TOP SECRET

SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

1. USSR. Moscow broadcast mentions an American campaign for a Korea "truce by Armistice Day;") Soviet broadcasts on 31 October made no mention of the Korean truce talks except for reports of an alleged campaign by the North California Peace Council for a truce by Armistice Day and for great power negotiations on a peace pact. (R FBID, 31 Oct 51)

Comment: While no immediate significance can be attached to this isolated report, it should be recalled that the Soviet press gave considerable play to US Senator Johnson's proposal to end the Korean war by 25 June, and that this was followed by Malik's cease-fire proposal on 27 June.
9. KOREA. Specialized Communist units in Korea:

- Three North Korean Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments—the 19th, 20th and 23rd—with a strength of 1,200 each—as being located in the general area of Pyongyang.

- The Chinese Communist 32nd Anti-Tank Division with a strength of 3,000 as being in Korea in an unlocated area. Although Communist prisoners have mentioned a 31st and a 33rd CCP AT Division in Korea, these units are not accepted.

Comment: A considerable build-up in Communist units of the more technical arms has been noted since last spring. In addition to the above-mentioned units, a Chinese Communist antiaircraft division, two Chinese Communist armored divisions, additional artillery troops and a rehabilitated North Korean armored division are now accepted in Korea.

10. Work continues on Communist airfields in Sinanju complex: Late October UN aerial reconnaissance of Samman and Taehum airfields in the Sinanju area of northwestern Korea reveals that both fields—suspected of being readied as advance enemy jet bases—are inoperable due to bomb damage and incomplete construction. On both fields, however, the repair of bomb damage, the building of revetments, and the extension of runways continue, with "numerous personnel and some heavy equipment" engaged in
Comment: Preparation of these air fields and neighboring Namsi for operational use apparently enjoys a high priority. It has been speculated that these fields are being readied to receive Communist jet interceptors from Manchuria in order to extend further southward the enemy's challenge of the UN's air superiority.

12. Communist guerrillas increase activities in ROK: Communist guerrilla activity in the ROK has increased during the past few weeks. On 17 October, guerrillas narrowly missed two Pusan-Seoul passenger trains during an attack on a station near Taegon. On 13 October, other Communist elements raided a freight train carrying ammunition in the Chiri-san area, and 80,000 to 120,000 rounds of ammunition were captured.

The National Assembly, worried by the worsening situation, has requested both the Minister of National Defense and the ROK Chief of Staff to explain past failures and to submit future plans for anti-guerrilla operations. The chief complaints from guerrilla-affected areas are that adequate ROK army forces are not available and "forced contributions" to the Police are not used "to maintain adequate anti-guerrilla forces."

Countermeasures against the guerrillas have recently been increased. UN medium bomber strikes against guerrillas on 26 and 27 October in the area south of Taegon were described by captured partisans as having "completely demoralized guerrillas as well as being extremely effective." A large scale anti-guerrilla campaign in this area— with air support and armored half-track vehicles—is in the planning stage.

Comment: The estimated 7,000 Communist guerrillas still operating in southern Korea are generally compartmentalized in the eastern Taebak mountains and in the southwestern Taegon-Chiri area. Although these forces are not considered an active threat to UN military operations at present, their harassing effect and their disruption of local economies...
have caused a significant decline in food production in rice-rich southwestern Korea.

Well-coordinated anti-guerrilla operations, utilizing air and ground units, will do much to minimize the effectiveness of these residual groups. An important factor, however, is that the cooperation of the local populace is involved in the operations. Police corruption can do much to alienate this vital support.