1. USSR

2. **Communists planning to use Sinuiju airfield for coordinated ground attack operations:**

   **US Navy 30 Apr 51**
   
   In a US Navy analysis of recent North Korean and Chinese Communist air messages, it is stated that the "North Korean air force was forced to abandon plans for operations from most Korean airfields during April and has shifted to preparation of Sinuiju airfield (in North Korea) for support of apparent coordinated ground attack operations in the near future, involving three North Korean fighter regiments (conventional) and the Chinese Communist Fifth Division (a conventional ground attack air division)."

   **Comment:** It seems illogical that the Communists would plan to utilize Sinuiju for this purpose, in view of the proximity of that field to excellent facilities in protected Antung, just across the Yalu river. A possible explanation may be that the enemy is attempting to avoid the possibility of UN air action against Manchuria in the event of large-scale Communist operations originating...
from there and expects that sufficient jet fighter cover can be provided from protected Antung air facilities to maintain Sinuiju in operational capacity.

FAR EAST

3. Enemy armor contacted in Chinese Communist sector:

Reported that five enemy tanks attacked six miles northeast of Seoul and that UN aircraft observed seventeen more in enemy rear areas.

Comment: Although there have been almost continuous air sightings of enemy armor since January, scarcely any ground contacts have been reported during this period. This tank contact is reported in the sector occupied by the Chinese Communist 3rd Army Group, previously reported as having received armored support in Manchuria. Two major North Korean armored units are also known to be located in western North Korea.

An analysis of enemy tank sightings revealed 82 sightings in western Korea south of Pyongyang for the period from 16 March to 10 April. In the light of previous experience indicating that air sightings fail to account for more than 50 percent of actual armored strength, this same analysis estimated that the enemy may have at least 150 to 175 tanks for future employment along the more favorable west coast road net.