area, in naval assault shipping, supporting troops and their supplies; to deny enemy reinforcement of the Leyte area from Samar, western Visayas and northeastern Mindanao areas; to clear Surigao Strait of hostile naval forces and shipping and to sweep it to open it for naval operations and shipping in the Camotes Sea and adjacent waters, in conjunction with operations of the SIXTH Army; to escort and protect shipping to the objective area until relieved by COMSEVENTHFLT.*

(1) TG 77.1 Flagship Group**

To perform tasks as directed by CTF 77

(2) TG 77.2 Bombardment and Fire Support Group

To carry out prior to D-day, bombardment and night harassing fire, in accordance with instructions from CTF 79; to cover and

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** Commander Allied Naval Forces SWPSPAC Operation Plan 13-44, September 28th, 1944.
control activities of beach demolition units and minesweeping units; to
control support aircraft at objective until arrival Commander Support
Aircraft, TF 77.

(a) Fire Support Unit NORTH

To carry out bombardment, night harassing fire and
close fire support as directed by CTF 78.

(b) Fire Support Unit SOUTH

To carry out bombardment, night harassing fire and
close fire support as directed by CTF 79.

(3) TG 77.3 Close Covering Group

To escort and provide close support to objective area;
to carry out bombardment and night harassing fire, and to provide close
fire support for ground forces and neutralization of shore batteries; all
as required by CTF 78.

(4) TG 77.4 Escort Carrier Group

To provide air protection and direct air support of
ground and naval forces in the objective area until relieved by Commander
Allied Air Forces; to provide anti-submarine patrol, and to provide rescue
of flight personnel forced down in objective area.

(5) TG 77.5 Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group

To sweep for acoustic, moored, and influence mines
in the objective area; and to conduct hydrographic survey and install
navigational aids as directed.

(6) TG 77.6 Beach Demolition Group

To clear beach obstacles as directed by CTF 79.

(7) TG 77.7 Service Group

To provide logistic support for naval forces in the
objective area.

(b) TF 78 Northern Attack Force*

To transport safely Headquarters SIXTH Army and X Corps.

* Commander Allied Naval Forces SOMESPAC Operation Plan 13-44, September
26th, 1944, as modified.
SIXTH Army to Leyte area; on D-3 day to seize Sulu Island, southern Homonkon Island and northern Dinagat Island in Leyte Gulf; at H-hour on D-day to establish major elements of the X Corps ashore in the Tacloban area of Leyte Island; on D-day to establish a Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of the 24th Infantry, ashore at Panacan Strait.

(c) TF 79 Southern Attack Force

To transport safely the XXIV Corps, SIXTH Army to Leyte area. On D-day establish major elements of the XXIV Corps ashore in the San Jose and Dulag areas of Leyte Island.

(3) Discussion

It is clear from the above that TF 77 was a very powerful amphibious force, which had the capability of carrying out the tasks assigned. It was capable of defeating any Japanese forces which might be encountered, with the possible exception of the Combined Fleet. But, even in such case, the superiority of Allied carrier pilots over Japanese carrier pilots, as observed during the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, if it continued during October 1944, might well have been sufficient to turn the tide of battle toward TF 77. However, TF 77 was not expected to engage in a major naval action, but was, instead, to be protected by the naval and air power of TF 38. It should be clear that, should the naval and air power of TF 77 be coordinated with that of TF 38, the resulting combination was capable of defeating any Japanese naval force of whatever strength which might be brought against it.

(b) Commander Allied Naval Forces, SWESPAC (O710, October 17th, 1944)

(1) Composition of Forces

(a) TG 70.1 (Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons)

(1) TU 70.1.3


46 MTB's

* Commander Allied Naval Forces SWESPAC Operation Plan 13-44, September 28th, 1944, as modified.
** CTG 70.1 Operation Plan 2-44, October 5th, 1944.
(2) TU 70.1.6 (Advance Tender Unit)

3 AGP, 1 AVP

(b) TF 71 (Submarines West Australia)

(1) TG 71.1 (American Submarines)

(a) On Patrol

ANCLER, BLUEGILL, COD, DARTER, LAGON, BERGALL, BONEYFISH, DACE, HAMMERHEAD, PADDLE, ROCK 11 SS

(b) En route Patrol

BATFISH, BREAM, GUARDIAN, GURNARD, RATON 5 SS

(c) En route Base

BAHA, CAVALI, HAWKBILL, RAY, BEGUNA, FLASHER, RHEE 7 SS

(d) Total 23 SS

(2) TF 71.7 (British and Dutch Submarines)

(a) On Patrol

ZWAARDVIS, STOIC, STURDY, SIRDAR 4 SS

(b) En route Patrol

STORM, TANTIVY 2 SS

(c) En route Base

SEA ROVER, SPIFFFUL, TELEMACHUS 3 SS

(d) Total 9 SS

(c) TF 72 (Submarines East Australia)

(a) Special Mission

NAUTILUS, NARWHAL, CERO 3 SS
(d) TF 73 (Naval Air Force SEVENTH Fleet)*

Total aircraft (Table 5) 87

TANGIER, CURRITUCK 2 AV
SAN PABLO, ORCA, HERON, SAN CARLOS, HALF MOON 5 AV

(2) Tasks Assigned

(a) TG 70.1 Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons

To support ground forces in the occupation of Leyte as directed by CTF 77.

(b) TF 71

(c) TF 72

While continuing present missions to the fullest to conduct strong offensive and reconnaissance patrols and lifeguard operations in the approaches to Allied movement routes and in the approaches to the objective area as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT. In general, to interdict and report enemy surface forces in the approaches to Allied movement routes and objective area.**

(d) TF 73

To conduct supporting operations in the occupation of Leyte under control of Commander Allied Air Forces.**

(3) Discussion

(a) The Motor Torpedo Boats were capable of accomplishing their assigned tasks.

(b) The submarines were insufficient in number to accomplish all of their assigned objectives, of which the reporting and destruction of enemy naval forces was paramount. To accomplish the latter objective in adequate measure it was necessary to station the submarines in intercepting positions in adequate strength. This was not done. Instead, Lingga and Mindoro Straits and Verde Island Passage were given no coverage whatsoever, thus leaving the western entrances to the Sulu and Celebes Seas improperly covered. In addition, no coverage was provided for the Lingga-Singapore area and none was provided for the Hainan-Luzon area. There were sufficient submarines to have accomplished the blocking

* Units attached TG 70.2 (anti-submarine group) V-12, 1 AVP, 3 PF, 4 FBY (VPB-11) are included here.

** Commander Allied Naval Forces SOWESPAC Operation Plan 12-44, September 25th, 1944.
of the western entrances to the Sulu and Celebes Seas, to have covered
the approaches from Lingga-Singapore and to have covered Makassar Strait
provided that anti-shipping patrols were reduced to a minimum and pro-
vided that the Hainan-Luzon patrols were omitted.

(c) The land and tender-based aircraft of the SEVENTH Fleet
were capable of accomplishing their assigned tasks.

(c) Commander Allied Air Forces SOWESPAC (as of O719, October 17th)

(1) Composition of Forces

(a) FIFTH Air Force
   Total aircraft (Table 1) 1356

(b) THIRTEENTH Air Force
   Total aircraft (Table 2) 352

(c) Northern Solomons
   Total aircraft (Table 3) 530

(d) RAAF Command
   Total aircraft (Table 4) 564

(e) Total
   2802

(2) Tasks Assigned*

(a) To support the operation by:
   (1) Providing aerial reconnaissance and photography

   (2) Neutralizing, in coordination with carrier and land-
       based aircraft of the THIRD Fleet, hostile naval and air forces in areas
       within range in the Philippine Archipelago, intensifying the neutralization
       in the western Visayas and Mindanao areas from D-3 day to cover the
       movement of naval forces, the landing and subsequent operations.

   (3) Providing protection of convoys and naval forces
       and direct support of the landing and subsequent operations within
       capabilities and as requested by Commander Allied Naval Forces.

* SOWESPAC Operations Instructions Number 70, September 21st, 1944.
(4) Assuming the mission of direct support of the operations in the Leyte-Samar area at the earliest practicable date after the establishment of fighter and light bombers in the Leyte area, as arranged with the Commander Allied Naval Forces.

(b) To destroy hostile naval and air forces and shipping in the Arafura and Celebes Sea areas in northeastern Borneo and the Sulu Archipelago at the earliest practicable date; and to deny the use of naval facilities in the Sulu Archipelago to the Japanese and to protect the western flank of the operation.

(c) To destroy hostile installations and sources of war materials in eastern Netherlands East Indies.

(3) Discussion

Allied land-based aircraft, while sufficient in number and in quality to accomplish many of the assigned objectives, was unable to do so completely because its air bases during the early phases were too far removed from the western Visayas and Mindanao to permit neutralization of those areas and too far from Leyte to permit direct support of the landing and subsequent operations. These responsibilities fell completely upon carrier-based aircraft.

(d) CINCPAC-CINCPAC (as of 0719, October 17th)

(4) Composition of Forces

(a) Western Pacific Task Forces

(1) THIRD FLEET

(a) TF 38 (Fast Carrier Force)

(1) TF 38.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Carrier</th>
<th>Total Aircraft</th>
<th>escorting ships</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WASP (55 VF, 25 VB, 18 VT)</td>
<td>131 VF, 49 VB, 45 VT</td>
<td>2 CV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORNET (49 VF, 24 VB, 15 VT)</td>
<td>2 CV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTEREY (24 VF, 9 VT)</td>
<td>1 CVL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total aircraft</td>
<td>131 VF, 49 VB, 45 VT</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRISTI, PELESGO, SALT LAKE CITY</td>
<td>3 CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN DIEGO, OAKLAND</td>
<td>2 CAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZARD, CONNER, BROWN, MARSHALL, THREE A, WOODWORTH, DUNLAP, CUMMINGS, CASE, CASSIN, DOWNS, FANNING</td>
<td>12 DD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) TG 38.2

INTREPID (54 VF, 24 VB, 16 VT)
HANCOCK (54 VF, 24 VB, 18 VT)
BUNKER HILL (54 VF, 24 VB, 18 VT)  3 CV
INDEPENDENCE (15 VF, 6 VT)  1 CVL
Total aircraft 177 VF, 72 VB, 62 VT - 311

IOWA, NEW JERSEY  2 BB
VICENNES, MIAMI  2 CL
TINOSY, HICKOX, HUNT, LEWIS
HANCOCK, CUSHING, COLAHAN,
HALSOE FOWELL, UHLMAANN,
BENHAM, YARNALL, STOCKHAM,
VEDDERBURN, TWING  13 DD

(3) TG 38.3

LEXINGTON (40 VF, 30 VB, 18 VT)
ESSEX (53 VF, 24 VB, 13 VT)  2 CV
PRINCETON (23 VF, 6 VT)
LANGLEY (23 VF, 9 VT)  2 CVL
Total aircraft 140 VF, 54 VB, 52 VT - 246

WASHINGTON, SOUTH DAKOTA,
MASSACHUSETTS, ALABAMA  4 BB
RENO
CLARENCE K. BRONSON, COTTON,
BORTH, GATLING, HEALY,
PORTERFIELD, CALLAGHAN,
CASSIN YOUNG, TAYNIN, PRESTON,
LAWS, LONGSHAN, MORRISON  13 DD

(4)  38.4

FRANKLIN (37 VF, 28 VB, 18 VT)
ENTERPRISE (53 VF, 22 VB, 16 VT)  2 CV
DELLAUWOOD (24 VF, 10 VT)
SAN JACINTO (23 VF, 9 VT)  2 CVL
Total aircraft 137 VF, 60 VB, 55 VT - 242

NEW ORLEANS  1 CA
BILXI  1 CL
MAURY, GRUDELEY, HEM, MCCALL,
MUGFORD, RALPH TALBOT, PATTEN,
BAGLEY, WILKER, NICHOLSON, SWANSON  11 DD
(b) TG 30.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CABOT (VF, VT)</td>
<td>2 CVL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPENS (VF, VT)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total aircraft</td>
<td>46 VF, 18 VT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSTON, WICHITA</td>
<td>2 CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSTON (Pawnee towing)</td>
<td>1 CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANBERRA (Munsee towing)</td>
<td>1 CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANTA FE, BIRMINGHAM, MOBILE</td>
<td>3 CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOYD, CONWELL, GRAYSON; THE SULLIVANS; STEPHEN POTTER, BURNS, BELL, CHARRETTE, MILLER, KNAPP, COGSWELL, CAPERTON, INGERSOLL</td>
<td>13 DD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) TG 30.5 (Search, Reconnaissance and Photograph Command)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total aircraft</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POCOMOKE, KENNETH WHITING, CHANDLEUR, HAMLIN</td>
<td>4 AV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONSLOW, MAKINAC, COOS BAY, SHELIKOF, CASCO, YAKUTAT</td>
<td>6 AVP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) TF 59 (Shore-Based Air Force, Forward Area CENPAC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total aircraft</td>
<td>455</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(b) TF 17 (Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet)

(1) On Patrol

(a) CONVOY COLLEGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submarine Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAILFISH, SEADRAGON, SNOOK, SAWFISH, PARCHE, SHARK, URUM, BLACKFISH, GOLIATH ICEFISH</td>
<td>10 SS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) NE and NW Formosa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submarine Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TANG, SILVERSIDES, TRIGGER, SALMON</td>
<td>4 SS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) MARU MORGUE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submarine Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HURRFISH, BARBEL, STEERLET, CAURY, SKATE, SEA DOG</td>
<td>6 SS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-199-
(d) Nagasaki - Sasebo
PERCH, ESCOLAR, CROAKER 3 SS
(e) HIT PARADE
BESUGO, RONQUIL, GREENLING, CABILAN, TAMGOR 5 SS
(f) POLAR CIRCUIT
TILEFISH, APOGON 2 SS
(g) Truk
PERMIT 1 SS
(h) DUNKERS DERBY
SNAPPER, SEA FOX, HILLFISH 3 SS

(2) En route Patrol
PILOTFISH, KINGFISH, HALIBUT, HADDOCK, BLACKFIN, JALLAO, PINNADO, SEAL, ATULE, SARGO, SCAMP, TUNA, POGY 13 SS

(3) En route Base
FLYING FISH, GUARDFISH, RAZORBACK, ASPRO, CAIMILLA, PIRANHA, TREPANG, SEGUNDO, SEAHORSE, SEA DEVIL, WHALE 11 SS

(4) Total
58 SS

(2) Tasks Assigned

(a) Western Pacific Task Forces

To destroy enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine areas; to protect air and sea communications along the Central Pacific Axis; to maintain and extend unremitting military pressure against Japan; to apply maximum attention to enemy air, ground, and naval forces and merchant shipping; in case opportunity for destruction of major portion of enemy fleet offer or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task.*

* CINCPAC-CINCPACOA Operation Plan 8-44, Serial 000891, September 27th, 1944.
(1) THIRD Fleet

To inflict maximum damage on enemy air and surface forces and ground installations on Okinawa, Formosa, Luzon and Visayas in support of KING II Operations. In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of enemy fleet offer or can be created such destruction becomes the primary task.*

(a) TF 38

To destroy enemy aircraft, ships, aircraft facilities, shipping facilities and enemy defenses in Okinawa, Formosa, Luzon, and Visayas and to provide air and strategic support for landing operations of COMSOUTH PAC as directed by Commander Western Pacific Task Forces.**

(b) TG 30.3

To protect CANBERRA and HOUSTON, as well as possible with forces assigned, from any surface and submarine attacks and to move them as rapidly as practicable to Ulithi.***

(c) TG 30.5

To conduct long-range searches from the Marianas and from Kossol Passage to provide air cover for TG 30.3 as it retired to Ulithi.****

(2) TF 89

To attack enemy forces and bases and to defend Allied bases.*****

(b) TF 17 (Submarine Force Pacific Fleet)

To intercept, report and destroy enemy forces approaching the area of operations or retiring therefrom; to provide lifeguard services

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* CTF 38 Operation Order 21-44, Dispatch O31800, October 1944.
** CTF 38 Operation Order 11-44, Serial 00020, October 1st, 1944.
**** CTF 38 Operation Order 21-44 Dispatch O31600, October 1944; also Action Report COMAIRPAC 10, October 2nd-29th, 1944, Serial 0022, October 29th, 1944, pp. 4, 5 and 6.
***** COMAIRPAC 10 Operation Plan 7-44, Serial Oul477, October 1st, 1944.
as ordered; to maintain and extend unremitting military pressure against Japan; to apply maximum attrition to enemy air, ground and naval forces; in case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offer or can be created such destruction becomes the primary task.

(3) Discussion

(a) Western Pacific Task Forces

(1) THIRD Fleet

The THIRD Fleet was designed to meet any threat which the Japanese might be able to launch against it. The Allies knew fairly accurately what the probable composition of the Combined Fleet might be and where its principal components were located. It is apparent that TF 38, which was the principal striking force of the THIRD Fleet, was greatly superior to the Japanese surface strength - reportedly in the Lingga-Singapore area - although there were no battleships within TF 38 equal to the MUSASHI and the YAMATO, and it is also apparent that the JMSF carrier-based aircraft within the seventeen carriers of TF 38 greatly outnumbered those within the eleven (excluding the ISE and HYUGA) carriers of the Combined Fleet, reportedly within the Inland Sea. This being so, it is likewise apparent that TF 38 and hence the THIRD Fleet was capable of defeating the Japanese Combined Fleet as it existed at this time.*

(2) TF 59

The shore-based aircraft was in general too far removed from the Leyte area to contribute directly to the landing operations. As has been pointed out earlier, Angaur and Peleliu, which had been recently captured, were within range and operations from these bases, once the air facilities had been installed, would be able to contribute somewhat to the neutralization operations in the Visayas.

(b) TF 17

The submarines were adequate in number and in quality to accomplish their assigned objectives of which the reporting, and destruction of enemy naval forces was paramount. However, to accomplish such an objective in adequate measure it was necessary to station the submarines in intercepting positions in adequate strength. This was not done. Instead, the submarines were stationed thinly along the Empire - Nansa Shoto - Formosa - northern Luzon line, with the destruction of merchant shipping as a primary objective. Had larger numbers of TF 17 submarines been stationed thickly in HIT PARADE rather than in MARU MORGANS and CONVOY COLLEGE, perhaps the accomplishment of the basic objectives would have been facilitated.

* Operations in the Pacific Ocean Area, October 1944, prepared by CINCPAC, CINCPAC, May 31st, 1945, page 55.
(e) China-Burma-India Theater (as of 0719, October 17th)

(1) Composition of Forces

(a) FOURTEENTH Air Force

Total aircraft (Table 8) 236

(b) TWENTIETH Bomber Command

(Under Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Total aircraft (Table 9) 140

(c) Total 376

(2) Tasks Assigned

(a) FOURTEENTH Air Force

To support the operations of COMSOWESPAC by (a) reconnaissance of the South China Sea* and (b) by attacking hostile air installations within 1000 miles of Kunming, including Hong Kong, Hainan, and the Gulf of Tonkin.**

(b) TWENTIETH Bomber Command

To support the KING II Operation by exerting maximum effort against enemy air forces based on Formosa.***

(3) Discussion

(a) The FOURTEENTH Air Force, because of lack of bases and logistic difficulties, was unable to provide effective direct support to KING II, other than limited reconnaissance of the South China Sea, and limited attacks against shipping and port facilities along the coast of China. Moreover, the aircraft available to support the Leyte operation were limited to but four air groups (236 aircraft out of a total of 612), because of the necessity to carry out the primary task of supporting Chinese ground operations against the southward drive of the Japanese

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* CINCPAC Dispatch 151230, October 1944 to COMNAVCHINA.
*** CINCPAC Dispatch 100661, October 1944 to Deputy Commander, 20th Air Force.
land forces taking place at this time.

(b) The full strength (140 - B-29's) of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command was diverted from its mission against occupied China and Japan to lend support to the Leyte Campaign, on orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unlike the aircraft of the FOURTEENTH Air Force, the B-29's had the necessary range to reach targets in Formosa from their bases in central China, and were more fully capable of accomplishing their assigned tasks.

(h) ALLIED PLAN

As has been pointed out in the INTRODUCTION, the original Allied Plan, prior to moving into the Philippines, called for the completion (a) by CINCPAC of STALEMATE II which involved the capture of Peleliu, Angaur, Ulithi and Yap, and (b) by COMOWESPAC of INTERLUDE which involved the capture of Morotai and of GOSSIPMONGER, which involved the capture of Talaul.

However, upon the highly successful operations of COMTHIRDPAC against the central Philippines on September 12th and 13th wherein he discovered a lack of organized and effective Japanese air opposition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on September 15th, after recommendations thereon had been received from CINCPAC and COMOWESPAC decided to abandon the capture of Yap by CINCPAC, and of Talaul by COMOWESPAC, and to proceed directly with KING II. Meanwhile, COMOWESPAC, on September 15th, captured Morotai. CINCPAC, on the same day, in execution of Phase I of STALEMATE II, commenced operations for the capture of Peleliu. He captured Angaur on September 20th. COMTHIRDPAC, on September 23rd, captured Ulithi.

The KING II Operations visualized a major amphibious assault from Hollandia and Manus to seize the group of hostile airfields and potential base sites on the east coast of Leyte Island. Landings were to be made in the Tacloban and Dalag areas. Initial lodgment was to be followed by the introduction of light naval forces into Visayan waters via San Juanico and Pecan Straits, the seizure of control of Surigao Strait, the consolidation of western Samar and Leyte, and the establishment of necessary base facilities in the Leyte Gulf area for support of subsequent SOWESPAC operations in the Philippines.

The reason for choosing the east coast of Leyte was that it offered certain obvious advantages for amphibious landings. It had a free undefended approach from the east, sufficient anchorage area, and good access to the remainder of the central islands in that it commanded the approaches to Surigao Strait. Moreover, the position by-passed and isolated large Japanese forces in Mindanao. The accelerated timing of the operation and choice of the east coast for landing required, however, the acceptance of one serious disadvantage -- the rainy season. Most of the islands in the Philippines are mountainous and during the northeast monsoon, from October
to March, land areas on the east sides of the mountains have torrential rains.*

The plan was simple. It called for the transportation, by SEVENTH Fleet amphibious lift, to the Leyte area (a) of the THIRTEENTH Corps (FIRST Cavalry Division and TWENTY-FOURTH Infantry Division) and its landing in the Tacloban area, and (b) of the TWENTY-FOURTH Corps (SEVENTH Infantry Division and NINETY-SIXTH Infantry Division) and its landing in the Dulag area and (c) of the TWENTY-FIRST Regimental Combat Team which was to seize control of the Panay Strait area -- all on D day, October 20th. It called for transportation also by the SEVENTH Fleet, of the SIXTH Ranger Battalion which was to seize Sulu Island, the northern end of Dziagat Island, and the southern end of Homonhon Island, commencing D-3 day.

The movement of these forces to the Leyte area called principally for preliminary covering operations (a) by the Commander Western Pacific Task Force, (composed mainly of the THIRD Fleet, including carrier, land, and tender-based aircraft) against the Nanso Shoto, Formosa, Luzon and the Visayas, commencing on October 10th for the purpose of destroying enemy aircraft, ships, aircraft facilities, shipping facilities and defenses, (b) by the CG, FOURTEENTH Air Force, under the operational control of CG, U.S. Army Forces in the CBI, against shipping and enemy airfields in the Formosa and Luzon areas. (c) by CG, TWENTY-FIRST Bomber Command under the operational control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, against enemy installations on Formosa, in coordination with carrier strikes of the THIRD Fleet. (d) by Commander Submarines Pacific Fleet, and by Commander Submarines SOWDES PAC against merchant and combat shipping and for the purpose of obtaining intelligence concerning enemy forces.

As has been discussed in previous pages, the covering operations by the THIRD Fleet against Nanso Shoto and Formosa as of OY/2, October 17th had been very successfully completed, those against Luzon had been scarcely started, and those against the Visayas had not as yet been attempted. Submarine operations up to this time had been singularly unproductive. The operations of the FOURTEENTH Air Force had not been very successful because range limitations from available bases in East China restricted most of these operations to the coastal areas of China and to reconnaissance over the South China Sea. However, attacks on Formosa by the TWENTY-FIRST Bomber Command from China bases had been successful.

The plan now called for the execution of the succeeding phase, i.e., the seizure of Sulu Island, the sweeping of Leyte Gulf for mines, the seizure of the northern end of Dziagat Island, the southern end of

Hemachon Island, the landing of the troops in the Taoeioban and Dulag areas, the gaining of control of the Panon Strait area, and, finally, the establishment of base facilities, notably air facilities ashore on Leyte Island. This plan, on the basis of what was then known and the best current estimates, was sound since:

(a) As a consequence of the above covering operations the Allies knew that Japanese land-based aircraft was not only ineffective against the planes of TF 38, but had suffered very heavy losses. They also knew that Allied carrier-based air power was even stronger now, in the Philippine-Formosa area, than it had been on October 10th since it had been reinforced by the planes of TF 77.4 (Escort Carrier Group), and thus should be much superior to Japanese land-based air power.

(b) The Allies estimated that they would be opposed by about 18,000 men in the Leyte area of which 4,000 were reported at Taoeioban and 5,000 at Dulag. Since they were landing in the first four days about 148,000 men (85,000 XXIVth Corps, 93,000 Xth Corps) they had reason to believe that they were vastly superior in ground troops.

(c) Finally, they continued to estimate that the Japanese Fleet would not oppose the landings.** However, they estimated that, even if they did, the Allied surface forces would be very superior in numbers and quality. They estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Allied</th>
<th>Japanese***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9 (including HYUGA and ISH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>11****</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They had reason to believe also that whereas the Allied surface power which was somewhat dispersed could, in general, be readily concentrated, the Japanese power was widely scattered between the Empire and Singapore making concentration very difficult indeed.

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* XXIV Corps After Action Report Leyte, page 34; also Action Report CTF 78 Leyte operation, Serial 00911, November 10th, 1944, page 5.
** General Headquarters SWAC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Intelligence Summary No. 20, Periods Summary of Enemy Trends, October 21st, 1944.
**** HUNTS and CANAAN omitted, damaged.
CHAPTER III

(a) JAPANESE COMMAND RELATIONS

(1) General Discussion

The Japanese system of command was radically different from that employed by the Allies. There were, for example, naval area commands such as the Southwest Area, which were under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, but the naval officer in command of such an area only had command of the naval forces, both sea and air, in his area and, except in special instances, did not have command of any army ground forces there. On occasions as provided by joint agreements he did command certain army air force units in his area. There were also area army commands such as the Southern Army where the army commander had command of army ground and air forces in his area but did not have command of the sea forces. On occasions, as will be shown later, he did command certain units of the naval air forces as well as the naval base forces in his area.

The army areas and the naval areas were not bounded by the same geographical boundaries, but were instead entirely separate, although a naval area might be within an army area. The naval Southwest Area, for example, was within the army Southern Area. The result of this was that there was no over-all unified command in any area. This was in contrast with the Allied system of command wherein a theater commander such as COMGNEWSPAC or CINCPAC commanded, in general, all forces of whatever service assigned to his area.

(2) Chain of Command

(a) General

The Japanese chain of command was, theoretically, the Emperor, assisted by two consultative bodies, viz., the Supreme War Council and the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals; the Imperial General

* The time of receipt of many Japanese dispatches has been generally unavailable to this analysis. Often the time of receipt is known for one command but not known for other commands. In order to compensate for this, it has been assumed from an average time of receipt of a number of important dispatches that, unless otherwise stated, important dispatches concerning operations were received by action addressed in one half hour. Such assumed times of receipt are indicated by the phrase "at about." While this assumption may seem somewhat generous, a study of this analysis will show that the result of later receipt (such as one hour or more) would have caused little or no change in the basic study.
Headquarters; and thence (a) for the Navy, from the Naval Section of the Imperial Headquarters to the Naval General Staff and thence to the Cinc, Combined Fleet, and (b) for the Army, from the Army Section of the Imperial General Headquarters to the Army General Staff and thence to field commanders.

Practically however, the chain of command, insofar as the Battle for Leyte Gulf was concerned, was from the Imperial General Headquarters, which controlled all military and naval operations, to the Cinc, Combined Fleet, and field commanders of the Army.

Although apparently an organ of unified command the Imperial General Headquarters was not so in fact. It was compartmented into Army and Navy Sections, which were headed respectively by the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs. The sections were manned chiefly by Army and Navy General Staff personnel, augmented by personnel from other Government organs, such as the naval and war ministries. Each section was fully competent to prepare plans and issue orders and directives to its own service in all matters pertaining only to its service. In cases involving both services, such as the SHO Operations, joint plans were evolved by the staffs of the two sections in cooperation. It is important to note however, that the basic orders and directives prepared from the joint plans mentioned above, were disseminated to the operational commands of the Army and Navy, by the heads of the two sections, independently, and by their capacities as chiefs of General Staffs. Thus the chain of command during the Battle for Leyte Gulf, was (a) from the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters to Cinc, Combined Fleet, transmitting orders and directives of a joint Army-Navy nature, and orders and directives of a purely Navy character, and (b) from the Army Section of Imperial General Headquarters to the Cinc Southern Army transmitting orders and directives of a joint Army-Navy nature and orders and directives of a purely Army character.

It would appear from the foregoing that the Army and Navy General Staffs, in this command arrangement, were being by-passed, but such was not the case, for the senior members of the Army and Navy Sections were also the senior members of their respective General Staffs and transmitted all orders evolved from General Headquarters planning and decisions to their respective services, in their capacity of Chief of their General Staff.

Since this study of the Battle for Leyte Gulf is primarily one relating to the operations of Japanese sea and air forces, discussion of the Army chain of command will be limited, in the future, to those occasions when such discussion is necessary for clarification.

(b) Naval Chain of Command

Japanese naval units were organized both administratively and tactically. Generally, the title of an administrative command was
"Fleet" while that of the tactical command was "Force." Thus, under Cinc, Combined Fleet’s order "Allocation of Forces" dated August 1st, 1944, the SECOND Fleet became tactically the FIRST Striking Force, the FIRST Air Fleet became tactically the FIFTH Base Air Force and the EIGHTH Fleet became tactically the Outer South Seas Force. The only exception to this was the Combined Fleet which was both an administrative and tactical title. This analysis will generally use the tactical designation of forces, and, where desirable, the administrative designation will be indicated in parenthesis.

All of the Japanese naval forces, including the base air forces but excepting the China Area Fleet, the Naval District and Guard Forces, and the Surface Escort Forces were under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet. The Combined Fleet consisted (a) of the mobile forces including submarines which could operate in any area (b) of the localized area forces which were responsible for and restricted to certain geographical areas, and (c) of the base air forces. The mobile forces constituted the main striking forces of the Combined Fleet. The area forces were normally defensive in character and were generally unable to take any strong offensive action without assistance from the mobile forces. The base air forces included naval land-based air units and carrier air groups when they operated from shore-bases.

Plate "XII" shows the chain of command within the Combined Fleet as of August 10th as established for the SHO Operations. This chain of command remained constant until October 18th when some modifications were made. This plate therefore, depicts the command structure which existed at 0719, October 17th.

It will be noted that Cinc, Combined Fleet exercised direct command over (a) the Mobile Force, consisting of the FIRST (SECOND Fleet) Striking Force, the SECOND (FIFTH Fleet) Striking Force, and the Main Force (THIRD Fleet) with its carriers and air groups, (b) two base air forces, the SIXTH and SEVENTH Base Air Forces (SECOND and THIRD Air Fleets), (c) Inner South Seas Force consisting of the remnants of the FOURTH Fleet plus the attached Base Forces, (d) Advance Expeditionary Force (SIXTH Fleet, composed of submarines) and (e) the THIRTY-FIRST Army, which was composed of the Japanese Army Forces in the Bonins, Marianas and western Carolines. In addition, after August 21st, Cinc, Combined Fleet had full operational control over the Surface Escort Forces, Naval District Guard Forces, and the China Area Fleet insofar as the SHO Operations were concerned.** It is of interest that certain of the base air forces included Army air units attached to them for operations. In this connection it should be pointed

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* Japanese Naval Organization ONI 49, January 1944.
** Naval General Staff Directives No. 33, August 9th and No. 35, August 21st, 1944, SCAP/ATIS Document 14016A and 14016B.
out that CinC, Combined Fleet in his order allocating forces and tasks to his command advised his commanders among other things, as follows:

(1) "Depending upon the situation the FIRST and SECOND Striking Forces may be placed under the direct command of CinC, Combined Fleet." This was done on October 20th, when CinC, Combined Fleet assumed command of the FIRST Striking Force.

(2) "The commanders of all forces will cooperate in effecting the transport of the FIFTH, SIXTH and SEVENTH Base Air Forces. The Commander Southwest Area Force will cooperate in the transfer of the Inner South Sea Area Force and of the THIRTY-FIRST Army."

(3) "The commanders of all forces will cooperate in the protection of sea communications and A/S operations with the Commanders Surface Escort Force, China Area Fleet, and Naval Bases and Guard Districts."

(4) "The commanders of carrier air groups operating from land bases will endeavor to conform to the air combat regulations prescribed for land-based air forces in the SHO Operations."

(3) Coordination between Army Air Force and land-based Naval Air Forces

(a) Basic Agreement

Although there appear to have been no written agreements concerning the coordination of the Army ground forces and the Naval sea and carrier-based air forces, there was a basic agreement covering land-based aircraft of both services.** This basic agreement provided for lower command level agreements to be concluded, among others, between CinC, Combined Fleet and General Defense Command and between CinC, Combined Fleet and CinC, Southern Army. The latter agreement was effected, as will be pointed out later, between the local representatives, i.e., CG, FOURTH Air Army and Commander FIFTH Base Air Force. The basic agreement also provided that both air forces would by a "converted

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** Army-Navy Central Agreement concerning SHO air operations concluded July 24th, 1944, Supplement to Imperial General Headquarters Navy Section Directive 435, July 26th, 1944, WDC Document 210769 (Microfilm).
utilization of forces" destroy the enemy. Insofar as the Philippines, Nansel Shoto and Formosa were concerned, it further provided that overall command of and responsibility for air operations in these areas was vested in:

1. Nansel Shoto and Formosa: Navy
2. Philippines: Joint Army-Navy

In this latter case it provided that (1) when the primary emphasis was on sea operations, that portion of Army (FOURTH Air Army) Air Units assigned to sea attack operations would be under the tactical command of the Navy (Commander FIFTH Base Air Force) and (2) when the primary emphasis was on land operations that portion of the FIFTH Base Air Force required to support the Army would be under the tactical command of the CG, FOURTH Air Army. The agreement also provided that the principal tasks of the Army and Navy Air Forces in the Philippines up to the time of decisive battle were (a) Naval Air Forces: Long-range patrol, (b) Army Air Forces: Air operations in the area north of Australia, i.e., Halmahera, western New Guinea, etc.

This agreement also provided for the joint utilization of certain bases which were specifically designated within the Nansel Shoto, Formosa and the Philippines and further provided that the flexible use of bases by both services would be sought beyond the scope of this agreement as the situation demanded.

It was quite complete in many respects and seems to have covered most of those points necessary to obtain the maximum effective effort of the Army and Navy Air Forces within the Philippines or at Formosa. However, the agreement is lacking in several important particulars.

1. It does not state who determined when the primary emphasis was to be changed from sea operations to land operations. Why this is so is not clear, for a lack of clear-cut definition of command can, and often does, have a highly disruptive effect on the conduct of military operations. All the available evidence points to the conclusion that shifts of Army aircraft to Navy tactical command, and vice-versa, were to be decided by mutual agreement between the interested commanders in the area - Commander FOURTH Air Army and Commander FIFTH or SIXTH Base Air Forces.

2. It does not state the method of coordinating the air forces on Formosa with those in the Philippines. Since there was no coordination compact in this agreement and since no coordination compacts of any nature have been located, it would appear that any action taken by the air commander in one area in support of the other area was to be purely cooperative with all of the uncertainty which that entails.
(b) Implementing Agreement

In accordance with the provisions of the Central Agreement the two local air commanders in the Philippines (Commander FIFTH Base Air Force and CO, FOURTH Air Army) concluded an implementing agreement under which the FIFTH Base Air Force appears to have assumed primary responsibility for over water air patrol, and attacks on enemy task forces, while the FOURTH Air Army assumed primary responsibility for attacks on enemy transports. COMTHIRDPLT's air attacks during September demonstrated the inadequacy of this agreement, so a new agreement specifically providing for joint action against enemy air attack prior to the activation of SHO was prepared.* This new local agreement which was in much more detail than the basic agreement and evidently more in detail than the local agreement which it superseded provided that:

(1) Patrols

(a) Long-range patrols were to be accomplished by the Navy.

(b) Short-range patrols were to be accomplished by designated Army and Navy units, each in its assigned sectors.

(2) Search

Searches were to be conducted in the same manner as patrols.

(3) Contact Scouting

(a) Day contact scouting was to be accomplished by designated Army and Navy units, each in its assigned sectors.

(b) Night contact scouting was to be accomplished by designated Army units in sectors to be assigned as demanded by the situation.

(4) Attacks

Both surprise attacks and general offensive attacks were to be made. These attacks were to employ as necessary all naval aircraft of the FIFTH Base Air Force based in the Philippines and most of the Army fighter strength and some of its bomber strength, based in the Philippines.

* Documents from file of Lieutenant Colonel Katao Sato, Staff Officer, FOURTH Air Army, Department of the Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-7, Agreement probably made late summer 1944.
(4) Summation

The Japanese command organization, based on Allied concepts, was poor with the possible exception of Army and Naval land-based air, but even here the command relationship was not fully defined. In the Japanese organization all major decisions on basic policy were made in Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo which was 1700 miles from Manila; the control of all naval operations remained in CINC, Combined Fleet's Headquarters at Hyoashi in the Tokyo area; the control of the Southern Army operations was in the Southern Army Headquarters in Manila. With radio communications the distance between Tokyo and the Philippines might seem unimportant, but when the numerous difficulties inherent in long-range radio communications are considered this on occasion could prove disastrous. Also, Allied experience has shown that it is important that the commander be within easy range of the combat area in order that he may personally consult with his own commanders and see for himself the morale of his troops and the nature of the warfare being waged. In the Korean War of 1950-53, this was clearly shown by the frequency of the visits of the Allied commander in Tokyo (CINC, United Nations Command) to the battle front. He did this because he found his distance from the battle front too restrictive. The difficulty of exercising command from long distances was also shown at the Battle of Midway where CINCPAC in view of his distance (1150 miles) from Midway Island was unable to maintain adequately the coordination necessary between his carrier forces, his submarines and his land-based aircraft at Midway. It was for similar reasons that the Joint Chiefs of Staff established theaters in the Pacific Ocean during World War II notably, POA, SOWESPAC and SOPAC. Does it not appear that it would have been wiser had the Japanese established a Philippine theater (SHO One was the defense of the Philippines) with headquarters on Luzon, wherein the theater commander had full operating control of all ground forces, of all air forces, both Army and Navy within the theater, and of certain naval forces, mostly escort, which might be assigned to the theater? And is it not clear that should such a theater have been set up there should at the very least have been provided in augmentation a coordination agreement wherein the theater commander and CINC, CINCG Fleet coordinated their operations to obtain the maximum results? It seems possible that such an agreement, couched in rather general terms, may have existed between CINCG Southern Army and CINCG, Combined Fleet, but if so, it has not as yet been located.

Perhaps, based on Japanese concepts, the organization actually provided was the best that could have been obtained under the circumstances. The Japanese Army and Navy had often been widely apart in their strategic thinking and their commanders were unwilling to place the command of major ground or naval surface forces of one service under the direct command of the other service. They preferred to retain the operational command within the CINCG, Combined Fleet in the Tokyo area and within CINCG Southern Army in Manila and to conduct operations from these headquarters.

(b) INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE JAPANESE COMMAND

(1) He believed that the Allies would employ elements of, or a major part of, their carrier task forces to carry out bombing attacks on key cities in Japan proper and on strategic sectors of southern Kyushu, Formosa and the Philippines in order to lower Japanese economic production, to cause unrest among the Japanese people, and to destroy the Japanese air strength.*

While this estimate was exaggerated it was, in general, correct.

(2) He believed that at an opportune time the Allies would launch invasion operations against strategic sectors of the southern Philippines and might, at the same time, launch invasion operations against strategic sectors of the central and northern Philippines should the counter air action by Japanese land-based aircraft prior to invasion prove ineffective.*

This estimate was reasonably correct, but erred in that the Allied landings occurred in the central rather than in the southern Philippines. It was in line with the Allied original plan which called for seizure of Yap and Talaud, but this plan was changed on September 15th because the Allies had discovered that the Japanese were militarily weak in the Leyte area.

(3) He believed that, prior to launching invasion operations, the Allies would employ the major part of their carrier-based aircraft in an attempt to destroy the Japanese air strength in southern Kyushu, Hainan Shoto, Formosa and the Philippines.*

This was a correct estimate and shows that the Japanese had an excellent appreciation of Allied strategy.

(4) He believed that the Allies would increase their submarine activities in order to prevent the Japanese from deploying their combat strength to the Philippines.*

This estimate was incorrect in that the Allies did not actually increase their submarine activities to any noticeable extent. Instead they maintained them at the high level at which they had been operating. They did however, employ some of their submarines in support of direct military operations and therefore reduced somewhat the number operating against merchant shipping during these times.

(5) He anticipated that the Allies would endeavor to land in the Philippines area (including the Sulu Sea) during or after the last ten days of

* Situation Estimate at start of the Allied Invasion of Palau and Halmahera, September 17th, 1944, Combined Fleet Headquarters, Army Historical Division Microfilm NS-26, Item F.
October and therefore directed that operational preparations for SHO One were to be completed with first priority.*

This was a very correct estimate as the Allies landed in strength at Leyte on October 20th. While the term "Philippine area" was all-inclusive and did not specify the exact landing area, nevertheless it shows that the Japanese High Command was definitely alerted to an Allied landing in the Philippines as early as late October.

(*) He had information that certain of the enemy carrier task forces were in the Marianas** and that the amphibious forces were in the Hollandia-Wake area.***

This was only partially correct. The carrier task forces were normally at Ulithi, and the principal amphibious forces were normally at Manus, although the amphibious reinforcement groups were in the Hollandia-Wake area.

The Japanese belief that the carriers were in the Marianas appears to have been based on the fact that TG 38.2 had been reported there by friendly sources. This task group had loaded ammunition at Saipan from 0602, September 28th to 1641, September 29th and had then gone to Ulithi.**** That the Japanese had an interest in Ulithi seems clear for on October 7th the Japanese submarine RO46 was directed to reconnoiter this base and reported one carrier, several cruisers, ten destroyers, and thirteen transports.***** The carrier was the BUNKER HILL, the cruisers were the RENO and BIRMINGHAM which had been left behind to complete ammunition replenishment when the carrier task groups had sorted the previous day. The Japanese were unfortunate here, for had the RO46 arrived one day earlier, she would have observed TG's 33.2 and 38.3 sortieing to the westward and would possibly have estimated (a) that Ulithi was an important carrier base, and (b) that the anticipated Allied air attacks against the Japanese defense line - Kyushu, Nansei Shoto, Formosa, Philippines - were about to start.

It seems surprising that the Japanese did not appreciate the importance of Manus at this time. This base, which had been in Allied hands since its capture in February 29th, had been built into a great

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** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 021021, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 161437; also Commander Sasebo Naval District Dispatch 032021, October 1944 to all units Sasebo Naval District, WDC Document 163369.
*** Material for Situation Estimates First Section Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC Document 216764 (Microfilm).
**** War Diary BUNKER HILL, October 28th and 29th, 1944.
repair, supply and staging base by the Allies, and yet prior to October 9th there is but one reference to it, and that indirect, in all of the Japanese information available to this study. This reference, dated September 1st, merely stated that it was believed that an element of the enemy surface fleet would be in the vicinity of the Admiralty islands around that time,* but it made no reference whatsoever to Manus. Does it not seem strange that, at this vital time when an invasion was expected, the Japanese failed to reconnoiter, at least by submarines, some of the islands which the Allies had seized as stepping stones? Twenty-seven submarines were operational in the Empire.** Was it not highly probable that such bases were of strategic importance to the Allied advance also they would not have been seized?

(7) He believed that the Allied carrier task forces which were in the Marianas would soon commence operations against Kyushu, the Namesi Shoto, and Formosa. For this reason, commencing October 4th and continuing indefinitely, the Commander SIXTH Base Air Force alerted his command from two hours before sunrise until 1200 noon (the time his patrol aircraft reached their limits of search). It was also for this reason that the Commander Saipan Naval District on October 3rd tightened the air precautions of the units in the Okinawa area.***

This estimate of Allied intentions was correct for COMAFDPLT struck the Okinawa area with his carrier-based aircraft on October 10th.

(8) He had information, on October 4th, that the concentrations of enemy strength in the Ulithi area might be complete.**** What the nature of these concentrations was is not explained. It appears doubtful that the Japanese expected the carrier task force(s) to be based there as they repeatedly referred to the "enemy task force in the Marianas." Whether they know it or not the fact remains that the Allied carrier task force concentrations at Ulithi were, in fact, generally complete on this date. On the following day, October 5th, TG's 38.2 and 38.3, which had resupplied there, sortied to join TG's 30.1 and 38.4 on October 7th to commence the preliminary operations of KING II.

(9) He believed that the enemy had begun to employ the airfields on Peleliu as early as October 2nd. This was correct. However, the field

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** Appendix to Japanese Naval War Diary World War II, April 1st, 1944 - September 2nd, 1945, ATIS Document 168338.
** Japanese Submarine Operations in Philippine Waters, 1944-1945, Department of the Army Historical Division 3-5, JS-10.
*** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 021021, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 161437; also Commander Saipan Naval District Dispatch 032021, October 1944 to all units Saipan Naval District, WDC Document 160369. Also Takao Air Base Dispatch 061946, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force.
**** Material for Situation Estimates First Section Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC Document 216784 (Microfilm).
was usable by small aircraft only and therefore, the planes stationed there at this time were fighters and night fighters which were being employed for local air patrols, air support of the military operations underway, and air defense.*

(10) He had information that on October 9th in the Hollandia-Wakde area of New Guinea there were six carriers, four battleships, ten cruisers, over twenty destroyers and over 200 large medium and small transports, and that in Biak there were fifty large transports, a large number of medium and small transports and several cruisers and destroyers.**

This information was incorrect as regards combat ships and transports at Wakde and Biak as there was no important naval shipping at either of these bases. It was incorrect as regards large combat ships at Hollandia as there were no battleships nor carriers there. It was reasonably correct at Hollandia as regards small combat ships as there were about forty-eight destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates and destroyer transports there. It was surprisingly correct at Hollandia as regards transports for, if the Liberty Ships, transports, LST's and service ships are included as transports, there were approximately 187 ships.

(11) He had information that Allied carriers would attack Formosa and that the U.S. FOURTEENTH and TWENTIETH Air Forces based in China would participate by attacking either Formosa, Okinawa or Kyushu*** or perhaps all three. The record is not clear on this point. (It is of interest that most of this information was obtained from a report by the Australian Minister to Moscow who told the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs there that these attacks were designed to isolate the Philippines).** Although no date was specified, it is assumed that the Japanese expected the attacks during October as the information was dated October 4th. However, Cinc, Combined Fleet made no searches to the northwest against the China-based attacks. The Japanese information concerning these strikes was in general correct. The THIRD Fleet strikes were to be on October 12th and 13th; the TWENTIETH Bomber Command Strikes on October 11th and 14th. The FOURTEENTH Air Force, owing to logistic difficulties and lack of bases was unable to give the support originally planned.

(12) He believed that the Allied surface ship attack on Marcus Island on October 9th was purely diversionary and employed but limited

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* War Diary CTF 57, October 1944.
** Material for Situation Estimates First Section Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC Document 215764 (Microfilm).
*** War Diary GROKU Detachment of 301st Air Group Dispatch 022021, October 1944, from Commander Sasebo Naval District, WDC Document 160369.
forces.** This was a correct analysis.**

(13) He believed that Allied Air Forces were operating from Morotai as of October 3rd. This was almost correct as the Allies had commenced using the Morotai fields on October 4th.

(14) He had information that numerous Allied submarines were in the waters in the vicinity of Kyushu, Nansei Shoto, Formosa and the Philippines since on the morning of October 9th submarines had been reported as follows: one surfaced submarine (CROAKER) to the westward of Kyushu;*** one surfaced submarine (RONQUIL) about 330 miles,*** one surfaced submarine (GABILAN) about 310 miles*** southwest of Tokyo Bay, and one surfaced submarine (RAZORBACK) about 600 miles almost due east of Garan Bi, Formosa.*** A number of contacts on submarines were also reported west of Luzon and south of the Philippines (Borneo).*****

This information was correct although the number of submarines in all areas were much greater than the above contacts would indicate (Diagram "B"). It is not clear what submarines were contacted west of Luzon and south of the Philippines. Although the location of Allied submarines may be found under the discussion of the Allied side they are restated here by days for reference. Submarines were on station on October 9th as follows:

(a) In the sea areas west of Luzon, six submarines, viz., HOE, about 180 miles almost due west of Cape Bojeador; BONAFISH and LAFON in the vicinity of Cape Polines; the FLASHER, about twenty miles west of Paluig Point; and the RAY and COD which, while not together, were both about eighty miles west of Cape Santiago. These submarines, which normally operated submerged at periscope depth, reported having sighted planes on October 8th and 9th, as follows: On October 8th, RAY, one;***** on October 9th, FLASHER, seven.***** The other submarines made no contacts on these two days.

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* War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161858, NA 11739 (Microfilm).
** Action Report CTU 30.2 Bombardment of Marcus Island, Serial 0138, October 14th, 1944.
*** War Diary OROKU Detachment of 901st Air Group Dispatch 091055, October 1944, WDC Document 160389.
**** Commander Kanoya Air Base Dispatch 091801, October 1944 to Designated Ships, WDC Document 161437.
***** CoFS, SW Area Fleet Dispatch 101554, October 1944 to Flags SW Area contained in War Diary DESRON 10, October 1944, WDC Document 161638.
(b) In the sea areas due west of Mindoro, three submarines, the BECUINA, CAVALA and HAWKBILL. These submarines, which were about 150 miles from the west coast of Mindoro, made no contacts on October 8th or 9th.

(c) In the sea areas of the southern Philippines, five submarines. These were the ANGEL in the Mindanao Sea, the BLUEGILL off Guimaras Island in Panay Gulf, the CERO in Sibutu Pass just west of Tawi Tawi; and the DACE and DARTER in Palawan Passage. The CERO sighted one enemy plane on October 8th;* the DACE two on October 9th.** The other submarines made no contacts on these two days.

(d) In the sea areas south of the Philippines (Borneo) two submarines. These were the HAMMERHEAD, which was in the South China Sea about sixty miles north of Cape Sirik, Borneo and the PADDLE which was forty miles east of Balikpapan Bay in Makassar Strait. The HAMMERHEAD made no contacts on October 8th or 9th; the PADDLE sighted, on October 8th, two planes and on October 9th, five planes.

(e) JAPANESE LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT
vulnerable period of the actual landing, the base air forces together with other Fleet and Army forces would concentrate and destroy the landing forces.

The Japanese plans did provide, under certain circumstances, for deviation from this basic plan. For example, if conditions were such as to render impossible the dispersal of the base air forces or if good results could be achieved with the forces available, an attack could be made immediately with all available forces.*

How effective this plan of avoiding losses by dispersing prior to the time of the decisive battle might have been cannot be ascertained, for subsequent to October 10th it was not used. However, it should be noted that such a plan required that the base air forces not be surprised in order to have time to disperse and also that, at the later time of concentration and decisive attack, they have sufficient control of the air over their staging base to permit their forward movement and attack.

That there was some doubt that this plan could be effected is evident for or September 18th, 1944, Commander Southern Army at Manila forwarded to Imperial General Headquarters a recommendation that his air strength (FOURTH Air Army) be authorized to strike with full force against enemy carriers rather than attempt to conserve this strength for employment in the later decisive battle against the landing forces.** As a result of the damage inflicted by the THIRD Fleet strikes against the Philippines in September this commander doubted if the conservation plan would be effective in future operations. He based this doubt on a belief that he could not rely on his intelligence to provide timely warning and that his airfield defenses did not appear capable of protecting the air strength he was trying to conserve.***

This recommendation was not approved, although the CG, FOURTH Air Army was authorized to conduct small scale attacks on enemy task forces under particularly favorable situations. Possibly, Imperial General Headquarters felt that the eventuality foreseen by Commander Southern Army was sufficiently provided for under the existing concept which permitted attack rather than dispersal under certain conditions previously cited.

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** Statement of Colonel Yosh Miwama, Staff Officer (Operations) Southern Army, G-2, Historical Section Files, GHQ, FEC.  
*** Southern Army Operations 1941-1945; First Demobilization Bureau Monograph File No. 6-6, JS-21.
At the time of the first Allied attack of the Leyte Campaign, the THIRD Fleet attack on Okinawa on October 10th, Japanese land-based aircraft were generally organized along area lines corresponding to the SHO plans. Since in the Battle for Leyte Gulf, Allied attacks were directed solely against the Formosa-Manseki Shoto-southern Kyushu area (SHO Two) and in the Philippine area (SHO One) this study will be concerned with these areas only.

(1) Organization and composition of Japanese air forces in Southern Kyushu, Manseki Shoto, Formosa and Philippines

(a) Formosa, Manseki Shoto, Southern Kyushu Area

In this area there was one major land-based air command. This was SIXTH Base Air Force. The Commander, SIXTH Base Air Force,* who operated directly under CinC, Combined Fleet, was in the process of shifting his headquarters from Kanoya, southern Kyushu to Takao, Formosa. On October 10th, he commanded all fleet land-based air in the area and exercised operational control over all army air in that area. There were also based in the area certain other air units which were not under his command at this time, although they had been taken over in August by CinC, Combined Fleet for operational control in connection with the SHO Operations. These were the air elements of the Surface Escort Force and of the Naval Guard Districts, and training air groups. Certain of these, as will be later noted, were placed under his command subsequent to the first Allied attack. There were also in the Inland Sea area carrier air groups. These were not under his command at this time although subsequently some of them did operate under him.

He had organized his command into five subordinate commands.**

(1) Western Attack Force ONE (W1AB) with headquarters at Kanoya. This command embraced all tactical units based in southern Kyushu with the exception of "T" Force units (see below). He took direct command of this attack force.

(2) Western Attack Force TWO (W2AB) with headquarters on Okinawa. This force was commanded by Commander TWENTY-PIFTH Air Flotilla

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* Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, IJN.
** During the period embraced by this volume, i.e., October 10th to 0719 October 17th, the administrative titles of these commands (such as Commander 51st Air Flotilla) rather than these operational titles will be employed. This is because (a) the confused command organization which resulted from the Allied attacks on the Okinawa, Formosa, Philippines line and (b) the ensuing transfer of numerous planes from different commands to the objective area, made impractical any clear delineation of the operational command functions and responsibilities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>VP</th>
<th>WC(N)</th>
<th>Land Attack</th>
<th>Carrier Attack</th>
<th>Land Bomber</th>
<th>Recco Seaplanes</th>
<th>Recco Landplanes</th>
<th>Recco Flying Boats</th>
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<td>Source: War Diary Commander 25th Air Flotilla</td>
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<td>Source: Action Report 708th Attack Unit Detach at Shinshiku</td>
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* Does not include Army aircraft which may have been present on Okinawa. Data available includes no figures on Army aircraft at that base.  
*** Army bombers of 7th and 98th Air Regiments.
### TABLE 12
SIXTH BASE AIR FORCE - REINFORCEMENTS

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Includes 200 Army planes (Table 11)

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Units: 901st & 955rd Air Groups; 14th Combined Air Group

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Unit: 501st Attack Unit.

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Units: CARDIV's 3 and 4

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Units: 51st Air Flotilla

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Units: 254th & 256th Air Groups

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* Memorandum Notes of Capt. Dunce Shibata, IJP, Staff Officer FOURTH Air Army, Department of Army
** Historical Division, Microfilm HS-War Diary 501st Attack Unit (752nd Air Group), October 11th, 1944, WDC Document 161254.
*** Staff Officer, SIXTH Base Air Force at Kanoya, Dispatches 121556 and "no time group" October 13th, 1944.
**** Staff Officer, Base Air Force at Kanoya Dispatch, October 13th, 1944. War Diary KOKUBU, 103rd Detachment Attack Unit, October 15th-31st, 1944. WDC Document 163258.
***** Action Reports 254th and 256th Air Groups.
and included the land-based air units based in the Nansei Shoto.

(3) Western Attack Force THREE (W3AB) with headquarters at Shiriiku on the northwest coast of Formosa. This force was commanded by Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla and embraced land-based air forces in Formosa.

(4) Western Attack Force FOUR (W4AB). This force was apparently an administrative command which embraced the Army Air Force units operating under Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. It does not appear to have controlled the operations of those units. They operated under one of the other subordinate commands.

(5) "F" Force. This was a special attack force composed of the more experienced crews of the various tactical organizations of SIXTH Base Air Force. It was the major striking power of SIXTH Base Air Force and was trained to conduct both night and adverse weather attacks.* On October 10th it was based in Kyushu.

In early October Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was engaged in conducting long-range search defensive patrols, and training. In addition, he was concerned with the maintenance of planes for redeployment which would be required under the SHO plans.

The strength of the SIXTH Base Air Force on October 10th was as indicated in Table 11. By this time it had reached a relatively fair state of operational readiness. Its most competent unit was the "F" Force. The remaining units were less fully trained but were considered capable of attack during daylight. Subsequent to October 10th, the SIXTH Base Air Force was reinforced as shown in Table 12.

Detailed availability figures for units of the SIXTH Base Air Force are not available. The over-all number of aircraft actually available, however, was one-half to two-thirds of those assigned.** Such unit figures as are available indicate that this figure was about 50%. Thus of the 737 aircraft under the operational control of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force on October 10th, about 442 aircraft were operational. Likewise, of the total of 1425 aircraft operated by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force during the period October 10th-17th, about 855 were operational.

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 5-5, JS-104.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>Carrier Type</th>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Carrier Type</th>
<th>Attack</th>
<th>Land Bombers</th>
<th>Land Attack</th>
<th>Land Rescue</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>203</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) These are proportionate figures projected from firm figures for Sept. 1st 1944, contained in Naval Air Operations in the Philippines area, 1942-1945, Japanese Studies in World War II. Historical Section G-2, GHQ, FOC.

(2) They are based on three separate notations. One gives a complete breakdown of aircraft by types and totals for both assigned (on hand) and available (operational) aircraft as of September 1st. The second gives a firm total for available aircraft only as of October 1st. The third indicates the replacements of aircraft expected during the month of October. The table figures were then obtained by taking the total figure for available aircraft on October 1st, adding one-third the expected October replacements, and applying the ratios of available aircraft (a) to assigned aircraft and (b) to the relative numbers of aircraft by types which obtained on September 1st.
TABLE 14
FOURTH AIR ARMY*
26 September, 1944**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Assigned</th>
<th>138</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>27</th>
<th>57</th>
<th>395</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Available</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Documents kept by Lieutenant Colonel Katsuo Sato, IJA, Staff Officer FOURTH Air Army, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-7.

** Data available to this study does not indicate any significant change in strength between September 26th and October 10th, 1944.

*** The "aircraft available" figures are those given by the Japanese documents and are considered to be correct. The aircraft assigned (on hand) figures were obtained by dividing the various "aircraft available (operational)" figures by sixty per cent since Japanese records indicate that in general about sixty per cent of the assigned aircraft were available.
(b) Philippines Area

In the Philippines area there were two major land-based air commands, one Navy, one Army.

The Navy command was the FIFTH Base Air Force. This base air force, with headquarters in Manila, operated under Commander Southwest Area Force* who was a subordinate of CinC, Combined Fleet. On October 10th, its strength was as indicated in Table 13. It was not at this time a well trained organization since it had been reorganized in July from the remnants which had survived the defeat in the Marianas. However, an intensive training program and a plan for the replenishment of aircraft and personnel had been instituted. The program had not as yet been very successful since (a) it had been seriously interfered with during September by Allied carrier raids on its bases, and (b) availability of aircraft had been severely reduced by maintenance difficulties and lack of spare parts. As a result, the effective aircraft strength of the FIFTH Base Air Force which had been built up to 280 by early September had fallen to but 110 by September 25th. Thereafter it was built up to the figures shown in Table 13. However, due to these rapid fluctuations in strength and to the influx of new personnel, coupled with the difficulties of conducting training simultaneously with combat operations, the FIFTH Base Air Force had not become a thoroughly trained combat organization at the time of the Leyte campaign.**

The Army air organization in the Philippines was the FOURTH Air Army.*** This air army, also with headquarters at Manila, operated under CinC Southern Army**** who in turn operated directly under the Army General Staff in Tokyo. The FOURTH Air Army in a manner similar to the FIFTH Base Air Force had incurred heavy losses from Allied carrier attacks in September, and in addition had had many of its senior officers debilitated by malaria or dengue. Both its Commanding General and Chief of Staff had been replaced on September 8th as a result of disease. These factors seriously hindered the attainment of a satisfactory degree of readiness.***** The aircraft strength of the FOURTH Air Army available to this study is for September 26th and is indicated in Table 14. These figures do not appear to have materially changed by October 10th.

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* Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, IJN.
*** Commanded by Lieutenant General Kyoji Tominaga, IJA.
**** Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, IJA.
As has been noted previously there was no unified command of all units operating in the Philippines. There was, however, the Army-Navy Central Agreement concerning SHO air operations, and also a coordination agreement between Commander FIFTH Base Air Force and CG, FOURTH Air Army, the latter to provide for coordination prior to the activation of the SHO Operations. The details of these agreements have been noted under Japanese Command Relations.

(2) Types and General Characteristics of Japanese Aircraft Employed in Land Operations

(a) Fighter Aircraft

There were several types of fighter aircraft available to the Japanese in October 1944. These fighters, in general, had an average speed of about 300 knots and a combat radius of about 400 miles. This radius was slightly better than that of the Allied fighters which opposed them, but the average speed was considerably lower. While the Allied fighters were considerably heavier, carried more guns, armor, and equipment, and had a considerable faster rate of climb, they were less maneuverable.

(1) Navy

The most numerous of the fighter types available to the Navy was the carrier-type fighter which, with the land reconnaissance plane and interceptor-fighter, accounted for most of its fighter strength.

(a) The carrier-type fighter had a combat radius of 400 miles and a maximum speed of 300 knots. It carried four guns, two 7.7mm and two 20mm but had no armor or self-sealing fuel tanks.

(b) The land reconnaissance plane was basically a three-place reconnaissance aircraft employed as both a day and night fighter. Its combat radius was 450 miles; its maximum speed 270 knots. It carried four 20mm guns and was equipped with armor and self-sealing tanks.

(c) The interceptor-fighter, which was the newest of the Navy fighters, outperformed the older types with a combat radius of 500 miles and a maximum speed of 354 knots. It was equipped with four 20mm guns, armor and self-sealing tanks.

* Data on Japanese Aircraft obtained from:
(a) Representative Enemy and Allied Aircraft: Comparative Performance and Characteristics, TAIC Manual, No. 2, October 1944.
(b) CINCPAC-CINCPAC Weekly Intelligence Vol. 1, No. 15; Enclosure Data Table, Japanese Combat Aircraft, November 17th, 1944.

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(2) Army

The most numerous of the fighter types available to the Army were the Type-1 and Type-3 fighters.

(a) The Type-1 fighter had a combat radius of 350 miles and maximum speed of 296 knots. It carried armor and self-sealing tanks, although the tanks were defective and not actually leak-proof. It carried two 12.7mm guns.

(b) The Type-3 fighter had a combat radius of 450 miles and a maximum speed of 314 knots. It also carried armor and self-sealing tanks and was armed with four 12.7mm guns.

(c) A third Army fighter, the heavy fighter, was available in lesser numbers. It had a combat radius of 400 miles, a maximum speed of 309 knots, armor and ineffective self-sealing tanks and was equipped with two 12.7mm guns, and one 37mm gun. It was employed as both a day and night fighter.

(b) Bomber Aircraft

There were several types of bombers available to the Japanese in October, 1944.

(1) Navy

In the bomber field, the principal Navy strength was made up of carrier-based bombers, carrier-based reconnaissance planes, and two-engine land-bombers. The first two were carrier dive bombers.

(a) The carrier-based bomber had a combat radius of 350 miles and a maximum speed of 230 knots and was armed with three 7.7mm guns and carried a 550 lb. bomb. It had neither armor nor self-sealing tanks.

(b) The carrier-based reconnaissance plane, which had been replacing the carrier-based bombers in October 1944, had better performance. It had a combat radius of 400 miles with a maximum speed of 295 knots. Its armament was the same as that of the carrier-based bomber, but it could carry a 1100 lb. bomb. It had neither armor nor self-sealing tanks.

(c) The two-engine land-bomber had a combat radius of 700 miles with bomb load of 1,000 miles on search missions. Its maximum speed was 305 knots. It could carry a 1760 lb. bomb or a torpedo; armor was provided for the pilot.
(2) Army

Of the Army bombers available the heavy bomber was the most numerous. Its combat radius was 700 miles, its maximum speed 260 knots and its bomb capacity two 1100 lb. bombs. It was armed with one 30mm and six 7.9mm guns and was equipped with armor and self-sealing tanks.

(c) Attack Aircraft

There were several types of attack aircraft available in October, 1944.

(1) Navy

The Navy had available two carrier-based types, the Type-14 and the Type-97, and one land-based type. The carrier-based types were capable of carrying torpedoes.

(a) The Type-14 had a combat radius of 400 miles and a maximum speed of 260 knots. It was armed with two 7.7mm guns and could carry one 1760 lb. bomb or torpedo. It had no armor or self-sealing tanks.

(b) The Type-97 had a combat radius of 375 miles and a maximum speed of 192 knots. It was armed with three 7.7mm guns and could carry the same load as Type-14. It also had no armor or self-sealing tanks.

(c) The land-based type had a combat radius of 750 miles with a bomb load of one 1760 lb. bomb or torpedo. When on a reconnaissance mission its radius was increased to 1,000 miles. Its maximum speed was 230 knots. It carried armor for the tail gunner and ineffective self-sealing tanks.

(2) Army

The Army's attack aircraft were the heavy bomber and the light bomber.

(a) The heavy bomber had a combat radius of 800 miles and a maximum speed of 245 knots. It could carry two 1,100 lb. bombs and was armed with five 7.7mm and one 12.7mm guns. It had armor and self-sealing tanks.

(b) The light bomber had a combat radius of 400 miles and a maximum speed of 270 knots. It could carry a maximum bomb load of 1,600 lbs. and was armed with four 7.7mm guns. It had no armor and only ineffective self-sealing tanks.
(d) Reconnaissance Aircraft

Two types of reconnaissance aircraft were available to the Navy.

(1) The carrier-based reconnaissance plane had a combat radius of 700 miles and a maximum speed of 340 knots. It was armed with one 7.9mm gun, and equipped with armor and self-sealing tanks.

(2) The land reconnaissance plane, which in addition to its use by the Navy, was the principal reconnaissance plane of the Army, had a combat radius of 500 miles and a maximum speed of 323 knots. It carried the same armament as the former but no armor or self-sealing tanks.

(e) Aircraft Radar Characteristics

Complete details regarding the installation of airborne radar in Japanese aircraft in October 1944 are not available. Radar was installed in at least some of the carrier-based attack planes, land attack planes, and land reconnaissance planes in operation at this time. These aircraft so equipped carried Mark 6, Model 4, Type 3 search radar.* This equipment had an estimated maximum range of forty-five miles on a battleship and of fifteen miles on a submarine awash.** Heavy bombers, and possibly some other types of Army aircraft, were equipped with TA 51 Mark 1* radar which had an estimated maximum range of thirty-two miles on a cruiser and of seven miles on a submarine awash.***

(5) Japanese Air Bases

(a) Kyushu

Within the southern Kyushu area there were a total of fourteen naval airfields, three seaplane bases, and six Army airfields.*** All but three of the airfields provided two or more runways. The fields were generally concentrated on the southern coast of Kyushu including Kagoshima Bay. In this area there were thirteen fields, including the principal naval air station at Kancya, and the three seaplane bases. Further north on the east coast were five more fields including the major base at Miyazaki. On the west coast there were two fields including the major naval air station at Isumi.

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** COM-ONI Technical Intelligence, Bulletin No. 2; Japanese Radar Equipment, May 2046.
*** CINCPAC-CINCPACOA Bulletin No. 112-45, May 12th, 1945, (Digest of Japanese Naval Air Bases, Special Translation No. 65) Information on Southern Kyushu, Nansel Shoto and Formosa Airfields.
(b) Nanso Shoto

In the Nanso Shoto the principal air base facilities were on Okinawa. There were two naval air stations on Okinawa, (Okinawa North and Oroku) and one Army air base. Each naval air station had three runways; the Army air base had three satellite strips. An additional Army air base with two separate strips was located on Ie Shima, Southwest 150 miles from Okinawa was Kiyaka Jima on which was located a naval air station with three runways and also two Army strips. Seventy miles farther to the southwest at Ishigaki Jima there were one Army strip, and two Navy strips. One of these Navy strips was being expanded into a three-runway field, but the additional runways had not been completed.

In the islands to the northeast of Okinawa there were two Army strips on Tokuno Shima, one naval air station on Kikai Shima and one naval air station on Tanega Shima which island was but twenty miles off the south coast of Kyushu. To the east of Okinawa two hundred miles there was one naval air station with four runways on Minami Daito Jima.

(c) Formosa

On Formosa, due to the terrain, air base facilities were generally concentrated in three areas: the north coast, the central west coast, and the southwest coast. In the north there were three naval air stations, five Army airfields, and one seaplane base. All of the Army airfields, and one of the Navy air stations had single strips. The naval air station at Shintoku which was a major base had five runways, while that at Taichu had three runways, the third being completed in October 1944.

On the central west coast there were three naval air stations of which one, Taichu (Navy), had two runways; one had a single strip, and one had an unsurfaced landing mat. In this area there were five Army air bases and a sixth under construction. Of these five, only Taichu (Army), was a major base with more than one runway.

On the southwest coast there were a total of five naval air stations, one seaplane base, and five Army air bases. Of the naval air stations three were major installations: two at Takao with seven and three runways, respectively, and one at Tainan with seven runways plus a small satellite field. Of the remaining two naval air stations one had two runways, and the other had only a single strip. The major Army air base was at Hailo where there were two adjoining fields each with two runways. Of the remaining four Army installations, one had two runways, one had one, and two had unsurfaced landing mats.

On the east coast of Formosa in the narrow level area between the mountains and the sea there were a few minor installations. In the

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northern portion were two Army fields one with a landing mat, the other with a single strip. To the south was one Naval air station (Taito) and one Army base, each with two unsurfaced runways.

(d) Philippines

Within the Philippines there were a large number of airfield installations.* On Luzon the airfields were concentrated in part in the central area between Manila and Lingayen. Within the Manila area there were approximately nine airfields including Nichols and Neilson. To the north of Manila Bay there were eleven more airfields including Clark, Mabalacat, and Tarlac, while south of Manila there were five fields. Nichols was the largest of the Manila area fields, having an estimated capacity of from two hundred to three hundred planes. Neilson's capacity was estimated as between one hundred and two hundred planes while the remaining seven airfields had capacities estimated as between fifty and one hundred planes.

The heaviest concentration of air installations in the Philippines was in the area of Clark Field. Clark Field No. 1 had an estimated capacity in excess of three hundred planes; Clark North an estimated capacity of from two hundred to three hundred planes. Both Mabalacat and Tablas had estimated capacities of from one hundred to two hundred planes each. The four satellite fields of the Clark Air Base complex together had an additional capacity in excess of three hundred planes. The three remaining operational fields in this area had estimated capacities of less than fifty planes.

Four of the five airfields south of Manila, including two fields at Lipes, were estimated to have capacities between fifty and one hundred planes each. The fifth installation was smaller with a capacity of less than fifty planes.

In northern Luzon there were but five operational airfields located as follows: (a) In the Lingayen area two fields, each with estimated capacities of from fifty to one hundred planes; (b) on the northwest coast a small field at Laoag and a similar installation at Aparri on the north coast, with capacities estimated at less than fifty planes each; (c) at Tuguegarao in north central Luzon a single airfield with an estimated capacity of from fifty to one hundred planes.

*Information on Philippine airfields from:
(2) Operational Airfields, Enclosure to CINCPAC-CINCPAC Bulletin Intelligence Bulletin Vol I, No. 12, September 29th, 1944.
In southeastern Luzon there were four operational airfields located as follows: two small airfields at Naga and Bulaan with capacities of between fifty and one hundred planes each; two smaller fields at Legaspi and Tiwi with capacities of less than fifty planes each.

In the Visayas air installations were generally concentrated on the east coast of Leyte, and the north coast of Negros. There was a smaller concentration on Cebu. On Leyte, there were at least five operational airfields. Three of these were on the east coast of the island. Three of these, Tacloban and San Pablo were estimated to have an aircraft capacity of fifty to one hundred planes. The other two, Dauis and Malabka, together, had a similar capacity. Near the west coast, north of Ormoc, was Valencia airfield which also had a capacity of from fifty to one hundred planes.

On Negros there were at least eight operational airfields located as follows: (a) On the northeast coast, four fields. Cebu, the major base with an estimated aircraft capacity of from one hundred to two hundred planes was at Bacolod. Bacolod had two satellite fields each with a capacity of less than fifty planes. An additional field in the area had a capacity of from fifty to one hundred planes. (b) On the north coast, three fields, each with a capacity of from fifty to one hundred planes. (c) On the southeast coast, a small field at Dumaguete with an estimated aircraft capacity of less than fifty planes.

An additional minor concentration of airfields was located on the central east coast of Cebu. There were three fields in this area of which two were estimated to have a capacity of from fifty to one hundred planes, while a third and smaller field had a capacity of less than fifty planes.

In Mindanao the largest concentration of air facilities was in the Davao area, where there were at least six installaments with a total estimated capacity of more than five hundred planes. In the Del Monte area on the northwest coast there was a smaller group of fields with a capacity in excess of one hundred and fifty planes. On the Zamboanga peninsula was another similar group. Near the Surigao peninsula in the northeast was a single field estimated capable of supporting fifty to one hundred planes.

(d) JAPANESE AIR SEARCH AND RECONNAISSANCE

The plans for Navy air reconnaissance under the SHO Operation were promulgated by CINCPAC, Combined Fleet. The plans provided for:

instructions relating to the type aircraft to be used, types of search
and reconnaissance, patrol origins and sector designations, patrol
altitudes, and general tactics to be employed in patrol, search, and
scouting.

Control of reconnaissance operations was normally vested in Base Air
Force commanders within the narrow limits set down by CinC, Combined
Fleet. Changes in patrol sectors resulting from the enemy situation or
availability of aircraft could be made. However, such changes together
with times of take-off were to be reported to CinC, Combined Fleet in
advance who reserved the authority to control directly those operations
at any time.*

Why CinC, Combined Fleet found it necessary to maintain such rigid
control over his air searches even to the extent of designating the
number of planes to make a designated search is nowhere explained.
Whether it was the usual Japanese practice, or whether it was done be-
cause CinC, Combined Fleet, owing to the heavy losses he had suffered
during the Marianas operations, had a lack of confidence in his various
air commanders, particularly those on the lower echelons of command, is
not known. Certainly it is important that a commander know whether or
not certain searches have been made, but it is not important that he
know, for example, the number of planes which make the search nor the
density of search. In this connection the U.S. Navy instructions state
that "It is essential that the commander responsible for the security of
areas on which the search is being conducted be kept fully informed of
any omissions in sectors which he considers under surveillance. Fleet
commanders, operating in areas covered by search operations are also
concerned with the effectiveness of the searches and normally should
have control of all such operations."**

In American naval practice it is usually sufficient for the com-
mander to direct that certain sectors from certain bases be covered to
a designated limiting range. The subordinate commanders will then
determine the type of search best suited for their areas and the density
of search. In other words, while the control of the sectors to be
searched remains within the commander who ordered the search, all other
details are the province of the subordinate commanders.

* Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 82, August 1st, 1944, Regulations
and Standard Procedures for Air Patrols by Combined Fleet Base Air
Fleet; and Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 86, August 4th,
1944 - Air Combat Regulations for SHO Operations, ATIS Document

** Long-Range Air Reconnaissance and Scouting Instructions U.S. Fleet
USF-11, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Chapter 7, para.
715, page 7-1.
Control of air reconnaissance was exercised as follows:

(1) In the Formosa-Nansei Shoto - Southern Kyushu Area.

By Commander SIXTH Base Air Force who was the unified commander of all air forces in this area.

(2) In the Philippine Area.

Since there was no unified command of air forces in this area the responsibility for control of air searches was divided between the Navy and the Army.

(a) Long-range patrol (600-900 miles) by Commander FIFTH Base Air Force.*

(b) Short-range patrols (300 miles) jointly by Commander FIFTH Base Air Force and CG, FOURTH Air Army (local agreement).**

(1) Formosa-Nansei Shoto - Southern Kyushu Area

(a) The plan promulgated by CinC, Combined Fleet called for searches in this area as follows:***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>No. of Planes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kansaya</td>
<td>097°-153°(T)</td>
<td>650 mi.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Southern Kyushu)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jikinawa</td>
<td>097°-163°(T)</td>
<td>650 mi.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinoniku</td>
<td>067°-143°(T)</td>
<td>600 mi.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Northern Formosa)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** Agreement Concerning Operations Against Enemy Task Forces concluded by CG, FOURTH Air Army and Commander FIFTH Base Air Forces, date unknown, but believed to be September or early October 1944, contained in file of Lieutenant Colonel Katayana Sato, IJN, Staff Officer, FOURTH Air Army, Department of Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-7.

(b) As noted, CinC, Combined Fleet held close control over Navy air reconnaissance. He directed that searches be carried out based on the sectors indicated above, with any required changes reported to him in advance. He further directed that such searches depart their bases between sunrise and two hours thereafter and normally fly at 1500 feet altitude, or less.

CinC, Combined Fleet's search plan covered an adequate sector as regards limiting bearings, but did not cover an adequate sector as regards limiting radii. Why CinC, Combined Fleet did not extend his searches beyond 650 miles is not understood since both the land attack planes and the two engine land bombers had a maximum patrol radius of more than 800 miles.** A search to a radius of 800 miles would have required about eleven and one-half hours for the two-engine land bombers and thirteen hours for the land attack planes. Since there were approximately eleven and one-half hours of daylight plus nearly one and one-half hours of twilight on each end of the day, the longer patrol could have been conducted during daylight including twilight. The 650 mile search was divided into 10° sectors and the search planes were directed to fly the sector in such manner as to permit complete coverage allowing a thirty mile range of visibility or radar detection. This was beyond the normal range of visibility but was within the detection range of the radar carried. However, in several instances, for unexplained reasons, the search sectors were so laid down as to require as much as forty-five miles range of detection between adjacent sectors to insure coverage. This was the case in the sectors covered from Chinchiku during the first ten days of October. The Kanoya search on October 9th required thirty-five miles range of visibility between sectors.

Since the visibility in the search area was reported by the search aircraft as varying between zero and fifteen miles*** it is evident that CinC, Combined Fleet relied almost entirely on radar detection in his search plan.

(c) CinC, Combined Fleet's search plan was implemented as follows:

(1) Kanoya: Searches from this base were conducted by the 706th Attack Unit of the 762nd Air Group under Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. Land attack aircraft, radar equipped, were used for search. Prior to October 8th, the search from Kanoya was in accordance with CinC, Combined Fleet's basic search plan which called for six search sectors. On October 9th the search was reduced from six to four sectors.

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** Comparative Performance and Characteristics, Representative Enemy and Allied Aircraft, TAIC Manual No. 2, October 1944.
*** Commander Kanoya Air Base Dispatches 061902, 081817 and 091801, October 1944, Details of Patrol and Action Report No. 5, 708th Attack Unit (762nd Air Group), Patrols of "Q" Sector, October 4th-11th, 1944; WDC Document 161437, NA 12447.
aircraft to cover the sector 084°(T) to 153°(T). Each sector was increased from ten degrees to twelve and one-half degrees, thereby increasing the range of visibility required to cover the sector from thirty miles to thirty-five miles. This change was apparently approved by Cinc, Combined Fleet. One of these search aircraft failed to return from its mission on October 9th having been shot down by an American patrol plane from Tinian.

(2) Okinawa: Searches from this base were conducted by the Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla. Two-engine land bombers were employed. Commencing with October 8th, Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla at Okinawa reduced his search from six to four planes and thereafter, instead of covering the sector between 097°(T) and 163°(T) planned to cover on odd days the sector 117°(T) and on even days the sector 122°(T)-182°(T).

(3) Shinohiku: The Shinohiku searches were conducted by a detachment of the 708th Attack Unit, 762nd Air Group, using land attack aircraft. During the first ten days of October only three aircraft per day were employed in search.

The reasons for the reduction in search coverage from Okinawa after October 8th, and from Kanoya after October 9th, are not clear. Would it not appear that, as the time of expected Allied attack approached, it would be reasonable to increase rather than reduce these searches? Apparently it was felt that this reduced coverage was adequate to provide early warning. Possibly the desire to conserve aircraft and crews in readiness for later operations affected this decision.

(2) Philippines Area

(a) Inasmuch as there was no unified air command in the Philippine area, the conduct of air search was the subject of a joint agreement. As has been previously noted, the Army-Navy Central Agreement concerning SHO air operations promulgated in July authorized Army and

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* Commander 762nd Air Group Dispatch 081920, October 1944 to Cinc, Combined Fleet and Commander SECOND Air Fleet (SIXTH Base Air Force), WDC Document 161437.

** Detailed Patrol and Action Report No. 5, 708th Attack Unit, 762nd Air Group; Patrols of "Q" Sectors, October 4th-11th, 1944, WDC Document 161437.

*** Western Attack Force TWO (Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla) SigOrd No. 24, October 7th, 1944.

**** Detailed Action Report No. 6, 703rd Attack Unit, 762nd Air Group; Searches and Patrols of "P" Sectors, October 1st-17th, 1944; WDC Document 160579 also War Diary TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla, October 1st-31st, 1944, WDC Document 160137.
Navy subordinate commanders to enter into such agreements. Accordingly, sometime in late September or early October, Commander FOURTH Air Army and Commander FIFTH Base Air Force made an agreement concerning operations against enemy task forces. Among the joint operations agreed upon were air searches.

(b) Prior to the above agreement, CinC, Combined Fleet's plans for air reconnaissance from Philippines bases provided for the following:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>No. of Planes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>057°-113°(T)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>037°-133°(T)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legaspi</td>
<td>047°-113°(T)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) As a result of the THIRD Fleet carrier strikes in September, long-range patrol planes in the southern Philippines were moved to bases to the westward to provide better protection from future attacks. Accordingly, under the Joint Agreement the effective search plan was revised in late September or early October and provided for the following searches:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>No. of Planes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>041°-101°(T)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legaspi</td>
<td>076°-121°(T)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamboanga</td>
<td>071°-116°(T)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Agreement concerning Operations against enemy task forces, -
  Documents from file of Lieutenant Colonel Katsumi Sato, IJA, Staff
  Officer, FOURTH Air Army, Department of Army Historical Division,
  Microfilm HS-7.
** Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 82, August 1st, 1944, ATIS
*** Legaspi searches added by Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 94,
  August 27th, 1944, ATIS Document No. 39, Part VIII, June 4th,
  1945, (NACHI Document).
Short-Range Search:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>No. of Planes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tuguegarao</td>
<td>040°-100°(T)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>069°-093°(T)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naga</td>
<td>039°-10°(T)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacloban</td>
<td>054°-110°(T)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>065°-164°(T)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those searches are indicated on Diagram "A".

(d) By agreement all long-range searches were assigned to the Navy. The short-range searches were divided between the Navy and Army. The Navy units designated for the long-range search are not available to this study. In the case of the short-range searches, responsibility was assigned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tuguegarao</td>
<td>27th Air Regiment (Army)</td>
<td>Type 2 - two seater VF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>2nd Air Regiment (Army)</td>
<td>Hqtrs Racco planes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naga</td>
<td>27th Air Regiment (Army)</td>
<td>Type 2 - two seater VF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacloban</td>
<td>27th Air Regiment (Army)</td>
<td>Type 2 - two seater VF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>102nd Racco Unit, 153rd Air Group (Navy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) The search plan as agreed upon by the Philippine air commanders was adequate insofar as the sectors covered. The range of the long-range searches however could have been increased from 600 miles to 800 miles and the probability of early detection of an enemy force thus improved. While the data available does not specify what types of aircraft were employed by Commander FIFTH Base Air Force to conduct the long-range search, he had available sufficient numbers of both two-engine land bombers and land attack planes for this purpose. As discussed under the similar conditions existing in the SIXTH Base Air Force searches, either of those types was capable of an 800 mile daylight flight.

* Agreement concerning Operations against enemy Task Forces -
  Documents from file of Lieutenant Colonel Katsuo Sato, Staff Officer, FOURTH Air Army, Department of Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-7.
search. Information available does not indicate whether or not radar was installed in the search planes from the Philippines, but since the search plan was based on a range of detection of about forty-one miles, which would be excessive for a visual search, it is presumed that the search planes were radar equipped.

The data available to this study does not indicate whether or not Commander FIFTH Base Air Force and CO, FOURTH Air Army compiled completely with their plan for conducting three daily searches prior to October 10th. However, since the number of planes required was out a small part of the number available and since the only other requirement, during this period, was that of training of air units, it seems reasonable to assume that they did carry out the plan.

(a) JAPANESE DEPLOYMENT NAVAL AND AIR FORCES

(1) General Discussion

As has been pointed out previously the Japanese Combined Fleet consisted of surface forces, submarine forces, base air forces, and area forces. The composition of the base air forces has been discussed under Japanese Land and Tender-Based Aircraft. The surface force for the SHO One Operation was essentially the Mobile Force. The Mobile Force, as designated by CinC, Combined Fleet, consisted of three principal forces - the Main Force (THIRD Fleet), the FIRST Striking Force (SECOND Fleet) and the SECOND Striking Force (FIFTH Fleet). The submarine force consisted of the Advance Expeditionary Force (SIXTH Fleet). Area forces consisted of minor surface craft, base forces and in some instances shore-based air.

The basic objective of all Japanese forces, land, sea and air, for the SHO Operation was the destruction of the Allied Fleet and invasion forces in the area finally selected as the area for decisive battle.** This area was to be designated by Imperial General Headquarters.***

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** Commander Mobile Force Operation Order No. 76, August 10th, 1944, Section I, General Policy for Operations, para. 8, page 4, ATIS Document No. 39, Part I, April 22nd, 1945 (NACI Document); also Outline of Future Army-Navy Operational Policy, Imperial General Headquarters Army and Navy Sections, NAC Document 216768 (Microfilm).
*** SIXTH Base Air Force Basic SHO Operation Order No. 6, September 8th, 1944, Part I, General Outline of SHO Operations, from file of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-10, Item B; also Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section Directive 435, NAC Document 216769 (Microfilm).
The Japanese hoped that this would cause the disruption of the plans of the advancing Allies and would thereby, at least temporarily, safeguard the Japanese lines of communications with their vital southern resources. This required the concentration of all available Japanese power at a definite time and place.

CinC, Combined Fleet found that the accomplishment of this objective was going to be very difficult for, owing to (a) a critical shortage of oil in the Empire and (b) a shortage of trained pilots and replacement aircraft in his carriers, he had been forced to separate his principal forces by some 2000 miles. He had been forced to retain his carrier forces (Main Force) within the Empire until he had trained sufficient pilots and had received his replacement aircraft, and he had been forced on July 7th to order his heavy surface forces (FIRST Striking Force) south to the Lingga-Singapore area where there was oil in sufficient quantity to permit training as well as to permit fleet operations. He had been forced to do this in order to prevent the exhaustion of the limited oil stocks still remaining in the Empire.** This was obviously a highly unsatisfactory situation in either a strategic or tactical sense and was far from satisfactory to CinC, Combined Fleet and to Commander Mobile Force both of whom desired to maintain the forces concentrated. They preferred to maintain them concentrated within the Empire (Inland Sea) but would have been satisfied to have had them concentrated at Lingga-Singapore.*** They planned to concentrate the bulk of the Mobile and other surface forces in the Lingga-Singapore area about early November, but the Allies prevented this by striking before the training of the Main Force was completed and therefore before the command was ready.** The FIRST Striking Force departed the Inland Sea on July 9th.***

CinC, Combined Fleet in Operation Order 83 issued on August 1st and Operation Order 86 issued on August 4th, promulgated his general instructions for the conduct of the ShO Operation.****

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** War Diary DESHON 10, July-September 1944, ND 15 Document 16038B-A.


*** Naval War Diary World War II (B), Vol III, April 1944 to September 2nd, 1944, SCAP/ATIS Document No. 160338-B.

Unfortunately, these two operation orders are not available as they were ordered burned when no longer required. However, their contents are known in general, since on August 10th, Commander Mobile Force issued a directive to his own command which directive was based on these two operation orders. This Mobile Force directive is available and gives the Japanese plan for the employment of the surface forces as developed by CinC, Combined Fleet and Commander Mobile Force.

(a) Commander Mobile Force Allocations prior to October 10th,

In his plan Commander Mobile Force prescribed four different task organisations (allocations) of the forces under his command each of which was designed to meet a different situation. These allocations were designated as One, Two, Three and Four and covered the Main Force, FIRST Striking Force and SECOND Striking Force. They were designed to provide (a) the maximum strength for operations prior to the end of August during which period the carrier force was being reorganized (Allocation One), (b) to facilitate training and preparation between the end of August and prior to the issuance of the alert for SFO Operations (Allocation Two), (c) to provide the maximum strength for carrier operations by the Main Force during SFO Operations after the end of August (Allocation Three), and (d) to provide maximum strength for surface operations by the Main Force after the end of August (Allocation Four).

In his Allocation Three, Commander Mobile Force did not designate the SECOND Striking Force as a separate force, but instead absorbed its units within the Main Force which was organized into two carrier groups. In his Allocation Four he did designate the SECOND Striking Force as a separate force, but in so doing included it within the Main Force. The reasons for this, while nowhere explained, seem reasonably clear. During air operations he desired to concentrate his air power within two powerful task groups; during surface operations he considered that the need for strong anti-aircraft defence within his task groups was relatively unimportant compared with the need for a powerful striking force which he might employ in independent action against Allied surface forces.

For the SFO Operation CinC, Combined Fleet considered that the FIRST Striking Force was his primary striking force. Not only is this evidenced by the title "First" which he gave this force, but it is also

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*** Ibid, pages 7-11 inclusive.
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evidenced by the fact that his Main Force (his carrier force) in carry-
in out the basic objective of the Mobile Force "the destruction of the
enemy task force and landing group," was given an objective in support
of the FIRST Striking Force. Whether this supporting objective was a
concept of CinC, Combined Fleet is not known, but best evidence is that
it was contained in CinC, Combined Fleet's Operation Orders 33 and 35
previously referred to. The FIRST Striking Force's objective was the
destruction, by decisive battle, of the Allied surface forces (such as
the SEVENTH Fleet) which endeavored to stop its entry into the landing
area. Then after annihilating these forces, it was to attack and
destroy the transports and their embarked troops at the landing point
(beachhead). In accomplishing this the Commander FIRST Striking Force
was directed to avoid any engagement with the Allied carriers.∗

The supporting objective assigned the Main Force was "the facilita-
tion of the penetration of the FIRST Striking Force into the Allied
landing area (a) by diverting the Allied carrier forces (THIRD FLEET)
to the northeast (b) by engaging the Allied carrier task forces in a
flank attack and (c) if the situation permits, by destroying the Allied
service forces." Thus, it is clear that as early as August 10th, 1944
both CinC, Combined Fleet and Commander Mobile Force had envisaged
the employment of the carrier force as a bait to lure the Allied carrier
forces (in this case the THIRD FLEET) to the northeast and away from a
suitable covering position with relation to any Allied landing opera-
tions in the Philippines, Formosa, Manuelcho area area. They hoped thus
to increase the freedom of action of the FIRST Striking Force.

Since under Commander Mobile Force's Operation Order No. 76∗
Allocation was to be in effect until the issuance of the alert for
SHO One, it is of interest to note the composition of the various
groups of the Mobile Force as assigned by Commander Mobile Force for
this allocation. Those groups were:

(1) Main Force

This force was divided into four forces called the "A
was composed solely of CRUDIV ONE less UNRYU, the "B Force" of CRUDIV
THREE, the "C Force" of CRADIV FOUR, and the SECOND Striking Force of
CRUDIV TWENTY-ONE, DESRON ONE, MCGAII, DESRON ELEVEN, DESDIV SIXTY-ONE
and BATDIV TWO. BATDIV TWO, which was composed of the MUSO and
YAMASHIRO, completed training on September 22nd, at which time it was
detached. Escort by DESDIV SEVENTEEN (URAKAZE, HAMARAZKE, ISOKAZE
and YUKIKAZE) it sailed, on the same day, for Lingay, via Brunei Bay,
where it arrived at 1400 October 2nd, 1944 and reported to Commander

∗ Commander Mobile Force Operation Order No. 76, August 10th, 1944,
Section 11, Combat Operational Policy, ATIS Document No. 39,
FIRST Striking Force for duty.* MOJAMI also was detached about
this time and proceeded to Lingga. The SECOND Striking Force, except
for these changes, was maintained with slight variations as demanded by
operations until October 14th when, as will be shown later, it was
radically reorganized. The Main Force continued to operate in the
Inland Sea.

(2) The FIRST Striking Force

The major portion of this force, composed of BATDIV's
ONE and THREE, CHUDIV's FOUR, FIVE and SEVEN, DESRON's TWO and TEN,
arrived in the Lingga-Singapore area around the end of July. It re-
mained in that area until October 19th when it sorted for the ill-
fated battle of October 25th. It was reinforced prior to this time by
BATDIV TWO, CHUDIV SIXTEEN, and MOGAMI.

The Main Force and the FIRST Striking Force continued their train-
ing in their respective areas. On October 6th, when intelligence was
received that Allied planes, China-based, were going to attack the
Empire, the Main Force, because of bad weather,** and probably as a
consequence of this dispatch,*** discontinued training, returned to the
Kure-Iwakuni area and engaged in final preparations for the sortie which
was to be ordered when the Allies made their expected attack somewhere
on the Japanese defense line, but most probably in the Philippines. On
the other hand, the FIRST Striking Force in the Lingga area continued
extensive training during this time. This training consisted primarily
of exercises in night battle, and of exercises designed against Allied
landing operations. It also consisted of training in the employment
of radar and in anti-aircraft defense.**** Such specialized training
was in support of the "destruction" objective assigned the FIRST
Striking Force.

(b) Commander Advance Expeditionary Force (Submarine F
Operations prior to October 10th.

On August 20th CinC, Combined Fleet issued Combined
Operation Order No. 87, "The Outline for Advance Expeditionary F
Operations in the SHO Operations."*****
He assigned the Advance Force the following objectives: (a) the interception of the enemy task force and landing force in the vicinity of the landing area, and (b) the support of friendly surface forces' attacks in the landing area. Other than in objective (b) above, the submarines were, while engaged in interception, patrol, anti-submarine and enemy supply line cutting operations, not to attack in strength.*

Thus the submarines, in conformity with the basic SHO concept, were to conserve their strength until the enemy launched amphibious operations, at which time they were to participate in the all-out attack by Japanese forces.

The Japanese had lost a large number of submarines during the Saipan operations.** Subsequently they retired to the Inland Sea, where, except for a few engaged in operational transport to by-passed areas, and four engaged in cutting supply lines in the Indian Ocean, they were being repaired or modernized during the summer.

At the beginning of September, the submarines of the Combined Fleet, totalling thirty-two, were organized into four forces - the FIRST, SEVENTH, EIGHTH and ELEVENTH.

(a) The FIRST Submarine Force, consisting of nine I Class and four RO Class, based in the Inland Sea under repair and conducting post-repair trials.

(b) The SEVENTH Submarine Force, consisting of two I Class, was engaged in transporting supplies to the outlying islands.

(c) The EIGHTH Submarine Force, consisting of two I Class and two RO Class based at Penang, and one I Class under overhaul in Japan, were engaged in commerce destroying operations in the Indian Ocean and

(d) The ELEVENTH Submarine Force, consisting of ten I Class and two RO Class, was in the Inland Sea conducting shakedown cruises.**

As a result of the Allied landings on Palau and Morotai in mid-September, 1944, five submarines (I-177, RO-41, RO-43, RO-45, RO-47) of the FIRST Submarine Force were dispatched to that area to conduct interception operations.** During the air strikes by TF 38 during the latter part of September, they were diverted to the area off Lamon Bay, Luzon. On September 24th, since no attacks on TF 38 were considered possible, they were returned to the Palau-Morotai area. On October 3rd,

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* CINC, Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 07, August 20th, 1944,
** Japanese Submarine Operations, Philippine Waters, 1944-1945,
Department of Army Historical Division File No. 8-6, JS-16.
the RO-41 torpedoed the SHELTON (DE) off Morotai. On October 5th, these submarines were ordered to return to the Inland Sea, making a two-submarine reconnaissance (RO-46 and I-177) of Ulithi while en route. The RO-46, reported on October 7th that an enemy force consisting of one carrier, several cruisers, ten destroyers and thirteen transports was at Ulithi.* But three of the above five submarines, the RO-41, RO-43 and RO-46 finally reached Japan. The RO-47 was lost about November 2nd, the I-177 about November 8th both in the Palau area.**

Since the submarines did not actively participate in the operations prior to 0719, October 17th, their movements during this period will be discussed under "CINCPAC Fleet."

(c) Alert on October 9th

On October 9th the shooting down by an Allied patrol plane of a Japanese plane searching to the eastward caused the Commander, Sasebo Naval District to conclude that the plane had been destroyed by carrier planes and awakened him to possible Allied action against Kyushu and Nansei Shoto. He therefore alerted the subordinate commands within his district - the Sasebo Naval District included Kyushu and the Nansei Shoto - and directed them to tighten the air raid alerts especially at dawn.*** Whether or not he informed CINCPAC Fleet of this action is not known, but it does not appear that any specific warning was sent out by that Commander at this time. Perhaps CINCPAC Fleet felt that the ships of the Combined Fleet within the Sasebo Naval District had already been alerted by the action of the District Commander. Perhaps he felt that, since Allied air action by carrier task forces, as well as by China-based air forces, had been expected for some time, all units of his command within the Empire were already alerted to the possibility of Allied air strikes.

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* Material for Estimates of the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, List of Combatant and Non-Combatant Vessels Lost or Damaged in the War, prepared by Military History Section Special Staff GHQ, FEC, February, 1952.
** The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, List of Combatant and Non-Combatant Vessels Lost or Damaged in the War, prepared by Military History Section Special Staff GHQ, FEC, February, 1952.
*** Commander Sasebo Naval Base Dispatch 100100, October 1944 to All Units Sasebo Naval District, WDC Document 160269.
**** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 102102, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 161437; also Commander Takao Air Base Dispatch 061946, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 161437.
(2) Operations of Combined Fleet and FOURTH Air Army

(1) Operations on October 10th.

(a) Operations of CinC, Combined Fleet

About 0730, October 10th, CinC, Combined Fleet received word that repeated air strikes by carrier planes were being made against all key points in Okinawa* as well as against all key points on certain lesser islands of the Nansei Shoto. It should be pointed out that, at this time, CinC, Combined Fleet was not at his headquarters at Hiyoshi, but was instead on an inspection trip of the southern areas and was presently at Shinchiku Air Base on Formosa (his dispatches originated from there). He was accompanied by but two members of his staff - his Deputy Chief of Staff and his Staff Air Officer.** From this it would appear that he had not expected any Allied carrier air strikes of consequence at this time, and had therefore been caught by surprise by the power of the Allied air attack. This is somewhat surprising for as has been pointed out previously in detail CinC, Combined Fleet had forecast:

(1) That there would probably be Allied air strikes after October 4th.

(2) That the Allies would probably attempt a landing during or after the last ten days in October. In preparation for this Commander SIXTH Base Air Force in Formosa had directed that all preparations by his command for countering this invasion be completed by October 18th*** and,

(3) That these landing operations would be preceded by major scale carrier-based air strikes in southern Kyushu, Nansei Shoto, Formosa and the Philippines.

Since that was his estimate, should it not have been clear to him that October 10th was likely to be within the carrier air strike time zone and that he properly should have remained at his headquarters where his staff and information sources were, rather than to have commenced

* Commander Okinawa Base Force Dispatch 100700, October 14, 1944 to CinC, Combined Fleet, Commander SECOND Air Fleet, etc., WDC Document 160-69.
*** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Operation Order No. 13, September 27th, 1944, issued from Headquarters at Kanoya, Southern Kyushu, Documents from file of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Department of the Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-22, Item 8.
an inspection trip which took him away from his command center at a most
critical time. Actually, in view of the fact that he was the CINC,
Combined Fleet, it is not improbable that he was with his subordinate,
the Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, * who was in the process of moving his
headquarters to Takao, Formosa, but who had not as yet organized adequate-
ly his intelligence section. ** However, he left the following command
instructions to his Chief of Staff: "After careful consultation with
the Navy General Staff, the necessary decisions and orders should be
issued from Hiyoshi headquarters in the name of the CINC, Combined
Fleet." *** The Chief of Staff who had remained at Hiyoshi then, in
pursuance of these instructions, consulted the Navy General Staff and
arrived at the conclusion that, for the present at least, these strikes
were not more than carrier strikes and that only the southern Kyushu,
Mansel Shoto, Formosa area was endangered. He therefore, in the absence
of the CINC, Combined Fleet but in accordance with prearranged plans,
at 0902, commenced moving air units from other parts of Japan to join the
"^m" Force, which was in southern Kyushu, and directed the Commander
SEVENTH Base Air Force, which was in the Tokyo area to stand by to move
his entire operational strength to southern Kyushu.****

At 0925 the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet alerted SHO Two for
base air forces only; ***** at 0930 he directed the Commander SIXTH Base
Air Force to scout the general enemy situation and when a favorable
opportunity occurred, to attack and destroy the enemy,****** and at

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* Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, IJN.
** USSBS Interrogation NAV No. 181, Interrogation of Japanese
  Officials, Interrogation of Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, IJN,
  page 501, and War Diary 25th Air Flotilla, October 1944, WDC
  Document 160137.
*** Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, Vol IV,
  Military History, Section FCE, page 20, Statement of Rear
  Admiral Toshitane Takata, IJN, October 10th, 1949.
**** CINCPAC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 100902, October 1944 to
  Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 330), Memorandum Notes
  of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet,
  Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
***** CINCPAC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 100925, October 1944, apparently
to Base Air Forces, Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 331),
  Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer,
  SECOND Air Fleet, Department of the Army Historical Division
  Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
****** CINCPAC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 100930, October 1944,
  apparently to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force (Combined Fleet
  DesOpOrd 332), Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN,
  Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, Department of the Army Histori-
  cal Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
0935 he advised the Combined Fleet that Okinawa had been hit at 0800 by "seven tons of enemy carrier planes" and directed Commanders FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces to make searches from Garan Blt, Tolima and Shinchiku and Manila. These dispatches were received probably prior to 1000 by CinC, Combined Fleet in Formosa who evidently approved them, for he did not cancel them.

At 1019 the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, also in accordance with prearranged plans, issued an order of transcending importance.** He directed that all operational planes of CAVIV's THREE and FOUR were to complete preparations for land-based operations and were then to stand by for additional orders. This clearly indicated that these planes were to be land-based during the present operations. It would be interesting to discover why CinC, Combined Fleet authorized his Chief of Staff to issue such instructions during his absence from Miyoshi even on the advice of the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters. He must have realized the importance of his carriers in support of his naval operations and he must have realized further that without aircraft his carriers were useless except as targets which might be employed to draw off Allied air power from vital areas. In fact, as has been pointed out previously, he had assigned as one of the objectives of his Main Force the facilitation of the penetration of the FIRST Striking Force into the Allied landing area by engaging the Allied forces in a flank attack. How he proposed to accomplish this without carrier aircraft is nowhere explained. The answer seems to be that:

(a) CinC, Combined Fleet, prior to his departure or his inspection trip of the southern areas, had prepared a tentative plan which provided for the activation of SHO One or Two for the base air forces alone should the situation be favorable for such action. His Chief of Staff was merely carrying out that preliminary phase of this tentative plan which provided for the employment of his carrier based planes from land bases. This was also a provision of the Combined Fleet SHO plans as will be discussed under Commander Mobile Force.

(b) CinC, Combined Fleet felt that he had no alternative to reorganizing his carrier groups as his carrier pilots had not completed their flight training in so far as the carriers were concerned. He stated later "Many of the pilots had not received sufficient training and, therefore, while they could take off from the carriers, were

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** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 100935, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH, SIXTH and SEVENTH Base Air Forces (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 333), Memorandum Notes of Captain Dunsu Shibata, Iw, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-52, Item B.

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not always able to get back to the carriers successfully."

(c) By directing these plans to prepare for land-based operations he was not irrevocably committing them to operations under the base air forces at this time. He was only moving them into positions from which he could operate them as base air forces should that later become desirable and from which, so long as they remained in the Kyushu area, he could easily return them to their carriers. While it seems reasonably clear that he had already decided to fight a decisive action with his base air forces including the carrier air groups from Kyushu, should the opportunity present itself, at least his actions at this time did not make it impossible to return the carrier groups to their ships for ship-based operations.

If such was the mental process of CINC, Combined Fleet, and all available evidence supports the conclusion that it was, it was of doubtful correctness. The Japanese had already learned in the Solomon operations of 1942-1943 where they had committed their carrier aircraft to the defense of Rabaul and had had it destroyed in the operations around Port Moresby, Buna, and Santa Cruz, that their fleet was seriously handicapped in its freedom of action and in its striking power by the absence of its carrier aircraft.

In addition, while CINC, Combined Fleet was not technically committing his carrier groups to land-based operations, the fact nevertheless remains that, in stopping the carrier training of those groups commencing October 10th, he was in fact committing them to such land-based operations, or at least to increasingly ineffective carrier operations.

It should be pointed out here that the actual mechanics of getting on and off a carrier safely are merely the means to an end. The end achieved is the placing of the aircraft in a position to apply its military potential, and the return of the aircraft so that it may be readied to repeat. Launching and landing are therefore the basic maneuvers of the carrier pilot and demand constant attention in training in order that individual proficiency and over-all coordination may be attained and maintained.** Much of the preliminary training should be done ashore. Carrier take-off, rendezvous, departure, break-up and landing procedures should be simulated during day and night operations from shore bases insofar as air traffic at the base will permit.*** It is presumed, from their presence aboard the carriers and from the statement of CINC, Combined Fleet,* that the pilots had completed the
land-based phases of their training. Now they were conducting carrier-based training and were "almost trained."

This was particularly applicable to the pilots of the four carriers of CARDIV THREE. As late as September 10th Commander Mobile Force had stated that "all aircraft of CARDIV THREE air units will be capable of daytime carrier operation by the middle ten days of October."** In November in his action report on the Battle for Leyte Gulf he inferred that the 653rd Air Group had been completely trained and that he would have accomplished much better results had he been allowed to retain them instead of being forced to transfer them to land bases, and to use instead a hastily formed air group.*** It was also applicable somewhat to the pilots of CARDIV FOUR. COMCARDIV FOUR stated in interrogation that the pilots for the ISE and HYUGA were more or less completely trained, but those for the JUNYO and RYUJIN which had been added to his command were not adequately trained and therefore did not participate in the operation.****

Does it not appear that the Japanese carrier pilots who, while not fully trained, "were almost trained," and who could at least take off from a carrier were more important to the defense effort and to the SHO plans than were carrier pilots committed to land operations and who constituted but a small percentage (possibly fifteen per cent) of the Army and Navy pilots so committed?

And does it not seem also that with the prospect always in view of the activation of SHO One and SHO Two that every opportunity should have been employed to complete the training of the carrier pilots rather than to lose those opportunities away by land basing the planes and stopping the carrier training at the very moment of the pilots greatest training need?

At 1035, the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet advised the Combined Fleet that, depending on the movements of the Allied carrier forces, he expected that Cinc, Combined Fleet would activate SHO Two for the Base Air Forces and that it was his (the Chief of Staff's) intention to keep

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* The Campaigns of the Pacific War, USSBS Naval Analysis Division, page 293.
** Memorandum FIRST Mobile Fleet Headquarters Concerning Tactical Organization of Mobile Force, September 10th, 1944, Department of Army Historical Division Japanese, Microfilm HS-26, Item A.
the Mobile Force (less carrier aircraft) in stand by in its present dispositions.*

This dispatch by the Chief of Staff*, Combined Fleet is highly illuminating. It supports the view above expressed that the concept of destroying Allied carriers by aircraft alone had already been approved by Cinc, Combined Fleet as his accepted primary policy in the event that a favorable opportunity to destroy Allied carriers by air strength alone presented itself. Now this policy was laid down nowhere stated. It is presumed however, that since the Allied amphibious forces had been reported as Hollandia the previous day, and since no other reports had been received concerning the location or movement of these or other amphibious forces, the Chief of Staff considered that those air strikes were pure raiding operations with no immediate landings in prospect and, therefore, the employment of the base air forces against them was authorized.

At about 1130, Cinc, Combined Fleet received a dispatch from the SIXTH Base Air Force which indicated (a) that the SIXTH Base Air Force had commenced morning search operations from Kanoya as per schedule, (b) that it had not as yet succeeded in locating the enemy and was still searching, (c) that an afternoon search would be launched, and (d) that the "F" Force would retire to its bases in northern Kyushu where it would complete attack preparations.**

As the Allied strikes continued and as reports indicated the number of planes which had attacked and were still attacking Okinawa,*** Cinc, Combined Fleet appears to have decided that perhaps these strikes were more than had been envisaged by his Chief of Staff; that they were in fact those which had been forecast; that they were possibly the prelude to an actual invasion somewhere, but most probably in the Philippines.

He decided therefore that the Philippines should also be alerted and at 1204, from Formosa, he alerted SHO One and Two, also for the base air forces only.****

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** Kanoya Air Base (Senior Staff Officer, SIXTH Base Air Force) Dispatch 101112, October 1944, Detailed Patrol and Action Report No. 5, 708th Attack Unit, 762nd Air Group, October 4th-11th, 1944, WDC Document 161437 NA Index 12447.
*** Commander Okinawa Base Force Dispatch 101020, October 1944, to Cinc, Combined Fleet, WDC Document 160389.
**** Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101204, October 1944 to Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet Special DesQOrd 5), WDC Document 101505.
The action of CinC, Combined Fleet in alerting SHO One and Two for the base air forces only was not in conflict with his plans for the SHO Operations. These plans stated:

"(a) In the event the opportunity to destroy the enemy presents itself, however, land-based air units may, with no outside support, detect and attack enemy aircraft carriers. In this case the SHO One Air Operation will be ordered."

"(b) If there is an opportunity to destroy the Allied carrier force through the use of air alone, CinC, Combined Fleet may, at times, order SHO One (or Two or Three...) Air Operations Warning or he may order the execution of such SHO One (or Two or Three...).

"(c) In the course of SHO Operations if the Base Air Forces alone are to undertake action the order 'Base Air Forces commence SHO Operations' will be issued by Combined Fleet Headquarters.'*

It should be emphasized here that the above quoted plans for alerting as well as activating the SHO Operations for the Base Air Forces only, applied solely to the Navy. The inclusion of these provisions in the Navy plans was evidently within the competence of CinC, Combined Fleet provided that their inclusion did not thereby interfere with the joint operations at the time of an enemy landing or militate against the successful conclusion of such operations.

Present available information indicates that no such provisions were included in the Army plans.

In fact CG, Southern Army had endeavored, after the TF 38 air raids on the Philippines in September, to obtain such authority on the grounds that (a) attacks on enemy task forces by the air force (Army) must be authorized, since to do otherwise would be disadvantageous to the SHO One Operations and (b) by checking the Allied task forces in their early stages it would be possible to carry out freely the Japanese plans while at the same time, disrupting the enemy's plans. This request had been disapproved by Imperial General Headquarters which stated that (a) attacks against enemy task forces were not sure to succeed and (b) such attacks might decrease Japanese strength and interfere with joint operations at the time of enemy landing. However, Imperial General Headquarters did authorize elements of the air force (Army) to carry out such attacks at opportune moments.***

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*** Southern Army Operations 1941-45, First Demobilization Bureau Monograph, Army Historical Division File No. 8-8, JS-21.
Why then if Imperial General Headquarters did not approve activating the Army air forces against enemy carrier task forces did they approve activating the Navy's base air forces against these same task forces? The answer seems to have been that since, under the central agreement, the Navy's principal objective as derived by Cinc, Combined Fleet, was the destruction of enemy carrier task forces, and the Army's principal objective was the destruction of enemy transports at the point of landing, it seemed logical to permit the Navy to accomplish their objective when they wished, providing of course that, in so doing, they did not, as has been stated previously, interfere with the joint operations at the time of enemy landing or militate against the successful conclusion of such operations.

This decision of Imperial General Headquarters does not appear sound since it seems clear that such unilateral operations by one service (Navy) might well force the other service (Army) to come to its support and thereby force the undeclared activation of the total air force of the other service. This might then force the commitment of all air forces, both Army and Navy, in a designated area in advance of the activation of a designated SHO Operation and might well ensure the defeat of that SHO plan.

As will be shown later this did in fact occur but to a lesser degree. The Army air forces in the Philippines did come to the support of the FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces, thereby lessening their efforts during the decisive battle some days later.

Cinc, Combined Fleet awaited information from his morning search planes flying out of Kyushu and Okinawa but received none. This was because the Kyushu search planes which returned to base about 1340 had failed to make contact on TF 38 although the visibility was satisfactory, and because three of the four Okinawa search planes had been destroyed presumably by Allied fighters and the fourth plane had returned because of engine trouble. The Okinawa planes, had they completed their search, should have returned about 1600.

Some time around noon he received a dispatch which reported that at 1100 that day Halikpapan had been struck by 100 B-24's escorted by thirty P-38's and that twenty B-24's had been shot down and twenty-three damaged.** This dispatch may have been of interest to him as it indicated a continued possibility of Allied action against the southern Philippines.

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** Material for Situation Estimates, First Section Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC Document 216764 (Microfilm).
At 1241, at Shichoku Air Base, he decided that it was not enough to alert the base air forces for SHO One and SHO Two, but that he should, in addition, clarify the extent to which the units of the FIFTH Base Air Force were to be committed should SHO Two be activated for the base air forces. The basic plan called for committing the major part of the FIFTH Base Air Force, but he therefore advised his command that (a) in case SHO Two was activated for the base air forces the Commander FIFTH Base Air Force would, in the absence of special orders, continue operations in the Philippines and western Caroline areas and (b) that, depending on the situation a part of the FIFTH Base Air Force, would participate in the SHO Two Operation. He did not state how this participation was to be effected because Imperial General Headquarters had already directed that the command relations between the FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces were to be through cooperation.

Meanwhile, at about 1245, he received a report from Okinawa that about thirty enemy planes had, at 1200, commenced a third attack on Okinawa.

At 1406 he received Commander SIXTH Base Air Force's dispatch outlining the commander's plans. This dispatch advised the SIXTH Base Air Force that its commander planned first, to determine the nature of the present situation and second, at a favorable opportunity, to destroy the enemy carrier force. It also stated that should SHO Two be activated, operations would be in accordance with previously established policies, whereas should there be simultaneous activation of SHO One and SHO Two, or the activation of SHO One only, the Commander SIXTH Base Air Force planned to destroy first, the Allied carrier force operating off Nansha Shoto and second, the Allied carrier force attacking Formosa; after which he planned to carry out decisive battle operations in the Philippines.

This dispatch is included here in the discussion of CINC Combined Fleet's actions on October 10th because it appears to reflect the views of that commander. It will be remembered that CINC Combined Fleet was at Shichoku, Formosa but whether the Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was with him or was at Takao is not known. However, it seems clear that these two commanders were, at the very least, in telephonic communication with each other since telephonic communications were in

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** CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101241, October 1944 to All Fleet and Squadron Commanders (Combined Fleet Special Despatch No. 5), WDC Document 160264.
*** Commander Okinawa Base Force Dispatch 101215, October 1944 to CINC, Combined Fleet, WDC Document 160369.
**** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 101406, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160137.
effect between Takao and Shinchiku Air Base and were being employed by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force in issuing directives. Therefore, it seems highly probable that they discussed the developing situation and that this dispatch is the result of that discussion. Is this not particularly likely when it is also remembered that neither of them had competent staffs on Formosa since the majority of the members of both staffs were at Miyoshi (Combined Fleet), and at Kanoya (SIXTH Base Air Force)? And finally does not the subject matter of this dispatch reflect the views of a commander-in-chief rather than the views of a subordinate commander? If we accept these conclusions we are forced to arrive at the opinion previously expressed that CINC, Combined Fleet considered that the Allied carrier strikes were a forerunner of an invasion somewhere but most probably in the Philippines.

At about 1426, also because of his proximity to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, he knew that that commander had directed his units to strengthen their patrols and to employ every available means to ascertain and keep track of the over-all enemy situation by making day and night searches from southern Kyushu, and day searches from Iki, Ki, Saga, Nakasaki, and other bases.

At about 1430 he received a dispatch from Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla wherein that commander stated (a) that the Tokyo sector of Okinawa was being continuously attacked by enemy carrier planes, (b) that two hundred enemy aircraft had attacked so far, and (c) that the Allied carrier task force had not as yet been located. He took no direct action on this dispatch but permitted his chief of staff to continue to effectuate his tentative plan.

That his chief of staff appreciated this responsibility is apparent for at 1603 that officer directed Commander Mobile Force (a) to prepare to sortie the SECOND Striking Force and CANDIV FOUR, (b) to expedite such preparations and (c) to incorporate CANDIV FOUR (less air units) into the SECOND Striking Force on sortie.

The action of the (Chief of Staff) Combined Fleet in ordering the reinforced SECOND Striking Force to prepare to sortie seems sound. He hoped thereby, if the Allied carrier attacks made it necessary, to lure...
the Allied carrier task force away from the Kanso Shoto where Japanese
air power was weak, and into the range of Kyushu-based planes, where
Japanese air power was strong, and he also hoped, through the strikes
of his land-based aircraft, to damage some of the Allied ships so
seriously that it would be feasible for his 300C.D. Striking Force,
under the cover of this land-based aircraft, to sink those damaged
ships through raiding operations. It should be remembered here that
the FOURTH Carrier Division consisted of the two hermaphroditic battle-
ships, 182 and 183A, with eight fourteen-inch guns each, and that, al-
though they had flight decks, they had not as yet operated carrier air-
craft from them. Therefore the 300C.D. Striking Force in this case was
essentially a pure surface force.

At about 1500 he received a dispatch from Kanoya Air Base which
stated that the morning search, which had returned at 1330, had failed
to locate the enemy. This was followed at about 1530 by a report from
Kuma Shima (off Okinawa) that twenty carrier aircraft were overhead
and at about 1625 by a report from Commander Okinawa Base Force that
the third enemy air attack had been driven off at 1445, and the fourth
attack had commenced at 1630 employing thirty carrier aircraft.

At about 1630 he received a dispatch estimate of the situation,****
prepared by Commander 37TH Area Fleet who was based at Maalila, wherein
that commander referred to that day's air attacks on the Kanso Shoto
and stated that, although the information as to enemy strength was in-
complete, there were, in his opinion, more than two carrier groups
operating together with a possibility of one more carrier group operating
separately. In this estimate Commander 37TH Area Fleet arrived at the
conclusion that there was a strong possibility that the objective of the
Allied carrier operations (presently attacking Okinawa) was to cut the
Japanese supply lines and to prepare the way for landing operations in
the southern Philippines. He therefore estimated that, if this was a
correct analysis, air attacks by the Allied carrier force would be made
on Formosa and on the Philippines. He based this conclusion on the fol-
lowing factors: (a) the Allied air attacks on Okinawa, (b) the concentra-
tion of enemy ships reported in the western New Guinea area (it is
assumed that he was referring to the report concerning six carriers,
four battleships, ten cruisers, over twenty destroyers and over 200

- Kanoya Air Base Dispatch 101435, October 1944 to Authorized
  Ships, WDC Document 164137.
- Kuma Shima Lookout Post Dispatch 101510, October 1944 to CINC,
  Combined Fleet, WDC Document 160382.
- Commander Okinawa Base Force Dispatch 101615, October 10th,
  1944 to Ships and Stations receiving Enemy Intelligence Reports,
  WDC Document 160060.
- CINCH, 37TH Area Fleet Dispatch 101554, October 1944 to CINC,
  Combined Fleet, WDC Document 161538.

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large medium and small transports in the Hollandia-Wakde area, and fifty
large transports, a large number of medium and small transports, and
several cruisers and destroyers in the Blak area), (c) the appearance
of enemy submarines east of Luzon and (d) the active Allied air opera-
tions against the southern Philippines and Borneo.

It is not known how Commander SW Area Fleet arrived at this esti-
mate, but it is probable that the reports of the attacks on Okinawa
were available to him. He knew, therefore, that at least 200 enemy
aircraft had, by 1400, attacked Okinawa and that attacks were still
underway which attacks had already reported fifty additional Allied
planes. Thus, it can be assumed that Commander SW Area Fleet had
reason to believe that at least 300 enemy aircraft had attacked already.
In view of the fact that the Japanese had considerable general informa-
tion concerning the Allied carrier force, it seems correct to say that
Commander SW Area Fleet could make a rough estimate of about sixty-five
planes per carrier (ninety-six per CV and thirty-three per CVL), and
that about seventy per cent of these planes would be available for attack
the first day; the remaining thirty per cent being required for fighter
cover, anti-submarine work, services and unavailability. He also
probably realized that some of these attacks were repeat attacks by the
same planes but not necessarily so. Assuming, for rough estimate
purposes, that he ignored this possibility, he could therefore estimate
a total of about 450 planes within the carrier task force. This would
be the equivalent of seven carriers.

Whether Commander SW Area made an analysis similar to the above
and arrived at a similar figure of seven carriers which he divided into
not less than three carrier groups, or whether he arrived at more than
seven carriers or estimated the number of task groups by some other
method such as radio intelligence is not known.

Actually TF 38 had launched some 1396 sorties most of which had
attacked targets in the Namsei Shoto area. The planes making those
sorties were from seventeen carriers in four task groups.

The reason for inaccuracy is clear. The reports of the numbers of
enemy aircraft attacking Okinawa were incomplete, either because of
many very incorrect estimates by the local commanders, or because
many of the local commanders had failed to report, thus presenting a
distorted picture of the nature of the attack and of the size of the
attacking Allied carrier force. Part of this failure to obtain a
correct estimate of the enemy planes was, of course, due to disrupted
communications, but this is not considered to have been the dominating
factor, as there were numerous means of communication available.

Between the receipt of Commander SW Area's dispatch estimate and
2230, CINCPACFLT did not receive any information concerning
the Allied carrier task force. Although he knew that as late as 1500
it was still attacking, he had heard nothing further from his command concerning the continuing nature of the battle; its results so far; of what the enemy forces consisted, and their course and speed.

However, commencing about 1720 he began to receive reports on two Allied carrier task groups as follows:

(a) At 1533 three carriers bearing 195°(T) distant 350 miles from Toi Misaki (south Kyushu) and,

(b) At 1540 two large carriers about ten cruisers and destroyers bearing 187°(T) distant 400 miles from Toi Misaki.*

These contacts were what he was waiting for and gave him a certain gratification in that they tended to support the estimates of the enemy composition given by his Commander SW Area Force. On the other hand they probably gave him considerable concern for at least two hours had elapsed between the time of the first contact and its receipt by him and about four hours had elapsed between the second contact and its receipt by him (possibly 1925). This was, of course, excessive. He took no corrective action, however, presumably because he felt that such corrective action was properly within the purview of the responsible commanders and was being taken. In this he was correct for in war, mistakes will inevitably occur. If the commander, at the slightest provocation, manifests lack of confidence in a subordinate’s abilities he will seriously affect thereby that mutual understanding and loyalty which should prevail between them.

At 1851, he knew that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was planning night attacks once the enemy had been discovered.**

He knew also, at 1905 that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was planning on the following day to make certain searches from the Okinawa sector employing numbers of aircraft.***

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* Commander Sasebo Naval District Dispatch 102109, October 1944 to All Units Sasebo Naval District, WDC Document 160369; also Material for Situation Estimate, First Section Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC Document 216764; also Kikai Island Air Base Dispatch 101650, October 1944; Detailed Action Report No. 2 Northern Attack Force, SECOND Base Air Force, October 10th-November 15th, 1944, WDC Document 161645 NA 12262.

** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 101851, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, etc. Forwarded by GHQ, FEC Letter, January 10th, 1952 to President, Naval War College.

*** Ibid, Dispatch 101905.
At about 2230, CINC, Combined Fleet received a dispatch, source unknown, which stated that at 2230, radar equipped flying boats had detected surface craft, apparently hostile, on bearing 069°(T) distant 140 miles from Garan Bi. Although the contact must have appeared incorrect to him as his scheduled searches had flown over the probable approach tracks, it is assumed that he reorganized that it was an Allied capability to have had one or more task groups in this area. Therefore, he presumably watched this contact to await developments. Actually the contact, as a hostile contact, was in error. No Allied forces, including submarines, were within one hundred miles.

(b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force, October 10th.

At about 0730, Commander Mobile Force, who was at his headquarters at Cita Air Base (actually he was at the headquarters of the 653rd Air Group)** and was awaiting there the results of the searches being conducted to discover the Allied carrier force believed to be operating off Kyushu, received word that repeated air strikes were being made against the Hansel Shoto.*** This was possibly quite a relief to him as carrier strikes on Kyushu might well have endangered his carriers. This possibility was, for the moment, over.

At about 1050 he received a dispatch from CINC, Combined Fleet which directed that all operational planes of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR were to complete preparations for land-based operations and were then to stand by for additional orders.****

This was of exceeding interest to him for, although the SHO plans covered this point rather completely, this order seemed to indicate that his carrier planes were to be land-based throughout the forthcoming operations whatever they might be. This would seriously interfere with his plans for the employment of the Main Force should SHO One or Two be activated as seemed not unlikely.

In this connection the fleet operation orders issued in support of the basic GHQ directive for SHO Operations stated:

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Secord Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File 8-5, JS-104; also Material for Situation Estimates First Section Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC Document No. 216/64 (Microfilm).
** War Diary Commander Mobile Force, October 10th, 1944, WDC Document 160341 NA 11404.
*** Commander Okinawa Base Force Dispatch 100700, October 1944 to CINC, Combined Fleet, etc. WDC Document 160369.
**** CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101019, October 1944 to Commander Mobile Force, etc. (Combined Fleet DesOp# No. 334), Document from file of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IN, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-18, Item B.
(a) "In certain circumstances and by special order the carrier air force may deploy at base as a base air force and participate in the operations."

(b) "In certain circumstances and by special order, diversionary movements may be carried out accompanied by a carrier upon which there are no airplanes."

(c) "In SHO Operation Two, and at other advantageous times, carrier-based air units may be assigned to land bases and put under the command of the commanding officers of the base air forces."

(d) In the outline for the concentration of the base air forces for SHO Operations the employment on shore of the carrier-based planes, should they be so employed, showed them to have been assigned for all SHO Operations as follows: SHO One, southern Kyushu; SHO Two, southern Kyushu; SHO Three, central Honshu and areas adjacent to the Inland Sea; SHO Four, Hokkaido area."

Whether or not Commander Mobile Force made any representations concerning the land-basing of his planes is not known, but it does not appear that he did. He seems to have been of the opinion that, as there was no certainty where the enemy would strike next, his planes would be safer ashore than on the carriers, and as they were to be employed, at the worst, in southern Kyushu, he felt this was a reasonable temporary employment. He knew that Kyushu was a likely target on the following day for Allied carrier planes, although based on previous estimates, not so likely a target as Formosa, and he knew that attacks on Kyushu might seriously endanger his carriers in the Inland Sea. Therefore, until this danger had passed, the land-basing of his planes seemed not only logical but appropriate since they were of but limited value on the carriers if the carriers were underway (the Inland Sea offered little maneuvering room for combat operations), and were of no value if the carriers were anchored or moored.

He also was of the opinion that so long as his planes remained on land bases nearby (particularly at Oita, northern Kyushu) he could

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readily continue the flight training during peaceful periods, by operating
the planes between the land bases and the carriers. He had been doing
this for the past week. As will be pointed out later, he had no expecta-
tion that his planes might be otherwise employed and might not be re-
turned to his carriers should SHO One or Two be activated, although, Cinc,
Combined Fleet's instructions that his planes were "to stand by for addi-
tional orders," might well have caused him some mental agitation.* It
seems reasonable to assume that Commander Mobile Force was not fully
cognizant of his commander-in-chief's plans for the future employment of
these planes from land bases.

At about 1100 he received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff
Combined Fleet wherein he was advised that (a) depending on the movements
of the enemy task force attacking Okinawa, SHO Two would probably be
activated for the Base Air Forces, and (b) it was the Cinc, Combined
Fleet's present intention to maintain the Mobile Force, less its carrier
aircraft, in a stand by condition in its present dispositions.**

Although there is no direct information that Commander Mobile Force
took any action with relation to these two dispatches there is consider-
able indication that he did as Commander Main Force. For Commander
Mobile Force was also Commander Main Force and he issued instructions
as that commander. In addition, since Commander SECOND Striking Force
was near by at Iwakun, necessary instructions were often given by
telephone.

At about 1530 he received Cinc, Combined Fleet's dispatch which
ordered him (a) to prepare to sortie the SECOND Striking Force and
CARDIV FOUR and (b) to expedite preparations to incorporate CARDIV FOUR
(less air units) in SECOND Striking Force on sortie.*** This was a
clear departure from SHO plans which called for the simultaneous employ-
ment of all surface forces against an Allied landing. However, any
concern which he may have had was dispelled a few minutes later for, at
about 1545, he was advised by the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet by dis-
patch that the reason for this contemplated sortie was (a) to draw the
Allied carrier force towards Kyushu in case that force carried out a per-
sistent and prolonged attack in the Nansui Shoto area and (b) to exploit
any favorable opportunity created by the operations of the base air
force.****

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* Letter from Captain Toshikazu Ohno, IJN, to Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
World War II Battle Evaluation Group, U.S. Naval War College, no
date, but about May 23rd, 1952.
** CoFS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101035, October 1344 to Commander
Mobile Force etc., WDC Document 16108.
*** CoFS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101509, October 1944 to Commander
Mobile Force, WDC Document 161713.
**** CoFS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101512, October 1944 to Commander
Force, WDC Document 161715.
This action of the Chief of Staff was unusual based on American procedures. However, as the Chief of Staff issued amplifying and explanatory dispatches continually, and as the chiefs of staff of other Japanese commands - notably the SIXTH Base Air Force - did likewise, it was an authorized procedure, or, if not an authorized procedure, it was at least an approved custom.

American procedure did not permit such amplifying dispatches, and does not permit it today. Instead, such dispatches would be issued in the name of the commander and the recipient would consider them as from that commander no matter who composed them or released them. This maintains the structure of command.

Throughout the day, Commander Mobile Force continued to receive the various dispatches sent out from Okinawa concerning the attacks on that place by the Allied carrier task force. Among these was the Commander SW Area Fleet's estimate of the situation as of 1554. However, except for this estimate, he had no important information other than his own estimates and the fact (a) that should SHO One or Two be activated, his planes would be ordered to southern Kyushu and (b) his SECOND Striking Force was being prepared for sortie.

At 2136 he directed the Commander SECOND Striking Force and CARDIV FOUR to expedite sortie preparations and cancelled the dispatch of the four destroyers to Oita, Iwakuni and Tokushima which he had ordered at 1600. (This was, of course, to insure that the SECOND Striking Force would be available in full strength). In this dispatch he advised the Mobile Force that at the time of sortie, which would be fixed by special order, CARDIV FOUR (less air units) would be incorporated in the SECOND Striking Force. He likewise advised that he would take direct command of the 634th Air Group from CARDIV FOUR.

He took no further important action during the remainder of the day.

(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force, October 10th.

This force, consisting of BATDIV's OWF, TWO and THREE, CRUDIV's FOUR, FIVE, SEVEN and SIXTEEN and DERNON's TWO and part of DERNON TEN was in the Liagga-Singapore area on October 10th where it was conducting training exercises. As has been pointed out previously...

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* Communication Instructions USN, 1944, para. 1101.
* Joint Communications Instructions, Part I, General (JANAP 121A) Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chapter V, Message Preparation, para. 1500.
* Commander Mobile Force Dispatch 102136, October 1944 to CinC, Combined Fleet and Mobile Force, MDC Document 161638.
this training consisted of exercises in night battle, radar, anti-aircraft defense and exercises against enemy landings.*

At this time BATDIV ONE was composed of the NAGATO, MUSASHI, YAMATO; BATDIV TWO of the FUSO, YAMASHIRO; BATDIV THREE of the KONGO, HARUNA; CRUDIV FOUR of the heavy cruisers ATAGO, MAYA, TAKAO, CHOKAI; CRUDIV FIVE of the heavy cruisers MYOKO, HAGURO, ZOSAN (assigned for training); CRUDIV SEVEN of the heavy cruisers KUMANO, SUZUYA, CHIKUSA, TONE; CRUDIV SIXTEEN of the heavy cruiser AGASA, the light cruiser KINU, the destroyer URANAMI; DESRON TWO of the light cruiser HOSHIRO and the destroyers KISBINAMI, NAGANAMI, OKINAMI, ASASHI of DESDIV THIRTY-ONE; the HAMANAMI, FUJINAMI of DESDIV THIRTY-TWO and the SHIMAKAZE and SHIIGURE; DESRON TEN of the light cruiser YABASHI and the destroyers URAKAZE, HAMAKAZE, YUKIKAZE, ISOKAZE of DESDIV SEVENTEEN, the MICHISHI, ASAGUXO, YAMAGUXO, NOKARI of DESDIV FOUR. This was a total of seven battleships, twelve heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and sixteen destroyers.

At this time there was a service force in the Lingga-Singapore area consisting of the FIRST and SECOND Supply Forces and composed of oilers, and escorts as follows: FIRST Supply Force - YUHO MARU (AO), HAKKO MARU (AO), OKUROSAN MARU (AO), ITSUKUSHIMA MARU (AO), MAEBI MARU (AO), NIPPON MARU (AO), CHIBURI (PF), YUJUIMA (Cm). COAST DEFENSE VESSEL #19, COAST DEFENSE VESSEL #27, MINE SHERPER #34; SECOND Supply Force - NICHIBI MARU (AO), RYOKI MARU (AO), KRAHASHI (PF), COAST DEFENSE VESSEL #32. This service force, with the exception of the NIPPON MARU which was attached to the FIRST Striking Force, was under command of CINC Combined Fleet. It remained so until the FIRST Striking Force sortied from Lingga-Singapore on October 13th when CINC Combined Fleet finally transferred the various units to Commander FIRST Striking Force.**

Commander FIRST Striking Force received most of the dispatches concerning the Allied air operations against Okinawa as well as CINC Combined Fleet dispatches concerning prospective operations for the various forces of his command. He was familiar with the fact that the CINC Combined Fleet had ordered a SHO One and Two alert for the base air forces, that the planes of CRUDIV's THREE and FOUR were being readied for shore operations and that the SECOND Striking Force plus CRUDIV FOUR was making preparations for a sortie.

From the above it was plain that to Commander FIRST Striking Force CINC Combined Fleet was not expecting an immediate landing by enemy forces and that therefore he (Commander FIRST Striking Force) probably

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* USSBS Interrogation NAV No. 9, Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Interrogation of Vice Admiral Takao Kurita, IJN, Vol 1, page 34; also War Diary CRUDIV 5, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
had time to complete training and prepare for possible operations later. However, he did not count on this too heavily for he intensified his training exercises and continued fueling, supplying and docking his ships in preparation for sorties.

(2) Operations of Commander Main Force, October 10th.

The Main Force consisting of CARDIV's ONE, THREE and FOUR, plus supporting elements of cruisers and destroyers as designated, had, until October 10th been training in the Inland Sea. The planes of CARDIV THREE were ashore at Oita while those of CARDIV FOUR were ashore at Tokushima and Iwakuni. It is not clear whether the planes for CARDIV THREE were basing ashore at this time and were making qualification landings and take-offs from the carriers by operating from that base, or whether they had merely become shore-based on this date as is often the American custom when carriers are moored at an air base. The planes of CARDIV FOUR were not based on the carriers of CARDIV FOUR, but were based on shore.

CARDIV ONE, which at this time consisted of the UNRYU and AMAGI, was still undergoing training and on October 10th was at Yashima. The UNRYU had only been completed on August 8th and the AMAGI on August 10th. Neither was ready for combat as late as October 20th.

CARDIV THREE consisted of the ZUHAI, **** ZUIMAKU, and CHIYODA. On October 10th the ZUIHO was at Oita, the CHIYODA and ZUIMAKU were at Kure, the CHIYODA's location is not known. CARDIV FOUR consisted of the ISE, HYUGA, JUNYO and RYUHO. The ISE and HYUGA, which were at Kure, were the only ships of the CARDIV that participated in the Battle for Leyte Gulf. Therefore, the JUNYO and HYUGA will be dropped from further consideration.

It seems pertinent to point out here again that Commander Main Force was also Commander Mobile Force and therefore was familiar with the Mobile Force plans. Why CinC, Combined Fleet assigned the direct

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* War Diary CARDIV E, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739; also Battle Summary FIRST Striking Force Detailed Action Report for SHO Operations, October 1944, WDC Document 161641 Group 17, Item 17B
*** Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of the War, Compiled by Shizuo Fukui, Administrative Division SECOND Demobilization Bureau, April 25th, 1947.
**** War Diary ZUHAI, October 10th, 1944, WDC Document 161636 NA 11973.
***** War Diary ZUIMAKU October 10th, 1944, WDC Document 161636 NA 11973.
****** War Diary CHIYODA October 10th, 1944, WDC Document 161636 NA 11973.
******* War Diary HYUGA October 10th, 1944, WDC Document 161636 NA 11973.
command of the Main Force to his Commander Mobile Force is not known, for it caused that officer to command on two echelons. In view of the fact that Commander Mobile Force was, at the same time, commanding the FIRST and SECOND Striking Forces as major forces under his over-all command, this direct command of the Main Force could have resulted in his becoming so engrossed in the tactical details of the Main Force's operations as to overlook possibly his basic responsibility as Commander Mobile Force.

At 1500 he directed the 634th Air Group and the 653rd Air Group to expedite preparations for the transfer of the air groups to southern Kyushu. (This was in accordance with SHO plans One and Two for the employment on shore of carrier-based planes), and he advised the command that Commander SECOND Striking Force, in order to assist in this transfer, was dispatching two destroyers (including HATSUMA) to Cita, and, in order to assist CARDIV FOUR in transferring the 634th Air Group, was assigning two destroyers to COMCARDIV FOUR.*

From these orders issued by Commander Main Force, it is clear that he now realized that the carrier training of his air groups operating from Cita was discontinued for the present. It must also have been clear to him that CINC, Combined Fleet planned to activate SHO Two for the Base Air Forces only, and in that event he would probably be required to employ his carriers without their regularly assigned air groups, utilizing instead such planes and pilots as were available at the time.

At about 1640 he received CINC, Combined Fleet's dispatch to Commander Mobile Force wherein he ordered the SECOND Striking Force plus CARDIV FOUR (less air units) for sortie,** and he also received the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet's amplifying directive wherein the situations which would call for such a sortie were set forth.***

From 1640 until midnight, Commander Main Force received no important instructions and issued no important orders to his command other than to authorize COMCARDIV FOUR to communicate directly with Commander SECOND Striking Force concerning matters connected with the sortie. It was for this reason that Commander SECOND Striking Force ordered fuel for CARDIV FOUR.****

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* Commander Mobile Force Dispatch 101500, October 1944 to Striking Force, COMCARDIV 4 and COM 653rd Air Group, WDC Document 161715.
** CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101530, October 1944 to Commander Mobile Force (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd No. 336), WDC Document 161716.
*** CoCS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101512, October 1944 to Commander Mobile Force, WDC Document 161715.
**** CoCS, SECOND Striking Force Dispatch 102120, October 1944 to Commander Kure Naval District, WDC Document 161715.

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(3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, October 16th.

The SECOND Striking Force consisted, on this day of CRUDIV TWENTY-ONE, DESRON ONE, DESRON ELEVEN, DESDIV FORTY-ONE and DESDIV SIXTY-ONE.*

On October 16th this force was either training in the Inland Sea, although the weather there had been bad, or was at base in the Kure area preparing final sortie preparations. For example, DESRON ONE at Kure was installing additional machine guns, unloading non-essential supplies, dry-docking and preparing plans for improving the sortie equipment.* Certain units, such as the KASUMI and HATSUHARU were engaged in special operations.* The HATSUHARU had been operating with CARDIV THREE in aircraft carrier qualifications.* DESDIV FORTY-ONE was on detached duty and was at Yokosuka.*

Throughout the day Commander SECOND Striking Force received most of the dispatches concerning the Allied air attacks on Okinawa. As a consequence of the receipt of a dispatch, at about 0730, which reported Okinawa and Amami O Shima being attacked since 0700, he ordered a No. 3 Anti-Aircraft Alert at 0924.***

At about 1050, he received word that all operational planes of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR, which were from the main force, were to complete preparations for land-based operations and were to stand by for additional orders.****

At about 1100, he received a dispatch which indicated that SHO Two would probably be activated for the Base Air Forces and that it was the present intention of CINC, Combined Fleet to maintain the Mobile Force, less its carrier aircraft, in a stand by condition in its present dispositions.*****

At about 1530, he received instructions from Commander Mobile Force to dispatch immediately two destroyers (including HATSUHARU) to Oita to assist COMCARDIV THREE in transferring the 653rd Air Group to southern Kyushu, and to assign two destroyers to COMCARDIV FOUR to assist in the transfer of the 634th Air Group.******

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* War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
** War Diary DESRON 10, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
*** Commander SECOND Striking Force Dispatch 100924, October 1944 to SECOND Striking Force, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
**** CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101019, October 1944 to All Fleet and Squadron Commanders (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 334), Documents from File of Captain Bunzo Shibata, JN, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-18, Item B.
***** CofS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101035, October 1944 to Commander Striking Force, WDC Document 161008.
****** Commander Mobile Force Dispatch 101500 October 1944 to Commander SECOND Striking Force, etc., WDC Document 161715. CONFIDENTIAL

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Also at about 1530 he received CinC, Combined Fleet’s orders directing that the SECOND Striking Force was to expedite sortie preparations and directing that at the time of sortie CARDIV FOUR would be incorporated into the SECOND Striking Force.*

At about 1546 he received CinC, Combined Fleet’s dispatch wherein that commander advised the Mobile Force as to his plans for sorting the SECOND Striking Force.**

Commander SECOND Striking Force now estimated the situation and, after receiving reports from the various units of his command which evidently took considerable time, he decided that it was necessary to fuel his command. He therefore, at 2102, advised Commander Kure Naval District that he desired to fuel fully CRUDIV TWENTY-ONE, DESRON ONE, CARDIV FOUR (ISE and HYUGA) and DESRON ELEVEN; indicates the amount of fuel required for each division and squadron, and advised that CRUDIV TWENTY-ONE would reach Kure early the following morning.*** As he made no provision for fueling DESDIV SIXTY-ONE it is assumed that DESDIV was fully fueled.

At about 2200 he received orders from Commander Mobile Force directing him to expedite sortie preparations and cancelling the dispatch of the four destroyers to assist the carriers in transferring their air groups.****

(c) Operations of Base Air Forces, October 10th.

(1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force

As has been noted, when a Kanoys search plane broke off communications with its base and failed to return on October 9th, Commander Sasebo Naval District issued at 0100, October 10th, an alert to all units in southern Kyushu and the Nansel Shoto against the possibility of an air attack.*****

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*** CofS, SECOND Striking Force Dispatch 102102, October 1944 to Commander Kure Naval District, WDC Document 161715.
***** Commander Sasebo Naval District SigDesOpOrd No. 115 to All Units Sasebo Naval District, October 10th, 1944, WDC Document 160369.
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At 0315, three hours before sunrise (sunrise was at 0615), four radar equipped land attack planes of the 708th Attack Unit based at Kanoya departed on routine patrol to search the sector 132°-162°(T) to 650 miles and, also, to cover the area to the east of this sector between bearings 132°-135°(T) distance 500 miles on the west side and 420 miles on the east side. This search had been planned prior to the issuance of the alert but, as a result of the alert, its departure was advanced two hours.** It will be observed that this search covered the sector where the lost Kanoya search plane had last been reported on the previous day.

At 0400, units of the "T" Force, which were at bases in southern Kyushu, commenced retiring to more secure bases. This movement was completed at about 0630 and a total of 164 aircraft were dispersed to bases to the north.**

Between 0600 and 0630 a second search departed from Kanoya composed of four land reconnaissance planes of the 41st Air Group to cover the sector 098°-175°(T) to 300 miles. This search had not been previously scheduled but was an additional precautionary measure resulting from the alert.** It was ineffective as the radius of search and the sector searched were inadequate.

At Okinawa a routine search took off at 0610. Four two-engine land bombers of the TWENTY-SIXTH Air Flotilla were to cover the sector 122°-162°(T) to 650 miles. This was the search scheduled before the Sasebo Naval District alert. One of these four planes returned shortly with engine trouble. The remaining three planes failed to return to base.*** and were presumably shot down as this search covered the area in which TF 38 was operating.

As at Okinawa, no special action regarding morning searches was taken at Shichihiku, northern Formosa, since Shichihiku was not within the Sasebo Naval District and Commander SIXTH Base Air Force gave no special orders.

Actually but one search was launched from Formosa on the morning of October 10th. This was a routine air search of three land attack planes from the 708th Attack Unit, which was to cover the sector 111°-169°(T) to a distance of 600 miles. Although the search was scheduled to depart at about 0658 only one plane - the center plane - departed at this time. The other two planes failed to depart until much later.

* Commander "T" Force Dispatch 091336, October 1944 to authorized ships, WDC Document 161437.
** Memorandum notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item 8.

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The plane in the southern sector departed at 0807 and covered the full 800 miles; the plane in the northern sector departed at 1007 and covered but 500 miles. Meanwhile the center plane, after covering 110 miles suffered engine trouble and was forced to return to base. A replacement was sent out immediately, but did not depart until 1053 and then returned to base having covered but 350 miles. Although this search was very poorly organized and flown, this had no adverse effect as TF 38 was well to the north of the sector searched.

Thus, it was that on October 10th, prior to the Allied attack on Okinawa, the SIXTH Base Air Force had already effected the following counter operations. It had (a) advanced the regular morning search from Kanoya two hours and (b) it had retired the "T" Force planes from southern Kyushu bases commencing nearly two hours before sunrise.

While it is not clear who directed these operations it appears to have been the Senior Staff Officer, SIXTH Base Air Force at Kanoya since the dispatches originated with him. Is it not logical therefore to assume that this senior staff officer in the absence of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force who was on Formosa, would, upon receiving Commander Saobo Naval District's alert order, take appropriate action as necessary regarding the SIXTH Base Air Force? This seems to have been in accordance with Japanese practice as evidenced by the actions of CINC, Combined Fleet during this same time. Although the action of the Senior Staff Officer in advancing the departure of the radar equipped aircraft from Kanoya was sound, his failure to direct similar action by Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla on Okinawa is not considered sound. In all fairness it should be pointed out that perhaps the aircraft available on Okinawa were not radar equipped, and were unable to conduct an effective search before daylight. However, if such were indeed the case would it not have been wise to have increased the area searched from Kanoya to cover the approaches to Okinawa with radar equipped aircraft?

The retirement of the "T" Force from the south Kyushu area before dawn on October 10th, was in accordance with the original plan for conserving the strength of the base air forces prior to the time of decisive battle. This action indicates that considerable credence was given to the Allied capability of making an air attack on bases in southern Kyushu at this time. This was not an idle thought for CINC THIRDFLT had stated on October 6th that, should the typhoon create the opportunity, he planned to strike Kyushu in lieu of Okinawa. Why the Allied capability of making such an attack on Okinawa was not given equal weight and did not dictate taking added measures from that command to insure detection of an enemy force attacking that area is not known. Does it not appear that, if an Allied task force was believed to be approaching the area, the determination of its location, composition, and movement was imperative and warranted maximum search effort?

* CONTHIRDFLT Dispatch 080712, October 1944 to CINCPOA.
Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, who was at Takao, was aware of the
loss of the Kanoya search plane on October 9th and of the alert in the
Sasebo Naval District. He appears to have taken no specific action
prior to the attack on Okinawa. It is probable that he felt that the
alert he had established for the SIXTH Base Air Force on October 4th
was sufficient. On the previous day (October 3rd) he had directed that
(a) all units were to maintain an alert status from two hours prior to
sunrise until noon each day, (b) patrols were to be launched thirty
minutes before sunrise, (c) additional patrol planes were to be ready to
take off on thirty minutes notice for additional search or contact
scouting, and (d) "T" Force and all combined groups were to be prepared
to take off on one hour's notice to attack or to disperse.* On October
6th he had extended the provisions of this alert indefinitely, and had
added that regular sector patrols would be fixed by the respective
commanders according to the number of operational patrol planes.**

That Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had complete confidence in his
commanders at Kanoya and Okinawa is apparent when it is noted that he
did not issue any specific orders for the operation of his forces at
those bases during October 10th. His Senior Staff Officer at Kanoya
did find it necessary to issue orders for units in that area, but his
Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla on Okinawa did not consider that
the situation required any modifications of his routine search plans.

At about 0730 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received information
that Okinawa was under attack by enemy carrier planes.*** At this time
he had no information whatsoever as to the location of the enemy carrier
force or the number of planes attacking Okinawa. He did know, of course,
that his searches from Kanoya and Okinawa were scheduled to take off at
least one-half hour before sunrise and should have been well on their
search course by the time of the attack. He could therefore reasonably
expect to receive a contact report shortly. He could also expect that
his commander on Okinawa would soon amplify his original report.
Actually, since this attack appeared to be the one he had anticipated
when he set his alert on October 3rd effective October 4th and had con-
tinued indefinitely on October 6th, he directed units of the SIXTH Base
Air Force at 0809 to operate in accordance with previous orders.****

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* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 061021, October 1944 to
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 061946, October 1944 to
  SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 161137.
*** Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 100700, October 1944 to
  CINCP, Combined Fleet; Flag, SIXTH Base Air Force; Flag, SEVENTH
**** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 100809, October 1944 to
This meant that they were to conserve their strength while preparing to conduct small scale attacks on the enemy task force as conditions might permit.

The first Allied sweep was detected by Japanese radar on Okinawa at 0330, ten minutes before the attack commenced.*

SIXTH Base Air Force headquarters at Kanoya received the information of the attack on Okinawa at about the same time that their commander received the information on Formosa. By this time (0730) two searches had already departed from Kanoya, but no contacts had been reported.

At about 0830 Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla sent out two carrier-type reconnaissance planes to search for the enemy, the search sectors being unknown. They made no contact; both planes failed to return to base.**

At about 0930 the Kanoya search plane of the second search covering the sector 106°-110°(T) reported sighting a large enemy formation. An air raid alert was ordered. At about 0935 a reconnaissance plane of the 141st Air Group, which had presumably been ordered out prior to receipt of this contact, took off to search the sector 175°-190°(T) to 300 miles. This search was ordered after information regarding the attack on Okinawa had been received and was intended to extend the original coverage of the second morning's search toward Okinawa. At about the same time a reconnaissance plane of the ELEVENTH Recon Unit was sent out to scout the enemy formation reported to the east of Kanoya. At 1010 the contact report was found to be in error due to improper coding and the air raid alert was cancelled. Actually the message had reported a contact,*** on the submarine GABILAN which, while en route to Bungo Suido, had reported sighting an enemy plane at 0937 in Latitude 30°-05'N, Longitude 134°-49'E. The GABILAN was not attacked.****

How much information concerning these operations from southern Kyushu was forwarded to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force in Formosa is not known, but it is probable that he was not informed of each detail, for, at 1112, his Senior Staff Officer at Kanoya originated a dispatch.

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* Detailed Action Report Oroku Detachment 901st Air Group, October 10th, 1944, WDC Document 160369.
** War Diary Commander 25th Air Flotilla, October 1st-31st, 1944, WDC Document 160157.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunse Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
wherein he indicated (a) the searches which were then underway but which had not yet located the enemy, (b) the fact that the "T" Force had retired to northern Kyushu bases where it would complete attack preparations and (c) his intention to launch an additional four plane search in the afternoon.*

In the meantime, subsequent to issuing his order to operate in accordance with previous orders, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received certain orders and information:

(a) At about 0935, CinC, Combined Fleet's order transferring the 501st Attack Unit from the SEVENTH Base Air Force to the "T" Force and directing Commander SEVENTH Base Air Force to stand by to move the entire operational strength of that air force to southern Kyushu.**

(b) About 0955, CinC, Combined Fleet's alert for SHO Two for the base air forces.***

(c) At about 1000, orders from CinC, Combined Fleet directing him to scout the enemy situation and, at a favorable opportunity, to attack and destroy him.****

(d) At about 1005, orders to alert searches from Gara Bi, Toimisaki (Kanoya) and Shinchiku.*****

(e) At about 1050, information that Commander Combined Fleet had ordered all operational aircraft of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR to complete preparation for land-based operations and stand by.******

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* Kanoya Air Base Dispatch 101112, October 1944 addressees unknown, WDC Document 161437.
** CoFS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 100902, October 1944 to Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 330), Documents from File of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
*** CoFS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 100935, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH, SIXTH and SEVENTH Base Air Forces (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 331), Documents from File of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
**** CoFS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 100930, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH Base Air Forces, etc., (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 333), Documents from File of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
****** CoFS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101019, October 1944 to Commanders CARDIV's 3 and 4, etc., (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 334), WDC Document 161437.
During the morning, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received no further amplification of the initial dispatch from Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla on Okinawa, although he did receive three meager dispatches from the Base Force Commander at Okinawa. That commander reported (a) at 0940 that several tens of enemy carrier aircraft had attacked Okinawa since 0640,** (b) at 1020 enemy aircraft had been driven off and (c) at 1215 a third attack of about thirty enemy aircraft had started at noon.*** Also at about 1215, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received CinC, Combined Fleet's order alerting the base air forces only for both SH0 One and SH0 Two.****

In estimating the situation as it existed at about noon it was obvious to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force that he still lacked any specific information other than that the attack on Okinawa was continuing. His commander on Okinawa, Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla, had given him no details from which he could make an estimate of the size of the attack force. While he likely realized that that commander was finding it difficult to counter the attack effectively (his silence supported this belief) he nevertheless necessarily found that he was being seriously handicapped in his ability to estimate the situation and to make decisions because of his failure to receive more complete information. This points out the importance of information to any commander and particularly to top-level commanders who are responsible for making the more important decisions. It further points out the necessity for senior commanders to make every effort to obtain such information using all means available, and accepting any losses within the limits of authorized calculated risk to accomplish this objective.

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force could not have been surprised by the directive issued by CinC, Combined Fleet. Certainly the order to attack the enemy and at a favorable opportunity attack and destroy him was one which might well have been expected. In this connection it should be remembered that both commanders were on Formosa and were in communication with one another.

While an order to attack the enemy at this time was not in accordance with the basic concept of the conservation of base air force strength prior to an actual landing, it was nevertheless authorized in the basic SH0 Plan. Further, as already noted, such utilization of the base air forces appears to have been CinC, Combined Fleet's approved

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* Commander Okinawa Base Force Dispatch 100940, October 1944 to Commander Sasebo Naval District (Combined Escort Force DesOpOrd 269) WDC Document 160369.
** Ibid 101020.
*** Ibid 101215.
**** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101214, October 1944 to Combined Fleet, WDC Document 160137.
policy under the conditions as then known.

That he apparently felt that the actions which had been taken regarding searches from Kanoya and Okinawa were sufficient, for the present, seems correct for, until midafternoon, he issued no directive beyond his original order to operate in accordance with previous orders.

Shortly after 1400, having received no additional information on the enemy situation, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force issued an operational outline to his command. Therein, repeating the directive received earlier from CINC, Combined Fleet, he ordered his command (a) to "clarify the over-all enemy situation and at favorable opportunity... to engage and destroy the enemy task force," (b) should SHO Two be activated to operate in accordance with previously established policies and (c) should both SHO One and SHO Two, or SHO One only, be activated, first to destroy the enemy task force off Nansei Shoto, second to destroy the enemy task force off Formosa, and third to carry out decisive battle operations from the Philippines.*

By this time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had become impatient with the failure of his command to locate the enemy. Knowing the combat radius of Allied carrier aircraft and the many hours they had been operating off Okinawa he could not understand why they had not been located. Therefore, at 1426 he issued more specific instructions.** He directed all SIXTH Base Force units to employ every available means to ascertain the enemy situation. In addition, he directed (a) his forces on southern Kyushu to institute day and night searches using large and small type aircraft from both main bases and outlying bases including those in northern Nansei Shoto. These forces were also to augment the strength of the Okinawa forces for dusk searches, and

(b) his forces on Formosa, which up to this time had taken no action other than to send out three aircraft on routine morning search from Shishiku, to utilize outlying bases in Sakishima Gunto, midway between northern Formosa and Okinawa, for additional searches.

At about this same time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received word from his Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla on Okinawa wherein that commander advised him that at 1403 the Ormoc sector of Okinawa was being continuously attacked by Allied carrier planes about 200 of which had already attacked and that the enemy task force had not yet

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* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 101406, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 30), NBC Document 190157.
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 101426, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 31), Historical Section NBC Unnumbered Microfilm.
been located.** This dispatch which was the first information he had received from this commander since early morning, and which was far from complete, must have left some questions in the mind of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force viz., (a) what were his forces on Okinawa doing to ascertain the enemy situation and, (b) considering the probable damage received, what could they do? It should be clear here that Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla had neglected to inform his commander of the effect, if any, the Allied air attack had had on his capability to carry out the orders he had received. The difficulty of conducting effective military operations without such information is so obvious as to require no explanation here.

At about 1503, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was informed by his commander at Kanoya that the first morning search from that base had returned at 1339 without locating the enemy.*** By this time the second morning search had also returned without having made contact and the afternoon search of four two-engine land bombers of 408th Attack Unit had been underway for two and a half hours.**** This latter search, of which Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had been informed by his Senior Staff Officer at Kanoya at about 1140,***** had actually taken off at 1230 to search the sector 17°-23°(T) to 600 miles. An additional search by two carrier-type reconnaissance planes of 141st Air Group at Kanoya had also been sent out at 1317 to cover the sector 17°-19°(T) to 500 miles. Data available does not indicate whether or not Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was informed of this latter search.

During the afternoon Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received no further information from Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla on Okinawa although an additional dispatch from Commander Base Force at Okinawa indicated that the attack was still in progress.******

He could assume by now that his "T" Force was ready to attack. However, although he had directed maximum effort by his search commanders he had as yet received no information as to the location of the enemy task forces.

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** Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 101433, October 1944 to 0110, Combined Fleet, Commanders FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces.
*** Kanoya Air Base Dispatch 101433, October 1944 to Authorized Ships, etc., WDC Document 101437.
**** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Fujibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-13th, 1944, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
***** Kanoya Air Base Dispatch 101112, October 1944, addressees unknown, WDC Document 101112.
****** Commander Okinawa Base Force Dispatch 101515, October 1944 to Ships and Stations receiving Intelligence Reports, WDC Document 160389.
Sometime in the late afternoon but probably after 1720* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received the contacts for which he had been wait-
ing since morning. The two carrier-type reconnaissance planes of 141st Air Group which had departed Kanoya at 1317 reported by dispatch having made two contacts as follows: Three enemy carriers bearing 195° dis-
tance 357 miles at 1533, and two large enemy carriers bearing 180° dis-
tance 400 miles from Toi Misaki (near Kanoya) at 1540. These contacts were broadcast by Commander Sasebo Naval District to his command at
2109**. Whether Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received these reports directly or whether they were given to the search unit of the "T" Force attack group is not indicated in the data available. The reported po-
positions were of fair accuracy. Actually, the first contact was about twenty-eight miles north of the most northerly task group of TF 38; the second one was about the same distance to the east of the most easterly group. Considering the formidable opposition which the Japanese pilots had reason to expect when scouting for TF 38 and further considering that these two carrier-type reconnaissance planes were the only search planes during the day to make contact and survive, their observations were creditable.

At 1851, expecting these contacts to be followed by a night attack by the "T" Force, he alerted all of his commanders to the necessity for being prepared to take care of aircraft of the night attack unit should such aircraft be forced back to base.***

At about 2000, the "T" Force commenced attack operations. The first phase consisted of sending out five search planes of the THIRTEENTH Reconnaissance Unit and the 708th Attack Unit to locate the enemy. Of these five planes, for reasons unknown, two turned back without searching. Up to 2400 the remaining three had failed to locate the enemy. During this search the "T" Force kept in readiness an attack group of about sixty aircraft.****

At about 2105, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was informed that the three regular search planes from Shinchiku and, also, three special search planes which had been ordered flown by Formosa Air Group later

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** Commander Sasebo Naval District Dispatch 102109, October 1944 to Sasebo Naval District, WDC Document 160369.
*** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 101851, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force and 14th Combined Group (unnumbered) Microfilm, Historical Division FDC.
**** Memorandum Notes of Captain Puno Shibata, JPO, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item E.
in the day to cover the sector 007°-123°(T) to 300+ miles had returned to base without sighting any enemy surface force. The Shinchiku search ASRO reported sighting a surfaced submarine at 1515 in position latitude 20°-30′N, longitude 123°-30′E on course 050°(T), speed 16 knots. For reasons not stated, an attack could not be executed. This was the ASRO which was returning to Saipan from patrol. The ASRO reported that at 1515 she had in latitude 20°-45′N, longitude 123°-10′E contacted by radar an aircraft target closing. She had promptly submerged. On surfacing twenty minutes later she had observed that the aircraft had disappeared.

At about 2100, two of the four search planes of 406th Attack Unit had departed Kanoa at 1230 returned without making contact. The other two failed to return.

At about this time four radar equipped flying boats departed to search for the enemy task force. Information available does not indicate the base from which they had departed nor the unit to which they belonged although they probably belonged to the 301st Air Group. Up to 2400 they had made no contact.

Shortly after 2100 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received another contact report. This one reported surface craft, apparently hostile, bearing 050°, distance 140 miles from Garan B1 on the southern end of Formosa, and was made by other radar equipped flying boats. This position was about 406 miles to the west of the earlier 1540 contact and 346 miles southwest of Okinawa. What action he took is not known. Inasmuch as the position was 670 miles bearing 201°(T) from Kanoa, he did not pass this contact to his forces which were standing by to attack from that base. Apparently, although he must have realized the capability of the enemy to have a task force in that area, he decided to wait until his dawn searches from Shinchiku could confirm and develop this contact. As has been noted earlier, this was actually a false report; there were no Allied forces in the area in which the contact was reported.

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* Commander 21st Air Flotilla, Service No. 31, WDC Document 162579.
** Detailed Action Report No. 6, 708th Attack Unit, 782nd Air Group, Searches and Patrols of F/J's (Shinchiku) Sectors, October 1st-17th, 1344, WDC Document 162579.
*** War Patrol Report ASRO, Report of FIFTH War Patrol, Serial 017, October 25th, 1944.
**** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, S5COC Air Fleet, October 19th-25th, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
***** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 3-5, JS-104.

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Thus, by the end of the day Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had been unable to attack the enemy. Despite the alerted condition of his forces before the Allied attack, and despite the many searches flown during the day, he had made but one contact on the task force which had returned, although that contact had been neither maintained nor regained. Why this contact was not reported by one of the two planes until after they had returned to base is not known. Possibly, due to material failure neither plane was able to communicate with its base, but if such was the case would it not have been logical to return to the nearest base in the Hachijo Shoto from which the contact could be relayed? This would have been Okinawa. Perhaps the fact that this base was still under attack deterred the pilots.

The failure to receive promptly this contact report prevented the dispatch of tracking aircraft which might have maintained the contact and have guided the attack of the "F" Force. As a result no attack was made.

During the day Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was aware that Cinc, Combined Fleet had taken certain additional actions, looking to activation of either SHO One or SHO Two or both for the base air forces. In addition to incorporating the 501st Attack Unit in the "F" Force and directing Commander SEVENTH Base Air Force to stand by to move his forces to southern Kyushu as already noted, Cinc, Combined Fleet had transferred the 901st Air Group from the Escort Force, the 953rd Air Group from the Takeo Guard Force, and the Okinawa Air Group from the Sasebo Naval District, all to the SIXTH Base Air Force.*

(2) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, October 10th.

Commander FIFTH Base Air Force at his headquarters at Manila, although he may not have been aware of the alert established in Sasebo Naval District in the early morning of October 10th, received information of the initial attack on Okinawa at about 0730.** Therefore he was generally informed of the developing situation by being made an information address on the more important dispatches.

At about 1005, he received the first order requiring his action. Cinc, Combined Fleet, in addition to repeating the information of the initial attack on Okinawa, directed a patrol alert in the search sectors

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* Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item D.
** Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 100700, October 1944 to Cinc, Combined Fleet, Commander FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces, WDC Document 160137.
of the SIXTH Base Air Force and also in the sectors covered from Luzon.*

At about 1245, he received the second order requiring his action, the Combined Fleet Order setting an alert for SHO One and Two, for the base air forces.** What specific action he took is not shown in the data available to this study. Presumably, he continued to carry out the searches as designated for the SHO Operation. Beyond that he readied his command for action while carefully watching the movements of the enemy task force. He realized, of course, that should SHO One be activated later for action in the Philippine area, he would be expected to engage his entire force; should SHO Two be activated, he would be expected to provide a supporting role to the operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. What this would consist of would depend on the situation existing at the time. At about 1320, this was made clear when CinC, Combined Fleet advise that should SHO Two be activated for the Base Air Forces, Commander FIFTH Base Air Force would continue his operations in the Philippines and western Carolines and in addition, depending on the situation, would employ a part of his strength in the SHO Two Operations.***

He does not appear to have been surprised by the attack on Okinawa. As early as October 4th he had considered it strongly possible that an enemy task force might attack in the Formosa and northern Philippines area and had accordingly established a strict alert in his command.****

His command was even further alerted during the afternoon by a dispatch received at about 1600 from his superior, Commander SW Area Fleet.***** That commander estimated the general situation in the light of the Okinawa attack, and reiterated the necessity for a strict alert due to the possibility that the enemy task force might proceed to attacks on Formosa and the Philippines after Okinawa.

From Diagram "B" it is apparent that during October 10th the enemy task force was well beyond the range of the FIFTH Base Air Force and no direct action could be taken. The latter force could only continue its searches and await further developments.

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* CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 10C135, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH, SIXTH and SEVENTH Base Air Forces, etc., (Combined Fleet DesOrd 333), NDC Document 161437.
** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101214, October 1944 to Combined Fleet, NDC Document 160137.
*** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101241, October 1944 to All Fleet and Squadron Commanders, Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet Special DesOrd 8), NDC Document 150264.
**** Commander FIFTH Base Air Force Dispatch 042300, October 1944 to FIFTH Base Air Force, NDC Document 150264.
***** CoFS, SW Area Fleet Dispatch 101554, October 1944 to All Fleet and Force Commanders, SW Area, etc., NDC Document 161638.
(d) Operations of CC, FOURTH Air Army, October 10th.

The CC, FOURTH Air Army was presumably informed of the attack on Okinawa at about 0730, although the Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla on Okinawa had not included army commands in his dispatch advising of the attack, it is logical to assume that Commander FIFTH Base Air Force passed this information to the Army air commander, since the FOURTH Air Army and the FIFTH Base Air Force, both with headquarters in Manila, were cooperating in search operations. It is also logical to assume that this information was received from Imperial General Headquarters as well. As with the FIFTH Base Air Force, what action CC, FOURTH Air Army may have taken is not known.

It should be clear, however, that in accordance with the agreement for joint action against enemy task forces by Army and Navy air forces in the Philippines prior to the activation of the SHO Operations, the CC, FOURTH Air Army was already carrying out short-range searches. Beyond these search operations he could do little except to prepare his forces for more direct action should the enemy task force come within range. In the meantime, in cooperation with Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, he was forced to watch the actions to the north and await developments.

(2) Operations on October 11th.

(a) Operations of Cinc, Combined Fleet

Cinc, Combined Fleet, at his headquarters at Shinchiku Air Base Formosa awaited further contacts from his night search planes and further reports from his force commanders.

At about midnight he received a very important report from the Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla transmitted at 2302 the previous day (October 10th). This report, which was quite comprehensive, stated (a) that from 0600 until 1615 a total of about 280 planes had struck the Naha area in four waves attacking mainly airfields, harbors and shipping, (b) that the two reconnaissance planes launched at 0830 (to discover the enemy) had been shot down and had obtained no enemy information (c) that his forces had observed five enemy planes destroyed by AA fire and one by air combat (d) that his plane losses were twenty planes destroyed, two damaged (e) that there had been fifty bomber hits on his airfield runways, but that the runways would be operational that morning (October 11th), (f) that practically all buildings on the Naha airfields had been destroyed and (g) finally that his personnel losses had been slight.

* Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 102302, October 1944 to All Concerned, DDC Document 160137.
This report was discouraging. Heavy enemy air forces had struck Okinawa; had retired with limited losses, and had inflicted considerable, but not vital damage, with little loss to themselves. He noted that the airfields would be speedily repaired. This compared favorably with Allied experience which had shown that bombing airfields, while often temporarily effective, is ineffective for other than short periods unless the bombing or shelling of the airfields is maintained continuously. He also noted that the 280 planes were only for the Naha area; it would be interesting to learn what had occurred in the north Okinawa airfields.

At about 0145, he most likely received a dispatch from Commander "T" Force wherein he advised his command that on that day they were going to reconnoiter the over-all enemy situation and would endeavor to destroy the Allied task forces present by day and night action.*

At about 0230, he received a second dispatch from Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla which answered his earlier queries with respect to the north Okinawa airfields. This dispatch stated (a) that from 0645 until 1600 October 18th a total of about eighty carrier planes had attacked Okinawa North Air Base (b) that of the four scheduled search planes which had departed at 0610, three had been shot down with no contacts and one had returned because of engine trouble (c) that ten planes (total available aircraft) had been destroyed on the ground with very light personnel losses and (d) that he believed that all Army fighter planes present (number unknown) had been destroyed both in the air or on the ground.**

CINC, Combined Fleet could now see that about 360 sorties had struck Okinawa. Since some of these sorties were obviously repeats, he could also see that this report from Okinawa tended to confirm Commander SW Area's estimate made at 1554 the preceding day. There were at least two, and probably more, carrier groups.

At about 0330, he received word that at about 0300 his search planes had detected a surface force on a southerly course bearing south-southeast distant 380 miles from Naha.*** This contact report was reasonably correct but it was incomplete in that it merely reported a contact rather than the group nature of the contact. Whether this was due to the fact that Japanese aircraft radar was too poor at this time for such definition, or whether the pilots were reluctant to close the contact sufficiently to permit definition, is not known.

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* Commander Kanoya Air Base Dispatch 110115, October 1944 to "T" Force ("T" Force Urgent Patrol Report No. 8) WDC Document 161437.
** Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 110136, October 1944 to All Concerned, WDC Document 160137.
*** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of Army Historical Division File 8-5, JS-104.
CinC, Combined Fleet took no action as the areas embraced by the SHO One and SHO Two alert had already been alerted to the possibility of Allied air attack.

At about 1000, he was advised by Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla that all airfields in the Kansui Goto area were operational as of 0800.*

At about 1130, he most likely received a dispatch which reported that at 1105, a contact had been made on an Allied carrier task group consisting of three carriers and three battleships bearing 062°(T) distant 515 miles from Manila which alerted the SW Area Force to the strong possibility of an attack on the Philippines at dawn the following morning (October 12th).** This contact, while reasonably accurate as to range was approximately ten degrees to the right in error. The correct bearing should have been about 052°(T).

It is important to observe here that Commander SW Area Force’s estimate of the possibility of an Allied carrier strike against the Philippines forecast the attack for the following morning rather than for that day. Actually, the Allied strike, as will be shown later, struck Aparri, northern Luzon at about 1415. This error in judgment appears to have stemmed from the fact that TF 38 carrier strikes had almost invariably struck at dawn and therefore Commander SW Area Force had overlooked the enemy’s capability of making an afternoon attack on northern Luzon. This shows the value of the surprise factor in war and also shows the value of not permitting the attack plans to become so stereotyped as to give the enemy an unnecessary advantage.

CinC, Combined Fleet received no further reports until about 1330 when he received an intelligence dispatch from Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo wherein that command advised the fleet as to the probable character of the Allied carrier task force based on the September attacks of TF 38 on Palau and the Philippines. GHQ believed (a) that this force was TF 38, composed of eight large carriers (CV), eight cruiser-carriers (CVL), eight-tenth battleships, fourteen to eighteen cruisers and sixty destroyers, (b) that TF 38 was organized into four groups each with a nucleus of two CV and two CVL with CTF 38, Vice Admiral Mitscher, in the LEHIGH with third group, (c) that TF 38 constituted the entire Allied carrier strength operating in the western Pacific against the Japanese islands and that it was ready for decisive

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* Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 110927, October 1944, WDC Document 160137.
** Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 111259, October 1944 to Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160264, NA 12592; also Detailed Action Report No. 6, Attack Unit 708, October 1st-17th, 1944, WDC Document 160679, NA 12297.
battle at any time, (d) that the designation given this Allied carrier task force was TF 38 when it was operating with the THIRD Fleet and TF 58 when it was operating with the FIFTH Fleet and (e) that replacement planes and aircraft were provided by two or three carrier escorts (CVE) which were disposed behind the above forces, and which carried about seventy flying crews ready for operations, including crews for the various types of aircraft within TF 38.*

This is an extremely interesting dispatch and shows very clearly how accurate the Japanese information concerning TF 38 was. For the information contained in this dispatch was almost entirely correct. There were eight large carriers (CV), nine instead of eight cruiser-carriers (CVL), six instead of eight to ten battleships (BB), fourteen cruisers (CA and CL) and fifty-nine instead of sixty destroyers (DD). This information was probably largely obtained from the interrogation of prisoners, as had been done several years previously, at the Battle of Midway,** by an earlier CinC, Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. The fact that the information was so accurate points out the lesson that a commander who has been operating against the enemy for some time with carrier task forces of more or less stable composition should credit his enemy with a fairly accurate knowledge of the composition of those forces.

Also at about 1330 he presumably received a dispatch reporting an Allied carrier task group of three carriers and three battleships with an unspecified number of cruisers in approximately the same area as the 1105 contact report.*** This contact was reasonably correct.

At about 1420 he received a dispatch from Shinchiku of another task group, of undetermined origin, operating about sixty miles to the northwest of the 1105 group.**** This was also a reasonably correct report.

At about 1500 he received information that "several tons" of enemy aircraft, shortly after 1400, had raided the northern sector of Luzon, with particular emphasis on the Engano and Aparri areas, but had

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* Third Section, Imperial General Headquarters Navy Section Dispatch 111255, October 1944 to All Fleet Commanders, WDC Document 161005.
*** Detailed Action Report No. 6, Attack Unit 708, October 1st-17th, 1944, WDC Document 160579 NA 12297.
**** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of Army Historical Division File 8-5, JS-104.

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inflicted practically no damage. He knew then that his Commander SN Area Force had been caught by surprise by this attack.

At about 1700 he received a message from Commander "XX" Force stating that the Kanoya searches, returning at 1500, had failed to sight the enemy; that the weather had been generally clear with rain in certain areas at the outward perimeter of the search; and that the visibility had varied from 10-20 miles. Naturally, these searches had failed because TF 38 had moved out of the search areas.

He received no contact reports from his Okinawa search planes because but one search plane was available and this plane searched an area other than the one in which TF 38 was operating.

During the early evening the CoFS, Combined Fleet appears to have re-estimated the situation and arrived at the conclusion that (a) since his air searches from Kyushu and Okinawa had been negative which showed that TF 38 was most probably not in the searched area, and (b) since his contacts on carrier task groups to the northeast of Manila and the air attacks on Aparri showed that the enemy was in all probability in the Philippines-Formosa area, it was not necessary to maintain his SECOND Striking Force and CARDIV FOUR (less air units) in an alert condition. He therefore at 2117, cancelled the sortie alert for those forces. This decision seems sound, for it is unwise to retain naval commands in an alert condition any longer than is absolutely necessary since it adversely affects the morale of the personnel.

Also, possibly about this same time, the exact time not being available to this study, he directed Commander Advance Expeditionary Force (Submarine Force) to dispatch the FIRST Submarine Force to the waters east of Formosa to deliver a full-scale attack against the enemy there.

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* Material for Situation Estimates, First Section, Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC Document 210764 (Microfilm). Also Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of Army Historical Division File.

** Commander Kanoya Air Base Dispatch 111625, October 1944 to All Concerned, WDC Document 161437.


**** Submarine Operations in Philippine Waters 1944-1945, Department of Army Historical Division, File 8-5, JS-16.
While this employment was not in accordance with the SHO plan, which matter will be discussed under Japanese submarines, it is considered sound in this case since, if the Base Air Forces were successful, many targets might become available to submarines as occurred at the battle of Midway, June 6th, 1942, when the I-168 torpedoed the damaged YOKOHAMA.

During the afternoon and evening, CinC, Combined Fleet followed the movements of his air forces. He knew that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was planning to carry out searches with radar equipped planes in order to trail TF 36 and had issued orders for October 12th.* He knew that the "T" Force was being ordered to attack on October 12th, staging through Okinawa.** He also knew that the SITHE Base Air Force was redeploying to Formosa, employing the light cruiser KASHIMA.*** Finally he knew that orders had been issued to disperse and conceal aircraft not being employed for interception.*

As he took no action with regard to the above plans it is assumed that he considered them satisfactory.

(b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force, October 11th.

During the 11th Commander Mobile Force took no important action, but awaited the outcome of the air operations of that day, and, also awaited orders from CinC, Combined Fleet.

At about 2140 he received a dispatch from CinC, Combined Fleet cancelling the sortie alert for the SECOND Striking Force and CANNON FOUR.****

(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force, October 11th.

The FIRST Striking Force remained in the Jangga-Singapore area and continued its training as discussed under October 10th.

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* Commander SITH BASE AIR FORCE Dispatch 111830 to SIXTH Base Air Force, October 1944, contained in GHQ, FDC Letter January 10th, 1952 to President, Naval War College.
** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibusawa, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army, Historical Division Microfilm NS-22, Item E.
*** Imperial General Headquarters Dispatch 111503, October 1944 to CinC, Combined Fleet, Commandant Kure Naval District.
Commander FIRST Striking Force maintained close watch on the developing situation since, should a SHO alert be called, he expected, under certain circumstances, to send his tankers in advance towards Brunei or towards the north central Philippines. The tankers were to proceed by a direct route in order to expedite their arrival at the designated base. This was in contradiction to the probable movement of his combat forces which were not limited to any predetermined route.*

(2) Operations of the Commander Main Force, October 11th.

During the day Commander Main Force took no important action but awaited the outcome of the day's operations. The units of the Main Force remained at the same anchorages they had occupied on October 10th, and continued their preparations for the transfer of the air groups to southern Kyushu.

CARDIV FOUR fueled during this day in anticipation of sorties with the SECOND Striking Force.

At about 1920 he received word that the destroyer KASHI was to proceed to Tokushima to assist in the transfer of CARDIV FOUR Air Group (634th Air Group).**

At 2140 he received CinC, Combined Fleet's dispatch cancelling the sortie alert for the SECOND Striking Force and CARDIV FOUR.*** Since he had received most of the dispatches concerning the day's activities and had maintained thereafter a running estimate of the situation it seems probable that the sortie order cancellation was not unexpected.

(3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, October 11th.

On October 11th this force plus CARDIV FOUR less DESDIV's FORTY-ONE and SIXTY-ONE was fueling at Kurio. All ships were in No. 3 Anti-Aircraft Alert.

Commander SECOND Striking Force was observing closely the day's developments not only in the strategical situation, but in the material readiness of his ships. He, of course, realized that at any moment he

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** COMDESRON 11 Dispatch 11343, October 1944 to DESRON 11, War Diary DESRON 11, October 1944 (DESRON 11 SigOrd 109), WDC Document 161715.
might be ordered to sortie, and it became highly important not only that his ships be fully ready, but also that he be prepared with possible plans for the employment of his ships under the most probable situations which might obtain.

He received most of the more important dispatches concerning the air operations of the Japanese as well as those of the enemy, and sometime after 1130 received word of the contact on an Allied carrier task group bearing 082°(T) distant 515 miles from Manila.* He also, sometime after 1330, received an Imperial General Headquarters' dispatch which advised the fleet as to the probable character of the enemy task force.** What his reactions to this dispatch were, are not known, but it seems clear that he realized that the chances of a sortie were very small indeed (a) because his limited forces would have little success against the Allied armada should but one task group of that armada be in the Manus island area and (b) because the indications were that the Allied task force was most probably in the vicinity of Luzon.

If this was his idea it was verified in part by a dispatch received about 1500 which reported that northern Luzon had been hit by an air strike at about 1400.*** Therefore, hearing of no Allied attacks other than this air strike, Commander SECOND Striking Force, at 1630, cancelled his No. 3 Anti-Aircraft Alert.****

At about 1700 he received word that the Kanoya searches had all been negative.*****

Sometime after 2140 he received a dispatch from CinC, Combined Fleet cancelling the sortie alert for the SECOND Striking Force and CARAVAN FOUR.****** Since he took no immediate action on this dispatch but instead maintained the sortie alert within his command, it would

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* Detailed Action Report No. 6 Attack Unit 708, October 1st-17th, 1944, WDC Document 160579 NA 12297.
** Third Section, Imperial General Headquarters Navy Section Dispatch 111259, October 1944 to All Fleet Commanders, WDC Document 161003.
*** Material for Situation Estimates, First Section, Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC Document 216794 (Microfilm). Also Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II October-December, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of Army Historical Division File No. 8-6, JS-104.
**** Commander SECOND Striking Force Dispatch 111550, October 1944 to SECOND Striking Force, WDC Document 161710.
***** Commander Kanoya Air Base Dispatch 111862, October 1944 to All Concerned, WDC Document 161457.
seem that this dispatch had (a) been delayed in transmission until early the next morning when, as will be shown later, Commander SECOND Striking Force did take action or (b) had been received on schedule but had not been acted on for reasons not available to this study.

(c) Operations of Base Air Forces, October 11th.

(1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force

At 0000 October 11th Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was awaiting the results of the two night searches then underway: (a) that by three search aircraft of the "T" Force operating from Kyushu which were attempting to locate the enemy task force preliminary to an attack by the "T" Force attack group which was being held in readiness, and (b) that by four flying boats operating apparently from Formosa which had commenced a radar search during the evening of October 10th.

Shortly after midnight Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received his first comprehensive report from his commander on Okinawa, wherein that commander reported (a) that the Naha area of Okinawa had been attacked by about 250 planes in four waves which had attacked mainly airfields, harbors, and shipping, (b) that the following damage had been inflicted:

(1) Practically all buildings on the airfield destroyed.

(2) Fifty bomb hits on the runways which would be operational by morning, October 11th.

(3) Own aircraft destroyed in the air: Two

(4) Own aircraft destroyed on the ground: Nineteen

(5) Own aircraft moderately damaged on the ground: Two

(c) that five enemy aircraft had been destroyed by ground fire, and one by air combat; that one man had been killed, and three seriously wounded, and that two carrier type reconnaissance planes, which had been sent out at 0830 to locate the enemy task force, had failed to return.

* Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 102301, October 1944 to Stations Authorized to receive SIXTH Base Air Force Battle Reports, WDC Document 180137.
At about 0200 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received another report from his Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla. This report stated that eighty additional enemy carrier planes had attacked Okinawa. North Air Base causing ten two-engine land bombers to be set afire on the ground, two oil trucks destroyed and two men killed. It also stated that of the four two-engine land bombers which had departed on routine search on the morning of the 10th, one had returned with engine trouble and had been damaged on the ground, while the other three had failed to return. Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla also added that he believed that all Army fighter planes present on Okinawa had been destroyed.

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force now knew why it was that his forces on Okinawa had been unable to provide him with confirmation concerning the attacking Allied carrier force. All of his planes at that base had been either damaged or destroyed and all of his planes, which had been sent on search, had failed to return.

The "T" Force search made no contacts but the flying boat search did. At about 0300, one of these flying boats reported a radar contact on the enemy task force. This contact, which was on a course of south, was bearing southeast of Okinawa distant 380 miles, and bearing 185°(T) distant 150 miles from Kanoya. The Commander "T" Force decided that the distance of the contact from Kanoya was too great and, that since the task force was proceeding south, no attack was possible. Actually this contact was in error for the Allied carrier task force at this time was bearing 192°(T) distance 500 miles from Kanoya. Since the base of the search plane is not known it cannot be determined whether the error was in bearing or in range or in both. It seems probable that the base was somewhere in Formosa and therefore the error was most likely a range error. The reported contact was 100 miles bearing 126°(T) from the nearest group of TF 38. Possibly the pilot of the aircraft had grossly underestimated headwinds on his outbound leg.

At 0430 the "T" Force in accordance with orders received at 0116 launched a five plane search from Kanoya to locate the enemy task force. This search, made by land attack planes of 708th Attack Unit,

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* Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 110130, October 1944 to Stations Authorized to receive SIXTH Base Air Force Battle Reports, WDC Document 160187.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, SECOND Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-32, Item B.
**** Kanoya Air Base Dispatch 110115, October 1944 to "T" Force, WDC Document 161437.
was directed to search the sector 107°-167°(T) to 650 miles.*

At 0500 Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla sent out one carrier type reconnaissance plane, presumably the only plane of those damaged on October 10th which could be repaired by morning, to search the sector 152°-208°(T) from Okinawa to a distance of 300 miles.**

At 06 three additional search planes were launched from Kanoya. Three land reconnaissance planes were sent out to search the sector 149°-200°(T) to 300 miles.***

At 0630 eight land attack planes (all operational aircraft) of the 708th Attack Unit detachment based at Shinohi departed on search of sector 062°-133°(T) to a distance of 600 miles. At the same time two land reconnaissance planes of the 804th Fighter Unit departed Shinohi to search the sector 062°-153°(T) to 300 miles.****

At about this same time six carrier type attack planes of the FOURTEENTH Combined Air Group commenced a search***** from Taito, Formosa to a distance of 250 miles between bearings 105°-150°(T).

At 0722 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force directed his forces in southern Kyushu to reinforce the depleted air strength on Okinawa by sending, provided the enemy situation permitted, about ten two-engine land bombers to Okinawa.****** Actually seven two-engine land bombers were sent.******* Why Commander SIXTH Base Air Force waited about five hours to issue this order is not clear, for he knew by 0200 that, although Okinawa's aircraft had all been damaged or destroyed, the runways would be in commission again by morning. Possibly he expected his senior staff officer at Kanoya to act in this matter and only issued the order when no action was forthcoming.

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** War Diary, 27th Air Flotilla, October 1st-31st, 1944, WDC Document 12167.

*** Memos and Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 16th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army, Historical Division Microfilm HS-27, Item 4.

**** Commander 21st Air Flotilla SigOrd 32, WDC Document 160579.

***** Merit Report, 14th Combined Air Group Taiwan Air Battle, Oct 19th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012.

****** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 110722, October 16 to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force SigOrd 32), WDC Historical Division Microfilm (unnumbered)
During the morning Commander SIXTH Base Air Force again awaited information on the location of the enemy. He was still carrying out the first part of his orders received on the previous day from CinC, Combined Fleet, namely to scout the enemy situation and at a favorable opportunity to attack and destroy him. What contacts had been made thus far had failed to provide him with the favorable opportunity.

In the meantime, in addition to watching the situation, his staff at Naha was concerned with plans for the deployment of SEVENTH Base Air Force units, and of the air groups of CARDIV'S THIRDS and FOUR at Kyushu bases should such be ordered by CinC, Combined Fleet.

At about 1135 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received the first contact from his day searches. One of the land attack planes of the 709th Attack Unit based at Shinden reported sighting at 1105 an enemy task group with three carriers bearing 115°(T) distance 480 miles from Gurun Bi. While this force was beyond the effective range of his land-based aircraft, the position indicated to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force that the enemy had completed its attacks, at least for the time being, on Okinawa and that either northern Luzon or Formosa would be the next target. At 1140 he directed the "T" Force to prepare immediately to move to the Formosa area, or to Okinawa, depending on the situation.

At about this same time the 501st Attack Unit with thirty-one two-engine land bombers arrived in southern Kyushu and reported to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force for duty in the "T" Force. This was in accordance with CinC, Combined Fleet's orders issued on the preceding day.

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** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-22, Item E.
** Philippine Area War Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, SECONC Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 3-S, JS-194.
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 111141, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, etc. (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpOrd 34) NDC Document 160258.
**** Detailed Action Reports, 752nd Air Group Units, June 1944-January 1945, NDC Document 160354.
**** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 100862, October 1944 to Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 330) contained in Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22 Item E.
At about 1330 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received the dispatch intelligence estimate of Navy Section, Imperial General Headquarters.*

As noted previously, this dispatch estimated, based on previous information of the Allied carrier force, that the enemy task force was probably composed of eight large carriers (CV), and eight cruiser-carriers (CVL), as well as eight-ten battleships, fourteen-eighteen cruisers, and about sixty destroyers and that this force was divided into four groups.

Also at about 1330 he presumably received a dispatch reporting an Allied carrier task group of three carriers and three battleships with an unspecified number of cruisers in approximately the same area as the 1105 contact report. This contact, by a Shinohiku search plane, was reasonably correct.**

How closely he agreed with the estimate is not indicated in the information available to this study. Presumably knowing the wide sources available to General Headquarters, he accepted the estimate.

From this information, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force could now estimate that he was opposed by approximately one thousand carrier-based planes. This was about twice as many as he had operational in the SIXTH Base Air Force. However, he knew that should SHO One and SHO Two be activated for the base air forces, he could then count on reinforcements from the SEVENTH Base Air Force and possibly also from CARD IV’s TIPPO and FICR, as this was provided by the SHO plan. In addition he knew that Commander FIFTH Base Air Force and CG, FOURTH Air Army in the Philippines would cooperate in the attack. This should give the superiority in numbers to the Japanese. Moreover, from a study of relative positions, he could see that should the enemy task force attack Formosa, which appeared likely at this time, it would be in range of Japanese land-based aircraft from three directions: Nansai Shoto to the north, Formosa to the west, and Luzon to the south. This would indeed provide the favorable opportunity for destroying the enemy for which he was seeking.

At about 1420 a second contact was reported by Shinohiku-based planes. This one was at 1350 on a second task group of undetermined strength sixty miles to the northwest of the first group.***

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* Third Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section Dispatch 111265, October 1944 to All Fleet Commanders, NDC Document 161006.

** Detailed Action Report No. 6, Attack Unit 703, October 1st-17th, 1944, NDC Document 160579 NA 12297.

*** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-C, JS-104.
These two contacts, one at 1105 and the second at 1350, were approximately correct in bearing from Shinchiku but, like the earlier 0300 contact, were over in range. The 1105 contact was about ninety miles from the nearest TF 38 task group; the other contact was about fifty miles. Why the Japanese pilots at this time consistently over-estimated their ground speeds and hence their distances from their bases is not known. These errors did not have a vital effect upon the developing air battle because no attack was launched because of them, but they are stressed here to indicate the need for accurate navigation in order that contact reports may be correct.

Shortly thereafter, at about 1500, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received information that Yaperi and Engano in northern Luzon had been attacked at about 1400 by "several tens" of carrier aircraft, but that little damage had been inflicted.* It is not improbable that this attack surprised and confused him somewhat for previous attacks by the Allied carrier task force had almost invariably commenced at dawn. He could not be certain now whether this attack indicated continuing enemy action against the Philippines on the next day, or whether this was but a passing sweep by the Allied carrier task force en route Formosa. Actually, this attack had little or no effect on his plans for he was still seeking a favorable opportunity to attack and could only continue his searches until the enemy had come within effective range of his bases.

At about 1700 he received dispatch information from Kanoya stating that four land attack planes of the morning search had returned at 1500 without sighting the enemy. The fifth plane was missing. Search visibility was but ten to twenty miles.** Presumably, at about this same time, he was informed that eight two-engine land bombers of the 405th Attack Unit deploying from southern Kyushu to Formosa had conducted search en route but had made no contacts.***

Shortly thereafter he received the report of Shinchiku searches, for the last plane had returned to that base at 1649. These search planes had made no contacts other than the three already noted. Two aircraft had failed to return.****

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-6, JS-104.
** Kanoya Air Base Dispatch 111625, October 1944 to Al. Concerned, WDC Document 161427.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Utaro Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SIXTH Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
**** Detailed Action Report No. 8, 708th Attack Unit, 762nd Air Group, Searches and Patrols of F's (Shinchiku) Sector, October 1st-17th, 1944, WDC Document 160079.
The searches from Taito and Okinawa had reported no contacts.

At 1830 he issued his orders for operations on October 13th. He planned (a) to continue his searches from Kanoya, Okinawa, Shinchiku, and Taito, (b) to move the "T" Force to Okinawa after dark and to conduct dark and night attacks with that force against the Allied carrier task force east of Formosa, and (c) to prepare the remaining units of the SIXTH Base Air Force on Kyushu for a rapid advance to Formosa.*

At about 1930 he learned that Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, was making the light cruiser KASHIMA, then assigned to the Kure Naval District, available for the transportation of material and base personnel of the SIXTH Base Air Force from Kyushu to Formosa.**

During the night radar searches were conducted by patrol seaplanes of the 901st Air Group.*** Three planes of this group, which had departed Toko, Formosa, at 1900, had made contact at 2245 on three separate enemy task groups**** southeast of Formosa, the exact position being Latitude 21°-10 'N, Longitude 124°-10 'E.***** This contact was approximately correct in bearing and about twenty miles short in range, but was well within the capabilities of the radars of the Japanese seaplanes which could detect a large ship at an estimated range of forty-five miles.******

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force took no action on these contacts prior to midnight. However, in estimating the situation at that time, it appeared probable that the Allied carrier task force was moving to a dawn position for attacks on Formosa on the following morning. He now had to decide what to do with the "T" Force which he had ordered to Okinawa after dark. Should he allow these orders to stand or should he move this force up immediately so that it would be available to take advantage of any favorable attack opportunity which might arise?

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* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 111830, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, NHC Historical Division Microfilm unnumbered.
** Imperial General Headquarters Navy Section Dispatch 111903, October 1944 to CinC, Combined Fleet and Commander Kure Naval District, AFG/PSC Historical Section Document 6239.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Tento Shibata, IJN,Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm NS-22, Item B.
**** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1944, Department of Army Historical Division File No. 5-5, JS-104.
***** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 123233, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force contained in GHQ, FRK Letter, January 10th 1942 to President, Naval War College.

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Operations on October 12th.

(a) Operations of CinC, Combined Fleet.

CinC, Combined Fleet remained at his headquarters at Shinchiku Air Base, Formosa and awaited developments. At this time he knew that his command was most probably being attacked by TF 38 which consisted of four task groups. To date he had located but two of these groups. These two groups were in the northeast quadrant distant about 500 miles from Manila and were about sixty miles apart on a NW-SE line of bearing. Where were the other two?

He also knew that a long range ineffective air strike had been made at about 1400 on Apurri, Luzon by a limited number of planes. He did not know whether these planes had come from the known carrier groups or from those not as yet located.

Since the initiative lay with the enemy as it was difficult to track him, he was faced with the problem of determining the enemy's plans.

Shortly after midnight he learned from Commander SIXTH Base Air Force that three radar equipped flying boats had, at 2245 October 11th, made contact on three separate Allied carrier task groups in the waters southeast of Formosa.

He now knew where three of the Allied search groups were. But, where was the fourth?

At about 0330 he received word from Commander SIXTH Base Air Force that an enemy force had been located at 0440 in Latitude 20°10'N, Longitude 125°10'W on bearing 130°(R) distant 175 miles from Garan Bl, Formosa. CinC, Combined Fleet presumably assumed that he had now located all four Allied task groups, although it was possible that this was one of the three originally contacted.

As a consequence of these contacts a general air raid alert was ordered on Formosa at 0334 by Commander Teko Naval Guard District, as
it was estimated that Formosa was to be the target of that day's enemy air attacks.**

This estimate was correct for at 0648 Allied carrier planes commenced striking that island.*** Since Cinc, Combined Fleet was on Formosa it is clear that he was fully familiar with the nature and power of the Allied air attack. It is also clear that during this time he was either in company with Commander SIXTH Base Air Force or in direct telephone communication with him (Takao to Shinchiku). He knew, of course, that the Allied planes were attacking his principal bases and were causing considerable destruction especially in Takao Harbor and at Makao.

During this time he presumably received reports as follows:

0630 - That fifty enemy aircraft were overhead proceeding west;***

0700 - That fifty fighters were east of Tokyo heading north;****

0709 - That sixty aircraft were observed SW of Taito heading NW;*****

0727 - That the Formosa air group was engaging the enemy******* and that at

0735 - Thirty enemy fighters and bombers were heading towards

Takao.********

Meanwhile he himself had been under attack for between 0730 and 0830 about fifty enemy fighters and bombers had attacked Shinchiku.********

He also knew at this time that about thirty-eight carrier type fighters (Zeros) from Shinchiku had engaged about 100 Allied fighters (P5's). He probably believed, from the reports, that the Shinchiku planes had succeeded in destroying about twenty-two Allied fighters with six more probably destroyed, and had shot down two SB2C (presumably meant SB2C) by AA gunfire. He knew that the Shinchiku forces had lost eighteen

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** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944 Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government October 1947 Department of Army Historical Division File No. 8-5 RS-104.
*** Taiwan Air Group Dispatch 120030, October 1944 to Kahi Air Group, WDC Document 160495.
**** Takao Naval Guard District Dispatch 120706 to All Units, WDC Document 160496.
***** Ibid, Dispatch 120709.
****** Commander FOURTEENTH Air Group Dispatch 120727, October 1944 to all Units, WDC Document 160495.
******* Ibid, Dispatch 120728.
******** Western Attack Force No. 3 Urgent Battle Report (October 12th) Forwarded by Shinchiku Air Base Dispatch 130200 October 1944, WDC Document 160579.
(2) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force,
October 11th.

Commander FIFTH Base Air Force at Manila continued
his search operations from the Philippines concurrent with readying his
command for combat operations. Detailed information on what searches he
conducted is not available but, it is assumed that his operations were
generally in accordance with the FOURTH Air Army - FIFTH Base Air Force
agreement concerning operations against enemy task forces prior to the
activation of the SHO Operations.* This included long-range searches
as indicated on Diagram "C" and co-tain of the short-range searches as
noted under the chapter "Land-Based Aircraft."

Whether or not Commander FIFTH Base Air Force received the 0300 con-
tact made by a radar search seaplane is not known. Presumably he did,
and, if so, the fact that this force was at that time still on a
southerly course would have indicated to him (a) that its attack on
Okinawa had been completed, and (b) that it now was approaching a po-
sition from which it might strike either the Philippines or Formosa.
He could see, from its present position, that a dawn attack on Luzon
that day was not possible, but he also could see that a strike later in
the day, or at dawn on the following day (twelfth) was possible.
What action he took, if any, is not known.

At about 1300 he received Commander SW Area Fleet's dispatch re-
pealing the 1105 contact made by Shinchiku-based aircraft of the SIXTH
Base Air Force, and alerting the Philippines forces to the strong pos-
sibility of an enemy attack on the Philippines after dawn, October 12th.**
Why he did not also receive a contact report from his own long-range
searches is nowhere explained. However, since TF 38 was operating with-
in the area covered by such searches from Manila, it is probable that
some of the searches planned for this day were not actually made.

At about 1330 he received the intelligence estimate of Navy Section
Imperial General Staff.

Shortly after 1400 he was informed of the enemy attack on northern
Luzon, wherein it was reported that practically no damage had been
injured.*

The actual report of Japanese losses is not available but it might
be recalled that in this attack, made by fifty-five VF and six VM(P) of
TF 38, Allied claims included fifteen Japanese aircraft destroyed on
the ground and no airborne interception of the attack group. Japanese

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December, 1944,
Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947,
Department of Army Historical Division File 8-5, J3-104.
** Commander SW Area Fleet's Dispatch 111255, October 1944 to FIFTH
Base Air Force, etc., WDC Document 10264.
information on their losses in this attack are lacking due presumably to
the destruction of the records incident to the capture of the Philippines.
It would appear, however, that the air units at Aparri were operating
under the basic concept of CinC, Combined Fleet wherein they were to avoid
losses by generally refusing combat in the preliminary stages of the opera-
tion. Therefore the failure of the Commanding Officer at Aparri to dis-
perse aircraft was probably due to surprise brought on through adherence
to Commander SW Area Fleet's erroneous estimate of the preceding day.

Why he did not disperse his planes is not understood. It should have
been apparent to him that planes retained on the field offered a simple
target to attacking planes. It should also have been apparent that the
Allied carrier task force had the capability of striking northern Luzon at
almost any time in the afternoon. Since Aparri was the most northerly
Japanese air base on Luzon does it not seem correct to say that its Com-
manding Officer should have realized that its danger to attack was ever
present, and that his Commander SW Area Fleet's estimate referred more to
the Manila area than to a distant outlying station such as Aparri?

Sometimes thereafter Commander FIFTH Base Air Force probably received
information of the 1350 contact made by a Shinkoku plane on a second
Allied carrier task group sixty miles to the northeast of the first group
sighted at 1105. In the light of Navy Section, Imperial General Staff's
estimate of four groups this could have been no surprise.

Whether or not he expected additional attacks on northern Luzon
during the remainder of October 11th is not known, but when they did not
materialize and night search planes reported the enemy southeast of For-
maza he may have decided that the attack on Aparri had been some sort of
diversion. He presumably continued (a) to ready his command to assist
SIXTH Base Air Force should CinC Two be ordered, (b) to assume primary
responsibility for base air force operations should SHO One be activated,
and (c) to cooperate equally with Commander SIXTH Base Air Force should
both SHO One and SHO Two be activated.

(a) Operation of CG, FIFTH Air Army, October 11th.

CG, FIFTH Air Army continued to operate under his joint
agreement made with Commander FIFTH Base Air Force for operations prior
to the activation of the SHO Operation. This agreement required him to
make certain short-range maneuvers as noted under "Land-based Aircraft."

It can be assumed that he was informed of the contacts made during
the day. It can also be assumed that these contacts were also reported
as well to CinC, Southern Army and to the two senior naval commands,
Southwest Area Force and FIFTH Base Air Force, all of which were in
Manila. There is no record of what action, if any, he may have taken as
a result of the developing situation to the north. Undoubtedly he con-
tinued to prepare his command for combat and awaited the progress of
operations as information became available.
fighters which had failed to return, of which five had reportedly crashed into Allied planes, four had been heavily damaged in forced landings and one was hit by shellfire. He knew that two hangars had been set on fire, one had been demolished and one bachelor officers quarters had been destroyed. The runways had escaped damage. This claim of damage done to Allied fighters by the Shinohiku planes was far from correct and was, in fact, highly exaggerated for the Allies lost but twenty-two fighters in all Formosa. However, it is a fact that the Allies lost, on this day (October 13th), forty-eight planes of all types.

It is not clear at this writing whether the results of the Allied attack at Shinohiku had any effect on the future decisions of CINC, Combined Fleet. However, it may have suggested to him that perhaps his land-based aircraft was as effective as the Allied carrier-based aircraft for the claimed plane losses favored the Japanese (28 vs 23), and the Japanese interceptor fighters had been but two-fifths those of the Allies (39 vs 150).

At about 0630 he received a contact report from a Shinohiku search plane reporting two large ships, probably carriers, and at 0915 he received another report from a Taito search plane reporting a large enemy force including carriers, bearing 090° (T) distant sixty miles from Taito.

At 1015 the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet directed Commander SEVENTH Base Air Force in Honshu to place his operational planes, in excess of those required for patrolling his assigned patrol area, under the command of his Commander FIFTY FIRST Air Flotilla for immediate movement to the Kyushu area.

At about 1030 the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet activated SHO One and SHO Two for the base air forces.

CINC, Combined Fleet was not surprised by this activation order. Sometime during the preceding day he had arrived at the conclusion that

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* Western Attack Force No. 3 Urgent Battle Report (October 12th) Forwarded by Shinohiku Air Base Dispatch 130200 October 1944, WDC Document 160579.

** Commander Shinohiku Air Base Dispatch Summary 130200 October 1944, to SIXTH Base Air Force WDC Document 160589.

*** Mort Report FOURTEENTH Combined Air Group Formosan Air Battle October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012, NA 14275.


***** CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 121030 October 1944 to Combined Fleet, (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd No. 34), WDC Document 16137.
the SHO Operations should be activated for the base air forces. Since
the SHO Two alert had been issued on the 10th by his Chief of Staff, he
had felt that the activation order would also be issued by his Chief of
Staff. But when early morning arrived without the activation order hav-
ing been issued by his Chief of Staff he grew concerned lest he be con-
sidered derelict in not issuing the order himself. Whether he now, as
a consequence of this situation, telegraphed his Chief of Staff that
"the orders to begin the operations be issued at Hiyoshi after a thorough
discussion of the matter with the Naval General Staff," as stated by
his Deputy Chief of Staff who was with him at Shinchiku, or whether he
issued these instructions to his Chief of Staff after he had been queried
by that officer as to the advisability of activating the base air force
alone as stated by himself, is not clear. ** However, it is clear that
he directed his Chief of Staff to issue the necessary activation orders.

This action by CinC Combined Fleet is extremely interesting, for
it shows conclusively that the intention of this commander at this time,
obviously concurred in by Imperial General Headquarters Navy Section
(Naval General Staff), was to attempt the destruction of the Allied car-
rrier force by the employment of naval land-based air power alone, with-
out awaiting the full activation of the SHO Operations by Imperial Gen-
eral Headquarters. As has been pointed out earlier, such action was
provided for in Combined Fleet's basic SHO plan of operations. But, at
the time that CinC, Combined Fleet directed his Chief of Staff "to issue
the orders from Hiyoshi" he had only limited information concerning the
composition of the Allied carrier forces which had struck Okinawa and
northern Luzon and no information whatsoever concerning the movements
of the Allied amphibious forces which had been observed in the Wake-Hollandia
area on October 9th. A study of his preliminary plans shows that CinC,
Combined Fleet had expected Allied air operations by carrier task forces
to be commenced about this time to be followed by a landing in the central
or southern Philippines. Consequently, he should have expected that,
should the base air forces now be committed and their action fail to
secure the desired objective of destroying the Allied carrier force, not
only would the landing surely follow, but the Combined Fleet would then
have to execute its assigned mission in the full SHO Operations with a
depleted air force, thus prejudicing the chances of success. And yet,
despite those considerations, and despite the lack of adequate informa-
tion, he wished that the SHO plan for the activation of the Base Air
Forces alone be made effective (by inference) as soon as practicable.
Why did he do this? No definite answer on this is available but it
seems highly probable that:

** Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, Vol. IV, Military
History Section FMF, page 20, Statement of Rear Admiral Tomitane
Takata, IJN, October 10th, 1945.

** The End of the Imperial Navy by Admiral Soemu Toyoda, IJN, pages
142-154. Published in Tokyo, April 1946.
(a) He had confidence that his land-based aircraft, and particularly the "T" Force, would be effective against carrier-based aircraft. This was stated succinctly by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet who, it will be remembered, was with CINC, Combined Fleet at Shimaichi. The Deputy stated, in 1940, "The attack by the American task force at that time was carried out because the enemy had underestimated our air power. We rejoiced thinking that the opportunity had come for successfully carrying out counterattack employing the 'T' Attack Force."

(b) He felt that if "he could deal a serious blow to your surface task force (TF 38), that would widen the gap between your landing attempt and also shorten the distance between the stepping stones by which you made your advance to Japan."**

(c) He presumably felt that the location of the Allied carrier task force at this time placed it in range of land-based aircraft from north, west and south, a situation which might not obtain again.

(d) He presumably felt that this was not a vital decision for, should such preliminary air strikes against the Allied carrier force fail, he could cancel SHO One and SHO Two for the base air forces alone, which time if deemed necessary the correct SHO Operation would be activated by Imperial General Headquarters.

Such reasoning by CINC, Combined Fleet (and by the Naval Section of Imperial General Headquarters as well) was of doubtful correctness. It was made possible through a minor provision in the Combined Fleet SHO plans. The basic SHO plans of Imperial General Headquarters called for a destruction objective to be accomplished by the simultaneous employment of all forces, both surface and air, including land and carrier-based aircraft against an Allied landing at the time of landing. In order to accomplish this objective the SHO plans called for the retirement of the major portion of the land-based aircraft during the earlier phases of carrier attack, so that they would be available for the simultaneous all-out attack by all forces.

The minor Combined Fleet provision, despite the above long and comprehensive plans, permitted the entire SHO concept, as above expressed, to be set aside. How it was that CINC, Combined Fleet could institute this minor provision deviating from the basic SHO concept - which provision became a major one by reason of its effectuation - is not understood. For by inserting it, a breakdown of the detailed coordination necessary for the success of the SHO Operation was made possible.

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It should be clear that it is unwise in naval operations to employ less than maximum forces in decisive action against what might be expected to be superior enemy forces. CinC, Combined Fleet well knew the strength of the Allied carrier task force because of its operations against Japanese island positions in the Pacific during the past year including operations in September against the Philippines. In all cases Allied carrier-based air power had been highly effective against Japanese land air power (Truk, Marianas, Luzon) and Japanese carrier-based air power (Midway, Battle of Philippine Sea). But, in addition to this carrier-based air power, there would also be the concentrated effective AA gun power, not only of the carrier force, but also of the amphibious forces as well. Since the ultimate aim of Japanese power was the prevention of an Allied landing within the areas covered by the SHO plans, does it not seem correct that the full force of the Japanese air and naval power should have been hurled, as provided in the basic SHO plans, against the amphibious forces rather than against the carriers? Was this not a case of incorrect physical objectives (targets)? For, in view of his previous experiences with Allied carriers, CinC, Combined Fleet had little reason to expect other than limited success against them, and in fact should he persist in such an attack he stood a great chance of losing so many of his planes as to insure thereby the success of the Allied landings. And even should he gain limited success, such limited success was extremely unlikely to prevent a continuation of the landing operations by the Allied amphibious forces. It is an old military precept that it is not always wise to deal with the enemy by first destroying his elements of strength, for success may still be possible by first disposing of elements of weakness. And, in this case, were not the elements of weakness the Allied amphibious forces at the point of landing?

Finally, does it not seem surprising, in view of the developing situation and the great responsibilities which were his and in further view of the fact that "communications between Fomosa and Hiyoashi were unsatisfactory and facilities for obtaining radio intelligence at Commander Sixth Area Air Force Headquarters were also inadequate," that CinC, Combined Fleet did not return at once to Hiyoashi and assume direct command rather than leave the general conduct of the operations of the Combined Fleet to the lesser hands of his Chief of Staff? Was this not inherent in his function as CinC, Combined Fleet? And is it not surprising that Imperial General Headquarters did not order his return?

That he concurs in this view is clear for he stated later, "Looking back at it in the light of the consequences it was not proper for me to have been absent from Headquarters for a period of close to twenty days on the eve of the Leyte operations."

At 1100 the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet directed Commander Mobile Force to place all operational aircraft of Carrier's THREE and FOUR under

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the operational command of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

Cinc, Combined Fleet was satisfied with this distribution of his carrier-based aircraft. The fact that he was so, confirms the idea expressed previously that he had made a prearranged plan for commitment of his base air forces in advance of full SHO activation if a favorable opportunity arose to destroy the Allied carrier forces by such action, and that this plan provided also for employing the carrier air groups in these operations from shore bases.

At 1115, October 12th, the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet directed the Commander China Area Fleet to concentrate its entire fighter strength in Formosa where it was to operate under the operational command of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. He further directed that the date of movement into Formosa would be as directed by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

Cinc, Combined Fleet could now see that practically all of the combat strength of his base air forces in the Empire and in China, as well as a major part of his carrier air strength was being concentrated in Kyushu and Formosa.

During the remainder of the day he awaited further results of the searches being conducted from Kyushu, Okinawa, Formosa, and the Philippines. At about 1720 he received word that a Taito search plane had sighted an enemy force of one BB, two CA and three DD, bearing 100°(°), distant ninety-six miles from Taito. This was gratifying because he knew that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had already launched his attack by "T" Force planes from Kyushu and had made arrangements for the immediate refueling of these planes at Makin, Taichu, Shinchiku and Takao bases after they had landed from the attack. He knew that Commander SW Area Force also had, 1235, directed his Commander FIFTH Base Air Force to make an all out attack on the Allied carrier task force.

Sometime around early evening, Cinc, Combined Fleet learned that three Allied carrier task groups had been located by search planes from

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* Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 121110, October 1944 to Commander Mobile Force, (Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 344). ZUKAKU War Diary WDC Document 161536.
** Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 121115, October 1944 to Cinc, China Area Fleet, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 161422.
*** Merit Report 14th Combined Air Group Formosa Air Battle October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012, NA 12275.
ENCOURAGING WESTERN patterns, north, and northwestern of Tarawai, Formosa.

No known, of course, that the "F" force planes from Kusaku airfield would attack immediately, and admitted the results as certain. If those planes were returned to land at Kusako, Formosa after having attacked. This was more fortunate from the Japanese viewpoint for it seems clear that Cinc Combined Fleet investigated more of the aviators himself, and thereby "gathered information from returned crew"** . These crew grossly exaggerated their successes and gave Cinc Combined Fleet a false impression as to their effectiveness. It is not believed that this was done deliberately, but was more the result (a) of the difficulty of taking correct estimates of damage achieved by air operations at night especially when under heavy air fire and (b) of the enthusiasm of combat pilots especially when being questioned by the Cinc Combined Fleet or by high staff officers.

It is clear whether Cinc Combined Fleet received the total early claims of damage done by the attacking "F" force, but as these claims were received at Tokyo it is highly probable that they were also received by him. These claims were that the attacks had been highly successful; that the ships had been set on fire,*** four of which sank. These four ships were presumed to be carriers.**** Actually, all attacks had failed and had been driven off without having made a single hit nor of accomplishing no material damage whatsoever.*****

Sometime during the early evening Cinc Combined Fleet learned that no night time Air Force attacks had been made because preparations could not be completed in time.*

(b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force, October 12th.

During the morning of the 12th Commander Mobile Force took no important action but awaited the results of the day's operations.

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944 Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government October 1947 Department of Army Historical Division File No. 9-5, 45-104.
** Statements of Japanese Official's in World War II Vol. IV Military History Section 335 Page 20, Swedish Naval, Tokyo, October 10th, 1945.
*** Memo: Captain Muso Shibata, UN, Staff Officer Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm US-22 Item 3.
**** Ibid, also Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944 Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government October 1947 Department of Army Historical Division File No. 9-5, 45-104.
***** War Diaries of Allied carrier task groups concerned.

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At about 11:45 he received a dispatch from CinC, Combined Fleet which directed him to place all operational aircraft of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR under the operational command of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.*

He therefore consulted with staff representatives of the SIXTH Base Air Force and arranged that CARDIV THREE aircraft (853rd Air Group) would be based at Kagoshima and that CARDIV FOUR aircraft (634th Air Group) would be based at Kancya, Kokubu, Kagoshima and Ibusuki.**

He studied his availability reports and agreed to transfer (a) from CARDIV THREE to Kagoshima twenty-six carrier-based fighters, twenty-three fighter-bombers, twenty-nine Type 14 and five Type 57 carrier attack planes; or a total of eighty-three planes of all types, (b) from CARDIV FOUR to Kancya forty carrier-based fighters; (c) to Kokubu nine carrier-based bombers; to Kagoshima ten Type 14 carrier attack planes and (c) to Ibusuki twelve reconnaissance seaplanes or a total of seventy-one planes of all types. This was a grand total of 154 planes.*** If the figures given by Commander Mobile Force in interrogation in 1945 are approximately correct there were a total of 260 planes in those two air groups.**** It is of interest that a study of all sources available to this analysis supports the approximate accuracy of this figure. Analysis figures indicate somewhere between 250-260 planes. This would give an operational availability of 154/260 or about sixty per cent which, while low for American carrier standards, was a fair average for Japanese land-based planes at this time, as evidenced by the records of the various Japanese air units during this operation.

At this same time, since he considered it necessary to continue the training of air crews, he decided to withhold from the transfer those flying personnel qualified to be instructors.*****

He also issued instructions to his Commander SECOND Striking Force.

* CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 121110 October 1944 to Commander Mobile Force, ZUHAKU War Diary October 1st-25th, 1944, WDC Document 101345 NA 11973.
** Senior Staff Officer SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 121136 October 1944 to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, ZUHAKU War Diary October 1st-25th, 1944, WDC Document 101345 NA 11973.
*** Rear Admiral Staff Officer, SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 121156 October 1944 to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 101345.
***** Letter from Captain Tohikazu Ohae, IJN, to Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami, World War II Battle Evaluation Group, U.S. Naval War College, no date, but about May 23rd, 1952.
to assign two destroyers to assist in transferring the 634th Air Group. He issued no instructions this day to the 853rd Air Group but did so the following day.

Commander Mobile Force did not, at first, approve of these preparations. He had had no idea that his carrier aircraft were to be placed under Commander SIXTH BASE Air Force and transferred to southern Kyushu and this order came as a clear surprise to him. He therefore called the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet at Miyoshi by telephone and pointed out that the carrier force would become incapable of sortie and queried if this would not interfere with operations. This shows plainly that Commander Mobile Force had not been consulted in the present plans any more than he had been consulted in the basic planning. In reply to this query Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet replied that there was no thought of employing the carrier force. Commander Mobile Force accepted this assurance and since he knew that the basic plans permitted the transfer of his carrier planes to southern Kyushu should SHO One or Two be activated, he hoped that this transfer now ordered was in furtherance of these plans.

(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force, October 12th.

The FIRST Striking Force remained in the Lingga area and continued its training as discussed under October 10th.

Commander FIRST Striking Force continued to maintain a close watch on the developing situation as discussed under October 11th.

(2) Operations of the Commander Main Force, October 12th.

During the day Commander Main Force, who it will be remembered was also Commander Mobile Force and therefore familiar with the circumstances received by that commander, likewise took no important action but awaited developments.

--- Commander Mobile Force Despatch 54, October 12th, 1944. Referred to in Commander SECOND Striking Force Dispatch 121201 October 1944, (Despatch 4 to GUADALCANAL ELEVEN). DESRON ELEVEN War Diary, WDC Document 151715.

** Letter from Captain Toshikazu Ohmoe, IJN, to Mr. Clarke KeKawakami, World War II Battle Evaluation Group, U.S. Naval War College, no date, but about May 23rd, 1952.


At about 1145 he received Cinc, Combined Fleet's dispatch directing Commander Mobile Force to place all operational aircraft of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR under the operational command of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.*

In view of Commander Mobile Force's conference with the staff of the SIXTH Base Air Force he knew that his CARDIV THREE aircraft were to be based at Kagoshima, and his CARDIV FOUR aircraft at Kusato, Kusukuba, Kagoshima and Ibusuki. He directed his carrier division commanders to expedite this transfer.

At about 1230 he received word that Commander SECOND Striking Force had ordered the SHIMOTSUKI and KAYA to transfer the 354th Air Group to Tokushima and Kagoshima, and to Iwakuni and Kagoshima respectively.** This was unsatisfactory not only to him, but also the COMCARDIV FOUR since COMCARDIV FOUR had been working, during the past few days, with the RASHI instead of the SHIMOTSUKI. It is commented on here merely to indicate what appears to have been poor staff work.

COMCARDIV FOUR therefore, at 1430, requested Commander SECOND Striking Force and COMDESRON ELEVEN to hasten the dispatch of the KAYA to Iwakuni and the RASHI to Tokushima to transfer the 354th Air Group to Kagoshima and Ibusuki air bases.*** During the early evening he was advised by COMDESRON ELEVEN that these destroyers were being ordered to the designated bases as requested.****

(*) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force,
October 12th.

During the night and forenoon the SECOND Striking Force plus CARDIV FOUR less DESDIV's FORTY-ONE and SIXTY-ONE continued fueling at Kure, DESDIV FORTY-ONE was missing, because it was en route escorting the light cruiser OYCD to Cita, DESDIV SIXTY-ONE was apparently fully fueled.

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* Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 121110 October 1944 to Commander Mobile Force, (Cinc, Combined Fleet DespOrd 344). ZUKAYU War Diary, WDC, Document 151636.
** Commander SECOND Striking Force Dispatch 121201 October 1944 to COMDESRON 11, etc. (Commander SECOND Striking Force DespOrd 4) WDC Document 161115.
*** COMCARDIV 4 Dispatch 121439, October 1944 to Commander SECOND Striking Force, COMDESRON 11, DESRON 11 War Diary, October 1944, WDC Document 161115.
**** COMDESRON 11 Dispatches 121700 and 121953 October 1944 to COMCARDIV 4, Commander SECOND Striking Force, DESRON 11, War Diary, October 1944, WDC Document 161115.
 At 0300 in accordance with CINC, Combined Fleet’s directive to cancel the sortie alert for the SECOND Striking Force and CARDIV FOUR (less air units) he cancelled his sortie alert and directed CARDIV TWENTY-ONE, DESRON ONE less KASHI and HATSUHAKU which were on special missions, DESRON ELEVEN and DESDIV SIXTY-ONE to proceed to Iwakuni, which was the naval anchorage near Kure. The HATSUHAKU was in drydock at Kure.

At about 1145 he received word that all operational aircraft of CARDIV’s THREE and FOUR were to be placed under the operational command of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

He therefore, at 1201, ordered the SHIMOTSUKI and KAYA to transfer the 634th Air Group to Tokushima and Kagoshima, and to Iwakuni and Kagoshima respectively. This order was the result of poor staff work for it failed to include the KASHI which had been working with CARDIV FOUR, and was presently at sea.

Therefore, when at about 1500 he received COMCARDIV FOUR’s dispatch requesting the KASHI and KAYA, he took no action but awaited the action of COMDESRON ELEVEN. At about 1730 he noted that COMDESRON ELEVEN had complied with this request.

At about 2030 he probably learned of the torpedoing, at 1935 off Tokyo Bay, of the destroyer FUYUTSUKI or DESDIV FORTY-ONE. This destroyer succeeded in reaching Kure for repairs, but her damages were sufficiently serious to keep her out of the battle for Leyte Gulf. This left but one destroyer, the SHIMOTSUKI, in that destroyer division.

(c) Operations of Commander Base Air Forces, October 17th.
(1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force

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At 0000, October 17th, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force at his headquarters at Takeo, Formosa, commenced reestimating the situation. He had to determine whether the contacts on three separate groups of the enemy task force reported by radar night search seaplanes southwest of Formosa during the evening warranted a change in his present orders to the "T" Force. It will be remembered that he had ordered that force to move to Okinawa from southern Kyushu after dawn, and to conduct dusk and night attacks against TP 38 from Okinawa.**

At 0055 he ordered his commander at Nacoya to reinforce further the air strength at Okinawa by sending five patrol planes to that base as soon as possible, these planes to conduct short-range search and route if practicable.*** This transfer of patrol planes from Nacoya to Okinawa was sound for it now appeared that at least three of the four enemy task groups estimated to be in the attacking force had definitely moved from Okinawa-Kyushu area to the vicinity of Formosa-northern Luzon. Aircraft operating from Okinawa could cover this area far more effectively than could aircraft operating from Kyushu.

Sometime after this Commander SIXTH Base Air Force decided to modify his orders to the "T" Force. Since contacts of the previous twelve hours showed the enemy task force to be moving steadily westward toward Formosa with its 2245 location about 350 miles southwest of Okinawa, he was now convinced that Formosa or Luzon would be the next target. Therefore at 0135 he directed the "T" Force instead of waiting until dawn, to move immediately to Okinawa and to seize any favorable opportunity to attack the enemy.**** This decision to move the "T" Force to Okinawa during darkness offered no particular hazard since it was specially trained for attack operations at night or in bad weather. It had already demonstrated its ability to deploy at night when, on October 10th, it had successfully retired from southern Kyushu during darkness before the Allied attack on Okinawa.

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Vol. 11, October-December 1944, Second Reissue, Bureau, November 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-9, J3-104.
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 11830, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, FEC Historical Division Microfilm File unnumbered.
*** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 120055, October 1944, to Nacoya Base, FEC Historical Division Microfilm File unnumbered.
**** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 120135, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, FEC Historical Division Microfilm File unnumbered.
The new orders to the "X" Force which permitted attack under any favorable conditions rather than only at dusk or night allowed the Commander of the "X" Force discretion in selecting the earliest opportune time. Due to the special training of his "X" Force this might well not be until dusk, but the change would permit him to take advantage of weather, or other favorable attack conditions, which might develop during the day.

At about 0320 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received another contact. This one reported an enemy force at 0240 in position Latitude 20°-10', Longitude 125°-10'. This position was about eighty-five miles southwest of the 2245 position of an enemy task group. Commander SIXTH Base Air Force presumably considered that this contact represented the fourth task group which was reportedly in the area, but had not heretofore been located. However, he may have felt that it was possibly one of the previously sighted groups which had turned to a southwesterly course. In either case it is clear that this latter contact supported the estimate that Formosa or Luzon would be attacked at dawn. Actually the contact as reported was very much in error since it was eighty miles bearing 02°(T) from the most southerly group of TF 38. The reason for this large error is not known.

As a result of the contacts above discussed, a general air raid alert was established throughout Formosa at 0534 by Commander Takao Naval Guard District.**

At 0530 two land reconnaissance planes took off from Shinchiku to attack the enemy task force. Who ordered this attack or what its specific purpose was is not indicated in the data available. One of the planes developed engine trouble and returned to base at 0639; the other failed to return.***

At about 0640 five two-engine land bombers of FOURTEENTH Combined Air Group departed Tainan to search the sector 106°-163°(T) to a distance of 600 miles from Ganam Bi, the southern tip of Formosa.**** Shortly thereafter five carrier type attack planes, also of the FOURTEENTH Combined Air Group, took off from Taito to search the sector 078°-203°(T) to a distance of 250 miles from that base.****

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* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 1904, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, FEC Historical Division Microfilm File un-numbered.
** Detailed Action Report No. 1, Kobi Naval Air Group, October 12th, 1944, MDC Document 160405.
*** Shinchiku Air Base Dispatch 130200 October 1944 to Authorized Ships, MDC Document 160579.
**** Commander 14th Combined Air Group Dispatch 112:58, October 1944 to 14th Combined Air Group, MDC Document 160495.
At 0630 six land-attack planes of 708th Attack Unit Detachment at Shinchiku took off from that base to conduct search. This search was to cover the sector between 012°E and 163°E (T) to a distance of 600 miles.**

At about the same time Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla on Okinawa launched his search. For reasons not apparent he decided to cover two sectors. One carrier type reconnaissance plane and one land reconnaissance plane departed to cover the sector between 102°E-130°E (T) to a distance of 300 miles; two more land reconnaissance planes took off to cover the sector 132°E-226°E(T) to 300 miles.** These land reconnaissance planes were most likely from the group which had been ordered to Okinawa from Kancyo by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force at 0400 that morning.*** Why Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla limited himself to such short-range searches and failed to conduct a long-range search in an effort to regain contact with TF 38 last reported at 0240, using the seven two-engine land bombers which had been sent to him from Kancyo on the previous day, is nowhere explained. Did not the existing situation require such a long-range search?

It will be observed that on this day the Japanese searches covered reasonably well the areas to the eastward of Formosa and the Philippines but they made only slight provision for possible Allied action against the Nansei Shoto and, based on the data available, no provision whatsoever for Allied action against southern Kyushu. The weather in these areas was generally clear and there was no reason why searches should not have been made excepting the apparent fact that the Japanese had decided that TF 38 was following the course of action which they had forecast, viz., attacks on the Nansei Shoto, then on Formosa, then on the Philippines. Therefore there would be no attacks on the Nansei Shoto or Kyushu. While this happened to be a correct evaluation of Allied plans it was not a sound procedure for the high mobility of TF 38 and its inherent power in whole or in its separate groups gave it a very real capability of striking almost anywhere and everywhere in the Japanese archipelago from Kyushu south to the central Philippines.

At about 0645 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force intercepted a Tainan report indicating that the Allied task force was about to attack Formosa. This report stated that fifty enemy planes had sighted proceeding west.**** Thereafter commencing at about 0700 numerous reports were

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* Shinchiku Air Base Dispatch 130200, October 1944 to Authorized Ships, WDC Document 160579.
** Commander 25th Air Flotilla, SigOrd No. 28, October 12th, 1944, WDC Document 160137.
*** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 120055 to Kancyo Base, FSC Historical Division Microfilm File unnumbered.
**** Commander Tainan Air Group Dispatch 120630, October 1944 to Kobi Air Group, WDC Document 160495.
received which indicated that the enemy was attacking many different air facilities in Formosa. At 0709 Takan Naval Guard District reported sixty enemy fighters east of Toko heading north, and at 0709 the same command reported sixty enemy aircraft southwest of Haito heading northwest.** At 0727 Commander FOURTEENTH Combined Air Group reported that the Tainan Air Group was engaging the enemy*** and at 0735 he reported in addition that a large enemy formation of thirty aircraft was heading toward Takan out of the sun.****

As has been noted this attack was no surprise to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. Since Formosa had been alerted at 0334 to its probability he had dispatched his search planes to cover the area in which the enemy task force would operate for such an attack, and he had ordered his major striking force, the "T" Force, to advance to Okinawa and attack. Now he had only (a) to await the expected contact report from his search planes and then (b) to carry out the remainder of his orders from CINC Combined Fleet i.e., to destroy the enemy.

Whether or not he knew that the "T" Force had not yet advanced to Okinawa is not indicated in the data available. For reasons not known the "T" Force was still in Kyushu.*****

At about 0830 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received the first contact report from his day search. A Shinkoku based land attack plane reported sighting at 0800 two large ships of unidentified type, very probably carriers.****** The position as reported in the data available is garbled so that its accuracy cannot be determined.

Shortly thereafter at about 0915 a second contact was reported. A carrier type attack plane from the Taito search reported sighting at 0845 a large enemy force including carriers bearing 60,000(D) sixty miles from Taito.******* This position was about fifteen miles west of the most northerly task group of TF 38.

* Commander Takan Naval Guard District Dispatch 120/09, October 1944 to All Units, WDC Document 160496.
** Ibid, Dispatch 120/09, October 1944.
*** Commander 14th Combined Air Group Dispatch 120/27, October 1944 to All Units, WDC Document 160430.
**** Ibid Dispatch 120/35, October 1944.
***** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm MI-22, Item D.
******* Shinkoku Air Base Dispatch 1320/00, October 1944 to Authorized Ships, WDC Document 160579.
******** Merit Report for 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012.
At about this same time the Senior Staff Officer, SIXTH Base Air Force at Kanozy correctly decided not to advance the "T" Force to Okinawa but to mount the attack from southern Kyushu. He did this because, at 0600, he had received word from Army sources that an air raid alert had been established at Okinawa and he felt that since the "T" Force might be attacked while moving to that base or while on the ground there, the original plan of staging through Okinawa should be revised. It is of interest that no Allied planes attacked Okinawa on this day.

Additional reports of the air action underway were received by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force during this time. Shinchiku Air Base reported** later that between 0700 and 0830 that base had been under attack with the following results: (a) two hangars set afire, one hangar and one BQ destroyed, (b) no damage to the runways, (c) thirty-eight fighters had engaged about one hundred enemy fighters and had shot down twenty-two fighters and had probably shot down six other fighters while losing eighteen fighters shot down (five of which had crashed into Allied planes) and five fighters damaged, (d) two enemy dive bombers had been shot down by AA fire. This gave a total loss to Japanese forces over Shinchiku of twenty-three planes, whereas they believed that the Allies had suffered a loss of thirty planes in the same operations. As has been pointed out earlier these claims were very incorrect and misleading since the Allies lost but twenty-two fighters over all Formosa.

At 0958 a report from Tainan stated that that area had been attacked but that no damage had been received.***

During the morning, while awaiting the development of an opportune moment to attack the enemy task force, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received certain important dispatches from CINC Combined Fleet:

(i) At 1015 ordered Commander SEVENTH Base Air Force in Honshu to put the operational strength of his command above that required to conduct his patrols into FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla and to direct that Flotilla to deploy as soon as possible to Kyushu.****

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** Memorandum Notes of Captain Kunzo Shibata, TJR, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 16th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division, Microfilm NS-22, Item B.  
** Shinchiku Air Base Dispatch 1302/3, October 1944 to Authorized Ships, WDC Document 160879.  
*** Tainan Air Group Dispatch 120958, October 1944 to Kobi Air Group, WDC Document 160494.  
(2) At 1030 orders activating SHO One and SHO Two for the base air force.

(3) At 1110 orders to Commander Mobile Force to place all operational aircraft of CARDIV'S THREE and FOUR under the operational command of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

(4) At 1115 orders to Commander China Area Fleet to deploy his entire fighter strength to Formosa where it would be under the operational command of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

How much if any discussion of the situation was engaged in by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force with CINC Combined Fleet by telephone or other interior means is not known, but it seems reasonable to assume that such took place. The reports of action received during the morning indicated that while some damage had been done, it was not serious. Moreover in the Shinchiku air battle his pilots had apparently scored a victory over the enemy even though outnumbered nearly three to one. He did not know, of course, that the report of the Shinchiku battle was highly optimistic.

It is of interest to note here that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had been in command of that air force for but four months and this was not only his first combat operation but, worse than that, it was his first experience with land-based air forces. Possibly he was unaware of the need for expert evaluation of pilots' reports to determine the actual facts, and he was operating under the handicap of having part of his staff on Formosa and part still at Kanoya. As he has been pointed out before, the intelligence section of his staff on Formosa had not yet been well organized. What influence he may have exerted on CINC, Combined Fleet's decision to commit fully the base air forces under his command to the destruction of TF 38 is not known, but it could well have been considerable.

The activation of SHO One and Two for the base air force at 1030 by CINC Combined Fleet was probably done on the recommendation of, or

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* CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 121130, October 1943 to Combined Fleet etc, WC Document 160137 (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 342).
*** CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 121115, October 1944 to Commander China Area Fleet and Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, WC Document 161472 (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 346).
***** Ibi', page 504.
at least with the concurrence of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. With
the activation, the other orders merely made available to Commander
SIXTH Base Air Force additional air units to accomplish the destruction
of the enemy task force. The basic SHO planes had provided for the move-
ment of SEVENTH Base Air Force units and also, where used as base air
forces, of the air units of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR into Kyushu.* The
employment of the fighter strength of the China Area Fleet under Com-
mander SIXTH Base Air Force had also been decided upon some time prior
to September 23rd, 1944.**

During the interval when Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was re-
ceiving these directives from CINC Combined Fleet, he also received at
about 1130 information from Kyushu that the "T" Force had commenced at-
tack operations. As noted earlier the plans for the attack had been
changed due to a reported air raid alert at Okinawa and the attack had
been launched directly from Kyushu with the planes to land on Formosa
after the attack.*** At about 1030 the advance "T" Force search took
off from Kanoya to locate the enemy and guide the attack groups to their
targets. This search group was composed of four carrier-type reconna-
issance planes and one two-engine land bomber. It was ordered to search
the sector 208°-230°(T) from TCI Misaki (Kanoya) to a distance of 320
miles and establish contact with the enemy.**** Under the plan these
aircraft would be followed by the attack groups which would take off
about two hours later.

At 1145 one carrier type reconnaissance plane of the TWELTH Recon-
naissance Unit departed Kanoya to search for the enemy task force.*****
Whether or not Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was informed of this sortie
is not indicated in the data available nor are the bearings and range of
the sector searched. The plane returned to base at 1830 having made no
contact. From Kanoya this plane had insufficient range to cover the area
in which TF 38 was operating at this time.

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* Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 66, Air Combat Regulations for
SHO Operations - Appendix 2; Outline for concentration of Base Air
Forces for SHO Operations, August 4th, 1944, ATIS Document No. 39,
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Operation Order No. 12, September
23rd, 1944, Appendix 2 - No. 1 Attack Organization, also Central
Air Agreement of July 24th, Appendix 2 to Supplement Manual
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer
SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the
Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
***** War Diary 12th Reconnaissance Unit, Kanoya Detachment, October
12th-15th 1944, WDC Document 160381.
At 1149, with no further contact reports, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force directed his commander at Shinchiku to launch an additional search of five aircraft as soon as possible. This search was directed to cover the sector from that base 101°-166°(T) to a distance of 400 miles.*

The circumstances under which he issued this order are not entirely clear. Shortly after 0600 Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla at Shinchiku had lost communication with each of his search planes in the sectors on either side of the one which had reported the CAGC contact.** Whether or not this fact had been reported to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force at Takeo is not known. Failure to report this fact, if such occurred, could have been due to the fact that Shinchiku itself was under attack and Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla may have been fully occupied meeting that attack. However, it should be apparent that, even if Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had not received information relative to the loss of contact with the morning search planes, he still might have ordered this second search to reestablish contact with the enemy force, since he had had no information on it for nearly three hours. Probably due to lack of available aircraft, this search was not launched.***

The failure of the Japanese to maintain contact was not a result of improper planning. Detailed and most complete instructions had been promulgated covering this matter.**** Reliance for tracking was placed on special tracking planes which were to be dispatched after initial contact was made. These planes were to maintain position fifty to one hundred miles from the enemy and were to close the enemy from varying directions every hour or half hour, making use of clouds, sun, weather, very high or low altitudes to avoid interception by the enemy. A system was also provided for tracking by search planes other than the one making the contact. For reasons not known, but in at least some cases due to a shortage of aircraft, separate tracking planes were not used. Daylight tracking of TF 38 was generally not possible due to the inability of the Japanese to remain in a tracking position position with it being shot down or driven off. Had special tracking planes been used they might have proved more effective.

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* Taiho Air Group Dispatch 121149, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, (SIXTH Base Air Force SigOrd 10), NDC Document 160575.
** Detailed Action Report No. 2, 709th Attack Unit, 708th Air Group: Searches and Patrols of TF's (Shinchiku) Sector, October 1st-17th, 1944, NDC Document 160579.
*** Shinchiku Air Base Dispatch 13087C, October 1944 to Authorized Ships, NDC Document 160579.
but the limitations on the ability of tracking planes to perform their missions in the face of such enemy strength as was contained in TF 38 should be recognized.*

At 1159 Commander SEVENTH Base Air Force, acting upon CinC Com-
bined Fleet's order issued at 1015, directed Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air
Flotilla to take operational command of designated attack and fighter
units of the SEVENTH Base Air Force and to move without delay to Kyushu.**
This order had actually been anticipated by Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air
Flotilla for that commander at 1145 had notified CinC Combined Fleet
and other interested commanders that at 1200 he would depart Katori Air
Base, near Tokyo, and move to Kanoya. At the same time he had directed
all units under his command to move as fast as possible to the designated
bases in Kyushu.***

At 1226 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force directed his forces in
Formosa to make all necessary arrangements to service aircraft of the
"T" Force which would land on Formosa after carrying out a night attack
on the enemy task force.**** It might be noted here that Commander SIXTH
Base Air Force's earlier modification of orders to the "T" Force which
gave to that commander more discretion in the type and time of his att-
acks, had not actually changed the "T" Force attack plan, since the "T" Force
commander had already decided to carry out a night attack as origi-

Commencing at about 1230 and until 1330***** the "T" Force attack
groups took off from Kanoya*. These groups which were from 501st, 703rd,
and 708th Attack Units, numbered fifty-six planes****** They were aug-
mented by the 262nd Attack Unit and NINETY-EIGHTH Air Regi-
ment,****** which took off from Okinawa.******* The NINETY-EIGHTH Air Regiment was

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* Long Range Air Reconnaissance and Scouting Instructions (USP II)
  1943, paragraph 617.
** Commander SEVENTH Base Air Force Dispatch 121159, October 1944
to SEVENTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 161944.
*** Commander 51st Air Flotilla Dispatch 121145, October 1944 to
CinC Combined Fleet, Commanders FIFTH, SIXTH and SEVENTH Base
Air Forces, etc., WDC Document 160253.
**** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 121226, October 1944 to
Commander Western Attack Force THREE - PEC Historical Division
Microfilm unnumbered.
***** Detailed Action Reports of 752 Air Group Units, June 1944 -
  June 1945, WDC Document 160364.
****** Worn Audum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer,
SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the
Army, Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
******* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944,
SECOND Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947,
Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 5-5, JS-104.

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an independent Army unit under the operational control of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. Now these latter two units, which numbered forty-five planes happened to be at Okinawa is not known but it seems probable that they had already departed for that base, when the decision was made in the morning to mount the attack from Kanoya. The total attack strength of the above five groups was one hundred and one aircraft of which sixty-seven carried torpedoes, and ten carried bombs. The remaining twenty-four were path-finders and control aircraft used to direct the attack. The physical objective of this attack, TF 38, was known to be some seven hundred miles from Kanoya and therefore it was apparent to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force that it would take this force five to six hours to reach the objective area.

During the early afternoon Commander SIXTH Base Air Force undoubtedly received additional reports of the progress of the Allied attack on various air facilities and ports of Formosa. Although he had received no further contact reports of the enemy since 0845, it must have been quite evident from the progress of the enemy attack that a large enemy task force was still in the waters to the east of Formosa. He had now committed a large part of his "M" Force, the best trained of his air units, to an attack under low visibility conditions for which they were specially trained and he awaited the results with confidence.

At about 1305 he likely received Commander Southwest Area's orders to the FIFTH Base Air Force in the Philippines. Following the activation of SHO One and Two for the base air forces that commander had ordered Commander FIFTH Base Air Force to destroy the enemy task force operating southeast of Formosa, employing its full strength. Whether or not Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was informed of the plans of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force or whether or not he took any action to coordinate his operations with those of that Base Air Force is not known.

At about 1600 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that his senior staff officer at Kanoya, after consultation with Commander Mobile Force or his representatives, had designated deployment bases in Kyushu for the aircraft of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR. He also learned in specific numbers how many planes Commander Mobile Force was turning over to him as a result of CinC Combined Fleet's order. This added up to a total of 154 aircraft including eighty-nine "fighters, forty-four attack planes, nine bombers, and twelve reconnaissance sea-planes.

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Detailed Action Reports of 752nd Air Group Units, June 1944 - January 1945, WDC Document 16036.

Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 121235, October 1944 to FIFTH and THIRD Base Air Forces, WDC Document 16026.

Senior Staff Officer, SIXTH Base Air Force, Dispatch 121236, October 1944 to Commanders SIXTH Base Air Force and Mobile Force, WDC Document 161636.
At about 1720 he received another contact report on the enemy task force. This report stated that at 1650 a search plane of the FOURTEENTH Combined Air Group from Taito had sighted an enemy force of one battleship, two cruisers, and three destroyers bearing 100° (r) distance ninety-six miles from that base. This position was about twelve miles east of the nearest group of TF 38. Data available does not reveal what sector this plane was searching nor its time of take-off. This contact was the last one reported by the regular day searches since the last plane of the Shizukiku search had landed at Okin at 1630 and the Saran 31 search planes had all returned to base by 1715 having made no contacts during the day.

The only search still in progress, at this time, was the search group of the "F" Force which had departed Kureya at 1030. This group, operating in advance of the "F" Force attack groups, made contact by evening with three enemy task groups bearing northeast, east, and southeast of Saran 31, distance 120-140 miles. The bearings, only vaguely expressed in the data available, were but partially correct, for TF 36 was northeast of Saran 31. The distance was approximately correct.

When this information was received by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force or the "F" Force attack groups is not known. Presumably it was immediately transmitted to the latter to aid them in finding their targets.

At about 1900 the "F" Force commenced its attack on TF 36. Its planes attacked in relatively small groups rather than in a concentration. This may have been due, at least in part, to the fact that some areas of bad weather were encountered by the attacking planes and caused the attacking groups to become separated. Some of the planes, number unknown, were unable to find any target and failed to attack. Of the total number (102) of search (fifteen) and attacking planes (101), forty-two failed to land at bases in Formosa as planned, and were considered as having been shot down by the Allied task force or lost at sea due to battle damage or from other causes. TF 36 claimed shooting down only twelve of these planes.

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* Merit Report for 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle October 16th-17th, 1944, NACA Document 161012.
* Shizukiku Air Base Dispatch 190200, October 1944 to Authorized Ships, NACA Document 150579.
* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, 33-104.
* Detailed Action Reports of 752nd Air Group Unit's, June 1944 - January 1945, NACA Document 164364.
* Action Reports CG 35-2, MOBILE, GRIDLEY, BAGLEY, Attacks on Formosa, October 15th, 1944.

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The detailed claims of damage inflicted by each of the "T" Force attack groups is not known but the claims, as received at SIXTH Base Air Force headquarters at Formosa, were that ten ships had been set on fire of which four sank. These four were presumed to be carriers. As has been noted, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force did not have a competent staff on Formosa to evaluate properly pilots' reports. Only probably both he and CinC, Combined Fleet, to whom he must have relayed information as received, were unduly influenced by the natural enthusiasm of the returning pilots. The inherent difficulty in accurately ascertaining damage inflicted in night air attack undoubtedly assisted in forming a completely erroneous picture in the eyes of both Commanders. Actually, no ship of TF 38 received any damage whatever.

The effect of the greatly exaggerated claims made by the "T" Force, and accepted by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, had far reaching and unhappy consequences for the Japanese. For the acceptance of these claims removed any doubts as to the ability of land-based aircraft to destroy ultimately the enemy task force. While he had lost more 40% of his attacking force, and many additional planes had been damaged in landing at Formosa bases, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force now believed that these losses were well worth the results achieved and visualized future successes as he made other attacks with his additional forces available in Kyushu including the planes of CAROLINA TIGERS and TOUG and the FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla. In addition, he probably expected some assistance from the Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, possibly augmented by cooperative action from the CINAC. KU Air Army.

At 2207 he requested that the two fighter groups, which CinC Combined Fleet had ordered at 11Th to deploy on Formosa from the China Area Fleet and report to him, commence that deployment as soon as possible. He further stated that these two groups would report to Commander FOURTEENTH Combined Air Group.

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** Philippine Area Battle Operations, Part II, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm 155-57, Item D.
*** Philippine Area Battle Operations, Part I, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm 155-57, Item B.
**** Action Reports of TF 38 Units Concerned.
***** Detailed Action Reports of 752nd Air Group Units, June 1944 - January 1945, NDC, Document 102164.
****** CINAC SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 107207, October 1944 to Commanders 256th and 258th Air Groups, NDC Document 161427.

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At 2300 for reasons unknown he cancelled searches from Shinchiku for the following morning. Perhaps he believed that he could obtain adequate coverage from other bases. Perhaps he believed that after the Allied attacks of the 12th and the losses incurred by Shinchiku search planes (three had been lost) there would not be sufficient planes available on the 15th. Actually there were three land-attack planes and two land reconnaissance planes available for search.

(2) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force,
October 12th.

As on the previous day Commander FIFTH Base Air Force was fully occupied in preparing his command for action and in conducting the designated searches as jointly agreed upon with CINCPAC FOURTH Air Army for operations prior to the activation of the SHO Operations.

His search planes reported no contacts. This was because throughout the day TF 38 had operated outside of the areas covered by the Philippines search plan. Presumably, as on previous days, he was kept informed of the contacts made by other forces.

At about 0715 he learned that Formosa was under attack by the enemy task force. This information may have afforded him some relief since it indicated that he would have at least another day and possibly more in which to prepare before the Philippines would be the target of the enemy's attack. However, this idea was short-lived for between about 0830 and 0945 he likely received the two enemy contacts made by aircraft of the SIXTH Base Air Force which placed TF 38 some 260 miles north of Luzon. This was a dangerous situation since it made possible further strikes on his northern bases similar to the one made the previous afternoon.

At about 1100 he received CINCPAC Combined Fleet's order activating SHO One and Two for the base air forces. Whether or not he was informed of the other orders issued by CINCPAC Combined Fleet at about this time, directing reinforcing of SIXTH Base Air Force from forces in Honshu and China, is not indicated.

At about 1240 Commander FIFTH Base Air Force received orders from Commander Southwest Area Force directing him to destroy the enemy task force.

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* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 122800, October 1944 to Shinchiku Air Base, WDC Document 160579.
** Shinchiku Air Base Dispatch 130200, October 1944 to Authorized Ships, WDC Document 160579.
force southeast of Formosa employing his full strength. He must have anticipated such orders for the operations of the previous two days had plainly indicated that it was CinC Combined Fleet's intention to conduct a land-based aircraft battle against the enemy task force.

In accordance with these instructions Commander FIFTH Base Air Force planned to launch an attack on the 15th but because he could not complete his preparations in time, he was forced to postpone this attack for one day.**

While expediting his preparations he kept close watch on the situation to the north. The three contacts made by the "T" Force search group that evening plainly indicated to him that the enemy task force was operating 120-140 miles east northeast, east, and east southeast of Garan Bi. Should this obtain on the 15th, perhaps he would be afforded an opportunity to carry out his attack.

(d) Operations of CG FOURTH Air Army, October 12th.

CG FOURTH Air Army at Manila was cooperating with Commander FIFTH Base Air Force in accordance with their joint agreement for operations prior to the activation of the SHO Operations. During the day he conducted the short-range searches required of him in this joint agreement. In addition he was undoubtedly readying his command for combat.

Information available does not indicate how well informed CG FOURTH Air Army was of the actions taking place to the north, but it seems logical to assume that Commander FIFTH Base Air Force passed on what information he had.

When CinC Combined Fleet activated SHO One and Two for the base air forces at 1030 and Commander Southwest Area Fleet at 1235 ordered Commander FIFTH Base Air Force to destroy the enemy task force, no similar orders appear to have been given to CG FOURTH Air Army by his superior, CinC Southern Army. It would appear that a situation of this nature, arising from a lack of unified command of the air forces in the Philippines, would result in considerable difficulty in coordinating the operations of the Army and Navy Air Forces. Actually in this particular case, although it does not appear that CG FOURTH Air Army received any activation

* Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 121725, October 1944 to Commanders THIRD and FIFTH Base Air Forces, WDC Document 160864.

** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-6, JS-104.
of the SHO Operations at this time, this was not the case, for that Commander made plans to attack the enemy task force in cooperation with FIFTH Base Air Force on the following day. While this cooperation was apparently given freely, since both the CinC Southern Army and CG FOURTH Air Army had already, in view of the September attacks by the THIRD Fleet, requested authority to attack enemy carrier forces, it had only covered limited Air Forces. This was because Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section had refused to commit other than limited forces to such attacks prior to the activation of SHO Operations.**

(4) Operations on October 13th.

(a) Operations of CinC, Combined Fleet.

In view of the evening and night attacks made by the planes of the "T" Force, CinC, Combined Fleet, at his Shinchiku headquarters, awaited verification and evaluation of the results achieved. He expected such verification and evaluation to arrive presently from his Commander SIXTH Base Air Force who would obtain the basic data from the commanders of Shinchiku, Taishu, Tainan, and Takao bases where the "T" Force had landed. At this time, as has been pointed out on October 11th, he appears to have already gained from the "T" Force pilots who had landed at Shinchiku, and perhaps from other sources, a highly erroneous impression as to the effectiveness of Japanese land-based aircraft against TF 38.

What reports he finally received are not available to this study, Units which attacked were the 282nd, 501st, 703rd, 708th Attack Units and the NINETY-EIGHTH Air Regiment, with a total of 101 planes. Fragmentary reports are available from the 501st, 703rd, and 708th Attack Units.*** These reports, which were available to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, and perhaps to CinC, Combined Fleet as well because all force units which had attacked were now on Formosa were:

(a) 501st - Unknown.

(b) 703rd - (1) One cruiser or destroyer and one other ship (type unknown) sunk.

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* FOURTH Air Army Operation Order A-469, October 13th, 1944, Documents from files of Lt. Col. Katsuo Sato, IJN, Staff Officer, FOURTH Air Army, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm MS-7.

** First Demobilization Bureau Monograph, History of Army Section Imperial General Headquarters, Army Historical Division File 8-5, JS-72, undated.

*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bumao Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm MS-22 Item B.
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(2) One carrier burning in four places.

(3) One cruiser damaged.

(e) 708th -

(1) One large carrier sinking.

(2) One other carrier sinking.

(3) Seven columns of fire from direct hits.

It is not known what final report CINC, Combined Fleet received from his Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. However, anyone experienced in air operations in action knows that it is difficult, when interrogating pilots, not to be affected by the attitudes of the pilots. It is known in this case, that the "T" Force pilots possessed an air of confidence and success which must have affected for good or ill those with whom they came in contact.

This being the case, the report of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was definitely optimistic.

On the basis of such an evaluation CINC, Combined Fleet had reason to believe that his decision to alert SHO One and SHO Two for the base air forces only and to make an all-out attack on the Allied carrier task force had been correct.

Meanwhile while awaiting further information concerning the losses suffered by the Allied carrier force he awaited reports from his search planes which were already searching from Formosa, Okinawa, the Philippines and perhaps from south Kyushu.

He knew, of course, that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had ordered, at 0314, a No. 2 Alert in Formosa and in the Nankai Shoto commencing at 0600, and that an enemy air attack was expected almost any time thereafter. He also knew at this same time, 0214, that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force planned to move the aircraft of CARDIV'S THREE and FOUR to Formosa, for, in a dispatch timed 0314, that Commander directed "All air units of CARDIV'S THREE and FOUR win immediately prepare to move to Formosa for the purpose of carrying out sustained attacks against the enemy carrier striking force." Since this order meant the redeployment of the 634th and 653rd Air Groups which, by the SHO plans for SHO One or Two, were to be based initially in southern Kyushu and which at that very moment were undergoing transfer to that area, it seems wise, at this time to endeavor to analyze the situation.

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 130014, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WD Document 160137.
In this connection it seems wise also to point out (a) that the order to move the two carrier air groups to Formosa was issued by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force from Takao, (b) that both the Cinc, Combined Fleet and the Commander SIXTH Base Air Force were on Formosa, the former at Shimonoseki, the latter at Takao, (c) that the movement of the carrier air groups to south Kyushu was not a departure from Cinc Combined Fleet's SHO plans but was instead strictly in accordance with those plans, (d) that the movement of those carrier air groups to Formosa was not in either Cinc Combined Fleet's or the basic SHO plans. This was a distinct change from the basic concept of those plans for, with the transfer of the carrier air groups to Formosa, the entire concept of the SHO plan, insofar as the employment of the Mobile Force Main Force was concerned, also changed. Now, because of this transfer of a large portion of its aircraft, the Main Force of the Mobile Force would most likely be unable to take direct and positive action against the Allied carrier force and against the Allied transports as prescribed in the SHO plans. Instead it would be forced to accomplish its objectives by deception only. Thus a minor provision of Cinc, Combined Fleet's SHO plan had become the governing provision.

Since this might well have a most adverse effect on the success of the basic SHO plan, it seems impossible that it could have been ordered by anyone other than the Cinc, Combined Fleet himself who appears to have directed Commander SIXTH Base Air Force to comply. Since there is no record of any dispatch ordering this action it appears highly probable that it was done by telephone from Shimonoseki to Takao. This view is amply supported by Cinc, Combined Fleet's commanders.

(1) By Commander Mobile Force.

"Furthermore about 160 planes from the carriers were sent to Formosa, consequently our carrier strength was greatly reduced so the operation was changed to use land-based planes more frequently instead of carrier planes. My force of carrier planes became very much weakened. Only 110 were left, so less than half remained; it was not my intention to send reinforcements to Formosa but it was by order of Toyoda."

(2) Deputy Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, (who was with the Cinc, Combined Fleet on Formosa).

"The decision (to send carrier planes and pilots to Formosa) was made by the Cinc, Combined Fleet, Toyoda."

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(3) Commander Carrier Division FOUR.

"That was the decision of Admiral Toyoda (to take away half of the planes)."

Why then if the employment of these carrier planes on Formosa had not been originally contemplated did Cinc, Combined Fleet modify his plans? The answer is simple. Because of his location at Shinchiku he had become unduly impressed with the results claimed by his pilots there, and possibly also by the original claims forwarded by Commander SIX. Base Air Force. He became convinced that these reports were worthy of belief and so, without waiting for further evaluation from his headquarters at Tokyo, or from the Naval General Staff, he committed the carrier planes irrevocably. This view is completely supported by his Deputy Chief of Staff who stated:

"It was thought in the beginning that Japan gave your fleet a very big loss. This was later found to be a mistake, but that thought made the decisions to send as much reinforcement as possible to give the American fleet a bigger loss; in a word to overwhelm them.... Although Admiral Toyoda perhaps did not believe that it would destroy the American task forces it was thought the most effective tactic to carry out the Philippine operations."

This decision of Cinc, Combined Fleet, based as it was on unverified and unevaluated claims of his attack pilots, seems unsound since it was highly possible that daylight reconnaissance might not support the claims. It was highly possible because Japanese land-based planes had not proved successful in recent operations against Allied carrier planes and had not proved successful in night attacks against the carrier task groups. During the Marianas operation in June the Japanese had sent most of their best pilots to the defense of the Marianas, where they had been wiped out. The pilots remaining in the Empire who were under training were generally inferior to those employed in the Marianas. It was these pilots who constituted the Japanese land-based air power. All of this was known to Cinc, Combined Fleet. In addition Cinc, Combined Fleet had received no further word concerning the large Allied amphibious forces reported in the Hollandia-Wewak area on October 9th. It seems surprising that he ignored.

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at this time, the possibility that TF 38 might be preparing the way for
such an invasion in the southern Philippines and therefore had as its
objective the destruction of Japanese planes and facilities in the Nan-
seki Shoto, Formosa and the Philippines. Certainly the SHO plan had
been built in part on this concept and for that reason it provided for
the immediate retirement of most planes from the area attacked. Does it
not also seem surprising therefore that Cinc, Combined Fleet did not ap-
preciate that, by engaging in all-out attacks on TF 38 he was, in fact,
assisting that task force to succeed in its basic objective?

At about 0430 he received Commander "T" Force's order to the "T"
Force wherein that commander directed (a) that a search for the Allied
carrier task force, believed to consist of three to four groups, and
reportedly at midnight within a 200 miles radius east of Formosa be made
commencing at 1030, (b) that an additional search group take off at 1330
to reconnoiter the general situation and (c) that the "T" Attack Force
remaining in Kyushu escorted by fighters depart its bases between 1200
and 1300, make a dusk attack, and then land on Formosa, Takao, Tainan,
Taichu and Shinhiku.*

At about 0730 Allied carrier planes commenced attacking Formosa.

At about 0740 Cinc, Combined Fleet received word that at 0710 a
plane from Formosa had sighted, in Latitude 23°-10'N, Longitude 122°-50'E,
on a westerly course an enemy force consisting of two carriers, two battle-
ships, several cruisers and destroyers, and that at 0713 the plane had
sighted a second group with two carriers and several other ships.**

Sometime after 0830 it is highly possible that he was informed by
Commander SIXTH Base Air Force that the Naval General Staff had in-
fomed his Kamaya Headquarters by telephone at 0800 that they had esti-
matcd the results of the "T" Force dusk attack on the preceding night
as two enemy ships sunk; two moderately damaged.*** Since this was well
below the original estimate of ten ships afire, four of which sank, it
would appear as if this might have had a sobering effect on Cinc, Com-
bined Fleet's opinions as to the success of his aviators. However, the
fact that he permitted the air operations for that day to be executed as
planned indicates that he either disagreed with this opinion or decided
to go ahead anyway.

* Commander "T" Force Dispatch 130400, October 1944 to "T" Force,
** Detailed Action Report No. 2, 11th Reconnaissance Group, October
13th, 1944, WDC Document 161442.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Runzo Shibata, 1LBN, Chief Deputy
Second Air Fleet October 16th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army
Historical Division Microfilm NS-22, Item B.
Sometime around 1100 CinC, Combined Fleet received another contact report. This report was from the same Formosa plane that had made the 0710 and 0713 contact reports. The pilot reported that at 1040 he had sighted, in Latitude 22°-40'N, Longitude 122°-38'E, an Allied carrier task group consisting of two carriers, two battleships and two destroyers.*

What effect these contacts (0710, 0713 and 1040) had on CinC, Combined Fleet's mental processes is not known. However, since they confirmed the presence of roughly two groups, it would seem as if these reports had been received with considerable satisfaction as they tended to support his decision for all-out attack. He had been advised by Imperial General Headquarters that there were probably four task groups in the Allied carrier force; his search planes had located three or four of these task groups on the previous day; now in daylight his search planes could discover but two - or at the most three - of the four carrier groups. Where were the others? Perhaps he decided now that, despite the opinion of the Naval General Staff, the claims of his aviators were reasonably correct, and that one or two Allied carrier task groups had been forced to retire.

During the day the Japanese estimated that about 600 Allied planes had struck Formosa.** This estimate was low for TF 30 had actually launched 974 sorties most of which had struck Formosa, although some had struck Pescadores islands as well as Miyako Jima and Ishigaki Shima.

Between 1826 and 1940 (evening twilight) CinC, Combined Fleet knew that if all went well certain of his planes were attacking TF 30. Actually since the attack groups had departed around noon it seems correct to say that at this time CinC, Combined Fleet knew that forty-three "m" Force planes had departed Kyushu and 170 FIFTH Base Air Force and Army planes had departed the Philippines to make these attacks.** He appears to have awaited their reports with confidence and had great hopes for success.

Sometime around 1923*** CinC, Combined Fleet knew that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was preparing to launch a general air offensive****

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** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October, 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104; also, Material for Situation Estimates First Section Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC Document 216764 (Microfilm).
*** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 131923, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force DCG 47), War Diary, Kanoya Detachment 701st Air Group, 15th-31st October 1944, WDC Document 160288, NA 12592.
**** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer Second Air Fleet, October 16th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item 3.
originating from Kyushu against TF 38 on the following day, October 16th and that the attacking planes were to include those planes of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR which had been transferred to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. Whether he knew this because he had directed that officer to commence such a general air offensive or whether he knew it because he had been so advised by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force is not known.

It was at this point that CINC, Combined Fleet should have taken action to ensure that this general air offensive was in fact a general air offensive. For, in addition to the SIXTH Base Air Force and Army planes on Kyushu, there were many Army and Navy planes on Formosa and in the Philippines which might well have been committed at the same time in a coordinated attack. However, as has been pointed out in Chapter I under "Air Coordination Between Army and Land-Based Naval Air Forces" the existing agreements did not provide a means for coordinating the air forces on Formosa with those in the Philippines. Therefore, does it not seem as if such coordination should properly have been made effective by CINC, Combined Fleet who was the immediate superior in command to both Commander FIFTH Base Air Force and Commander SIXTH Base Air Force?

In this connection it can be stressed here that it is the function of a commander to whom an objective has been assigned to apportion his available resources in such manner as to provide the requisite strength at points likely to be decisive without unduly weakening other points. CINC, Combined Fleet had decided when the SHO One and SHO Two for the base air forces had been activated that action against TF 38 was to be decisive, and he appears to have decided that October 16th in particular was to be the decisive day. Why then did he permit limited forces to be engaged when he had far greater forces which might well have been committed in a powerful coordinated attack without unduly weakening other areas?

Upon the landing of the "T" Force planes on Formosa CINC, Combined Fleet learned, in part directly and in part from Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, that the "T" Force claimed results as follows:

(a) One attack between 1827 and 1907 against a two-carrier task group in Latitude 22°25'N, Longitude 123°05'W. This was TG 34½, which consisted of four carriers. The Japanese claimed sinking one ESSEX-class carrier, one cruiser and probably sinking one battleship. Actually no hits were made, but the FRANKLIN received superficial damage from an enemy


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plane which slid along the deck.

(b) One attack between 1353 and 1905 against a four carrier task group in Latitude 22°-45'N, Longitude 123°-26'E, a position about twenty miles north northeast of the first group. This was TG 38.1 which consisted of four carriers. Planes returning from this attack reported two carriers afire at 1353, that at 1845 one ship, apparently a carrier, blew up and that at 1850 a large carrier blew up. Actually while this attack was more successful than was the attack on TG 38.4, no carriers were hit. One hit was made, however, on the heavy cruiser CANBERRA at 1836.

Commander "T" Force reported losing twenty planes in the attack. As TF 38 claimed thirteen by anti-aircraft fire and four by CAP, it is probable that the remaining three planes were lost at sea due to battle damage or for other causes.

The above indicated that it was possible that three more carriers, one battleship and one cruiser had been sunk and two carriers damaged. This was a hitting percentage of about sixteen percent. In view of previous unsuccessful attacks of this nature, and, particularly in view of those off the Marianas in June, Cinc., Combined Fleet must have felt this was a very high percentage for a forty-three dusk attack made against a heavily defended maneuvering carrier force and should be viewed with caution. This was especially so since the Naval General Staff had not accepted earlier the claims of his "T" Force Commander but had markedly reduced them.

At about 2220 he knew that his "T" Force was planning an attack, for the following day, on what remained of TF 38, for he received a dispatch wherein Commander "T" Force ordered "its entire remaining strength in Kyushu to attack and destroy the enemy 'remnants' by a dusk (night) attack tomorrow October 14th."

Meanwhile, he most likely received word that the 170 plane attack from the Philippines had failed to discover the enemy because of bad weather and had returned to base. There was a weak to moderate cold front which passed over Formosa from northwest to southeast during the

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** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October—December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
afternoon which obscured Formosa for several hours during its passage. It seems reasonable to assume that it was this cold front which turned back the Japanese planes.

Cinc, Combined Fleet, if he accepted for planning purposes the claims of his "T" Force for the recently completed night attack, could now estimate that:

(a) At the best he had succeeded in sinking four ships (carriers) on the 12th, out of ten ships hit, and five ships (three carriers, one battleship and one cruiser) out of seven ships hit on the 13th - a total of seventeen ships hit, nine sunk of which seven were carriers.

(b) At the worst, if he accepted the Naval General Staff estimate for the 12th, he had succeeded in sinking two ships (carriers) out of four ships hit on that date and five ships (three carriers, one battleship, and one cruiser out of seven ships hit on the 13th - a total of eleven ships hit, seven sunk, of which five were carriers.

What Cinc, Combined Fleet finally assumed as the correct estimate of damage to TF 38 for October 12th is not known, but it can be assumed that it was within the limits of the above. It must have been with considerable interest then that he received about midnight his Chief of Staff's estimate from his Hyo oni headquarters. This dispatch, which was supposed to express the opinion of the Naval General Staff, stated:

"The "T" Force on the night of October 12th, carried out a fierce long-range attack on the enemy task force, sinking or setting fire to a total of more than six ships. This achievement, at the very beginning of the SHO battle for the base air forces, points the way to the destruction of the enemy."*

Whether Cinc, Combined Fleet accepted these figures is also not known, but since they were a considerable increase over the Naval General Staff estimate as of 0600,viz., two ships sunk two received moderate damage, it is not improbable that he accepted his Chief of Staff's estimate as the basis for future action.

He now could estimate that as of 2400, October 12th his air forces had succeeded in sinking or seriously damaging thirteen enemy ships, and that most of these ships were carriers.

Sometime on this day he learned that the I-26 had departed Kure for

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* Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 122335, October 1944 to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, etc., WDC Document 181005.
** Submarine Operations 1944, Merit Rating Reports for Naval Ship Units, WDC Document 161011.

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(b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force, October 13th.

During the morning of October 13th, Commander Mobile Force took no important action except to expedite the transfer of CARDIV THREE's Air Group to designated shore bases.

At about 0545 he received Commander SIXTH Base Air Force's dispatch to the SIXTH Base Air Force wherein that commander directed all air units of CARDIV'S THREE and FOUR to prepare immediately to move to Formosa for the purpose of carrying out sustained attacks against the enemy carrier force. This must have been a considerable surprise to him for he stated later that it was not his 'intention to send reinforcements to Formosa.'** It now became necessary for him to prepare plans for the employment of his forces and of his Main Force in particular, should SHO One or Two be activated. This was of critical importance because of the loss of his carrier planes which were to have been the backbone of the Main Force.

At 1203 he directed the Commander SECOND Striking Force to direct two destroyers to proceed immediately to Cita Bay to cooperate in the shore basing of the 653rd Air Group which at this time was at Olza, while its parent carriers were in the Kure-Yashima area.***

At about 1400 he received a dispatch from COMCARDIV FOUR wherein that commander stated that for the purpose of expediting the transfer of the 634th Air Group to Formosa or of expediting its transfer back to CARDIV FOUR, should that condition eventuate, he considered it necessary that the destroyer SHIMOTSUKI, following her arrival at Kogashima Bay, be retained there.****

This dispatch by COMCARDIV FOUR is exceedingly interesting in that it shows that that Commander envisaged the great possibility - and even the great probability - that SHO One would be activated before his planes, which had been ordered to Formosa, could be transferred there. It is clear that in such case he expected the prompt return of his carrier planes to CARDIV FOUR.

Why he retained this thought even though his planes had already been ordered to Formosa, and even though his Cinc, Combined Fleet had

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* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 1308514, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160137.
*** Commander Mobile Force Dispatch 151203, October 1944 to Commander SECOND Striking Force, WDC Document 161638.
**** COMCARDIV 4 Dispatch 151232, October 1944 to Commander Mobile Force WDC Document 161638.
apparently discarded the idea of an early activation of SHO One, is not explained. However, it would seem as if COMCARDIV FOUR's appraisal of the developing situation and of the ultimate objectives of the Allied commanders, were at variance with those of CinC, Combined Fleet as well as with those of the Naval General Staff, and were more in line with the basic objectives of the SHO plans.

That Commander Mobile Force concurred with this view of his COMCARDIV FOUR seems clear for the SHIYOTSUKI was retained at Kagoshima as requested.*

(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force, October 13th.

The FIRST Striking Force remained in the Lingga-Singapore area and continued its training as discussed under October 10th.

Commander FIRST Striking Force knew that for the present, action against the Allied carrier force was to be by base air forces alone and had observed the orders transferring the planes of CAVDIV's THREE and FOUR to the SIXTH Base Air Force, thence to south Kyushu and finally to Formosa. He therefore continued to maintain a close watch on the developing situation as discussed under October 11th.

(2) Operations of Commander Main Force, October 13th.

Commander Main Force during October 13th took no important action.

At about 0345 he received Commander SIXTH Base Air Force's dispatch to the SIXTH Base Air Force wherein that commander directed all of the units of CAVDIV's THREE and FOUR to prepare immediately to move to Formosa for combat operations against the enemy carrier force.**

At about 1400 he received a dispatch from COMCARDIV FOUR, directed to Commander Mobile Force, wherein that commander desired to retain the destroyer SHIYOTSUKI at Kagoshima Bay following her arrival there because he might require it to assist in the movement of the 634th Air Group to Formosa or back to the carriers.***

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* War Diary DESRON 10, October 1944, WDC Document 161658.
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 14384, October 13th to...
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(3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force,

October 13th.

Commander SECOND Striking Force took no important action on October 13th except to continue preparing his ships for possible sortie and combat operations.

These ships were, at this time, either at Iwakuni or at Kure. Actually most of them were at Iwakuni, but DESRON ONE was for the large part at Kure.*

At about 1230 Commander SECOND Striking Force received Commander Mobile Force's dispatch directing him to send immediately two destroyers to Oita Bay to cooperate in the shore basing of the 653rd Air Group.**

In accordance with this dispatch, at 1443, he directed COMDESEDIV SIXTY-ONE to comply.***

(c) Operations of the Base Air Forces, October 13th.

(1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

By about 0230 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had probably received complete reports of the damage sustained by his command during the attacks of TF 38 on the 12th and had commenced re-estimating the situation. From these reports he could see that (a) Formosa had been attacked by about 600 aircraft of TF 38, a large proportion of which had been directed against southern Formosa with smaller attacks in the north, (b) the heaviest damage had been received by the installations at Wako in the Pescadores Islands and by the merchant shipping in Takao Harbor,**** (c) lesser damage had been received by other air installations but presumably all of them were able to continue operations, (d) the loss of aircraft had been considerable. In addition to the forty-one planes lost by the *°* Force in its attack, fifty-seven others had been reported destroyed on the ground,**** and three search planes and one attack plane from Shimishiu had been reported missing. This was a total of one hundred two aircraft destroyed or missing and did not include those damaged.

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** War Diary DESRON 1, October 1st-31st, 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11735.
** Commander Mobile Force Dispatch 131203, October 1944, to Commander SECOND Striking Force (Commander Mobile Force DesOpOrd 55), Mobile Force War Diary October 1944, WDC Document 161638.
*** Commander SECOND Striking Force Dispatch 131443, October 1944 to COMDESEDIV 61 (Commander SECOND Striking Force DesOpOrd 5), War Diary DESRON 10, October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
**** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.

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Against these losses he could balance the damage which his command had inflicted on the enemy. This damage, as has been noted earlier, was believed to have been ten ships damaged, of which four, presumably carriers, had sunk. In connection with the above data it seems wise to point out here that it was almost completely erroneous since (a) he had not inflicted any damage whatsoever on TF 38, and (b) as was the case two days before when TF 38 attacked Okinawa, the report of the number of Allied aircraft attacking Formosa was in error. Actually TF 38 had launched 774 sorties against the target area instead of the 600 reported. Fortunately for Commander SIXTH Base Air Force he was not forced to rely on plane sightings alone to determine the strength of the Allied carrier task force. He had other sources which supplemented the plane sightings. Among these were (a) actual sighting of the task force by search planes and submarines although the latter had been highly ineffective, (b) radio intelligence, (c) general intelligence. Had he been forced to rely on plane sightings alone he might well have seriously underestimated the enemy strength.

As a result of his estimate Commander SIXTH Base Air Force decided that his attacks were progressing favorably and should be continued in strength that day. He therefore at 0415 ordered all SIXTH Base Air Force units in Kyushu including aircraft of CAVIV's THREE and FOUR, but excluding the "C" Force, to prepare immediately to deploy to Formosa and there to carry out sustained attacks against the enemy task force. He also ordered all units to enforce alert conditions at 0800 and to take precautions against damage from attack. His reason for omitting the "C" Force from this order was the fact that that force had previously received the same orders to attack, had already executed one attack under this same order, and was presumably preparing to carry out further attacks under the same order. His reason for including the aircraft of CAVIV's THREE and FOUR was clear. He felt that he required all of the aircraft he could find and since these planes were in southern Kyushu they might better be employed in Formosa. It is assumed that this decision met with the prior approval of CINCPAC, Combined Fleet Force, as noted previously, such employment of the carrier planes might well have few reaching effects on the prosecution of the entire SHO Operations.

At about 0430 he received by dispatch Commander "C" Force's plan for the "C" Force attack for that day. This plan directed the "C" Attack Force in southern Kyushu to destroy the remaining enemy carriers which were estimated to be in three or four task groups operating within a 200 miles radius east of Formosa. Plans of the search phase were to depart Kanoya at 1030 to be followed by the attack unit between 1200 and 1300, and by an additional reconnaissance plane at 1330. The attack unit was to be escorted by a fighter unit. The attack was to be made at dusk. All aircraft were directed to land, after the attack, at Takao.
Taiwán, Taichú and Shiouchú on Formosa. At this time sixty-five "T" Force planes remained in southern Kyushu.**

At 0630 the first day's search was launched from Okinawa. Whether this had been preceded by night search planes, as on previous nights, is not known, nor is there any record of contacts made on TF 38 during the night. The Okinawa search consisted of three two-engine land bombers which were to cover the sector between bearings 116°-127°(T) to a distance of 450 miles.***

Shortly thereafter at about 0600, FOURTEENTH Combined Air Group on Formosa launched two searches; three two-engine land bombers commenced search of the sector 116°-127°(T) from Taichú to a range of 250 miles, and two carrier type bombers commenced search of the sector 115°-140°(T) from Taito to a range of 250 miles.****

At 0630 one plane of the ELEVENTH Reconnaissance Unit took off from Taichú to return to Káyara where it was scheduled to be a part of the "T" Force Search Unit.***** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force probably was not informed of this detail, but he was informed of the contacts which this plane made. These contacts were (a) at 0710 an enemy force which included two carriers, two battleships, several cruisers and destroyers in Latitude 23°-10'N, Longitude 122°-50'E on a westerly course which position was bearing 070°(T) 100 miles from Taito and approximately twenty-eight miles bearing 060°(T) from the nearest group of TF 38, (b) three minutes later a second group with two carriers and several other ships.******

It will be observed that the Japanese searches provided reasonable coverage of the areas to the east of the Philippines; provided only slight coverage of the areas north of Luzon, east of Formosa and south of Okinawa, and provided no coverage whatsoever of the areas east of the Nanséi Shoto and north to south Kyushu. In addition most air searches provided coverage against early morning strikes only. This may have been due in part to the reduced visibility in the areas between Formosa and south Kyushu caused by widely scattered showers and variable conditions. This, however, seems improbable for under the reduced visibility search
conditions existing, the danger of surprise attack by carrier task forces naturally became greater and therefore the Japanese should have increased the density of their searches rather than have cancelled them.

The fact that they did not do so points out again the probability that they had decided at this time that it was the enemy's intention to remain in the waters east of Formosa and not to divide his forces and make strikes elsewhere. While this was a correct evaluation, it was not sound since as has been pointed out previously, the Allies had the capability of striking the Nansai Shoto again and perhaps to strike south Kyushu. Might this not have been a logical result of Japanese successes against TF 38 and thus have afforded some protection to the damaged ships reportedly in the area since these attacks would have reduced the flow of aircraft from the Empire to Formosa and the Philippines, and might even have reversed that flow?

At about 0730 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force commenced receiving reports of attacks on Formosa by TF 36 aircraft. The SECOND Taoyuan Air Group reported that its base had been attacked by forty fighters and bombers; Taoran Air Group reported that about sixty carrier bombers had attacked between 0727 and 0830 but had been driven off with five shot down. Similar reports arrived from other bases. It was now apparent to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force that, despite the damage which his air units reported having inflicted on the enemy task force, that force was still capable of making strong air strikes. He probably expected this since Imperial General Headquarters' original estimate of the enemy carrier strength had been sixteen to eighteen carriers and now, if his pilots had actually sunk four of these and damaged others, there would necessarily still be a minimum of twelve carriers remaining with their attached aircraft, which forecast continued strong air strikes. Since the reported strength of these air strikes was no greater than he had expected he correctly decided that his original orders issued at 0214 to all SIXTH Base Air Force units in Kyushu, including units of CARDIV THREE and FOUR, to destroy the remaining units of TF 38 were still sound. However, he planned to reinforce these units with units (FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla) of the SEVENTH Base Air Force which were on route to Korea. In addition he expected to receive some cooperation from the FIFTH Base Air Force and the FOURTH Air Army in the Philippines, although how much cooperation he expected to receive is not known.

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* Morit Report, 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, WGC Document 161012.
** Imperial General Headquarters, THIRD Section Dispatch 111255, October 1944 to All Fleet Commanders, WGC Document 161008.
At about 0900 he was informed that Commander FIFTH-FIRST Air Flotilla had arrived at Kanoya and had set up his headquarters at that base. He could now assume that that commander was moving his air units into position to attack as soon as possible.

At about 0930 he appears to have been informed by his Kanoya headquarters that his Senior Staff Officer at that headquarters had been advised by telephone that the Naval General Staff in Tokyo had estimated the damage inflicted in the "T" Force attack of the previous night as "two ships sunk, two received serious damage." What effect this reduced estimate had on his mental processes is not known. Perhaps it had a sobering effect as it indicated serious exaggeration by his pilots; perhaps he rejected it in favor of the reports of his pilots. In either case he had no choice. He was determined to continue his operations to destroy the enemy task force, and continued making plans to employ the substantial reinforcements which were being made available to him by CinC, Combined Fleet to accomplish this task.

At 1040 the single plane of the ELEVENTH Reconnaissance Unit, which had sighted two enemy groups with carriers earlier in the day reported a task group of two carriers, two battleships, and two destroyers. This plane had returned to Taito after the first two sightings, and had taken off again at 1010. The position of this latest contact was about twenty-five miles south of the 0130 contact and was about eighteen miles west of the nearest group of TF 38. Whether this contact was believed to be a third carrier task group, or whether it was believed to be a second sighting on one of the earlier contacts reported, is not known. At 1045 the plane discontinued search and proceeded to Okinawa.

It is of interest that this plane returned to base after both the morning and afternoon reconnaissance missions without having been relieved and without being forced to do so by a shortage of gasoline, at least in the afternoon mission. This was not in accordance with Japanese instructions which stated:

"When a scout plane spots the enemy it will determine the enemy strength, make a report covering composition, weather, location, formation, course and speed, and any additional enemy forces discovered and will continue scouting along the prearranged scouting line in an

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*Commander 3rd Air Flotilla Dispatch 130930, October, 1944 to
Commander SIXTH and SEVENTH Base Air Forces, WDC Document
180286.

** Memorandum Notes of Captain Junzo Shihata, IJN, Staff Officer
Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of Army
Hisatani Division Microfilm HS-22, Item 5.

*** 11th Reconnaissance Unit Detailed Action Report No. 2, October
13th, 1944, WDC Document 161442.
endeavor to perceive the over-all enemy situation. If the airplane has sufficient endurance it will continue to track the enemy on the line of return.**

At 1045 the search unit of the "T" Force Attack Group took off from Kanoya. This unit consisted of four planes: three carrier type reconnaissance planes of ELEVENTH Reconnaissance Unit and one two-engine land bomber of 708th Attack Unit. It was ordered to proceed to Okinawa and then to search sector 215°-242°(T) to a distance of 300 miles from Okinawa. On completion of its mission the planes were to land on Formosa.***

At 1145 one carrier type reconnaissance plane of TWELFTH Reconnaissance Unit departed Kanoya. Neither the area searched nor the orders under which it operated are known. It landed on Formosa at 1730 having made no contact.****

Two of the 1045 "T" Force search planes returned to base due to mechanical difficulties and were replaced, one at 1245 and one at 1306.*****

This return to base of two of his four search planes must have been somewhat discouraging to Commander "T" Force for it tended to diminish the effectiveness of the planned search. Although replacement planes were dispatched, the other two search planes had already been on search for two hours making it difficult to ensure that the area had been adequately searched even though the original search was twice as dense as necessary.

At about this time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received a dispatch, originated by his Senior Staff Officer at Kanoya, which directed SIXTH Base Air Force units in Kyushu to cooperate in providing logistic support for air units of the FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla and of CANNOYA's THIRTEEN and FOURTH which would move into south Kyushu bases during the afternoon. From this dispatch he learned that (a) Commander SEVENTH Air Force was transferring to Kyushu, under Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla, 120 fighters, fifty carrier type attack planes, fifty type bombers, and thirty carrier type reconnaissance planes — a

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*** 708th Attack Unit Detailed Action Report No. 9, October 13th, 1944, WDC Document 160899.
**** War Diary 12th Reconnaissance Unit, Kanoya Detachment, October 12th-15th, 1944, WDC Document 160385.
***** Senior Staff Officer, SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch unnumbered contained in War Diary Kokubu Detachment 103rd Attack Unit, 701st Air Group, October 13th, 1944, WDC Document 160250.

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250 planes - and (b) instead of the 154 planes of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR which were also moving into position in south Kyushu he was to receive 172 planes - a welcome addition of some eighteen planes. This gave him a total of 422 additional operational aircraft of all types which would shortly be ready to join the attack from the north.

At about 1306 he received a dispatch from the Chief of the Naval General Staff to Commanders "T" Force and 901st Air Group stating "This morning on reporting on the situation to the Throne the Emperor expressed extreme satisfaction with the results obtained the previous night October 12th."

Between 1300 and 1410 the "T" Force Attack Group consisting of thirty-three aircraft, took off from south Kyushu bases to strike the enemy tank force at dusk. This group included aircraft from three attack units: 501st Attack Unit - Six two-engine land bombers. 703rd Attack Unit - Eight land attack planes. 708th Attack Unit - Nineteen land attack planes. Seven of these planes were direct cooperation planes (pathfinders and control aircraft) carrying flares, twenty-three were armed with torpedoes, and three carried bombs. One of the direct cooperation planes and four of the others returned to base after take-off due to engine trouble. The remaining twenty-eight headed for Miyako Jima, their rendezvous point. The composition was now the 501st Attack Unit with four planes armed with bombs or torpedoes, the 703rd Attack Unit with eight planes with one torpedo each, and the 708th Attack Unit with sixteen planes, ten of which were armed with torpedoes, the remaining six, with flares.

This "T" Force attack group was escorted by a fighter unit of about ten fighters of the 303rd Fighter Unit. Thus, the "T" Force attack, as launched, consisted of forty-three aircraft of which thirty-eight proceeded to the target area.

It will be observed that although this attack group was only about one-third the size of the group which had attacked the previous night, and was composed of those "T" Force planes remaining in Kyushu, it represented the maximum force which was ready to attack. The large number of
reinforcements referred to previously would not be ready until the following day. Presumably Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew the composition of the "T" Force attack group.

At 1330 the 708th Attack Unit launched a single land attack plane to conduct a search on course 215° from Kiyamashiki, Okinawa to a distance of 425 miles. This plane was the additional reconnaissance flight directed by Commander "T" Force in his attack plan.

It seems probable that at about this same time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew that, unlike the previous day, he would be assisted by Commander FIFTH Base Air Force and 6th FORTY-FOURTH Air Army in the Philippines in destroying the enemy task force since these latter commanders had, at 1315, launched a combined force of 170 aircraft from the Clark Field area to attack TF 39. About how this attack was to be coordinated with the "T" Force attack is not indicated.

At about 1400 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received from his Senior Staff Officer at Kanoya a proposed deployment of the FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla and CANDIV's THREE and FOUR units to Formosa. About an hour later he received, also from his Senior Staff Officer at Kanoya, a proposed organization for these newly arrived units. He took no action on these proposals at this time.

By mid-afternoon the existing air situation was about as follows: (a) no further contacts had been reported since 1040 and all regular search planes had presumably returned to their bases or at least, as in the case of the one plane of the TWELFTH Reconnaissance Unit from Kanoya, had departed the area of probable contact, (b) the "T" Force search unit was still actively searching and (c) the "T" Force attack group of twenty-eight attack planes escorted by the ten fighter planes, and the attack group from the Philippines of 170 aircraft were proceeding to the objective area.

While Commander SIXTH Base Air Force awaited further contacts he received additional reports of damage inflicted by the attacking enemy.

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* 708th Attack Unit Detailed Action Report No. 6, October 13th, 1944, WDC Document 160479.
* Commander "T" Force Dispatch 130400, October 1944 to "T" Force, WDC Document 16145.
* Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 9-5, JS-104.
* Senior Staff Officer, SIXTH Base Air Force at Kanoya Dispatch 131350, October 1944, to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160256.
* Ibid Dispatch 131450, October 1944.
aircraft on Formosa. The Tainan Air Group reported that between 1435 and 1535 thirteen enemy planes had attacked, but had been driven off. The Second Takao Air Group reported that between 1400 and 1600 eighty enemy fighters and bombers had attacked but had been driven off. The damage sustained was reported as light."

In addition to these reports Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was informed that, in addition to the arrival of reinforcing units at bases in south Kyushu during the afternoon, elements of the two fighter groups ordered to deploy to Formosa from the China Area Fleet had commenced arriving. Sixteen fighters of 254th Air Group and two fighters of 256th Air Group had arrived at Tainan where they had reported to Commander Formosa Air Group, a subordinate of Commander FOURTEENTH Combined Air Group.

At 1620 the first contact by the "T" Force search was made. A pilot of the ELEVENTH Reconnaissance Unit reported sighting three enemy carriers in Latitude 22°-50'N, Longitude 122°-50'E. Four minutes later at 1624 he reported a second force of four carriers, two battleships, and other ships in Latitude 22°-50'N, Longitude 122°-30'E, and at 1722 he reported that the enemy strength was disposed in three groups. Thereafter he maintained contact. Also at 1720 a search plane pilot of the 708th Attack Unit reported sighting an enemy surface force at Latitude 39°-05'N, Longitude 123°-35'E. At 1730 he reported the composition of this force as one carrier and one cruiser on course 000° speed eight knots.

The 1620 and 1640 positions reported above were within five to ten miles of the actual position of TF 38; the 1720 position was about forty miles east of TF 38.

These contacts, which were transmitted by the search planes to the attack group, were received by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force who was at his headquarters at Takao awaiting information on the progress of the attack. They should have been very gratifying since they revealed

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* Merit Report, 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012.
**** Detailed Action Report of Expeditionary Fighter Unit, 256th Air Group, October 13th-October 17th, 1944, WDC Document 161222.
that (a) the sightings had been made in ample time for the attack group to make a coordinated dusk attack and (b) there were many appropriate targets. Sunset was at 1730 and the end of evening twilight at 1940.

The three attack units of the 'T' Force Attack Group, which had proceeded separately to Miyako, also arrived there separately. The first to arrive were the sixteen planes of the 708th Attack Unit which had arrived at 1538 and had commenced orbiting there awaiting dusk. On receiving the 1620 contact this attack unit departed without waiting for the other two attack units, and proceeded toward the contact which was about 1/2 miles away. The second to arrive were the eight planes of the 703rd Attack Unit which passed Miyako Jima at 1640 and continued on without delay toward the enemy's position. The last to arrive were the four planes of the 561st Attack Unit which passed Miyako Jima at about 1855. It will be noted that no reference is made here to the ten fighter planes escorting the attack units of the 'T' Force. This is because there is no further mention of them in the records available to this study. It seems probable that these planes returned to base without engaging the enemy fighters since there is no record by the Allies of having observed fighters during the attacks made by the three attack units. Between 1827 and 1907 these three attack units conducted continuous attack on TG's 38.1 and 38.4. The data available is very indefinite so that it is difficult to discern which attack unit accomplished the actual damage to the above two task groups. However, it seems that the following analysis is reasonably correct.

Each of the above three attack groups operated independently. Sometime after 1827 the 708th Attack Unit contacted TG's 38.1 and 38.4 and, guided by the direct cooperation planes, immediately commenced its attack with the first plane making a torpedo attack on an enemy ship in TG 38.1 believed to be a heavy cruiser. At the same time two planes of this attack unit launched an attack on TG 38.4 which was east in formation to the south. The planes of this unit continued their attacks until 1905 when the last plane made a torpedo attack on an enemy carrier and then retired. They reported seeing two carriers on fire at 1833, one ship apparently a carrier blow up at 1945, and a large carrier blow up at 1950.* Actually these claims were seriously in error since the whole damage inflicted was (a) slight damage to the FRANKLIN at 1931 caused by a plane which had been shot down by AA fire sliding across the

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* 708th Attack Unit Detailed Action Report No. 3, Night Torpedo Attack on Enemy Task Force off Formosa, October 13th, 1944

** 703rd Attack Unit Detailed Action Report No. 4, Night Torpedo Attack on Enemy Task Force off Formosa, October 13th, 1944

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deck, and (b) a torpedo hit on the CANBERRA at 1835.** In accomplishing
this result the attack unit lost eight of the ten attack planes and
three of the six direct cooperation planes. CTG 38.4 reported that he
had shot down six planes in this attack and CTG 38.4 reported that he had
shot down both planes which had attacked this group at this time for a
total of eight, thus exactly confirming the Japanese attack plane losses.

During this same time the aircraft of the 703rd and the 501st At-
tack Units, which were arriving in the area, were attacked by eight VF
from the ENTERPRISE in TG 38.4. These fighters shot down three land
attack and one two-engine land bomber aircraft before those attack units
could launch their attack.*** This reduced the attack strength of the
703rd Attack Unit to five and of the 501st Attack Unit to three planes.

At 1855, the 703rd Attack Unit commenced its torpedo attack on TG
38.4. Of the five planes which had commenced the attack, only three
survived to report the results. One pilot reported that he had launched
his torpedo at 1850 at a battleship, had observed a pillar of fire, and
therefore felt that it was highly probable that the ship had been sunk;
the second pilot reported having scored a torpedo hit at 1900 on a
battleship which had sunk; the third pilot reported that he had made two
runs, but had been unable to release his torpedo. He had therefore re-
turned to base with it.****

At 1910 the last attack unit, the 501st Attack Unit, commenced a
torpedo attack against TG 38.4. Two of the three planes which had com-
pleted the attack failed to return to base. The pilot of the surviving
plane reported that he had hit an ESSEX-Class carrier with one bomb
which had set the ship on fire, as a result of which the ship broke in
two and sank.***** Actually these claims were completely in error as
no damage was inflicted by this attack of the 703rd and the 501st
Attack Units. In this attack on TG 38.4 each attack unit lost two
planes for a total of four. This confirmed CTG 38.4's report that he
had shot down three planes at this time by AA fire, and a fourth by a
combination of AA fire and gunfire of an ENTERPRISE fighter.

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* No: Diary CTG 38.4, October 13th, 1944.
** Action Report CANBERRA, 1935, October 13th-17th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 27th, 1944, Enclosure A, Page 1.
*** Action Report ENTERPRISE, Operations Against Kansai Shoto, Formosa
Philippine Islands, October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial 0053, October
31st, 1944.
**** Detailed Action Report No. 2, 703rd Attack Unit, Night Torpedo
Attack on Enemy Task Force off Formosa, October 13th, 1944,
WDC Document 161445.
***** Detailed Action Report No. 3, 501st Attack Unit (752nd Air Group)
Night Dusk Attack on Enemy Task Force East of Formosa, October
19th, 1944, WDC Document 161442.
Thus, the total damage on TF 38 claimed by the pilots was:

(a) Sunk - three carriers, one cruiser, one battleship 
probably sunk.

(b) Damaged - two carriers on fire, another cruiser attacked
but results unobserved.

On the other hand losses sustained by the "T" Force were - sixteen 
out of twenty-two attack planes, three out of six direct cooperation 
planes, and one out of five search planes, missing, for a total loss of 
twenty planes. This was roughly sixty percent of the thirty-three "T" 
Force planes engaged in the attack operations.

This "T" Force attack was commenced at about sunset and completed 
well before the end of evening twilight. Although the number of planes 
involved was relatively small the attack was carried out by the three 
independent attack units over an unusually long period of time - about 
fourty-five minutes. In this connection it is of interest that the ten 
planes of the 708th Attack Unit took thirty-two minutes between the time 
the first plane dropped its torpedo and the last plane completed its attak.* 
There appears to have been no over-all attack commander and no 
coordination. This was at variance with the basic instructions issued 
for the SHO Operations which directed that "once the enemy is sighted, 
the airplanes will attack simultaneously."** These same instructions 
also directed that attack units would depart the rendezvous point (in 
this attack the rendezvous point was Miyako Jima) together and "complete 
the closing of the formation on the way to the attack."***

Why the attack was not made in accordance with the sound instruc-
tions of CINC, Combined Fleet is not known. While the weather existing 
in the area (there were rain squalls present) may have increased the dif-
ficulty of making a well timed, concentrated attack, it is obvious that 
there were no plans for such an attack. As a result, in part, of this 
lack of concentration, the attack group actually lost twenty planes to 
the combined anti-aircraft fire of TF 36 and the fighter CAP, although 
CTF 38 thought that he had destroyed seventeen.

It seems probable that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received 
flash radio reports from the surviving aircraft soon after 1900. How-
ever, it was after 2000 before he was able to receive interrogation

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* Detailed Action Report No. 9, 706th Attack Unit, Night Torpedo 
Attack on Enemy Task Force off Formosa, October 13th, 1944, 
WUC Document 160579.

** Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 86, Air Combat Regulations for 
SHO Operations, Paragraph II C2b, ATIS Document No. 39, Part VIII, 
June 4th, 1944 (Nachi Document).

*** Ibid, Paragraph II C2a.
reports from the attack pilots themselves since the first attack plane to return landed at Pahac at that time.

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force now re-estimated the situation. He had reason to believe that the "T" Force had inflicted substantial damage on TF 38 in its dusk attack of the preceding day; he had hoped that the "T" Force attacks now underway were being equally effective, but since the "T" Force attack unit was much smaller than the unit which had attacked on the previous day (43 vs 121) he could not expect great results; he knew that TF 38 despite the attacks of October 12th was still very powerful for he had not only observed that day's attacks on Formosa, but he had learned that Formosa had been struck by a total of 600 planes - exactly the same number that had attacked on the 12th - he therefore realized that additional attacks in strength were necessary if he was to destroy the combat ability of TF 38.

He examined his own air resources available. He knew, as has been pointed out earlier, that he would have on the morrow (October 14th) in south Kyushu 250 planes from the SEVENTH Base Air Force and 172 planes from CARDIV's THREE and FOUR - a total of 422 planes, additional to a small number of "T" Force planes remaining there. He decided to launch all of these planes in a general attack on TF 38 and immediately at 1923 issued orders to make the decision effective, which orders directed:

"1. The SIXTH Base Air Force will destroy the enemy task force east of Formosa today and tomorrow.

"2. The "T" Force will operate as previously directed (the "T" Force was to make a dusk attack as on October 12th and 13th).

"3. The FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla and the planes of CARDIV's THREE and FOUR, all under the unified command of the senior group commander, will depart early tomorrow, will stage at Okinawa and will attack TF 38 at about 1600 after which they will land at Formosa at about 1700."

This decision of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was sound, but it was not complete in that (a) it did not provide for a coordinated attack with the SIXTH Base Air Force planes which included Army planes, now in Formosa, and (b) it did not, in addition, provide for coordination with the attacks to be launched from the Philippines by Commander SIXTH Base

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**Detailed Action Report No. 2, 703rd Attack Unit, Night Torpedo Attack on Enemy Task Force off Formosa, October 13th, 1944, WDC Document 161445.**

**Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 131923, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, War Diary Kanoya Detachment, October 13th-31st, 1944, WDC Document 160258, NA 12592.**
Air Force and by CG FOURTH Air Army. This indicates that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had either not thought of such coordination, or had un-successfully requested such coordination thru Cinc, Combined Fleet. There is nothing in the record to indicate the latter.

At noted, the first “I” Force attack planes landed at Takao at 2000 and shortly thereafter Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned the detailed claims of the pilots involved in the attack. How much credence he put in them is not known. They must have appeared extremely optimistic to him. Even though he had had no previous experience directing land-based aircraft in combat and had no properly organized intelligence staff with him on Formosa, he was aware of the lack of success Japanese air units had experienced in previous attacks against the Allied carrier force particularly on the Marinas in June 1944. In addition, it is not improbable that he knew that the Navy General Staff had reduced the “I” Force claims of the previous night from four ships, presumably carriers, sunk and six others set afire, to two ships sunk and two receiving medium damage. Whether or not he now applied a similar factor to the latest “I” Force claims is not known, but even if he did so the attack would have appeared to have been very successful and would have indicated a further reduction in the carrier strength of TF 38.

At about this same time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force probably learned from Commander FOURTEENTH Combined Air Group that Army heavy bombers were landing at Tainan for refueling. These were a part of the 170 plane attack group which had departed from the Philippines at 1315. This group had encountered bad weather and had not attacked. Most of the planes returned to Philippines bases; a few were landing on Formosa.

At about 2100 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received a dispatch from Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla wherein that commander indicated bases on Formosa which would be used by aircraft units after the general attack on the following day and also requested that these bases be prepared to service these aircraft so that further attacks could be made.

At about 2130, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla’s plan for the general offensive. This

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* Merit Report 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012.
* Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 5-E, JS-104.
* Commander 51st Air Flotilla Dispatch 132022, October 1944 to Commander 51st Air Flotilla and Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160258.
* Commander 51st Air Flotilla Dispatch 132050, October 1944 to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160258.
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plan indicated that some 444 aircraft would be involved in the attack de-
parting from Kyushu at 0600, staging through Okinawa, and landing on For-
mosa after the attack.

At about 2020 he also received Commander "T" Force's plan for another
dusk attack on the 14th. This plan stated that the entire remaining
strength of the "T" Force on Kyushu would stand by after 0800 the follow-
ing morning to destroy the remnants of the enemy task forces.

Throughout the remainder of the evening, Commander SIXTH Base Air
Force, having already issued his orders for operations on the next day,
considered further the conflicting reports of damage already inflicted.
It is very possible that he consulted with Cinc, Combined Fleet on this
subject. At about midnight he received a further evaluation of the first
"T" Force attack of the previous night in which the Chief of Staff, Com-
bined Fleet now estimated that more than six ships had been sunk or set
afire.** This was considerably more than the Naval General Staff had
evaluated that morning and could be stretched to match the original pilots' reports. What Commander SIXTH Base Air Force actually believed had been accomplished is not known but it seems probable that, since the attacks
so far had been conducted by his specially trained and experienced "T"
Force, he had considerable faith in his pilots' reports and believed
that he was inflicting very serious damage on TF 38.

(2) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force

October 13th.

As on the previous day, Commander FIFTH Base Air Force
continued to operate in cooperation with Co FOURTH Air Army. As has been
noted, he had received an order from his superior, Commander Southwest
Area Force, on the previous day to destroy the enemy task force employing
his full strength*** but had been unable to attack because his air units
could not be readied.**** Presumably he launched searches on the morning
of October 13th. His planes made no contacts for TF 38 was not operating
in the area of his searches. It is logical to assume, however, that he
was informed of the contacts made by planes of SIXTH Base Air Force and
also of the continuing Allied attack on Formosa. The contacts indicated
that the enemy was still operating in an area approximately 240 miles
north of Aparri.

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* Commander "T" Force Dispatch 132143, October 1944 ("T" Attack
** CofS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 132333, October 1944 to Commander
FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH Base Air Force, etc., WDC Document 161055.
*** Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 121233, to Commanders THIRD and
**** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944,
Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947,
Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS 104.

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During the morning, while closely observing the situation off Formosa, he completed plans for an attack in cooperation with Army air units of the FOURTH Air Army. At 1315 this combined attack group, totalling 140 aircraft, departed from Clark Field bases to destroy the enemy task force. What part of this group were his own aircraft is not known. Thereafter he awaited the results of this attack. Presumably his orders were similar to those of CG FOURTH Air Army which directed the attack planes to land on Formosa, Manusai Shoto or northern Luzon for refueling prior to returning to the Manila area. If they went on to Formosa or Manusai Shoto there might be a delay before he could learn the scope of their success.

Whether or not Commander FIFTH Base Air Force was informed of the plans for a dusk attack to be executed by the "T" Force is also not known. There is no indication that any action was taken by any commander to coordinate these two attacks. It may have been felt that, since the attack group from the Philippines should reach the attack area some 500 miles from their bases more than an hour before sunset, they would not conflict with the "T" Force dusk attack.

Sometime in the late afternoon or early evening some of the attack planes returned to the Clark Field area and Commander FIFTH Base Air Force learned that they had encountered bad weather and been unable to attack. Others of the attack group landed on Formosa. Thus, for the second day, Commander FIFTH Base Air Force had failed to execute an attack. The remainder of the night was spent in reassembling aircraft which had landed at other than normal bases after the abortive attack in order to be ready to attack on the 14th.

(d) Operations of CG FOURTH Air Army, October 14th.

Operations of CG FOURTH Air Army were similar to those of FIFTH Base Air Force. He presumably launched morning short-range patrols and readied his command to attack. At CG's from his headquarters at Manila he issued orders to his air units - SIXTEENTH and TWENTY-SECOND Air Brigades of the SECOND Air Division - to attack in cooperation with the FIFTH Base Air Force the enemy task force operating east of Formosa and then to land on Formosa, Manusai Shoto or northern Luzon. After refueling they were to return as soon as possible to their original bases. As noted under FIFTH Base Air Force this combined Army-Navy air attack was launched at 1315 but owing to bad weather failed to locate the enemy. No other action was taken by CG FOURTH Air Army on this day.

* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japan Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 3-5, 32-194.
** Merit Report 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 16th-17th, 1944, WAC Document 181C12.
*** FOURTH Air Army Operations Order A-483, October 13th, 1944, contained in File of Lieutenant Colonel Kenzo Sato, I.A, Staff Officer FOURTH Air Army, Department of the Army Historical Division, Microfilm H-7.
(3) Operations on October 14th.

(a) Operations of CINC, Combined Fleet

CINC, Combined Fleet took no important action during
the remainder of the night of October 13th-14th. He appears to have
been highly satisfied with the performance of his air forces to date,
and with the success of his operations. To have hit thirteen ships,
mostly carriers, was a vast improvement over the performances of his
air force in the Marianas and gave promise of greater future success.
as his pilots became battle tested, and as the power of TF 38 necessarily
decreased under the successful attacks of his aircraft.

He now awaited reports of his search planes which had departed from
Garang Bi, Shinchiku, Okinawa and from Philippine bases. He was inter-
ested, of course, in learning what these search planes might discover of
the enemy. Had they actually retired? If not, where were the various
task groups located and what was the composition of each task group,
particularly in carriers?

He knew, of course, that the SIXTH Base Air Force was this day
launching a renewed air offensive from Kyushu against enemy Allied forces
discovered; that this offensive was to employ many more planes (probably
450 planes) than had the attacks on previous days; that it was to de-
part at 0600; was to stage through Okinawa fields; was to attack during
the afternoon and then was to land on Formosa at designated air bases.
He also knew that the "T" Force was making a dusk attack from Kyushu
bases also landing on Formosa.

At about 0715 the first of some 250 Allied carrier planes struck
Formosa. This was a single strike ordered by CTF 38 to cover the re-
tirement of the cruiser CANIBAL which had been torpedoed by a Japanese
air torpedo the previous evening. It is of interest that the Japanese
estimate of the number of carrier planes was almost exactly correct
since 246 planes had been launched by TF 38. If CINC, Combined Fleet
had wondered whether or not the attacks had forced the enemy carrier
force to withdraw during the night he now knew that they had not withdrawn
and that the attacks as planned for that day would find suitable targets.
He also knew, since he was present, that Shinchiku Air Base had been
heavily hit with damage as follows: barracks half destroyed, all
hangars unusable, torpedo maintenance shop damaged although torpedoes
could still be properly maintained there. On the other hand his pilots
at Shinchiku had shot down fifteen Allied fighters. Since TF 36 had
lost but fourteen planes over all Formosa those claims were obviously

* Ydit Report 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October
10th-17th, 1944. NDC Document 161612 NA 12275.

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excessive although CINC, Combined Fleet could not know it.*

He received contact reports as follows:

(a) About 0420 - by a Taiwan search plane - contact at 0750 on a carrier task group on course south in latitude 23°-15'N, longitude 123°-16' E.*

(b) About 0850 - by a Shinchiku search plane - an unidentified contact.*

(c) About 0900 - (1) by a search plane from Taiwan - contact at 0440 on a second carrier group on course southeast in latitude 21°-25'N, longitude 112°-50'E.** (2) by a RDF fix from Kureya at 0729 in latitude 22°-30'N, longitude 122°-00'E.***

Also at about this time CINC, Combined Fleet probably received a report from Commander FIFTH Zone Air Force that Aparri in northern Luzon had been hit by approximately twenty-four fighters at 0520. This must have been somewhat of a surprise to him as the contact reports received that morning had indicated a minimum of two carrier task groups off Formosa, and now here, most likely in view of the 0729 RDF fix was a third carrier group. He couldn't be sure as Aparri had, after all, only been hit by fighters which could have come from the carriers off Formosa, but, since the distance was about 300 miles, this was doubtful.

At about 1100 he received a contact report from one of the Shinchiku search planes that at 1055 it had contacted two enemy surface ships in latitude 19°-36'N, longitude 122°-38'E.****

Between 1240 and 1330 he received word that a total of about one hundred B-29's from China bases had attacked in the Taiwan-Takao area, inflicting heavy damage on the airfields and air matériel depots.*****

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* Commander Shinchiku AIR Base Dispatch 142113, October 1944 to Authorized Ships, WDC Document 160579.
** Detailed Action Report No. 9, 708th Attack Unit Night Torpedo Attack on Enemy Task Force off Formosa, October 14th, 1944, WDC Document 160579 NA 12276.
*** Ibid, No. 5.
**** Staff Officer 51st Air Flotilla Dispatch 140832, October 1944, WDC Document 160258 NA 12922.
***** Detailed Action Report No. 6, 708th Attack Unit, Searches and Patrols of "Pig" Sector, October 1st-17th, 1944, WDC Document 160579 NA 12297.

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Since this strike had been forecast by intelligence gained on October 4th which intelligence had predicted, (a) that Allied carriers would strike Formosa, (b) that the FOURTEENTH and TWELFTH Air Forces based in China would participate by striking either Formosa, Okinawa or Kyushu or perhaps all three, and (c) that these strikes were designed to isolate the Philippines, it seems correct to say that CINC Combined Fleet should have viewed this strike with far more than passing interest. There is nothing available to this study which indicates what consideration he actually gave it. However, the fact that it hit Formosa at the same time as the carrier strikes certainly proved the accuracy of Japanese intelligence, and gave strong indications that the concept that these strikes were designed to isolate the Philippines was most likely true. But why should the Allies endeavor to isolate the Philippines at this time? Does not the answer support itself — "to safeguard an amphibious landing," and had not the CNO plan been prepared to prevent such a landing? Therefore, should not the Allied capability of making very shortly an amphibious landing somewhere in the Philippines have been given serious study by CINC Combined Fleet? But since CINC Combined Fleet had committed his surface forces to the destruction of TF 38 and had gambled his whole air force, including carrier aircraft on this objective, it seems probable that he did not give the matter the consideration it deserved.

At about 1245 he received a dispatch which his Chief of Staff at Hisaikai had originated at 1215 wherein that officer directed the Commander SECOND Striking Force with CRUDES TWENTY-FOUR and DESTROYER ONE to expedite preparations, and when ready, to sortie immediately to the waters east of Formosa and there to take advantage of any favorable opportunity (a) to attack and destroy damaged enemy ships and (b) to rescue Japanese air crew.

It will be noted that this order was issued prior to the time that the general air offensive by Kyushu planes planned for later that day could be delivered. This was because his Chief of Staff at Hisaikai and the Naval General Staff in Tokyo obviously believed (a) that this air strike would be highly effective against TF 38 and therefore, to obtain the maximum result, it would be wise to have a light striking force of surface units near the objective area - the objective area was roughly 700 miles from Kujo Suide which striking force would be available to knock off "ripples" during darkness and (b) that TF 38 had been forced to retire. They believed this because, in the air strikes of the 12th and 13th, Formosa had been hit from early morning until early afternoon by as many as 600 carrier planes. Now Formosa had not been hit by but one air strike of some 250 planes and since 0900 had not been attacked at all. The inference was obvious. Actually, TF 38

* CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 14216, October 1944 to All Fleet and Squadron Commanders Combined Fleet (CINC, Combined Fleet Deschord 349) WDC Document 161538.
had not been forced to retire, and in fact at this time was operating in its morning attack position. However, it is true that several hours later at 1135 to be exact, TG's 33.2 and 33.3 commenced retiring to fuel leaving TG 33.1 to cover the damaged CANBERRA. TG 33.4, since 2201 the previous evening, had been heading south to attack northern Luzon.

Why the Naval General Staff estimated that this day's daylight attack would be so effective as to warrant the dispatch of the above light surface force is not clear for as has been indicated previously, Japanese land-based aircraft had heretofore fared badly against Allied carrier task forces, and in most operations previous to KING II had been highly ineffective. That the Japanese were fully cognizant of this is plain for on August 10th the Chief of Staff, Mobile Force in a statement on Mobile Force operations in the SHO Operations had stated, "At first glance, because of our present lack of both material and maintenance equipment, our chances of success in air combat may appear slight when delivering a strong daylight blow against the enemy. However, it should be borne in mind that in mobile sea combat there will be many opportunities which can be used to advantage and when an air attack is to be launched at such an opportunity our entire air strength must be so concentrated and so directed that the enemy will be destroyed in one blow."

While this refers to Japanese carrier-based aircraft it seems equally applicable to Japanese land-based aircraft. Perhaps CinC, Combined Fleet's Chief of Staff and the Naval General Staff felt confident that the damage and destruction inflicted on TF 38 on the nights of October 12th and 13th had created the opportunity, and that TF 38 had been so weakened thereby as to be a much easier target than heretofore, although reports already received that day, indicated that there were still two and, possibly three, enemy carrier groups operating off Formosa. Perhaps also the very successful but erroneous results claimed by Shinkoku-based aircraft against Allied aircraft in the day air strikes on Shinkoku Air Base on October 12th, contributed to this feeling of confidence.

What CinC, Combined Fleet thought of this order is nowhere stated. However, since he had advised his Chief of Staff to be guided by the counsel of the Naval General Staff, he could believe that this order met with the approval of that staff. It is doubtful if it met with his own full approval, for, as a senior naval officer of long experience, he must have felt that it was unwise to dispatch a light surface force without adequate air cover to an area where it might be within


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range of a still powerful enemy carrier force. In this case, of course, some air cover would be provided by the land-based air forces. But land-based air cover was of very doubtful quality since direct communications between land-based air units and surface craft were at this time non-existent. In fact, in commenting in 1945 on the Marianas operations of June 1944, CinC, Combined Fleet stated, "Communications had not been developed to the stage where for instance, a surface unit could intercept or receive messages from land-based aircraft." Therefore the quality of air cover to be provided by land-based planes could be expected to be very low indeed. There seems to have been no improvement by the time of KING II.

On the other hand he was quite familiar with the fact that during battle, damaged ships often drift about without any particular support. For example, he most likely knew that at Midway the Japanese had left their damaged carriers behind with two destroyers to each carrier, and with no air cover whatsoever, and had done about the same thing with the heavy cruisers KAGAMI and MIKASA. He also most likely knew that the Americans at Midway had left the YORKTOWN with but one destroyer as cover.** The YORKTOWN was not provided with air cover, although it is doubtful if the lack of much air cover was known to the Japanese.

In view of this it is probable that he felt that since Commander SECOND Striking Force might find valuable targets to destroy — in fact there were reports that such damaged ships had already been observed*** — and since the weaknesses of communications were known to the Naval General Staff, this order was in the nature of a calculated risk and if acceptable to Tokyo it was acceptable to him. Certainly he did nothing at this time to indicate his disapproval.

At about 1613 CinC, Combined Fleet received a dispatch from Commander SIXTH Base Air Force advising the command that two days earlier (October 12th) he had placed the SEVENTH Base Air Force units in the Kyushu area under Commander FIFTY-THIRD Air Flotilla, and had ordered him to command all SIXTH Base Air Force (less "T" Force) units in Kyushu.****

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*** War Diary COMTHROFLT, October 14th, 1944, page 15; also Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
**** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 141613, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force; War Diary Kanoa Detachment 252nd Attack Unit, October 13th-31st, 1944, TDC Document 160258 NA 12592.
CinC, Combined Fleet did nothing unusual during the late afternoon except to await the results of the attack by the Kyushu-based planes scheduled for late afternoon. This attack was made in three attack waves, with general attack forces in the first two waves, and the "T" Force, including Army heavy bomber units in the third wave. Sometime before 1800 he evidently received the first reports from the first attack wave wherein the pilots claimed having damaged four carriers between 1510 and 1530. This attack wave had attacked TG 38.2 as a principal target. CTG 38.2 reported that, except for a light bomb hit at 1523 on the HANCOCK, which did but slight damage, the attack had failed. TG 38.3 was also attacked but except for a single plane which dropped a bomb near the LEXINGTON nothing was accomplished.*

The pilots also undoubtedly reported that the task group attacked was on a southeasterly course, and gave a position much to the eastward of the forenoon contacts.

It is possible that CinC, Combined Fleet received three additional contact reports, one, at about 1620 concerning a contact at 1300 on the enemy task force but apparently giving no location or composition; one at 1700, reporting a 1650 contact on an enemy task group consisting of ten ships including carriers, battleships and destroyers, but once again giving no location; and one, at 1720 reporting a 1650 contact on a second task group consisting of one large carrier, one escort carrier, one battleship and several destroyers with no location stated. Although it is probable that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew roughly the probable locations, since he should have known the areas being searched and the number of the planes in the various search lanes, it is not known whether or not he made this information available to CinC, Combined Fleet.

That CinC, Combined Fleet now decided that his Chief of Staff and the Naval General Staff were correct in their opinion that he had succeeded in defeating the enemy seems clear, for at 1800 he initiated a special dispatch to the Combined Fleet wherein he stated:

(a) The enemy task force, as a result of our attacks, is retiring in defeat.

(b) The Base Air Forces and the SECOND Striking Force will destroy the remaining enemy with all forces at their command.**

It is possible that prior to issuing this message CinC, Combined Fleet found occasion to regret the fact that he had transferred his

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* War Diary LEXINGTON, October 14th, 1944.
carrier air groups to the SIXTH Base Air Force. For it was obvious that the SECOND Striking Force was, by the very nature of the situation, restricted to a very secondary role. It was also obvious that what was now required to complete the annihilation of the enemy was carrier-based aircraft and this was no longer available.

At about 1902 he learned, in addition, that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had ordered the "T" Force and SIXTH Base Air Force units remaining in Kyushu and the SIXTH Base Air Force units on Formosa to carry out present attack operations against TF 38 on the following day, October 15th.**

At about 2035 he received an astonishing dispatch from his Chief of Staff wherein that officer advised all flag officers that the results of the "T" Force attacks on the nights of October 12th and 13th had been evaluated as:

(a) October 12th - Six to eight carriers sunk including three to four large carriers.
(b) October 13th - Three to five carriers sunk including two to three large carriers.

He advised further that, in addition to the above, other ships had been sunk or damaged, and that (today) October 14th, those attacks by the base air forces were being pressed both day and night.***

What CinC, Combined Fleet thought of this evaluation is nowhere stated in precise language. However, that he thought it considerably exaggerated seems very evident for not only were these claims in excess of anything that he had heard, even directly from the pilots, but, based on past performances, such a high degree of success was highly improbable. It inferred that nearly every carrier of TF 38 had been sunk or damaged. In this connection he stated later, "I did not blindly accept the reports of forces on the spot with regard to the results achieved in air operations. Both at that time, and subsequently, I sought to arrive at an accurate estimate as possible on the basis of various information. I was consequently aware that it was necessary

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* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 141902, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (Commander SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpOrd 53) FDCH Historical Division Microfilm unnumbered.
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 141902, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (Commander SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpOrd 54) FDCH Historical Division Microfilm unnumbered.
*** CofS Combined Fleet Dispatch 142003, October 1644 to All Flag Officers Combined Fleet: War Diary CRUDIV 7, WDC Document 161636.
to discount the Imperial General Headquarters' claims to a considerable extent.**

Does it not seem strange therefore that he accepted these obvious exaggerations without, at least, querying his Chief of Staff concerning them? For, despite the fact that they were exaggerations, they had been sent by his Chief of Staff to all of his flag officers as though they were correct. He had reason to believe, of course, that his Chief of Staff's message reported the evaluations of the Naval General Staff, but he did not know what the Naval General Staff was hoping to accomplish by providing his flag officers with such incorrect information. Could it have been that they desired to bolster the morale of the base air forces and the surface forces which, because of a lack of success in operations previous to KIWO II, had learned to have a lack of confidence, not only in their ability, but also in the claims of their airmen?

That other Japanese officers recognized the above "T" Force claims as exaggerated and did not accept them without reservations is plain for COMBATDIV ONE, upon receipt of the above evaluation wrote: "Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet has announced without change the previously estimated "T" Attack Force battle results. There are times when exaggeration is desirable in order to raise morale, but great caution should be exercised in order that men who are directing operations do not place undue reliance on battle reports and get carried away."**

Sometime after this Cinc, Combined Fleet learned that the major portion of the second attack wave of Kyushu planes had failed to locate the enemy. Why this was so is not entirely understood for the first wave, a small portion of the second wave and the third wave succeeded in locating TF 38, and delivering their attacks on schedule. The unit of the second wave which did attack attacked at 1708 and reported having damaged two cruisers.

The planes of these various attack waves did not return together to their numerous designated bases but returned in groups since they had attacked in groups.

Later during the early evening as the planes of the third attack wave landed on Formosa, Cinc, Combined Fleet received more information. The pilots reported having delivered their attack between 1836 and 2024 and claimed, sinking one CV, one CVL, one BB, one CA; probably sinking

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one CVE, one FF, two CL, and dumping one RP,* and sinking one CVF.**
These reports were very incorrect.

The principal damage done to TF 38 was done to TG 38.1 at 1241 when
a torpedo plane torpedoes the HOUSTON.*** In view of the fact that this
was a strong attack and may have appeared successful to the pilots, it
seems surprising that there is no reference to it in the Japanese reports.
It is presumed therefore that all of the attack group were shot down.
Naturally, CinC, Combined Fleet knew nothing about it.

It is not known what credence CinC, Combined Fleet gave to the
claims of the "7" Force pilots. Certainly the claims were very high
and might have been termed excessive even when viewed in the light
of the Naval General Staff's evaluation for October 12th and 13th.
However, he probably waited evaluations from Commander SIXTH Fase
Air Force as well as from his Chief of Staff at Hiyo.

CinC, Combined Fleet most likely wondered what success Commander
FIFTH Fase Air Force's large scale attack from the Philippines, sup-
posed to depart at 1430, had had against TF 38. Since this large
attack group had failed to depart its bases owing to inability to
complete preparations, CinC, Combined Fleet was probably informed of
this fact. Actually, a small group of ten planes finally took off on
schedule but not finding the enemy landed on Formosa. Sometime around
2220 CinC, Combined Fleet received Chief of Staff, FIRST Striking
Force's dispatch**** advising that the FIRST Striking Force was being
directed to complete battle preparations by evening of October 15th.
What effect, if any, this dispatch had on his mental processes is not
known. Whether he estimated that Commander FIRST Striking Force was
preparing for sea because the SECOND Striking Force had been ordered to
see or whether he estimated that Commander FIRST Striking Force was
preparing for a possible invasion of the Philippines is nowhere stated.
In either case it should have been pleasing to him that his forces in
the Lingga-Singapore area were prepared for any eventuality.

(l) Operations of Commander Mobile Force, October 14th

Commander Mobile Force during the morning of October
14th took no important action.

At about 1245 he received CinC, Combined Fleet's dispatch instruc-
tions directing Commander SECOND Striking Force to expedite preparations
and, when ready, to sortie immediately with CRU DIV TWENTY-ONE and DESRON
ONE to the waters east of Formosa and there to take advantage of any

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* Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shikata, IJN, Staff Officer,
SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army
Historical Division Microfilm H3-22, Item 3.
** Detailed Action Report 752nd Air Group Units, June 1944-January
1945, WDC Document 160364 NA 12357.
*** War Diary CG 38.1, October 1944.
**** Coffs, FIRST Striking Force Dispatch 142150, October 1944 to Coffs,
Combined Fleet, Coffs, Mobile Force, Coffs, SECOND Striking Force,
PATTIV L War Diary, WDC Document 161638.
favorable opportunity (a) to attack and destroy damaged enemy ships and
(b) to rescue Japanese air crews.*

There is no information available as to the reaction of Commander
Mobile Force to this dispatch. While such an operation had not been
provided for in the basic plans CinC, Combined Fleet had, on October
10th, alerted the SECOND Striking Force plus CAR SVG FOUR to sortie.
Likewise this dispatch of a part of the SECOND Striking Force to the
operating area did not preclude its joining up at a later time with the
remainder of the surface forces and operating in accordance with the
ShO plan, provided of course that it had not been destroyed in the
meantime; Commander Mobile Force realized that this splitting of his
SECOND Striking Force entailed additional planning for the employment
of his forces should ShO One or Two be activated.

As a consequence of the above considerations Commander Mobile Force
decided at 1412 to transfer those units of the SECOND Striking Force not
scheduled to sortie, viz:, DESRON ELEVEN, and DESRON'S FORTY-ONE
and SIXTY-ONE to the Main Force.** This was a sound decision since Commander
Mobile Force also commanded directly the Main Force. By transferring
these destroyers to that force he (a) thereby relieved Commander SECOND
Striking Force of the responsibility for their operations, which responsi-
sibilities might have had an adverse effect on his decisions while in
operations at sea against the enemy, (b) assumed direct command over-
then and thereby denied Commander SECOND Striking Force the opportunity
of ordering them to sea in support of his own operations should he con-
sider that necessary and (c) provided support forces such as plane
guards and AA defense for his Main Force should that one be ordered to
sea for whatever purpose.

(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force,
October 14th.

The FIRST Striking Force remained in the Lingga-
Singapore area and continued training and preparations for sortie.
Commander FIRST Striking Force maintained a running estimate of the
situation to the north and closely observed the Allied air successes as
reported by CinC, Combined Fleet, and the Japanese successes against
TF 38 also as reported by CinC, Combined Fleet.

At about 1345 he received CinC, Combined Fleet's dispatch direct-
ing the SECOND Striking Force, composed of CRUDY FORTY-ONE and

* CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 141216, October 1944 to All Fleet
and Squadron Commanders Combined Fleet (CinC, Combined Fleet
** Commander Mobile Force Dispatch 141412, October 1944 to Combined
DESERT ONE, to complete preparations immediately and then to sortie to the waters east of Formosa where it was to attack and destroy enemy damaged ships and to rescue downed aviators.*

Also about this time he received word of the bombing of Formosa by China-based B-29's.**

Since this followed the original Japanese intelligence reports which forecast that the Philippines would be isolated by Allied carrier attacks and by attacks by China-based B-29's and since he knew that Japanese estimates of the situation had forecast (a) that an amphibious landing might be expected in the southern Philippines during or after the last ten days in October, (b) that such a landing would be preceded by heavy air strikes in southern Kyushu, Nansei Shoto, Formosa and the Philippines, and (c) that a large enemy amphibious force had been reported in the Hollandia area on October 9th, but that since that date there had been no further reports, he was concerned lest an Allied landing follow these air strikes. He appears to have realized that the amphibious force observed on October 9th might well be at sea and since the distance from Hollandia to Mindanao was roughly but 1500 miles this force might attempt to land shortly. He also knew from the contact reports that despite the Japanese successes there were still many carriers within TF 38.

Sometime before 1600 he directed the AKISHIMO and the HAYASHI to proceed to Manila for the purpose of transporting the Headquarters of the THIRTY-FIRST Army from Manila to Saigon. As a consequence of this order those destroyers departed Singapore for Manila at 1600.***

At about 1940 he received a dispatch from CINC, Combined Fleet reporting that the enemy task forces, as a result of the Japanese air attacks, were retiring in defeat, and directing the Base Air Force and the SECOND Striking Force to destroy the enemy with all forces at their command.****

At about 2030 he received a dispatch from the CINC, Combined Fleet stating that as a result of the "m" Force attacks on the nights of October 12th and 13th a total of nine to thirteen Allied carriers had

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* CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 141218, October 1944 to All Fleet and Squadron Commanders Combined Fleet (CINC, Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 348) WDC Document 161638.

** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File 8-5, JS-104.

*** War Diary AKISHIMO, October 14th, 1944, WDC Document 161638.

**** CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 141808, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH, SIXTH and SEVENTH Air Fleets and Commander SECOND Striking Force (CINC, Combined Fleet Special DesOpOrd 8) WDC Document 161005.
been sunk, and that other enemy ships had been damaged.*

He does not appear to have believed the claims set forth in the above dispatch, nor did he believe that the Allied carriers were retiring because of Japanese air attacks for he stated in his action report that, despite all of these and other claims, he had decided that an invasion of the Philippines was inevitable and therefore had discontinued the training operations he had been pursuing.**

Whether this was a hindsight decision since his action report was dated December 1st, 1944, or whether it is a fact that he, alone of all Japanese senior commanders connected with this operation, correctly evaluated the Allied plans and the Japanese and Allied claims is not known. However, it is known that he had decided that his command was likely to be called on, possibly at once, and that he should be prepared for battle for at 2250 his Chief of Staff advised the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff, Mobile Force, Chief of Staff, SECOND Striking Force and Imperial General Headquarters as follows:

"(1) With the exception of the ships indicated below, the FIRST Striking Force has completed battle preparations and is standing by at Lingga. All ships at Lingga are expected to complete fueling by evening, October 15th.

(a) Ships in drydock: NOSHIRO (undocks October 16th), ISOKAZE (undocks October 15th).

(b) CRUDIV SIXTEEN will complete installation of radar gear at Singapore on October 15th. AG0A is scheduled to enter drydock for propeller repair from October 16th-19th (she can make thirty knots in her present condition). DESRON TWO (HAYASHIMO, AKISHIMO) are on route Manila."***

This was an intelligent dispatch in that it correctly advised the several force commanders as to the battle readiness of his command.

(2) Operations of Commander Main Force, October 14th.

Commander Main Force during October 14th took no important action. However, at 1412, his command was increased by the

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* Cofs, Combined Fleet Dispatch 142000, October 1944 to All Flag Officers Combined Fleet; War Diary CRUDIV 7, WDC Document 161636.
*** Chief of Staff, FIRST Striking Force Dispatch 142250, October 1944; War Diary BATDIV 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638.
addition of DESRON ELEVEN and DESDIV's FORTY-ONE and SIXTY-ONE. All five ships of DESRON ELEVEN (TAMA (CL), SUGI, MOMI, KASHI, KAYA, HINOKI) were at sea en route Iwakuni except the TAMA which was already at Iwakuni and the SUGI which was at Kure. Of the two destroyers of DESRON FORTY-ONE, one - the FUYUTSUKI - was at Kure, the other was at sea en route Kagoshima. Of the four destroyers of DESDIV SIXTY-ONE (HATSUZUKI, WAKATSUKI, AKITSUKI, SUZUITSUKI), two were at sea in the Inland Sea; the third - the AKITSUKI - was at Kure; the fourth - the SUZUITSUKI - was at Oita. He now commanded CARDIV's ONE, THREE and FOUR, DESRON ELEVEN, DESDIV's FORTY-ONE and SIXTY-ONE, and the light cruiser KYODO which was at Oita.

(3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, October 14th.

During the forenoon of October 14th, Commander SECOND Striking Force continued his preparations for possible sortie and combat operations.

At about 1246 he received dispatch orders from CinC, Combined Fleet directing him as follows:

"Immediately upon completion of preparations the SECOND Striking Force (CRODIV TWENTY-ONE and DESRON ONE) will sortie to the waters east of Formosa and will take advantage of any favorable opportunity to attack and destroy damaged enemy ships, and to rescue Japanese air crews."

Commander SECOND Striking Force now estimated the situation. He realized that the two basic units of the Striking Force were separated; that is, DESRON ONE was, for the large part, at Kure, whereas CRODIV TWENTY-ONE was at Iwakuni. He decided that it would be wise to concentrate these two units at Iwakuni. Therefore, at 1332 he directed COMDESRON ONE "to concentrate at Iwakuni.

** Commander Mobile Force Dispatch 141412, October 1944 to Combined Fleet, Mobile Force (Mobile Force DesOpOrd 56); War Diary DESRON 11, WDC Document 161715.
*** War Diary DESRON 11, October 1944, WDC Document 161715 NA 12712.
**** War Diary DESRON 10, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739; also Tabular Records of Movements of Destroyers, WDC Documents 160620 and 160621 NA 11790.
***** War Diary KYODO, October 1944, WDC Document 161636 NA 11973.
****** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 141216, October 1944 to All Fleet and Squadron Commanders, Combined Fleet; War Diary DESRON 1, October 1st-31st 1944 (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 348) WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
******* Commander SECOND Striking Force Dispatch 141332, October 1944 to COMDESRON 1, War Diary DESRON 1, October 1st-31st, 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
As a consequence of these instructions, received by CO, DESRON ONE at 1600, CO, DESDIV SEVEN with DESDIV SEVEN and the SHIRANUI departed Kure at 1630 and CO, DESRON ONE in the ARADUNA departed Kure at 1700 and proceeded to Iwakuni where they arrived at 1915. Meanwhile, DESDIV TWENTY-ONE and the KASUMI remained at Kure where they expedited readiness for sea.

Soon after the arrival of CO, DESRON ONE at Iwakuni Commander SECOND Striking Force at 2000 held a conference on the projected operations. Although no information is available concerning this conference it appears that among other items it was concerned with the time of sortie which was affected in part (a) by the difficulty of transiting Bungo Suido during darkness, (b) by the probable time of completion of DESDIV TWENTY-ONE’s overhaul since the three destroyers of that DESDIV composed a large portion of his destroyer force (three out of seven destroyers) and (c) by the possible fact that the Japanese knew that Allied submarines normally operated on the surface at night and were, therefore, more dangerous to Japanese operations at that time than during daylight when Japanese air power generally forced them to submerge. He decided to depart from Iwakuni at 2400, October 14th, and to pass through Bungo Suido at 0700, October 15th.

The long delay in the Navy Yard at Kure required to complete the KASUMI (the KASUMI departed Kure at 2200), the still longer delay required to complete DESDIV TWENTY-ONE (0330 October 15th), and the drydocking of the HATSUSHIYO (she undocked at 0300 October 14th), plainly indicates that CINC, Combined Fleet’s sortie order came as a surprise to Commander SECOND Striking Force. Apparently that commander had arrived at the opinion that there was to be no sortie, for his command was clearly far from ready. It would seem as if (a) CINC, Combined Fleet’s order of 1204 October 10th to activate SHO One and SHO Two for the base air forces only, (b) CINC, Combined Fleet’s order of 2117, October 11th to cancel the sortie alert for the SECOND Striking Force and CAR DIV FOUR (loss air units) and (c) the reported great success of the base air forces to date had influenced that commander to the erroneous conclusion that time was not particularly important and, therefore, he had continued with routine operations, including drydocking of ships.

It seems clear that CINC, Combined Fleet, who was fully familiar with the dangers of night piloting in Bungo Suido and was familiar also with the operating techniques of Allied submarines, expected

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* War Diary DESRON 1, October 1st-31st, 1944, NAC Document 101838, NA 11739.
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Commander SECOND Striking Force to sortie without delay, and without consideration of the adverse factors above referred to. Since the destruction of Allied damaged ships, and the recovery of downed Japanese pilots were the objectives sought by CinC, Combined Fleet, does it not seem correct that in the present situation time was an essential component in the accomplishment of those objectives? A delay of approximately eleven hours between the receipt of CinC, Combined Fleet's original order and the projected time of sortie from Iwakuni seems excessive indeed.

(c) Operations of the Base Air Forces, October 14th.

(1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, having the evening before issued his orders for operations on the 14th, took no further action prior to the launching of his morning searches.

At about 0005 he received CinC, Combined Fleet's dispatch wherein that commander stated that he considered that the first "T" Force attack made at dusk on October 12th had succeeded in sinking or damaging more than six ships.

It is clear that at sometime before 0149 he received word that one of the Allied pilots shot down, presumably the previous day, had given considerable information concerning the composition and contemplated movement of TF 38 off Formosa for, at 0149, his Chief of Staff sent a dispatch to the FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla in particular since that command was launching a large general offensive that day, and to other units of the SIXTH Base Air Force in general, advising them:

(a) Of the two enemy carrier groups which had been sighted the previous afternoon by the ELEVENTH Reconnaissance Unit; the first group including one large and two medium carriers and the second group including two large and two medium carriers, all of which he termed "fleet" carriers.

(b) That a prisoner of war, a pilot from the WASP, had reported that the naval forces east of Formosa consisted at that time of about nine fleet carriers, about twenty-five replacement carriers, six battleships, about twenty cruisers and fifty destroyers; that this

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force was at present cruising in position bearing 13^0_1(T), distant 180 miles from Takao (this was questioned) with a separately operating supply force and that the Allies planned to continue these attacks for several more days.*

In view of the pertinence of the above dispatch it seems wise, at this point, to analyze its substance.

(1) There were at this time in TF 38 exactly nine large carriers (CV), and eight light carriers (CVL) instead of nine fleet carriers; there were exactly six battleships; there were fourteen instead of twenty cruisers and fifty-eight instead of fifty destroyers. However, the total number of cruisers and destroyers reported was almost exactly correct, there being seventy-two instead of seventy.

(2) The figure of twenty-five replacement carriers (CVE) was approximately correct for the total number of replacement carriers, available in the Pacific since there were twenty-one escort carriers assigned as carrier transports. However, it was quite incorrect as regards replacement carriers supplying TF 38 at this time inasmuch as there were but four escort carriers assigned to this duty. There were in addition three escort carriers which were employed as escorts for the fueling group to which the above four replacement carriers were attached.

(3) Since the information divulged was almost exactly correct as regards the battleships, cruisers and destroyers within TF 38 it seems likely that the pilot gave the correct number of aircraft carriers there as well. Thus, instead of giving nine fleet carriers it seems probable that he gave nine large carriers, which was the right figure, and that the interrogators confused this to mean nine fleet carriers. This would account for the absence of any light carriers (CVL) in the basic dispatch. What then happened to the light carriers? Does it not seem probable that these were included by the interrogators with the replacement carriers?

(4) The information was incorrect (a) as regards location, since TF 38 was operating some ninety miles to the northward of the reported position. This fact was known to the Japanese and it was for that reason that the Chief of Staff SIXTH Base Air Force questioned the location in his dispatch, and (b) as regards continuing the operations against Formosa for several days more as the plan called for discontinuing the operations after the air strikes scheduled for October 13th.

At this time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force likely recalled the intelligence dispatch from Imperial General Headquarters issued on October 11th which stated that TF 38 consisted in part of eight large carriers and eight cruiser-carriers, a sum total of sixteen fleet carriers. He could now observe that there was a difference of seven carriers between the CinC's intelligence estimate and the prisoner-of-war's statement. From this he may have concluded that his pilots' claims of damage inflicted on TF 38 on the two days of October 12th and 13th were reasonably accurate.

At 0553 the first search plane, a two-engine land bomber took off from Taishan. This was followed at 0620 by a second plane. Both of these aircraft were from the Taain Air Group. They were to search the following line: Miyako to Ishigaki to Ishigaki, thence return to Ishigaki flying a track sixty miles to the east of the southbound track, thence fly forty miles to the east and return south on a course of 212°(T) for 250 miles, thence return to Caran B1. The first plane was to commence this search from Miyako at 0800 to be followed by the second one hour later.

At about this same time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew that some of the units of Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla's general attack force were already leaving bases in southern Kyushu for their staging base at Okinawa.

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* Merit Report, 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012.
** Commander 14th Combined Air Group Dispatch 161023, October 1944 to 14th Combined Group (14th Combined Group DesUpOrd 129) WDC Document 161422.
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At 0630 Commander TWENTY-FlhST Air Flotilla at Shinchiku launched his morning search. Four land attack planes were to cover the sector 119°-153°E to a distance of 600 miles. One land reconnaissance plane was to cover the adjacent sector 069°-105°W to a distance of 200 miles.** These aircraft were from the 709th Attack Unit detachment at Shinchiku.**

At about 0730 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that fighters of the Tainan Air Group were engaging enemy carrier planes over Tainan and Kozan.***

Between 0800 and 0900 he received several reports of enemy air attacks on Formosa, and some information concerning the location of TF 38. He learned that (a) Tainan Air Group had engaged one hundred enemy planes (b) the air groups at Takao and Talohn had each reported that their bases were under attack by forty-fifty enemy aircraft,*** and (c) Shinchiku in the north was being attacked by about fifty aircraft.**** All in all he learned that about 250 enemy aircraft had attacked his Formosa bases.***** This was a correct report for TF 38 had launched 246 aircraft to attack Formosa.******

During the same period, at about 0820, he received the first contact report of the day. This report stated that at 0750 an enemy carrier task group had been sighted at Latitude 25°-15'N, Longitude 129°-15'E on course south.******* He received additional contact reports as follows: (a) At about 0820 from a Shinchiku search plane that it had made a contact.** The data available does not indicate what was sighted or the position. This was probably a submarine sighting since at 0747 the Allied submarine SILVERSTREAK had reported sighting a land...

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* Shinchiku Air Base Dispatch 132537, October 1944 to Western Attack Force PF62, TDC Document 160579.
** Detailed Action Report No. 8, 708th Attack Unit, Searches and Patrols 'P's' (Shinchiku) Sector October 1st-17th, 1944, TDC Document 160579.
*** Merit Report 4th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, TDC Document 161052.
**** Shinchiku Air Base Summary Dispatch 14213 to Authorized Ships, TDC Document 160579.
***** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Decentralization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-2, JS-104.
****** Action Reports Carriers of TF 38.
******* Detailed Action Report No. 9, 708th Attack Unit, Night Torpedo Attack on Enemy Task Force off Formosa, October 14th, 1944, TDC Document 160579.
attack plane on patrol in Latitude 24°46'N, Longitude 122°34'E. This position was in the sector assigned to the search plane and there were no Allied surface forces in that sector. No attack was made. (b) At about 0900 - (1) from a search plane that at 0840 a second task group had been sighted at Latitude 23°29'N, Longitude 122°56'W on course southeast, (2) from a dispatch originated by a staff officer, FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla reporting that an RDF fix had been obtained at 0728 on what was believed to be an enemy task force at Latitude 22°40'N, Longitude 122°56'W.

The two contact reports on task groups were apparently made by the two enemy land bombers which were searching for task groups. The 0740 position was actually about fifteen miles east of the most northerly group of TF 38; the 0850 position was about twelve miles north of the same group.

At 0900 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew that Commander THIRTY- FIFTH Air Flotilla was launching his search. This search was to cover the sector 175°21' N to a distance of 600 miles between bearings 175° and 206°N and 840 miles for the remainder of the sector. This search was launched so late is not known. At about the same time the first phase of the general air offensive presumably commenced.

The plan of Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla for the general attack consisted of an attack in two waves. Each wave in turn was composed of a reconnaissance unit, a fighter unit, a bomber unit and a torpedo unit. With the exception of the torpedo unit of the first wave, all aircraft were to stage through Okinawa. This torpedo unit was to attack direct from Konya presumably joining the other units of the first wave over Okinawa. All units, staging through Okinawa were scheduled to depart their bases in southern Kyushu between 0800 and 0930. The first attack group was scheduled to depart Okinawa at 1200; the second at 1400. All aircraft were to land on Formosa after the attack. The air strength allocated to each attack group follows:

* Detailed Action Report No. 3, 703rd Attack Unit, Night Torpedo Attack on Enemy Task Force off Formosa, October 14th, 1944, WDC Document 10057A.
* Staff Officer, 51st Air Flotilla, Dispatch 140832 to all Flying Units of the General Attack Force, WDC Document 10058A.
* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 151811, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpOrd 45) WDC Document 10139A.
* War Diary 51st Air Flotilla, Air Attack Plan October 14th, 1944 (51st Air Flotilla Operations Order 1) WDC Document 16164A.
(a) First Attack Group, fourteen reconnaissance planes, eighty-eight fighter planes, fifty-one bombing planes and twenty-four torpedo planes - a total of 177 planes.

(b) Second Attack Group, twenty reconnaissance planes, 133 fighter planes, fifty-six bombing planes and sixty-one torpedo planes - a total of 267 planes.

Thus, he had a total of 444 planes engaged in this attack operation.

At about 0900, the exact time being unavailable, the reconnaissance unit of the first attack group departed from Okinawa. This unit actually numbered twelve reconnaissance aircraft* and was ordered to cover the sector 130°-245°(T) from Okinawa. The radius of each search sector was 300 miles except between bearings 210°(T) and 230°(T) where the radius was 400 miles.** This search was dense, being based on a fifteen mile range of visibility and, in conjunction with the searches from Shinchiku and Saran Bi, covered the probable area of operations of TF 38. Why it was not coordinated with the search of Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla which departed Okinawa at about the same time and covered some of the same area is not known. Possibly it was due to difficulty in communications between aircraft of different commands, but proper coordination could have increased the area covered or reduced the number of aircraft required for search.

At about this same time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that Aparri had been attacked by Allied carrier aircraft. What his reaction was to this attack is not known. He had received two contact reports already which indicated that two task groups of the enemy force were about 500 miles north of Aparri. Perhaps he decided that this was a long-range air strike from these two task groups; perhaps he thought that the strike had come from the third group further to the south whose presence had been indicated by the 0720 RDF report from Kancya. His information was incomplete and inconclusive and since it did not specify the number of carriers sighted, he could not determine with certainty whether or not all Allied carriers still believed to be afloat were accounted for.

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* Memorandum Notes of Captain Sunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer
** Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the
*** Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item 8.
**** War Diary 51at Air Flotilla, Air Attack Plan, October 14th, 1944
     Appendix 2, WDC Document 161644.
As the morning progressed and no further reports of enemy air activity over Formosa were received after about 0930, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force likely decided that the Allied Task Force was retiring. From the reports of damage claimed by his pilots, he could readily decide that his attacking aircraft had forced the retirement of TF 38 and that this morning's strike had been in the nature of a defensive cover for that retirement. He knew that about noon his general attack would commence departure from Okinawa to be followed by a third attack by the "T" Force. Search planes were already out to locate targets for this attack. He may have believed that these attacks would succeed in accomplishing the accomplishment of his objective - the destruction of the enemy task force.

At about 1030 aircraft of the torpedo unit of the first wave of Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla's general attack took off from Kanoya. These were twenty land bombers armed with torpedoes of the 406th and 406th Attack Units.** They were to rendezvous with the main strength of the first wave over Okinawa.

At about 1125 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received his fourth contact of the day. A Shichibu search plane had reported sighting at 1055 in Latitude 19°-56'N, Longitude 122°-26'E, two enemy surface ships and had further reported that visibility in the sighting area was poor due to rain squalls.*** This search plane was one of the four which had departed Shichibu at 0630. This one had been ordered to cover the sector 143°-153°W but for reasons not known covered instead an irregular area to the east and southeast of Formosa.*** This contact was approximately 210 miles south of the position of the two groups previously sighted and definitely indicated that there was, in fact, a third task group to the south. This third task group was TF 38.4 which, at this time, was about twenty miles northeast of the position reported. It seems logical to assume that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force decided that this was the group which had attacked Aparri, since its position was but 110 miles northeast of that base. If he did so, he was correct, for at 0600 TF 38.4 had launched an attack of forty-eight VF against Aparri and Laucan.****

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 57-5, 41-104.
** Memorandum Notes of Captain Ezio Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer 3200 C Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm RS-22, Item B.
*** Detailed Action Report No. 6, 708th Attack Unit, 762nd Air Group, Searches and Patrols in the (Shichibu) Sector, October 1st-17th, 1944, 706 Document 1606-8.
**** War Diary CT- 38.4, October 14th, 1944.
From his contact reports Commander SIXTH Base Air Force could plainly see that the Allied carrier task groups were not concentrated but were, instead, widely separated - that is, there were two groups which were together off Formosa, and one group some 210 miles to the south of these two groups. He could also plainly see that this separation precluded attacks being made by his SIXTH Base Air Force on the southern groups since that force had been oriented towards the northern groups. He probably felt that this was not an unmixed blessing since it would reduce the opposition his attack groups would encounter and would thereby facilitate the accomplishment of their objectives. The question probably arose as to what he should do about the southern group. He correctly decided to do nothing since that group was well within range of the FIFTH Base Air Force and was a suitable target for that command.

At 1200 six aircraft of the TWELFTH Reconnaissance Unit, and between 1215 and 1330 six two-engine bombers, carrying flares, from the FOURTEENTH Reconnaissance Unit departed Fumousa to search for the enemy task force.* These aircraft were the search unit of the "T" Force attack group which, as noted earlier, was to be composed of all "T" Force planes remaining in southern Kyushu and was to make a dusk or night attack separate from that of Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla. No information is available as to the sectors searched.**

The six aircraft from the FOURTEENTH Reconnaissance Unit were directed to discontinue search at dusk and then perform the mission of direct cooperation,*** (pathfinding and attack control).

At about 1245 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that Cinc, Combined Fleet had ordered the sortie of the SEVENTH Striking Force to the waters east of Formosa to take advantage of opportunities (a) to destroy crippled which might result from the general air attacks on TF 38, and (b) to rescue Japanese air crews.**** This is the first indication of any attempt on the part of the Japanese in this operation to recover downed air personnel. What caused this special measure is not indicated, but it was very probably due to the high losses sustained by the "T" Force in its first two attacks. Since the "T" Force represented

** War Diary 12th Reconnaissance Unit Fumousa Detachment, October 12th-15th, 1944, WDC Document 160391.
*** 708th Attack Unit Operations Plan, October 14th, 1944, WDC Document 160397.
**** Cinc, Combined Fleet, Message 141216, October 14th, 1944 to All Fleet and Squadron Commanders, Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet DesOpCrd 34F) WDC Document 161638.
the best and most highly trained personnel of the base air forces, the loss of its personnel would ill be afforded.

That the Japanese were well behind American practice in this regard is not only obvious from the fact that they made no attempt to recover their downed pilots until four days had elapsed since the first Allied attack had been made on Okinawa, but it is also obvious since the possibility of recovering such pilots by the employment of limited surface forces offered little chance of success. The Japanese gave no consideration to the employment of their submarines for this purpose, which the Allies had found to be highly effective.

At 1230 the 7th Force attack planes commenced take-off from Kanoya. Five land attack planes armed with torpedoes and two direct cooperation planes of 708th Attack Unit took off at this time. They were followed by ten two-engine land bombers of 501st Attack Unit. In addition the attack group included eight torpedo planes of the 708rd Attack Unit and fifteen heavy bombers carrying torpedoes from the NINETY-EIGHTH Air Regiment. In all there were about fifty-two aircraft including the reconnaissance units. This represented the remaining "F" Force strength available in Kyushu.

At about 1300 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that B-29 aircraft had been sighted over Tainan at 1230. During the ensuing hour sixty B-29's were reported in that area. Eight fighters of the 254th Air Group from the China Area Fleet attempted to intercept the B-29's over Takao but were unable to make contact.

At 1330 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew that the first wave of his general attack was taking off from Okinawa. As noted above, this wave was scheduled to consist of 163 aircraft exclusive of the reconnaissance group. Actually only 112 aircraft took off, but these seem to have been joined by the twenty which had departed from Kanoya at 1030 making a total of 132. The composition of this attack wave was eighty-two fighters, thirty bombers, and twenty torpedo planes.

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* Detailed Action Report No. 9, 708th Attack Unit, Night Torpedo Attack on Enemy Task Force off Formosa, October 14th, 1944, WDC Document 160579.
** Detailed Action Reports of 752nd Air Group Units, June 1944-January 1945, WDC Document 160364.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22 Item P.
**** Merit Report 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012.

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Some units of this attack group were unable to rendezvous due to poor visibility and proceeded to the target area independently.**

At 1430 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew that the second wave of the general attack was departing from Okinawa. The planned strength of this group as noted earlier was 267 aircraft; actually but 228 planes took off. Unlike the first wave, the reconnaissance unit departed at the same time as the attack units. The composition of this wave was twelve reconnaissance planes, ninety-seven fighters, fourteen fighter-bombers, fifty-six bombers, and forty-six torpedo planes.** The twelve planes of the reconnaissance unit were directed to search the sector bearing OSO°-222°(f) from Okinawa to a distance of 300 miles.*** Why Commander FIFTIETH Air Flotilla selected this sector and range is not clear, since it was well to the east of the TF 38 groups reported earlier. Perhaps he had decided that the reconnaissance unit of the first wave would locate the known TF 38 groups and would thus provide targets for his second wave attack, and he had therefore determined to cover the area south, east, and northeast of Okinawa to ascertain whether those undamaged forces might be found farther to the east which would serve as more suitable targets for subsequent attacks. He may have had some indication, such as RDF reports, of forces operating farther to the east although the data available do not indicate that he did. Whatever his reason his decision seems sound.

At about this time he received an interesting contact report. The location or composition of the contact is not indicated in the data available but it was a 1300 sighting of TF 38.**** It had probably been made by aircraft of the reconnaissance unit of the first attack wave. Until now he had received no information on the location of what appeared to have been the main part of TF 38 since the 0640 contact. The regaining of contact was most important at this time for his attack groups were already airborne and the first wave would soon be approaching the combat area. For reasons not known, his planes had made no attempt to track the morning contacts. This failure to carry out the tracking procedures as laid down by CinC, Combined Fleet has already been commented upon. However, now that the position of TF 38 had been reestablished, he could await with confidence the results of his general

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* Detailed Action Report, 5th Fighter Unit (752nd Air Group), Air Battle off Formosa, October 13th-16th, 1944, WDC Document 160264.
** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
*** 51st Air Flotilla Operations Order No. 1, October 13th, 1944, Appendix 1, Organization of Flying Units for General Attack, WDC Document 161644.
**** Detailed Action Report No. 1, 252nd Attack Unit (701st Air Group) Air Battle off Formosa, October 14th, 1944, WDC Document 160258.
air attack. Although he was probably not aware of it, this contact had been delayed in transmission to the attacking aircraft until 1430* which time was after the attack of the first wave. The reasons for this delay are not known.

Shortly after 1430 he learned that the B-29's which had been sighted earlier over southwest Formosa (now reportedly numbering 100) had attacked the Okinawa area between 1230 and 1430 and had heavily damaged the Takao and Tainan air bases,** but had not succeeded in rendering them non-operational so his air units continued to use them. He learned also that no airborne interception of the attacking B-29's had been made, although several had been reported hit by ground fire.*** Actually this attack had been made by 108 B-29's from China bases which had dropped 551 tons of bombs in the Okinawa area (southwest Formosa) and twenty-five tons on Taichu (central Formosa) and while so doing had had but three aircraft slightly damaged by AA fire.****

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force should not have been surprised by this attack, for on October 4th the Navy General Staff had had reason to believe that the U.S. FOURTEENTH and TWENTIETH Air Forces in China would participate in an attack on Formosa in cooperation with the enemy task force.***** This was the first such attack. Although the attack had inflicted heavy damage, it did not materially reduce Commander SIXTH Base Air Force's ability to apply pressure on TF 38. Possibly Commander SIXTH Base Air Force thought that, after another day, with the enemy task force disposed of as seemed probable at this time, he could give full attention to taking more effective action against any subsequent B-29 attacks.

By this time he received a report of damage inflicted at Shichiku by the attack of TF 38 planes in the morning. This report stated that half of a barracks and half of a hangar had been destroyed and a part of the torpedo maintenance shop damaged although such maintenance could

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* Detailed Action Report No. 1, 252nd Attack Unit (701st Air Group) Air Battle off Formosa, October 14th, 1944, NWC Document 1600258.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 3-5, JS-154.
*** Merit Report, 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, NWC Document 161012.
**** 20th Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report, Mission Number 17, October 28th, 1944.
***** Material for Situation Estimates, First Section, Naval General Staff, October 1944, NWC Document 216764.
be continued. Fourteen of about fifty attacking enemy fighters had been shot down.* That damage to other installations was reported is not indicated in the data available. Such damage, while it may have caused some inconvenience and minor changes in the air operations, does not appear to have materially affected the execution of the air plans then underway.

At about 1450** units of the first wave reached the combat area. As noted earlier, they had not all been able to rendezvous after take-off from Okinawa due to poor visibility and some units had been forced to proceed independently. Data available covering the actions of the various units of the attack groups is not complete. However, the following is considered to give a reasonably accurate account of the attacks.

On arriving in the area the attack units found the weather poor for search operations since the ceiling was low, the rain squalls numerous. Some of the attack units, therefore, assumed search formations and by this means succeeded in discovering two task groups.**

At about 1510 units of the first wave attacked a task group reportedly composed of four carriers, two battleships, and one cruiser in Latitude 22°45'N, Longitude 123°36'E. This was TG 36.3 which consisted of four carriers, four battleships, two cruisers, and destroyers. Pilots reported scoring one hit on each of two carriers, one of which took a list to starboard after being hit.*** Actually no damage was received by TG 36.3.

At 1516 other attack units of the first wave sighted a second task group reportedly composed of two carriers and one battleship and other units in Latitude 23°10'N, Longitude 124°10'E. These attack units immediately attacked, and pilots claimed a bomb hit on each carrier.*** This was TG 33.2 which was a five carrier group. One carrier, the HANCOCK received minor damage from a bomb hit received at 1525.**** No other damage was received.

Four of these attacking aircraft out of approximately twenty-five were from the 752nd Air Group, the units represented by the others are not known. Twenty-three planes were claimed shot down by CAF and the remainder retired.*****

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* Shinchiku Air Base Dispatch 142113, October 1944 to authorized stations, NDC Document 160579.
** Detailed Action Reports of 752nd Air Group Units, June 1944 - January 1945, NDC Document 160564.
*** Detailed Action Report No. 1, 252nd Attack Unit (701st Air Group) Air Battle off Formosa, October 14th, 1944, NDC Document 160255.
**** War Diary HANCOCK, October 14th, 1944.
***** War Diary CTF 38.2, October 14th, 1944.
Although the data available does not specifically so indicate, it appears probable, from the composition and general plan of the attack, that Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla had intended that this wave should execute a coordinated attack. In this he was thwarted by the weather. Not only did some of his units fail to rendezvous after takeoff and encounter difficulty in locating TF 38, due to poor visibility, but the low ceilings and rain squalls in the combat area precluded the execution of a normal coordinated attack. The ceiling at this time was about 1200-3000 feet and T0's 38.2 and 38.3 were operating on the western edge of an extensive squall line which extended southwest from Okinawa. All attacking planes had to use a low altitude approach in order to stay clear of the clouds. In this connection it might be recalled that only the "T" Force had been specially trained for attacks under such low visibility conditions. Other air units had not stressed this type of training and their offensive capabilities were therefore severely reduced by the conditions existing at the time of the attack. Also in this connection it should be stressed here that these conditions also seriously hampered the defending fighters in their efforts to locate targets, and seriously hampered the ships of TF 38 because the Japanese low altitude approaches reduced the detection range of the Allied radars. However, in all fairness to the Japanese it seems correct to say that, in view of the lack of proficiency of the Japanese air units in operating conditions so adverse as to necessitate a change of attack tactics and a piecemeal rather than a concentrated attack they were more affected by the weather conditions than were the planes of TF 38.

By about 1600, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had received flash reports of the claims of damage inflicted by the pilots of the first wave attack which claims totaled four carriers damaged. Those reports should have given him considerable gratification for this was the first attack by air units, other than "T" Force units, against TF 38 and the success of these units indicated that they too could inflict serious damage on the enemy possibly because the enemy's powers of resistance had been lessened by previous attacks. Knowing as he did that the second wave of Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla's attack was considerably stronger than was the first wave, and was to strike a damaged force, he could now anticipate that even greater damage would be inflicted by this second attack. To this would be added the damage caused by the third "T" Force attack which would occur at dusk. He could estimate that, by the end of this day's operation, there would be only remnants remaining of TF 38. However, with victory apparently so close he did not desire to reduce the heavy pressure he was exerting on the enemy. His action in maintaining the offensive was militarily correct since it tended to disorganize the enemy and to force him to conform to his plans. While Japanese instructions in matters of this kind are not available to this study it is assumed that they bore close resemblance to those of the U.S. Navy which today (paraphrased) state
that initial successes should be exploited at once in order to accelerate their effect and should be extended to complete annihilation of the enemy.**

At 1615 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, acting on a recommendation received the previous day from his Staff Officer at Kanoya, directed that all reinforcing units from the SEVENTH Base Air Force would be incorporated into the Western Attack Force ONE under the command of Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla. He further designated Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla to command all SIXTH Base Air Force units in Kyushu except the "T" Force. These organizational arrangements were effective as of October 12th.** Actually they had apparently been made effective, at least in part, by some prior designation, for Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla was already exercising command over all SIXTH Base Air Force units in Kyushu except the "T" Force and was carrying out the general air offensive.

At 1650 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force advised his commanders on Formosa that large numbers of aircraft would be landing extending into the night and he directed the following action in regard to these aircraft: (a) they be refueled and rearmed, (b) those landing at bases other than Shinchiku, Taithu, Tainan and Saikosan be directed to concentrate at one of these four bases by dawn of the next day, and (c) a report be made to his headquarters of battle results and of the number of planes present.*** It is thus evident that at this time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force intended to continue his general offensive on the next day.

At about 1700 he received a contact report from a plane of the TWELFTH Reconnaissance Unit which had left Kanoya at 1200. This plane reported sighting at 1350 a task group of ten ships including carriers, battleships, and destroyers. The position is not indicated in the data available.****

At about this same time units of the second attack wave arrived in the combat area. These units had encountered bad weather on route.

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** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 141615, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpord 51), WDC Document 160258.
*** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 141650, October 1944 to Commanders 21st and 25th Air Flotillas, 14th Combined Air Group (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpord 52) FEC Historical Division Microfilm unnumbered.
**** War Diary 12th Reconnaissance Unit, Kanoya Detachment, October 14th, 1944, WDC Document 160381.

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and had become separated into several groups. How many of them received the 1300 position of TF 38, which had been broadcasted at 1540, is not known, nor is it indicated whether or not they received the 1630 position reported by the TWELFTH Reconnaissance Unit plane. It seems clear, however, that the proficiency of many of those units in flying and navigating in bad weather was poor, for but few of the units made any contact.

One unit that did make contact, was the 252nd Attack Unit composed of seventeen carrier type torpedo planes, which sighted at 1704 in Latitude 21°55'N, Longitude 124°45'E, on an easterly course, an enemy task group of three carriers and supporting ships. At 1708 the 252nd Attack Unit attacked and claimed having damaged two cruisers, while losing all but one of its planes.* This task group was TG 38.3 which had been attacked at 1708 by an estimated twenty-five to thirty aircraft. The aircraft which approached from all directions, low on the water, under low ceilings and in an area of numerous rain squalls inflicted no damage on TG 38.3. Other groups of the second attack wave were in close proximity to Allied task groups, but were unable to make contact. At one time as many as ten different groups of Japanese aircraft were tracked by Allied radars.*** Several of these groups were attacked by fighter aircraft of TF 38.**** but the data available does not indicate how many were shot down.

After failing to make contact the several separated groups landed at bases on Formosa and the western Nansei Shoto. The total damage claimed in this near-abortive attack of 213 planes exclusive of the reconnaissance unit was two cruisers damaged.

At about 1720, possibly at the same time as he was receiving flash reports from the second wave attack groups, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received a second contact report from the TWELFTH Reconnaissance Unit search. A plane of this search reported sighting at 1650 a second task group composed of one carrier, one escort carrier, one battleship and several destroyers. The search plane reported that it had been taken under fire but not damaged. As with the 1630 contact report the position of this enemy task group is not indicated in the data available.*****

* Detailed Action Report No. 1, 252nd Attack Unit (701st Air Group), Air Battle off Formosa, October 14th, 1944, W/MC Document 160258.
** War Diary CTG 38.3, October 14th, 1944.
*** War Diary HANCOCK, October 14th, 1944.
***** War Diary 12th Reconnaissance Unit, Kango Detachment, October 12th-15th, 1944, W/MC Document 160361.
What Commander SIXTH Base Air Force's reaction to these contacts was is not known, but it seems probable that he considered that these two groups reported by the TWELTH Reconnaissance Unit aircraft were the same as those which were attacked by the two waves of the general air attack. At this time he appears to have accepted generally the pilots' reports of damage inflicted in the previous day's attacks and therefore it was unlikely that more than the two carrier groups existed in the area east of Formosa. By this time, too, he knew that his regular searches from Garan Bi, Shinchiku, and Okinawa had returned to their bases without reporting any additional contacts. Why no contact was reported by the search planes of Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla from Okinawa is not known, for TF 38 was operating in the area supposedly covered. It may have been due in part to the state of the weather which was scattered to broken clouds with bases of 1200 to 3000 feet and moderate rain squalls. Information available does not indicate whether or not these planes were equipped with radar. At this time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that the Shinchiku search plane in the sector 125°-133° (T) from that base was missing. As this sector was adjacent to the positions of both the 0740 contact and the enemy position as reported by the attack group at 1510, he could assume that it had been shot down.

Shortly after 1800 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received the order issued at that time by CINCPACFleet stating that the enemy was at that time retiring in defeat as a result of the effective attacks already delivered and directing the base air forces and the SIXTH Striking Force to destroy the remaining enemy with all forces. It is probable that this order had been discussed by him with CINCPACFleet prior to its issuance and therefore its contents were already known. As has been noted previously, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had anticipated continuing the action on the next day when, at 1600, he had directed the concentration of his aircraft on Formosa by dawn. Since that time he, and presumably CINCPACFleet, had received information that another task group, which included three carriers, had been attacked by the second wave of the general attack, but that only two cruisers had been hit. It must have been clear then that there were still carrier targets available and that some would, perhaps, still remain after the impending "T" Force attack.

At about 1830 the attack groups of the "T" Force arrived in the combat area. It appears that, as with the previous attacks, these groups had proceeded separately. At 1831 one group attacked TG 33.14 at 1811 and succeeded in scoring a torpedo hit on the HOUSTON.**

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* CINCPACFleet Dispatch 14180B, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH Base Air Forces and Commander SECOND Striking Force, WDC Document 161005.
While the available data is incomplete, it is probable that this attack was made by the 501st Attack Unit. This unit, which had departed from Koyayu at 1400 to attack, consisted of eight two-engine land bombers carrying torpedoes. Since all eight planes failed to return and since CTG 38.1 claimed shooting down eight attacking planes, it seems correct to say that CTG 38.1's claims were justified. Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received no information of this attack.

At 1846 a plane of the FOURTEENTH Reconnaissance Unit reported an enemy surface force at Latitude 22°-45' N, Longitude 124°-15'E on course east. Six minutes later four attack planes of the 708th Attack Unit reached the area, took attack formation, but were unable to sight the enemy. At 1907 a direct cooperation plane of this attack unit sighted a heavily damaged battleship or cruiser at Latitude 22°-50' N, Longitude 124°-10'E. This may have been the damaged HOUSTON, although the position was about twenty miles northeast of the HOUSTON's position. At 1910 another direct cooperation plane sighted the same force which had been reported at 1846. One plane of the attack group made a torpedo attack, but the results were not noted. This was the only actual attack made by the 708th Attack Unit and at 2020 the planes of this unit commenced retirement. One attack plane failed to return.

At 1902, not yet having received information of the "X" Force attack then in progress, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, in compliance with the orders issued by Cinc, Combined Fleet about an hour before, issued his orders for the next day's operations. He directed the SIXTH Base Air Force to carry out a general pursuit attack and destroy the remaining enemy. Specifically he ordered (a) the air units at Takao and Tainan to launch a 400 mile search from Garam 81 commencing at 0800 between bearings 050°(T) and 110°(T) and (b) the remaining strength in that area to form the attack unit. He also ordered the air units at Shinshiku, Taizhu and Ishigaki to carry out a search sweep and to execute an attack if possible.

At the same time, in support of the all-out pursuit-attack operations of the forces on Formosa, he ordered the "X" Force and all remaining SIXTH Base Air Force strength on Kyushu to attack as ordered by the respective commanders. In addition, he ordered pre-dawn searches

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* Detailed Action Reports of 782nd Air Group Units, June 1944 - January 1945, WDC Document 160364 NA 12357.
* War Diary CTG 38.1, October 14th, 1944.
*** Detailed Action Report No. 9, 708th Attack Unit, Night Torpedo Attack on Enemy Task Force off Formosa, October 14th, 1944, WDC Document 160579.
from Okinawa augmented, as necessary, by aircraft from Kyushu, the
latter searches to be made as ordered by the responsible commander in
Kyushu. The only specific sector which Commander SIXTH Base Air Force
ordered searched was from Okinawa where he directed Commander TWENTY-
FIFTH Air Flotilla to cover the sector 147°-213°(T). He did not
specify the range, but the bearings covered the area in which TF 38
would probably be found on the next day. As already noted, these
orders which directed maximum exploitation of the success already be-
lieved attained in attacks against TF 38 were sound.

Details of the attacks of the other units of the "T" Force, namely
the 703rd Attack Unit and the TWENTY-EIGHTH Air Regiment are not avail-
able in this study. Presumably their attack took place at about this
same time. The final attack of the day was made by one of two two-engine
land bombers of the 501st Attack Unit which had departed from Tainan on
Formosa at about 1420. One of these planes had failed to return. The
other, at 2042 operating singly, had sighted an enemy escort carrier in
Latitude 22°-36'N, Longitude 123°-00'E which it sank with its single
torpedo.** This attack was actually made on the HUNSTON Group (HUNSTON,
COWELL, BOYD) which at 2042 opened fire on approaching aircraft. Two
minutes later these aircraft retired having inflicted no damage.***
There were no carriers in the HUNSTON Group which, at this time,
was actually about sixty miles east of the position reported by the Japanese
aircraft.

At about 2030 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received a revised
estimate of the damage inflicted on TF 38 by the "T" Force on October
12th and 13th from the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet at Miyoashi. This
officer informed all flag officers that, on the 12th, the "T" Force had
sunk six to eight carriers including three to four regular carriers
(CV's) and on the 13th it had sunk three to five carriers including two
to three regular carriers (CV's). In addition several other vessels
were sunk or damaged.**** This estimate of the 12th represented an up-
ward revision from the previous estimate of the Chief of Staff of more
than six ships sunk or set afire and now exceeded the original pilots'claims of four carriers sunk. The estimate for the 13th tended to con-
firm the pilots' reports of three carriers sunk and two afire although
the estimate claims were in general higher than these reports. What
Commander SIXTH Base Air Force thought of this estimate of damage is
not known. If he had doubted his pilots' reports and had considered

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* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 141502, October 1944 to
  SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOp 55) FEC
  Historical Division Microfilm unnumbered.
** Detailed Action Report 752nd Air Group Units, June 1944-January
  1945, WDC Document 160384.
*** War Diary CTG 38.1, October 14th, 1944.
**** CoFS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 142005, October 14th, 1944,
  WDC Document 1f1689.

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them overoptimistic, as he evidently did,* he now probably dismissed such doubts since the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, with all the facilities of Fleet Headquarters and also Imperial General Headquarters available for evaluation, had now more than conspired in the original pilots' claims. However it seems clear that he must have considered the Chief of Staff's evaluation considerably exaggerated since his claims were well beyond any claims previously made by his pilots. Whether or not he thought that the Naval General Staff was expanding the claims for psychological purposes is not known.

Probably at about this same time he learned that, as on the previous day, the efforts of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force and CO, FOURTH Air Army in the Philippines to join in the attack on TF 38 had been abortive. No large scale attack had been attempted by those commanders but a token attack of ten aircraft had been launched at 1430. These planes had been unable to locate a target and had landed on Formosa.**

By about 2200 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force should have had available fairly complete reports of the "T" Force attack. He knew that his pilots, in this attack, claimed the following results: sunk — one large carrier, one small carrier, one escort carrier, one battleship, one heavy cruiser; probably sunk — one battleship, one small carrier, two light cruisers; damaged — one battleship. He also knew that, with the exception of one escort carrier sunk and one battleship damaged, all of these claims had been made by pilots of the NINETY-EIGHTH Air Regiment. Of the forty planes of the attack unit, exclusive of reconnaissance planes, twenty-six failed to return. Of approximately ten reconnaissance planes three were lost.*** Total losses were approximately sixty per cent of the aircraft involved. There is no indication in the data available of the losses sustained by the previous attacks of Commander FIFTEENTH Air Flotilla.

Reviewing the claims made by pilots during the entire day it is possible that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force now believes that his forces had sunk three carriers, had probably sunk a fourth, and had damaged but four carriers. However, it seems doubtful that he did so since the majority of the claims had been made by the NINETY-EIGHTH Air Regiment which, with its fifteen torpedo planes, constituted but twenty-nine per cent of the "T" Force attack group of fifty-two planes and yet claimed the successes gained against seven of the ten targets. It also

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** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item 5.
seems doubtful since the NINETY-EIGHTH Air Regiment, although trained with the "T" Force, was presumably not considered on a par with the naval units of the "T" Force. The Japanese Navy, at this time, did not consider that Army flyers, in general, were as good as Navy flyers (a) because of "inter-service rivalry and discords,"* and the difference in military concepts which seems to occur in many military establishments where, to quote Commander Mobile Force in 1945: "I sometimes felt the difficulty in getting decisions was because the Army had their trend of thought which is different from the Navy, and we had a hard time to get over that discrepancy,"** (b) because, owing to the differences in the cruising radius of Army and Navy aircraft, coordinated operations, particularly in sea warfare, were relatively ineffective. In the "T" Force the Army appears to have flown Ki-67's and the Navy, two-engine land bombers. The characteristics of the Navy plane were greatly superior to the Ki-67,* and (c) because the problem was almost entirely naval. The naval command felt that units trained entirely in overwater operations should be better than those only partially so trained. In fact, in 1945, Commander Mobile Force stated, "that it was true (referring to the beginning of the war) that Navy pilots were appreciably superior to the Army, and that was due to the training; the Navy training was much more severe and thorough than the Army."*** That this idea persisted as late as October 1944 seems clear when it is considered that in 1945, when discussing the relative quality of the Army and Navy pilots at the time of the Battle for Leyte Gulf, a senior staff officer (aviator) who was on duty at Imperial Headquarters during this time stated "after the Navy suffered losses (referring to the Battle off Formosa) I feel that we became about the equal of the Army."***

If he did believe that his pilots had sunk and damaged the Allied shipping claimed then the pilots' figure for the three days was ten carriers sunk, one probably sunk, and six damaged for a total of seventeen. These included two which had been identified as escort carriers. The pilots' claims were less than those of Tokyo whose figure, based on their evaluations of October 12th and 15th, was between twelve and seventeen carriers sunk, four carriers damaged - a total of sixteen to twenty-one. As previously noted he had already issued his orders to continue the air offensive on the following day against the remnants of the retiring task force. He saw no need to change his plans although he may have wondered whether his aircraft would find any undamaged carriers to attack, since the number of carriers sunk or damaged was

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approximately equal or greater than the total carrier strength reported to have been within TF 38.

(2) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force,
October 14th.

During the morning of October 14th Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, in addition to launching his searches, prepared to launch another attack against the enemy task force operating to the southeast of Formosa. This he had been ordered to do by Commander Southwest Area Fleet on the 12th but, as already noted, his attack launched on the 13th in cooperation with CG, FOURTH Air Army had been abortive. His first consideration now was to reconcentrate his planes preparatory to attack. Having been scattered after encountering bad weather the day before they were presently located at bases in Luzon and Formosa.

At about 0845 he knew that enemy carrier-type lighters had attacked Aparri. At about the same time he knew of the contacts made at 0750 and 0820 by aircraft of SIXTH Base Air Force, which indicated that two task groups were operating about 300 miles north of Aparri. What his reaction was to the attack on his northern base is not known. He had received a similar attack three days before and it had proved only a diversion. Unlike the earlier attack, however, this one indicated a dawn launching from the enemy carriers and Commander FIFTH Base Air Force knew that this was the usual practice of the enemy task force when it planned a full day of air strikes. By now he also knew that his short-range searches were on their return legs and had reported no contacts. His long-range search would not reach its outer limit until about 1300, but it covered only the area to the northeast of Luzon and not to the north. He apparently took no action to augment his searches to cover the area to the north.

Actually CTG 38.4, who had made the attack, was operating to the west of the area searched from the Philippines. The Japanese search had been devised to detect enemy forces moving toward the Philippines from the east with no attempt to detect those moving from the north. This was doubtless done on the assumption that any force moving south from the Formosa area would be tracked, in accordance with existing instructions, by air units based on Formosa. This was not done and therefore CTG 38.4 was enabled to move undetected to a position about 110 miles to the north and east of Luzon in an area not covered in the Philippine search plan. In the afternoon CTG 38.4 did move to the eastward into the area covered by a Philippine short-range search. This search, however, had been designed to give early morning protection only and to reach its limit at about 0700. It had therefore returned to base many hours before CTG 38.4 entered the searched area. Apparently Commander FIFTH Base Air Force was not concerned with the weakness of his search plan for no action was taken to strengthen it after the attack of CTG 38.4.
Possibly Commander FIFTH Base Air Force considered this strike to have been a long-range attack launched by the task groups already sighted to the north. He may have been overly influenced by the reports of damage already inflicted on the enemy task force by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force and believed that not more than two task groups could remain of the enemy task force. He may have also considered that, since little damage had been incurred at Aparri - only five planes had been destroyed and all of these on the ground, * and this was not a large facility - it was more important for him to direct his full effort to preparing his command to attack the task groups off Formosa in the afternoon. This action of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force is not considered sound for had he properly appraised the destruction objective contained in his assigned task - to destroy the two enemy task groups off Formosa - he would have seen that this destruction objective did not confine itself to the two task groups referred to but was equally applicable to any other carrier task group within range since that would contribute equally to the over-all objective "the safeguarding of the Japanese line of communications with their vital southern resources." Therefore, it is not clear that he should properly have conducted immediate searches to ascertain the characteristics and location of the task group which had struck Aparri since, if it was nearer than the two task groups off Formosa and was an equally suitable target - it was highly probable that it was - this task group automatically became his correct physical objective and its destruction his primary objective.

At about 1130 Commander FIFTH Base Air Force was probably informed of the contact made at 1055 by a Shinchiku search plane. This plane reported two enemy surface ships in Latitude 19°-56'N, Longitude 122°-58'E. ** This position was about 110 miles northeast of Aparri. Although no carriers were reported, it must have appeared to Commander FIFTH Base Air Force that this was very possibly a partial sighting of the group that had attacked Aparri. There is no indication that he took any action to develop this contact. He presumably continued to ready his units to attack in cooperation with CG, FOURTH Air Army the task groups operating off Formosa.

By 1430, with the time limit for launching a daylight attack approaching, Commander FIFTH Base Air Force probably learned from CG, FOURTH Air Army - both of their headquarters were in Manila - that his command was unable to launch an attack on this day. The FOURTH Air Army had encountered difficulty in reassembling its aircraft units after their abortive attack of the day before, and was not ready. Commander FIFTH Base Air Force had experienced similar difficulty but
had received a token attack group of two carrier-type reconnaissance planes and e... carrier-type fighters. These he launched with orders to attack the task group of Formosa.**

Thereafter, Commander FIFTH Base Air Force continued to watch the changing situation off Formosa and to ready his command for future action. He had received no further attacks on his northern bases and may have now decided that the morning attack had been intended only to provide flank protection to the defeated enemy task force which was now retreating from the Formosa area.

At about 1830 he received CinC, Combined Fleet's dispatch which confirmed that the enemy had been greatly damaged and was retiring and directed further attacks on the 15th by the base air forces.** Presumably at this time he was already taking all possible action to be ready to attack on the following day.

At about this same time he learned that, as on the previous day, his attack, even though of only token forces, had been abortive and his ten planes had landed on Formosa without sighting the enemy.* This must have been a disappointment to him for it marked the third day that he had failed to comply with the orders received on the 12th to attack the enemy task force. He may have consoled himself somewhat with the thought that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force likewise encountered similar difficulties since that officer had not launched a general attack until the 16th, although he had been ordered to attack on the 10th.***

During the remainder of the evening Commander FIFTH Base Air Force spent every effort to insure that his command would be ready on the next day so that in cooperation with CG, FOURTH Air Army he could launch a successful attack.

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 141300, October 14, 1944 to Commanders FIFTH, SIXTH and SEVENTH Base Air Forces and Commander SECOND Striking Force, WDC Document 141300.
*** CNO Combined Fleet Dispatch 100330, October 14, 1944 to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, Combined Fleet DesOp Ord 332, Memorandum Notes of Captain Munro Shibe, JMN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 18-23rd, 1944, Department of Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
(d) Operations of CG, FOURTH Air Army, October 14th.

CG, FOURTH Air Army, like Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, was concerned with reassembling his air units following their abortive attack of the 13th. In addition, he presumably launched those searches for which, under his joint agreement with the Navy, he was responsible. Inasmuch as their headquarters were both in Manila, CG, FOURTH Air Army probably continued to maintain close liaison with Commander FIFTH Base Air Force and discussed with him the changing situation off Formosa and plans for their cooperative efforts.

During the morning he was informed of the attack on Aparri and of the contacts made on groups of TF 38. Whether or not he felt that the attack on Aparri indicated an inadequacy in the searches being conducted is not known, but as the search was a primary responsibility of the Navy, he may have considered that any action on his part to augment the search to the north was inappropriate.

Sometime in the early afternoon it must have become clear to him that his units had been delayed in reconcentrating from the previous day's attacks for he had to cancel any plans for an attack on this day.

Thereafter he continued to reassemble his aircraft while watching the situation off Formosa and awaited the next day to launch an attack.

(6) Operations on October 15th.

(a) Operations of CinC, Combined Fleet

CinC, Combined Fleet probably spent the remainder of the night in restless slumber since the indications were impressive (a) that his air attacks had been very successful in that they had succeeded in sinking thirteen to seventeen enemy ships, mostly carriers and (b) that TF 38 was definitely retiring. In addition, the SECOND Striking Force would presently (0700) pass through Bungo Suido en route to the area east of Formosa to destroy damaged enemy ships. He had now but to await the attacks which he had ordered for this day. It will be remembered that at 1800 on the previous day he had ordered his base air forces and his SECOND Striking Force, "to destroy the remaining enemy with all forces at their command."** and since that time he knew that his "I" Force had attacked most successfully on the previous evening. He also knew that his Commando, SIXTH Base Air Force had ordered the "I"

* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Seco. 3, Despotslicion Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division, File No. 8-6, JS-106.
** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 141602, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH, SIXTH and SEVENTH Base Air Forces, (CinC, Combined Fleet Special DesOp Ord 8), DOC Document 161005.
Force and the remaining SIXTH Base Air Force strength in Kyushu to
attack in support of the all-out pursuit attack operations of his
forces on Formosa,* which latter forces with those of the FIFTH Base
Air Force on Formosa had been ordered to participate in the general
offensive.**

At about 0700 he was probably convinced, if at any previous time
he had had doubts, that he was winning the air action, for whereas on
previous mornings Allied aircraft had struck Formosa before 0700 and
more nearly at 0640, today there had been no strikes whatsoever.
Where were the enemy task groups? He awaited reports from his search
planes which he knew were searching from Okinawa, Kyushu, Formosa,
and the Philippines.

At about 0830 he received a contact report (source not identified,
but likely Army aircraft from the Philippines)** that an enemy task
group consisting of four carriers had at 0800 been sighted bearing
066°(T) distant 240 miles from Manila.**** This was TG 38.4. This
contact probably did not surprise him since at 1055 the previous morn-
ing an Allied surface force had been observed about 110 miles northeast
of Apamal but the fact that it consisted of four carriers may have
surprised him since the Apamal attack had been on a small scale and had
not been repeated, thereby giving indications of but one or two carriers.
Whether he considered that this new contact was the same group observed
at 1055 or, instead, had decided, in view of the four undamaged carriers,
that this was an entirely new task group is not known. But whether or not
he thought that it was a new task group or an old one is not so important
as the fact that, instead of retiring, it was evidently closing Luzon
and was preparing to launch an air strike against that island. Per-
haps at this moment he had commenced to wonder if his estimates of the
previous days' accomplishments had been correct, since the boldness of
the Allied commander and the four evidently undamaged carriers, lent
an air of doubt to the claims of the Japanese pilots. Certainly, if
his reports were to be believed, between thirteen and seventeen
carriers had been sunk and yet the composition of TF 38 had been

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* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 141902, October 1944
to SIXTH Base Air Force (Commander SIXTH Base Air Force
DesOpOrd 53) FEC Historical Division, Microfilm unnumbered.
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 150505, October 1944
to SIXTH Base Air Force (Commander SIXTH Base Air Force
DesOpOrd 55) FEC Historical Division, Microfilm unnumbered.
*** Philippine Air Operations, Phase II, 1944-1945, First Demobil-
**** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944,
Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October, 1947,
Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.

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reported on October 11th as only sixteen carriers.*

It would be intensely interesting to know whether at this point CinC, Combined Fleet gave consideration to the fact that the presence of this carrier task group was in accordance with previous Japanese estimates pertaining to possible future Allied operations. If he did so he must have been struck by the similarity between the present Allied carrier strikes and those forecast. As has been pointed out previously the Japanese had forecast that the Allies would, prior to launching invasion operations, employ the major part of their carrier-based aircraft to destroy the Japanese air strength in southern Kyushu, Nansei Shoto, Formosa and the Philippines. While the Allies had not struck southern Kyushu they had struck Nansei Shoto and Formosa and now were about to attack the Philippines. CinC, Combined Fleet may well have wondered whether this carrier task group was alone, or whether there were other groups in the vicinity. He also may well have wondered whether an amphibious landing was about to occur since that had been forecast. If he did then the fact that he had received no further intelligence concerning the Allied amphibious forces observed in the Hollandia-Wadke area on October 9th must have given him serious concern.

At about 0930 he likely received a contact on a carrier dead in the water, made by search attack group from Formosa.**

At about 1000 he received a 0930 contact report on an entirely different group making almost no headway and trailing oil slicks. This group consisted of eleven ships, apparently destroyers, and bearing 038°(T) distant 260 miles from Takao.*** It was, of course, TG 30.3 which was composed, at this time, of the damaged CANBERRA in tow of the tug MUNSEE, and escorted by SANTA FE, BIRMINGHAM, MOBILE, COOSWEE, CAPERTON, ING-SULL, THE SULLIVANS, STEPHAN POTTER and by the light carrier CAYOT, a total of eleven ships. What CinC, Combined Fleet thought of this group is nowhere stated. Perhaps he thought that some of the Allied destroyers had been damaged and were being escorted from the combat area; more likely he thought that this was all that remained of one of the Allied carrier task groups, and that the others had retired after suffering heavy losses.

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** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, Operations in SHO Operations, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm WS-22, Item B.

*** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December, 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 3-8, JS-104.
Also at about this same time, 1000, he knew, since he still had his headquarters at the Shinchiku Air Base, that about twenty planes had departed Shinchiku to attack the above destroyers. 

At about 1100 he most likely heard the results of the expected strike by the Allied carrier task force (TG 38.4) on Luzon. The air attack group, which struck the Manila area at about 1025, reportedly consisted of about eighty fighters and bombers. The Japanese did not consider that the strike had been particularly effective for they claimed having intercepted the attack group with fifty fighters (both Army and Navy, but under Army control) and having shot down twenty-seven planes and having damaged five, losing but one plane and that on the ground. Whether CINCPAC Combined Fleet accepted such claims at face value is not known, but it would appear not, for at no time since October 10th, had his base air forces succeeded in being so successful. Heretofore his planes had always suffered heavy losses. Were his FIFTH Base Air Force and the FOURTH Air Army so much better than the SIXTH Base Air Force including the "T" Force?

At about 1115 he appears to have received word that twenty-five fighters, six of which were armed with bombs, had sorted from Luzon fields, had attacked the carrier group reported at 0800 off northeast Luzon at the very moment (1040) when it was launching planes (it was launching fighters to oppose the attack), and had obtained one direct hit on a battleship or cruiser, and a near miss on a large carrier. He could not have been very impressed with this result, even though he knew that the air attack group was probably a heterogeneous collection of planes, since the carriers which were the principal targets of Japanese aircraft had escaped damage. Actually this Japanese attack made one bomb hit on the FRANKLIN, but the damage was slight. CINCPAC Combined Fleet now awaited word as to the further operations of this Allied carrier task group. Then and where would it strike?

Also about this time he learned that the Shinchiku attack group of twenty planes which had departed that base to attack the eleven destroyers (TG 36.3) had failed to locate that task group.

At about 1200 he knew that operations in the Formosa area were proceeding satisfactorily; for, at that time, he received a dispatch from Commander SIXTH Base Air Force to the SIXTH Base Air Force wherein that commander (a) advised his command that the enemy task force which

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 9-5, J5-104.  
** 4th Air Army Plans for 34th Jna, Papers of Lieutenant Colonel Katsuo Sato, JIA, Staff Officer 4th Air Army, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-7.
had been reported at 0930, was, at 1010, in Latitude 22°-56' N, Longitude 124°-55'E, and that it was not composed of destroyers alone, but instead included two carriers, (b) directed all forces to make repeated attacks. Evidently Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had received an additional contact report which is not available to this study, for the composition of this group was more nearly correct although there was but one carrier, the CABOT, with this group at this time. CINC Combined Fleet now had reports of three carriers off Formosa.

At 1237 he received an additional dispatch from Commander SIXTH Base Air Force amplifying his 1205 dispatch to the extent of giving the enemy speed as slow, his course as 080°(T), and directing the base air forces on Okinawa and Ryushu to attack repeatedly.

Sometime about 1445, the exact time being indeterminate, he received a contact, source not known, which indicated that there was but one carrier in the two carrier task group, for a composite intelligence estimate at 1500 reported but one carrier in this group, and also reported that there was a strong probability of an additional carrier or carriers with two battleships bearing 069°(T) distant 155 miles from Samar B.i. Thus, this composite report showed the probability of but two carriers off Formosa. This is the same number shown in the notes at this time (about 1600) of the staff officer previously referred to at Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Headquarters.

He also received a report that four additional carriers and several other ships had been sighted on bearing 065°(T) distant 600 miles from Manila. This report, source also unknown, is likewise shown in the composite report as well as in the staff officer’s notes.

He now knew that there were probably two carriers off Formosa, and eight carriers off Luzon - a total of ten carriers.

At about 1530 he had reason to believe that an attack group from Okinawa was on route to attack the enemy task force off Formosa in Latitude 22°-05' N, Longitude 121°-55' E, since such an attack group had

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** Commander SECOND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 0900, October 1944 to SECOND Striking Force, War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 181538 NA 11739.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Enzo Shibata, JNR Staff Officer SMC-IV Air Fleet, October 1944-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item D.
been ordered to depart O-oku at 1330.** He probably noted that the instructions to this group gave merely the 0930 position of this group and did not give course and speed. The reason for this was, of course, the fact that the group was reported making almost no headway - which was a correct estimate - the speed being about three and one-half knots.

At about 1600 the Oroku air attack group which had departed about 1330 attacked to 33.1. The pilots claimed having crashed into an enemy carrier with two fighter-bombers with unreported results.** Actually, whereas one or two planes did succeed in breaking through the combat air patrol, and did attack the carriers, no hits were made.

At about 1630 he likely received the report of the results obtained by the second strike made on 77 33.4 by Luzon-based planes of the FIFTH Base Air Force and the FIFTH Air Army.*** This strike, which was composed of about ninety fighters and bombers, departed Clark Field at 1430, attacked 77 33.4 at about 1530 and reported having sunk one large carrier (CV), set the flight deck of two carriers afire, damaged one cruiser, and shot down over twenty Allied fighter planes.

It is also likely that, in this dispatch, he learned (a) that its 1630 position was well to the eastward of the O800 position, and (b) of the death of the commander of the TWENTY-SIXTH Air Flotilla, and of Clark Air Base,**** who had died by crashing his torpedo plane into a carrier. Whether Cinc, Combined Fleet realized it or not, this action of the Commander TWENTY-SIXTH Air Flotilla was the forerunner of the Japanese Special Attack Units - the so-called Kamikaze Units - which were subsequently organized.*** Cinc, Combined Fleet accepted the pilot claims of one carrier sunk.*****

Also at about 1630 he probably learned (a) that a third and fourth strike had departed Manila to attack the retiring Allied carrier task group which had been attacked twice that day,*** and (b) that a strike of six land attack planes and six fighter planes had departed Formosa.*****

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* Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 151423, October 1944 to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, Cinc, Combined Fleet, etc., WDC Document 150137.

** War Diary 653rd Air Group, October 15th, 1944, WDC Document 169299: NA 1230.

*** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944 Sec of War: Mobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.

**** Rear Admiral Musabumi Arima, JN.

***** Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 152036, October 1944 to Combined Fleet: War Diary 31st Air Flotilla, WDC Document 161843.

See JNOS Air Fleet Operations in 31st Operations, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm RS-22, Item B.
Sometime during the late afternoon it seemed possible that CinC, Combined Fleet was advised by his Chief of Staff - although there is no record of such a dispatch - that a reconnaissance made that day of the Admiralty Islands (presumably Seeadler Harbor, Manus Island) had discovered there four carriers (including two CV and one CVE), three battleships, four cruisers, thirteen destroyers, twenty transports and about twenty medium sized aircraft. What the source of this intelligence was is not stated, but it was quite incorrect since at this time (October 15th) there were no large carriers and no battleships anywhere in the Admiralty Islands. This, of course, was not known to CinC, Combined Fleet. One escort carrier, the MAKASSAR STRAIT, was present in Seeadler Harbor.

If he received this dispatch, despite the four additional carriers reported 600 miles northeast of Manila, it probably reassured him as to the prospects of an immediate landing for the following reasons: (a) this powerful force was anchored in the Admiralty Islands and therefore far away (1400 miles) from the southern Philippine Islands and was showing no signs of imminent departure, (b) many of the carriers of TF 38 had been destroyed or damaged, (c) the remaining carrier task groups were widely dispersed and, in most cases, retiring, (d) no further reports had been received concerning the large transport force in the Hollandia-Wake area and (e) the carrier task group (TG 54.4) which had been attacked off Lizin that day was retiring after suffering heavy damage.

If such was the estimate of CinC, Combined Fleet it was strongly supported by his Chief of Staff at Niyoshi and hence by the Naval General Staff at Tokyo for at 2030 the Chief of Staff in the name of CinC, Combined Fleet advised the commanders of the base air forces and of the SW Area as follows:

"As a result of our intense and sustained attacks, the main strength of the enemy task force east of Formosa faces complete destruction. In addition, the enemy group which fled toward the Philippines was attacked today by FIFTH Base Air Force, resulting in the destruction of one carrier while the rest of the group barely escaped.

"The tide of battle can be turned and the way paved toward complete victory only by continuing to pursue and attack the enemy. Therefore, although they have already put forth great effort, the base air forces must seize the present opportunity and carry on their intrepid

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*Material for Situation Estimates, First Section Naval General Staff, October 1944, NDC Document 215704 (microfilm).*
and resolute general offensive without relaxation, thus advancing on to
certain victory.""
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force, October 15th.

Commander FIRST Striking Force, who was closely observing the operations of the base air forces against TF 38 and who continued to feel that an invasion was inevitable, continued his preparations for battle. Since he had directed his command to be ready in all respects for battle by the evening of October 15th this required considerable effort. One important operation was fueling, and most of this day was occupied by this.

As stated previously Commander FIRST Striking Force expected to complete fueling all his units at Lingga during the 15th. Information available does not indicate the means of fueling all FIRST Striking Force units but apparently the destroyers and some cruisers were fueled from battleships which, in turn were fueled from tankers and barges, as follows:

(a) CRUDIV FIVE** - MYOKO, HAGURO, MOGAMI from oil barge HAYATOMO (formerly a fleet oiler but so damaged as to be unable to go to sea).

(b) CRUDIV SEVEN*** - TONE, SUZUYA from oiler FUKUAN MARU, CHIKUMA from YAMATO, and KUMANO from MUSASHI.

(c) CRUDIV SIXTEEN - AOBA, KINK and URANAMI evidently fueled at Singapore Naval Base where they were having new radars installed.

(d) DESRON TWO - lose MOSHIRO which evidently fueled at the Singapore Naval Base, were probably fueled by battleships.

(e) DESRON TEN**** - except ISOKAZE which evidently fueled at Singapore Naval Base prior to her departure for Lingga that day; from the MUSASHI.

The fueling of these ships was not a very serious operation since Commander FIRST Striking Force, during the preceding days, had endeavored to keep his ships fully fueled. Therefore this day's fueling was, in general, a simple "topping off" procedure. However, it has been included here to show that Japanese practices in this regard

* COPS SECOND Fleet Dispatch 142230, War Diary BATDIV 1, October 1944, NDC Document 161558.
** War Diary CRUDIV 5, October 15th, 1944, NDC Document 161558.
*** War Diary CRUDIV 7, October 15th, 1944, NDC Document 161559.
closely approximated our own, and to point out that the practices of first class navies in matters of this kind are often quite similar.

By evening the FIRST Striking Force was, in general, ready for battle in accordance with Chief of Staff, FIRST Striking Force's dispatch of the previous evening and the exceptions contained in this dispatch still obtained for (a) CRUDIV SIXTEEN was still at Singapore where the work on its radars was being rushed or curtailed; the NOSHIRO was also at Singapore; the ISOKAZE had returned to Lingga; and the HAYASHIMO and AKISHINO were en route to Manila.

About 2100 Commander FIRST Striking Force received Cinc, Combined Fleet's dispatch** of 2035 that evening wherein that Commander (a) advised his command of the imminent destruction of the Allied carrier force off Formosa and of the successful attack on the task group observed off Luzon that morning and (b) directed the base air forces to seize the present opportunity and complete the destruction.

From his actions it does not appear that Commander FIRST Striking Force fully accepted the ideas advanced in the above dispatch. On the contrary the evidence indicates that he never wavered in his conviction that there would be landing in the southern Philippines and therefore prepared himself and his command to that end. He awaited the activation of SHO One.

The above actions of Commander FIRST Striking Force are considered to have been correct and logical. This is particularly so when it is realized that, by preparing for battle, he was in no way acting contrary to Cinc, Combined Fleet's plans, but was instead placing himself in position to promptly support these plans should he be called upon to do so. In other words should Imperial General Headquarters order full activation of SHO One, or should Cinc, Combined Fleet suddenly order the FIRST Striking Force to sea as he had suddenly ordered the SECOND Striking Force, he, Commander FIRST Striking Force, would be ready. By so doing he was giving an excellent example of mutual understanding wherein without specific instructions, he was acting constructively as his immediate superior, had he been present, would have wished him to act.

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** CofS, FIRST Striking Force Dispatch 142250, October 1944 to CofS, Combined Fleet, etc., War Diary BATDIV 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161628.
** Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 152035, October 1944 to Commander FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces, Cinc, SW Area Force and Commander Kansya Air Base, War Diary 61st Air Flotilla, October 1944, WDC Document 161643.
(2) Operations of Commander Main Force, October 15th.

Commander Main Force during this day took no important action. He continued conducting training and preparing for sortie should he be called upon to sortie. He appears to have maintained his ships fueled and therefore during this day the OYODO was fueled at Tokuyama.** Meanwhile the SHIKAKUJI arrived at Kagoshima*** and the TAMA, MOKI, HINKO, NAYA and KASHI arrived at Iwakuni**** where the latter two were to assist in the shore basing of the 634th Air Group. The SUGI remained at Kure.

(3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, October 15th.

Commander SECOND Striking Force***** departed Iwakuni at midnight in accordance with his prearranged plans and headed for Bungo Suido. He had with him CRDiv TWENTY-ONE (NACHI FF, ASHIGARA) the light cruiser AKUSA(P) and three destroyers of DESSON ONE. These three were the ASHIGARA and USHIO comprising DESSDIV SEVEN, and the SHIRANUI of DESSDIV EIGHTEEN. The KASUMI, the other destroyer of DESSDIV EIGHTEEN, which had been at Kure rejoined Commander SECOND Striking Force before reaching Bungo Suido. COMDES0DIV TWENTY-ONE with DESSDIV TWENTY-ONE (WAKABA(P), HATSUHIKO, HATSUHARI) departed Kure at 0330 and headed for Bungo Suido planning to rejoin Commander SECOND Striking Force as soon as practicable. However, owing to failure to receive a radio message from Commander SECOND Striking Force, COMDES0DIV TWENTY-ONE missed the rendezvous for that day and was not able to rejoin until the following evening.******

At 0730 Commander SECOND Striking Force with CRDiv TWENTY-ONE, AKUSA, DESSDIV SEVEN and DESSDIV EIGHTEEN passed through Bungo Suido and into the Pacific.*******

Although he did not know it, he was contacted at 0746 by the submarine HESSO off Bungo Suido in latitude 32°30'N, Longitude 132°36'E, which contact, owing to the fact that the HESSO remained submerged until nightfall, was not reported to COMTHIRPAC until about 1030 that evening.********

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* War Diary OYODO, October 15th, 1944, JIC Document 1C638 NA 11973.
** War Diary DESHON 10, October 15th, 1944, JIC Document 161638.
*** War Diary DESHON 11, October 15th, 1944, JIC Document 161715.
**** Vice Admiral Kiyoshito Shimizu, JNH.
***** War Diary DESHON 1, October 15th, 1944, JIC Document 161638.
****** War Patrol Report HESSO, Report of FIRST War Patrol, Serial O27, November 4th, 1944, also HESSO Dispatch 151014, October 1944 to CONSHIPAC.
At about 1107 COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE who, with DESDIV TWENTY-ONE, had passed through Bungo Suido at about 1050 was sighted in Latitude 32°34'N, Longitude 132°30'E while on a southeasterly course at about twenty knots, by the BESUGO. This contact likewise was not reported by the BESUGO until about 1930 when she surfaced after nightfall. The fact that he had been contacted by a submarine was unknown to COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE.

Commander SECOND Striking Force continued without incident on generally southerly courses during the day passing at noon through Latitude 31°20'N, Longitude 135°00'W.

** At 1725 he advised his command by visual signal that (a) "From 0400 tomorrow the force will be within patrol range of B-24's based on Saipan. From 0600 to 0900 enforce No. 2 anti-aircraft alert. After 0900 enforce No. 2 radar alert. (b) After 1900 today be prepared to make twenty-one knots immediately and twenty-four knots on thirty minutes notice. After 0800 tomorrow be prepared to make twenty-four knots immediately. (c) After 1330 today use extra-short wave twenty-one megacycles (presumably radio telephone for interface communication)."

The remainder of the evening until 2400 was uneventful. At 2400 the SECOND Striking Force was in Latitude 28°30'N, Longitude 132°20'E. DESDIV TWENTY-ONE was to the north and west of this position.

(o) Operations of the Base Air Forces on October 15th.

(1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force awaited dawn to launch his searches and attack groups in anticipation of completing the destruction of the retiring enemy task force. It will be recalled that he had already ordered a continuation of the General Offensive and had directed his forces on Formosa and in southern Kyushu to attack. He had also ordered that aircraft landing in Formosa and the Nansen Shoto after attacks on the 14th be concentrated prior to dawn at designated Formosa bases.

At about 0030 he learned that this latter order had not been carried out insofar as it concerned aircraft which had landed at Miyako and Ishigaki. At that time he discovered that Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air

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* War Patrol Report BESUGO, Report of FIRST War Patrol, Serial 027, November 4th, 1944; also BESUGO Dispatch 151014, October 1944, to COMSUBPAC.
** War Diary ABUKUMA, October 15th, 1944, WDC Document 161636.
Flotilla at 2354 at Okinawa had ordered those aircraft, commencing at 0615, to be prepared to attack on fifteen minutes notice. Why the aircraft in the Nansei Shoto had not been concentrated as directed is not known. Perhaps it was due to bad weather which had caused Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla to delay their departure; perhaps it was due to his failure to receive the order to concentrate, since that order, although addressed to him, does not appear in his log. Whatever the cause, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force appears to have accepted this change, for he took no further action to concentrate those planes on Formosa.

While restating the situation during the early morning Commander SIXTH Base Air Force realized that his order for a general attack by units on Formosa required clarification since (a) the large influx of units which had landed on Formosa, after earlier attacks, might lead to some confusion in the command of those forces, and (b) some forces which were available on Formosa had been omitted in the order. To prevent the first possibility he ordered Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla at Shinchiku to command all units in the Shinchiku and Taichu areas, and placed the commanders of all units in the Tainan and Takao areas directly under himself. As regards the second point, at 0505 he directed all "A" Force and FIFTH Base Air Force strength on Formosa to join the forces at the nearest base and participate in the sustained general offensive. He did this because he realized (a) that his order to the "A" Force which had directed an additional attack from southern Kyushu, had been incomplete since most of that force was now on Formosa; and (b) because he knew that some aircraft of the FIFTH Base Air Force had also arrived on Formosa, ten planes having landed there during the previous evening after their failure to find TF 38.

During the dawn period between about 0545 and 0600, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force presumed that his searches were being launched as he had directed. Actually the searches launched were as follows:

(a) At 0545 Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla at Okinawa launched two two-engine land bombers to cover the area between 180°-190°(T) to a distance of 650 miles from Okinawa and three carrier-type reconnaissance planes to cover the adjacent sector between 180°-210°(T)

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* Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 142354, October 1944 to Western Attack Force Two, WPA Document 180137.
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch (Date & time group unknown) October 15th, 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOp Ord 86).

PAC Historical Division Microfilm unnumbered.

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to a distance of 400 miles from that base.** This sector of 157°-219°(T) was slightly different from that which Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had ordered, namely 157°-213°(T).*** The reason for this discrepancy is not indicated in the data available.

(b) At 0600 a search group of three two-engine land bombers and three carrier-type attack planes took off from Kanoya. What sectors they were ordered to search is not indicated in the available data.****

(c) At 0600 a search group took off from Tainan to search the sector 065°-116°(T) from Garan Bi to a distance of 400 miles.***** How many planes composed this group is not known.

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force in his orders issued the previous evening had directed his forces in northern Formosa to carry out search-sweeps. There is no indication that any dawn search was launched, although the unit which had conducted searches from Shinchiku on previous days had seven aircraft available for search.****** Possibly Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla, who was in command of forces in this area, considered that the area of probable contact with the remnants of TF 38 was being adequately covered from Garan Bi and Okinawa and that he could best further his commander's plan by using all of his available aircraft to attack what targets were located by other searches. The searches launched from these other two bases did cover largely the same area which could be covered from Shinchiku. Inasmuch as Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla had only about twenty planes available to attack,****** his decision to hold this group in readiness, rather than dissipate it in covering a search sector, was sound. Presumably Commander SIXTH Base Air Force approved of this decision since no search was launched.

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*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, JMN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm RS-22, Item B.
**** Detailed Action Reports of 752nd Air Group Units, June 1944-January 1945, WDC Document 160364.
***** Detailed Action Report No. 8, 708th Attack Unit, 732nd Air Group, Searches and Patrols of F's (Shinchiku) Sector, October 1st-17th, 1944, WDC Document 160369.
****** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
At 0645 a search-attack group comprising nine two-engine land bombers escorted by nine carrier-type fighters departed from the Tainan-Takao area. This was in accordance with the orders of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force who had directed that a search and attack group should take off after the search planes had been launched and proceed on course 070°(T) for 130 miles from Garam Bi and then on course 110°(T) for about 300 miles.**

At 0735 another search-attack group departed from Miyako. This group was composed of three carrier-type reconnaissance planes, five carrier-type fighters carrying bombs and ten escorting carrier-type fighters.*** Presumably this flight was ordered by Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla from Okinawa. Whether or not Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was informed of its departure is not known.

At about 0830 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received his first contact report of the day. This report stated that an enemy task group which included four carriers had been sighted at 0800 in Latitude 16°-16'N, Longitude 124°-32'E.**** The source of this contact is not indicated in the data available, but as the position was bearing 066°(T) 240 miles from Manila it was probably made by a Philippines search plane. The contact was actually on TG 58, which included four carriers and was at that time bearing 307°(T) forty miles from the position reported.

What Commander SIXTH Base Air Force's reaction to this contact was is not known, but it is assumed that they were similar to those discussed under CINC, Combined Fleet.

At 0830 a search-attack group of eighteen planes launched from Miyako at 0735, and which had proceeded southwest was intercepted by some thirty Allied fighters at a position bearing 210°(T) distant 120 miles from Miyako. During the ensuing air action the pilots reported having attacked an enemy task group composed of five carriers,

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* Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 141902, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpOrd 64) WDC Document 160354.
*** Detailed Action Report No. 1, 188th Fighter Unit (663rd Air Group) SHO Operations, October 14th-21st, 1944, WDC Document 161904.
**** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilisation Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-3, JS-104.
three battleships, and several other ships, with undetermined results due to intense AA fire and fighter interception. They also reported that they had shot down three enemy fighters while losing one carrier-type attack-plane, one fighter-bomber, and five escorting fighters.

This attack had been made on TG 38.1 which comprised at this time four carriers, two anti-aircraft cruisers, and nine destroyers. The CAP of this task group had intercepted the approaching attack so successfully that no enemy planes had been sighted by the ships of TG 38.1. In making this interception the CAP claimed having shot down six fighters and two two-engine land bombers, while losing no Allied fighters.

From the data available it seems clear that this contact was not received by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force at this time. Instead, most likely because of communication difficulties, its receipt was long delayed - possibly as will be shown later - until sometime during the following night.

At 0900 aircraft took off from Kancya to search for the enemy task force commencing at 1115 from Minami Daito Jima. The number of planes or sectors to be searched are not known but presumably this was the search unit of an attack group which was to be launched later from southern Kyushu. Such an attack had been ordered by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

At about 0930 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned of the attack made by his search-attack group which had departed from southern Formosa bases at 0645. Since but one of the eighteen planes of this search attack group had returned to base, the complete results achieved are not known. However, the single survivor reported having attacked a carrier dead in the water, but made no further claims regarding the results of this attack. What the actual target of this attack was is not clear, for no task group of TF 38 had been attacked at this time, and there were no carriers dead in the water. This attack group seems to have been the same group that had been intercepted at about 0900 by

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** Detailed Action Report No. 1, 164th and 165th Fighter Units (653rd Air Group) SHO Operations, October 14-21st, 1944, WDC Document 161004.
*** War Diary CTC 38.1, October 15th, 1944.
**** War Diary 12th Reconnaissance Unit, Kancya Detachment, October 15th, 1944, WDC Document 163031.
***** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
the CAP of TG 38.1. This view is supported by CTG 38.1 who reported that between 0900 and 0927 his CAP had shot down seven carrier-type reconnaissance planes and three carrier-type fighters,* and that none of the enemy planes had been sighted visually by the task group.

At about 1000 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received another contact report. This report stated that, at 0930, eleven ships, apparently destroyers, makin no headway and trailing oil,** had been sighted in Latitude 22°08’N, Longitude 124°45’E. This sighting, which had been made by a search plane either from Garan 81 or Okinawa, occurred in an area covered by the searches from both bases. The group sighted was TG 30.3 which was comprised of eleven ships: four cruisers, one light carrier, five destroyers and one fleet tug. This group had not yet been joined by the HOUSTON Group; it was actually making a speed of about 3.5 knots and was about forty miles southwest of the position reported. About twenty aircraft from Shinchiku were ordered to attack this force.***

Shortly after 1000 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force likely learned that at about 0930 Commander FIFTH Base Air Force and CG, FOURTH Air Army had launched an attack group consisting of twenty-five planes to attack the four-carrier task group which at 0800 had been sighted 240 miles northeast of Manila.

At about 1100 he also learned that the Manila area had been attacked at about 1025 by about eighty enemy aircraft. It seems clear that his mental processes concerning this attack and the fact that it might be the forerunner of an invasion were probably similar to those discussed under CinC, Combined Fleet and will therefore not be discussed here.

At about 1100 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that the attack group which had taken off from Shinchiku to attack the eleven ships which had been sighted at 0930 had failed to make contact due to interference from Allied fighters.**** Although TG 38.1 was actually, at this time, about twenty-four miles west of the position stated in the 0930 contact report it nevertheless seems correct to say that this was probably the group which had been intercepted by TG 38.1’s CAP at 1033, and which TG 39.1 claimed had lost six planes to that CAP.* The data available does not indicate how many Japanese planes had failed to return.

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* War Diary CTG 38.1, October 15th, 1944.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-8, JS-104.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
At about 1115 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force likely learned that the first attack from the Philippines had succeeded in scoring a direct hit on a battleship or cruiser and a near miss on a large carrier. Also at about this same time he was informed that the eleven ships reported at 0930 east of Formosa included two carriers. The source of this information is not known but it may have been contained in amplifying reports from pilots of the abortive Shinchiku attack. This revision of the original report of the composition of the group was partially correct, for as noted earlier there was one light carrier in the group at this time.

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force now had contacts on three carriers off Formosa, the single one dead in the water and the two carriers included among the eleven ships retiring from the area.

At 1205 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force ordered all of his forces on Formosa to make repeated attacks on the enemy task force which had been originally sighted at 0930 and which he stated now included two carriers. In his order he indicated the 1010 position of this force as Latitude 22°-05'N, Longitude 124°-55'E. This was about ten miles east of the 0930 position and about forty miles northeast of the actual position of TG 30.3. At 1237 he issued the same order to make repeated attacks to his forces on Okinawa and Kyushu. In this order he indicated that the enemy force was on course 080°(T) at slow speed. Actually TG 30.3 was making a speed of about three and a half knots.

At about 1300 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that his commander on Okinawa - Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla - was taking immediate action in accordance with his attack orders. At this time that commander informed him that at about 1330 he would launch an attack against the enemy task group which included two carriers east of Formosa. This group would consist of thirty-six planes including five carrying torpedoes and would land at Miyako after the attack. This attack was actually launched prior to 1345 and comprised thirty-seven aircraft.

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October–December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 151205, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpOrd 56) WDC Document 160256.
***** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bun-o Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army, Historical Division, Microfilm HS-22, Item 8.
At about 1430 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force presumably learned that a second air attack had been launched from Philippine bases against the four-carrier group to the south. This attack comprised about ninety Army and Navy aircraft.*

At 1445 Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla on Okinawa reported that at 1125 one of his search planes had sighted an enemy group composed of one large carrier, one medium carrier, one small carrier and eight cruisers and destroyers. The position of the sighting was Latitude 22°45'N, Longitude 124°45'E; the group was on course 080°(T) speed twelve knots. No airborne fighters were observed. Scattered squalls were reported in the vicinity.** This was a sighting of TG 38.1 which at this time was composed of four carriers. The course and speed were correct*** but the position was about eighteen miles north of the actual position of TG 38.1. The reported position was about thirty-five miles north of the 1010 position of the two carrier group which he had ordered his forces to attack.

From the data available it seems clear that this contact, in a manner similar to the Miyako 0830 contact on five carriers, was not received by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force at this time. Instead also most likely because of communication difficulties its receipt was long delayed—possibly as will be shown later—until sometime during the following night.

About this time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received a contact, source not known, which indicated that there was but one carrier in the two carrier task group, for a composite intelligence estimate at 1500 reported but one carrier in this group, and also reported that there was a strong probability of an additional carrier or carriers with two battleships bearing 080°(T) distant 155 miles from Garan Bl.**** Thus, this composite report showed the probability of but two carriers off Formosa. This is the same number shown in the notes at this time (about 1500) of the staff officer previously referred to at Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Headquarters.*****

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Amphibious Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 5-5, J5-104.
** Commander 26th Air Flotilla Dispatch 151446, October 1944 to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160137.
*** Deck Log, WASP, October 15th, 1944.
**** Commander SECOND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 0900, October 1944 to SECOND Striking Force, War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161838 NA 11739.
***** Memorandum Notes of Captain Buuko Shibata, JN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
He also received a report that an additional group of four carriers and several other ships had been sighted on bearing 055°(?) distant 500 miles from Manila.* This report, source also unknown, is likewise shown in the composite report as well as in the staff officer's notes.

He now knew of two carriers off Formosa, and eight carriers off Luzon - a total of ten carriers.

Shortly after 1600 he knew that an attack group of twelve planes had departed from bases in southern Formosa. This group was composed of six land-attack planes escorted by six fighters.** What enemy group these planes were to attack is not indicated.

Shortly thereafter he learned that this attack group had returned to base when the flight commander's plane developed engine trouble.** This was a surprising performance since it indicated a complete break-down in command. It was also a warning to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force that the morale of his entire command was possibly deteriorating. It is clear that he realized the factors which were responsible for it. He knew for example that (a) his attack units were fatigued, and at least partially disorganized, as a result of continuous operations with very heavy losses, coupled with the redeployment of many units during the past few days (b) after previous attacks his attack units had not always landed at designated bases but had sometimes been scattered among several bases on Formosa and in the Nansel Shoto with the result that subsequent attack groups launched from these bases had not only been non-homogeneous but had been made up of detachments of several units (c) a lack of previous training together and the differences in unit attack procedures and in types of aircraft had reduced the effectiveness of his attack. He knew all of this and yet until this twelve plane unit had turned back, he had reason to believe that all other attack groups had either accomplished their missions or at least had attempted to do so. On the other hand he also knew that such conduct should not be permitted to go unpunished since "success is won not by personnel and material in prime condition but by the debris of an organization worn by the strain of campaign and shaken by the shock of battle."*** Therefore if he was to win his battle he must fight on, despite the fatigue and falling morale of his pilots, for who could tell but that many of the enemy pilots were likewise deteriorating in an equal or even more rapid manner. Unfortunately there is no material available to this study that indicates that he took any corrective measures whatsoever. Perhaps he left that to the commander of the unit concerned.

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* Commander SECOND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 0900, October 1944, to SECOND Striking Force; War Diary DESEON 1, October 1944, ADM Document 161608.
** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division, Microfilm H5-22, Item 6.
At about 1630 he learned that all of the planes which had departed from Kowlo to search for the enemy task force had returned to that base at 155 having made no contact.*

At about the same time he probably learned that the second attack group which had taken off from Clark Field in the Philippines at 1400 had attacked the four carrier enemy task group northeast of Manila between 1545 and 1600 and claimed sinking one carrier, setting fire to the flight decks of two other carriers, and damaging a cruiser. This group also claimed shooting down twenty defending enemy fighters.**

That he evaluated this attack as one carrier sunk, one probably sunk and one damaged is clear from the fact that on the following morning he referred to "more than six carriers off Luzon"*** which estimate could only have been obtained by assuming that the four carriers (CV) which had been observed 500 miles to the northeast were still there, and that the task group which had been attacked as stated above still consisted of at least six carriers.

At about 1700 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned of the attack made by planes which had departed from Okinawa. This attack group, although numbering only thirty-seven planes, was composed of aircraft from eight different units.**** These aircraft had been directed to attack the two-carrier enemy task group. The data available on this attack is not complete, but the following is believed to be reasonably correct, viz:

The attacking planes proceeded to the target area in three groups at an altitude of about 13,000 feet. The weather in that area at the time was scattered light rain showers, high overcast and low broken clouds at about 5,000 feet.***** Visibility was six to twelve miles. At least one of the attack groups was unable to locate any target and, after searching the area from 1630 until 1605, departed

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* War Diary 12th Reconnaissance Unit, Kowlo Detachment, October 15th, 1944, WDC Document 160361.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 5-5, JS-104.
**** Memorandum Notes of Captain Kusunishi, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
***** War Diary CTS 39.1, October 15th 1944.
and landed at Miyako. At 1543 the attack groups were detected by radars in TG 38.1 at a range of sixty to seventy-one miles and interception by the CAP was commenced. During the ensuing forty-five minutes the attack groups were engaged by the CAP and all but a few planes were driven off or shot down. Of the few which broke through, one plane dropped its bomb off the starboard quarter of the HORNET causing no damage. This plane was shot down by AA fire after its attack. In this action CTG 38.1 claimed destroying eight planes by fighters and AA fire.** Information available does not indicate how many Japanese planes failed to return nor what total claims of damage were made by those pilots who did return. A report was made, however, that two fighter-bombers had crashed into an enemy carrier.*** The carrier group attacked was, of course, not the two-carrier group (TG 30.3) as had been ordered, but was instead TG 38.1 which at this time was a three-carrier group, COWPENS having departed at 1400 to join TG 30.3.

At 1855 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force issued his orders for the next day. He directed units in southern Formosa to conduct dawn 400 mile searches and also to launch a search-attack group at 0645 to attack the enemy carriers and battleships dead in the water near Latitute 22°-05'N, Longitude 12°-55'W. Units in northern Formosa were directed to coordinate their operations with those of the units in the south. From Okinawa he ordered a search of the sector 157°-029°(T) from that base, range unspecified; from Kyushu he also ordered a search, although not specifying either sector or range. He directed the forces in Kyushu and Okinawa to continue repeated attacks on the same enemy group.**** He also ordered a night radar search from Garan Bi.

At about 2000 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that, acting in accordance with his orders to conduct a search from Kyushu, Commander FIFTI-FIRST Air Flotilla at 1933 had directed 763rd Air Group at Kanoya to search the sector 137°-020°(T) to a distance of 650 miles from that base, the search planes to take off at 0500 the next day.*****

** War Diary CTG 38.1, October 15th, 1944.
*** War Diary 653rd Air Group, October 15th, 1944, WDC Document 160295.
***** Commander 51st Air Flotilla Dispatch 151933, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, information to Commander SECCND Striking Force, WDC Document 161644.
At about the same time he learned that no attack had been launched by those units of the "P" Force still in Kyushu.* The reason for this failure to attack is not known but it may have been due to the lack of operational aircraft. As already noted, by this time most of the "P" Force was on Formosa, and those aircraft which had remained in Kyushu presumably had not been able to join in the attacks launched on previous days because they were not ready. They were apparently still not ready. He most likely learned at this time that two more attack groups launched from the Philippines and totalling about twenty aircraft had been unable to locate the enemy task group northeast of Manila, and had therefore returned to base.**

At about 2100 he received CINC, Combined Fleet's dispatch orders for the next day as issued by his Chief of Staff at Hiyoshi. In this dispatch the Chief of Staff, after noting that the enemy task force east of Formosa faced complete destruction as a result of the intense and sustained attacks already made and that the enemy group which had fled toward the Philippines had been attacked and one carrier sunk but without referring to the additional four carriers reported 600 miles northeast of Manila, ordered his forces to carry on without relaxation the general offensive to attain certain victory.***

At 2135 he issued orders to the KAGOSHIMA MARU to proceed to Kilum on the north coast of Formosa as soon as preparations could be made.**** This vessel was a small cargo ship of 182 tons.***** At this time it was presumably loading in the Kagoshima Bay area of Kyushu and had been made available to transport ground personnel of the air groups which had deployed to Formosa.

About an hour later, at 2230, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned of Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla's (Kyushu) attack plans for the 16th; these plans provided that the attack would be launched between 0600 and 0630 from Kyushu, staging through Okinawa, and that the attack group would consist of about fifty carrier type bombers and

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* Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-25th, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944 Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, J3-104.
*** CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 152036, October 1944 to Commander FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces, etc., WDC Document 101663.
**** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 152155, October 1944 to KAGOSHIMA MARU, Information to Commander 21st Air Flotilla (at Shinohiku) and CofS Saga Naval District, FEC Historical Division Microfilm unnumbered.
***** Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II: Military History Section G HQ, FEC, February 1952.
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forty-one fighters under the command of Commander 701st Air Group.*

At 2:55 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force modified his orders
issued earlier to the forces on Formosa for operations on the 16th. He
now directed that attack forces would not take off as previously directed
but instead would be ready on thirty minutes notice after 0600 to take
off on special order.** While his reasons for this change of orders are
not known, it seems probable that he realized that to commit all of his
attack forces to the destruction of the two carriers already damaged
and withdrawing at very slow speed when his morning searches might well
find other undamaged carriers in the area was not sound employment of
his striking power. At least he now believed it better to await the
report of his morning searches and then, on the basis of the situation
found to exist at that time, he could better determine the most profi-
table target for his attack. As discussed earlier this change was
found in that it left open for the time being the selection of targets.

(2) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force.
October 15th.

As on the previous day, Commander FIFTH Base Air
Force presumably launched his morning searches and continued to ready
his command for attack operations. Despite the orders issued by
Commander Southwest Area Force on the 12th to destroy the enemy task
force, he had so far failed to deliver a single attack. His one
large effort, a 170 plane attack group composed of forces from his own
command and forces from the FOURTH Air Army, had been unable to locate
the enemy on the 18th and he had been engaged since then in reassem-
bling his units for further attack.

At about 0830 he received his first contact report of the day.
An enemy task group comprising four carriers was reported bearing
066°(T), distant 240 miles from Manila. The sighting was probably
made by one of his own search planes. As noted earlier the group
sighted was TG 38.4 which comprised four carriers and at the time was
actually about forty miles northwest of the reported position. By this
time Commander FIFTH Base Air Force had readied some of his aircraft
and, at about 0930, he launched his first attack. This attack group
consisted of twenty-five carrier type fighters of which six carried
bombs.*** This was not a large attack group, but was apparently all

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* Commander SIXTH Air Fictilla Dispatch 152155, October 1944 to
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 152255, October 1944
to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpCrd 62)
FSC Historical Division Microfilm unnumbered.
*** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944
Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947
Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 9-5, JS-104.
that were ready at this time. Commander FIFTH Base Air Force hoped that this small group would succeed in at least damaging some of the carriers and thus reduce the air opposition for succeeding attack groups. In the meantime he renewed his efforts to ready a larger group which, together with Army air forces, could inflict greater damage shortly.

About a half hour later, he probably heard of the attack by Formosa planes on a carrier lying dead in the water.

About this same time enemy aircraft attacked the Manila area where his headquarters were located. This enemy group was reportedly composed of eighty fighters and bombers. It was intercepted by about fifty Army and Navy fighters under Army control. Twenty-seven Allied aircraft were reported shot down with five more damaged. Japanese losses in the air were not reported.* It is of interest that (a) the report of the number of enemy planes in the attack was nearly correct; actually there were seventy-one** and (b) the report of the number of enemy planes shot down was completely erroneous; actually only one plane of the entire group was lost in the attack.*** The data available does not indicate how Commander FIFTH Base Air Force reacted to this attack, but it seems likely that he decided that it had been launched by the four carriers already sighted. In this he would have been correct, for CTG 38.4 launched this attack at 0845.

At about 1100 he learned, by flash reports, the results of his first attack. The twenty-five plane group reported attacking the enemy task group northeast of Manila at 1046 scoring a direct hit on a battleship or cruiser and a near miss on a large carrier.*** Data available does not indicate how many Japanese planes were lost.

This attack had been made on TG 38.4 and had succeeded in scoring a bomb hit on the deck edge elevator of the FRANKLIN. Damage was superficial. CTG 38.4 believed he had shot down nineteen of the attacking planes.** Although Commander FIFTH Base Air Force did not know it, his attack did succeed in preventing a second attack on the Manila area. Due to this attack CTG 38.4 had been delayed in launching a second Allied attack group of forty-five planes and, after its

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944.
  Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 5-5, JS-104.
** War Diary CTG 38.4, October 15th, 1944.
*** War Diary FRANKLIN, October 15th, 1944.
launching, had held it in the vicinity of the task group to have available its fighters for defense if necessary. By the time the Japanese attack had been dissipated this group had used up too much fuel to proceed to the target and had been recovered.

At about this same time Commander FIFTH Base Air Force probably learned that two carriers had been sighted in the eleven ship group previously reported by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. This indicated that there were two or three carriers east of Formosa which with the four northeast of Manila, totalled six or seven carriers.

At 1400 the second attack group took off from Clark Field on Luzon. This was a combined group of ninety Army and Navy planes, and was directed to attack the enemy task group to the northeast. While awaiting the results of this attack Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, in cooperation with CG, FOURTH Air Army, expedited plans to launch two or more attacks during the afternoon.

Sometime before 1500 he received a report, source unknown, that four additional carriers and several other ships had been sighted on bearing 065°(T) distant 600 miles from Manila.**

He now knew of eight carriers off Luzon and possibly three off Formosa.

Whatever his earlier reactions may have been to the great damage being inflicted by aircraft attacking from Kyush. and Formosa is not known, but it was now clear to him that there still existed many enemy carriers (ten or eleven). It should also have been clear to him that if the enemy was following the plan of operations predicted by CINC, Combined Fleet,*** well in advance of the Allied strikes and the situation indicated that he was, the Japanese forces in the Philippines would soon be the target for the whole weight of the remaining enemy task force attacks, which might prove the prelude to landing operations.

At about 1550 he learned the results of this second attack. Between 1530 and 1600 the group reported attacking the four carrier enemy task group. One carrier was reported sunk and the flight decks of two

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** Commander SECOND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 0900, October 1944 to SECOND Striking Force; War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 151628.
*** Situation Estimate at the Start of the Enemy Invasion of Palau and Ulithi, September 17th, 1944, Combined Fleet Headquarters Army Historical Division Microfilm MS-26, Item 8.
more set afire. One cruiser was also reported damaged and more than twenty defending fighters were shot down. He was also informed that in this attack, Commander TWENTY-SIXTH Air Flotilla* had led a unit of torpedo planes and had crash-dived his plane into a carrier. This example of devotion to duty by a high ranking officer formed the basis for the later formation of special attack (Kamikaze) units.** The report of damage inflicted on TG 38.4 in this attack was completely erroneous. The attack group was intercepted by the CAP of TG 38.4 and the attack was turned back. CTG 38.4 believed he had destroyed about twenty Japanese planes of this group.*** Not a single plane attacked the task group and none were sighted by the ships of the formation.

Whether or not Commander FIFTH Base Air Force accepted the above claims of his pilots is not known but it seems logical that his analysis and that of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force were the same: that one carrier sunk, one probably sunk and one damaged. This reduced the number of carriers observed off Luzon to "more than six." He must have been gratified by this as it not only indicated that his pilots were good, but it also might act as a deterrent to the enemy should he (the enemy) be planning a landing presently.

At about this same time two more smaller attack groups took off.** These totalled about twenty planes and were presumably all from FIFTH Base Air Force.

At about 1900 Commandr FIFTH Base Air Force learned that the third and fourth attack groups which he had launched at about 1630 had failed to locate the enemy task group due to bad weather. The weather had actually deteriorated during the afternoon with the ceiling lowering from about 8,000 feet to less than 1,000 feet by early evening.****

At about 2100 he received Cinc, Combined Fleet's orders to continue the general offensive on the following day.***** He probably noted with some satisfaction that in this same dispatch Cinc, Combined Fleet credited the Philippine air forces with sinking one enemy carrier during the day, although he personally may have believed that it was likely that he had sunk two carriers. In cooperation with CG, FOURTH Air Army he presumably devoted the remainder of the evening to planning his searches and attacks for the following day.

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* Rear Admiral Masabumi Arima, JUN.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Mobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
*** War Diary CTG 38.4, October 15th, 1944.
**** Action Report BELLLEAU WOOD, Action Against Nueseii Shoto, Formosa, Luzon and the Visayas, October 7th-21st, 1944, Serial Q170, November 3rd, 1944.
***** Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 152035, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces, MDC Document 160137.
(d) Operations of CG, FOURTH Air Army, October 15th.

CG, FOURTH Air Army, as on the previous day, presumably launched those short-range morning searches for which he was responsible under his joint agreement with Commander FIFTH Base Air Force. As noted earlier, with both his headquarters and those of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force in the Manila area, these two commanders undoubtedly exchanged information in conjunction with their planning for joint action against the enemy. Accordingly it is probable that CG, FOURTH Air Army was informed of the various contacts which were reported by the searches from the Philippines and also by forces of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force to the north.

When the first contact was received at about 0930 reporting four carriers northeast of Manila, CG, FOURTH Air Army was not ready to join in the attack. Inasmuch as he was responsible for the air defense of the Manila area, he was required to maintain defensive fighters to repel any enemy attack and with enemy carriers so close such an attack must have been clearly possible.

Shortly after 1000 CG, FOURTH Air Army launched about fifty fighters to defend the Manila area against enemy attack. As previously noted these planes engaged the strike of TG 38.4. Whether or not he actually believed the reports of his pilots of shooting down twenty-seven of the enemy planes is not known. The general experience with pilots reports over the past three days of which he must have been informed would indicate that he may have thought them excessive, not only because of previous unverified claims but also because the downed planes could be counted.

By afternoon he had readied additional planes so that he was able to take part in a combined attack with Commander FIFTH Base Air Force. How many of the ninety planes, which took off from Clark Field at 1400, were Army planes is not indicated. The results of this attack have already been noted. It is not clear whether any of the about twenty planes which took off later in the afternoon but were unable to find the enemy were from his command or whether they were Navy planes.

During the remainder of the day, CG, FOURTH Air Army watched the situation closely and exerted every effort to ready as many planes as possible to strengthen his air defense forces and also to provide more aircraft for attacks on the enemy task force on the following day.

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* Draft Plan of FOURTH Air Army Operations after mid-October, Operations Section, FOURTH Air Army, October 15th, 1944 from file of Lieutenant Colonel Katsumi Satō, IJA, Staff Officer, FOURTH Air Army, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-7.

** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October, 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-102.

*** Since going to press, what may be a more accurate figure of eighty-seven planes rather than ninety, has been received. The eighty-seven planes reportedly consisted of seventy-four Army and thirteen Navy planes. (Daily Record of War situation maintained by Captain Kinji Takahashi, Operations Department, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.)

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(7) Operations on October 16th.

(a) Operations of CinC, Combined Fleet.

CinC, Combined Fleet probably spent some time during the night in examining the situation and in studying the enemy capabilities with relation thereto. While he knew only two-three carriers had been observed to the eastward of Formosa, he also knew that more than six others were still to the eastward of Luzon. In addition he knew that there had been no attacks on Formosa since October 14th, but there had been attacks on Luzon as late as 1025 the preceding day, October 15th. What did all of this portend? While as stated previously he did not seem to have been concerned about an immediate landing at this time he must have been concerned with the enemy capabilities for future operations, since despite Japanese claims, Allied carrier forces were still strong and his own air forces had suffered heavy losses. He knew that a night search by a radar equipped flying boat was underway from Garan Bi and that orders had been issued for air searches to be made in the morning from Garan Bi, Okinawa and Kyushu and that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had ordered the SIXTH Base Air Forces (a) in Kyushu, to continue the attacks on the enemy carrier force off Formosa which was retiring at slow speed (b) in Formosa, to standby after 0600 to take-off on thirty minutes notice. He was of course, also interested in the SECON Dis Striking Force, now at sea, for if the two-three Allied carriers remained off Formosa the SECON Dis Striking Force might be heading into difficulties. He could do little but await later intelligence.

During the early morning he received three contact reports from the flying boat which reported radar contacts on what appeared to be three separate enemy task groups as follows: (a) at 0045 in Latitude 22°05'N, Longitude 123°45'5 (b) at 0200 in Latitude 20°10'N, Longitude 125°10'E and (c) at 0230 in Latitude 21°20'N, Longitude 126°20'E. These reports were very incomplete and gave no indications of the composition or movements of the contacts. He also seems to have received (1) the 0830 October 15th (the preceding day) report of five carriers sighted by the 166th Fighter Unit bearing 210°(T) distant 120

* Detailed Action Report 901st Air Group, Night Searches, October 10th-26th, 1944, WDC Document 160551 NA 12402.
miles from Miyako, (2) the report of three carriers (one carrier, one medium carrier, one small carrier) and eight cruisers and destroyers sighted by the TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla at 1125 October 15th in Latitude 22°45'N, Longitude 124°45'E** and (3) the 2107 October 15th report by Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla which stated, in part, that all but one of his search planes had returned to base without making any contacts other than the 1125 contact previously reported.

These contacts were evidently a complete surprise to him since the intelligence reports and contact reports of the previous day had given no indication of forces other than the ones heretofore discussed. He could now see that if these additional reports of the previous day were true, and the radar contacts by the flying boat although made many hours later tended to confirm them, the situation was very serious. At this time he probably discussed the situation by telephone with Commander SIXTH Base Air Force and decided that contacts (1) and (2) above were on the same task group and that since there was no way at the moment to determine the correct number of carriers he would arbitrarily establish it as four. If these two contacts were to be accepted as having been made on two separate task groups, the probable number of Allied carriers off Formosa based on present estimates would have been increased thereby to an illogical figure. Because of the lack of confirmatory data and the fact that the radar contacts if correct would indicate that these were in fact two separate groups, it seems clear that Cinc Combined Fleet accepted the radar contacts primarily as an indication that there were some Allied units there, probably the damaged group which he knew was moving slowly to the southeast. It is significant that these radar contacts are not included in subsequent reports and estimates. Actually TG 30.3 was the only Allied unit in the vicinity and even this group was some sixty miles from the nearest radar contact.

He now had a minimum of six carriers east of Formosa, and about the same number east of Luzon - a total of not less than twelve carriers of which probably nine seemed to be undamaged. He

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* Detailed Action Report No. 1, 66th Fighter Unit (653rd Air Group) SHO Operations, October 14th-21st, 1944, WDC Document 161004.
** Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch 151445, October 1944 to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160137.
took no action for the present but awaited the results of the morning air searches. These should disclose the gravity of the situation.

He was of course familiar with the contents of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force's dispatch issued at 0621 wherein that commander (a) advised his command that there were about six enemy carriers off Formosa and more than six others off Luzon which constituted practically all of the Allied carrier strength and (b) directed the SIXTH Base Air Force (1) to reorganize its strength and launch an all-out attack and (2) to move all forces to Formosa to take station previously ordered for the SHO Operation's decisive battle.

CinC, Combined Fleet now decided that the situation was becoming somewhat complicated and felt that he needed advice and more help than was available to him with his very small staff. He evidently found that the telephonic communication with Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, which had heretofore sufficed, was now no longer adequate. He wished to be in the heart of the air operations since he might have to issue orders to his various surface forces and he wanted a clearer picture of the developing situation. He decided to transfer his headquarters from Shichi to Takao where his Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had his headquarters. Therefore, sometime between 0930 and 1000 he departed for that base where he arrived and hoisted his flag at 1100." On this trip to Takao he was accompanied by his small staff and by Vice Admiral Takijiro Onishi, IJN who, according to Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, had joined him at Shichi on October 11th or 12th, although this is not mentioned by CinC, Combined Fleet nor by his Chief of Staff in their interrogations.

This decision to transfer his personal headquarters to Takao seems sound for the reasons above stated but why he did not shift his headquarters to Takao on October 10th rather than some six days later is not clear. Perhaps he did not wish to interfere with Commander SIXTH Base Air Force's operations; perhaps, so long as the battle remained entirely an air battle, he felt that he would be wise to permit that command to operate more or less independently; perhaps he felt that the communications facilities at Takao Air Base, which were admittedly below standard, might be inadequate to handle both the traffic of the SIXTH Base Air Force and his own traffic, especially that between Shichi and Togyo.

From this point on, it is assumed that in view of the closeness of the Headquarters of both CinC, Combined Fleet and Commander SIXTH

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** CinC Combined Fleet Dispatch 161151, October 1944 to Combined Fleet; War Diary CRUSING 7, October 1944, WDC Document 161638.
*** Diary of Vice Admiral Kimmel Teraoka, IJN, August 1st-November 1st, 1944, FIFTH Base Air Force in SHO Operation; GHQ-FEC Special Historical Collection; Supporting Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 30, Footlockers of 10, SWPA Series Vol. II).
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Base Air Force that all information available to one commander was available to the other.

Upon his arrival at Takao he received an intelligence dispatch from Imperial General Headquarters which stated:

"Between 0020 and 0330 today, four urgent operational messages were sent by the principal commanders of the U.S. Air Forces at Kunming and other points in China to the commander of the currently operating enemy task force and to the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force commander at Honolulu. There is great probability of attacks by the China-based U.S. Air Forces on Formosa and Luzon. Also an intensification of enemy submarine activity should be guarded against."

There is no information as to whether or not he alerted his command to this dispatch but it is assumed that he discussed it with Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

He also received, at this time, additional contact reports. These were (a) the report that at 0920 two Allied surface ship groups had been contacted. One group consisting of two carriers and four battleships had been sighted in Latitude 21°-06'N, Longitude 124°-25'E on a southeasterly course and a second group of two battleships, four cruisers and five to six destroyers had been sighted about twenty miles to the east of the first group. **(b) the report, source not available to this study, which stated that four carriers had been observed about 600 miles north-east of Manila.*** This he may have recognized as the task group (TG 33.4) which had struck Manila on the previous day, although if the damage reports of his pilots had been correct there should now be no more than two or three carriers in this group. Actually, as is discussed under "Operations of the SIXTH Base Air Force," this was TG 38.1; and (c) the report that at 1030 in Latitude 21°-50'N, Longitude 127°-50'E an Allied carrier task force consisting of seven carriers, seven battleships, ten cruisers and smaller ships had been sighted on course west.****

The first two contact reports probably did not unduly arouse him since they were made on task groups which were known to be in the area.

* Chief Special Affairs Bureau Imperial General Headquarters Dispatch 161008, October 1944 to CinC, Combined Fleet, Commander SECOND Striking Force; War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
** Merit Report 14th Combined Air Group Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012.
*** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944 Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of Army Historical Division File No. 8-b, JS-104.
**** Cofs Combined Fleet Dispatch 161229, October 1944 to Commander SECOND Striking Force, WDC Document 161638.
but the third contact report was something quite new and so powerful as to be seriously menacing. When considered with relation to the first two contacts he could readily see that he was confronted by thirteen carriers. This supported his early morning estimate of more than twelve carriers on the previous day. He probably decided that this new contact was a concentration of the four-carrier task group reported as bearing 036°(T) distant 600 miles from Manila the previous day with the group which had first been reported at 0830 the previous morning as having five carriers and then, later in the same morning at 1125, as having three carriers. He must now have arrived at the unhappy conclusion that the reported Japanese air successes of the past few days were almost entirely untrue since TF 38 in virtually its greatest reported strength lay before him. He also knew at this time that the attack group of ninety-nine planes ordered from Kyushu and which had actually taken off had been recalled, but it is doubtful if he knew why.

He had now to reestimate the situation. What he thought and why is not known, but the fact that at 1209 from Takao he issued a special dispatch to his command on the situation is known. In this dispatch he stated (a) the retreating enemy was concentrating his strength to cover his damaged ships and it was not impossible that a part of his forces would counterattack, (b) the base air forces would endeavor to ascertain the enemy situation; would concentrate as much strength as possible and would pursue and destroy the enemy, (c) the SECOND Striking Force would keep close watch on the enemy situation and cooperate with air force operations, (d) the submarine units would vigorously advance and attack the enemy.

From this dispatch does it not seem clear that he was endeavoring more to calm his command than to admit to them that the air battle had been lost? Perhaps he truly believed that the Allied carrier task group of seven carriers which was heading to the westward, was actually closing the other two contacts reported in order to concentrate with them since these latter bore 256°(T) distant 180 miles from the seven carrier group, and were reportedly retiring at slow speed. Certainly from the situation as it appeared on the chart it was possible to make that deduction. But, on the other hand, this powerful task force, when concentrated with the two-carrier task force, would present nine and, should the additional four-carrier task force reported nearby be included, would present thirteen carriers off Formosa which were quite capable of continuing the attacks on that island not only for the purpose of protecting the retiring task group without carriers, but also for the purpose of completing the

* Commander 51st Air Flotilla Dispatch 1857, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 180268.
** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 181209, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces etc., (Combined Fleet Special DesOpOrd 11), WDC Document 180264.
destruction of Japanese planes and facilities on Formosa and thereby facilitating later operations. What did he have in the area with which to oppose such an attack? Merely a disorganized and seriously reduced base air force as discussed later under "Operations of SIXTH Base Air Force." Did he not give thought again to his prediction of long ago that air operations of this nature would be employed by the Allies to reduce Japanese air power prior to an amphibious landing?

Actually the Allied carriers were not proceeding to cover TG 30.3 but were instead preparing, based on Allied intelligence, for a fleet action. Their search planes were out - they were eager for battle - they were in almost full strength in ships and planes.

At about 1230 he received a dispatch from his Chief of Staff at Hiyoishi to the Commander SECOND Striking Force wherein the Chief of Staff advised that commander that sightings had been made as follows: (a) at 0045 two carriers and several other ships, course southeast. Large enemy force about twenty miles east of the above, and (b) at 1030 seven carriers, seven battleships, ten plus cruisers and below on course west, and advised him that in view of this enemy strength he take a course to the north of the Nansui Shoto.

From this dispatch he could see that at last the high command in Tokyo was alerted to the character and power of TF 38 and to the fact that most of its carrier strength was obviously intact.

At about this same time he knew that a large number of B-29's were attacking the Tsingtao area and had appeared over Takao. This was also in consonance with the predictions and the intelligence concerning prospective Allied operations which had preceded the TF 38 attacks on Okinawa. Does it not seem surprising that he still seems to have refrained from giving proper consideration to the possibility of continuing strong Allied action against Formosa and the Philippines with a possibility of an ultimate landing?

At about 1430 he received a Cinc, Combined Fleet directive to Commander FIRST Striking Force issued by dispatch at 1405 by his Chief of Staff from the Hiyoishi headquarters wherein the Chief of Staff directed that commander to prepare immediately to sortie. He could do this because he had been informed by Commander FIRST Striking Force on the evening of October 14th that he would be ready for battle by evening, October 15th.

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* CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 161228, October 1944 to Commander SECOND Striking Force, War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638.
* CINC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 161405, October 1944 to Commanders Mobile Force and FIRST Striking Force; War Diary SUZUYA, October 1944, WDC Document 161633.
Then about this same time he received the usual explanatory dispatch from his Chief of Staff, to Commander FIRST Striking Force explaining the above order. The dispatch follows:

"Search missions today, October 16th, show that the remaining enemy strength is relatively large. It is therefore not impossible that the enemy will continue to operate within the range of our base air forces in order to assist his damaged ships, or that he may actively resume the offensive. I am anticipating that our base air forces will continue attack operations for several days more and that the number of damaged enemy ships will increase. Accordingly, we are considering the advisability of speedily dispatching the FIRST Striking Force for a decisive battle in order to augment the enemy losses. The order to prepare for sortie was issued on this basis. However, since it is recognized that such a sortie would vitally affect the fuel situation as well as future operations, the final sortie order will be issued (only) if the sortie appears necessary upon consideration of the over-all situation."

This dispatch is confusing. What does "relatively large" mean and what did it mean to the interested commanders? Presumably it meant relative to the number of carriers which the Chief of Staff inferred he expected to discover. But what did he expect to discover? On the preceding day he knew of a minimum of eight - nine carriers off Formosa - Luzon. Today he knew of thirteen. Was the "relatively large" based on the ratio of thirteen versus eight or nine or was it based on thirteen versus "the complete destruction which the Chief of Staff had reported the remaining strength of TF 38 off Formosa had faced on the evening of the previous day?"

That the Chief of Staff was more realistic than was CinC, Combined Fleet concerning the capabilities of TF 38 seems clear for, whereas CinC, Combined Fleet referred to the possibility of counter-bombing by TF 38 to protect the damaged retiring forces the Chief of Staff pointed out that TF 38 was in such strength as to make it quite possible for that task force to resume actively the offensive.

On the other hand the Chief of Staff was not realistic when he stated that the "number of damaged ships will increase" since from the contacts now made (thirteen carriers) he knew that only limited damage had been inflicted on the enemy despite many attacks by his best pilots, and therefore the probability of increased damage was slight. Also he was not realistic when he ordered Commander FIRST Striking Force to prepare immediately to sortie for decisive action since the Allied carrier
task force was evidently in great strength - much stronger even than the Combined Fleet - his own base air forces were relatively weak, and the distance from Lingga-Singapore to the objective area off Formosa- Luzon was so great (about 1700 miles) as to necessitate, with refueling, the passage of about six days before the FIRST Striking Force could appear in that area. In addition, it was evident that should TF 38 actually be retiring, that force could, in a matter of a day or so, be beyond the effective range of Japanese land-based aircraft so that our surface forces would be forced to operate without fighter cover since the main Force also lacked aircraft in consequential numbers on its carriers. All of this was known to the Chief of Staff.

Students of naval warfare may wonder, if the above analysis is accepted, why it was that the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet sent such a message to Commander FIRST Striking Force. There appear to have been two possible answers neither of which can be documented. These answers are:

(1) That the message meant what it said.

(a) That the Chief of Staff, and possibly the Naval General Staff, was thoroughly confused because of his sudden realization that the great gamble, the activation of the SHO plan for the base air forces only, had failed, and might become a complete disaster.

(b) That he now, in a desperate state of mind, and most anxious to snatch victory out of almost certain defeat, commenced thinking illogically, as is evidenced by (1) his concept that his base air forces, which he well knew were thoroughly worn out and seriously depleted, would have any success against the almost undamaged TF 38; (2) his concept that such depleted air forces augmented by the FIRST and SECOND Striking Forces, would be able, even if TF 38 remained in the area, to defeat that task force, which, as had been pointed out earlier, was at this time much stronger than the Combined Fleet augmented by the base air forces. He had lost three-quarters of his "T" Force and one-third of other base air force aircraft in six days and had succeeded, if the present contact reports were correct, in destroying but three or four enemy carriers. How then could he expect, with his vastly reduced air forces, to defeat thirteen carriers with possibly normal air complements?

(2) That the message did not mean what it said.

(a) That the Chief of Staff wished to have the FIRST Striking Force ready for any eventuality, and did not, at this time,
desire to reveal the real reason - the fear of an invasion - since should TF 38 actually retire and no invasion occur he could still claim victory despite the Japanese air losses.

(b) That he felt that Commander FIRST Striking Force, as an experienced naval officer, would, as actually happened, recognize the improbable features of the dispatch and therefore would understand what it was intended to convey - that the air battle had been lost - and that he was to prepare not so much for decisive battle against TF 38 as for decisive battle against future enemy action, i.e., invasion.

In respect to paragraph (a) above, the Chief of Staff did have some reason for the thought that TF 38 might retire to Saipan since Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla in Kyushu stated in his report* that Allied prisoners of war shot down on Formosa had divulged, among other items—notably the composition of that portion of TF 38 operating off Formosa—that after the three-day Formosa air strikes, TF 38 would return to Saipan. It is not known what credence the Chief of Staff placed in this information. However since it was received by COMBATDIV ONE at Lingga,** it was undoubtedly available to him and may have influenced his thinking.

Actually, the information given by the prisoners relative to retirement was incorrect since TF 38 was not scheduled to retire immediately after the Formosa strikes and was not in any event to retire to Saipan but rather to Ulithi. The prisoners stated that (a) there were four task groups operating off Formosa under Admiral Halsey as Commander THIRD Fleet and Admiral Mitscher as CTF 38; (b) the first task group was composed of four carriers, three cruisers, ten-twelve destroyers; (c) the second task group of four carriers, two battleships, five cruisers, fifteen destroyers; (d) the third task group of four carriers, five battleships, two cruisers, thirteen destroyers and (e) the fourth task group of three-four battleships, two-three cruisers, twelve-fifteen destroyers. The information given concerning the names of the commanders of the THIRD Fleet and of TF 38 was correct; the composition of the three carrier task groups operating off Formosa (TG's 38.1, 38.2 and 38.3) was quite accurate as regards the larger ships, and was reasonably accurate as regards the destroyers; the

composition of the fourth group was very much in error. It is presumed that this referred to either TF 34 which at this time existed only in the plan, or to TG 30.3 which was retiring.

Cinc, Combined Fleet now learned that (a) the attack group of 107 planes which had departed Formosa to attack the two carrier task group had reported damaging and setting afire one carrier and damaging one battleship, losing in the action twenty-seven planes,* and (b) a twenty-two plane attack which had been launched from the Philippines had failed to find a target and had returned to base."**

Outside of general information concerning the operations of the various base air forces Cinc, Combined Fleet received no unusual information until about 1730 when he received two public announcements from Imperial General Headquarters timed at 1500 and 1630, October 16th which stated:*** (a) 1500 announcement—Our forces are continuing to pursue the fleeing enemy task forces. Combined battle results inclusive of those already made public are (1) Sunk: Ten carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, one destroyer; damaged: Three carriers, one battleship, four cruisers, eleven ships of undetermined type. (b) 1630 announcement included additional claims for an attack on the Philippines the preceding day. Sunk: One carrier; damaged: Three carriers, one battleship or cruiser.

The total Japanese claims then were: (1) Sunk: Eleven carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, one destroyer. (2) Damaged: Six carriers, two battleships, four cruisers, eleven undetermined type.

These announcements, in the light of the thirteen carriers already sighted that day were such an obvious exaggeration that it is highly probable that Cinc, Combined Fleet recognized them immediately for what they were - pure propaganda - and gave them no consideration in his estimate.

At about 1937 he received his Chief of Staff's dispatch to Commander SECOND Striking Force wherein the Chief of Staff directed that commander that should the air searches scheduled for the following day

* Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer SECOND Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of Army Historical Division File 8-5, J3-104.
*** Diary of Vice Admiral Kiyoshi Terasaki, IJN, August 1st-November 1st, 1944, FIFTH Base Air Force in SINO Operation; GHQ-FEC Special Historical Collection; Supporting Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 30, Footlocker 7 of 10, SWPA Series, Vol. II); also New York Times, October 17th, 1944.
(October 17th) reveal the enemy carrier groups to be still intact and a night attack impossible, he was to proceed to Mako in the Pescadores Islands."

This message must have been of some concern to CinC, Combined Fleet since it was highly indefinite, and placed Commander SECOND Striking Force in the unenviable position of having to make a decision on what might be very limited information. What, for example, would Commander SECOND Striking Force do should weather conditions make search operations of doubtful value? The weather diagrams show that weather conditions were not expected to be favorable. Again he may have wondered why the SECOND Striking Force was to proceed to Mako rather than to return to the Inland Sea, since Mako being in the Pescadores was a likely target for B-29's from China bases, as well as a target for the planes of TF 38 should that task force resume the offensive against Formosa. The answer seems to have been that he accepted this risk (a) because of the oil shortage in the Empire it was considered wiser to send this force to Mako where an oiler - the ROEI KARU was due to arrive on October 20th - and (b) because Mako was about 900 miles nearer the southern Philippines than was the Inland Sea, and therefore the SECOND Striking Force would be better positioned in the event (1) surface operations became practicable against units of TF 38 or (2) an invasion took place as anticipated in the southern Philippines. He probably made a note that air cover should be provided.

If CinC, Combined Fleet had had any doubts as to Imperial General Headquarters reasons for sending out the public announcement previously referred to, these doubts must now have been dispelled for it was clear that the High Command fully realized that their air battle had been unsuccessful.

There is no information available as to the further actions of CinC, Combined Fleet. However, it seems logical to assume that both he and his Commander SIXTH Base Air Force discussed the developing situation most carefully and arrived at the conclusion that since the Allies, in view of their evident strength, were capable of resuming the offensive against Okinawa, Formosa and the Philippines as well as to attempt other operations, it would be well to continue the marches to ensure that the Allied plans were discernible as early as possible.

(b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force.

Commander Mobile Force during October 16th took no important action except to follow the activities of Commander SECOND Striking Force, and to ensure that the remaining planes under his command were

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* CofS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 162007, October 1944 to Commander SECOND Striking Force War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638.
prepared for immediate dispatch to south Kyushu as replacements for those planes of his force now operating in the Formosa operation.*

(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force.

October 16th.

Commander FIRST Striking Force at Lingga, with most of his ships now ready for battle, continued expediting the work being done on CRUDIV SIXTEEN and NOSHIRO which were at Singapore. It will be remembered that the idea of preparing his command for battle was not the result of a directive from Commander Mobile Force or from CINCPAC, Combined Fleet, but instead was the result of his own estimate of the developing situation. He had received no instructions from the high command since 1635 October 10th when the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet had advised him that it was his intention to keep the Mobile Force (less carrier air groups) on standby in its present dispositions.** At about 1130 he received the report that CINCPAC Combined Fleet had shifted its headquarters from Shinkoku to Tabao.*** He also likely received the various morning contact reports**** so that he knew about noon that thirteen carriers had been observed that morning to the eastward of Formosa. This should not have surprised him since, as has been pointed out earlier, he had not believed many of the claims made by the Japanese pilots and had decided as early as October 14th, that an invasion was inevitable. This sighting merely reinforced that view.

At about 1435 he received a directive from CINCPAC Combined Fleet directing the FIRST Striking Force to prepare immediately to sortie***** This was followed by an explanatory dispatch from the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, which is quoted in full under CINCPAC Combined Fleet, and which, after explaining the present situation, advised Commander FIRST Striking Force as follows: "Accordingly we are considering the

* War Diary FIRST Mobile Fleet, October 1944, WDC Document 160341.
** CofS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 101035, October 1944 to Commander Mobile Force, Commander FIRST Striking Force, etc.; War Diary DESRON 10, October 1944, WDC Document 161005.
*** CINCPAC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 161151, October 1944 to Combined Fleet; War Diary CRUDIV 7, WDC Document 161238.
***** CINCPAC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 161405, October 1944 to Commander Mobile Force and FIRST Striking Force; War Diary SUZUYA, October 1944, WDC Document 161555.
advisability of immediately sending the FIRST Striking Force for a decisive battle in order to augment the enemy losses." Also, "That since it is recognized that such a sortie would vitally affect the fuel situation as well as future operations the final sortie order will be issued (only) if sortie appears necessary upon consideration of the over-all situation."

It seems clear that Commander FIRST Striking Force immediately realized that either the Chief of Staff was thoroughly confused or else this dispatch was designed to convey a meaning not clear to the uninformed recipient. He analyzed the situation and arrived at the conclusion that there was little possibility of accomplishing the objective of the sortie. He based this conclusion primarily on the estimate that even if the FIRST Striking Force should sortie for Formosa, it could not reach the scene of battle before the 22nd or the 23rd because of the necessity of refueling en route. He also based his estimate on the obvious fact that if the enemy were planning to withdraw, his forces would probably be beyond the attack range of the base air forces by the evening of the 18th.

Commander FIRST Striking Force now intensified his preparations to ensure that he was ready for any eventuality, and issued instructions as follows:

(a) At 1600 he placed his command in condition of Battle Readiness No. 1

(b) At 1615 he cancelled the AOGA docking and directed both the AOGA and NOSHIRO which were still at Singapore, to complete sortie preparations immediately and to be ready for twenty knots on two hours notice.

(c) At about the same time he appears to have directed the KINU and URANAMI of CRUDIV SIXTEEN to depart Singapore for they arrived at Lingga during the day.

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** Philippines Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government October 1947, Department of Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.

** Commander FIRST Striking Force visual Dispatch 161600, October 1944 to FIRST Striking Force (FIRST Striking Force SigOrd 170) War Diary SHigure, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4).


**** War Diary CRUDIV SIXTEEN, October 1st-15th, 1944, WDC Document 160986 NA 11730.
(d) At 1656 he ordered all of the observation planes installing radar gear at Singapore to return to their parent ships by the following morning.

(e) At 1716 he directed all units that, with the exception of the air units dispatched to Singapore, the FIRST Striking Force would complete sortie preparations during the day.

(f) At 1800 he informed CinC, Combined Fleet that the FIRST Striking Force was ready for sortie with the exceptions of (1) the NOSHIRO at Singapore, which would be ready at noon on the following day (2) the AGA at Singapore which would be ready by evening on the following day and (3) the about ten seaplanes, also at Singapore which would be returned to their parent ships by noon on the following day.

Thus, with the exception of the two destroyers HAYASHIMO and AXISHIMO, which were en route to Manila to report to Commander Southwest Area Force for temporary duty, all of his command, by evening on October 17th would be ready in all respects (a) to sortie and (b) to battle.

In view of the above activities of Commander FIRST Striking Force and the fact that he considered that an invasion was inevitable it may perhaps seem somewhat discordant that he did not take some action to ensure that sufficient oilers were ordered to proceed immediately to Brunei Bay and to there await his arrival. However, this is not believed to have been the case since (a) except for the NIPPO MARU (a 13,900-ton, fourteen-knot oiler) which was under Commander FIRST Striking Force and was presently at Singapore, all other oilers were under the direct command of CinC, Combined Fleet (b) CinC, Combined Fleet was therefore responsible for either (1) dispatching the oilers himself, or (2) assigning sufficient oilers to Commander FIRST Striking Force for this purpose. The fact that he did not do so was a possible indication to Commander FIRST Striking Force that CinC, Combined Fleet was not anticipating an immediate invasion. Whether or not Commander FIRST Striking Force concurred with this view is not known.

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* Commander FIRST Striking Force Dispatch 161656, October 1944 to FIRST Striking Force No. 2 Air Base, NOSHIRO, etc., October 1944 Action Report FIRST Striking Force SHO Operations, WDC Document 161641.

** Commander FIRST Striking Force visual Dispatch 161715, October 1944 to FIRST Striking Force (FIRST Striking Force SigoPord 1) War Diary SHIGURE, WDC Document 161717, (part 4).

(2) Operations of Commander Main Force, October 16th.

Commander Main Force remained ashore at his headquarters at Oita Air Base. He continued the preparations of his surface forces for sea, and continued the training of those air units which had not as yet been transferred to the SIXTH Base Air Force.

His light forces continued to assist in shore basing the air groups. The SHIMOTSUKI remained at Kagoshima.** At 0856 he received Commander Mobile Force directive 160856 to the commanding officers of the WAKATSUKI and SUZUTSUKI to transport the personnel and matériel of the 653rd Air Group to Takao and then to return to the Inland Sea.** The two destroyers departed Oita during the day and proceeded to Takao via Bungo Suido and Kagoshima.***

Commander Main Force had his surface units disposed as follows:

(1) CYCO at Oita.
(2) CARDIV ONE - UNRYU at Kure.
(3) CARDIV THREE - ZULKAKU at Oita, ZUIHO and CHITOSE at Yashima, CHIYODA in Western Inland Sea, probably at Yashima.
(4) CARDIV FOUR - ISE and HYUGA at Iwakuni.
(5) DESRON THIRTY-ONE - IZUSU at Kure, destroyers (DESDIV FORTY-THREE) MAKI, KIRI, KUWA, in Western Inland Sea.
(6) DESDIV's FORTY-ONE and SIXTY-ONE in Western Inland Sea except WAKATSUKI and SUZUTSUKI en route Kagoshima, SHIMOTSUKI at Kagoshima and FUYUTSUKI at Kure (in dry dock).
(7) DESRON ELEVEN at Iwakuni, except SUGI which was at sea en route Kagoshima.

At 2212 the SUZUTSUKI was torpedoed in the bow off Bungo Suido by the submarine BESUGO,**** as a result of which both destroyers returned to the Inland Sea.

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* War Diary DESRON 10, October 1944, WDC Document 161636 NA 11739.
** Commander Mobile Force Dispatch 160856, October 1944 to WAKATSUKI and SUZUTSUKI (Mobile Force SigOrd 6), War Diary DESRON 10, WDC Document 161656.
*** War Diary 653rd Air Group Units, October 1944, WDC Document 160896 NA 12550.
**** War Patrol Report BESUGO, Report of FIRST War Patrol, Serial 027, November 4th, 1944; also BESUGO Dispatch 161634 to CTF 17, Information COMINCH, COMTHIRDFLT.

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(3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force,

October 16th.

Commander SECOND Striking Force with CRUDIV TWENTY-ONE and DESRON ONE continued at moderate speeds - sixteen to eighteen knots - on southerly courses, zigzagging against submarines. DESDIV TWENTY-ONE also continued on in similar manner, but well astern and well beyond radar contact.

He knew that at 0400 he would be within range of the Allied B-24's on Saipan. Therefore, it is assured that at 0600 his ships assumed Anti-Aircraft Alert No. 2 and Radar Alert No. 2 as previously ordered.*

At about 0800 he advised his command that six (actually there were seven) enemy patrol planes had departed Saipan between 0500 and 0630. This information was received from Japanese Communications Intelligence.**

At 0900 he advised his command by visual signal that he had made an estimate of the enemy situation as of 1600 the preceding day and indicated the location of the contacts which he knew. This dispatch was:***

(a) Composite intelligence estimate of enemy situation 1500 October 15th is as follows:

(1) One carrier, two battleships lying to and leaking oil on bearing 088°(T) distance 220 miles from Caram Bii, eleven destroyers guarding, and direct air cover present (1500 October 15th).

(2) Strong probability of damaged enemy carrier(s) on bearing 068°(T) distance 155 miles from Caram Bii (0930 October 15th).

(3) Large enemy force including four carriers on bearing 080°(T) distance 220 miles from Manila (1100 October 15th).

(b) In addition to the above, four carriers and several other ships (reported) on bearing 066°(T) distance 600 miles from Manila. From noon on search contact or attack by enemy carrier or aircraft possible. Tighten anti-aircraft alert dispositions and prepare for sudden anti-aircraft gun action.

* Commander SECOND Striking Force Dispatch 161725, October 1944
(SECOND Striking Force SigOrd 128) to SECOND Striking Force, War Diary DESRON 1, October 1st-31st, 1944, WDC Document 161658 NA 11739.

** Ibid, Dispatch 160800, October 1944.

*** Commander SECOND Striking Force Dispatch 160900, October 1944 to SECOND Striking Force (SECOND Striking Force SigOrd 129) War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161658 NA 11739.
From his plot it was clear to Commander SECOND Striking Force that he should continue on southerly courses at present speed he would be heading into danger since the nearest Allied carrier was at 1500 October 15th, about 680 miles away, and now since eighteen hours had elapsed, he was, from Diagram H, about 475 miles away, assuming, of course, that the carrier was still lying to, or at the most, slowly retiring. He decided to continue on and await instructions from CinC, Combined Fleet. His action in doing so was sound for he knew that own air forces were attacking the one or more carriers off Formosa that day and should provide him the needed protection. Should they fail he could expect to receive orders from his commander.

During the forenoon he found it necessary to refuel his destroyers. Therefore, at 1045 he commenced refueling them from the two cruisers of CRUDY TWENTY-ONE.* The sky was clear and evidently the sea conditions were satisfactory.

At 1205 the ABUKUMA detected a large plane bearing 080°(T).**

At 1325 Commander SECOND Striking Force received a dispatch*** from Imperial General Headquarters, with a time group of 1005, wherein that headquarters advised him in part that there was a probability of attacks by the China-based U.S. Air Forces on Formosa and Luzon, and that an intensification of enemy submarine activity should be guarded against.

He continued his fueling until 1429 when two enemy carrier fighters were sighted closing the formation. These planes which were from the BUNKER HILL in TG 288.**** were driven off by anti-aircraft fire. Commander SECOND Striking Force now at 1440 directed that the fueling be discontinued, presumably because he was sure that he had been reported, which was correct, and realized that it was tactically unsound to have the freedom of action of his ships restricted by fueling operations. At 1450 he reversed course to north to retire, if possible, beyond the range of the carrier aircraft.* At 1452 he received a dispatch from Commander SIXTH Base Air Force advising that the enemy appears to be pouring

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* War Diary DESRON 1, October 15th, 1944, WDC Document 181638 NA 11739.
** War Diary ABUKUMA, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 181636.
*** Chief Special Affairs Bureau Imperial General Headquarters Dispatch 161005, October 1944, to CinC, Combined Fleet, Commander SECOND Striking Force; War Diary DESRON 1, October, 1944, WDC Document 181638 NA 11739.
**** Aircraft Action Report Air Group 8, forwarded by BUNKER HILL, Serial 0304, October 30th, 1944."
in virtually his entire carrier strength. More than six carriers are still operating to the east of Formosa.**

This dispatch appears to have convinced him that his decision to retire was sound. COMDESRON ONE, who was in the ABUKUMA, states that Commander SECOND Striking Force retired because of intelligence reports which indicated that an undamaged enemy task group (three carriers, seven battleships and ten cruisers) blocked the course to the south, but it seems probable that his analysis is incorrect, since the message referring to battleships and cruisers was not received by the ABUKUMA until 1640** and, instead of referring to three battleships referred to nine battleships.

At about 1505 DESDIV TWENTY-ONE which was about twenty miles to the westward of the SECOND Striking Force and in a position about 130 miles to the westward of Okinawa, sighted enemy carrier planes.*** The destroyers opened fire without inflicting any damage on the planes. COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE now, having been observed, correctly broke radio silence and informed Commander SECOND Striking Force as follows: This unit is in action against enemy Grumman (referring to fighters built by the Grumman Aircraft Corporation). Position Latitude 28°30'N, Longitude 129°50'E.****

This message was received by Commander SECOND Striking Force at 1624 and was probably the first definite information that he had received concerning the location of his missing DESDIV TWENTY-ONE.

At 1640 he received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet at Hiyori's wherein that commander advised him (a) that sightings had been made as follows: (1) At 0945 in Latitude 21°70'N, Longitude 124°50'E, two carriers and several other ships on course southeast, large enemy force about twenty miles east of the above; (2) at 1050 in Latitude 21°50'N, Longitude 127°50'E, seven carriers, seven battleships, ten plus cruisers and below course west, and (b) to take a course to the north of the Hannai Shotou.*****

From his later action it is correct to say that Commander SECOND Striking Force accepted this advice and decided to carry out the recommendations.

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* Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 181457, October 1944
  * War Diary DESRON 1, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 161656 NA 11739.
  ** War Diary DESRON 1, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 161656 NA 11739.
  *** COMDESDIV 21 Dispatch 161605, October 1944 to COMDESRON 1, Commander SECOND Striking Force; War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161656 NA 11739.
  **** CofS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 161226, October 1944, War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161656 NA 11739.
  ***** Confidential
Sometime before 1715, in view of the fact that his presence had been known to the enemy at 1430 and possibly later, and since surveys would be at 1747 and the end of evening twilight at 1811, Commander SECOND Striking Force appears to have decided it might be well to practice radio deception in order to reduce the probability of his command being trailed by Allied night search planes. He, therefore, at 1716 directed the USHIO that “upon receipt of radio signal from the (flagship) NACHI, USHIO will separate. Signal(s) will be sent between Amami O Shima and Tokuno Shima. USHIO will rejoin during 17th. Position of force at 0900, Latitude 29°00'N, Longitude 128°00'E, course 220°(T), speed eighteen knots.”

Since this 0900 rendezvous was but eighty miles northwest of Amami O Shima, it seems clear that Commander SECOND Striking Force wished to remain within easy distance of that island, where fueling facilities, and a harbor, were available, rather than to continue on a northerly course to pass clear of the entire Hamsui group.

At 1720 Commander SECOND Striking Force received a dispatch from COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE, time group 1600, wherein that commander reported “enemy aircraft repulsed. No damage. Position (at 1600) Latitude 25°50'N, Longitude 130°10'W, course north, speed twenty-six knots.”

At 1800 Commander SECOND Striking Force ordered the USHIO to depart on duty assigned and she left the formation.**

At 1840 he received CinC, Combined Fleet’s dispatch 161209*** wherein that Commander stated: (a) The retreating enemy is concentrating his strength to cover his damaged ships, and it is not impossible that a part of his forces will counterattack. (b) The Base Air Forces will endeavor to ascertain the enemy situation, will concentrate as much strength as possible and will pursue and destroy the enemy. (c) The SECOND Striking Force will keep close watch on the enemy situation and cooperate with air force operations. (d) Submarine units will vigorously advance and attack the enemy.

This dispatch could not have been alarming. It showed Commander SECOND Striking Force that CinC, Combined Fleet was alert to his situation and would clearly keep him advised. Besides, retiring to the north as he was, he was rapidly drawing away from the area of Allied carrier operations.

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* Commander SECOND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 161715, October 1944, War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
** War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
*** CinC Combined Fleet Dispatch 161209, October 1944; War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
At 2021 the SECOND Striking Force was fired at by the SKATE with three torpedoes. All torpedoes missed and were not observed by SECOND Striking Force.*

At 2030 DESDIV TWENTY-ONE rejoined the SECOND Striking Force which now, for the first time since leaving the Inland Sea, had all of its units in company with the single exception of the USHIO. The SECOND Striking Force at 2034 detected the SKATE and made an ineffective attack on her, dropping ten depth charges.**

During the confusion resulting from the submarine contact and from a passing rain squall which obscured the ships, the destroyer HATSUHARI which was with DESDIV TWENTY-ONE became separated from the SECOND Striking Force. Her position was unknown until 2315 when her Commanding Officer advised Commander Striking Force that he had become lost in a shower, that his 2300 location had been Latitude 28°-42'N, Longitude 131°-18'E, course 020°(T) speed eighteen, and requested instructions.***

Commander SECOND Striking Force took no action at this time presumably because he was still maintaining radio silence.

At about 2250 he received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet which directed, in part, that "If air search on October 17th reveals the enemy carrier groups to be still intact and a night attack is impossible you will proceed to Mako (Pescadores) and await further orders."****

What Commander SECOND Striking Force thought when he received this dispatch is nowhere discussed. However, since (a) Mako was to the westward of Formosa and therefore much nearer Luzon than any of the Nansei Shoto, (b) he was aware of the orders to the FIRST Striking Force to be prepared to sortie immediately and (c) he was also aware of the many carriers off Formosa, it seems logical to assume that he visualized that (1) the Chief of Staff feared an invasion attempt presently and was quietly disposing his forces for that eventuality, or (2) actually planned to employ both the FIRST and SECOND Striking Force in an all-out attempt against the enemy carrier forces.

Commander SECOND Striking Force with the SECOND Striking Force, less the HATSUHARI, and the USHIO which latter destroyer was on detached duty to the south of Amami O Shima, continued steaming north until 2400, at which time he rounded Amami O Shima and debouched to the northwest of the Nansei Shoto.*****

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** HATSUHARI Dispatch 16221b, October 1944 to COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE, COMDESRON 1, War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
*** War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
**** HATSUHARI Dispatch 16222a, October 1944 to COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE, COMDESRON 1, War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
***** War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638 NA 11739.
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(c) Operations of the Base Air Forces on October 16th.

(1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

During the early morning of October 16th, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, having directed his forces (a) to continue the general offensive against the enemy task force, (b) to make searches from Kyushu, Okinawa and Garan Bi and (c) to launch an early morning attack from Kyushu against enemy carriers and battleships dead in the water near Latitude 22°05'N, Longitude 124°55'E, issued no further orders. He held his attack forces on Formosa in readiness pending the results of his searches.

During the early morning he received three contact reports from the flying boat which reported radar contacts on what appeared to be three separate enemy task groups as follows: (a) at 0015 in Latitude 22°05'N, Longitude 123°45'E, (b) at 0200 in Latitude 22°10'N, Longitude 125°10'E and (c) at 0230 in Latitude 21°20'N, Longitude 126°20'E. These reports were very incomplete and gave no indications of the composition or movements of the contacts. He also seems to have received (1) the 0830 October 15th (the preceding day) report of five carriers sighted by the 166th Fighter Unit bearing 210°(T) distant 120 miles from Miyako, (2) the report of three carriers (one carrier, one medium carrier, one small carrier) and eight cruisers and destroyers sighted by the TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla at 1125 October 15th in Latitude 22°45'N, Longitude 124°45'E and (3) the 2107 October 15th report by Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla that (1) all but one of his search planes had returned to base without making any contacts other than the 1125 contact previously reported, and (2) one plane assigned to sector 18°00'-18°30'(T) from Okinawa had failed to return. The weather in the search area was reported cloudy with scattered clouds and ten miles visibility.

These reports were an evident surprise since no reports of previous day which he had received from his own forces nor any other contacts received by other forces, nor any evaluations received from other sources indicated that more than two or three carriers were on Formosa. He could now see that if these additional reports of the previous day were true, and the radar contacts by the flying boat, although made many hours later, tended to confirm them, the situation...
was very serious. He evaluated the "five carrier" report and the "three carrier" report as being the same group consisting of "four carriers" since the contacts were relatively near one another (forty miles) and three hours had elapsed between the sightings. He now knew of about six carriers off Formosa—the two observed on the previous day and the above four which had also been observed on the previous day—and he knew of not less than six off Luzon.

In the above evaluation he does not appear to have given serious consideration to the flying boat contacts because there was a lack of confirmatory data and because the pilot himself was not firm in his evaluation. Also, he realized that if he accepted the reported radar contacts as true, this would lead to an illogical increase in the number of Allied carriers estimated to be off Formosa. He, like CINCPAC Fleet, therefore appears to have accepted the radar contacts primarily as an indication that some enemy forces were in the vicinity, probably the damaged group which he knew was moving slowly to the southwest.

It is not clear what the flying boat contacted since TG's 38.1, 38.2, and 38.3 were over 430 miles to the eastward of Garan Bi and therefore were some eighty miles to the eastward of the easternmost contact. It is probable that the pilot contacted only TG 30.3 which was within the radius searched by the flying boat (300 miles) since units of that task group reported a single plane circling the formation at a distance of fifty miles whereas the other task groups reported no contacts at this time. It is concluded therefore that but one of the above contacts was real; the other two being "phantoms."

Between 0500 and 0530 he knew that certain of his searches were departing from their bases:

(1) At 0500 seven two-engine land bombers of the 763rd Air Group took off from Kancyo to search the sector 137°-207°(T) to a distance of 650 miles.***

(2) At 0530 five search planes took off from Okinawa. Two of these were two-engine land bombers of 405th and 406th Attack Units which had been ordered to search the sector 157°-178°(T) to 500 miles; the remaining three, carrier type reconnaissance planes of THIRD and FOURTH Reconnaissance Units which had been ordered to cover the sector 178°-209°(T) to 400 miles.***

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* War Diary BOSTON, October 16th, 1944.
** Commander 51st Air Flotilla Dispatch 151933, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 161044.
*** Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch, SigOrd 33, October 15th, 1944, WDC Document 160137.
For reasons not known, the search from Garan Bi which had been ordered to depart at dawn was delayed for some three hours. Since Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was at Takao he must have been aware of this delay. If the delay could have been avoided it should have been, since, by not searching the areas assigned at the same time that the other areas were being searched, the search could thereby have been made ineffective. There were known to be at least two or three enemy carriers off Formosa with their last reported positions but 200 miles east of that island, and in view of the night radar contacts and the delayed reports from the previous day there were probably other carriers there as well. Some of these carriers were therefore in good position to launch dawn air strikes against Formosa bases. In cases of this kind prudence dictates that searches be made as early as possible and in as good coordination as possible to provide maximum warning against such an attack, and to provide early information as to the location of the enemy carriers so that own attack groups may depart advantageously.

At about 0630 Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla commenced launching his attack from Kyushu. The attack group comprised forty-seven carrier type fighters from the 252nd and 341st Air Groups, and forty-five carrier type bombers and seven carrier type attack planes from the 701st and 752nd Air Groups—a total of ninety-nine aircraft. He directed the attack group to stage through Okinawa and then to attack the stricken enemy task group last reported at 1010 the previous morning in Latitude 22°05'N, Longitude 124°55' E. As noted earlier this group was actually to 30°3.

At 0821 he issued additional orders to his command. Stating that about six enemy carriers were still operating east of Formosa and more than six others were operating east of Luzon, he ordered (a) the SIXTH Base Air Force to regroup its strength and to launch an all-out attack to assure victory, and (b) all units to advance in full strength to Formosa and take positions for the Shō Operation's decisive battle.**

This order indicates that in the mind of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force the battle was entering a new phase. Until now he had been engaged in

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* Commander 51st Air Flotilla Dispatch 161857, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 162028.
making repeated attacks on the enemy task force east of Formosa in order to destroy that force as he had been ordered to do. At first he had believed that he had at least nearly succeeded in accomplishing his objective, but now he knew that, while he had undoubtedly sunk some ships, the enemy still possessed effective fighting strength. However, he also knew that the enemy had not attacked Formosa for forty-eight hours and seemingly had taken a more defensive attitude in that area. This change he now may well have attributed to a desire on the part of the enemy commander to cover the withdrawal of his damaged units, while at the same time, preparing to move his area of operations to the Philippines. This latter move had been plainly indicated by the presence of the two four-carrier task groups which had been observed off Luzon on the previous day. Such a shift in areas by the enemy had been predicted by CINC Combined Fleet before the battle had been joined.

At the same time he realized that, as a result of fatigue and progressively growing disorganization, his own command was fast losing its value as an effective force. Time for regrouping was essential if this was to be regained. While it is clear that he did not intend to cancel his strikes planned for this day, he probably considered that should the enemy move further to the eastward such opportunities to attack would lessen, and time might be available for reorganization.

The decision to complete the movement of his forces to Formosa at this time and to prepare for decisive battle seems sound, since it seems logical to assume that not only had the Allied operations of the past six days indicated rather clearly that if such a landing were to come it would be in either the SHO One or SHO Two areas, but also these were the areas which had been alerted by CINC Combined Fleet at 1214, October 10th, and subsequent events had brought forth no change by that commander. It will be recalled that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had been in the process of moving his headquarters and his command to Formosa when the Allied task force had struck Okinawa on October 10th. Thereafter he had continued this deployment as much as possible by directing his attack groups from Kyushu to land on Formosa after their attacks. However, it was evident that this method of deploying had resulted in scattering his units with a consequent breakdown in his organization. Now by bringing down all of his remaining units and concentrating them at designated bases he planned to effect the needed reorganization.

At 0847 the search planes from southern Formosa finally took off.** This flight, which completed his planned searches, was ordered to cover the sector from Garan Bi between 060°-130°(E) to a distance of 400

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** Situation Estimates at the Start of the Enemy Invasion of Palau and Halmahera, September 17th, 1944, Combined Fleet Headquarters, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-28, Item B.
** Merit Report 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012.
miles.* Except for the delay in take off from southern Formosa, the plan and its execution appear to have been generally adequate. The search provided for maximum coverage by planes from both Okinawa and Formosa, of the area to the east of Formosa, where TF 35 had been operating, and for some added coverage of that area, and farther to the east, by planes from Kanoya. It did leave uncovered the area directly east of Kyushu. This area was very possibly covered by Honshu aircraft but information thereon is not available to this study.

During the morning, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force acted to replenish his aircraft on Formosa.** He realized that this operation would probably require several days since the aircraft would presumably require ferrying from Japan and would probably take at least a few days to arrive.*** He also directed, at 0915, that (a) base material required by all forces be rapidly moved to Formosa and (b) the "T" Force remaining in Kyushu reorganize and then move up to Taiwan.****

At about 0950 he received the first day search contact. A Garan Bi search plane of the Tainan Air Group reported sighting at 0920 two carriers and four battleships at Latitude 21°05′N, Longitude 124°25′E on a southeasterly course and a second group comprising two battleships, four cruisers, and five to six destroyers about twenty miles to the east of the first group.***** This was a sighting of TG 30.3. At this time one unit of this group (TU 30.3.1) was composed of five cruisers, including two damaged and under tow, eight destroyers and two fleet tankers. About ten miles to the east was the other unit (TU 30.3.2) comprising two light carriers, two cruisers, and five destroyers. The position of TU 30.3.1 was actually about thirty miles east of the position reported in the contact. The contact report had reversed the actual relative positions of the two units. The reported position was only about sixty miles south of the location of a group of damaged ships which at 0920 the previous morning had been reported as making practically no headway. Commander SIXTH Base Air Force probably correctly decided that this was the same group, and that it was this group which Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla's forces had been directed to attack. Actually TG 30.3 had been proceeding on a course of 130°(T) at about three and a half knots during the preceding twenty-four hours.

** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm RS-22, Item B.
**** Marit Report, 16th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012.
Shortly after this (at about 1030), Commander SIXTH Base Air Force ordered his attack group in southern Formosa to attack the enemy force sighted at 0920. At about the same time he may have learned of a second contact. An aircraft reported sighting an enemy group which included four carriers 600 miles northeast of Manila. The time of the contact and the base from which the reporting aircraft came are not indicated in the data available. What his evaluation of this contact was is not known but it may have appeared to him to be the same group which had attacked Manila and had been attacked in return by Army and Navy planes from the Philippines on the previous day, rather than the group which had been reported as bearing $055^\circ (T)$, distant 600 miles from Manila. This seems logical since this group was the group most likely to be within range by morning whereas the other group could well have moved beyond search range by this time. While this new position was nearly 400 miles further to the northeast it could easily have been covered in twenty-four hours at about seventeen knots. He probably noted that this group had four carriers while the pilots from the Philippines had claimed sinking one of the four carriers attacked the day before. With his recent experience with pilots' reports fresh in his mind he would have had no difficulty reconciling this apparent discrepancy. This was actually a sighting of TG 38.1 which at this time comprised three carriers, the CONIFENS having been detached to join TG 30.3. The approximate position of TG 38.1 was 590 miles bearing $053^\circ (T)$ from Manila in an area covered by search planes from both Okinawa and Kancyo.

Thus far in the morning it probably appeared to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force that the above two contacts were as he expected. Both contacts appeared to represent relocations of the two-carrier group, and of one of the two four-carrier groups which had been sighted the previous day; the first contact being east of Formosa and the second being northeast of Manila. The first group appeared to be continuing its withdrawal at very slow speed; the second group which had attacked Manila (TG 38.4) the previous morning appeared to have withdrawn at high speed, possibly to add covering strength to the first group which included damaged units. He had already ordered his attack forces in Kancyo and on Formosa to strike the slow-moving two-carrier group. Those still remained unlocated two other groups. These were (a) the group which had first been reported the previous morning as having five carriers and then later the same morning as comprising three carriers, and (b) the four-carrier group reported the previous day as bearing $055^\circ (T)$, distant 600 miles from Manila. Where were these groups?

The detection of these groups was particularly important in view of the present operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force. The data.

available does not indicate that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received any orders to provide protective searches for this surface force, but it would appear probable that his searches for the 16th were determined with this purpose in view. It must have been evident that the SECOND Striking Force, with no carriers, could safely operate east of Formosa and sink the Allied cripples in that area, only if it could avoid contact with superior enemy forces. In order to do this Commander SIXTH Base Air Force would be required to ascertain the locations not only of all enemy carrier groups, but of enemy surface units as well.

At about 1100, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received his third and most important contact of the day. A search plane reported sighting at 1030 an enemy task group in Latitude 21°-50'N, Longitude 127°-50'E composed of seven carriers, seven battleships, and more than ten cruisers and destroyers. This group was on a westerly course. This was a sighting of TG 38.2 and TG 38.3 which were actually about twenty miles northeast of the position reported. TG's 38.2 and 38.3 were comprised at this time of eight carriers and six battleships so that this contact was unusually accurate. From what base the reporting aircraft had departed is not known, but the location was in an area covered by searches from Garan Bi, Okinawa and Kauyapu.

Since this contact was much larger than any contact heretofore made and since it was in a position where it was easily possible that the two task groups heretofore unlocated might well have rendezvoused and formed one composite group it seems clear that Commander SIXTH Base Air Force decided that this had in fact occurred.

Commander SIXTH Base Air Force now knew that a strong Allied carrier force of some eleven carriers was operating in an area only about 200 miles south of Okinawa, with two more carriers in the damaged ship group about 150 miles east by south of them. He took no action to divert to this more lucrative and menacing target either the attack of Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Fleet, which had been launched from Kyushu at 0630 or the attack which he had ordered at about 1030 to take off from Formosa. As noted earlier this failure to attack undamaged carriers rather than to sink ships possibly already damaged was not sound. Perhaps he felt that the effectiveness of his disorganized units was such that he could no longer afford the results of sending them against powerful opposition and must be satisfied to direct them against units already reduced in defensive power.

Also at about 1100 he knew that Cinc, Combined Fleet had arrived at Takao and had shifted his headquarters to that location from Shinshiku.**
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This change, putting his superior in the same location as he, would facilitate discussion of the situation and exchange of information.

At about this same time he probably learned that Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla's attack group, comprising ninety-nine aircraft, had not attacked. The attack had been cancelled and the aircraft had been ordered to proceed to Formosa.** The reason for this is not known nor does the data indicate whether or not Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew of this cancellation before it had been made effective. While there were scattered showers in the area with ceilings of 1600-2500 feet and a visibility 5-10 miles,*** which conditions might have caused difficulty in locating the enemy they were not sufficient to have caused the cancellation.

At about 1130 he likely learned that another search had departed from Kanoya at 1105.**** Neither the number of planes involved, nor the purpose of this search, nor the sector to be searched is indicated in the data available. However, analysis indicates that this may have been the search unit in advance of a "T" Force attack group from Kyushu. It will be recalled that the "T" Force (a) had been ordered to attack the enemy two carrier group the previous day but had not taken off and (b) had received new orders to make such an attack on this day.*****

At this same time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew that the attack group which he had ordered to depart from Formosa and attack the damaged enemy group including two carriers which had been sighted at 0920 had become airborne. This group was comprised of forty-four carrier-type fighters, thirty-seven carrier-type bombers, eighteen carrier-type attack planes, and eight two-engine land bombers. This was a total of 107 aircraft,****** from at least six different air groups.

Probably at about this same time he learned that Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla was sending out a special search. A single carrier-type reconnaissance plane had been directed to proceed from Okinawa on course 220°(T) for 305 miles and then search from that point a circle of eighty miles radius.******* Since the center of this circle was some 210

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* Commander 51st Air Flotilla Dispatch 151857, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160256.
** Report of Action during the period 1400, October 15th to 2250 October 17th, 1944, COWPEA, Serial 0027, October 17th, 1944.
*** War Diary 12th Reconnaissance Unit, Kanoya Detachment, October 12th-15th, 1944, WDC Document 160381.
***** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
****** Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch SigOrd 34, October 1944.

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miles west of the reported locations of eleven carriers and seventy miles northwest of the 0920 position of two carriers which were retiring, it is not clear for what purpose this special search was being made. Possibly some indication of an enemy force in that area had been received.

At about 1209 he received additional orders from CinC, Combined Fleet. At that time CinC, Combined Fleet, estimating that the enemy was apparently concentrating to protect his damaged ships, stated that it was not impossible that the enemy might counterattack, and ordered the base air forces to clarify the enemy situation, concentrate their strength, and pursue and destroy the enemy. While these orders represented no change from what Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was already doing, they did permit him to concentrate his forces before again attempting to destroy the enemy, which concentration he had already ordered.

About this time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew that (a) his searches, except the one launched from Hansyo at 1105 and the single planes from Okinawa, had returned to base, or would shortly, and (b) except for the thirteen enemy carriers no other contacts had been reported.

At about 1258 he received information that the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, had directed the SECOND Striking Force, which until then was proceeding to engage the crippled enemy ships east of Formosa, to change course to the northwest and retire. This order was issued as a result of the 1030 sighting of seven carriers in the area proceeding westward toward the two carrier group. Apparently the Chief of Staff had not as yet received the report of four additional carriers 600 miles northeast of Manila.

At about 1300 he commenced receiving reports of Allied B-29's over southern Formosa. During the ensuing forty minutes he learned that (a) twenty-eight B-29's had been over Tainan and had been intercepted by defending fighters of the Tainan Air Group and driven off, (b) a total of seventy B-29's had been over Takao and had been intercepted by fighters of the Takao Air Group and driven off, and (c) that his fighters made no claims of enemy aircraft shot down. These attacks were actually made by fifty-nine B-29's of the TWENTIETH Bomber Command which on this day had attacked targets in southern Formosa and dropped 589.4 tons of bombs. The B-29's reported that (a) a total of fifty-one attacks by defending interceptors had been made against them with resulting

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* CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 181209, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces, etc. (Combined Fleet Special DesOp Ord 11), WDC Document 160284.
** CinS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 181228, October 1944 to Commander SECOND Striking Force, etc., WDC Document 161055.
*** Merit Report, 14th Combined Air Group, Formosa Air Battle, October 10th-17th, 1944, WDC Document 161012.
damage to two B-29’s, (b) two more B-29’s had received minor damage from AA fire, and (c) three interceptors had been shot down and three more probably destroyed.

At about the same time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that a small attack group composed of twelve carrier type fighters and three land attack planes** which had taken off at 1230 had engaged the attacking B-29’s instead of the enemy task force. Presumably when the fighters engaged the B-29’s, the attack planes, without an escort, returned to base.

This action of the commander of this attack group in changing his objective from the destruction of enemy carriers to the destruction of the B-29’s arose, of course, from the demands of the situation. But there is considerable doubt as to the correctness of his decision since (a) there were many B-29’s, (b) there were a number of carriers, (it is doubtful if the pilots of the interceptors knew how many, but they had reason to believe only a few), (c) the attack by B-29’s was expected, and (d) no orders changing the pilot’s targets appear to have been issued by the immediate superior. The destruction of the carriers was a strategic objective which would, if accomplished, prevent an invasion; the destruction of one or more B-29’s was a purely tactical objective which contributed little or nothing to the strategic plan.

By early afternoon Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had become concerned over the movements of the eleven carriers reported earlier south of Okinawa. He knew that most of his searches had returned. He had received reports that weather in the area, showers and fairly low ceilings, might make visual sighting difficult. He realized that this strong carrier force could attack the Hamsel Shojo this afternoon or even make a long-range fighter sweep of Formosa by late afternoon. It could be in position to conduct heavy attacks on either base by the next morning. Accordingly, at 1326 he ordered that a flying boat of the 801st Air Group carry out a radar search for the enemy task force to the west of Longitude 129°00’E and north of Latitude 20°00’N.*** The location of the 801st Air Group at this time is not known, but it was probably Kyushu or Okinawa.

By this order he indicated that he correctly appreciated the capabilities of the enemy task force, but he did not indicate why he ordered that the search be conducted by a single plane rather than by two or more planes.

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* 20th Bomber Command Mission Reports Nos. 11 and 12, October 28th, 1944.
** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item 8.
*** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 161326, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force and Commander SW Area Force (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpOrd 65), FEC Historical Division Microfilm unnumbered.
Perhaps he learned at about this time, that Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla at Okinawa planned to send out at 1400 two carrier type reconnaissance planes (a) to cover the sector 194°-214°(T) from that base to a distance of 300 miles and (b) to locate the seven carrier group last sighted at 1030 and to maintain contact until dusk.* Since the eastern limit of this Okinawa search was some 160 miles west of Longitude 129°E, it is clear that the area between the Okinawa search and Longitude 129°-130°E could be covered by one radar equipped plane if its radar obtained the maximum expected range of detection. However, since recent experience had indicated that the enemy had frequently shot down search planes before the pilots had been able to send a contact report, the necessity for employing more than one plane on such an important search seems obvious.

By 1400 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew that his command was making good progress in regrouping, and would be capable of increasing its offensive effort by the next day. He also knew that, while it was possible that the enemy task force might counterattack to cover withdrawal of its damaged units, thus offering targets for the base air force, it might not have to do so but might instead prefer to maintain a covering position to the northward of the damaged ships. Since the damaged ships were slowly withdrawing to the southeast it was clear that while such action would soon place the enemy task force beyond effective range from Formosa bases, it might not place them beyond effective range from Okinawa. In order to be ready for such an eventuality, he at 1407, alerted his forces to the possibility of moving to Okinawa and attacking the enemy from there. He tentatively designated the airfields on Okinawa at which his various units would base.** This warning to his forces of possible future operations was sound and indicated that, while Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had recognized the need for regrouping his forces, he did not intend to abandon the attack but rather intended to resume offensive operations as soon as possible.

At about 1415 he presumably learned that at 1340 the "Q" Force Attack Group had taken off from Kyushu to attack the two carrier group. This attack group was composed of eight land bombers and twenty attack planes*** and was taking off in accordance with the orders he had issued the previous night. At the same time he learned that Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla at Kanyak had directed his units to move up to Formosa.

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* Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch Sigord 38, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 160137.
** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 161407, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, WDC Document 160137.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
as rapidly as possible.**

At about 1430 he learned, by flash reports, of the results of the 107 plane attack group which had departed from Formosa to attack the enemy two carrier group. The thirty-seven carrier type bombers of the 103rd Attack Unit had become separated from the rest of the aircraft en route to the target and had failed to sight the enemy.** Between 1330 and 1400 the remaining attack group had been intercepted by enemy fighters. The 256th Attack Unit claimed shooting down seven of these,*** the 203rd Air Group five more**** for a total of twelve enemy fighters destroyed. The group had continued on and had attacked the enemy task group, reportedly damaging and setting a fire on one carrier and also damaging one battleship.***** In this action the Japanese lost twenty-seven of the seventy planes which attacked.******

The group attacked was TG 30.3 which had detected the approaching planes by radar at a range of eighty miles. The attack had been intercepted by fighters from the CABOT and COWFENS who claimed shooting down forty-one Japanese planes without the loss of any defending fighters. No planes had attacked the carrier unit of TG 30.3 but three land-bombers carrying torpedoes succeeded in breaking through to attack the cruiser unit.******* All three of these had been shot down by AA fire but not before one had scored at 1548 one torpedo hit in the already damaged HOUSTON.********

Possibly at about this same time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that a twenty-two plane attack which had been launched from the

* Commander 51st Air Flotilla Dispatch 161345, October 1944 to Commanders 21st and 25th Air Flotillas, Commander 203rd Air Group, Commanders SIXTH and SEVENTH Base Air Forces, WDC Document 160288.
** War Diary Kokubu Detachment, 103rd Attack Unit, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 160256.
*** War Diary Katori Detachment 752nd Air Group, 256th Attack Unit, SHO Operations, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 161634.
**** War Diary Ta303rd Air Group, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 161635.
****** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
******* Action Report CABOT, Air Cover for Task Group 30-3 from October 14th to October 18th, 1944, Serial 063, October 18th, 1944.
Philippines had failed to find a target and had returned to base.*

At about 1630 he presumably learned that the two search planes which Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla at Okinawa had planned to send out at 1400 had been delayed in take off and had not departed the Oruku base until 1600.**

At about 1730 he learned that Imperial General Headquarters had made two public announcements to the effect that already in the battle Japanese forces had sunk eleven carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, and one destructor, and had damaged six carriers, two battleships, four cruisers, and eleven undetermined types.*** Whether or not he approved of such gross exaggeration of the facts, even in order to stimulate public morale, is not known.

At about 2800 he was informed that the Kanoya search, which had departed that base at 1105 and presumably was the search unit of the "T" Force attack group, had landed at Okinawa at 1725 having made no contacts.**** At about the same time he probably learned that the "T" Force attack group which had taken off at 1320 had failed to locate a target and had returned to base.* Why this attack had failed to locate the enemy is not understood for, as noted previously, the weather in the area should not have prevented detection of the enemy task force. This is particularly true in the case of the "T" Force for it will be recalled that this force was specially trained for attack under low visibility conditions.

At 1815 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force who, in addition to watching the enemy situation and launching attacks, had been concerned in regrouping his forces, directed Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla at Shinchiku and Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla at Okinawa to return all aircraft of the "T" Force which were then under their command or present in their areas***** to Commander "T" Force.

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* Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
** Detailed Action Reports of 752nd Air Group Units, June 1944 - January 1945, WDC Document 160364.
*** Diary of Vice Admiral Kimpe Teraoka, IJN, August 1st - November 1st, 1944, FIFTH Base Air Force in SHO Operation; GHQ-FOE Special Historical Collection; Supporting Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 30, Footcover 7 of 10, SWPA Series Vol. II); also New York Times, October 17th, 1944.
**** War Diary 12th Reconnaissance Unit, Kanoya Detachment, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 160381.
***** Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Dispatch 161215, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force (SIXTH Base Air Force DesOpord 67) FEC Historical Division Microfilm unnumbered.
At 1836 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force ordered Commander 901st Air Group to launch his night searches as soon as practicable and to search to a radius of 300 miles from Gara Bi. The available information does not indicate the bearing limits of this search. His decision to send out such night searches was sound, for as noted earlier, he knew that a strong enemy task force could be in position to attack Formosa at dawn. Why he did not order similar searches from Okinawa and extend the radius of search to provide greater protection is not clear, but it may have been due to non-availability of more long-range radar equipped aircraft.

At about 2000, while completing his plans for the next day's operations, he received Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla's plans for the morning search for the next day wherein that commander had ordered the 783rd Air Group at Nanoya to launch seven two-engine land bombers at 0600 to cover the sector 135°-200°(T) to a distance of 660 miles.**

At about 2030 he learned that the two search planes which had departed from Okinawa at 1800 to locate and track the enemy carriers south of that base had landed at Okinawa at 2000 having made no contact.*** He also learned about this time that the search plane of the 801st Air Group, which he had ordered at 1326 to search by radar the area east of that covered by the above two planes, returned to base without having made any contacts although TG's 38.1, 38.2, and 38.3 were operating in that area.

At 2117 he issued orders for the next day's operations. He directed that searches be made from Gara Bi covering the sector 065°-150°(T) to 400 miles, and from Nanoya covering the sector 150°-185°(T) to an unspecified radius. Searches in other sectors were to be made as directed by the responsible commanders. He also ordered that, commencing at 0600, all forces were to be ready to take-off for attack on thirty minutes notice.**** Why he reduced the search that Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla had already planned to send out is not known, but it is possible that he desired the maximum number of planes available for attack operations. To reduce this search, however, without specifying that Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla provide adequate coverage of the

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** Commander 91st Air Flotilla Dispatch 181923, October 1944 to SIXTH Base Air Force, Information to Commander SECOND Striking Force, WDC Document 161844.
areas eliminated from the Kanoya search, appears of doubtful correctness. Since his afternoon searches had failed to reestablish contact with the eleven carriers sighted earlier south of Okinawa, he could not be assured that that force would not strike his bases at dawn. Does it not appear that he might have better provided for the security of his forces had he directed that an integrated search be conducted from both Kanoya and Okinawa to cover the areas of possible approach of the enemy task force? He probably knew at this time that Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla had directed (a) three two-engine land bombers and five carrier type reconnaissance planes to be ready at 0530 to take off for search on fifteen minutes notice, and (b) that by 0645 (1) all operational aircraft on Okinawa were to be prepared to disperse on fifteen minutes notice and (2) all fighters were to be ready for interception operations.*

Sometimes during the evening he learned that Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla at Shinchiku planned to send out three search planes at about 0600 in the morning to cover the sector 137°-182°(T) to an unspecified range.** He also learned that indications of a typhoon rising to the south had been reported and that special units were being readied by the commanders in the Philippines to attack under cover of this bad weather.*** What other information he had of the weather conditions at the time is not known, but there were heavy squall lines lying across the intertropical front in the area east of Leyte, Samar, and southern Luzon. These had produced bad flying conditions which appeared to have forced cancellation of the Philippine searches on this day. Although he continued to regroup his forces in an endeavor to regain his striking power, he knew that he could not possibly regain the original striking power of his "Z" Force, since some three-quarters of that force had already been lost.****

October 16th.

Commander FIFTH Base Air Force had planned to conduct routine searches at dawn as on previous days. However, as dawn approached he received reports of increasingly squally weather in the area east of Samar and Leyte. Several heavy squall lines were moving into that area from the east, and conditions during the day approached typhoon conditions. Whether or not his searches were launched is not known but, if they were, the search aircraft apparently turned back before reaching the limit of their sectors due to weather. There is no indication

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* Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch Sig Ord 36, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 160357 (Transmitted by telephone.)
** Commander 21st Air Flotilla Dispatch Sig Ord 5, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 160579.
*** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.

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that his planes reported any contacts although TG 38.4 was this day fueling in an area about 325 miles east of Luzon and the MeneeWeeper Group (TG 78.5) and Dimagat Attack Group (TG 78.4) of TF 77 were only about 140 miles east of Mindanao proceeding to Leyte Gulf. TG 38.4 was actually in an area of unlimited ceiling and fifteen miles visibility but during the entire day detected no enemy aircraft. The groups east of Mindanao however were experiencing heavy rainfall and extremely limited visibility. Why the area northeast of Luzon, where TG 38.4 was operating, was not adequately covered by search planes is not known.

During the morning Commander FIFTH Base Air Force undoubtedly was informed of the contacts made to the eastward of Formosa by the SIXTH Base Air Force. By about 1050 he presumably knew (a) of the two-carrier group reportedly withdrawing from east of Formosa and which was being attacked by the SIXTH Base Air Force and (b) of the four-carrier group 600 miles northeast of Manila. Like Commander SIXTH Base Air Force he probably considered this latter group to be the one which had attacked Manila the day before. Sometime after 1100 he likely learned of the third sighting, this one on a seven-carrier force near the four-carrier group. None of these groups appeared to be menacing the Philippines area at this time. The nearest one the two-carrier group which was at 420 miles north northeast of Manila. He probably conferred with CG FOURTH Air Army on their joint ability to launch a long-range strike.

At about 1220 he knew that Cinc, Combined Fleet had shifted his headquarters from Shinchiku to Takao where he would be in close proximity to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. Shortly thereafter at about 1240 he received additional orders from Cinc, Combined Fleet. These orders were the same as those issued to Commander SIXTH Base Air Force and directed that the base air forces, while clarifying the enemy situation, concentrate their strength and pursue and destroy the enemy.

At about 1345 he received word that the 258th Attack Unit of the THIRD Base Air Force, which was also under command of Commander Southwest

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**War Diary CG 38.4, October 16th, 1944.
***Report of Minesweeping Operations in Surigao Straits and Leyte Gulf, Commander MINHON TWO (CG 78.5), Serial 0111, October 29th, 1944.
****Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 161161, October 1944 to Combined Fleet, WDC Document 161086.
*****Cinc, Combined Fleet Dispatch 161209, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Force, etc. (Combined Fleet Special DesOpOrd 11) WDC Document 160284.
Area Forces, has been ordered to Manila and upon arrival was to report to him for duty. This dispatch is of interest since it is the first known instance of the employment of the Third Base Air Force in this operation.

At some time during the day, and more probably in the afternoon, Commander Fifth Base Air Force presumably in cooperation with CG Fourth Air Army, launched a small strike. The time of take-off and the target of this strike are not known, but it comprised twenty-two planes and failed to find any target.** Except for this one abortive effort it does not appear that the Philippine air forces contributed anything to the general offensive on this day. This was probably due, at least in part, to the long range to the nearest reported enemy group which, because of a shortage of long-range planes in the Philippines, limited attacks to that attempted above. In anticipation of a worsening of the weather over the entire area and the possibility of a full typhoon developing, Commander Fifth Base Air Force readied those of his units which would be able to operate under such conditions for future attacks against any enemy forces.***

(d) Operations of CG Fourth Air Army, October 16th.

As on previous days, CG Fourth Air Army presumably cooperated closely with Commander Fifth Base Air Force in his operations on this day. It is not known whether or not he launched those short-range searches for which he was responsible under the joint agreement with the naval commander, but if he did his planes would probably have made no contacts. As noted earlier TG 38.4 was in an area of good flying conditions just beyond the short range search arc of 300 miles from the Philippines, while the groups of TF 77, approaching from the southeast, were in an area of bad flying conditions, well within the range search arc of 300 miles.

CG Fourth Air Army was undoubtedly informed of the three contacts reported during the morning and probably conferred with Commander Fifth Base Air Force on what actions could be taken against the enemy task groups. The data available does not indicate whether or not the twenty-two plane abortive attack which was launched from the Philippines was made up of both Army and Navy planes but it would seem likely that it was. Beyond this small effort CG Fourth Air Army took no active part in the day's operations.

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* Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 151314, October 1944 to Commander Fifth Base Air Force, WDC Document 160334 NA 12378.
** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944
** Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947,
** Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.
** Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer,
** Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army
** Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item 8.

C O N F I D E N T I A L
During this time he was concerned with plans for the employment of large reinforcements expected from Japan and China. To inform the FOURTH Air Army of changes entailed he issued a tentative order on this date stating that such changes would be made effective on October 25th by subsequent orders.*

(8) Operations until 0719 October 17th.

(a) Operations of CinC, Combined Fleet.

During the early morning CinC, Combined Fleet at his new headquarters at Takao received two contact reports from a radar equipped flying boat searching to a radius of 290 miles from Garam Bl. This plane reported what appeared to be two separate task groups, one at 0235 in Latitude 19°-05'N, Longitude 125°-15'E and one at 0250 in Latitude 20°-15'N, Longitude 124°-25'E.** As on the previous day it seems likely that CinC Combined Fleet estimated one of these to be the Allied task group retiring slowly to the southeast (TG 30.3).

His estimate of the situation as of this time is not known but it is undoubtedly true that he was greatly concerned since the combat capabilities of the Allies now far exceeded his own. Had he expected an immediate Allied landing somewhere in the Philippine area, it seems reasonable to assume that he would have insured that oilers were available at Brunei, and would have issued instructions to the Main Force to prepare to sortie, and to collect its aircraft not employed in Formosa. On the other hand, it will be shown in a later volume of this study that when the 0719 report of Allied surface forces off Suluan Island was received by him he acted with such dispatch (fifty minutes including time of transmission and decoding) as to indicate that he may have expected this very situation to eventuate.***

(b) Operations of Commander Mobile Force.

Commander Mobile Force remained ashore at Cita Air Base. Whether in view of the developing situation, he obtained from the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet that officer’s estimate of the situation is not known. However, it seems clear that, as a responsible commander he must have viewed the capabilities of the Allied carrier task force with considerable concern. As early as October 12th he had been advised by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet that his carriers would not be required in this operation. It was to be accomplished

* FOURTH Air Army Operations Order A-497, October 16th, 1944, Documents from Pile of Lieutenant Colonel Katao Sato, IJA, Staff Officer, FOURTH Air Army, Department of the Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-7
*** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 170809, October 1944, to all Flags Combined Fleet (8, special DesOpOrd 14) WDC Document 161536.
entirely by land-based air forces. He was not so sure now that this condition would still obtain since the thirteen carriers contacted on the preceding day showed conclusively that the land-based air forces had failed. The situation had obviously changed radically. He probably wondered whether or not his carriers would now be required even though almost completely defenseless as regards carrier-based air power.

At 0633, noting that the SUZUTSUKI had been torpedoed off the east coast of Kyushu, he directed her to proceed to Kure and to transfer there to the SUGI the personnel and supplies she was transporting to Takao. He also directed the SUGI and the WAKATSUKI to then proceed to Takao.**

(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force.

Commander FIRST Striking Force remained in his flagship, the heavy cruiser ATAGO at Lingga. His command had been reported ready for sea with the exceptions of the NOSHIRO and AOBA and about ten seaplanes which were at Singapore, and the KAYASHIMO and AKISHIMO which were approaching Manila. It seems logical to assume that he viewed the developing situation with intense interest since his orders to be prepared to sortie definitely forecast some immediate action for his force.

(2) Operations of Commander Main Force.

Commander Main Force, who it will be remembered was also Commander Mobile Force, remained ashore at Olca Air Base. Naturally the comments concerning the reactions of Commander Mobile Force are equally applicable to Commander Main Force.

(3) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force.

Commander SECOND Striking Force with the SECOND Striking Force, less HAYASUHARU and USHIO had at 2400, October 16th, passed Amami O Shima and headed into the East China Sea.

The HAYASUHARU proceeded independently. Her movements after 2315, October 16th and until 0719 October 17th, are not available but it appears that she moved in a northerly direction for a time.

The USHIO remained on special communications duty to the south of Amami O Shima with orders to rejoin during the 17th.*** This duty was completed at 0200 and the USHIO rejoined the SECOND Striking Force at 0615 in Latitude 29°00'N, Longitude 129°53'E.****

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** Commander Mobile Force dispatch 170633 October 1944 to WAKATSUKI, SUZUTSUKI, SUGI, etc., WDC Document.
*** War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638.
**** War Diary DESDIV 7 (USHIO), October 1944, WDC Document 161717 NA 11801.
The SECOND Striking Force remained to the northwest of Amami O Shima during the night and at 0719, was in approximate position Latitude 29°-05'N, Longitude 128°-35'E.

(c) Operations of the Base Air Forces until 0719, October 17th,

(1) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force.

During the night of October 16th-17th, Commander SIXTH Base Air Force conducted continuous searches employing radar equipped flying boats of the 81st* and 901st** Air Groups.

Shortly after midnight he reviewed his plans for the dawn searches and then made a modification to the proposed search from Shinchiku. He had been informed by Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla that the search would depart at about 0600 and cover the sector 135°-164°(T).*** He now, at 0108, in order to better coordinate this search with the night searches underway, directed that commander to change the time of departure to 0400 and to make the search radius 250 miles.**** Why he set the search radius at 250 miles is not clear since the land attack planes of the 708th Attack Unit at Shinchiku, which were being used for search, were capable of flying a radius of over 750 miles. Perhaps his principal concern was the possibility of dawn carrier attacks on Formosa.

Sometime during the early morning he learned that Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla had ordered his search planes now on fifteen minutes notice after 0530***** to take off at 0600 and to cover the sector from Okinawa between bearing 115°-125°(T) to 500 miles except within the sector 145°-165°(T) wherein the range was to be 500 miles.******

About this time he received two contact reports from a radar equipped flying boat on what appeared to be two separate task groups; one at 0235 in

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* Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Navy Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
*** Commander 21st Air Flotilla Dispatch SigOrd 5, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 160579.
***** Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch SigOrd 35, October 16th, 1944, WDC Document 160137.
****** Commander 25th Air Flotilla Dispatch SigOrd 37, October 17th, 1944, WDC Document 160137.
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Latitude 19°-05'N, Longitude 125°-15'E and one at 0250 in Latitude 20°-15'N, Longitude 124°-25'E. As on the previous day, he likely estimated that one of these contacts was on the Allied task group retiring slowly to the southeast (TG 30.3). If this was his evaluation it was correct since units of that group reported radar contact on an enemy plane which at this time operated in the vicinity for a period of some hours.**

In addition he may have evaluated the other contact as either the seven carrier group (TG's 38.2 and 38.3) or the four carrier group (TG 38.1).

Regardless of his evaluation, he was relieved, at least temporarily, to see that the enemy group were far enough from Formosa and Okinawa as to make dawn strikes unlikely. If he were not attacked, it would give him sorely needed time to reorganize his forces and further their deployment to Formosa.

Actually only TG 30.3 was within the search area of the flying boat as TG's 38.1, 38.2 and 38.3 were operating some 420 miles from Garan Bi.

At 0500 Commander FIFTY-FIRST Air Flotilla commenced launching his morning search from Kanoysa. This search which he had planned at 1923 the night before, was to cover the sector 135°-200°(T) to a radius of 650 miles.***

At about the same time Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that the two search planes which he had directed to take off from Shinchiku at 0400 had not departed at that time. The first plane of this search actually took off at 0445 to search the sector 149°-164°(T) to 250 miles. The second of the two planes, this one to cover the adjoining sector 133°-149°(T) was further delayed due to engine trouble and finally took off at 0700.**** Presumably he was informed of these modifications.

At 0600 Commander TWENTY-FIFTH Air Flotilla at Okinawa commenced launching his search in accordance with the plans communicated to him earlier that morning by Commander SIXTH Base Air Force. Also at 0600 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force learned that (a) Commander TWENTY-FIRST Air Flotilla, who was having trouble launching his two-plane sector search, had launched an additional search of two land reconnaissance planes to search the area north of a bearing of 067°(T) through Garan Bi and west of a bearing of 130°(T) through Kii, and (b) in accordance with his orders issued the previous evening, an attack group at southern

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** War Diary COMPENS, October 17th, 1944.
**** Shinchiku Air Base Dispatch 171352, October 1944 to Authorized Ships, WDC Document 160579.
Formosa bases had assumed an alert status prepared to take off on thirty minutes notice. This group comprised fifty carrier-type fighters as a fighter striking unit, thirty-eight fighters as escort, and forty land bombers and eight carrier-type attack planes as an attack unit, a total of 136 planes.**

At 0710 he knew that the search he had ordered from Garan Bi had commenced taking off. However many delays occurred so that the last plane of this search did not take off until some fifty minutes later.** These delays had an adverse effect on the effectiveness of the entire search plan, for the Garan Bi search was one which would cover at least a part of the most probable area of contact. The sectors as laid down from the various bases generally covered the area adequately providing they were covered at the same time. This delay would permit an enemy force originally in an area to be covered from Garan Bi to move from the area before the Garan Bi search arrived, into an area already covered by the Okinawa search.

By 0719 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had reason to believe that his searches from Kancya, Okinawa and Shinshiku, were underway and that his searches from Garan Bi were also underway although in a somewhat staggered manner. He awaited reports from these searches but, as of this time, none had been received. Meanwhile his forces were continuing their deployment to Formosa, and effecting the regrouping necessary to regain their combat effectiveness.

(2) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force.

Commander FIFTH Base Air Force presumably launched at dawn at least some of those searches for which he was responsible. He knew that the weather was still undesirable to bad in the area east of Leyte and Samar but that it was better east of northern Luzon.

At about 0615 the four hecklers which CTG 38.4 had launched at 0440,*** should have been over Legaspi. There is, however, no information available which shows that they had been observed. Certainly Commander FIFTH Base Air Force appears to have been unaware of their presence.

By 0719 he had received no contact reports. He awaited development of the current situation while endeavoring to increase the readiness of his command.

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* Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, I/J, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-22, Item B.
*** War Diary CTG 38.4, October 17th, 1944.
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(d) Operations of CG FOURTH Air Army.

CG FOURTH Air Army had also probably launched at least some of the short-range searches for which he was responsible. At 0719 he awaited the developments while directing his efforts toward increasing his combat readiness.

(3) Discussion of Losses of Japanese Aircraft October 10th - 0719
October 17th.

(a) SIXTH Base Air Force

At the time of the initial Allied attack against Okinawa on October 10th, the Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had assigned to him 737 aircraft of all types. Subsequently he received as reinforcements 688 additional planes, making an aggregate of 1425. Based on an over-all availability factor of sixty per cent. as derived from Japanese statistics and as shown under "Japanese Land Based Aircraft," 865 of this total number of aircraft were actually operational and ready for combat. A SIXTH Base Air Force staff officer estimated that the "T" Force had lost three-fourths of its operational aircraft and the other units about one-third. The application of these respective loss factors to the 130 operational aircraft of the "T" Force and the 725 operational aircraft comprising the other units of the SIXTH Base Air Force indicates that about 97 planes were lost by the "T" Force and about 241 were lost by the remaining units, for a total of about 338. However, Japanese records place the actual losses for the "T" Force at 118. Using this figure in lieu of the 97 computed in accordance with the staff officer's estimate gives a total loss of 359 aircraft. Reports from ten different units of the SIXTH Base Air Force indicate that during this period about 350 operational aircraft were destroyed, presumably in the air. Since the 350 figure approximates the mean of 338 and 359, and is also substantiated to a certain degree by the SIXTH Base Staff Officer, who placed the approximate total losses at 300, it will be accepted for this analysis. Therefore, an over-all loss factor of 41% (350/865) is established.

By subtracting the 350 operational losses from the total number of 865 operational aircraft, a figure of 515 planes is obtained as the operational strength on October 17th. Of this number, there were 250 planes operational on Formosa. Others remained in Nansei Shoto and Kyushu, but

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* Memorandum Notes of Captain Bunzo Shibata, IJN, Staff Officer, Second Air Fleet, October 10th-23rd, 1944, Department of the Army Historical Division Microfilm ES-22, Item B.
** Situation of the "T" Attack Force, October 15th, 1944, FEC Microfilm unnumbered, forwarded by Chief, Military History Section, Special Staff, GHQ, FEC, letter of January 10th, 1944 to President, Naval War College.
information on exactly how many is lacking. However, by subtracting the number of planes on Formosa from the total operational strength remaining on October 17th, it would appear that about 255 planes were still operational in those areas.

An estimate of the non-operational aircraft destroyed is obtained by applying the over-all loss factor of forty-one per cent to the 570 planes in this category in the SIXTH Base Air Force. This computation indicates that about 234 planes were destroyed on the ground. This figure added to the 350 operational aircraft losses establishes the total losses for the SIXTH Base Air Force during the period October 10th-17th as 584 planes.

In contrast to the above computed losses of SIXTH Base Air Force planes, COMTHIRDFLT claimed that he had destroyed at Okinawa, Formosa and in the vicinity of TF 38 a total of 906 aircraft (516 in the air and 390 on the ground) during this period.**

The above computations show that Japanese losses amounted to about sixty-four per cent of the Allied claims. Therefore, this factor will be used in evaluating claims by COMTHIRDFLT later in this discussion, in regard to establishing the operational strengths of the FIFTH Base Air Force and the FOURTH Air Army at 0719, October 17th.

Although the Commander SIXTH Base Air Force still had about sixty per cent of his original number of operational aircraft on October 17th, the combat efficiency of his command had been greatly reduced, and, temporarily at least, had approached zero. His command organization had been disrupted, his units widely scattered, many of his most experienced pilots lost, his material condition deteriorated by lack of spares parts and by intensive operations, and the morale of his personnel seriously impaired. Now greatly one or another of these factors contributed to the decline of effectiveness of the SIXTH Base Air Force is not known, but as a result of the air battles during September and early October the Base Air Forces (including the SIXTH Base Air Force) had lost the greater part of the available strength which they had been assiduously building up since August. Consequently, at the crucial moment when the U.S. forces landed in the Philippines, the strength of the air forces was at its lowest ebb.***

(b) FIFTH Base Air Force and FOURTH Air Army

Japanese documents indicate that the FIFTH Base Air Force had thirty-three operational aircraft and the FOURTH Air Army had sixty-nine operational aircraft as of 1800 October 18th.*** Since there is no

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** COMTHIRDFLT Carrier Strikes; operational summary of, Serial 0074, October 27th, 1944.

** Philippine Area Naval Operations Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.

*** Urgent Reinforcement Plan of SHO One operation, FEC Microfilm contained in FEC Military History Section letter January 10th, 1952, to President, Naval War College.
information regarding admitted Japanese aircraft losses between 0719 October 17th and 1800 October 18th, the approximate strengths of these units as of 0719 October 17th are derived by (1) taking the number of Japanese aircraft claimed destroyed in the Philippines by the Allies in the air and on the ground (85 and 145, respectively)* and multiplying by sixty-four per cent to establish actual losses; (2) multiplying the actual ground losses so obtained by the sixty per cent operational factor to obtain the number of operational aircraft destroyed on the ground; (3) adding together the resultant operational ground losses and the air losses (55 and 54); (4) dividing the total by two and adding this figure (54) to the number of operational aircraft in the two forces as of 1800 October 18th (33 and 69, as stated above) to establish the number of operational aircraft as of 0719 October 17th, viz.; FIFTH Base Air Force eighty-seven, FOURTH Air Army 123, a total of 210 operational aircraft. Dividing the total number of operational aircraft in these two units by the sixty per cent operational factor indicates that a total of 350 aircraft were available, distributed as follows: FIFTH Base Air Force 145 planes, FOURTH Air Army 205 planes.

In making the above computations, the following basic considerations apply: (1) losses are distributed evenly between the FIFTH Base Air Force and the FOURTH Air Army, since each started out with about the same number of aircraft (Tables 13 and 14, page 222); (2) all aircraft shot down are operational; (3) sixty per cent of aircraft destroyed on the ground are operational; (4) actual losses are sixty-four per cent of Allied claims; (5) aircraft shot down in the vicinity of the task force are excluded, since it cannot be established whether such aircraft came from the Philippines or from Formosa.

(f) JAPANESE POSITION AT 0719 OCTOBER 17TH.

At 0719 October 17th, the time that the Japanese lookout post at Sulu Island made its contact report on Allied surface forces entering Leyte Gulf, the various Japanese surface forces and groups, less submarines, were located in the following positions:

(a) Combined Fleet.

(1) Mobile Force.

(a) FIRST Striking Force was at Lingga with the exception of the cruisers AOBA and NOSHIRO, which were at Singapore, and the destroyers HAYASHIMO and AKISHIMO which were approaching Manila.

(b) Main Force was at various bases in the Kure area in the Inland Sea. The FUJITSUKI was under repair at Kure and the SUZITSUKI was en route Kure for repairs having been torpedoed at 2212 the previous day.

(c) SECOND Striking Force less the HATSUHARU was bearing 305° (T) distant sixty miles from the northern tip of Amami O Shima. The HATSUHARU's position is not definitely known but was presumably south of Kyushu.

* Volume II, "Battle for Leyte Gulf," "Operations of CGT 77.4 and CGT 32.4," October 17th, 1944; also "Operations of CGT 77.4, CGT 38.1, CGT 38.2, and CGT 38.4, October 18th, 1944."
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(g) COMPOSITION OF FORCES AND TASKS ASSIGNED (0719, OCTOBER 17th, 1944)

(a) Combined Fleet

(1) Composition of Forces

(a) Mobile Force

(1) MAIN Force

ZUKIKU, AMAGI, URUYU, KATSURAGI
ZUTO, CHITOSE, CHIYODA, RYUHO
RYUGA, INE
JUNYO
Incl: Elements of 601st, 634th, 653rd Groups

OUYODE, T. MA
SUGI, MOKI, KASHI, KAYA, HINOKI,
SHIMOMUKI, WAKATSUKI, HATSUZUKI,
AKITUS

(2) SECOND Striking Force

MACHI, ASHIGARA
ABURUMA
AKESONO, USHIO, KASUMI, SHIRANUHI,
HATSUHARU, HATSUSHIMO, WAKABA

(3) FIRST Striking Force

YAMATO, MUSASHI, MAFATO, FUSO,
YAMASHIRO, KONO, HARUMA
ATAGO, TAKAO, CHOKAI, MAYA, MYOKO,
HAGURO, MOGAMI, KUMANO, SUZUYA, TONE,
CHIKUMA, AODA
NOSHIRO, TAKAGI, KINU
SHIMAKAZE, SHIGURE, HAYASHIMO,**
AKISHIMO,** KIYOSHIRO, KISHINAMI, OKINAMI,
ASASHIHO, MAFANAMI, MAJANAMI, FUJINAMI,
MICHISHIHO, ASAGUMO, YAMAGURO, NOWAKI,
URAKAZE, HAMAKAZE, YUKIZAKE, ISOKAZE,
URANAMI, 1 AO

* Exact strength not known but the minimum figure is not less than 27 planes (601st Air Group); the maximum not more than 116 planes. The reason for this large disparity is that no information is available to this analysis as to the number of planes of the 634th and 653rd Air Groups transferred to the SIXTH Base Air Force in accordance with CINC Combined Fleet's directive of October 12th. It is known, however, that 99 planes of these two air groups were embarked in CARDIV THREE upon its sortie October 20th. Detailed Action Report Main Force SHO One operations, October 20th-29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.

** En route Manila for temporary duty under CONSOWESAREA Force.

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(b) SIXTH Base Air Force

Aircraft available (approximately) 842*

(c) Advance Expeditionary Force

Submarines available


(d) SW Area Force

(1) FIFTH Base Air Force

Aircraft available (approximately) 145*

(2) Philippine Force

(Composition light combatant forces only)

(e) Anti-submarine Patrol Force

ISUZU 1 CL
T3UZIKI, UZUKI, AKIKAZE, KIRI, UME, TAKE, NAMO, MAKI, KIWA 9 DD

Air groups 933 (about 9 planes)

(2) Tasks Assigned

Combined Fleet

To continue present operations to destroy enemy carrier task force (self assigned);** to otherwise assume the strategic defensive until enemy has indicated decisive battle area; prior to decisive battle to reduce approaching enemy by attrition attacks while conserving

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* Obtained by applying the estimate of operational planes as 60% of total planes available. Thus SIXTH Base Air Force had available 506 or 842 planes and the FIFTH Base Air Force had 87 or 145 planes.

** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 161209, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces, Commander FIFTH Fleet and Commander Advance Expeditionary Force (War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944) WDC Document 161658 MA 11739.
own strength; when decisive battle area has been attacked to assume de-

fensive until enemy is drawn as close as possible; then to destroy: (1) 

Enemy carriers, (2) Amphibious groups, by concerted and repeated attacks 

by navy and army forces including air; when other areas are attacked to 

destroy enemy by naval and air forces locally available (area forces).* 

(a) Mobile Force**

To prepare to destroy damaged ships of TF 38; to 

destroy enemy task forces and amphibious groups at the forward line of 

the area selected for the decisive battle employing full strength.

(1) Main Force

To facilitate FIRST Striking Force's penetra-

tion of the landing area by diverting Allied task force to northeast, 

and joining in attack on enemy task force flank. If opportunity arises, 

to destroy Allied supply forces.**

(2) SECOND Striking Force

To prepare to destroy damaged ships of TF 38; to 

facilitate FIRST Striking Force's penetration of the landing area by 

diverting Allied task force to northeast, and joining in attack on enemy 

task force flank. If opportunity arises, to destroy Allied supply forces.**

(3) FIRST Striking Force

To prepare to destroy damaged ships of TF 38, when 

Allied landing plan is determined, to proceed via Brunei or north-
central Philippines, aiming to reach landing area at time landing is 
taking place. In cooperation with base air forces, and avoiding Allied 
task forces, to engage decisively Allied surface force opposing its ad-

vance; thereafter to destroy Allied transports and troops at landing 

area.***

(b) SIXTH Base Air Force

To continue present all-out air operations to 

destroy Allied carrier force by air power alone; if Allies attack in

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* Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive 431, July 21st, 1944, 
WDC Document 218769 (Microfilm).
** Mobile Force Operation Order 76, August 10th, 1944, ATIS Document 
No. 59 (Part 1) April 22nd, 1945 (NACHI Documents).
*** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 161209, October 1944 to Commanders 
FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces, Commander FIFTH Fleet and Commander 
Advance Expeditionary Force (War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944) 
WDC Document 161838 NA 11739.
decisive battle area, to await approach of invasion forces, drawing major part of Allied strength as near as possible, while concentrating forces; then at a favorable opportunity to engage decisively, destroying Allies in cooperation with all-out concerted attack by friendly air, army and navy forces; to commence all-out attacks on day previous to FIRST Striking Force's penetration of landing area. Priority of targets: (1) carriers, (2) invasion forces.  

(c) Advance Expeditionary Force

In event of attack by enemy task forces or amphibious groups, to intercept enemy and gain control of invasion area.

(d) SW Area Force

To secure SW Area in cooperation with the army; to protect sea communications; to destroy Allied shipping and to provide transport as required.

(1) FIFTH Base Air Force

To continue present all-out air operations to destroy Allied carrier force by air power alone; if Allies attack in decisive battle area, to await approach of invasion forces, drawing major part of Allied strength as near as possible, while concentrating forces; then at a favorable opportunity to engage decisively, destroying Allies in cooperation with all-out concerted attack by friendly air, army and navy forces; to commence all-out attacks on day previous to FIRST Striking Force's penetration of landing area. Priority of targets: (1) carriers, (2) invasion forces.

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* Army-Navy Central Agreement concerning SHO Operations concluded July 24th, 1944, Supplement to Imperial General Headquarters Navy Section Directive 456, July 26th, 1944, WDC Document 216789 (microfilm); also Commander SIXTH Base Air Force Operation Order 6, September 6th 1944, Army Historical Division, Microfilm H3-18, Item D.


**** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 161232, October 1944 to Commanders FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces, Commander FIFTH Fleet, and Commander Advance Expeditionary Force (War Diary DESRON 1) WDC Document 161639 NA 11739.

(2) Philippine Force

To protect sea communications.*

(e) Anti-submarine Patrol Force

To destroy enemy submarines, to provide escorts for Mobile Force and Supply Force and to guard fleet anchorages.*

(3) Discussion

The Combined Fleet, including its land-based aircraft, was insufficient in strength to accomplish its assigned objectives. It had already failed in its self-assigned objective "the destruction of the Allied carrier force." In this operation it had achieved nothing but negative results. It had lost, in round figures, three-quarters of its "T" Force and one-third of its other base air forces in the SHO One and SHO Two areas without inflicting any important damage against the Allied carrier task force. This made the accomplishment of the objectives for the SHO Operations much more difficult than would have been the case had the Japanese land-based air power, including Army air, not been dissipated against TF 38. The Combined Fleet now was clearly inferior in strength to the Allied forces which CinC, Combined Fleet could estimate might be concentrated against it. This was especially so in carriers (CV's and CVL's) where the ratio was eight (about half of these carriers were new and not ready to sortie) to at least thirteen (since thirteen Allied carriers had been observed the previous day). It was also so in planes since CinC, Combined Fleet could estimate about 845 (13 x 65) planes in the Allied carriers plus an unknown number of shore-based aircraft operating from various bases. Against this Allied air strength, he had available at this time but 987 (942 + 145) land-based aircraft (naval) of which but 592 were operational and about 205 army aircraft of the FOURTH Air Army of which but 123 were operational, plus an unknown but small number of Kyushu-based planes of his three carrier air groups.

A study of the surface strengths available also shows that CinC, Combined Fleet could estimate that the surface strength of the Combined Fleet was likewise not only inferior to the Allied surface strength, but its principal forces were separated by some 2500 miles.

There were thirty-five modern submarines attached to the Advance Expeditionary Force at this time. Of these thirty-five only eighteen (all in the FIRST Submarine Force) were available to the Leyte operation.

** CinC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 070953, September 1944 to All Fleet and Squadron Commanders, Combined Fleet DesqPord 292, War Diary 23rd Air Flotilla, September 1944, WDC Document 160264 NA 12546.
Four of these (I-26, 45, 54, 56) were en route for operations against TF 38. Twelve (I-38, 41, 44, 46, 53, RO-41, 43, 46, 49, 50, 109, 112) were in the Inland Sea, and two (I-177 and RO-47) were still at sea in the Palau area, apparently having been directed to remain there. The other seventeen submarines were on other duty as follows: seven (I-361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367) in operational transport to by-passed areas; six (I-48, 368, 369, 370, 371, RO-55) in training and shakedown in the Inland Sea; one (I-12) en route west coast; and three (I-36, 37, 47) were being equipped for launching Kaiten (human torpedoes).

(b) Southern Army

(1) Composition of Forces

(a) FOURTEENTH Area Army

(1) SIXTEENTH Division (Leyte)

Total ground troops (plus one tank company)
(approximately) 16000*

(b) FOURTH Air Army

Total aircraft (approximately) 205**

(2) Assigned Tasks

(a) FOURTEENTH Area Army

To defend the Philippines

(1) SIXTEENTH Division

To defend Leyte

(b) FOURTH Air Army

To continue present operations to destroy Allied carrier

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** Detailed data regarding total aircraft are not available. It is known that about 123 operational aircraft were available on October 17th. Applying the estimate of operational planes as 60% of the total planes available, the approximate figure of 205 has been arrived at. Since going to press what may be a more correct figure of 105 operational planes rather than the computed 123 has been received. (Daily Record of War Situation Maintained by Captain Kinji Takehashi, IJA, Operations Department, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.) This figure which tends to support the mathematical analysis, gives a total of 175 aircraft rather than 205.
force: prior to landing operations in cooperation with naval air forces destroy Allied carrier force or, if operating alone, conduct raids on Allied carrier forces, and on Allied air bases and intercept Allied attacks; after landing operations destroy Allied invasion force, especially transports, commencing on day previous to FIRST Striking Force penetration of landing area.**

(3) Discussion

The FOURTH Air Army, with its limited number of planes, (205) even when employed in cooperation with the 145 planes of the FIFTH Base Air Force was inadequate to accomplish its destruction objectives alone since the number of planes in the Allied carrier forces alone (thirteen carriers had been observed) was approximately 845 planes which was much larger than those available in the Philippine area (350).

(b) JAPANESE PLAN

(1) Basic SHO Plan, October 10th.

The basic SHO plan as originally promulgated in July 1944,*** and as discussed throughout the preceding pages, had as its objective the prevention of an Allied landing through the destruction of the Allied invasion forces in the vicinity of the landing area by a coordinated and sustained air, surface and subsurface attack by all designated units of the Army and the Navy.

This was to be accomplished by:****

(a) An initial withdrawal and dispersal of the air forces, to reduce losses from Allied task force attacks. During this time the defense against these attacks was to be effected by (1) ground installations (2) small scale air attacks against the Allied task force and (3) interception of the Allied task force by submarines.

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* FOURTH Air Army Operation Order A-489, October 13th, 1944, file of Lieutenant Colonel Sato, IJA, Department of Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-7.
** Draft Plan of FOURTH Air Army Operations after mid-October, October 15th, 1944, Operations Section, FOURTH Air Army, file of Lieutenant Colonel Sato, IJA, Department of Army Historical Division, Microfilm HS-7.
*** Outline of Future Army-Navy Operational Policy, July 24th, 1944, Imperial General Headquarters Army and Navy Sectors, WDC Document 216768 (Microfilm).
(b) When the Allied landing area had been determined, and while the submarines continued interception operations, all other forces, both Army and Navy, were to concentrate. During this time every effort was to be made to draw the Allied forces as near as possible to the Japanese bases.

(c) On the day prior to the estimated date of Allied landings the air forces were to initiate and maintain full-scale attacks upon both the Allied carrier force and the Allied invasion force while the Main Force of the Mobile Force diverted the Allied carrier force to the northeast (i.e., away from the landing area), and carried out an attack on it from the flank, and

(d) On the date of the Allied landing the FIRST Striking Force was to arrive at the landing area from its advanced base, either Brunei or north-central Philippines and was to destroy first, the enemy surface forces opposing it, and second, the Allied transports. During this time the submarines were to continue their interception operations, the Main Force was to continue its diversion attempts and the air forces were to continue their full-scale attacks. All naval and naval aviation operations were to be coordinated by CinC, Combined Fleet.*

Although the plan was unsound for a number of reasons, some of which will be discussed later, its chief faults were (a) the necessity for precise coordination and (b) the incorrect objective assigned the FIRST Striking Force. These will be discussed separately.

(a) Precise Coordination

The attainment of the precise coordination essential to the success of the plan was of doubtful feasibility under the prevailing situation since, to obtain it, it was necessary that CinC, Combined Fleet have advance information of the movements of the Allied naval and air forces of such exactness that he would be able to move his Main Force from its assigned base (Inland Sea) and his FIRST Striking Force from its assigned base (Lingga-Singapore) in sufficient time to permit their coordination in the objective area at the time of the Allied landing.**

In case SHO One were activated this would have required from five to six days, as pointed out by Commander FIRST Striking Force,*** during which

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* Commander Mobile Force Operation Order No. 76, August 16th, 1944
*** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division File 8-5, JS-104.
time the Japanese commander could estimate that the Allied troops and their supplies would have been landed and a large part of the non-combat shipping retired. It is here that the 2500 miles separating the above forces becomes of such great importance, for the Philippines are about midway between Bungo Suido and Singapore. How CINC, Combined Fleet planned to obtain such information is not known since he did not station his submarines off the most likely departure points for Allied Amphibious Forces such as Manus and Hollandia, and since his air power, based on data available to this study, appears to have been unable to reconnoiter these bases effectively except on rare occasions.

Therefore, the basic plan seems to have been defective in this regard, since the possibility of obtaining definite information was poor until such time as the Allied invasion forces came within the normal search range of Japanese search aircraft - 600 miles in the SHO One and SHO Two areas - or, assuming an average speed of advance for the Allied amphibious forces of about thirteen knots, about two days before the landing. This would make it impossible for either the Main Force or the FIRST Striking Force to arrive in their designated positions on the designated days since their present bases were over twice that distance from the Philippines. In addition the ability of Japanese search aircraft to discover approaching Allied forces, even 600 miles at sea, could be expected to decrease in effectiveness since bad flying weather was to be anticipated during the projected period of the KING II Operation.

(b) Incorrect Objective

The FIRST Striking Force was assigned as its objective (a) the destruction by decisive battle of the Allied support forces (such as the SEVENTH Fleet) which opposed its entry into the landing area and (b) after annihilating these forces, the destruction of the transports and their embarked troops at the landing point (beachhead).* This meant, of course, that Commander FIRST Striking Force was committed to decisive battle should any Allied surface forces interfere. Actually, the assigned objective was incorrect. Should not the proper objective for preventing a landing have been "the destruction of the transports" which transport the ground troops and much of the materials essential for the successful operations of the ground troops, rather than the destruction of the local covering forces by decisive battle? Would it not have been more in keeping with the entire concept of preventing a successful landing to have assigned as the primary objective of the FIRST Striking Force "the destruction of the transports," and to have directed that enemy forces were to be engaged only as necessary to get

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* Commander Mobile Force Operation Order 76, August 10th, 1944, Section II, Concrete Operational Policy, paragraph A2(a) ATNS Document No. 39, Part 1, April 22nd, 1945 (MACI Document).
at the transports and even then not necessarily in decisive battle since that might endanger seriously the accomplishment of the basic objective? This concept of giving priority to the destruction of the local covering forces in lieu of the transports was also a Japanese command failure at the Battle of Savo Island.

That Commander Mobile Force as a result of war games conducted in early September also had doubts as to the feasibility of the basic SHO plan as presently designed is shown by his recommendations on September 10th: "In view of the situation of the Main Force with respect to air strength, it will be extremely difficult for the Main Force to achieve the expected results in mobile operations at the requisite time to insure the success of the FIRST Striking Force operations." He further said that "it was necessary to augment the surface combat strength of the FIRST Striking Force as much as possible and to, at the same time, provide it with directly cooperating air strength. The present base air forces cannot be counted on to provide any substantially effective direct cooperation . . . there is great probability that the FIRST Striking Force will find itself carrying out its own operations alone and unsupported." He advocated allotting a carrier division to the direct support of the FIRST Striking Force since to that force was assigned the destruction of the Allied surface ships which opposed it, and then the destruction of the Allied transports. Finally, he stated that "in view of the preponderant probability that SHO One Operation will be carried out it is necessary to effect a comprehensive readjustment of the Combined Fleet Operational Plan."

(2) Modified SHO Plan, 0719, October 17th.

If this then was the general opinion concerning the feasibility of the basic SHO plan on September 10th, how much more was it so at 0719, October 17th? For the basic SHO plan had now been modified, partially through the will of the commander, and partially through the demands of the situation.

In the first place, it will be remembered that the principal modification due to the will of the commander was occasioned because he (the commander) had decided on October 12th by the employment of the base air forces alone** to attempt to defeat the Allied task forces which,
on October 10th, had commenced striking the Japanese island chain between the southern Philippines and Kyushu and in particular had struck Okinawa. This was obviously a serious deviation from the basic SHO plan which called for the initial withdrawal and dispersal of the principal air forces under such an attack. As a consequence of this deviation which, while authorized by the basic SHO plan, was, nevertheless, a minor provision thereof, the Japanese suffered very heavy losses in their land-based air power, as has been pointed out previously. In addition the base air forces were thoroughly disorganized, and their morale was low.

A second modification due to the will of the commander was occasioned when the commander directed that the qualified air strength of the carriers be removed from the carriers and diverted to land-based operations.* This, to all intents and purposes, clearly eliminated the "attack from the flanks" task which had been assigned the Main Force and limited that force to the diversion task only since there was little likelihood of these planes being returned to the carriers - they had been committed in the Battle off Formosa.

A third modification - this one brought on by the demands of the situation - which modification was not in the full sense a deviation from the basic SHO plan, occurred when the SECOND Striking Force was ordered (a) on October 14th, to sea to destroy Allied ships damaged in the Battle off Formosa,** and (b) on October 16th, to proceed to Makin in the Pescadores if the Allied carrier task force, which had been observed on that day as consisting of thirteen carriers as a minimum, was still operating to the eastward of Formosa on the following day.*** This modification separated the SECOND Striking Force from the Main Force, but this was unimportant since the Main Force had now been committed to diversion action only.

Also, the FIRST Striking Force, which under the basic SHO plan had been assigned the task of destroying the Allied amphibious forces at the time of landing, was now given a new assignment, also brought on by the demands of the situation. This new assignment was to be prepared to proceed to the area east of Formosa and there to operate against the Allied carrier task force.****

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* CINCPAC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 121110, October 1944 (DesOpOrd 344) to Combined Fleet, ZUIKAKU War Diary, WDC Document 161638.
** CINCPAC, Combined Fleet Dispatch 141216, October 1944, to Combined Fleet (DesOpOrd 348) War Diary DESRON 1, WDC Document 161638.
*** COFS, Combined Fleet Dispatch 162007, October 1944 to Commander SECOND Striking Force, War Diary DESRON 1, WDC Document 161638.
**** Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, October-December 1944, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government, October 1947, Department of the Army Historical Division, File 3-5, JS-104.
The Japanese High Command then, at this time, 0719, October 17th, should Allied invasion operations occur, could only place in effect a modified SHO plan.

That this plan was unsound seems clear for numerous reasons.

(a) The ability of the Main Force in the Inland Sea and the FIRST Striking Force at Lingga-Singapore to concentrate at a definite time and place continued to be very doubtful indeed, and, if anything, owing to the reduction in the land-based air power and the carrier air power, had even become less possible.

(b) The ability of the land-based aircraft to maintain full scale attacks upon the Allied carrier force, and the invasion force, had seriously lessened. The Japanese had lost about 365 of their best aircraft, divided as follows: SIXTH Base Air Force 584 (including 100 planes of the EIGHTH Air Division), FIFTH Base Air Force 191, FOURTH Air Army 190. Moreover, many of their most experienced pilots had also been lost. They knew it was highly probable that, in view of the replacement program in effect within TF 38, the Allied carriers were in full strength in air power. They also knew that since their land-based air power had been so ineffective against TF 38, it stood little chance in its weakened and demoralised condition of being effective in the future until it had been reorganised and refitted. This would require considerable time.

(c) (1) The ability of the FIRST Striking Force to move from Lingga-Singapore to the objective area had been lessened since the ability of land-based air to provide it with proper air cover had been seriously reduced, if not made entirely ineffective. In fact, as has been pointed out previously, this ability had always been more of a concept than of a fact since Japanese communications at this time were such as to deny, in general, communications between land-based aircraft and ships. It was probably for this reason, in part, that Commander Mobile Force had recommended that the basic SHO plan be changed to permit Commander FIRST Striking Force to have his own planes for air cover, and for offensive operations against the Allied amphibious forces at the point of landing.

(2) The ability of the FIRST Striking Force to accomplish its assigned objectives even should it succeed in reaching the landing area was open to serious question. The Japanese well knew, at this time, that strong support forces composed of battleships, cruisers and destroyers, supported by carrier air power, were employed by the Allies in landing operations. As has been pointed out earlier Commander FIRST Striking Force had been directed to destroy in decisive battle those surface support forces which opposed him after which he was to destroy the transports. This was admittedly a difficult assignment. However, it became more difficult if the Main Force failed to divert the Allied carrier force away from the objective area, since the FIRST Striking
Force would then be opposed not only by the powerful Allied surface support forces but by the planes and ships of the carrier force as well. Its feasibility was open to serious question.

That this analysis of the weakness of the plan is correct is indicated by the following statement by Cinc, Combined Fleet in 1930 concerning the feasibility of the plan: "Of this plan it can only be said that it was contrary to every principle of naval tactics. When we could not possess adequate control of the air, to send the main strength of our surface decisive battle force against the enemy landing point, was a flagrant departure from military common sense. However, under the existing circumstances there was no alternative unless, seeking safety in retreat, we were to supinely sit by and watch the enemy carry out his invasion."

(i) GENERAL SUMMARY

The preceding discussions of the background of the Battle for Leyte Gulf show, in a general way, that:

(a) The Allied effort in seizing the Philippines was designed to cut the Japanese lines of communication to the rich sources of strategic materials in the Southern Resources Area (Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, Burma, Malaya), and thereby fatally disrupt the Japanese war economy which was even, at this time, in serious shortage. This would both advance the progress of the war by many months and simplify arrangements for future operations. This Allied effort was spearheaded by a powerful amphibious force, strong in both naval and air power, which, as an initial move in the operations for the capture of the Philippines, was to seize beachheads on the east coast of Leyte. It was supported by (a) great air strikes by the fast carrier task force which had already hit heavily and most successfully against Japanese land-based air power in Nansui Shotō, Formosa and Luzon (b) by large numbers of submarines which were normally occupied in anti-shipping operations but which were also given offensive reconnaissance duties and (c) by limited numbers of land-based aircraft operating from the Marianas, Palau, Morotai and Chinese bases. In strategic command of all forces in the SOMESPAC area was COMSOMESPAC with his headquarters at Hollandia, but who, at this time, was in the cruiser NASHVILLE. In strategic command of the supporting forces of the FOA was CINCPAC with his headquarters at Pearl Harbor.

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* Admiral Soemu Toyoda, ex-IGN, The End of the Imperial Navy, (Tokyo, 1950), pages 149-156.
** Joint Chiefs of Staff Dispatch 24, September 13th, 1944 to COMSOMESPAC.
(b) The Japanese effort was designed to prevent the extension of Allied power into the Philippine - Formosa - Nansei Shoto line because should that line be pierced the lifeline of Japanese economy to the Southern Resources Area would be broken. This was clearly stated, for the Fleet, by CinC, Combined Fleet when he said "Should we lose in the Philippines operations, even though the fleet should be left, the shipping lane to the south would be completely cut-off so that the fleet, if it should come back to Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel supply. If it should remain in southern waters, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and arms." This was, of course, equally applicable to Formosa and the Nansei Shoto. The Japanese effort was spearheaded by the Combined Fleet, which, with its powerful naval power including its air power, both land and carrier-based, was to repel any attempt by the Allies to make an amphibious landing anywhere in the above mentioned Japanese lifeline. It was supported by army aircraft and by army ground troops. In strategic command of all naval forces including naval air forces, was CinC, Combined Fleet with his headquarters at Hiyoishi (Tokyo), but who at this time was at Takao, Formosa. In strategic command of all army ground and air forces in the Philippine area was CinC, Southern Army.

*The Campaigns of the Pacific War, US BBC 1946, Chapter XII, page 281.*
CHAPTER IV

EPILOGUE

At 0650, October 17th, the Naval Lookout Post on Sulu Island at the eastern approach to Leyte Gulf sighted a group of ships to seaward. At 0700 the Post Commander broadcasted an urgent plain language dispatch in substance as follows: "About ten battleships, cruisers and destroyers have appeared east of Sulu Island."*

Some minutes later, when he noted some of the above ships entering Leyte Gulf, he sent out an additional dispatch as follows:

"One enemy battleship and six destroyers sighted on bearing 065°(T). Are penetrating into the strait. 0650."**

This dispatch evidently referred to TU 7844 composed of the light cruiser DENVER, the destroyer A.W. GRANT, the high speed minesweepers HOWARD, PALMER, CHANDLER, and the high speed transports CROSBY and SANDS, which at this time were bearing about 165°(T) and were preparing to seize Sulu Island.

At 0805 Commander Southwest Area, at Manila, upon receipt of the above reports from his Lookout Post, ordered his forces to prepare for "Operation Philippines."*** Four minutes later, at 0809, CinC, Combined Fleet, then on Formosa, alerted the Combined Fleet to decisive battle in accordance with the previously promulgated SHO plans as follows:***

"From: CinC, Combined Fleet.
To: All Flags, Combined Fleet.
Info: Surface Escort Force China Area Fleet.

Combined Fleet Special Dispatch Operation
Order No. 14 SHO 1 Operation alert."

Thus the preliminary phase of the Leyte Gulf campaign came to a conclusion, and the climactic period of the operation, which will be the subject of subsequent volumes in this study, was ushered in.

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* Material for Situation Estimates First Section Naval General Staff, October 1944, WDC Document 216754 (Microfilm); also Philippine Area Naval Operations, Second Demobilization Bureau Japanese Government, October 1947, Army Historical Division File No. 8-5, JS-104.

** War Diary ZUIKAKU, October 1944, WDC Document 161636 NA 11793.

*** SW Area Force Dispatch 170C05, October 1944 to All Fleet and Squadron Commanders SW Area Force, War Diary 51st Air Flotilla, October 1944, WDC Document 161643 NA 12260.
APPENDIX I

ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED FORCES AT

0719 OCTOBER 17TH

BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF

ALLIED NAVAL FORCES

(a) TF 77 CENTRAL PHILIPPINES ATTACK FORCE.

(a) (1) TG 77.1 Flagship Group

(a) TU 77.1.1 Fleet Flagship Unit.
   AGC WASATCH (FPTFF).
   DD'S ASHEN, MULLANY.

(b) TU 77.1.2 Cruiser Unit*
   NASHVILLE.
   DD'S ABNER READ, BUSH.

(2) TG 77.2 Bombardment and Fire Support Group.

(a) TU 77.2.1 Fire Support Unit NORTH**
   BATDIV 3 less NEW MEXICO,
   IDAHO,
   MISSISSIPPI (FPP).
   BATDIV 4 less COLORADO,
   WEST VIRGINIA (F),
   MARYLAND.
   DD'S AULICK (F), CONY,
   SIOURNEY.

(b) TU 77.2.2 Fire Support Unit SOUTH***
   BATDIV 2
   TENNESSEE (F),
   CALIFORNIA,
   PENNSYLVANIA.
   CRUDIV 4 plus MINNEAPOLIS
   less INDIANAPOLIS.

Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Thomas C.
Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Thomas C.
Captain Granum, Alfred M.
Captain Granum, Alfred M.
Captain Coney, Charles E.
Captain Coney, Charles E.

Rear Admiral Oldendorf, Jesse B.
Rear Admiral Weyler, George L.
Rear Admiral Weyler, George L.
Captain Redfield, Herman C.
Rear Admiral Ruddock, Theodore D.
Captain Wiley, Herbert V.
Captain Ray, Herbert J.
Commander Andrew, John D.

Rear Admiral Oldendorf, Jesse B.
Rear Admiral Chandler, Theodore E.
Captain Heffernan, John E.
Captain Burnett, Henry P.
Captain Martin, Charles F.
Rear Admiral Oldendorf, Jesse B.

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* War Diary MULLANY, October 15th, 1944.
** War Diary NASHVILLE, October 16th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTU 77.2.1, Bombardment and Fire Support Mission on Leyte Island, Serial 0166, October 29th, 1944.
**** War Diary CRUDIV 4, October 12th, 1944 and CRUDIV 4 Operation Plan 2-44, Serial 0008, October 5th, 1944.
LOUISVILLE (FF),
PORTLAND,
MINNEAPOLIS,
CRUDIV 9 less ST. LOUIS,
HONOLULU (F).
CRUDIV 12 less MONTPELIER,
CLEVELAND,
DENVER (F),
COLUMBIA,
DESRON 56
DESDIV 111
LEUTZE, NEWCOMB (FF),
BENNION, HETWOOD L.
EDWARDS, RICHARD P. LEARY.
DESDIV 112 plus HALFORD,
ROBINSON (F), ROSS, ALBERT
W. GRANT, BRYANT, HALFORD.
DESDIV X-RAY less AULICK,
CONY, SIGOURNEY,
CLAXTON (F), THORNTON, WELLES,
AVP SAN CARLOS.

(3) TG 77.3 Close Covering Group
(a) (1) TU 77.3.1 (Light Cruiser Group)
CRUDIV 15 less NASHVILLE
PHOENIX (FF)
BOISE
DESDIV 47 less BEALE
HUTCHINS (F), BACHE, DALY, KILLEN.

(2) TU 77.3.2 (Heavy Cruiser Group)
HMAS SHROPSHIRE
HMAS AUSTRALIA (F)
HMAS ARUNTA, HMAS WARRAMUNGA, BEALE.

(4) TG 77.4 (Escort Carrier Group)
(a) (1) TU 77.4.1 (Panama Carrier Group)
(CVW 37-22 VF, 9 VT)
(CVW 60-21 VF, 9 VT)
(CVW 35-18 VF, 8 VT)
(CVW 26-22 VF, 8 VT)

Rear Admiral Berkey, Russell S.
(Rear Admiral Berkey, Russell S.
Rear Admiral Berkey, Russell S.
Captain Duncan, Jack H.
Captain Roberts, John S.
Captain MacManus, Kenmore M.
Lt. Commander Mills, Delong.

Commodore Collins, John A., RAN
Captain Nichols, Charles A.G., RN
Captain Dechaineux, Emile F.V., RAN

Rear Admiral Sprague, Thomas L.

Rear Admiral Sprague, Thomas L.
Captain Browder, Maurice E.
Lt. Commander Hindman, Stanley E.
Captain Johnson, William D.
Lt. Commander Faibach, Harvey O., USN
Captain Van Deusen, George
Lt. Commander Moore, Frederick T.
Captain Bick, Robert E., Jr.

CTG 77.3 Letter of Instructions Musketeer, Operations Serial 00113 October 11th, 1944.
Action Report CTU 77.4.1, Leyte Operation, from October 12th-October 29th, Serial 00104, November 8th, 1944.
(b) TU 77.4.12 CARDIV 28 less
CVE's SARGENT BAY and
RUDYERD BAY. Rear Admiral Henderson, George H.
CVE SAGINAW BAY (FF) Captain Sutton, Frank C.
VC 78 - 15 VF, 12 VT Lieutenant Lewis, F.G., USNR
CVE PETROF BAY Captain Kane, Joseph L.
VC 76 - 18 VF, 12 VT Commander McCauley, James W.

(c) TU 77.4.13 Screen. Captain Nunn, Ira H.
DESDIV 93 less
HEERMANN, HOEL. Captain Nunn, Ira H.
DD's McCORD (F), TRATHEN, HAZELWOOD.
CORDIV 63 less
SHELTON, DENNIS. Commander Bewick, James V.
DE's EDMONDS,
RICHARD S. BULL,
RICHARD M. ROWELL,
EVERSOLE, COOLBAUGH.

(2) TU 77.4.14* Rear Admiral Henderson, George H.
(Special Escort Group)
CVE's SAGINAW BAY (FF) (VC 78 - 15 VF, 12 VT),
PETROF BAY (VC 76 - 18 VF, 12 VT).
DE's EDMONDS, RICHARD S. BULL.

(b) (1) TU 77.4.2 Southern Carrier Group** Rear Admiral Stump, Felix B.

(a) TU 77.4.21 CARDIV 24 less
CVE's ANZIO and
CORREGIDOR. Rear Admiral Stump, Felix B.
CVE NATOMA BAY (FF) Captain Morehouse, Albert K.
VC 81 - 18 VF, 12 VT Lt. Commander Barnes, Robert C.
CVE MANILA BAY Captain Lee, Fitzhugh
VC 80 - 18 VF, 12 VT Lt. Commander Stubbs, H.K., USNR

(b) TU 77.4.22 CARDIV 27 Rear Admiral Sample, William D.
CVE MARCUS ISLAND (FF) Captain Greber, Charles F.
VC 21 - 18 VF, 12 VT Lt. Commander Murray, T.S., USNR
CVE KADASHAN BAY Captain Hunter, Robert N.
VC 20 - 15 VF, 12 VT Lt. Commander Dale, John R., USNR
CVE SAVO ISLAND Captain Ekstrom, Clarence E.
VC 27 - 15 VF, 12 VT Lt. Commander Jackson, Percival W.
CVE OMANEY BAY Captain Young, Howard L.
VC 75 - 17 VF, 12 VT Lt. Commander Smith, A.W., Jr., USNR

* Escorting TC 79.1 to Leyte Gulf.
** Action Report CTU 77.4.2, Reoccupation of Leyte Island, October 18th-29th, 1944, Serial 00114, November 2nd, 1944.
(c) TU 77.4.23 Screen. Captain Reynolds, Luther K.
DESDIV 94 less
JOHNSTON.
DD’s HAGGARD (F),
FRANKS, HAILEY.
CORTDIV 69 less STAFFORD
plus LeRAY WILSON. Commander Phifer, Thomas C.
DE’s RICHARD W. SUESENS,
ABERCRONBIE, LeRAY WILSON,
ODERRENDE, WALTER C. WANN.

(2) TU 77.4.24 Captain Hunter, Robert N.
(Special Escort Group)*
CVE’s KADASHAN BAY (F), (VC 20 - 15 VF, 12 VT)
CUMMANY BAY (VC 75 - 17 VF, 12 VT).
DE’s RICHARD W. SUESENS, ABERCRONBIE.

(c) (1) TU 77.4.3 Northern Carrier
Group** Rear Admiral Sprague, Clifton A.F.

(a) TU 77.4.31 CARDIV 25 Rear Admiral Sprague, Clifton A.F.
CVE FANSHAW BAY (FF) Captain Johnson, Douglas P.
VC 68 - 17 VF, 11 TEM Lieutenant Johnson N.B., USNR
CVE ST. LO Captain McKenna, Francis J.
VC 65 - 15 VF, 11 VT Lt. Commander Jones, R.M., USNR
CVE WHITE PLAINS
VC 4.12 VF, 12 VT
Lt. Commander Fickenscher, Edward R., Jr.
CVE KALININ BAY
VC 3 - 16 VF, 12 VT
Lt. Commander Keighley, W.H., USNR

(b) TU 77.4.32 CARDIV 26
CVE’s HOGGATT BAY
and NEHENTA BAY.
CVE KITKUN BAY (F) Rear Admiral Ofstie, Ralph A.
VC 5 - 18 VF, 11 VT Captain Haidly, Albert
CVE GAMBIER BAY
VC 10 - 18 VF, 11 VT
Lt. Commander Huxtable, Edward J., Jr.

(c) TU 77.4.33 Screen. Commander Thomas, William D.
DESDIV 93 less McCORD, TRATHEN,
HAZELWOOD, plus
JOHNSTON. Commander Thomas, William D.
DD’s HOEL (F),
HEERMANN, JOHNSTON.

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* Action Report CTU 77.4.2, Reoccupation of Leyte Island, October 18th-29th, 1944, Serial 00114, November 2nd, 1944. Escorting TG 78.6.
** Action Report CTU 77.4.32, Action off Samar Island, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00114, October 28th, 1944.
CORTDIV 64 less
O'FLAHERTY, CLARK,
SILVERSTEIN, LEWIS,
plus DENNIS and
SAMUEL B. ROBERTS. Lt. Commander Love, H.H.
DE's RAYMOND, DENNIS,
JOHN C. BUTLER (F),
SAMUEL B. ROBERTS.

(2) TU 77.434
CVS's KIKUN BAY (F), (VC 5 - 18 VF, 11 VT)
GAMBIER BAY (VC 10 - 18 VF, 11 VT)
DE's DENNIS, JOHN C. BUTLER (F).

(5) TG 77.5 Minesweeping and
Hydrographic Group
Commander Loud, Wayne R.

(a) TU 77.5.1 Minesweepers.
Commander Loud, Wayne R.

(1) Sweep Unit ONE
Commander Loud, Wayne R.
Lieutenant Brennow, John E. (USNR)
Mine Division 5.
DMS's SOUTHARD (F),
CHANDLER, HOWEY (FF),
LONG.

Mine Division 19
Commander Clague, John (USNR)
(Modified).
DM's FREBLE, BRESEE.
DMS's HAMILTON (F),
HOWARD, PALMER,
(APD SANDs with
4 LCPR sweepers)
Lieutenant Samuels, Jerome M.
CHICKASAW (ATF), Lieutenant Olson, Louis C. (USNR)

(2) Sweep Unit TWO.
Lt. Commander Woodhouse, Ernest W. (USNR)
Mine Division 14 plus AM SCOUT.
AM's ZEAL (F), VELOCITY, TUMULT,
TOKEN, SCOUT.

(3) Sweep Unit THREE
Lt. Commander Pierce, Herbert R. Jr. (USNR)
Mine Division 14 plus AM SENTRY.
AM's REQUISITION (F), PURSUIT, REVENGE,
SAGE, SENTRY.

* Escorting TG's 78.1 and TG 78.2 to Leyte Gulf.
** Action Report CTG 77.5, Minesweeping Operations in Surigao Straits and
Leyte Gulf, Serial 0111, October 29th, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL
(4) **Sweep Unit FOUR.**
Lieutenant Stachli, Ralph J. Jr.
YMS's 1, 81, 140 (F), 219*, 319.
(USNR)

(5) **Sweep Unit FIVE.**
Lieutenant Latza, William A.
YMS's 238, 243, 285, 293, 335, 398 (F).
(USNR)

(6) **Sweep Unit SIX.**
Lieutenant Schminke, Paul (USNR)
YMS's 6, 39, 49, 52, 340 (F), 342.

(7) **Sweep Unit SEVEN.**
Lieutenant Burns (USNR)
YMS's 70, 71, 73, 314, 341 (F).

(8) **Sweep Unit EIGHT.**
Lieutenant (jg) Daly (USNR)
4 LCPR's (carried in APD SANDS).

(b) TU 77.5.2 Hydrographic Unit. Commander Hunt, Robert B. A. (RAN)
EMAS GASCONE, YMS's 316, 393, HMAL 1074.

(6) **TG 77.6 Beach Demolition Group.**
Lt. Commander Morgan, Charles C. (USNR)

(a) **Transport Groups.**
TRANSDIV 12 (Temporary).
Lt. Commander Morgan, Charles C.
(USNR)

APD's TALBOT (F), MANLEY, GOLDSBOROUGH, KANE,
TRANSDIV 14 (Temporary).
Lt. Commander Murphy, Owen B.
(USNR)

APD's BROOKS, BELNAP, OVERTON, HUMPHREYS (F),
TRANSDIV 13 (Temporary), less SANDS.
Lt. Commander Welch, Richard L.
(USNR)

APD's RATHBURN, GEO E. BADGER, CLEMSON.

(b) **Reconnaissance and Demolition Group.**
Lt. Commander Eaton, James B. Jr.
(USNR)

(1) **UDT Unit NORTH.**
Lt. Commander Eaton, James B. Jr.
(USNR)

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* Broke down and returned to Manus October 10th. Action Report CTG 77.5 Minesweeping Operations in Surigao Straits and Leyte Gulf, Serial Olll, October 28th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.5 Minesweeping Operations in Surigao Straits and Leyte Gulf, Serial Olll, October 29th, 1944.
*** War Diary TALBOT, October 12th, 1944.
**** Carried demolitions only. War Diary TALBOT, October 12th, 1944.
***** CTG 77.2 Operation Plan 2-44, Appendix 3 to Annex B. War Diary TALBOT, October 12th, 1944.
UDT No. 6 (Embarked in APD CLEMSON), Lieutenant Logsdon, D.M. (USNR)
UDT No. 9 (Embarked in APD BROOKS), Lt. Commander Eaton, James S. Jr. (USNR)
UDT No. 10 (Embarked in RATHBURN), Lieutenant Choate, Arthur O. Jr. (USNR)

(2) UDT Unit SOUTH.
UDT No. 3 (Embarked in APD TALBOT), Lieutenant Crist, Thomas C. (USNR)
UDT No. 4 (Embarked in APD GOLDSBOROUGH), Lieutenant Carberry, William G. (USNR)
UDT No. 5 (Embarked in APD HUMPHREYS), Lieutenant Debolt, John K. (USNR)
UDT No. 8 (Embarked in APD GEO. E. BADGER) Lt. Commander Young, Donald E. (USNR)

(7) TG 77.7 Service Group* Rear Admiral Glover, Robert O.

(a) TU 77.7.1 Fueling Group** Captain Beard, Jefferson D.
AO's ASHTABULA (F), SALAMONIE,
SARANAC, CHEPACHET, AE MAZAMA,
S.S. DURHAM VICTORY,***
CORTDIV 40 less FOREMAN, ENGLAND,
plus MANNING. Commander Thorwall, C.A. (USNR)
DE's BOWERS, WHITEHURST, WILLIAMTHORT,
WITTER, MANNING.

(b) TU 77.7.2 Task Unit Leyte****Captain Hylan, Emory P.
IX (AO's) ARSTUSA, CARIBOU,
MINK, PANDA, AN's TEAK,
SILVERBELL, SATINLEAF,
AKN INDUS (F'), ARL ACHILLES,
ARS CABLE, AO(F) SEVERN,
AE MURZIM.

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* CG 77.7 Operation Plan 2-44, Serial 00021, October 8th, 1944.
** War Diary SARANAC, October 1944.
*** Employed as an ammunition ship.
**** War Diary INDUS, October 1944.
(b) TF 78 Northern Attack Force.

(1) TG 8.1 Palo Attack Group.

(a) TU 78.1.1 Group Flagship
    (Also Force Flagship Unit).
    ASC BLUE RIDGE (PF-3).

TU 78.1.2 Relief Group
    Flagship.
    DD RUSSELL.

(b) TU 78.1.3 Transport Unit
    TRANSDIV 8 (Temporary).
    APA's FAYETTE (F), ORMSBY,
    LEEDSTOWN,
    "A TITANIA,
    AK HERCULES,
    LSD FARRING FOREST,
    LSD CARTER HALL.

TRANS DIV 24 (Temporary).
    CAPTAIN BRITTAIN, THOMAS B.
    APA's DUPAGE (FF), FULLER,
    ELACORE, WAYNE,
    AP JOHN LAND,
    AKA AQUARIUS,
    LSD GUNSTON HALL.

(c) TU 78.1.4 LST Unit
    26, 138, 171, 181, 452 (F),
    455, 458, 459, 467, 463,
    465, 466.

(d) TU 78.1.5 LSM Unit
    19 (F), 21, 257.

(c) TU 78.1.6 Escort and Fire
    Support Unit
    DESDIV 49 less STEVENS,
    DD's JOHN RODGERS (F),
    MURRAY, HARRISON,
    McKENZIE.

Rear Admiral Barbey, Daniel E.
Rear Admiral Barbey, Daniel E.
Commander McDowell, Lewis R.
Commander McDowell, Lewis R.
Commander Wicks, John E. Jr.
Commander Wicks, John E. Jr.
Captain Brittain, Thomas B.
Captain Baker, Danford Y.

Commander Baker, Danford Y.

Lieutenant Combs, Edward L. (USNR)

Captain Crommelin, Henry

Captain Crommelin, Henry

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CTF 78 Operation Plan 101-44, Serial 0008, October 3rd, 1944.
** Action Report CTF 78.1.3, Leyte Assault, Serial 0200 October 24th, 1944.
**** War Diary LSM-21, October 1944.
***** Action Report CTF 78.1.6 Serial 0114, November 5th, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL
(f) TU 78.1.7 Control Unit*  
PC's 598, 623 (F),  
1129, SC 726.  

(g) TU 78.1.8 LCI Support Unit**  
Lieutenant Sargent, Robert E., Jr.  
LCI's 65, 23, LCI(R)'s  
71 (F), 72, 73, 74, 331.  

(h) TU 73.1.9 Demolition  
Unit***  
LCI(D)'s 227, 228.  

(i) TU 78.1.10 LCI Smoke  
Unit****  
LCI's 28 (F), 361, 363,  
364, 429, 447, 448.  

(j) TU 78.1.11 Salvage  
Unit*****  
Lt. Commander Castle, Northrup  
H. (USNR)  

(k) TU 78.1.12 Army Headquarters Unit******  
PCB(R)'s 848 (F), 849, 850  
S.S. APACHE, FP 47.  

(l) TU 78.1.13 Beach  
Parties*******  
Beach Party No. 1.  
Beach Party No. 4.  

Lieutenant Gunby, D. Kirk (USNR)  
Lieutenant Walter, Raymond G. (USNR)  
Lieutenant Zinser, Eugene J. (USNR)  

* Action Report CTU 78.1.7 Serial (none), November 1st, 1944.  
** Action Report CTU 78.1.8 Serial 160, November 22nd, 1944.  
*** Action Report CTU 70.1.10, Leyte Operation, Serial 0122, November 20th, 1944.  
**** War Diary QUAPAW, October 16th, 1944.  
***** War Diary PCB(R) 848, October 13th, 1944.  
****** CTG 78.1 Operation Plan 1-44, Serial FF-0001, October 7th, 1944.
(2) TG 78.2 San Ricardo Attack Group

(a) Group Flagship,
AFA FREMONT (FFF).

(b) Relief Group Flagship.
DD ANDERSON.

(c) Headquarters Support Aircraft.

(d) TU 78.2.1 Transport Unit

(1) TU 78.2.2 TRANSDIV 20,
APA's LEONARD WOOD (FF), PIERCE, JAMES O'HARA,
AP LaSALLE, AXA ELECTRA, LSD OAK HILL.

(2) TU 78.2.3 TRANSDIV 32,
APA's HARRIS (F), FREMONT (FFF), BARNSTABLE,
AP HERALD OF THE MORNING, AXA ARNES,
LSD WHITE MARSH.

(e) TU 78.2.4 Tractor Unit.
LST's 18, 60, 67, 68, 202, 204, 245, 466 (F), 467, 468, 469, 470, 474, 476.

(f) TU 78.2.5 LSM Unit.
18 (F), 20, 22, 23, 34, 138, 139, 256, 311.

(g) TU 78.2.6 Screening Unit.
DESDIV 42 less RADFORD plus ANDERSON.
DD's FLETCHER (F), LEVALLETTE, JENKINS, ANDERSON.

Rear Admiral Fechteler, William M.
Captain Conlan, Clarence V.
Lt. Commander Benson, Ralph H., Jr.
Commander Spangler, John G.
Captain Carlson, Milton O.
Captain Loomis, Donald W.

*Action Report CTG 78.2, Leyte Operation, Serial 0086, November 29th, 1944.*

CONFIDENTIAL
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(h) TU 78.2.7 Control Unit.  
PC's 1134 (F), 1119, 1120, SC 991.  

(i) TU 78.2.8 Support Unit.  
LCI(R)s 34, 230 (F), 337, 338, 346, 341.  
LCI(9)s 64, 69 (F).  

(j) TU 78.2.9 Salvage Unit.  
ATG SONOMA.  

(k) TU 78.2.10 Beach Parties.  
Beach Party No. 3.  
Beach Party No. 8.  

(3) TG 78.5 Panaon Attack Group**  

(a) TU 78.3.1 Group flagship.  
DD HUGHES (FF).  

(b) TU 78.3.2 Transport Unit.  
LSI's MANOERA, KANIMBLA, WESTARLIA.  

(c) TU 78.3.3 Fast Transport Unit.  
CM ARIADNE.  

(d) TU 78.3.4 Escort Unit.  
DESDIV 4 less STERETT and WILSON.  
DD's LANG (F), STACK.  
DESDIV 50.  
DD's SIGSBE, LINGGOLD (F), SCHROEDER, DASHIEL.  

(e) TU 78.3.5 Control and Support Craft.  
PC's 1122, 1133, LCI(G)s 68, 70 (F), LCI(R)s 31 (F), 342, LCI(D) 29.  

Captain Loomis, Donald W.  
Commander Day, Dwight H.  
Lieutenant Wurser, Walter R. (USNR)  
Lt. Commander Halloran, Edward R. (USNR)  
 Lt. Commander Halloran, Edward R. (USNR)  
Lieutenant Nordyke, Ted (USNR)  
Rear Admiral Struble, Arthur D.  
Commander Rittenhouse, Ellis E.  
Commander Cousin, Alan P. (RANR) (S)  
Captain The Lord Ashbourne (RN)  
Captain Melgaard, John L.  
Commander McGarry, W.T.  
Captain Parrish, H.O.  
Captain Murphey, Charles D.  

**Action Report CTG 78.2, Leyte Operation, Serial 0085, November 28th, 1944.  
**Action Report CTG 78.3, Panaon Group, Serial 0019, undated.  

CONFIDENTIAL
(4) TG 78.4 D'Ingaet Attack Group
   Rear Admiral Struble, Arthur D.
   Rear Admiral Struble, Arthur D.

(a) TU 78.4.1 Black Beach ONE Unit.  
   DD's HUGHES (PF), STACK, 
   ROBINSON, PF GALLUP, 
   CM EMAS ARIADNE, 
   APD's WARD (F), KILTY, 
   SCHLEY.

(b) TU 78.4.2 Black Beach TWO Unit.  
   DD's LANG (F), ROSS, 
   PF BISBEE (F), 
   APD HERBERT.

(c) TU 78.4.3 also TU 77.2.3, Close Covering Group.  
   CL's DENVER, COLUMBIA, 
   DESDIV 112, 
   DD's BRYANT, ROBINSON, 
   ROSS, ALBERT W. GRANT.

(d) TU 78.4.4 Black Beach THREE Unit.  
   DENVER (F), DD ALBERT W. 
   GRANT, APD's CROSBY.

(5) TG 78.5 Harbor Entrance Control Group.  
   FF's BISBEE (F), GALLUP, 
   LCI's 343, 344, 350 (F), 432.

(6) TG 78.6 Reinforcement Group ONE.  
   Captain Jenkins, Samuel P.
   Captain Jenkins, Samuel P.

(a) RED Beach Unit ONE. 
   TRANSDIV 8 (Temporary). 
   APA's CRESCENT CITY (F), 
   WARREN, WINDSOR.
LST Unit.
623, 666, 667, 668, 695,
697, 740, 741, 744, 761,
986, 1017, 1018 (F), 1027.

(b) BLUE–ORANGE Beach Unit.
LST's 24, 471, 472 (F),
606.

(c) WHITE Beach Unit.
TRANS DIV 26 (Temporary).
APA's CALLAWAY (F),
LEON, TUNTER,
AP STORM KING,
AK JUPITER.

(d) LST Unit.
170, 397, 460, 549, 613,
614 (F), 696, 698, 700,
910, 911, 912, 993, 1014,
ARL ACHILLES, XAK'S THOMAS,
FIELDS, SHORT, CAMELLA,
KINNEY, JUDSON.

(e) LCI Unit 44 (Temporary).
683, 684, 686, 693, 977,
978 (F), 979, 980, 981,
982, 1064, 1065.

(f) Escort Unit.
DD's MORRIS (F), HOWORTH,
MUSTIN, STEVENS,
FF'S CARSON CITY,
BURLINGTON.

(7) TG 78.7 Reinforcement Group TWO
Captain Ginder, John K.B.
ConvoY Unit.

(a) Liberty Ships.
GENERAL FLEISCHER, CAPE ROMANO, CAPE CONSTANCE, JOHN PAGE,
SABIK, JAMES, LEON MERRITT, DAVID GALLIARD, FRANK CUELH,
MARCUS DALY, BENJAMIN WATERHOUSE, JOHN FOSTER, VITUS BERING,
JAMES BROWN, BENJAMIN WHEELER, LOUIS WUELE, CHARLOTTE
CUSHMAN, OWEN BUTLER, ESCANABA VICTORY, CASSIOPIA,
CLARENCE DARRON, ESCALANTE, JAMES KING, EDWARD S. ROUGH.

* Action Report CTG 78.7, Serial 0173, November 10th, 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL

(b) SERVICE FORCE:
TG 77.7.2 less HE MURZIM
AN SATINLEAF, ARL ACHILLES Captain Hylant. Emory P.
IX (AO's) ARTHUSA, CARIBOU,
MINX, PANDA, AN'S TEAK,
SILVERBELL, AXN INDUS,
ARS CABLE, AO(W) SEVERN.

(c) LST Unit

Captain Seay, Engraving A.
464, 552, 553, 564, 565,
556, 557, 558, 569, 569,
573, 610 (FT), 619, 658,
563, 675, 637, 689, 694,
703, 734, 735, 737, 746,
749, 760, 908, 919, 990,
991, 1015, 1026, 1026,
AO SUAMICO, PG TULSA.

(d) SCREEN:

Captain Ginder, John K.B.
DESDIV 41 less HOWORTH.
Captain Ginder, John K.B.
DD's NICHOLAS (F), O'BANNON,
TAYLOR, HOPENWELL, PF's SAN PEDRO.*
MUSKOGEE.

(8) TG 78.3 Reinforcement Group THREE** Commander Steinmetz, J.L.,

(USCG)

CONVOY UNIT:

(a) Service Ship Unit

AK's MURZIM,** HYPERION, ZAURAK,
APC 17, AN SATINLEAF.***

(b) Liberty Ship Unit

FLYOD E. OLSON, THOMAS NELSON, PRINCE L. CAMPBELL,
JOSE C.S. BLACKBURN, AMERIGO VESPUCCI, MATTHEW P. DEADY,
VAN NUTS, CAPE JUDY, CAPE CUMBERLAND, SERANIAN A. NAPP,
MORRISON L. WAITE, JOHN ALDEN, ATWATER, A. BAILEY,
JOHN BARTLOM, JUAN CARRILLO, CARL G. BARTHI.

(c) LST Unit

22, 208 (FF), 220, 454, 618, 922.

(d) Screen

PF EUGENE, EL PASO, VAN BUREN, ORANG.

* Action Report TG 78.7, Central Philippines Operation, Serial 0176.
November 10th, 1944.
** War Diaries, HYPERION, ZAURAK, October 25th, 1944.
*** Attached to TU 77.7.2.
Confidential

(a) TF 79 Southern Attack Force.*

Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Theodore S.

Force Flagship.
AGC MOUNT OLYMPUS (FFFF).

Captain Shultz, John H.

Commander Support Aircraft.

Captain Taylor, Herbert W., Jr.

(1) TG 79.1 Attack Group ABLE.

Rear Admiral Conolly, Richard L.

Group Flagship.
AGC APPALACHIAN (FFF).

Captain Jeffs, Charles R.

(a) TG 79.3 Transport

Group ABLE**

Captain Richardson, Clifford G.

(1) TU 79.3.1 TRANSDIV 7.

APA CAVALIER (FF),
J. FRANKLIN BELL,
PELANT, AKA THUBAN,
AP GOLDEN CITY, LSD LINDENWALD.

Captain Richardson, Clifford G.

(2) TU 79.3.2 TRANSDIV 30*** Captain Misson, Clinton A.

APA KNOX (F), CALYNDRT,
CUSTER, AKA CHARA,
APH RIXEY.

(3) TU 79.3.3 TRANSDIV 38

(Temporary).**** Captain Allen, Charles.

APA LAMAR (F), ALPINE,
HEYWOOD, AKA ALSHAIN,
AP STARLIGHT, LSD ASHLAND.

(4) TU 79.3.4 TRANSDIV

X-RAY.***

APA's GEORGE CLYMER,

PRESIDENT HAYES,

AGC MOUNT OLYMPUS,

AK MERCURY.***** LSV MONITOR.*****

* Action Report CTG 79.1, Leyte Operation, Serial 00434, October 28th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 79.3, Serial 0165, November 8th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTU 79.3.2, Serial 083, October 26th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTU 79.3.3, Serial 0118, October 31st, 1944.
***** For administrative purposes the MERCURY and the MONITOR were under
CTU 79.3.2, and the PRESIDENT HAYES and possibly the GEORGE CLYMER
under CTU 79.3.1.
C O N F I D E N T I A L

(5) TU 79.3.5 Underwater Demolition Unit.*
Lt. Commander Morgan, Charles C. (USNR)

UDT No. 3
(in APD TALBOT).
Lieutenant Crist, Thomas C. (USNR)

UDT No. 4
(in APD GOLDSBOROUGH) Lieutenant Carberry, William G. (USNR)

(6) TU 79.3.6 LCT Unit.*
Lieutenant Wassell, Meyer (USNR)
687, 738, 739, 740, 772,
781, 819, 820, 861, 863,
864, 990.

(7) TU 79.11.1 Transport Group ABLE Screen.**
DESRON 48
CAPTAIN MARSHALL, WILLIAM J.
DESDIV 95 less STENBACH,
ERBEN (F), WALKER,
HALE, ABBOTT.
DESDIV 96 less BULLARD
plus MANSWORTH and
KIND, MANSWORTH,
BLACK (F), CHAUNCEY,
BRAINE.

(b) Tractor Group ABLE.
Captain Webb, Richard C., Jr.

(1) TG 79.5 LCT Unit.
Captain Webb, Richard C., Jr.

(a) TU 79.5.1
Commander Shively, Joshua C.
608, 609, 611, 612 (FF),
658, 738, 739 (F), 909.

(b) TU 79.5.2.
Commander Parsons, Edwin C. (USNR)
128, 169, 206, 223, 242, 566 (F),
605, 670, 688, 733.

* Action Report CTG 79.3, Amphibious Invasion, Leyte, P.I., October 20th-23rd 1944, Serial 0159, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report CTU 79.11.1, October 20th-24th, 1944, Serial 080, October 31st, 1944.
(a) TU 79.5.3* Lt. Commander Harlan, James L.
34, 123, 125, 207,
213, 219, 461 (F),
461, 478, 482, 488, 617, 1006.

(2) TG 79.7 Control Unit.** Commander Busack, Wilhelm K.
DD STEMBEL (F), PC's
462, 464, 470, 563;
PC's 1391, 1418, 1429;
SC's 631, 632, 1004;
S LCG's.

(3) TG 79.7.1 Gunboat Support Unit. Commander Montgomery, Alan R.

(a) TU 79.7.2 Rocket Unit.*** Commander Montgomery, Alan R.
LCI(9)'s 366, 367, 407,
422, 439, 440, 442, 475,
568 (F), 559, 560, 561,
566 (FF), 567, 568, 580,
761, 752.

(b) TU 79.7.3 Mortar Unit.**** Lt. Commander Robinson, Carl F.
LCI(M)'s 1056(F),
1057, 1058, 1068;
LCI(A)'s 975, 1055.

(c) TU 79.7.4 Salvage and Fire Fighting Unit. Lt. Commander Starkus, Charles J.
LCI(L)564 (F), 678**

(2) TG 79.2 Attack Group BAKER***** Rear Admiral Royal, Forrest B.
Group Flagship.
AGC HICKORY MOUNT (FF). Captain Patten, Stanley F.

(a) TG 79.4 Transport Group BAKER.
Captain Knowles, Herbert B.

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** Action Report CTG 79.3, Amphibious Invasion, Leyte, P.I., October 20th-23rd, 144, Serial 0149, November 8th, 1944.
*** Action Report LCI(9) 565, Assault on Leyte, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTU 79.7.3, Serial 001, October 23rd, 1944.

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CONFIDENTIAL
(1) **TU 79.4.1 TRANSDIV 10**
(Temporary)*

Captain Morrison, George D.

APA's CLAY (F),
ARThUR MIDDLETON, BAXTER,
WM. P. BIDDLE, AP GEORGE F. ELICIT,
AKA CAPRICORNUS, LSV CATSKILL.

(2) **TU 79.4.2 TRANSDIV 18**

Captain Knowles, Herbert E.

APA's CAMERIA (FF),
MONROVIA, FREDERICK FUNSTON,
AP WAR HAWK, AKA ALCYONE,
LSD CASA GRANDE, LSD RUSHMORE.

(3) **TU 79.4.3 TRANSDIV 28**

Captain Flanagan, Henry C.

APA's BOLIVAR (F), SHERIDAN,
DOYEN, AP COMET, AKA ALMAACK,
AK AURIGA, LSD BELLE GROVE.

(4) **MINDIV 34**

Lt. Commander James P. Keefer
Sentry***

SAUNTER (F), SALUTE, SCRIMMAGE

(5) **TU 79.11.2 Transport**

Group BAKER Screen.****

Captain McLean, Ephraim R., Jr.

DESDIV 49 (Temporary).

Captain McLean, Ephraim R., Jr.

DESDIV 97 less

WILLIAM D. PORTER

and YOUNG.

PICKING (F), SPROSTON, WICKES.

DESDIV 98 less

KIMBERLY, LUCE.

Captain Cooper, William G.

ISHERWOOD (F), CHARLES J. BADGER.

DESDIV 101 less HALL,

PAUL HAMILTON plus

McDONOUGH.

Captain Martin, Hugh J.

HALLIGAN (F), HARADIN,

TWIGGS, McDonough.

(b) **TU 79.6 (LST-FC Transport**

Group BAKER), BAKER.**

Captain Rimer, Theodore W.

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* War Diary CTG 79.4 (CONTRANSDIV 10), October 1944.
*** War Diary COMET, October 1944.
**** Assigned to TG 79.4 for movement to Leyte—to report to TG 77.5 on arrival in accordance with CTG 79.2 Mailgram 120932 October 1944 to CTG 79.4, COMINDIV 34, SALUTE, SAUNTER and SCRIMMAGE.
***** Action Report CTU 79.11.2, Assault on Leyte Island, Serial 0121, October 30th, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL
(1) TU 79,6,1 LST-LSM Transport Unit. Commander Ageton, Arthur A.

Unit Flagship. DD LUGE (FF). Commander Owens, Hinton A.

(a) TU 79,6,11 Assault Unit BLUE.* Lt. Commander Reith, George (USNR)

LST's 20, 483, 486, 568, 671, 745, 918, 999, 1013, 1024.

(b) TU 79,6,12 Assault Unit ORANGE** Lt. Commander Drexler, Louis A., Jr.

LST's 117, 118, 277, 564, 697, 639, 672, 698, 916, 917 (F).

(c) TU 79,6,13 Reserve Unit ONE*** Lieutenant Barber, Oliver W.

LST's 289, 270 (F), 615, 704, LSM's 134, 135.

(d) TU 79,6,14 Reserve Unit TWO*** Lt. Commander Blanche, John G., Jr.

LSM 24 (F), 29, 136, 233.

(e) TU 79,6,15 LCT Unit** Lieutenant Franklin, Gordon P. (USNR)

638, 747, 921, 822, 830, 898, 992, 1316, 1298, 1298.

(2) TU 79,5,2 LCI Unit. Captain Rimer, Theodore W.

(a) TU 79,6,21 Mortar Unit*** Lt. Commander Hannett, George W. (USNR)

LCI(M)s 658, 659, 660 (F), 754; LCI(A)s 775, 974.

--- Action Report CTU 79,6,11, October 20th-24th, 1944, Serial 038-44, October 31st, 1944.


*** Action Report CTU 79,6,14, Seizure of Leyte, Serial 05, October 30th, 1944.

**** Action Report CTU 79,6,21, Seizure of Leyte, Serial 114, November 4th, 1944.
(b) TU 79.6.22 Rocket Gunboat Unit.**

Lieutenant Giliberty, Frank R.

USNR

LCI(G)s 365, 372, 373,
439, 440, 451, 461, 462,
464, 465, 467, 472, 475.

(c) TU 79.6.23 LCI Salvage Unit.*

Captain Rimer, Theodore W.

LCI(L)s (SAFF)

738 (F), 596.

(3) TU 79.11.3 Landing Craft Screen.**

Captain Coward, Jesse G.

DESRON 54.

DESDIV 107 less
WADLEIGH and
NORMAN SCOTT.
REMY, MERTZ,
MONSSEN.

DESDIV 108,
McDERMUT (F),
MCGOWAN, McNAIR, MELVIN.
PCE(R)s 851, 852, 853.

(c) TG 79.19 Salvage Group**

Commander Foss, Henry G. (USNR)

less GRAPPLE.

ARS PRESERVER, ARL EGERIA,
ATF's POKANONI, CHOWANOC,
CHICKASAW, MENOMINEE.***

(b) COMMANDER ALLIED NAVAL FORCES SOMESPAC

Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Thomas C.

(a) TG 70.1 (Motor Torpedo Boats)

Commander Bowman, Solman S.

(1) TU 70.1.3 (Leyte Group)

Lt. Commander Lessem, Robert

USNR

USNR

(a) MTB RON 7

127, 128, 129, 130, 131,
132, 134, 137, 138.

(b) MTB RON 12

146, 150, 151, 152, 190,
191, 192, 194, 195, 196.

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** CTG 79 Attack Plan A304-44, October 2nd, 1944.
*** PRESERVER with RMS 176, 311, 389 proceeding to Leyte as TU 79.12.1; CHOWANOC with TU 79.11.1; POKANONI, MENOMINEE with TG 79.6; CHICKASAW with TG 77.5; EGERIA proceeding join TG 79.1.1.
(c) MTB RON 21
320, 321, 323, 324, 325,
326, 327, 328, 329, 330,
331.

(d) MTB RON 33
488, 489, 490, 491, 492,
493, 494, 495, 496, 497.

(e) MTB RON 56
522, 523, 524, 525, 526
U.S. Army QG 13
One Crash Boat

(2) TU 70.1.6 (Advance Tenders
Unit).
WACHPREUDE (AGP 8)
WILLOUGHBY (AGP 9)
HALF MOON (AVP 26)*
OYSTER BAY (AGP 6)

(b) TF 71 Submarines, West Australia. Rear Admiral Christie, Ralph W.

(1) TG 71.1 U.S. Patrol Group.
Rear Admiral Christie, Ralph W.

(a) On Patrol.
ANGLER, BLUGILL, COTCH,
DARTER, LAPON, BERGALL,
BONEFISH, DACE, HAMMERHEAD,
PADDLE, ROCK.

(b) En route Patrol.
BATFISH, BREAM, GUITARRO,
GURRIED, RATON.

(c) En route Base.
BAYA, CAVALA, HAWKBILL, RAY,
BECUNA, FLASHER, HOE.

(2) TG 71.7 British and Netherlands
Patrol Group. Rear Admiral Christie, Ralph W.

(a) On Patrol.
ZWAARDVISH, STOIC, STURDY,
SINDAR.

(b) En route Patrol.
STORM, TANTIVY, TANTALUS.

* For movement to objective area only.
(c) En route Base.
   SEA ROVER, SPITEFUL, TELEMACHUS.

(c) TF 72 Submarines, East Australia.
   Captain Haines, John M.

   (1) TG 72.1 Special Mission Group.
      Captain Haines, John M.
      NAUTILUS, NARWHAL, CERO.

(d) TF 73 Naval Air Forces.

   (1) TG 73.1 Flag Group.
      CURRITUCK (FF)
      1 AVR.

   (2) TG 73.2 Strike and Rescue Group*

      (a) TU 73.2.1 (Rescue)
      ORCA
      VPB-11 (8 PBY)
      1 AVR

      (b) TU 73.2.2 (Strike)
      TANGIER
      VPB-29 (8 PBY)
      2 AVR's

   (3) TG 73.3 Manus Group**
      HERON 10
      Patrol Planes Present Manus
      Carrier Replacement Pool
      Patrol Planes Replacement Squadrons.

   (4) TG 73.4 Search and Support Group.
      Captain Jones, Carrol B.
      Patrol Planes Present Woendi.

      (a) TU 73.4.1***
      HERON
      VPB-62 Detachment (4 PBY).

* Based at Morotai. (Table 5, Naval Air Forces SEVENTH FLEET).
** 15 VSB (VS 61) employed for offshore patrol not included.
*** Based at Hollandia.
(b) TU 73.4.2.
    VPB-146 (12 PB4Y)
Lt. Commander Robinson, Josso P.

(c) TU 73.4.3.
    VPB-161 (12 PB4Y)
    VPB-115 Detachment
    (6 PB4Y)
Commander Miller, Justin A.
Commander Miller, Justin A.

(d) TU 73.4.4.
    VPB-115 (6 PB4Y)
Commander Compton, James R.

(TG 73.7 Advanced Group.

(a) TU 73.7.1*
    HALF MOON
    SAN CARLOS**
    VPB-33 (16 PBV)
    VPB-34 (12 PBV)
    LAV
Lt. Commander Anderson, Fernald P.
Lt. Commander Utgoff, Vadym V.

(b) TU 73.7.2.
    VPB-130*** (15 PBV)
Lt. Commander Dodds, Charles R.

(TG 70.2 Anti-Submarine Group**** Rear Admiral Wagner, Frank D.

(a) TU 70.2.1 Hunter-Killer
Unit.
    SAN PABLO
    VPB-11 Detachment (4 PBV)
Commander Pickering, Samuel M.

CGXTDTV 33 less MACHIAS
    ALLENTOWN (P)
    CHARLOTTESVILLE
    SANDUSKY
Commander Ryssy, J.W.,(USNR)

* Operating out of Palau. (Table 5, Naval Air Forces SEVENTH Fleet).
** En route to Le-ets. (Table 5, Naval Air Forces SEVENTH Fleet).
*** En route from Kaneohe, Oahu, to Mamo from October 16th to October 20th, 1944.
**** Operated out of Morotai throughout October, 1944.
(a) **ALLIED AIR FORCES, SOWESPAC**

   Lt. General Kenney, George C.,
   (AC) USA

(b) Far East Air Forces.

   Lt. General Kenney, George C.,
   (AC) USA

(i) FIFTH Air Force (Assault Force), Lt. General Whitehead, Ennis C.,
   (AC) USA

   (a) FIFTH Fighter Command.

   Brigadier General Wurtsmith,
   Paul B., (AC) USA

   3rd Fighter Group (52 P-38)
   35th Fighter Group (55 P-47)
   49th Fighter Group (69 P-38)
   58th Fighter Group (73 P-47)
   343rd Fighter Group (104 P-47)
   475th Fighter Group (68 P-38)
   418th Night Fighter Squadron (11 P-39)
   421st Night Fighter Squadron (12 P-61)
   547th Night Fighter Squadron (12 P-61)

(b) FIFTH Bomber Command.

   Brigadier General Crabb, James V,, (AC) USA

   3rd, 311th, 417th Light Bomb Groups (210 A20)
   38th, 345th Medium Bomb Groups (113 B-25)
   22nd, 453rd, 90th, 380th Heavy Bomb Groups (164 B-24)

(c) FIFTY-FOURTH Troop Carrier Wing.

   Brigadier General Carter, Warren R., (AC) USA

   317th, 374th, 375th, 433rd Troop Carrier Groups (271 C-47)

* — Data regarding the organization, disposition and strength of Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, was obtained from the following sources:

3. Letter from Director, Historical Division, USAF Air University Library, to President, Naval War College, February 25th, 1951.
4. Letter from the Research Studies Institute, USAF Air University, to President, Naval War College, November 3rd, 1952.
5. THIRTEENTH USAF Letter of Instructions No. 1, October 6th, 1944.
7. War Diary, Commander Aircraft Northern Solomons (CTG 70.9), October 17th, 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL

(d) NINTY-FIRST Photographic
Reconnaissance Wing. Colonel Sams, William C.,
(AC) USA

6th Photographic Group (61 F-5, F-7)
71st Reconnaissance Group (16 B-25, 43 P-40, 12 L-5)

(2) THIRTEENTH Air Force (Supporting Force)
Maj. General Streett, St. Clair,
(AC) USA

(a) THIRTEENTH Fighter Command. Brigadier General Barnes, Earl
W., (AC) USA

18th, 347th Fighter Groups (121 P-39)
419th Night Fighter Squadron (11 P-51)

(b) THIRTEENTH Bomber Command. Brigadier General Matheny,
William A., (AC) USA

42nd Medium Bomb Group (83 B-25)
6th, 307th Heavy Bomb Groups (78 B-24)
268th Heavy Bomb Squadron (11 LAB-24)

(c) Troop Carrier Group. Colonel Sands, Harry T., Jr.,
(AC) USA

403rd Troop Carrier Group (48 C-47)

(b) TG 70.9 Aircraft Northern Solomons. Maj. General Mitchell, Ralph
J., USMC

(1) FIRST Marine Aircraft Wing. Maj. General Mitchell, Ralph
J., USMC

Air Group 12
Colonel Willis, William A., USMC

VMF 115, 211, 216, 313 (62 F4U, 19 FG)
VMSB 142, 243 (41 SBD)

Air Group 14
Lt. Colonel Hopkins, Zebulon C.,
USMC

VMF 212, 222, 223 (63 F4U)
VMSB 244 (21 SBD)
VMO 251 (21 F4U)
Air Group 24

VmsB 133, 236, 241, 341 (87 SBD)

Air Group 61

Vmb 413, 423, 433, 443 (46 PBJ)

Air Group 25

Vmr 152, 153 (32 R4D)

(2) 79th RAAF Fighter Squadron (14 Spitfire)

(3) Royal New Zealand Air Units

3rd Squadron, RNZAF (17 P) 17th, 22nd Squadrons, RNZAF (36 F4U)

(4) 17th Photographic Squadron (5 F6A, 1 RA-24B)

Captain Bartman, Walter M., (AC) USA

(5) Attached Naval Squadrons

Vpb 130 (14 P)
Vpb 148 (9 P)
Vpb 44 (15 PBY)
Vpb 52 (11 PBY)

V5 61 (15 SBD, 1 J2F)

(c) Royal Australian Air Force Command

Air Vice Marshal Bostock, M.W., RAAF

378 Vf, 36 Vb(L), 36 Vb(M), 12 Vb(H), 42 Vbf(MS)

(d) CINCPAC-CINCPAC

(a) Western Pacific Task Forces

(1) THIRD Fleet

(a) TF 38 (Fast Carrier Force)

(1) TG 38.1

Admiral Halsey, William F.

Admiral Mitscher, Marc A.

Vice Admiral McCain, John S.
(a) TU 38.1.1 (Carrier Unit)  
Vice Admiral McCain, John S.

CAE DIV 5 less BATAAN
WASP (FF)
(CVG 14 - 53 VF,  
25 VB, 18 VT)
HORNET (F)
(Rear Admiral Clark, Joseph J.
Captain Doyle, Austin K.)

(CVG 11 - 54 VF,  
24 VB, 18 VT)
MCNTEREY
(CVLG 26 - 24 VF,  
9 VT)

(b) TU 38.1.2 (Support Unit)  
Rear Admiral Smith, Allan E.

CRUDIV 5
CHESTER (FF),  
PENSACOLA,  
SALT LAKE CITY,
(Captain Hartley, Henry  
Captain Mullinix, Allen P.
Captain Busbey, Leroy W., Jr.)

CRU DIV 11 less SAN JUAN,
FLINT, PENO, TUCSON, Captain Mullan, William E.A.
SAN DIEGO,  
OAKLAND,  
(Captain Mullan, William E.A.  
Captain Reed, Kendall S.)

(c) TU 38.1.3 (Screen Unit)  
Captain Espe, Carl F.

MARSHALL
DESRON 4
CASSIN, DOWNES (from DESDIV 8)
DESRIV 7
DUNLAP (FF), FANNING,
CASE, CUMMINGS

DESRON 12 less DESDIV 24 Captain Buford, William P.
DESRIV 23 less FARENHEIT, LANSDOWNE,
LARDNER
McCALLA (FF), WOODWORTH

DESRON 26 less DESDIV 92 except
BROWN
DESRIV 91 less CHARRETTE, BESS, BURNS
plus BROWN
IZARD (FF), CONNOR, BROWN

(2) TG 38.2  
Rear Admiral Bogan, Gerald F.

(a) TU 38.2.1 (Carrier Unit) Rear Admiral Bogan, Gerald F.

CAE DIV 5 less CABOT plus HANCOCK
INTREPID (FF)
(CVG 16 - 54 VF,  
24 VB, 18 VT)

Commander Coleman, Wilson M.
BUNKER HILL  
(CVG 8 - 54 VF,  
24 VB, 18 VT)  
HANCOCK  
(CVG 7 - 54 VF,  
24 VB, 18 VT)  
INDEPENDENCE  
(CVLGN 41 - 15 VF(N),  
7 VT(N).  
Captain Greer, Marshall R.  
Commander Shifley, Ralph L.  
Captain Dickey, Fred C.  
Commander Lamade, John D.  
Captain Ewen, Edward C.  
Commander Caldwell, Turner F., Jr.

(b) TU 38.2.2 (Support Unit)  
BatDIV 7  
ICWA (FF),  
NEW JERSEY (FFFF)  
Commander Whiting, Francis E.M.  
Admiral Halsey, William F.  
Captain McCann, Allen R.  
Captain Brown, Allen D.  
Captain Holden, Carl F.  
Rear Admiral Badger, Oscar C.  
Rear Admiral Badger, Oscar C.  
Captain Crawford, John G.

(c) TU 38.2.3  
(Screening Unit)  
DESRON 52  
DESDIV 1C3 less  
OWN,  
TINGEY (FF).  
DESDIV 1C4 less  
HASCHELL,  
HICKOX (F'), HUNT,  
LEW'S HANCOCK  
DESRON 53  
DESDIV 1C5  
HALSEY POWELL (F),  
CUSHING, COLLAHAN,  
UHLMANN, BENHAM  
DESDIV 106  
YARNALL (FF), TWINCING,  
STOCKHAM, WEDDERBURN  
Captain Womble, John P., Jr.  
Commander Minor, J.O.  
Captain Kenney, William T.  
Captain Womble, John P., Jr.  
Captain Jarrett, Harry B.  
Captain Jarrett, Harry B.  
Captain Tompkins, Benjamin F.

(3) TO 38.3  
Vice Admiral Sherman, Frederick C.

*(a) TU 38.3.1  
(Carrier Unit)  
CARDIV 1 less ENTERPRISE, COMPENS  
plus LEXINGTON, PRINCETON,  
LANGLEY.  
Vice Admiral Sherman, Frederick C.
ESSEX (FFF)
(CVG 15 - 53 VF,
24 VB, 16 VT)
LEXINGTON (FFF)
(CVG 19 - 40 VF,
30 VB, 18 VT)
PRINCETON
(CVLG 27 - 23 VF,
9 VT)
LANGLEY
(CVLG 44 - 24 VF,
9 VT).

(b) TU 38.3.2
(Heavy Support Unit)

BATDIV 6 less NORTH CAROLINA,
WASHINGTON (FFF),
SOUTH DAKOTA (F).
BATDIV 8 less
INDIANA
MASSACHUSETTS (F),
ALABAMA.

(c) TU 38.3.3
(Light Support Unit)
RENO

(d) TU 38.3.4
(Screen Unit)

DESRON 50 less
DESDIV 100
DESDIV 99
CLARENCE K.
BROSON (FF);
COTTON, DORCHE,
GATLING, HEALY.

DESRON 55
DESDIV 109
PORTERFIELD (FF);
CALLAGHAN, CASSIN YOUNG,
IRWIN, PRESTON.
DESDIV 110 less
FRITCHESS
LAWS (F),
LONGSHAW, MORRISON.

Captain Wieber, Carlos W.
Commander McCampbell, David
Vice Admiral Mitscher, Marc A.
Captain Litch, Ernest W.

Commander Winters, Theodore H.
Captain Buracker, William H.

Lt. Commander Bardshaw, Frederic A.
Captain Wegforth, John F.

Commander Worstell, Malcolm T.

Vice Admiral Lee, Willis A., Jr.

Vice Admiral Lee, Willis A., Jr.
Captain Cooley, Thomas R.
Captain Riggs, Ralph S.

Rear Admiral Davis, Glenn B.
Captain Warlick, William W.
Captain Murphy, Vincent R.

Captain Alexander, Ralph C.

Captain Wilkinson, Edwin R.

Captain Wilkinson, Edwin R.
Captain Wilkinson, Edwin R.

Captain Jarrell, Albert E.
Captain Jarrell, Albert E.

Commander Edsall, Warren R.
(4) TG 38.4

(a) TU 38.4.1  
(Carrier Unit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Captain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARDIV 2 less HANCOCK</td>
<td>Shoemaker, James M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANKLIN (FF)</td>
<td>Commander Kibbe, Richard L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CVG 13 - 37 VF,</td>
<td>Captain Martin, Harold M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 VB, 18 VT)</td>
<td>Commander Moore, Charles L., Jr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAN JACINTO</td>
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<tr>
<td>(CVEG 51 - 23 VF,</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 VT)</td>
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Rear Admiral Davison, Ralph E.

(b) TU 38.4.11  

<table>
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<th>Ship</th>
<th>Captain</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENTERPRISE (F)</td>
<td>Glover, Cato D., Jr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(CVG 20 - 53 VF,</td>
<td>Commander Smith, Daniel F., Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 VB, 18 VT)</td>
<td>Captain Perry, John</td>
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<tr>
<td>BELLEAU WOOD (CVL</td>
<td>Casey, Vincent F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 24 VF, 10 VT)</td>
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Rear Admiral Sallada, Harold B.

(c) TU 38.4.2  
(Light Support Unit)

<table>
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<th>Ship</th>
<th>Captain</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BILoxi (FF)</td>
<td>McGurl, Daniel M.</td>
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<td>NEW ORLEANS</td>
<td>Hurff, Jack E.</td>
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(c) TU 38.4.3  
(Screen Unit)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Captain</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DESRON 6</td>
<td>Long, Victor D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESDIV 11 less</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAVEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAURY (FF),</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GRIDLEY, HELM,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>McCall*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESDIV 12</td>
<td>Poehlman, Karl F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUGFORD (F),</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RALPH TALBOT,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATTERSON, BAGLEY</td>
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<tr>
<td>DESDIV 24 less</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAYSON</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>WILKES, NICHOLSON,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SWANSON (F)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Captain Greenacre, Alvord J.

* Temporarily with TU 30.6.5
(5) TF 34* (Heavy Surface Striking Force).
   Vice Admiral Lee, Willis A., Jr.

   (a) TG 34.1 (Battle Line).
       Vice Admiral Lee, Willis A., Jr.

   (1) TU 34.1.1
       BATDIV 7.
       Rear Admiral Badger, Oscar C.
       IOWA (FF),
       NEW JERSEY (FFFF).

   (2) TU 34.1.2
       BATDIV 8.
       Rear Admiral Davis, Glenn B.
       MASSACHUSETTS (F),
       WASHINGTON (FFFF).

   (3) TU 34.1.3
       BATDIV 9.
       Rear Admiral Hanson, Edward W.
       SOUTH DAKOTA (F),
       ALABAMA.

   (b) TG 34.2 (Right Flank).
       Rear Admiral Whiting, Francis E.M.

   (1) TU 34.2.1

   (2) TU 34.2.2
       CRUDIV 14 less
       VICKSBURG, HOUSTON plus
       MIAMI, BILOXI. Rear Admiral Whiting, Francis E.M.
       VINCENNES (FF), MIAMI,
       BILOXI.

   (3) TU 34.2.3
       DESDIV 99.
       Captain Wilkinson, Edwin R.
       CLARENCE K., BRONSON (F), COTTON,
       DOROTH, GATLING, HBALY.

   (4) TU 34.2.4 DESDIV
       104 less MARSHALL Captain Kenny, William T.
       NICKOX (F), HUNT, LEWIS HANCOCK.

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* Since TG's 34 and 34.5 were made effective October 25th, the tentative task organization for these groups as issued by Commander Battleships Pacific Fleet in COMBATPAC Operation Order No. 13-44 Addendum No. 1, Serial 00080, October 16th, 1944, is herewith included. The actual organization made effective October 25th differed somewhat from the above organization.
(c) TG 34.3 (Center).

(d) TG 34.4 (Left Flank). Rear Admiral Smith, Allan E.

(1) TU 34.4.1
    CRUDIV 5
    CHESTER (FF),
    PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY.

(2) TU 34.4.2

(3) TU 34.4.3
    DESDIV 91 less
    CHARETTE, BELL, BURNS plus
    PRESTON, UHLMANN Captain Sepe, Carl F.
    IZARD (F), CONNER, PRESTON, UHLMANN.

(e) TG 34.9 (Supporting Carrier Group).

(1) TU 34.9.1
    Carrier Unit ONE
    1 CVL
    PATTERSON, BAGLEY. Commander Shea, William H., Jr.

(2) TU 34.9.2 Carrier Unit TWO
    1 CVL
    DESDIV 12 less PATTERSON,
    BAGLEY. Captain Poehlman, Karl F.
    MUGFORD (F), RALPH TALBOT.

(f) TG 34.6* (Special Group) Rear Admiral Badger*, Oscar C.

(1) TU 34.6.1 BATDIV 7
    IOWA (FF), NEW JERSEY (FFFFF).

(2) TU 34.6.2 CRUDIV 14
    less VICKSBURG, HOUSTON
    plus MIAMI, BILOXI Rear Admiral Whiting, Francis, E.M.
    VINCENNES (F), MIAMI, BILOXI.

* Since TG's 34 and 34.5 were made effective October 25th, the tentative task organization for these groups as issued by Commander Battleships Pacific Fleet in COMBATPAC Operation Order No. 13-44 Addendum No. 1, Serial 0080, October 16th, 1944, is herewith included. The actual organization made effective October 25th differed somewhat from the above organization.
(3) TU 34.2.3
DES DIV 99.
CLARENCE K. BRONSON (F),
COTTEN, DORCH, GATING,
HEALY.

(4) TU 34.9.2 Carrier Unit TWO
1 CVL
DES DIV 12 Less
PATTERSON, BAGLEY. Captain Poehlman, Karl F.
MUGFORD (F), RALPH TALBOT.

(b) TG 30.3
TU 30.3.1 (Towing Unit).
HOUSTON (PAWNEE towing)
CANBERRA (MINSEE towing)
CRU DIV 13 less BILOXI.
SANTA FE (FF)
BIRMINGHAM,
MOBILE
BOYD (F), COWELL,
GRAYSON, THE SULLIVANS,
STEPHAN POTTER
DES DIV 100 less KAPP
COGSWELL (F), CAPIERTON,
ingersoll.

TU 30.3.2 (Air Support Unit). Rear Admiral Wiltsie, Lloyd J.
BOSTON (F)
WICHITA (F)
CABOT
(CVLG 29-23VF, 9 VT)
COWPENS
(CVLG 22-23VF, 9 VT)
BURNS (F), BELL, CHARRETTE,
MILLER, KNAPP.

(c) TG 30.5 (Air Search and Reconnaissance).
(1) TU 30.5.1 Seaplane
Squadrons and Tenders,
Kossol Passage.
CHANDELEUR, POCOMKE,
MAKINAC, YAKUTAT.
VPB-16 (13 PBM)
VPB-202 (14 PBM)
VPB-216 (14 PBM)
VH-1 Detachment (5 PBM).

Rear Admiral DuBose, Laurence T.
Rear Admiral DuBose, Laurence T.
Captain Behrens, William W.
Captain Early, Alexander R.
Rear Admiral DuBose, Laurence T.
Captain Wright, Jerald
Captain Inglis, Thomas B.
Captain Miller, Charles C.

Captain Sweetser, Willard M.
Captain Miller, Wallace J.

Commander Bullen, Jacob T., Jr.

Commodore Ketcham, Dixwell

Captain Goodney, Willard K.
Lt. Commander Scarpino, William J.
Commander Leaman, Robert W.
Commander Cook, Harry E., Jr.
(2) TU 30.5.2 Seaplane
Squadrons and Tenders,
Saipan.
KENNETH WHITING
COCS BAY
SHELIKOF
VPB-4 (16 PB2Y)
VPB-18 (12 PB4Y)
VH-1 Detachment (5 PB4Y).
Commander Lyons, Raymond R.
Lt. Commander Curtis, Frederick L.
Lt. Commander Brower, C.M., USNR

(3) TU 30.5.3 Land-Plane
Search Group,
Timian.
VPB-102 (15 PB4Y)
VPB-116 (15 PB4Y)
VPB-117 (15 PB4Y)
VPB-150 (16 PV)
VPB-161 (15 PV)
Commander Rigsbee, Everett G.
Lt. Commander Pearson, G.R., USNR
Commander Gunz, Donald C.
Commander Rigsbee, Everett J.
Commander Riddell, Robert S.
Commander Masterson, Paul

(4) TU 30.5.4 Seaplane and Tender Detachment,
Ulithi.
HAMLIN (BB)
CASCO
ONSLW
VPB-17 (13 PB4)
Commander McLean, Gordon A.
Lt. Commander Kushner, Kenneth A., USNR

(2) TF 59 Shore-Based Aircraft,
Forward Area,
Central Pacific
Major General Hale, Willis H. (AC), USA

(1) TG 59.1 Marianas Air Defense
Command
Brigadier General Cushman, Thomas J., USMC

Army
318th Fighter Group (82 VF)
Detachment 6th Night Fighter Squadron (6 VF(N))
Detachment 28th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron (4 F5B)

Marine
VMF 215, 217, 225, 321 (82 VF)
VMF(N) 534 (14 VF(N))
VMTB 131, 242 (40 VT8)
VMG 1, 2 (20 VO)

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(2) TG 59.2 Bomber Command. Brigadier General Landon, Truman H. (AC) USA

Army
30th, 494th Bomber Groups (109 VJH)

(3) TG 59.5 Transport Air Group. Colonel McQuade, Thomas J., USMC

Marine
VMR 253 (16 VR)

(4) TG 59.6 Garrison Force, Western Carolinas. Major General Moore, James T., USMC

(a) TU 59.5.2 Air Defense Command, Palau. Colonel Bailey, Caleb T., USMC

Army
Detachment 28th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron (3 F5B)

Marine
VMF 114, 122 (42 VF)
VMF(N) 541 (13 VF(N))
VMTB 134 (24 VTB)

(b) TF 17 Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. Vice Admiral Lockwood, Charles A., Jr.

(1) TG 17.1 Empire Patrol Group.

(a) On Patrol, Single Submarines.

SAILFISH, PARCHE, BURRFISH, BARBEL, STERLET, SAURY, SKATE, SEA DOG, TAMBOUR, TILDENFISH, GREENLING, APOGON, SNORK, SNAPPER, SEA FOX, BILLFISH, COBIA.

(b) On Patrol, Coordinated Attack Groups.

(1) TG 17.11 Commander Blakely, Edward N.

SHARK, SEADRAKON, BLACKFISH.

(2) TG 17.14 Commander Millican, William J.

ESCOLAR, PERCH, CRACKER.

*Lost about October 17th.*
(3) TG 17.15
Commander Banister, Alan B.
SAWFISH, ICEFISH, DRUM.

(4) TG 17.17
Commander Wogan, Thomas L.
BESUSO, SABILAN, RONQUAL.

(5) TG 17.19
Commander Coye, John S., Jr.
SILVERSIDES, TRIGGER, SALMON, TANG.

(c) En Route Patrol.
KINGFISH, PILOTFISH, SARGO, POGY, SCAMP,
ALBACORE, HALIBUT, HADDOCK, TUNA, SEAL,
BLACKFIN, JALLAO, PINTADO.

(d) En Route Bass.
FLYING FISH, GUARDFISH, RAZORBACK,
ASPRO, CARRILLA, PIRANHA, TREPANG,
SEGUNDO, SEAHORSE, SEA DEVIL, WHALE.

(2) TG 17.2 Mandate Patrol Group.

(a) On Patrol.
PERMIT.

(a) China-Burma-India Theater
Major General Wedemeyer, Albert C.
USA

(a) FOURTEENTH Air Force
Major General Chennault, Claire L.,
(AC) USA

* Data regarding the organization, disposition and strength of China-based
Allied air forces supporting the Ieyta campaign was obtained from the
following sources:
(1) Letters from the Director, Library Division, USAF Air University to the
President, Naval War College, November 2nd, 1950, and February 23rd, 1951.
(2) Letter from the Research Studies Institute, USAF Air University to the
President, Naval War College, November 3rd, 1952.
(3) TWENTIETH Bomber Command Tactical Mission Reports Nos. 10, 11 and 12,
October 14th, 16th and 17th, 1944.

-502-
308th Heavy Bomb Group (25 B-24, 20 LAB-24)
341st Medium Bomb Group (23 B-25)
51st Fighter Group (65 P-40, 19 P-61)
23rd Fighter Group (47 P-40, 25 P-61)

(b) TWENTIETH Bomber Command

FIFTY-EIGHTH Bomb Wing*

40th Bomb Group (35 B-29)
444th Bomb Group (36 B-29)
462nd Bomb Group (34 B-29)
464th Bomb Group (36 B-29)

Colonel Blanchard, William B., (AC) USA
Colonel Harvey, Alva L., (AC) USA
Colonel Kalberer, Alfred F., (AC) USA
Colonel Faulkner, Ted S., (AC) USA

* Headquarters discontinued October 12th, 1944.
APPENDIX II

ORGANIZATION OF COMBINED FLEET

0719 OCTOBER 17TH

BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF

COMMANDER IN CHIEF COMBINED FLEET

(a) MOBILE FORCE

(l) Mobile Force Main Force

CARDIV 1
CV's AMAGI, UNRYU, KATSURAGI
Air Group 601

CARDIV 3
CV ZUIKAKU (FFY)
CVL's ZUIM, CHITOSE, CHIYODA
Air Group 653, element of.

CARDIV 4
BB/XCV KYUGA (F)
BB/XCV ISE
XCV JUNYO
CVL RYUHO
Air Group 634, element of.

DEISRON 10, elements of.

DEISDIV 41
SHIMOTSUKI
DEISDIV 61
HATSUZUKI (F), AKITSUKI,
WAKAGUSUKI

DEISRON 11
CL TAMA (F), DD's SUCI, HOMI,
KAYA, KASHI, HINOKI
CL OYODO

(2) SECOND Striking Force

CRUDIV 21
CA's NACHI (FFY), ASHIGARA

Admiral Toyoda, Joemon
Vice Admiral Ozawa, Jisaburo
Vice Admiral Ozawa, Jisaburo
Vice Admiral Ozawa, Jisaburo
Rear Admiral Matsuda, Chiaki
Captain Amano, Shigetaka
Captain Wadu, Kiichiro
Captain Amano, Shigetaka
Rear Admiral Takama, Tamotsu
Vice Admiral Shima, Kiyohide
Vice Admiral Shima, Kiyohide
DESRON 1  
CL ASUKUMA (FY)  

DESDIV 7  
AYEBO, USHIO  

DESDIV 18  
KASUMI, SHIRANUI  

DESDIV 21  
WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, HATSUHARU  

(3) FIRST Striking Force  

First Section  

BATDIV 1  
YAMATO (FY), MUSASHI, NAGATO  

BATDIV 2  
YAMASHIRO (F), FUSO  

CRUDIV 4  
CA's ATAGO (FF), TAKAG, CHOKAI, MAJA  

CRUDIV 5  
CA's KYOKU (F), HAGURO, MOGAMI  

CRUDIV 16  
CA AOGA, CL KIJU, DD UHANAMI  

DDSRON 2  
CL NAGASHI (F), DD's SHIMAKAZE, SHIGURE  

DESLIV 2  
HAYASHIMO, AKISHIMO, KYOSHIRO  

DESDIV 31  
KISHINAMI, NAGANAMI, OKINAMI, ASASHIMO  

DESDIV 32  
HANANAMI, FUJINAMI  

Second Section  

BATDIV 3  
KONGO (FY), HARUNA  

Rear Admiral Kimura, Masatomi  
Commander Iwagami, Tsugichi  
Rear Admiral Mizui, Seiji  
Commander Ishii, Hisashi  
Vice Admiral Kurita, Takeo  
Vice Admiral Kurita, Takeo  
Vice Admiral Ugaki, Matomo  
Vice Admiral Nishimura, Shoji  
Vice Admiral Kurita, Takeo  
Vice Admiral Hashimoto, Shintaro  
Vice Admiral Sakonju, Nacmasa  
Rear Admiral Hayakawa, Mikio  
Captain Shiraishi, Nagoyoshi  
Captain Fukuoka, Tokujiro  
Captain Oita, Isuneo  
Vice Admiral Suzuki, Yoshio  
Vice Admiral Suzuki, Yoshio
CRUDIV 7
CA's KIMANO (F), SUZUYA, TONE, CHIKUMA

DESRON 10 less DESDIV's 41, 61
CL YAHAGI (F)

DESDIV 4
MICHISHIO (F), ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO, NOWAKI

DESDIV 17
URAKAZE, HAMAKAZE, YUKIKAZE, TSOKAZE

Vice Admiral Shiraishi, Kazutaka

Rear Admiral Kimura, Susumu

Captain Isogo, Kenma

Captain Tanii, Tamotsu
(3) FIFTH Base Air Force
   23rd Air Flotilla
   26th Air Flotilla
   61st Air Flotilla
   153rd Air Group
   201st Air Group
   761st Air Group
   1021st Air Group
   Vice Admiral Teraoka, Kimito

(e) ANTI-SUBMARINE PATROL FORCE
   Escort Squadron 31
   CL ISUZU (FP)
   DESDIV 30
      AKIKAZE, UZUKI, YUZUKI
   DESDIV 43
      MEGO, TAKE, UME, MAKI, KIRI, KUWA
   Rear Admiral Edo, Heitaro
   Rear Admiral Edo, Heitaro
   Commander Kamma, Ryochi
## APPENDIX III

### JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Japanese Designation or Name</th>
<th>U.S. Code Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Carrier-Type Fighter</td>
<td>Type 0 carrier-based fighter</td>
<td>Zeke</td>
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<td>Sam</td>
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<td>Jack</td>
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<td>Shiden</td>
<td>George</td>
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<td>Seaplane Fighter</td>
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<td>Type 87 carrier-based attack</td>
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<td>Tenzan</td>
<td>Jill</td>
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<td>Ryusei</td>
<td>Grace</td>
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<td>Carrier-Type Bomber</td>
<td>Type 69 carrier-based bomber</td>
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<td>Carrier-Type Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Suisei</td>
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<td>Myrt</td>
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<td>Irving</td>
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<td>Frances</td>
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<tr>
<td>Two Engine Land Bomber</td>
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<td>Nell</td>
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<td>Norm</td>
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<td>Zunun</td>
<td>Paul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance Seaplane</td>
<td>Type 3 reconnaissance seaplane</td>
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<tr>
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<td>KI 84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy Bomber</td>
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<td>Helen</td>
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</tbody>
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*Enclosure to CINCPAC/CINCPAC "Navy Intelligence," Vol. 1, No. 19, November 17th, 1944.*