Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

CHAPTER III
COMMAND OF OVERLORD OPERATION

PART III
NEPTUNE NAVAL COMMAND

A. Pre-Neptune Phase (25 October 1943 - 27 May 1944)

  1. After October 25, the naval organization for the cross-channel operation passed through three stages: Pre-NEPTUNE, NEPTUNE, and POST-NEPTUNE. In the pre-NEPTUNE stage the normal Naval authorities of both the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy brought together, maintained, and organized the Naval Forces to be employed in the operation. In the operational stage, SCAEF, employing ANCXF as his Naval Commander, assumed operational control of all forces of both navies with which he executed NEPTUNE. In this phase they executed his orders, while the normal authorities stood by to provide support and maintenance of the forces engaged. When the NEPTUNE phase ended, later stages of operation OVERLORD continued to require Naval support. During this phase the normal authorities resumed command, but assigned naval forces to the control of ANCXF., as necessary, to meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander.

  2. Although, in the pre-NEPTUNE phase, responsibility for developing organized naval forces rested with the "normal authorities", it was essential that these forces should be organized, trained, and prepared, in conformity with the operational plan which they were to execute. Conversely, the plan had to be so devised as to exploit fully the capabilities of the forces engaged, and to avoid requiring them to perform duties for which they were not suitably qualified. In order to assure the required coordination of effort, ANCXF proposed, while the Admiralty and ComTWELFTHFleet approved, the following division of responsibilities among the major authorities.1

    1. During the period of formation and operational training of the assault forces, ANCXF would issue general directions concerning the coordination of planning, and of the training of naval forces. In the case of British forces these were to be issued via the normal chain of command (viz. via the C's-in-C Home Commands). In the case of U.S. forces, they were to be issued via CTF122.

--213--

    1. Administrative Instructions were to be issued to the British and U.S. Forces separately by the Allied Naval Commander-In-Chief and by Commander Task Force 122.

    2. For day-to-day administration and operational purposes, the British Assault and Follow-up Force Commanders were responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Command, within which they were based. For the same purposes the U.S. Assault and Follow-up Force Commanders were required to conform to the local regulations of the Home Command within which they were based, but were responsible to normal U.S. Naval authorities, or as laid down by Commander Task Force 122.

    3. In addition to his executive function, in command of the Allied Naval Forces allotted to the operation, ANCXF was the naval advisor and the naval planning authority of the Supreme Commander.

    4. ANCXF was to issue the naval outline plan, and at a later date, his operation orders in sufficient time to enable Commander Western Task Force (CTF 122), Naval Commander Eastern Task Forces and the Naval Assault and Follow-up Force Commanders, to make their detailed plans in collaboration with the appropriate authorities in the other services.

    5. ANCXF was to make such adjustments, as might be required, between the strengths of the various naval assault forces and follow-up forces, to give effect to the NEPTUNE plan,

    6. The Naval Task Force Commanders were to be responsible, for the coordination of the training and organization of their forces and for assuring that they were prepared to execute the naval plan.

    7. The Naval Assault and Follow-up Force Commanders were responsible for the detailed training and organization of their forces.

--214--

  1. In the production of plans and operation orders, the following division of responsibility between the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, the Task Force Commanders, the Naval Commanders-in-Chief, Home Commands, and the Naval Assault and Follow-up Force Commanders were laid down,1

    1. An outline plan for the operation as a whole (the COSSAC Plan) had been issued under the authority of the Supreme Commander.

    2. A Joint Plan was to be issued, under the authority of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Amy Group, and the Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (NJC 1004).

    3. A naval outline plan was to be issued to the Naval Task Force Commanders by the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, after consultation with the Army and Air Commanders-in-Chief.

    4. A Task Force naval outline plan was then to be prepared by the Naval Task Force Commanders, in collaboration with the appropriate Army and Air Commanders, to give effect to the "combined" plan for the conduct of their operations.

    5. This naval outline plan was to take account of the detailed requirements of the Assault Force Commanders. The Task Force naval outline plan was to be submitted to the Allied Naval Commander-In-Chief for approval. He was to give it full effect in his naval operation orders in accordance with the combined plan. The Task Force Naval Outline plan was to be drawn up, in consultation with the Naval Commanders-in-Chief, Home Ports, insofar as local conditions were involved.

    6. The Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief was to issue Naval Operation Orders to give effect to the Task Force Naval Outline Plan as coordinated and integrated by him. He was also to consult with the Naval Commanders-in-Chief, Home Commands, insofar as operations within their commands were involved.

--215--

    1. Task Force, Assault Force, and Follow-Up Force Commanders were also to issue Force Naval Operation Orders which would conform to the movements directed in the Naval operation orders of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief and carry out those required by the combined plans for the assaults, as agreed with the appropriate Army and Air Force authorities. These orders were to be drawn up in collaboration with the Naval Commanders-in-Chief, Home Commands, insofar as movements within their commands were involved.

--216--

B. NEPTUNE Phase (May 27 to July 10,1944)

  1. During the Operation, ANCXF exercised, under the Supreme Commander, operational command of all naval forces engaged except those providing distant cover (viz. operating outside of the English channel). Under operational command of ANCXF were:

    1. The Naval Task Force Commanders who exercised 'general' operational control of their forces.

    2. The Naval Assault and Follow-up Force Commanders who exercised 'detailed' operational control of their forces under the appropriate Task Force Commanders.

    3. The C's-in-C, Home Commands (to the extent that they had operational functions to perform), who were required by Admiralty "to give immediate effect to the requirements of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, as set out in his plan and operation orders and as communicated by him at the time".1

--217--

  1. The principal operational functions of the C's-in-C, Home Commands, with respect to which they came under the command of ANCXF were:

    1. Management of the naval side of the Build-up outside the "assault area" including movements and maintenance of ships and the control of escorts; and,

    2. the operation of patrols and other measures for the defense of waters outside the "Assault area".

  2. In the normal R.N. organization the C's-in-C, Home Commands, were responsible for designated off-shore areas. They normally exercised command over all naval vessels operating in these waters, except those functioning as part of an organized fleet or force temporarily operating within these limits. For operation NEPTUNE, Admiralty on the recommendation of Admiral Ramsay, directed that this arrangement should remain in force with three qualifications:

    1. In exercising their Command over Channel waters, the C's-in-C Home Commands, during the progress of the operation, would be subject to the command of ANCXF.

    2. The Waters of the Bay of the Seine, South of 49° 40 N, would be withdrawn from the Portsmouth Command, and placed under the direct control of ANCXF who would delegate responsibility for sections of this area to the Task Force, Commanders. They, in turn, would delegate responsibility for sub-segments to the Assault Force Commanders.

    3. Task Force, Assault Force, and other NEPTUNE seagoing authorities were directly responsible for their (organized) forces under ANCXF while in Home Command Waters.

    4. The chain of Naval operational command may therefore be diagramed as follows:

--218--

                               _________
    
                               S C A E F
                               _________
                                   |
                                   |
                               ____|____
    
                               A N C X F
                               _________
                                   |
                                   |
                                   |
                                   o
                                   o
                                   o
                                   o
                                   o
             ______________________o______________________
            |                      o                      |
         _______           ________________             _______
        | NCWTF |         |    C's-in-C    |           | NCETF |
        |_______|         |  Home Commands |           |_______|
            |             |________________|               |
            |                                              |
       _ _ _|_____________________            _____________|___
      |        |      |     |     |          |     |     |     |
    ______  _______ _____ _____ _____      _____ _____ _____ _____
    Ser-    NC      NC    NC    NC         NC    NC    NC    NC
    vice    Mul-    Force Force Force      Force Force Force Force
    Force   Berry A   B     U     O          G     J     S     L
    ______  _______ _____ _____ _____      _____ _____ _____ _____
    
    
    
    
                  _________ Operational Command
    
                  ooooooooo Operational Command for NEPTUNE operations only
    
                  --------- Command outside ANCXF
    
    
    

--219--

C. Post NEPTUNE Phase1 (10 July 1944 - 14 July 1945)

  1. The broad policy for command changed after the assault phase was completed, provided for as rapid as possible a return to the "normal" Naval Command Organization of both navies, with such modifications as might be required:

    1. to operate naval activities on the continent of Europe; and,

    2. to give SCAEF the control required over naval "lift" and merchant forces to assure that they would serve his requirements. In order to achieve this result, the following arrangements were envisaged.

      1. Naval parties, capable of operating the beaches, artificial harbors and captured ports, were organized in advance of the operation; during the assault phase, they were established ashore, under the appropriate basic and assault force commanders.

      2. In addition, Shore Authorities to assume command on the Far Shore were established. Those authorities were called Flag Officer West (FOWEST), and Flag Officer British Assault Area (FOBAA).

      3. At an appropriate time the Assault Force Commanders were to withdraw, turning over command of their areas to FOBAA or FOWEST.

      4. Still later the Task Force Commanders were to withdraw turning over command of their areas to FOBAA or FOWEST.

      5. As vessels completed their assault duties they were to be transferred to other commands as follows:

        1. Ferry craft, minesweepers, area screen vessels and others required in the assault area were to be held under command of the Assault and Task Force commanders and later turned over to FOBAA and FOWEST:

--220--

        1. Vessels required for the Build-up were to be returned to the appropriate Home Commands, in the case of British vessels, and to the 11th Amphibious Force in the case of U.S. vessels.

        2. Vessels required for the defense of the channel were to be turned over to the appropriate Home Commands.

        3. A proportion of the vessels required for a subsequent one-divisional assault were retained by an Assault Force Commander.

        4. Other vessels were to be released from OVERLORD.

      1. In the post assault phase ANCXF continued to act:

        1. As Naval Advisor to SCAEF.

        2. In operational command of Naval Forces on the continent of Europe and its waters.

        3. With authority to require the C's-in-C, Home Commands, and other Naval authorities, to operate Naval Overlord forces to his requirements.

--221--

D. Chronological Summary of Naval Command Developments - OVERLORD Operation:

  1. Chronologically the various steps in the evolution of the OVERLORD Naval Command were as follows:

    1. 25 October 1943: Admiral Ramsay assumed command as ANCXF., RN. Commanders Force G, S, and L, were already "attached".1

    2. 10 November 1943: Admiral Stark assigned the llth Amphibious Force and Landing Craft and Bases to CTF 122, who reported for duty under ANCXF.2

    3. 27 November 1943: ANCXF issued XFPM No.1, by which command of NEPTUNE Naval Forces was to be executed by "normal" authorities during the pre-assault period, except that ANCXF reserved authority to issue general directives required to give effect to the combined plan.3

    4. 11 December 1943: CTF 122 issued his Operation Plan 1-43 by which "direct" command of U.S. Naval Amphibious Forces was to be exercised by Com11thPhib who was to prepare, organize, and train, the U.S. Naval Forces.4

    5. Mid-February 1944: Force G, the new British Assault Force, was formed in the Portland area of the Portsmouth Home Command.5 Naval Commander Eastern Task Force was established.6 The Home Commands continued to be responsible for assembly, administration, and support, while ANCXF supervised only broad policy.7

--222--

    1. 6 March 1944: Force U was established.1 NC, Force U, was assigned to 11th Phib. Com11thPhib was made responsible for formation, preparation, training, etc. of all three U.S. Naval Assault Forces.2

    2. 1 April 1944: Com12thFleet placed all U.S. Naval Forces, allotted to operation OVERLORD under operational command of ANCXF3 Neither ANCXF nor CTF 122 altered the pre-NEPTUNE command arrangements, which provided that Com11thPhib, in direct concert with Com12thFleet, was responsible for preparing, organizing, training, maintaining, and managing, the U.S. Naval Forces.

    3. 2 May 1944: For the purpose of a full-scale exercise (FABIUS), the assault chain of command was put into effect:

      1. ANCXF assumed operational control of the Channel, the C's-in-C, Home Commands, and the Naval Task Force Commanders, and,

      2. NCWTF (CTF 122) assumed direct command of U.S. Naval Forces taking part.4 This exercise ended on 6 May, and command reverted to the preceding arrangement.5

    4. 25 May 1944: ANCXF ordered NEPTUNE executed.6

    5. 27 May 1944: NCWTF (CTF 122) ordered WTF to execute his operation Plan 2-44, thus revoking the pre-assault command structure and putting into force the assault chain of command in the Western Tonic Force.7

--223--

    1. 1 June 1944 (1200): ANCXF assumed command in the English Channel over the Eastern and Western Task Forces, as well as over the Home C's-in-C, in accordance with the agreed operational chain of command.1

    2. 24 to 30 June 1944: The assault chain of Command in the Eastern Task Forces, was replaced by the post-NEPTUNE chain of command:

      1. FOBAA established headquarters in British Assault area preparatory to taking over command on 24 June 1944.2

      2. NC Force J withdrew on 24 June 1944, FOBAA assuming command of this sector.3

      3. NC Force G withdrew from assault area at 1000 27 June 1944, FOBAA assuming command of G-sector.4

      4. NC Force S withdrew at 1200 on 30 June 1944, command of the sector being assumed by FOBAA.5

      5. NCETF withdrew at 1200 on 30 June 1944 and command of the whole ETF area was assumed by FOBAA.6

    3. 24 June to 10 July 1944: The assault chain of command in the Western Task Force was replaced by the post-NEPTUNE chain of command.

      1. Admiral Moon was relieved as NC Force U (CTF 125) by Admiral Wilkes on 24 June 1944.7

--224--

      1. Admiral Wilkes assumed additional duties as FOWEST at 1200 on 27 June 1944.1

      2. Admiral Hall withdrew at 1200 on 27 June 1944. Command of his sector being assumed by Admiral Wilkes (FOWEST and CTF 125) while titles of NC Force O (CTF 124) and NC Force U (CTF 125) lapsed.

      3. Admiral Hall then resumed his commands as CTF 123 and Com11thPhib.2

      4. NCWTF, Admiral Kirk, withdrew at 1200 3 July 1944 being relieved by Admiral Wilkes, FOWEST.3

      5. CTF 122 was dissolved and command of U.S.N. OVERLORD Forces reverted to Com12thFleet as of 0001 10 July 1944.

      6. Com12th Fleet assigned control of naval forces on the French coast as set out in his 081724 of July 1944.

    1. 26 July 1944: ANCXF relinquished Naval control of the Channel to the normal C-in-C, Home Commands, except for the assault area, which was expanded to include Cherbourg.4

    2. 21 September 1944: ANCXF relinquished control of the assault area, and the naval command in this area then reverted to the normal control of C-in-C Portsmouth.5

--225--

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Footnotes:

p.213 #1 XFPM #1 (second revision) of 17 January 1944.

p.215 #1 XFPN #2 of 17 January 1944.

p.217 #1 Admiralty M.053859/43 (revised) gave the C's-in-C Home Commands the following orders:

"The Naval commanders-in-Chief of the Home Commands will continue to exercise their normal functions subject to the following modifications:

  1. Operational responsibility for the conduct of the operation within the "assault area" was delegated to the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief.

  2. All operations and movements within their commands must be coordinated so as to give immediate effect to the requirements of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief as set out in his plan and operation orders, and communicated by him at the time. It is the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief, Home Ports, to initiate and conform to all movements of the naval invasion forces as required by the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief. This includes the turn- round of craft during the Build-up period.

  3. Certain facilities within their Commands will be required for the use of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief. Prior to the operation the latter will state his requirements in this respect. Where additional facilities are necessary, their provision is the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief, Home Ports."
Diagram No. 2 (revised) of this same Admiralty document also shows the Home C's-in-C as under ANCXF for "Control in S.A.C." while under Admiralty for "Control outside S.A.C."

p.220 #1 Details of the Post-NEPTUNE Naval Organization are given in chapter ___. The generalized account given here is intended only to indicate to whom the reigns of control were passed when the assault organization was brought to a close.

p.222 #1 ANCXF Report, Vol. 1, page 24.

p.222 #2 CTF 122, serial 001 of 15 November 1943.

p.222 #3 XFPM No.1 of 27 November 1943.

p.222 #4 CTF 122 Serial 0043 of 11 December 1943.

p.222 #5 ANCXF Report, Vol. II, NC Force G, Section Page 5.

p.222 #6 ANCXF Report Vol.O, Page 26.

p.222 #7 XFPM No.l (second revision) of 17 January 1944.

p.223 #1 CTF 122 Serial 00865 of 6 March 1944.

p.223 #2 CTF 122 despatch 041117 of March 1944; CTF 122 Op.Plan
  1-44, serial 00164 of 18 March 44, and ComllthPhib Op.Plan
  B-44, serial 0024 revision of 20 March 1944.

p.223 #3 Com12thFleet despatch 141058A of March 1944.

p.223 #4 ANCXF Report Vol.I, page 34 Admiralty Letter M054861/43 of 18 Jan 1944, and M056795/44 of 27 April 1944.

p.223 #5 ANCXF Report Vol.I, page 34.

p.223 #6 ANCXF Report Vol.I, page 39.

p.223 #7 Despatch 291942B of May 1944.

p.224 #1 Admiralty Despatch 301738 May 1944.

p.224 #2 ANCXF War Diary for 24 June 1944.

p.224 #3 ANCXF War Diary for 24 June 1944.

p.224 #4 ANCXF War Diary for 27 June 1944.

p.224 #5 ANCXF War Diary for 30 June 1944.

p.224 #6 ANCXF War Diary for 30 June 1944.

p.224 #7 ANCXF despatch 241612 June 1944.

p.225 #1 CTF 122 despatch 262328 June 1944. ANCXF War diary of 27 June 1944.

p.225 #2 CTF 122 despatch 262328 June 1944. ANCXF War diary of 27 June 1944.

p.225 #3 ANCXF War diary for 3 July 1944.

p.225 #4 ANCXF War diary for 22 July 1944.
ANCXF War diary for 25 July 1944.
ANCXF despatch 161335 July 1944.
ANCXF despatch 182203 July 1944.
ANCXF despatch 192324 July 1944.
Admiralty despatch 222010 July 1944.

p.225 #5 Ref. ANCXF War diary of 20 September 1944.
Cositintrap No.170 of 21 September 1944.
Admiralty despatch 200652 September 1944.
Admiralty despatch4h 200651 September 1944.



Transcribed and formatted by Charles Hall for the HyperWar Foundation