THE KOREAN WAR

Coincident with the wide-scale exploitation of the Pongam incident, general comment on the war has assumed an accentuated note of belligerence reminiscent of that which characterized Chinese Communist propaganda immediately preceding Peking's admission in October 1950 that Chinese "volunteers" were actively engaged in the Korean hostilities. The following elements contribute to this new bellicosity:

1. American bestiality, distaste for peace, and aggressiveness have been denounced in the strongest possible terms by that chorus of political, religious, intellectual and social groups reserved for major propaganda offensives.

2. The Resist-America, Aid-Korea campaign which sparked the violently anti-American movement to elicit support for the Korean war effort has been reinvigorated after a period of relative inactivity, and there have been insistent demands for radical reforms in home-front thinking, in support for the troops and in the treatment of veterans and their dependents, and for greater austerity and "patriotic emulation."

3. There have been frequent allusions to the "blood debt" that must be exacted from the Americans.

4. There are frequent reiterations of the armed forces' ability to meet and smash any allied offensive, and an almost frenetic concentration on the casualties already inflicted upon the U.N. forces.

5. Horror propaganda exceeding the worst excesses of the biological warfare charges have been given considerable publicity, especially by Pyongyang, in what appears to be an effort to maximize resistance to the Americans and to alienate populations in potential occupation areas.

6. Pyongyang has claimed that the new plans formulated by President-elect Eisenhower call for the total annihilation of the Korean people, and both Peking and Pyongyang have charged that the "new and more dynamic foreign policy" enunciated by the General calls for a tremendous expansion of the war.

7. In widely broadcast messages in English, American and British POWs have abandoned their non-political pose and have equalled their captors in the virulence of their assault on American depravity and unwillingness to end the war.

Although the majority of these elements bear a striking resemblance to those which characterized Peking's comment in October 1950, and would thus constitute a suitable prelude to the initiation of large-scale military operations on the part of the Communists, the treatment of them
seems to reflect more accurately a Communist estimate that a U.N. offensive may be undertaken in Korea after the Eisenhower administration has taken office and that drastic measures are necessary to prepare the domestic and fighting fronts for it.

Political, Intellectual, Religious Groups Denounce American Bestiality: Although the Pongam incident is widely exploited by Moscow, Peking, and Peking, the last two go far beyond the context of the 14 December "massacre" to document and assail American inhumanity, depravity and bestiality. Peking has broadcast a barrage of comment from political, intellectual, social and religious groups who have vied with each other in the virulence of their assault on the Americans and in their alacrity to associate themselves with Chou En-lai's official protest against the mass "mural" of prisoners.

On only five previous occasions has Peking availed itself of this overwhelming unanimity of expression, and then in support of major propaganda offensives--immediately preceding the entry of Chinese troops into Korea, after the U.N. branded China as an aggressor, in denouncing the British for their mistreatment of Hong Kong Chinese, after the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty and in connection with the E.W charges. The pattern in each case has been strikingly similar. With almost verbatim identity, political parties, religious sects, scientists, merchants, students, and women have added their voices to the general denunciation, with a regularity which could not be accidental.

Resist-America, Aid-Korea Movement Must Go On: A dominant factor in the resurgent belligerence of Peking's comment on the war has been the major effort undertaken in domestic broadcasts to infuse new life into the dormant Resist-America, Aid-Korea movement which was the primary force in whipping the Chinese people into a frenzy of hate for the Americans in the early days of Chinese participation in the war. In stressing the need for such a reinvigoration, the following specific points were made:

1. There must be a thorough "thought-conditioning" through propaganda to "promote the people's confidence in a victorious conclusion to the war."

2. There must be greater publicity for the bravery and achievements of the People's Volunteers, more emphasis on the fact that the Americans have no desire for peace, and a fuller explanation of the necessary effect of a long war on the economy, construction, and national defense.

3. Better preparations must be made to supply and comfort the troops; supplies sent to them must be fully examined and bad equipment destroyed; more recreation groups must be sent to comfort the troops.

4. The people must enhance their spirit of patriotism and internationalism; there must be less concern for personal well-being, more austerity and "patriotic emulation" and more consideration for the wounded and their dependents.
Rather than an attempt to arouse home-front support of an offensive, virtually all of these elements are of a nature to correct a slackened home-front effort as regards popular thinking concerning the need and efficacy of the war, home-front concern for and cooperation with the armed forces, and the general concept of the American enemy. The present campaign may therefore constitute an effort to whip into line a population which had lapsed into expectation of peace.

"Blood Debt" Must be Paid by Americans: In October 1950, Peking's propaganda insisted that the Chinese forces owed a "blood debt" to the North Koreans because the latter had helped the Chinese in their struggle for liberation and that morally the Chinese were committed to return the favor. The highly emotional connotation of this reference to a "blood debt," coupled with the admission of a moral commitment involving questions of face, prepared for Chinese aggressive intervention in Korea. Although present propaganda similarly inveighs against the Americans and demands that they be made to pay for their ruthless butchery of prisoners and their disregard for all human values, there has been no intimation that this debt must be paid because of a commitment made to the prisoners or to those who have suffered from American bestiality. Thus, while seeking to create the emotional state engendered by this reference to the "blood debt" Peking has made no commitment to avenge the American crimes. This avoidance supports the conclusion that present propaganda is more concerned with the need to cope with a threatened U.N. offensive than with preparing for Communist-initiated action.

Communists Can Smash Any U.N. Attack: With specific reference to the present military situation, there has been a consistent allusion to the Communists' ability to smash any ill-conceived offensive launched by the Americans. Much is made of the victory at Kunwha and on the Sangkam ridge, and the improved equipment of the Chinese forces is presented as an important factor in these victories.

There are frequent references to the donations campaign, which is said to have made possible the procurement of the artillery so effective in dealing deadly blows to the Americans. Although comment during the donations campaign, which lasted from June through December 1951, stressed the number of planes primarily, and other heavy equipment secondarily, which would be purchased with the donations, present allusions make almost no reference to the purchase of planes, perhaps because of sensitivity to their failure to prevent the continuous U.N. aerial assaults, and their inability to retaliate in U.N.-held areas. This new stress on the donations campaign may also foreshadow a similar campaign to meet present needs.

A dominant element in the comment concerning present operations is the almost frenetic effort to highlight U.N. casualties in previous fighting and to relate this to greater losses in any future assault. Stress upon casualties to be inflicted if the enemy attacks seems more designed to lessen the morale impact of an expected enemy offensive than to prepare for self-initiated aggressive action.
POW's Used in Atomic Experiments. Machine-gun Practice: Pyongyang's new charges, given cursory mention by both Moscow and Peking, that prisoners have been subjected to the most horrendous tortures and practices lend substance to the belief that the Communists expect an offensive. The North Korean radio has widely reported that documents "uncovered by guerrillas in South Korea" reveal that some 1,400 prisoners had been shipped to the United States in 1951 for atomic warfare experiments, that prisoners had been slaughtered in droves in machine-gun practice and in testing new-type grenades and that others had been dismembered and had their eyes gouged out. These charges, which rival those disseminated by both the Russians and the Germans in the most agonizing days of their respective resistance to the other, seem the counsel of desperation, and to be intended primarily to (1) buttress flagging resistance to the enemy, and (2) to implant a lasting hatred among people who may shortly find themselves in areas under enemy control.

Eisenhower Plans Call for Annihilation of Koreans: Such horror charges are also directly linked to recent Eisenhower statements, and Pyongyang contends that his plot to have Asians fight Asians calls for the total annihilation of the Koreans. The President-elect is said to favor the use of atom bombs, atomic artillery, and guided missiles, and his references to a "new dynamic military strategy" are said to entail an expansion of the war by aggressive action not only in Korea but all through the Far East. In view of the Communists' various reactions, it seems likely that they really expect U.N. forces to take the initiative after 20 January to seek a quick end to the war.

Prisoners Drop Apolitical Pose: In a series of purported messages from American and British prisoners, widely broadcast in English by Peking, the POWs have discarded their customary disinterest in the moral and political aspects of the war and have equaled the vehemence of their custodians in their assaults on American military leaders and American intentions. The Americans are denounced for their recourse to bacteriological warfare, for the murder of prisoners, for their indiscriminate aerial attacks on civilian installations and prisoners camps, and for their refusal to agree to an honorable cessation of hostilities.
Pyongyang Foreshadows Government Efforts to Increase Supervision of the Economy and Agriculture Despite Wartime Hardships.

Pyongyang radio reported favorably on the gains made during the year by Korean industry and agriculture despite wartime hardships, especially those resulting from American bombing. As is customary, he contrasted these gains with the incredible suffering of the South Koreans. He also cited the "serious reverses" suffered by the United States, although warning that American "generals" are planning new aggressive schemes.

Bank Reforms to Stimulate Agrarian Economy: Continued North Korean concern for the agrarian economy and the welfare of farmers particularly is revealed in a new cabinet decree, this time directed at the correction of past shortcomings in the operation of the Korean Farmers Bank. The aim of the reforms will be to stimulate loans to destitute farmers through establishment of a "new sound democratic financial system." The loans, obtainable under simplified procedures, will consist largely of short-term loans of from one to three years and are apparently intended to bring about immediate and small-scale relief rather than permit more ambitious projects designed to bring about basic improvements in the agrarian economy.

Tightening of Administrative Controls Forecast: A Presidium decree of 27 December has abolished townships in the administrative structure in order to simplify the administration and bring the guidance of higher authorities closer to the lower levels. It is possible that this may foreshadow Government efforts to increase supervision of the economy and bring about the desired cooperation of the populace in future Government programs.

The seventy-third birthday of Stalin occasions a heavy volume of eulogistic comment from Pyongyang hailing him as the leader of the democratic camp. Familiar references are made to the Soviet liberation of Korea from the Japanese and to Stalin's "gift" of 50,000 tons of flour but the only references to present Soviet contributions to the Korean war are to the efforts made for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Pyongyang comment on South Korean affairs continues to increase both in volume and content, and reflects a sense of urgency in its appeals to the South Koreans to resist the tyranny and oppression of the Americans and the Syngman Rhee clique, and particularly calling for resistance to the draft.

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