DAILY DIGEST

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Dept., USAF reviews completed
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

1. USSR. Arrival of Soviet personnel at East German airfield: Two trains carrying Russian airforce personnel and two aircraft arrived in the Russian zone of Germany and proceeded to Koethen airfield on 14 and 15 November respectively. These trains were in addition to those previously reported, which arrived at Grossenhain and Koethen on 8 and 16 November. This may indicate the early return of the jet fighter regiments withdrawn from the Russian zone of Germany in mid-October. It could not be determined that the Koethen-bound trains carried units from the USSR, since the numbers observed on the aircraft now at Koethen have been reported exclusively from other fields in the Russian zone.

Comment: While the Zerbst airfield was undergoing repairs during the summer, the two regiments based at Zerbst operated out of Koethen. When construction was completed, the regiments returned to Zerbst.

Possible re-deployment of three divisions of the 24th Air Army, based at Finow, Grossenhain and Alt Lomnowitz, has been observed and reported. The arrival of trains carrying personnel at an airfield other than those belonging to the three divisions suggests more generalized 24th Air Army shifts. While it is impossible to determine the status of the new personnel at Koethen, they may be new pilots and ground personnel from the USSR.

2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA-HUNGARY. Trade agreements with GDR signed: Czechoslovakia and Hungary have signed new trade agreements with East Germany. On 29 November Hungary and the German Democratic Republic signed a trade agreement for the year 1952, which reportedly provides for a considerably larger exchange between the two countries than last year. Long-term exchanges until 1955 were also agreed on in principle. The GDR will export primarily machines, electrotechnical and optical products and instruments, chemical products and fertilizers. Hungary will export diesel engines, agricultural products, and bauxite.

The reported Czechoslovak-East German trade agreement is a three-year pact under which Czechoslovakia will ship tires, machinery and spare parts to the GDR in exchange for machine tools, optical instruments, mining equipment and chemicals. (R FBIS, 29 Nov 51; U Washington Post, 3 Dec 51)

Comment: With the decrease of trade between West and East Germany, it can be expected that the GDR will turn to Eastern Europe for more and more of its trade. East German officials stated that other pacts will
be signed soon with Communist China, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania.

3. HUNGARY. Propaganda attack shifts to Tito: After several days of violent press and radio attacks against the Mutual Security Act and the espionage and sabotage activities of the US, an editorial in Szabad Nap, the Budapest Communist daily, shifted the attack to Tito and identified him as the spearhead of American aggression against Hungary. It stated: "On reading a list of American crimes one remembers the ignominious activity of the Tito gang, this most treacherous agent of American imperialism, these Belgrade murderers who are foremost in outrages committed against Hungary." The editorial added that the 'Tito Fascists' were doing the dirtiest work in the UN in the 'American campaign against the Soviet Union and Satellites.' (R Budapest 348, 29 Nov 51)

Comment: In the Tass dispatch announcing the whereabouts of the US C-47 which was lost two weeks ago, the USSR claimed "that the aircraft's flight to Yugoslavia was to enable Yugoslav spies and diversionsists to board the plane and to parachute them on the territory of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies."

4. Purge of Army officers underway: During the past two months 36 army officers have been removed from office, according to the US Legation in Budapest. Legation sources have no information regarding the rumors of more extensive purges among officer survivors of the old regime. General Radvanyi is the only high ranking officer mentioned. (C Budapest 354, 30 Nov 51; S MA Budapest 2741, 24 Nov 51)

Comment: General Radvanyi was replaced as chief of the presidential group of the Ministry of National Defense last summer. This is the first reported purge on such a scale since July 1950 when fifteen high ranking officers, including the Chief of Staff, were arrested. Those officers have never received a public trial.

5. POLAND. Polish Government protests US Mutual Security Act: The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs has formally protested the recently approved US Mutual Security Act. In a note of 1 December to the US Ambassador in Warsaw, the US is charged with brutal interference in Polish internal affairs, abuse of diplomatic privileges in the past, liaison with anti-Polish terrorist bands, and organization of subversive centers among Polish refugees. The note ends with a demand for the immediate annulment of the act. (R Warsaw 406, 1 Dec 51; R FBIS-ticker, 2 Dec 51)

Comment: Poland, like Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, has followed the example of the USSR in sending a note protesting the US Mutual...
Security Act as evidence of aggressive US intentions.

The tenor of Poland's note, like those of the other Satellites, suggests a feeling of alarm at the implications of the US Mutual Security Act. Such alarm is probably due in part to the anti-Communist resistance and widespread unrest reported from certain of the Eastern European countries.

On the basis of these protests it is possible that steps will be taken by some of the Satellites to reduce further the effectiveness of existing US diplomatic establishments in Eastern Europe.

6. RUMANIA. Rumanians set up new office to service Diplomatic Corps. The Rumanian Foreign Office has informed the American Legation in Bucharest of the establishment of an "Office for Servicing Diplomatic Corps" to provide and maintain housing for offices and personnel and to find necessary office, technical, and domestic personnel for diplomatic offices and members thereof. (R Bucharest 237, 2 Dec 51).

Comment: This move was forecast by a confidential informant in the Rumanian Government in June 1951. The proposed office is a counterpart of the Soviet "Eurobin."

7. YUGOSLAVIA. Tito promises Yugoslav support against Soviet aggression; During interviews with US Congressmen, Tito promised that the West could depend on Yugoslavia's being actively on its side in the event of a war in Europe, whether Yugoslav territory was attacked or not. Tito added that Yugoslavia had made a great mistake in the last war in thinking that it could remain aloof. Moreover, he repeated the conviction that collective security was the only way to halt or overcome a powerful aggressor. Regarding aid to Greece and Turkey, Tito said that specific Yugoslav commitments could be given only to the extent that reciprocal undertakings were assured in return. (S Belgrade Joint Weeka 48, 80 Nov 51).

Comment: Tito's answers to Congressional questioning conform with recent policy statements concerning Yugoslav attitudes toward regional defense projects and Western defenses. He probably predicates his promise of Yugoslav participation on the assumption that Yugoslavia cannot possibly hope for immunity from any Soviet-Satellite military attack in Europe. Yet the Marshal has been careful to avoid any outright, unequivocal statement that Yugoslavia would "go to war" to defend Western Europe.
1. **BURMA. Nu's position reportedly secure:** The recent flurry of reports that Prime Minister Thakin Nu would be replaced have died down. US Charge during his recent visit to Rangoon that his observations supported the probability that Nu would continue in office. The US Embassy comments that Nu's political durability and popularity with ethnic minority groups are factors in his favor. (C Rangoon 520, 30 Nov 51)

   **Comment:** Thakin Nu unquestionably possesses important political attributes, not the least of which is his reputation of being a devout Buddhist. Nevertheless, so long as conditions continue to deteriorate in Burma, the appeasers are likely to become increasingly evident and insistent upon a change in leadership.

2. **Peace talks with Karens reported:** Press reports that efforts were being made to end the Karen insurgency have been confirmed by US Embassy contacts. (C Rangoon 520, 30 Nov 51)

   **Comment:** The end of hostilities between the Burmese Government and the Karens would be the most important step towards establishing stability in Burma since the various insurgencies began in 1948. Since Karen-Burman animosities are of such long standing and have been severely aggravated during the past ten years, no truce would be perfect and would require extremely delicate handling over a prolonged period. However, even a state of armed neutrality between Karen and Burman would reduce the Communist threat to Burma.

3. **BWPP activities continue:** In a recent press interview, a spokesman of the Burma Workers and Peasants Party criticized the Burmese Government's failure to attack the Chinese Nationalist troops in northern Burma. He stated that "a certain power" was supporting the Nationalists in an effort to incite the Chinese Communist Army into a pursuit action and turn Burma into "another Korea." (C Rangoon 520, 30 Nov 51)

   **Comment:** Communist propaganda concerning the Chinese Nationalists has heretofore been comparatively light. It is not clear whether this report is the beginning of a new propaganda drive, merely an "off-the-cuff" statement, or a threat to the Burmese Government.

4. **BURMA/CHINA. Chinese Communists training agents for operations in Burma:** The Chinese Communists are training agents in several places in southwestern Yunnan for the collection of military data.
intelligence in Burma. Other agents are also said to be training in methods of spreading Communist propaganda and will be used in an effort to induce the defection of the Chinese Nationalist guerrillas in north Burma. (S FRAP, AX 7138, 25 Nov 51)

Comment: This report is plausible but unconfirmed.

5. THAILAND. MacDonald comments on Thai coup: The UK Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, told the US Consul General in Singapore that the Thai coup was "a mixture of good and bad." The Commissioner General believes there is more good than bad, since Phibun continues in power. (S Singapore 630, 1 Dec 51)

Comment: MacDonald has always had a tendency to be overly optimistic. The basic causes of instability in Thailand remain and may well be accentuated by growing authoritarianism on the part of the military regime.

6. US Embassy comments on coup: Commenting on the recent coup d'etat, the US Embassy in Bangkok states that, despite the peaceful beginnings of the new regime, the situation is comparable to the rise of Fascism in Italy where accusations of subversion and corruption were used to justify the overthrow of a liberal, parliamentarian government. The new regime, according to the Embassy, is little short of a military dictatorship and represents a backward step so far as the development of democratic processes are concerned. Pointing to the sordid record of those taking over the administration in the alleged interest of clean government, the Embassy believes the Communists have been presented with some "real ammunition" which they will not fail to exploit. (R Bangkok 1241, 2 Dec 51)

Comment: The Embassy's critical view of the new Thai Government appears to be well founded. A more immediate danger, however, is the probable early reemergence of rivalries within the military clique. A serious division between any of several factions could easily embroil Thailand and present the Communists with an excellent opportunity to expand their influence.

7. INDONESIA. Cabinet approves draft Dutch-Indonesian agreements: Supomo, chairman of the committee for replacing the Round Table Conference agreements, told American Ambassador Cochran that the Cabinet and party leaders had approved drafts of five documents which his committee will submit to the Dutch as separate draft treaties. These will deal respectively with (1) general arrangements, (2) financial and economic matters, (3) trade and commerce, (4) military affairs—principally the Netherlands military mission to Indonesia, and (5) exchange of cultural objects.

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There is no reference in the treaties to any Dutch-Indonesian union or to any political or religious relationships. Supomo said these drafts would offer the Netherlands practically the same rights for holding property and doing business in Indonesia as provided in the RTC agreements.

Supomo said that although he expects to begin the discussions with the RTC agreements, he wishes to negotiate the West New Guinea question concurrently. He told Cochran that his tactic will be to let the Dutch know that the more favorably they treat Indonesia on the New Guinea issue, the more favorably they will be treated on the bilateral agreements. (S Djakarta 780, 30 Nov 51)

Comment: The RTC agreements of 1949 set up a Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown on the basis of which the economic, commercial and cultural agreements were negotiated. Most Indonesians consider the Union a vestige of colonialism and desire its abrogation. The moderate Indonesian Government wants little change in Netherlands-Indonesian relations and apparently is renegotiating the RTC agreements chiefly to the extent of removing them from a Union status and placing them on the basis of an ordinary international agreement.

8. INDOCHINA. ECA Chief in the Far East pessimistic over progress in Indochina: The Chief of ECA operations for the Far East emphasizes that the greatest impediment to US aims in Indochina is the weakness and conservatism of the present Vietnamese Government. He believes the Viet Minh "revolution" will continue despite massive US military aid and a sizeable US economic program unless a socially-conscious government with "grass roots" instincts is formed.

The ECA Chief further believes that French officials in Indochina now realize they are fighting a war that cannot be won without a political solution and that the conservative Vietnamese "mandarins" they have been supporting as leaders will never attract the masses sufficiently to achieve such a solution. The US official recommends, therefore, that the United States now consider this problem jointly with the French to the end of developing a government with a broad popular base. (S Singapore 613, 30 Nov 51)

Comment: There is no convincing evidence available that the French authorities in Indochina have undergone such a change in attitude as described by the ECA Chief. Those Vietnamese politicians who have shown the clearest social purpose are the ones whose political life under the French-sponsored Vietnamese Government has been briefest.

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4 Dec 51

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9. CHINA. Chinese Communist army identified in province adjacent to Indochina: "confirmed" information that the Chinese Communist 44th Army has moved from Canton to Kwangsi province, although its exact location is unknown.

   this brings the number of Chinese Communist armies now in Kwangsi and Yunnan to a total of eleven.

Comment: The 44th Army reportedly has been preparing for a move from the Canton area for the past several weeks. Elements of nine other armies have been reported moving into Kwangsi over the past month, but their arrival there remains unconfirmed.

10. Motor torpedo boats seen at Whampoa for first time: two motor torpedo boats, with "Europeans" on board, were seen at Whampoa in the third week of November. Motor torpedo boats, probably of Russian construction, have now been reported at Whampoa, Tientsin, Tsingtao and in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Comment: Motor torpedo boats have also been seen at Dairen, where 50 to 80 were reported under construction for the Chinese Communist Navy in July 1951. MTB's are the only naval vessels so far known to have been acquired by China from the USSR, although the transfer of many vessels, including submarines and destroyers, has often been rumored.

11. Communists resume buying in Hong Kong and Macao: After a suspension of buying activity following the failure of the Nan Kuang Company, principal Communist buying agency in Macao, the Chinese Communists have decided to resume purchase operations in Macao and Hong Kong. According to the Chinese press in Hong Kong, "limited foreign exchange" will be available for purchases in December and the first quarter of 1952. Buying will be more selective than heretofore. (S Hong Kong 1792, 30 Nov 51)

Comment: The Chinese are not yet ready to deprive themselves of the services offered by Hong Kong and Macao as sources of supply for Western goods. Because of Hong Kong export controls, Communist buying will have to be on a less extensive scale than formerly. These controls have already effected a sharp drop in the volume of shipments from Hong Kong to the mainland.

12. Nationalist China warns of attack on Formosa if peace is concluded in Korea: Nationalist China should maintain her "political vigilance" against the consequences of a possible armistice in Korea, according to
Tao Hsi-sheng, former Kuomintang party spokesman. Tao believes that, with the Chinese Communists freed of their commitment in Korea, Formosa would face a long period of military, political and psychological pressure. While believing that the military safety of Formosa should not be dependent upon an armistice in Korea, he stated that an invasion of the island will not be attempted by the Communists unless considered a "sure gamble." (U Taipei Pan-Asia, 2 Dec 51)

Comment: This is one of several Nationalist reports predicting disaster if American protection of Formosa is withdrawn following an armistice in Korea. It is probably true that US "neutralization" of the island is the principal deterrent to a Communist military operation against Formosa.

13. **Peiping lowers educational standards to get more engineers:** A national conference of deans of engineering colleges has announced a plan for "readjustment" of higher technological training, which is intended to make more engineers available to the regime. The plan envisages amalgamation of existing facilities, increased specialization and emphasis on short-term training. The plan recognizes that large-scale expansion is impossible at this time, and that an increased number of students must be trained with existing facilities. The US Consulate General at Hong Kong notes that the plan would lower engineering educational standards in order to produce partially-trained specialists rapidly, and suggests that this concept, already introduced in the medical field, was probably adopted from the USSR. (S Hong Kong 1791, 30 Nov 51)

Comment: The Peiping regime has chosen in many fields to produce half-trained personnel rapidly rather than well-trained technicians slowly. This plan is adequate for the operation of most existing industry, but reflects Peiping's awareness of the probability that industrial expansion will be limited for some years.

14. **Peiping regime shows high degree of centralization:** The US Consulate-General at Hong Kong notes that recent lists of personnel changes approved by the State Administration Council clearly demonstrate the high degree of centralization of the Peiping regime. The Consulate-General observes that one or the other of the regime's two principal organs must approve appointments of all officials down to the level of commissioners of administrative districts under provincial governments, office chiefs in provincial governments, and even members of municipal governments under provincial governments. (S Hong Kong 1791, 30 Nov 51)

Comment: There is evidence that Peiping not only merely approves but initiates appointments and dismissals of most or all significant provincial officials, as well as the policies administered by those officials. The objective of maximum central control inevitably conflicts with the objective of regional autarky.
of maximum local efficiency. Chinese Communist pronouncements have indicated Peiping's awareness of, but inability to resolve, this conflict.

15. **KOREA.** Ill-fated 30 November Communist bomber raid re-emphasizes offensive capability: The Far East Air Force states that the fighter-supported Communist bomber formation of 30 November, which suffered high losses from UN interceptors, "re-emphasizes the enemy capability for offensive action in Korea."

While it is believed that any future offensive action against UN rear area installations by the estimated one combat-ready enemy bomber regiment would suffer comparable losses, FEAF estimates that "the vulnerability of our crowded airfields and the possible destruction of a proportion of our fighter strength on the ground" might influence the enemy to accept such losses. (S CINCFE Telecon 5422, 3 Dec 51)

**Comment:** While the considerable Communist air capability both for challenging UN air superiority over Korea and launching air offensive action against UN ground installations is recognized, the degree of damage inflicted upon the enemy in this encounter by UN interceptors might well make him hesitate to take similar action in the future.

In any event, the enemy will probably husband his offensive air potential until political or military considerations dictate its use.

16. **Unidentified jet aircraft appear south of battle line:** On 3 December four unidentified jet aircraft were sighted over the city of Seoul from several ground positions. UN F-86 aircraft dispatched to intercept the aircraft lost sight of them over the Yellow Sea southwest of Chinnampo.

Earlier on the same day, three unidentified aircraft strafed a UN artillery position in the rear of the battle line west of Chirwon, causing light UN casualties. A UN ground force officer at the scene stated that the attacking aircraft had "swepit-back wings and red stars." (S CINCFE Telecon 5422, 3 Dec 51)

**Comment:** If, as seems probable, these aircraft were Communist, these incidents represent the southernmost enemy jet penetration and the first recorded instance of jet action against UN ground installations.

17. **Another Chinese Communist 4th Field Army unit reappears in Korea:**

The Far East Command, on the basis of reports received, reaccepts the Chinese Communist 38th Army in Korea, located in the Sunchon area north
of Pyongyang with a strength of 35,000. (3 CINCFE Telecon 5422, 3 Dec 51)

Comment: The reappearance in Korea of this veteran army, after having been withdrawn in the spring, signals the reappearance of almost all of the Chinese Communist units involved in the original Chinese intervention in 1950.

18. JAPAN. Factional dispute within Japan Communist Party seen resolved:
CINCFE reports that the Japan Communist Party has reinstated a Diet member who was expelled from the JCP for "internationalist faction" activities. The Diet member is one of several former internationalists who have submitted to "self-criticism," -- although they were not expelled from the party, -- and are awaiting readmittance to the centrist faction. CINCFE concludes that the strong factional cleavage has thus been practically resolved. (S Tokyo Weeks 48, 1 Dec 51)

Comment: Intraparty bickering and dissension, which has been going on in the JCP for nearly two years, has noticeably declined in the past few months due in some part to the influence of Peiping and Moscow. Japanese Communist leaders appear to have been eager to correct the problem for some time, and in the 1951 Party statutes the leaders apparently adopted a compromise approach which would be acceptable to both factions.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)

1. GENERAL. Latin Americans may support Byelorussia for Security Council seat:

The chairman of the Latin American caucus at the Paris UN meeting has advised the American delegation that the United States should "not now" count on Latin American support of Greece's candidacy for the Yugoslav seat on the Security Council. He added that the Latin Americans attached particular importance to retention of "the London understanding on geographic distribution" of Security Council seats and the "right of each region to select its own candidates." This would lead them to vote for Byelorussia. (C US UN Del Paris No. W48, 30 Nov 51)

Comment: Support of Byelorussia over Greece would reflect a definite change of position by a number of the Latin American nations. Brazil, for example, had informed the US that it would not support any Soviet state to succeed Yugoslavia.

The attitude of the Latin American delegates at Paris was described as ranging from "disappointed to furious" over the US decision not to back a Latin American candidate for the seat on the International Court of Justice left vacant by the expired term of a Mexican judge. The Latin Americans fear that this US move may presage further reductions in their representation on international bodies.

2. GERMANY. Constitutional Court gets case outlawing Communist Party:

The German Federal Government has presented its case against the German Communist Party (KPD) to the Constitutional Court. However, Deputy Minister of Interior Lex feels that the government may be unable to prove its charges, and thus be unable to outlaw the party.

The Constitutional Court is concurrently investigating charges against the Socialist Reichs Party (SRP), the radical rightist organization which has the largest following of all the neo-Nazi political aggregations. Lex is confident that the Court will ban the SRP. (C Bonn 534, 28 Nov 51)

Comment: On 17 November the Federal Cabinet decided to prosecute both parties under the terms of a constitutional provision that political parties may be outlawed if they seek to overthrow the libertarian democratic order. The KPD is being charged with, among other things, committing acts of aggression against the present government which are in accord with the plans of the Soviet Zone rulers. The US element of the High Commission, as well as important German leaders, regret that the party as a whole is being prosecuted rather than individual members. Outlawing the party, which as a legal entity is relatively impotent, will, it is feared, only force the movement underground where it will be more difficult to observe. Banning
the SRP, however, will greatly hamper its activities, because that party has been comparatively successful in recent elections. Its possible extinction will probably cause its followers to flock to the German Party, or even to the Free Democratic Party; and thus these groups might then assume more rightist tendencies than they now evidence.

The action being taken against the KPD and the SRP is a reflection of the current drive by liberal and trade union circles against subversive organizations. In this drive the Christian Democratic Party has been taking the lead.

3. UNITED KINGDOM. Eden considers European Army situation critical: British Foreign Secretary Eden views the European Army situation as critical and feels that the whole NATO structure will be endangered if something is not done about the European Defense Forces. Expressing the view that he had perhaps been too negative in his press conference statements, Eden asked Secretary Acheson if a more positive UK contribution could be made by suggesting some sort of British institutional association with the European Army, or by statements from Montgomery and Churchill on its military effectiveness. Eden suggested that the US and Britain devote some "vigorous" thinking to the European Defense Forces problem, since a really critical situation might arise by January. (TS Rome Secto 115, 29 Nov 51)

Comment: British concern was increased last week by the report to the NATO Council in Rome on the status of negotiations for the establishment of a European Defense Community and for contractual arrangements with the German Federal Republic. This report showed many points of disagreement requiring settlement before the February Council meeting.

French Premier Pleven has given assurance of personally pressing the Paris Conference to produce a draft treaty on the European Defense Community by the end of this month.

4. Increased production somewhat relieves UK's critical coal situation: The prospect of a critical domestic fuel shortage in Britain has diminished considerably, according to the latest coal production figures. From mid-October to mid-November, coal production increased by seven percent over the same period in 1950. For the first 46 weeks of this year the increase averages three and one-half percent above last year's figures. As of 17 November, coal stocks stood at 17.1 million tons, 1.9 million tons higher than in November 1950. At present there are 9,000 more miners than there were a year ago. (U London Financial Times, 28 Nov 51)

Comment: Although these current coal stocks fall short of the target figure of 16.5 million tons for the end of 1951, they are comfortably above
the 16.5 million tons estimated last July to be the maximum that could be produced by November.

If coal production stays at the present level for the remainder of the year, the recently intensified restrictions on consumption are maintained, and the 750,000 tons of US coal are imported as agreed during the next four months, there will be no serious coal crisis within the UK itself. However, the over-all European coal problem will remain critical, for the UK will not be able to export even the same small amount of coal as last year and by drawing upon US coal reserves will divert it from Western European countries where it is also vitally needed.

5. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. South African relationship to the General Assembly deteriorating on South-West Africa issue; The South African Government has refused to grant travel facilities to a delegation of chiefs from South-West Africa who have been invited by the Trusteeship Committee of the General Assembly to appear before it in Paris to submit their petitions in person. (U NY Times, 3 Dec 51)

Comment: By this action South Africa is defying a Trusteeship Committee resolution requesting that these travel facilities be granted. Since the Committee decided on 16 November to give the chiefs a hearing, South Africa has boycotted its sessions — the most vigorous position yet taken by the Union on the recurring question of the status of the sparsely inhabited territory held under League of Nations mandate. Minister of the Interior Donges, who came to Paris especially to plead South Africa's case, has hinted at a walkout of the General Assembly; although he personally feels that the most effective action would be a strong South African protest to the President of the General Assembly.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FRANCE. French ratification of Schuman Plan uncertain: Premier Pleven has told the US Ambassador that, if the Socialists' position can be "straightened out", the government will have a majority for passage of the Schuman Plan when it is debated on 6 and 7 December.

The Embassy reports, however, that the Socialists may demand negotiation of a supplementary agreement covering their objections, a condition which the government could not accept. The Socialists' votes will be decisive, because it is now clear that the Gaullists will vote against the Plan rather than abstain, and even the Radicals, a rightist group in the coalition, are receptive to a current "major campaign" by the steel interests to discredit the Plan. (C S/S Paris 3232, 30 Nov 51; C Paris 3227, 29 Nov 51)

Comment: In early October, Pleven expected the Plan to pass by "a comfortable majority"; however, powerful political and economic groups, whose opposition was evident earlier this year, made their influence felt in the Assembly.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Socialists, who favor the Plan in principle, would, in a showdown with the government, accept responsibility for non-ratification.

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