BW AND THE KOREAN WAR

The decreasing number of references to bacteriological warfare in broadcasts from Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang is especially marked during the second week. This strengthens the impression that the campaign will now return to more usual proportions. This inference is further supported by the failure of all three major transmitters to introduce new elements into the campaign.* The following factors characterize the campaign at its present stage:

1. Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang, in both their international and domestic services, sharply curtail the volume of attention to biological warfare.

2. This decline in attention to BW is accompanied by the reappearance in Peking-Pyongyang comment of themes which characterized their pre-BW exploitation of the Korean war but which have been slighted during the campaign.

3. To date, the sharp decline in Moscow's attention to bacteriological warfare is not accompanied by a complementary reappearance of themes which dominated Korean war comment prior to 22 February. This failure brings the level of Moscow's attention to the Korean war per se to the lowest point since the war started.

4. The premeditated curtailment of the campaign at this point seems indicated by the failure of all three transmitters to develop recent events which patently lend themselves to effective exploitation.

5. Moscow's unprecedented attention to the International Economic Conference may explain some of the decrease in BW references, and it is possible that the Vienna session of the IADL council, slated for 16-18 April, or the June congress of the WPC may revive the issue.

BW References Now at Lowest Point: The high point in Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang's concentration on BW issues was reached during the week 24-30 March and since then there has been a sharp decline in the volume of comment. This sharp decline is illustrated in the graph on the opposite page. It is possible that the decline in Moscow's attention may be a consequence of the overshadowing attention to the economic conference. However, Peking and Pyongyang also decrease the volume of comment without any such preoccupation with another topic.

* For a detailed analysis of Peking's development of the BW campaign see FBIS SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS, 10 April 1952.
Peking, Pyongyang Revive Pre-BW Themes: As Chinese and Korean transmitters decrease the volume of attention to BW, they revive Korean war themes which were prominent before 22 February but which were absent while the BW campaign was at its height. Thus, Peking and Pyongyang now make increasingly frequent references to Wall Street's profiteering at the expense of American lives in Korea, to American exploitation of its satellites, and to America's aggressive designs against Asia and the world. They also revive charges of mistreatment of prisoners along with claims that American stalling at Panmunjom demonstrates America's desire for further aggression. Lengthy descriptions of American losses in men and materiel during recent military actions also reappear.

Moscow's Attention to Korea at Lowest Point: Moscow's treatment of Korea and BW parallels that of Peking and Pyongyang in that the volume of comment declines. But Moscow does not re-introduce pre-BW themes. As a consequence, the volume of Soviet comment on the war is at the lowest point since the war started. In the second week there were only five items on the war outside the BW context and three of these were beamed to Korea. This suggests that Moscow may be writing off the war as such in broadcasts to non-Korean audiences.

Little Exploitation of WPC, IADL, Chinese Commission Reports: Further support for the possibility that all three Communist sources are consciously braking the campaign is provided by the curious failure to make capital of the WPC appeal for the condemnation of BW in general and of the Americans in particular. Although Moscow broadcast the WPC appeal 54 times, it made little effort to sustain interest in the resolution. There was almost no subsequent comment. Peking and Pyongyang, too, seem to have limited their efforts to use the appeal to buttress the campaign. The IADL's voluminous and detailed exposition of American crimes in Korea received equally moderate attention. Peking transmitted the complete report in Morse code and carried a slightly abbreviated version in its voice transmission. Moscow presented the report in a drastically shortened form and did not elaborate on it in subsequent comment. Moscow repeated this pattern in publicizing the Chinese Commission's report on the use of BW in Northeast China. And none of the three transmitters has yet developed Mei Ju-ao's message to his fellow members on the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal assailing American use of biological warfare. Instead of capitalizing on these developments, all three Communist sources appear to concentrate on presenting an airtight legalistic basis for future indictment of the Americans as war criminals.

IADL Council, WPC Congress May Revive BW: It seems possible that there may be renewed attention to BW in comment related to pending conferences, e.g., the 16-18 April session of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers Council in Vienna. Although Moscow has had nothing to say about the session, Peking declares that the IADL brief on American atrocities will be discussed there, and that "measures will be worked out based on the investigatory commission's conclusions." It is also possible that the June session of the WPC will take more concrete steps toward formalizing the indictment of the Americans than were taken at the Bureau meeting in Oslo.