BW AND THE KOREAN WAR

The campaign to push charges of American use of biological weapons reaches such proportions in Chinese, Soviet, and North Korean broadcasts--both as to the number of references and the degree of vilification--as to remove it from its initial relationship to the Korean war. The following six factors are the highlights of this voluminous campaign:

1. Communist transmitters in the Far East show a high degree of coordination and thoroughness in documenting American admissions concerning the feasibility, necessity and justification of the use of bacteriological weapons. This is coupled with a campaign to provide legally acceptable proof that germ warfare is actually being waged in Korea and Northeast China.

2. Similarly exhaustive efforts have been made--by recourse to written and unwritten protocols and conventions, and by specific allusions to the decisions and legal precedents established by the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals and the United Nations--to provide a basis for a subsequent demand that the Americans involved be tried as war criminals.

3. Moscow and Peking depart radically from standard propaganda patterns in publicising the charges in Home Service media and regional broadcasts. In contrast to the general tendency to disregard the Korean war, Soviet and Chinese regional stations give high and sustained attention to local and international protests. The number of such references in Soviet Home Service news transmissions sets a 12-month record.

4. The BW charges are only occasionally related to American attempts to obstruct the truce talks. Furthermore, there have been claims that American inability to attain its military goals forced recourse to such criminal methods. But there has been no mention of possible military retaliation for BW, nor have there been hints that the use of biological weapons actually threatens to wreck the truce talks.

   (Although previous charges of violations of the "laws and customs of war"--violations of neutral areas, maltreatment of prisoners, indiscriminate bombing of defenseless areas and civilian populations--have been brought to the attention of the negotiators at Panmunjom, the BW charges have never been raised at the truce talks. This seeming inconsistency suggests a reluctance to introduce charges which might further obstruct the talks.)

5. The bitterness of the abuse heaped upon the International Red Cross suggests Communist intransigence regarding IRC participation in post-armistice problems or the acceptance of the IRC as a neutral investigator in a subsequent investigation of the BW charges.

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6. Although such references have so far emanated only from Moscow, and have not been stressed, allusions to the forthcoming Oslo meeting of the World Peace Council Executive within the context of BW suggest the possibility that some major pronouncement or resolution similar to the Stockholm Appeal or the 5-Power pact drive may be forthcoming from the 29-31 March sessions.

a. Historical and Factual Evidence: In sustaining the charge that the United States wages biological warfare, Peking, Moscow, and Pyongyang show evidence of exhaustive research into American statements past and present, official and unofficial. The collations from newspaper and magazine articles and from scientific journals, and the quotations from military men reflect what seems to have been long-term research efforts. Peking and Pyongyang give accounts of the work carried out at Camp Detrick in Maryland, and in Mississippi, Iowa, and Indiana. There are parallel references to Forrestal’s defense of BW in 1949 and to scientific speculation concerning the possibilities of large-scale use of germ weapons. American recourse to biological warfare continues to be described as the climax to the long series of American crimes against humanity which was initiated by the atom bomb, and which includes the indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations, the shipment of Colorado beetles to Germany, and the use of poison gas.

Moscow finds even earlier precedents and claims that Lord Jeffery Amherst spread smallpox germs among the Indians in the Ohio Valley. The Asian radios have not exploited this historical precedent as yet.

Peking and Moscow place particular stress upon America’s failure to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Convention of 1949. This failure is also seen as proof of intent to use BW.

In a simultaneous attempt to provide the legal evidence for castigation of the Americans, Peking, Moscow, and Pyongyang place great stress upon the "impartial" investigations and reports by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the Chinese Red Cross, and scientific and medical groups. More substantive evidence is provided with the reminder that fleas and insects have been discovered which are not native to Korea. As for the diseases they carried—cholera, bubonic plague and yellow fever—the first has been absent from Korea since 1947, the second has never had any incidence in Korea, and the third is endemic only to tropical areas and the American continent. Peking adds that the fact that American troops are impregnated against diseases which have no incidence in Korea proves that the spread of these diseases in Korea was premeditated.

b. A Second Nuremberg Awaits the BW Criminals: The effort to document American use of BW is accompanied by a detailed delineation of the legalistic basis for condemning the perpetrators as war criminals. The extent to which Moscow and especially Peking have cited history and currently accepted legal precedents to support their condemnation lends support to the possibility of a post-armistice campaign based upon the evidence presented.
In structuring the legalistic facade for the indictment, Peking gives wide
play to the statement by Mei Ju-no, a judge in the war crimes trials in
Tokyo. He scores the Americans for all three of the crimes specifically
condemned at Nuremberg and Tokyo: crimes against peace; violation of
international conventions and the laws and customs of war; and crimes against
humanity. In the accompanying arguments, the U. S. is charged with defying
the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 (which prescribed the use of poison
or other weapons "calcuated to cause unnecessary suffering"), with failing
to sign the Geneva protocol of 1925 and the convention of 1949, and with dis-
regarding the convention on genocide adopted by the U. N. in December 1948.

With specific reference to the latter, and restricting itself to the exact
phrasing of the convention, Peking charges that the Americans "attempt
to commit genocide" by recourse to germ warfare. With the aim of "killing
and causing serious bodily harm" they deliberately inflict upon the Korean
and Chinese peoples "conditions calculated to bring about their physical
destruction in whole or in part." Peking declares that those who adhere
to the convention hold all persons committing such crimes responsible
whether they be constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals." With specific reference to America's non-adherence
to the Geneva conventions, Peking pointedly remarks that the war crimes
trials and the precedents that courts can deal with nations not party
to specific conventions when internationally condemned acts are concerned.

Aside from such legalistic discussions, both Peking and Moscow, end to a
lesser degree Pyongyang, made specific reference to the punishment awaiting
the American war criminals. Sautu Mei-tang, Peking's Minister for Overseas
Chinese, declares that the "gallows in the people's courts await that
handful of savage criminals who still deny their crimes." Moscow is generally
more reticent but quotes Jack Gaster, British member of the investigatory
commission on the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, as
predicting that "those who are breaking the law will find a second
Nuremberg awaiting them." PRAVDA foresees the day when those who waged
BW will "see the world pass a just sentence upon them." Madame Soong
Ching-ling adds her voice to the general denunciation by telling America
that "we hold you responsible for all damages, for every death and wound
in Korea, and we intend to prosecute to the full for the major international
crime of using bacteriological weapons."

A further attempt to place the crimes within the larger framework of the
Nuremberg trial decisions and to establish the precedent for an eventual
indictment is evidenced in a PEOPLE'S CHINA article of 19 March which
proposes that the "people of the world will not be satisfied to punish
only the flyers who drop germ weapons. When the final accounting is made
with the American aggressors, it will not be forgotten that germ warfare
and other crimes committed by them were carried out in execution of their
war of aggression" (in the words of the Nuremberg charter). The weekly
warns America's ruling circle of the precedent set by Article V of the
Nuremberg charter, which provides that there shall be individual
responsibility for "crimes against peace," "war crimes," and "crimes
against humanity." And within this same framework, the journal declares:
"The Pentagon is using Korea and Northeast China as huge proving grounds
for its preparation of a new war of aggression."
The possibility that the BW charges are intended to have larger than Korean war connotations is also suggested by the concentrated attention to the charges in domestic broadcasts in China and the USSR. In the past five months Chinese regional transmitters have made no reference to anything closely connected with the war, but during the past two weeks 23.5 and 18 percent, respectively, of the items monitored from all the regional services have been devoted to the charges. But there has been complete silence concerning the negotiations and the actual state of the war.

Not only do Soviet regional transmitters give heavy play to BW charges (in contrast to previous avoidance of the Korean war) but new shows for the Soviet home audience have, since 22 February, devoted 200 items to the subject of BW. No subject has attained such a high level of attention in these shows during the past year. Furthermore, Moscow's domestic and international services, in the period 10-23 March, devoted 543 commentaries to the subject. Not since the denunciation of the Japanese Peace Treaty in September 1951 has any subject attained such a volume of attention. Moscow's attention to the matter was greater in the second week than in the first week of this period.

Peking, too, devoted great attention to the charges. During the week 9-15 March, 46 percent of all items (both comment and news) in the international services were devoted to BW, and in the following week 45.3 percent of all items were so concerned. The avoidance of the truce talks and of the war in the regional broadcasts is pointed up by the fact that the international services continue to devote about 15 percent of all items (apart from BW) to the war.

Moscow's tremendous propaganda investment includes widely disseminated reports of protest rallies in the USSR. The only similarly reported meetings occurred during the Greek civil war and at the beginning of the Korean war.

d. No Military Retaliation Suggested: The desire to divorce the BW issue from the military phases of the war is further evidenced by the continuing avoidance of any threats of military retribution. However, there are assurances that the use of biological weapons will not give the Americans the victory they could not otherwise win. This reticence is made more striking when compared with the rationalizations for Chinese participation in Korea. At that time the threat to China's borders and the need to pay the "blood debt" to Korea was said to make Chinese participation mandatory.

e. The International Red Cross a Tool of the Aggressor: Peking, especially, continues to demonstrate great sensitivity to the possibility of Red Cross investigation. It insistently denounces the international organization as a "spy organization" in the pay of the aggressors. This suggests that the Communists will permit no real impartial investigation of the charges and will maintain their resistance to IBC participation in the post-negotiation settlement of prisoner-of-war and civilian problems. Peking is particularly incensed at the way the Red Cross "has thrown overboard the Geneva convention on P0W's and at the way it has condoned the
the atrocities committed by the Americans in Korea." It recalls that the IRC refused to investigate the atrocities charges preferred last year by the Women's International Democratic Federation and questions its willingness to probe into North Korea to "report" on the BW charges. Peking also notes that the "impartial" Red Cross has devoted more than a month to "investigation" of the first Koje "massacre" without coming up with any finding palatable to the Americans. It predicts that the matter will be permitted to fade into oblivion.

f. WFC Sessions May Relate to BW Charges: Peking makes no reference to the 29-31 March session of the World Peace Council Executive beyond reporting the departure of the Chinese delegation for Norway. But Soviet reports intimate that the sessions may take up the BW warfare charges. Routine condemnation is the least that can be expected for the Council has been established as the initiator of such propaganda efforts as the Stockholm Appeal, the demand for a 5-Power Peace Pact, the coming conference on East-West trade, and the recent Hugo-Cogol anniversary celebrations.

g. Expansion of the Campaign Anticipated: Regional broadcasts report that anti-epidemic committees have been established in Wuhan and Yenan and America is held responsible for the recent increase in illness. There is no mention of the methods being used to spread the germs in these regions but it seems possible that they will be traced to American-directed French and Kuomintang forces.

h. Other Propaganda Objectives: As is indicated above, the tremendous scope of the BW campaign suggests the possibility that it represents preparation for post-armistice propaganda attacks. It is also possible, however, that the campaign is an attempt to cope with the objective situation. For example it could be intended to explain away epidemics or to divert attention from popular dissatisfaction with domestic policy. News reports offer evidences supporting both possibilities. (The second possibility is discussed in the succeeding section on Chinese domestic affairs.)

The following evidences support the epidemics rationalization. Shantung has been added to the list of areas where germs have been dropped and regional broadcasts admit that measles, influenza and pneumonia have been widespread for months. Early in March the Shanghai LIBERATION DAILY noted that "a pernicious form of measles and influenza" had caused the death of 1700 persons in Shantung since the first of the year and was prevalent in one-third of the province. In early March also, the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY announced that medical workers were fighting epidemics in Shantung and that in one district alone—out of a total of 106 in the province—30,000 persons had contracted contagious diseases between 16 and 19 February. Furthermore Hong Kong sources quote the mainland press as reporting epidemics of influenza, smallpox, and measles in Inner Mongolia, Shantung, Anhwei, Kiangsu, Khepei, Shensi, and Kansu. Since these are the areas that suffered from drought or flood, it seems possible that the residents would be susceptible to disease.
On the other hand, however, regional broadcasts report mass protests and demonstrations in areas where such weapons are said to have been used. It seems unlikely that the central government would permit such demonstrations if disease was widespread. Pyongyang reports no such mass gatherings in Korea.

1. Military Operations and the Truce Talks: Pyongyang and Moscow limit themselves to daily reports of the communiques, which report defensive actions by the Communist forces, but Peking is more expansive and devotes some attention to the negotiations. It continues to insist that the demand for voluntary repatriation is the major obstacle to agreement. American insistence on this point is said to prove that the U.S. intends to turn the prisoners over to Chiang Kai-shek or Syngman Rhee. The second Koje incident is also brought in and Communist demands for forced repatriation are keyed to accounts of mistreatment of prisoners.

In reporting the final agreement on the number and location of ports of entry and the agreement to include nearby airfields within the boundaries of three of the specific ports of entry, Peking says that the Item Three Subcommittee made it clear that the Communists agreed to the inclusion of air transport points in the specific ports of entry on the assumption that the Americans would give up demands for a ban on airfield construction during the armistice period. This is the first reference to that stumbling block in the last two months.