7. Enemy aircraft to sortie over UN lines in Korea: "Airplanes of the People's Army will take off to carry out their duties...behind the enemies' lines," reported the commander of the Chinese 7th Artillery Division in east central Korea on 14 July.

The message cautioned that the flights would be made at night and that these planes could be recognized by anti-aircraft units by their engine sound which is "similar to the motor of a truck." The suggested area of operations was east central Korea, with flights originating from fields in the Pyongyang valley. (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-4459, 16 July 52)

Comment: The recent construction of several small dirt air strips immediately behind the enemy's front lines suggests that future harassing missions, using PO-2 biplanes or YAK trainers, may be flown from the strips.

No light aircraft have been encountered recently in this area, although on 18 July a US light bomber briefly engaged two conventional enemy fighter aircraft about 25 miles south of the front lines in central Korea.

8. Messages indicate continuing North Korean attacks on UN-held islands: Two messages passed on 16 and 17 July over nets associated with the North Korean 21st and 23rd Brigades in the Ongjin Peninsula area of western Korea indicate that further amphibious operations will be launched against UN-held islands off western Korea.

One message mentioned that a battalion did not need landing craft "to carry out our forthcoming island liberation campaign," and the other message spoke of an assembly of boats and personnel at points in the Ongjin area. (CANOE SSR Tokyo, TIK 123 H 76 W 99, 19 July Brief of SIB 546, 19 July 52)

Comment: Elements of the North Korean 23rd Brigade on 15 July occupied Changnim Island off Ongjin Peninsula. The enemy has the capability of proceeding against many of these small islands that are immediately offshore. Operations
against the larger, more important islands such as Paengyang would be more difficult to carry out because of the distance involved and the UN's control of the sea.

9. Joint Chinese-Korean unit suggested in western Korea: The chief of staff of a battalion of the North Korean 21st Brigade in western Korea reported to brigade headquarters on 14 July that "the 1st squad of the 1st Branch of the Voluntary Army (1 company; 156 persons) are assembled at Sanjikol," on the Ongjin Peninsula, "as the reserve force of this battalion." (CANOE ROK Int Grp M Korea, SK-L-357, 15 July 52)

Comment: While the term "volunteer" is generally applied to Chinese units in Korean messages, it is possible that the "Voluntary" used here also means Chinese.

Another possibility is that the "Voluntary Army" referred to in the message represents so-called North Korean "Farmer-Soldier Units." These paramilitary units are comprised of old men and disabled veterans organized to supplement regular units on guard duties.

10. Two North Korean armored units officially organized: On 14 July a North Korean armored regiment near Chinnampo reported to Armored Forces Headquarters that "the Kangso unit color presentation was held...on 13 July in the presence of 71 officers, 219 NCO's and 56 privates."

Similarly, a battalion-size armored unit probably on the east coast in the Wonsan area reported that "the unit color presentation ceremony was held on 14 July, and the military affairs inspection was carried out on the 15th." (CANOE 15RSM/486 and 15RSM/511, Korea, 16 July 52)

Comment: It has become evident during the past month that North Korean armored forces have undergone a major reorganization. Organic self-propelled artillery battalions and tank units have been severed from their parent tactical units and have been centralized under the command of an Armored Forces Headquarters.

There are at least five regimental-size tactical armored units and an armored training command subordinate to this headquarters. These in turn are broken down into battalion-size units, probably the major operational unit, such as the "Kangso unit" and the east coast battalion mentioned above.
11. Rigid control exercised over North Korean armored officers:

A 12 July message addressed to a major armored training unit from a ranking officer in North Korean Armored Forces Headquarters stated that "from now on a vacation for an officer should be given only under the permission of the commander."

The same officer addressed another major armored unit on 14 July with the statement that "the officers from the 105th and 103rd units are being sent on leave without the commander's permission." The message continued that unit commanders had given leave to their political officers and cryptographic officers and that since "we are short of personnel...counter-measures, which are severe" should be considered. (CANOE 330th Comm Recon Co Korea, SK-L-329, 14 July and ALT-113, 15 July 52)

Comment: These messages are chiefly interesting in that they demonstrate the degree of centralized control in this newly formed enemy armored force and that the shortage of personnel, particularly competent officers, is again emphasized.

12. North Korean mechanized division may have reverted to infantry:

On 14 July a North Korean armored regiment, probably in the Chinnampo area, informed a staff officer at North Korean Armored Forces Headquarters: "the 10th Infantry Division...did not arrive, they will...to headquarters as soon as they arrive."

Other recent messages have mentioned the 10th Division in a manner which suggests that it is no longer associated with armor. On 5 July this same armored unit informed Armored Forces Headquarters that "Comrade's drivers are...being sent to the rear from the 10th Division's medical office."

A 15 July message from the armored regiment near Chinnampo complained that "the order to move the 107th unit was sent to the 10th Division, but they burned it. No one knew of the move from Chongju to Kangso at the 107th unit." (CANOE 15RSM/541, Korea, 17 July; 15RSM/487, Korea, 16 July; PASAL 045, Korea, 14 July 52)

Comment: It is apparent from these messages that the "107th unit," a tank and self-propelled artillery unit, is no longer subordinate to the 10th Division. The 10th apparently has reverted to an infantry status.
13. Analysis reveals Soviet pilots engaged in 75 percent of Korean air combat: An analysis by the US Air Force Security Service of enemy ground-controlled intercept communications in Korea from March through May revealed that at least 75 percent of the MIG-15's engaged in combat over North Korea were Soviet-piloted. Chinese pilots were involved in only 10 percent and the remaining 15 percent could not be identified.

The analysis revealed that operational flights by Chinese pilots declined to such an extent that they were airborne only to create a show of force without engaging UN aircraft. (CANOE IAC Watch Committee, Supplement to Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions, pp 3-4, 17 July 52)

Comment: Intercepts received in June and July show that the majority of MIG-15's encountered over Korea are still Soviet-piloted. However, in the past month and a half, some increase in the aggressiveness of Chinese MIG-15 pilots has been noted, and jet fighters flown by North Koreans have on occasion attacked US planes.

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