

~~TOP SECRET SUEDE~~

6 Jul 51
CIB

FAR EAST

1. Chinese Communists feel they enter negotiations with strong position:

[redacted]
[redacted] 4 July 51
[redacted]

[redacted]

available to the 8th Army, the Chinese Communist Field Commander in Korea, General Peng Teh-huai, advised CCF tactical

commanders on 1 July that Chinese delegates to the cease-fire negotiations represent a victorious army, that South Korean demands will be ignored, and that, if negotiations prove unsatisfactory, the CCF will launch their summer offensive. [redacted] on the same date, the logistical commands of the CCF Third and Fourth Field Armies informed General Peng of the movement of 80,000 new "volunteers" from Manchuria to the Korean front. The US Far East Command endorses the 8th Army warning that, should this report be true, no significant concessions can be expected -- at least in the political field. Further, the time gained by the enemy during extended negotiations would permit them to concentrate forces equal to or greater than those employed during the April offensive and to construct and repair forward airfields for close air support.

2. Chiang Kai-shek expresses his views on Asian situation:

[redacted]
[redacted] 2 July 51
[redacted]

Chiang Kai-shek observed privately to the US Charge at Taipei on 30 June that the Chinese Communists in Korea badly needed a respite and quite likely would agree to a

cease-fire and armistice. [redacted]

[redacted]

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