3. Far East Command comments on heavy enemy ground action:
The Far East Command believes that the powerful limited-objective attacks launched against three points in the UN line on 6 and 7 September are not the forerunner of a Communist offensive. These attacks appear to have as their objective the capture of key terrain features, or to be "spoiling" attacks in anticipation of a UN offensive.

The unprecedented amount of artillery fire used by the Chinese against South Korean troops in east central Korea on 7 September reflects the enemy's generally improved forward supply situation. (S CINCFE Telecon 6123, 8 Sept 52)

Comment: Intercepted enemy messages of late August and early September have clearly indicated the Communists' very real fear of another UN amphibious operation or ground offensive.
The enemy has made increasing use of artillery in the past few months, and recent Chinese messages indicate the arrival of some additional artillery units in Korea.

4. North Korean west coast brigade sees imminent UN amphibious landing: In what appears to be a final alert form, the North Korean 21st Brigade on 30 August notified all infantry and artillery battalion commanders that the US "1st Marine Division" is to land on the Ongjin Peninsula while "three divisions in depth...are trying to occupy Kaesong," presumably in a UN land offensive.

Subordinate commanders are ordered to remain at their posts and to report immediately on "even a little movement" on the part of UN forces.

Of equal interest, battalion commanders are ordered to "have close coordination with the 63rd Corps and the 64th Corps of the Volunteer Army, located at the central part of your own defense area." (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-M-726, 30 Aug 52)

Comment: Reports such as this may have been behind the heavy limited-objective attacks made by Chinese troops against the US 1st Marine Division opposite Kaesong on 6 September.

5. Chinese Communist unit coordinates activities with North Korean Army: The commander of an unidentified Chinese Communist unit, possibly part of an engineer regiment engaged in ferrying duty across the Taedong River, stated on 31 August that he had contacted the North Korean Army "in reference to the Taechon bridge...question." According to the message, the Chinese unit was to await the arrival of the North Korean military before beginning construction on the bridge. (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, LM-730, 31 Aug 52)

Comment: This information further points up the apparent coordination and formality existing between North Koreans and Chinese even on the tactical level.
6. **Communists to conduct amphibious raid on UN-held islands:** A 7 September message passed over the 21st Brigade's net revealed that the North Koreans were planning an amphibious raid against UN-held islands off the Ongjin Peninsula on 10 September. The message stated that wooden ships, eleven mortars, two 45mm guns and numerous small arms are ready for the operation, which is to be a hit-and-run assault. After assembling, the attacking force is given "one hour to cross the river, four hours to search for the enemy, and one and a half hours to withdraw." (CANOE N1453, 7 Sept 52)

**Comment:** This message illustrates the enemy's continuing attempt to neutralize UN island bases off the west coast of Korea which are used for espionage, guerrilla and air rescue missions.

7. **Chinese units engage in local security screening and searches:** An element of the Chinese 402nd Antitank Artillery Regiment in east central Korea was ordered on 4 September to "write two reports on rear services anti-spy work for (the) months of June through August." These reports were to include the number of times "careful investigations were made in the mountains and in all buildings, and how many enemy secret agents were apprehended." (CANOE L187384, 4 Sept 52)

**Comment:** Considerable intelligence, both from message intercepts and agent reports, is available on North Korean counterespionage activities. This, however, is one of the few reports which details the extent of security precautions taken by a Chinese tactical unit.