10. KOREA. Soviet antiaircraft artillery seen linked to GCI net: A 26 October message from one station on the Russian-operated GCI net in Korea to another demands an explanation as to "why there was no reply from the artillery men in radio (network?). . . ." (SUEDE 2620, U-U, 26 Oct 51)

Comment: Although fragmentary and inconclusive, this message tends to confirm a belief that some relationship exists between Russian-served antiaircraft artillery in northwestern Korea and the early warning-ground control interceptor net operating in the area between Pyongyang and the Yalu River.

All evidence points to the operation of an efficient air defense system in northwestern Korea, including early warning, fighter interceptors, and coordinated radar-controlled antiaircraft fire.

11. Privileged Soviet position irritates North Koreans: A 1 November clear text message from one unidentified North Korean unit to another queries, "don't you provide the special food on 7 November? There are many Russian friends who are going to have pleasant time on that day."

TOP SECRET-SUEDE

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while we must only watch their glorious playing. I urge that you would provide something to eat. It would be good to have (rice?) on that day. . . ." (SUEDE CM IN 50217, M-M, 2 Nov 51)

Comment: This surprising message, if authentic, indicates a heretofore unexpressed resentment of the favored Soviet position in North Korea. The anniversary of the Soviet Revolution is celebrated on 7 November.

12. Chinese Communist front line unit suffers supply difficulties: On 21 October an unidentified Chinese Communist unit complained in a plain-language voice transmission that "right now we have no food to eat. The winter uniforms haven't been transported here yet. All combat men cannot move due to lack of these stuffs..." (SUEDE 1149, U-U, 21 Oct 51)

Comment: This message probably reflects the UN's degree of success in isolating certain front line units from their supply bases. It is believed, however, that the volume of Communist supply movement into forward areas is "adequate" and that such conditions do not prevail along the entire front.

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