KOREAN WAR: Soviet Propagandists Continue Fence-Sitting

Comment on the Korean war indicates that Soviet propagandists foresee neither an early settlement nor a resumption of hostilities.

Propaganda elements which would seem to preclude assumptions of a quick settlement are: (1) the Soviet attempt to picture American refusal to discuss the Korean issue at the United Nations as a desire to drag out the negotiations; (2) a Korean-language commentary by Boris Izakov which charges the Americans with delaying negotiations because of the ruinous effect that peace would have on the armament program (Soviet commentators have rarely initiated comment on the truce negotiations.); (3) a NEW TIMES review of the military operations during the past year—one of the two Home Service commentaries on Korea. It discusses troop resentment at the prospect of having to live through another Korean winter, the development of the Chinese volunteers into a regular, modernized army who "have mastered all the complexities of modern warfare," and the "hasty measures" which are being taken to form a hireling Japanese army to replace American troops; and (4) the reappearance in the Korean beam of atrocity propaganda. A commentary broadcast twice is related to Vishinsky's 17 January speech at the United Nations when he misquoted Gen. Van Fleet on the latter's "satisfaction" with the destruction of North Korea. Atrocity propaganda has been at a low level for some time in all beams and has been absent from Korean-language broadcasts for the past month.

There are other factors, however, which suggest that Moscow also does not foresee the resumption of full-scale hostilities. Thus, American intran- sigence at the United Nations is partially viewed as revolving around "political" problems, such as reconstruction and future independence of Korea. Finally, there is continued emphasis on topics broadcast to Korea, such as reconstruction, which are readily adaptable to a stalemate, if not a post-war situation.