
Comment: In early October there were flights of 30 to 45 MIG-15's from Chinshou airfield in the Port Arthur naval base area to the combat field at Antung, and there was a scheduled flight of ten MIG-15's from the USSR to Port Arthur, possibly to replace or supplement the ones which previously left Chinshou.

Flights of Soviet jet fighters to or from the Port Arthur area were rare before October. These messages appear to confirm that Soviet MIG-15's have been based at Port Arthur and are being committed to combat in Korea.

KOREA. Communist ground-air liaison SOP set up: Ground-air liaison signal operations procedure (SOP) was the subject of three Communist messages during early November, according to preliminary field translations.

Two North Korean messages of 3 and 9 November—one of which probably was originated by a brigade on west coast security duty—designated two different SOP's for ground-air liaison activity. A 5 November Chinese
Communist message stated that "one copy of 'Korean air-ground liaison signal' is needed by the communications section." (SUEDE CM IN 52299, 10 Nov; 52234, 10 Nov; 52951, 13 Nov 51)

Comment: It is interesting to note that the period of these SOP's coincides with the 6 November Communist TU-2 bomber attack on a UN-held island off the northwestern Korean coast.

Of greater significance, however, is the fact that air-ground liaison signals may be for operational use in Korea, rather than for training or morale-raising purposes as previously noted. The preponderance of enemy jet activity in northwestern Korea may have encouraged the Communist to attempt the use of ground attack and bomber aircraft in combat against UN-held positions in this area.

13. Communist units in Kaesong area continue to fear UN capture of that city. A 13 November North Korean message, apparently reporting the interrogation of a captured South Korean, states that "the 3rd battalion personnel are all evil men at Kaesong and ... they were strong and well indoctrinated troops. Their duty is to capture Kaesong and Yonbaek area...."

Another 13 November message, possibly from the same North Korean unit in the Kaesong area, includes instructions from the division commander to the regimental commander that "the troop should prepare for combat and await the order." (SUEDE US Air Force Japan, CM IN 53009 and 53047, 14 Nov 51)

Comment: It has become increasingly apparent, both in communications intelligence and in Communist propaganda, that the enemy anticipates a UN attack on Kaesong. The fear that "their (presumably the ROK 1st Division's) duty is to capture Kaesong and Yonbaek" (the area west of Kaesong) probably has been caused by official ROK pronouncements on the importance to the Korean people of these "historic" locations.