Chapter VII

LANDING CRAFT

From:       Commander Assault Force "O" (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force).

Craft And Boat Performance.

In Operation (INVASION OF FRANCE) several new lessons concerning landing craft and their performance were learned, and old ones were reemphasized. Conditions in this theater differed from those in the MEDITERRANEAN and AFRICAN ATLANTIC COAST where the Force Commander had engaged in three previous operations, in that there was a tremendous tidal range on the NORMANDY Beaches, and the weather was much more uncertain.

Perhaps the greatest single fact to emerge from the Operation is the ability of an LST to be dried out on a firm bottom where the tidal range is great enough, and to discharge its cargo dryshod, without the aid of pontoon causeways, floating piers, or ferry craft. Over two hundred had been so dried out in the OMAHA Area prior to the departure of the Force Commander, and as far as can be ascertained, none had suffered any ill affects.

LCT(6)

LCT(5)s and LCT(6)s were used initially to unload LSTs, and later, MT ships and MT coasters. The consensus of opinion of the operating personnel seems to be that the LCT(5) is a better working craft than the LCT(6). Competent officers stated that the LCT(5) using side loading could unload an LST in weather which would not permit the LCT(6) and the LST to be married. In unloading at the beach the high stern of the LCT(5) made it possible to unload under surf conditions, where the waves would have swept over the stern board and through the center section of the LCT(6).

LCI(L)s

LCI(L)s again proved their worth as personnel carriers, but it was difficult to unload them with the gentle beach gradients encountered without using LCVPs or LCMs as ferry craft. The LCI(L) with additional communication facilities, converted into a headquarters ship for subordinate commanders, was extremely valuable. It is particularly useful in that it affords the officer embarked a mobility which is denied him in a larger vessel.

In the opinion of the Force Commander an LCI(L) equipped with additional communications and navigation facilities would make the ideal Control Vessel. They have sufficient speed for the purpose, a large enough cruising radius to travel under their own power to the Assault Area, far more space for additional personnel than is

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available on a PC or an SC, and their shallow draft and beaching characteristics enable them to approach or even land on the beach if necessary so that the Control Officer may confer with the beaCh-master. They are not equipped as A/S patrol or escort vessels, hence are not an expensive luxury when employed as Control Vessels, If specially equipped for this purpose they can be given added gunpower in the form of additional 40mm and 20mm guns which would enable them to render close supporting fire in an emergency. It is urged that consideration be given to specially outfitting a number of these craft to equip them for this special duty.

LCMs

LCMs, when they were used, were employed to transport personnel rather than vehicles or freight. In an operation in which it is impossible to include LCT(5-6)s, the LCM is a valuable craft because it can take a good pay load and can also be carried to the scene of action on a larger vessel. When there is a choice between the two, however, the LCM is a poor second.

DUKWs

Early in the planning for Operation (INVASION OF FRANCE) Shore Party Commander declared his intention of employing DUKWs to the utmost for unloading cargo, and he resolutely adhered to this decision. His argument was that unloading bulk stores using landing craft entails double handling, and requires either additional equipment or additional personnel or both. He added that to manhandle stores in the quantities planned in the build-up estimate would require a prohibitive number of men, and that, therefore, bulk cargo must be handled by machinery. The DUKW appeared to be the best all around answer, eliminating, as it did, the necessity for the transfer of cargo at the water's edge.

THE MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS CARGO TRAILER DESCRIBED ON PAGE 4-5 OF "AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, COMINCH P-004" IS ALSO DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE MAN HANDLING OF SUPPLIES IN THE INITIAL PHASE OF A LANDING ASSAULT.

One of the most valuable characteristics of the DUKW appeared when large numbers of ferry craft were incapacitated by the storm previously mentioned. Throughout the blow the DUKWs were safely parked ashore, and upon its conclusion were ready for work immediately. In fact there were more available after the gale than were before because of the three day upkeep period afforded while they were idle. The DUKW is not the answer to all unloading problems. In the case of a large ship, such as a Liberty, with high sides and big booms the DUKW presents a small target for the deposit of a sling load of stores and the amount which it can carry is considerably less than

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the capacity of the boom to handle at one lift. Under such circumstances a lighter, or an LCT or a Rhino ferry, which after all is merely a self-propelled lighter, equipped with trawler cranes to expedite unloading, might well prove more efficient than DUKWs, however, for handling cargo from small vessels such as the continental or English coaster which draws little water, can go close inshore, and even beach if necessary, and has booms seldom exceeding three to five tons in capacity, the DUKW is an ideal vehicle. It has the added advantage, of course, of being readily transported aboard ship to any point, of being able to proceed from ship to shore under its own power, and after its use as a landing craft is no longer required, it can still be employed as a truck. Consideration must be given, however, to the landing point for the DUKW. It cannot negotiate all beaches. In the SLAPTON SANDS exercise Area, where most of the training of Force "O", was conducted, the beach gradient was very steep--being about 1-5 or 1-10, and the material of the beach was a very fine pea gravel. Neither wheeled nor tracked vehicles of any description could move on this beach except on specially constructed roadways.

RHINO FERRIES

Rhino ferries (barges constructed of pontoon units and propelled by outboard motors), proved their worth, Their great load and ability to discharge vehicles on the beach of almost any gradient made them great favorites for unloading MT ships. They also worked well with LSTs. Two Rhino ferry loads will empty a normally loaded LST. The personnel operating these craft deserve great credit. The Rhinos were towed across the channel astern of the LSTs with their crews embarked on them (on the Rhino ferry, not on the LST). They were without shelter and completely exposed, yet had to carry on for more than twenty-four hours after their arrival before reliefs were available.

LCC

As far as this Force is concerned, the LCC, in its present form, is a failure. No further comment will be made on this craft as it is being discussed in separate correspondence.

LCS(S)

The LCS(S)s proved a little value; this, however, was not due so much to the characteristics of the boats, as to the failure of the crews to handle them properly. Properly employed, they could have been of great value in the early stage of the assault.

LIGHTERS

One means of transporting stores and/or vehicles which, in the opinion of the Force Commander, was not properly exploited is to load

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them on dumb barges (Army term for lighters), and tow them over. Six large steel barges so loaded were towed to the Assault Area and beached on the afternoon of D day. Their cargo of ammunition then formed a reserve supply available in the event that foul weather delayed further unloading. It is understood that such barges were employed successfully in operations in the ALEUTIANS under the adverse weather conditions encountered there, and it is believed that they might have been employed more profitably in this theater had towing facilities been available. Their pay load is tremendous. One 1500 ton lighter will supply an infantry division for two days. They could have been beached at high tide and unloaded while dried out by trucks driven alongside and loaded by crawler cranes working on the deck of the lighter. The tugs towing them would not have been idle during the unloading period, but upon arrival in the Assault Area, could have turned over the loading lighter immediately to landing craft for beaching, and, taking an empty in tow, started at once on the return trip to the near shore.

Recommendations.

That the construction of all types of landing craft mentioned above, with the exception of the LCT(6) be continued. It is believed that the LCT(5) is superior to the LCT(6).

That the employment of Rhino ferries be further investigated, bearing in mind that the constituent parts of these craft can be transported to any locality and assembled on the scene.

LCT(A)

From:       Operations Officer, Gunfire Support Group Force "O".

The LCT(A) as a fire support ship proved to be of very little value. The additional armor plating was found to make the craft considerably less sea-worthy and to reduce its load capacity by fifty per-cent. If tanks are to fire their guns as the ship approaches the beach the fire should be in the nature of a barrage rather than a specified number of rounds at a particular target. Observation from the tank deck of an LCT is difficult at best and under some conditions impossible. The extra armor with which LCT(A)s were equipped undoubtedly saved a number of lives but the difficulties under which the ship operated more than outweighed the advantages of this protection.

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