FAR EAST

3. North Korean air unit ordered to suspend May Day celebration: A message from North Korean Air Force Headquarters at Sinuiju sent on 13 April to the commander of an air service unit, probably at Sariwon, near Pyongyang, stated: "The May Day celebration has been suspended. Do not make any preparations." (SUEDE 352, 13 Apr 52)

Comment: The suspension of traditional May Day activities apparently does not apply to all enemy forces, since 18 April messages from enemy ground units have referred to making preparations for the day.

The North Korean Air Force has used the sod airfield at Sariwon to operate obsolescent biplanes in harassing raids against the UN; there is also an early warning radar installation nearby.

4. Possibility of major new Chinese Communist unit in Korea reported: The "505th regiment" was mentioned in a garbled, high priority 16 April Chinese Communist message which referred to "lines contact."

The field collecting unit noted that the 505th Infantry Regiment is subordinate to the 169th Division, 57th Army, last located at Antung. It is not possible to judge from this message whether the 505th is actually in Korea. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2351, 20 Apr 52)

Comment: The 505th, 508th, and 524th Regiments were mentioned in a 21 March Chinese Communist intercept. These units are organic to the 57th and 59th Armies.

While no new Chinese Communist major units have recently been confirmed in Korea, all or elements of the 10th, 16th, 21st, 66th, and more recently the 57th have been tentatively identified by communications intelligence. Collateral intelligence gives some support for the presence of the 16th, the 66th and the 57th.

5. Immediate need for North Korean armored personnel seen: An unidentified North Korean unit was ordered on 16 May to "send the reserve tank crews immediately." (SUEDE Hqs ASA Pacific Tokyo Japan 8621 AAU-Spot 3358A 19 Apr 52)
Comment: North Korean messages of late March and early April suggested that both the 105th Tank and the 10th Mechanized Divisions would be in training north of Pyongyang during April. This requirement for additional armored personnel may reflect urgency in the training.

6. Emergency call procedure established for North Korean coastal unit: East coast defense headquarters informed a coastal security unit at Songjin on 19 April that "the enemy situation is severe...in one week we will do an emergency call training and will be prepared for complete combat."

The following day, another North Korean unit, probably also on coastal security duty, stated:"things are not going good...the emergency call must be practiced once a week. Training should be tightened." (SUEDE 330th Comm Recon Co ALT-836, 20 Apr; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/11140, 21 Apr 52)

Comment: The tenor of these orders suggests that the enemy in northeastern Korea may be anticipating a UN amphibious operation.

The over-all deployment of Communist forces in North Korea, since the Inchon landing, has reflected the fear of another similar successful UN operation.

7. Enemy counterattack in eastern Korea foiled by UN intelligence: "In order to confuse the enemy," the 21st Chinese Communist Artillery Regiment reported on 15 April, "we had originally intended to counterattack against Square Top mountain (in eastern Korea)...but because our counterattack plan leaked out, it was decided not to move infantry. However, our artillery barrage advanced according to the original plan." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2262, 19 Apr 52)

Comment: In early April, the 21st Chinese Communist Artillery Regiment was attached to the 203rd Infantry Division, 68th Army, an unusual procedure, presumably designed to support a specific operation assigned to the infantry unit.

It is possible that the "counterattack" referred to was the operation intended.
8. Communist supply officers inspecting vehicles in North Korea: "Inspectors of the General Bureau of Rear Service started to inspect all cars in all units, ...under the Korean People's Army," reports an unidentified North Korean unit on 18 April. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-1-599, 19 Apr 52)

Comment: It is not clear whether or not this vehicle inspection is related to a general inspection which was underway in many North Korean units in early April.

9. Chinese deserters assault North Korean convoy commander: A recently available North Korean message passed between two east coast security units states that a convoy commander was assaulted by an undisclosed number of "Chinese ruffians and deserters from the Chinese Volunteer Army." The message indicates that the attack took place in a small town located on an alternate supply route leading from northeastern Korea to the Sino-Korean border. (SUEDE HQS ASAPAC Tokyo Japan 8621 AAAU, Spot 3348A, 23 Mar 52)

10. North Korean naval unit expects combat: "As soon as the combat begins, the ...chief will give the orders concerning communications," reported an unidentified North Korean naval unit on 17 April. The message dealt with certain communications functions which were to be carried out by 22 April. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/10593, 18 Apr 52)

Comment: This information may reflect Communist expectation of another UN amphibious operation. On the other hand, recent intercepts have expressed increased urgency and have indicated preparations for some type of military operation.

11. Koreans may be connected with Chinese paratroop school: A message about an air transport flight to Manchuria, apparently from a paratroop school in Central China, referred to one or more "Korean" passengers. The Air Force comments that Korean elements may have been trained as paratroopers in Central China, and are now returning to Manchuria. (SUEDE Air Force Roundup 77, 4 Apr 52)
Comment: The intercept may also mean that Korean officials had been visiting this paratroop school. However, previous messages have suggested that a paratroop unit is transferring to Manchuria. Although the Chinese Communists have long conducted paratroop training in Central China, and possibly Manchuria, this is the first indication of Korean interest in this activity.