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
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KOREA

1. South Koreans disheartened--US Embassy Korea reports that the South Koreans and their Government are seriously dispirited by the course of hostilities, and particularly by the loss of Seoul. Pointing out that visible evidences of US assistance have been few thus far, the Embassy expresses the opinion that a very strong effort on the part of the US Air Force and Navy will be needed if the situation is to be stabilized and that the sight of US aircraft in action during the next few days will be necessary to maintain morale among South Korean troops engaged on the Han River line.



2. YUGOSLAVIA: Attitude toward Korean situation--The US Delegation to the UN has been informed by Yugoslav Security Council representative Bebler that his government privately supports and understands the US action on Korea but could not publicly support the US resolution in the SC because of Yugoslavia's ideological war with the USSR. Bebler admitted the resolution "might prove to be in Yugoslavia's direct interest if Yugoslavia were attacked next." Bebler expressed the opinion that in order to keep the sympathy of Marxists in "Democratic People's" countries and the USSR, Yugoslavia must be extremely careful not to appear to be a creature of the West. Bebler remarked that he knew the US was not out to rule Yugoslavia or any other independent country and commented that the difficulty arose from the colonial or semi-fascist nature of several US-backed governments throughout the world.



US Ambassador Allen reports from Belgrade that in an extensive conversation with Tito on the Yugoslav position regarding the Korean question, Tito stated that

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
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DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

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
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
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his chief aim was to convince world opinion of Yugoslav independence from any bloc, while showing clearly his condemnation of aggression. In this connection, Tito said that he must keep constantly in mind that if the Cominform suddenly attacked Yugoslavia, Moscow would seek to justify the attack as a purely defensive measure. Tito implied that the Yugoslav Government would abide by any Security Council decisions taken in accord with the UN Charter and remarked that he did not expect the Korean situation or reported troop movements in the Balkans to interrupt his plans for departing shortly for his summer capital at Bled.



(CIA Comment: Recent reports of Soviet military activity in the Balkan area, including those regarding Soviet Black Sea naval maneuvers with a hypothetical landing on the Turkish Black Sea coast, appear to be part of a Soviet war-of-nerves in that area. Soviet sabre rattling will probably continue and may be intensified, but the strong US reaction to Soviet-inspired aggression in Korea will probably discourage the USSR from any Soviet-Satellite military aggression in the Balkans.)

3. INDOCHINA: French favor prompt attack on Viet Minh forces-- US Ambassador Bruce in Paris transmits the opinion of Pignon, French High Commissioner for Indochina, that the developments in Korea make imperative the immediate destruction



- 2 -

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of the Communist-led Viet Minh forces in Indochina. Pignon expressed confidence that the Viet Minh forces can be eliminated, but commented that the margin of success could be increased only if the French forces in Indochina receive prompt delivery of additional US aircraft. Pignon expressed the feeling that Bao Dai will return to Indochina after taking a badly needed rest at Vichy.

- 3 -

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