On the other hand, and in what may be precautionary preparations, Soviet comment on Korea closely follows the pattern that characterized pre-negotiations comment. There are charges that Wall Street is profiteering from the war, that American leaders have revealed American prompting of the 25 June invasion, and that American casualties are high. There are claims that the Koreans are heroic in war and in reconstruction, and there are continuing references to the heroic behavior of Soviet citizens; these commentaries are beamed to Korea to stimulate such behavior there.

Kaesong and San Francisco: The possibility that tension is being maintained at Kaesong in an attempt to exert pressure at San Francisco is implied in Soviet broadcasts but is not explicated or discussed. Chinese speculations concerning American motives at Kaesong are relayed by Moscow—which itself does not comment on Kaesong. But because Communist broadcasters characterize their own motivations on their opponents, it is possible that the Communists themselves are desirous of applying pressure in San Francisco by prolonging the deadlock.

Kaesong and Aggression Against the USSR: Moscow frequently and consistently claims that American intervention in Korea was intended as the opening phase of aggression against the USSR and China. This claim is currently cited as an incentive for Soviet citizens to sign the demand for a Five-Power Peace Pact. But the nature of the publicity and the volume of attention do not seem to betray any real Soviet concern over the possibility. Furthermore, the RED STAR and RED FLEET versions of this claim (cited in the NEW YORK TIMES on 30 August) are not broadcast. Thus, their implication of imminent action seems to be a stimulus to members of the military elite rather than a device designed to produce general tension.
On the other hand, and in what may be precautionary preparations, Soviet
Korean War: Moscow Marks Time

The stereotyped volume and substance of comment on the war
indicate that Moscow is marking time pending the outcome of the
present stalemate in the Kaesong negotiations. This in turn
reflects a desire to avoid worsening the tense situation.
Moscow leaves no doubt that the Western negotiators are de-
liberately provoking the Communists; but it does not explicitly
make such charges on its own initiative, nor does it increase
the volume of attention to a degree that would serve to
establish the stalemate as a pretext for resuming open hostilities.

Along this same line, there is a marked attempt to avoid responsibility for
the continuing military actions. Current communiques do not mention any
Communist offensives but speak only of Western attacks which are being
repulsed. Other references to military operations are largely concerned with
atrocious air raids.

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Other references to military actions seem to be a stimulus to members of the military elite rather than a device
designed to produce general tension.