5. Front line Chinese Communist division prepares for action in eastern Korea: A recent message, passed from the 21st Chinese Communist Artillery Regiment to its parent 7th Artillery Division, indicated that the 21st had been attached to the artillery group of the 203rd Chinese Communist Infantry Division in eastern Korea. The message indicated that the regiment was moving forward together with the mortar and artillery elements of the 203rd's artillery group. The forward displacement of the command post of the 203rd Division was also suggested.

The Far East Command stated that "the placing of a complete CCF artillery regiment of an independent artillery division under control of an infantry division suggests that the latter division may be assigned a task where the utilization and complete control of a large amount of artillery is required." (SUEDE CINCFE, SIB 477, 8 Apr 52)

Comment: The 68th Chinese Communist Army, of which the 203rd Division is a component, occupies the eastern-most portion of the Chinese-held front. Recent reports have indicated that it was about to be relieved by a sister army--the 67th--which has deployed into this sector.

While this activity cannot be interpreted definitively, a flurry of recent reports have indicated an impending "offensive." The bulk of information suggests that such action would take place in the eastern sector.

There continues to be a lack of firm indication of Communist intentions to launch a "general offensive" along the entire front. It is entirely possible, however, that a limited objective offensive of some size might be launched in eastern Korea by Chinese and North Korean forces.

6. Chinese Communist 40th Army may be preparing for combat: A recent message, probably passed on the 2nd Chinese Communist Artillery Division's net, reported that "today personnel of the artillery unit of the 40th Army arrived (and inspected?) my battalion. They were introduced to us by the 115th Division."

The Far East Command commented that an inspection of an artillery unit, currently in support of the 39th Chinese
Communist Army, by another major unit—the 40th Army—may indicate an impending relief of the 39th. More ominously, the suggested presence of the 40th Army in the immediate rear of the 39th, poses a considerable offensive threat in this sector. (SUEDE CINCFE, SIB 478, 9 Apr 52)

Comment: A number of reports have recently been received indicating the possibility of a renewed Communist general offensive. The bulk of them have pointed to the eastern sector as the focus for such an operation. This is the first indication received of a significant strengthening of enemy forces deployed in the west.

7. Information program on atom bomb probably conducted by Chinese Communists in Korea: On 4 April a message directs that "should Army distribute any material that has the powers of the atom bomb, immediately notify us to pick them up so that they may be returned to the education unit." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon 4 Apr 52)

Comment: It is probable that this message refers to literature and propaganda on atomic weapons which will be used to educate Chinese Communist troops in Korea.

It is noteworthy that a Chinese Communist propaganda broadcast on 30 March charged that since the United States has allegedly tested BW and CW agents in Korea, the use of atomic weapons would be a logical step.

8. Chinese Communists believed training 2,500 pilots a year: An Air Force analysis of intelligence relating to the training of Chinese pilots indicates that there were 2,800 graduated pilots in the Chinese Communist Air Force as of 1 January 1952, and the training effort in China should produce 2,500 pilots annually.

The number of aircraft employed in primary, basic and advanced stages of training are 93, 63 and 44, respectively. The relatively small number of advanced trainers suggests that some of this training is done in the Soviet Union, or that part of the conventional fighter regiments of the CCAF are actually advanced training units. (SUEDE US Air Force SRTS Cont 2-30803, 4 Apr 52)
Comment: Expansion of Communist air schools and training activity has been pronounced in the past six months. However, recent performance in the Korean air war of MIG-15 pilots believed to be Chinese shows that they are less proficient than Russian pilots.

9. Message refers to unknown Sino-Soviet enterprise in Manchuria: A message from Moscow to Mukden referred to a shipment of goods sent to the "Daldok works" on a contract concluded with the "Sino-Soviet Shipbuilding Joint Stock Company." (SUEDE AFSA-261 Weekly Intelligence Notes 14-52, 2 Apr 52)

Comment: Nothing is known of this "Sino-Soviet Shipbuilding Joint Stock Company." The only large shipyard in Manchuria is Daldok in Dairen, which was a Sino-Soviet trust until early 1951 when it was returned to full Chinese ownership. The Chinese Changchun Railway is the only other Sino-Soviet economic organization presently identified in Manchuria.

10. Chinese Communists change weather cipher: On 1 April the Chinese Communists changed the cipher used by the Peiping collective weather broadcasts. A preliminary study of the alteration indicates that a larger supply of cipher books has been distributed. This increase was necessitated, in part, by the establishment of new stations. Changes were to be expected, since they previously occurred in April and September 1951. (SUEDE AFSA-271 WIB 15-52, 1 Apr 52)

Comment: Changes in major Chinese meteorological ciphers were reported in November 1950 prior to Chinese entry into the Korean war, and in April 1951 prior to the Communist spring offensive.