23. **NDREA.** Enemy troops in Korea retain potential for powerful offensive in west central Korea; while the enemy's current activities continue to indicate an "active and tenacious" defense, his strong potential for offensive action, developed over a considerable period of time, is still largely available, and he remains capable of launching attacks, local or more extensive, at the time of his choosing.

If the enemy chooses to initiate an offensive with his present deployment of forces, his major effort would be concentrated in the west with Seoul as an objective. Available for such action in the west central sector are eight or nine Chinese Communist armies, supported by a North Korean and a Chinese Communist armored division and by four Chinese Communist artillery divisions. Additionally the enemy would be capable of launching secondary efforts southeast towards Seoul from the east central sector with two and possibly three Chinese Communist armies, and with one Chinese Communist army and four North Korean corps in the eastern sector. (20 Oct 51)

24. **Major North Korean airfield under construction 60 miles south of the Yalu River:** a major effort underway to make an airfield south of the northwestern Korean city of Taechon operational. Thousands of laborers employing trucks, bulldozers and steam rollers working on some 30 aircraft revetments and on resurfacing -- apparently with concrete -- the 6500 x 200 foot runway. The area around the airfield was "saturated" with personnel slit trenches and the field was protected by three batteries of eight heavy antiaircraft guns and several antiaircraft machine gun positions. More antiaircraft positions were under construction.
While Taechon is only 60 miles south of the major enemy jet base at Antung, this distance represents "over one-fourth of the combat range of MIG-15's without external fuel tanks." Although the field, "due to its lack of facilities," is not suited for staging ground attack or bomber aircraft sorties," it is well suited for interception operations. (19 Oct 51)

Comment: These intensive efforts to prepare a major field capable of sustaining jet operations are further evidence of the importance attached to gaining at least partial control in the air over northwestern Korea. The elaborate antiaircraft defense system reported around the field, coupled with the increased Communist jet fighter interceptor operations over this area, signifies a determination not heretofore noted to put this field in an operational status.

26. Soviet pilots from east Germany arrive in Manchuria for combat operations over Korea. Learned that a group of about 100 Soviet jet pilots, ranging in rank from captain to lieutenant colonel, had arrived in Mukden in late September. These pilots, commanded by a Colonel "Otuyang-ko," were drawn from Soviet air force units in eastern Germany and were scheduled to return there after a two months combat tour in Korea.
Comment: This report tallies very closely with unconfirmed information received in early September of a Soviet jet pilot with the rank of major, who was transferred early in September to the Mukden area where he was to act as "operations officer to the 26th Soviet Air Force Command."

It is believed probable that Soviet pilots, acting as combat pilot instructors or in operational units, are currently piloting some of the MiG aircraft that are encountered almost daily over Korea.

27. KOREA. Percentage of Chinese Communist desertions decreases: The US Far East Command observes that the percentage of Chinese Communist prisoners who deserted to the UN has decreased since 10 August. Additionally, prisoners who deserted during this period were in groups of six or less and were motivated more by being isolated from their parent unit than by morale reasons.

Chinese Communist desertions since early June are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Prisoners</th>
<th>Per cent Deserted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Jun - 9 Jul</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jul - 9 Aug</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug - 9 Sep</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sep - 9 Oct</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The US Eighth Army attributes this decline to "close surveillance and intensified propaganda" on the part of the enemy. (19 Oct 51)

Comment: This lowering of the Chinese Communist desertion rate tends to confirm an earlier FOCOM estimate that the enemy's morale along the battle line ranged from good to excellent.

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29. **Communists use inland waterway as supply routes.** The UN naval task force operating off the North Korean west coast reports that as of 17 October "enemy use of the water way between Pyongyang and Sariwon formed by the Taedong and Chaeryong rivers appears increasing." \( \text{Oct 51} \)

**Comment: Communist utilization of all means of transportation in Korea has resulted in a generally, "adequate" level of supplies for the front line units, even in the face of the intensive UN air and sea interdiction program.**