THE KOREAN WAR

Exploitation of the prisoners issue continues to loom largest in the Korean propaganda picture as Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang insist that American mistreatment of POW's exceeds the worst excesses of the Hitlerites. Voluntary repatriation is compared to the greatest hoaxes of history—the Reichstag fire, Hitler's "liberation" of the Sudetenland, and the Swiss Red Cross leaders' white-washing of the Nazi concentration camps. Despite the intransigent note of most Communist comment, Peking declares that the Sino-Korean proposal of 2 May provides the basis for a just and humane peace, and that an armistice can be attained quickly if and when the Americans withdraw their insistence on retaining captured personnel.

BW as an issue of solitary concentration has virtually disappeared from Soviet comment, but within the larger framework of the continuing assault on American bestiality, it remains a consistent point of reference. Peking's comment on BW has increased somewhat in the international service, primarily in English, as a result of new attention to the Enoch/Quinn confessions. Pyongyang continues to stress the need for sanitary precautions to prevent epidemics.

While the assault on American depravity continues at a high pitch in Chinese output, Peking pointedly fails to report the trial of American-sponsored North Koreans who allegedly slaughtered 35,000 Koreans during U.N. occupation of the Sinchon area of Hwanghae Province. Pyongyang has given the trials wide coverage, while Moscow has mentioned the affair in press transmissions but not in voice broadcasts. All three transmitters pay increasing attention to South Korean affairs, and sensitivity to the role of the Chinese in Korea is suggested by Pyongyang's special tribute to the Chinese.

Kojo Island a New Buchenwald: There has as yet been no large-scale relaxation of the coordinated assault on American mistreatment of prisoners, and this campaign, tied in with references to the negotiations, remains the focal point of most comment on the war. Moscow echoes Peking and Pyongyang is declaring that the POW "massacres" exceed the worst crimes of Hitler and that Kojo Island has become the successor to Buchenwald, Oswiecim and Maidanek. Soviet vituperation reaches its height in reporting the details of a protest meeting of Soviet workers in Moscow on 29 May, but the intensity of the denunciation does not exceed that which characterized the previous Moscow protest meeting on bacteriological warfare. Nor has Moscow reported anything comparable to the rash of protest meetings throughout the USSR such as followed the Moscow BW meeting. The present (26 May - 1 June) heavy concentration on the POW question, with 13 percent of all Soviet commentaries specifically devoted to the subject, nonetheless represents a sharp drop from the previous week (19-25 May) when the figure was 22 percent. The fact that Chinese propaganda follows a similar pattern suggests that the previous highs represent expedient exploitation of the prisoner disorders.
and are intended to affect the negotiations, and that the propaganda will not be sustained at such high levels nor have as wide a scope as the BW charges.

POW/truce negotiation comment in Chinese international services has remained fairly constant during the two-week period at about 25 percent of all items, but the figure is somewhat distorted by the fact that during the second week there was a tendency to concentrate the references in broadcasts directed to English-speaking audiences. In contradistinction to Chinese regional's heavy concentration on BW during the height of that campaign, there have been no references to the POW disorders in these transmissions.

Denunciation and Cajolery Characterize Chinese Comment: Although Peking's propaganda has been relentless in assailing the Americans for their abuse of prisoners, specific references to the negotiations continue to note that agreement is still possible if the Americans will withdraw their unreasonable insistence on voluntary repatriation. The threatening implications of such remarks as that of Non II that the Chinese "will not stand by" while prisoners are massacred are somewhat mitigated by the frequent appeals to the Americans to hasten the end of the war and the subsequent relaxation of international tensions. Moscow's truculence is less diluted and there are few references to the still-existing possibility of a truce.

Americans Don't Want Peace in Korea: Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang insist that the POW disorders are the result of a definite plan to prevent a peaceful settlement and demonstrate that the Americans fear peace more than war. There are the familiar contentions that military men have enriched themselves through the misuse of military funds, that the threat of war must be maintained to keep the American people under the domination of Wall Street munitions kings, and in order to prevent a general collapse of America's war-gear economy. Also, the Americans are said to fear that peace and the relaxation of tensions will further aggravate the dissatisfaction of the Americans' NATO satellites and make it more difficult to keep these recalcitrant partners in line.

No Indication That Talks May be Wrecked: There are no concrete propaganda indications, however, that the Communists foresee a disruption of the talks or that they are prepared to resort to military action to supplement their truculence. References to the possible disruption of the talks have been infrequent these last two weeks, although the Americans have been specifically charged with a desire to stall and wreck the negotiations.

Peking Revives Enoch/Quinn confessions: Recent variations in Moscow and Peking's treatment of the biological warfare issue suggest a relaxation of the coordination among the two major sources on this subject. The confession of American flier Robert Gilrulc, presented by Moscow more than a month ago, has not as yet been mentioned by Peking, although it would seem to buttress the Enoch/Quinn depositions. Peking, on the other hand, has revived these latter confessions—especially in broadcasts in English—with new interrogations, interviews and supplementary depositions which add little
that is now. This increased attention has not been reflected in the
general broadcasts to Asian audiences or in the regional transmissions,
so that the general level of attention to BW remains low. However, as
is the case with Moscow, BW is a consistent component of the general
atrocities propaganda in which the POW disorders now loom largest.

"Red" Dean Sees Proof of BW: Peking has now added Hewlett Johnson, the
"Red" Dean of Canterbury, to the list of westerners testifying to the
truth of the BW charges. The Dean, now in Peking, declared after a study
of the evidence and talks with scientists and witnesses that the testimony
was "most damning" and left no doubt as to American guilt.

Pyongyang's concern with BW remains centered on the need for constant
sanitary precautions to prevent a spread of American-disseminated disease.

Peking Silent on Sinchon Trials: Pyongyang has in the last week given
heavy play to the trials of Koreans who under the direct command of an
American lieutenant allegedly participated in the slaughter of 35,000
Korean civilians during the Americans' occupation of Sinchon County in
Hwanghae Province. Although Moscow has reported the trials in Morse and
Hellschreiber broadcasts, but not in voice transmissions, Peking has not
mentioned them as yet. This silence is reminiscent of Peking's complete
reticence concerning the Kaesong spy trials of several months ago, when
Peking transmissions were devoting a major part of their transmissions
to the trial proceedings.

Appeals to South Koreans Increase: Peking, Moscow and Pyongyang continue
to increase the volume of references to the situation in South Korea. All
three report the growth of partisan harassment of the U.N. and ROK forces
and intimate that Syngman Rhee's imposition of martial law stems at least
in part from an inability to control this growing resistance. Peking re-
ports (but only in Mandarin) that a large number of ROK troops are defecting
to the Communists, and Pyongyang appeals to the troops to "point their guns
at the enemy Americans" and Syngman Rhee traitors. Rhee's quarrel with the
National Assembly is described as the result of a struggle for personal power,
and as a demonstration of his unbridled ambition to be president "for life."
Perhaps because of defensiveness concerning the situation in North Korea,
Pyongyang dwells at length upon the deteriorating living conditions through-
out the south, with famine and mass suicides said to be rampant.

Chinese Are the Best Friends of the Koreans: Sensitivity to the state of
Sino-Korean relations seems indicated by Peking's recent stress upon the
contribution that the Chinese have made to the Korean people and their struggle
for independence. The Koreans are told that the Chinese are supporting them
"with their blood" and that Chinese troops help the farmers in harvesting
crops. There are frequent references to Chinese donations to buy guns and
planes for use against the American invaders. Peking says that the
Resist America, Aid Korea campaign is active in every part of the Chinese
mainland. This reference to RAAK comes at a time when the campaign has
virtually disappeared from Chinese regional comment.

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