


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2. Korea - North China - Japan

There is substantial evidence that North Korea is making every effort to continue the struggle on into the winter. There has been no evidence of direct Chinese Communist participation.

Preparations continue for stepped-up air operations with continued airfield and revetment construction, establishment of more elaborate Air Force communications, arrangements for supplies of bombs, and the dispatch of service and anti-aircraft units to forward airfields. Messages emphasize the date of 15 September as a preparation deadline. It is believed that the training program will increase the currently estimated 100 pilots to 400 by January 1951. Availability of trained North Korean pilots will be a limiting factor to this program of Air Force expansion. Although messages have referred only to the

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obsolescent single engine PO-2 trainer and the light TU-2 bomber, pursuit as well as attack pilots have been mentioned. It is not likely that North Korea can successfully challenge UN air supremacy without Soviet participation.

Although recent identification of additional regiments in the combat zone indicates the presence of combat troops above previous estimates, it is believed that casualties during the past week have exceeded replacements and ground combat effectives in the area are still estimated at 125,000 (exclusive of 10,000 constabulary, of whom 5,000 are with combat units).

The possibility of new divisions is strengthened by a request on a front line division to send 100 men of "battalion commander class" to Seoul and by message references to new regiments. Men for new divisions could come from the 126,000 (previously reported) in training camps as of 10 September.

Blanketing of occupied South Korea with 12 Guard or Security Regiments indicates increased emphasis on behind-the-lines security, as well as a fear of UN airborne or amphibious attack. Considerable attention has been given to building up coast defenses, particularly in the Inchon area. North Korean messages of 3-9 September indicate that considerable amounts of arms and supplies reached the combat area, despite continuing transportation difficulties resulting from UN air attacks.

The issuance of winter uniforms was scheduled for 10 September. A Soviet message of 23 August indicates delivery of a large number of "caps with ear flaps."

Continuing flow of supplies from the USSR is indicated by routine transactions connected with shipments of petroleum and rubber products, probably tires. The shipments of these rubber products coincide with releases from Siberian stockpiles during the summer. A message indicating Soviet inability to

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ship certain commodities through Vladivostok to Sakhalin for the remainder of the year may be an indication of the strain placed on that center by the Korean war.

Strength of Chinese Communist field forces in Manchuria is now estimated at 85,000, including 60,000 in the 55th, 56th, and 57th Armies believed formed from Military District troops, and 25,000 in units of the 4th Field Army known to have moved to Manchuria. Military District forces are now estimated at 505,000.

There is insufficient information to indicate Soviet and Chinese Communist policy should UN forces cross the 38th parallel.

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-3-

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