SOVIET-SATELLITE COMMENT ON KOREA: LITTLE EFFORT TO PROVE AGGRESSION

The chief new development in Soviet and European-Satellite comment on Korea has been a virtual disappearance of the effort to "prove" U.S. aggression. It is now treated as one of the self-evident facts which "everyone knows." The general tone or amount of belligerence in Soviet propaganda on the issue seems to remain about the same; there is no clear change either in the proportion of atrocity stories or in the proportion of implicit threats of Soviet involvement. On the other hand, themes which have increased in frequency include: the possible use of the atomic bomb in Korea; disunity within the United Nations; the use of German and Japanese personnel in Korea; the advantages (e.g., land reform) enjoyed by South Koreans who have been "liberated" by North Korean troops. The Indian and British negotiations have not yet been commented on by Moscow at this writing, though the text of the Stalin-Nehru exchange has been widely distributed, and European Satellite radios praise Stalin's "calm and objective" reply--without stressing the issue of Chinese representation in the Security Council, which is stressed in the largely unfavorable Western radio comment.

As was true last week, Moscow fails to condemn the prominent American discussion of greatly increased military preparations. The Alsops, for instance, are not called "warmongers." Soviet attention remains concentrated on the atomic bomb and no aspect of land strength as such is considered, there is no discussion either of the present superiority of the North Koreans in tanks, etc., or of the possibility that the land strength of the United States might in the future be greatly increased.

a. Everyone Knows, Now, That South Korea Started It: Until as recently as 12 July the Soviet and other Communist radios devoted a fair amount of attention to alleged evidence that the South Koreans, with U.S. backing, were in fact the aggressors. "Confessions" by South Koreans, the visit of Dulles to Korea, aggressive statements by Syngman Rhee and other asserted facts were claimed to prove a long-premeditated invasion of the North. Even from the beginning, however, the great majority of broadcasts used the standard Soviet technique of assuming that the Soviet version of the facts is self-evident and that "the whole world knows" that the U.S. was the aggressor. Since 12 July, however, the effort to present plausible evidence has been virtually abandoned and Moscow has reverted to the more familiar technique of implicit self-evidence. With a few scattered exceptions, "the foul aggression of American imperialists" is referred to innumerable contexts as if it were now wholly beyond the need for any further proof.

b. Truman, "That Sanctimonious Hypocrite": Atrocity stories are fairly frequent, including charges that the South Koreans shoot messes of prisoners in cold blood, that one prisoner's hands were nailed to a table, and that American aircraft bomb hospitals as well as helpless women and children.
There are also a few examples of venomous ridicule, one of which equals the most extreme illustrations of this type of writing which have occurred at any time in the past. Surkov, in Pravda, pictures President Truman as follows:

"In what way is the President--that sanctimonious hypocrite, the perpetrator of so many bloody acts... today's murderer of Korean women and children--better than the mad Fuehrer?... Truman, bustling like a haberdashery shopkeeper, scribbling envenomed, man-hating epistles, whispering under cover with the professional butchers, Bradleys, MacArthurs, and other Forrestal-candidates, signing the order on the intervention in Korea with an ominously scratching pen--such is the unseemly, disgust-provoking image of the world of imperialist gangsters in the grip of violent insanity." (15 July)

Stalin, in contrast, is the great-hearted scholar:

"Stalin, carrying in his heart great solicitude for the fate of the peoples of his country, profoundly solicitous about the fate of humanity--Stalin holding discourse with people of the arts and literature about books, paintings, symphonies, plays and films--Stalin opening new horizons before people of science and culture with his articles on linguistics--such is the bright image of the new world turned toward the future and opposing the kingdom of the gold devil, the world of the decaying living corpses of capitalism."

c. The U.N. is Disunited; Many Disapprove of U.S. Aggression: Moscow fully capitalizes upon the reluctance of many U.N. members to send appreciable numbers of troops, and interprets this reluctance (without referring to the vote on condemnation of North Korean aggression) as if it implied widespread acceptance of the Soviet version of Korean events. The action of Trygve Lie and others in support of the U.S. is also attributed to sheer American domination--again with the implication that the U.S.
"lackeys," or at least the "peoples" in their own countries, would otherwise side against the aggressive position which the U.N. has officially taken.

It is perhaps noteworthy that the U.N. itself, as a symbol, has not yet been attacked. The imperialists are often said to be "trying" to reduce the U.N. to a branch of the State Department, but claims that this has actually been accomplished are rare. Similarly, the use of the U.N. flag in Korea is described as a disgrace and as a humiliation which the U.N. has to suffer, with implied sympathy for the flag and for the institution which it represents, rather than condemnation. And, similarly, the individuals in the Security Council who constitute the majority are described individually and collectively as venal "idiots," but again without condemning the organization in whose name they acted.
Typical of this individualized denunciation is the following characterization of Trygve Lie:

"In fact, if one listens to Trygve Lie without looking at him, one might mistake him for the red-faced, puffing American U.N. representative Mr. Austin, or for one of his deputies, so assiduously does Mr. Lie sing in another's voice." (Rassadin and Filippov, Soviet Home Service, 18 July 1950)

And the same writers denounce the U.N. Commission on Korea as a U.S. tool, without condemning the U.N. itself: "Of course it is known that this committee is the product of the well-known warmonger John Foster Dulles, and that it is headed by the Kuomintang agent Liu Yu-wan, but would Mr. Trygve Lie dare to doubt the authenticity of the Committee's reports?" There is also a linkage of the theme of U.N. disunity with the familiar cannonfodder theme:

"They (the American imperialists) wish to slaughter the freedom-loving people of Korea with other hands, and are demanding cannonfodder from their satellites, and once again Mr. Trygve Lie is at their service." (Soviet Home Service, 18 July)

d. No Discussion of Proposed Increase in U.S. Land Strength: In contrast with standard Soviet charges that American military expenditures were proof of "militarism," the major increases in expenditure which are now being considered in the United States are almost wholly ignored. The sole monitored reference to any aspect of American mobilization (in the broadest sense of that word) is the claim that the call-up of troops in the United States is unpopular and that volunteers are slow in coming. Americans favoring a greatly increased war effort (such as the Alsops) are not denounced as "warmongers" or "militarist." In fact, there is a scrupulous avoidance of anything which might, by focusing attention land strength, detract from the current enormous Soviet stress on the atomic bomb; and nothing is said which could imply that the strength of the West (in non-atomic weapons) might in the future be vastly greater than it is now.

e. No Admission That the North Koreans are Superior in Equipment. Somewhat paradoxical, too, is the fact that Soviet propaganda does not publicize or boast about the giant tanks and other equipment possessed by the North Koreans. On the contrary, Moscow pictures the North Korean army as winning entirely because of its magnificent fighting spirit and not at all because of superiority in material. "How can Mr. Trygve Lie, who gazes upon Korean events through American spectacles, understand and estimate the heroism of the Koreans who are fighting foreign invaders for the freedom and liberty of their motherland?"
There is also much stress on the poor morale of the South Koreans, attributed to their unreadiness to die for America: "The regime of colonization enforced in Southern Korea by American agents for the last five years has shown itself to have been so hated by the population that it crumbled immediately." On the few occasions when American equipment is mentioned it is treated with apparent respect: "The United States, in intervening in Korea, brought into action all types of armed forces--the Navy, Air Force, and land forces. These armed forces are equipped with modern fighting technique."

f. Nehru's Mediation Attempt: Soviet radio and press sources give wide publicity to the notes exchanged between Premier Nehru and Generalissimo Stalin, but they do not offer any comment on the exchange. Warsaw interprets Nehru's offer as an indication of his Government's apprehension over the "incalculable" policy of the U.S., and Leipzig sees Stalin's "calm and objective" reply as a further indication of the USSR's desire for world peace; it warns that U.S. rejection of the mediation offer will clearly reveal America's criminal intentions. In none of these Communist comments is there stress on the question of including Communist China in the Security Council--the issue with which Western sources appear most concerned.
ASIAN COMMUNIST RADIOS: THE WORLD SUPPORTS THE JUST KOREAN CAUSE

Korea's strength in the struggle to drive out the American invaders is as the strength of ten because it cause is just, according to Asian Communist broadcasts on developments in Korea. Furthermore, because that cause is just it has aroused the hearty support of the entire peace-loving world. These claims, which have been made repeatedly in North Korean broadcasts, continue to be emphasized along with assertions concerning the criminality of the U.S. imperialists. Continuing emphasis is also given to the claim that all Koreans are united behind Kim II Sung in their determination to liberate their homeland. The North Korean radios alternate these claims of solidarity with appeals for solidarity, ignoring the possible inconsistency. Pyongyang and Seoul continue their atrocity propaganda as part of their hate-America campaign, which is, in turn, part of the campaign to arouse solidarity against the Americans and Syngman Rhee.

Peiping, primarily concerned with the Formosa issue, continues to relay almost all Pyongyang's accounts of military and political events in Korea. Chinese Communist broadcasts also appear concerned to belittle by implication the fighting strength of the U.S. They report the rapidity with which the troops desert the front, the frequent changes in the high command in Korea, the Collins-Vandenberg visit to Tokyo, and the impending mobilization of the American economy and find in all these developments evidence that America is weak—a paper tiger.

The Viet Minh radio stresses the defeat awaiting America and quotes Ho Chi Minh as declaring that the U.S. will be defeated in Vietnam as it was in China; "we will meet with many difficulties but we are sure to win" Ho concludes.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST ATOM BOMB IS LINKED WITH KOREAN ISSUE

While references to the atom bomb in the Korean context are still not very frequent, they have considerably increased in frequency during the week. In conformity with the enormously-publicized campaign in support of the Stockholm Appeal, the possibility of American use of the bomb, as suggested in Congress and elsewhere, is denounced as "monstrous," "cannibalistic," etc. It is put on the same plane as poison gas and the torturing of prisoners:

"This demand is in no way exceptional. It is based on international law. The atom bomb must be outlawed in the same way as poison gas was outlawed—in the same way as it is forbidden to torture or kill prisoners, loot civilians, or bomb Red Cross hospitals." (Leontyev, Soviet Home Service, 16 July 1950)
The same writer treats Secretary Acheson's opposition to the Stockholm Appeal as virtually an endorsement of the bomb. "Men such as Churchill, Bidault and Schumann openly call for the use of the atom bomb now, at once, immediately. One might have simply ascribed this to the hysterical ravings of cannibals and misanthropes"--but Acheson also is a party to it. "According to Acheson no holds are barred in war."

The Canadian Peace Congress is said to have wired Trygve Lie and others expressing alarm over proposals made in the American Congress to employ the atom bomb in Korea, and demanding that President Truman publicly denounce these statements and assure the world that the United States would not use the bomb. Zaslavsky goes so far as to assume that the bomb will be used in Korea, and an anonymous commentator indulges in the following satirical description of the plight of the atom-mongers:

"All the imperialists are confused now, but some have remained unchanged under the impact of fear and spite. They raise the hue and cry: 'Drop the atom bomb!'

"Hysteries are infectious. With foam on his lips the Conservative MP Roberts is beside himself in the British Parliament. The schemes of the American aggressors are going awry, so the tender heart of the English reactionary and flunky of Wall Street is throbbing. Besides, Paul Reynaud and Maurice Schumann in Paris also started yelling. They also bawl, 'The bomb on Korea!', and together with them Brabazon and Lord Vansittart. All of them gathered in the Committee for the Study of European Problems dance around the fetish of the atom bomb, yelling and telling fortunes." (in Serbo-Croat, 18 July)*

The same commentator presents the formerly standard but now little-men- tioned thesis that the bomb is not, after all, a decisive military weapon. (He does not, however, make this claim with regard to the H-bomb. In fact, with the exception of a short period in March, any reference to the H-bomb has been conspicuously rare in Soviet broadcasts).

"The peoples well remember the words of Comrade Stalin when he said in September 1946, 'I do not take the atom bomb for such a serious force as some political officials are inclined to think.' Atom bombs are meant for intimidating men of weak nerves, but they cannot sway the outcome of a war because atom bombs are not enough for that."

*This claim that Reynaud and Schumann advocate use of atomic weapons in Korea appears to be a type of distortion of facts which is not typical of Soviet propaganda. Moscow usually avoids misstatements which are readily apparent as in this instance. (See section on France in this SURVEY.)