THE KOREAN WAR

North Korean and Chinese Communist broadcast propaganda since Stalin's death has provided no discernible indication of change in Communist intentions or expectations concerning the war. The following observations characterize the comment at the present time:

1. Pyongyang and Peking seem to have been taken by surprise by the U.N.'s summary curtailment of the Korean discussions. Comment at the time the sessions resumed seemed primarily intended to condition delegation attitudes.

2. In its continuing stress upon the Eisenhower Administration's commitment to "new military adventures" in Korea and elsewhere in the Far East, Peking has been unusually specific in noting recent American preparation for offensive action.

3. Prisoners' messages have become increasingly outspoken in attacks on American policy, and have abandoned any pretense of a non-political desire for peace.

4. After a temporary abatement, there has been a new flurry of attention to biological and chemical warfare, and Pyongyang has widely publicized a new list of alleged germ dissemination operations during the first three months of this year.

5. In a reaction to General Clark's tour of the Indochinese fronts, Peking interprets the visit as a prelude to the integration of the Korean war and Indochinese wars as part of a general American campaign against the people of Asia.

Indian Resolution Is Responsible for Continuation of War: Peking and Pyongyang seem to have been taken somewhat aback by the U.N.'s summary suspension of the Korean war discussions. Comment noted when the sessions resumed on 24 February was characterized by two separate but related lines: (1) charges that the Indian resolution had "emboldened" the Americans in their sabotage of the truce negotiations and their persecution of POWs, and (2) appeals to the conference to accept the Soviet proposal as the best chance for a peaceful and equitable settlement. The parallel themes of remonstrance/cajolery shared in common an accompanying stress upon the "immeasurably superior" military strength of the Communists and their willingness to continue the fight "until American imperialism is ready to quit." The sustained effort to impress Western delegations with the threat inherent in continued deference to the Americans' "aggressive appetites" seemed primarily intended to condition delegation attitudes rather than to support over-all Communist lines on the war.

Troop Movements, Reinforcement Prepare for Offensive Action: Peking continues its unique preoccupation with the imminence of aggressive U.N. action stemming from Eisenhower's commitment to seek a quick solution to the war. With unusual specificity, Peking notes the following alleged preparations for such offensive operations:

1. The entire U.N. frontline has been raised to a pitch of intensity; forward area positions have been reinforced and troops deployed in accordance with specific plans.
2. Structures located near the front lines have been dismantled and removed.

3. Large quantities of ammunition and other military supplies have been sent by sea and air to islands off the eastern and western coasts of Korea.

4. U.N. warships have appeared off the Korean coasts in large numbers and have engaged in amphibious and antiaircraft exercises.

5. There has been a further increase in the number of sabotage and espionage agents parachuted into North Korea.

In the emphasis upon the imminence of U.S. aggressive action in Korea, both Pyongyang and Peking have glossed over such contrary indications as the debate over ammunition shortages in Korea and official U.S. statements expressing doubts over the capacity of U.N. forces to sustain an attack under present conditions.

POWs Appeal to Eisenhower: U.N. to End the War: Purported messages from American prisoners of war which originally expressed only a desire for a quick truce and subsequent repatriation have now lost virtually every pretense of a non-political concern for peace. Prisoners now tend increasingly to echo the standard Communist denunciation of American intentions and American official depravity. Open letters supposedly composed by individual POWs appeal to President Eisenhower, the U.N. and American youth, respectively, to keep the promise to end the war, to put a brake on American aggressive intentions, and to refuse to serve the profit-hungry warmongers of Wall Street. The virtual identity of the terminology with the standard invective of the established Communist commentators indicates that such messages are carefully edited and doctored prior to dissemination even in those cases when they are apparently read by the POWs themselves.

BW, Chemical Warfare Operations Continue: After a temporary abatement, there has been a minor resurgence of BW comment, with Pyongyang widely publicizing a lengthy catalog of alleged dissemination operations by U.S. fliers during January, February and March. Both Pyongyang and Peking in addition have charged that poison-gas bombs were dropped near the North Korean capital; although the use of poison-gas artillery shells was claimed recently, this is evidently the first time that poison gas bombs have been mentioned. Attention to the Schwable-Eley confessions is meager, one item noting U.S. concern over the fact that they have been so readily accepted as true by Latin Americans.

Clark’s Trip to Indochina Precedes Integration of Far Eastern Wars: The Far East Commander’s visit to the Indochinese fronts is described as a prelude to the integration of the Korean and Vietnamese wars as Eisenhower develops his plans for a hemisphere-wide assault on the peoples of Asia. According to Peking the initial step in this plan calls for the transfer of control over Bao Dai troops to the United States,
NORTH KOREA

Comment Avoids Additional Soviet Commitment: Pyongyang comment on the fourth anniversary of the Soviet-North Korean Economic and Cultural Agreement maintains the distinction between Soviet aid prior to the Korean war and that rendered since the conflict began. Soviet prewar aid is acknowledged in unusual detail—exceeding that recorded in comment on Stalin's death, but Pyongyang restricts itself to only general references to Soviet wartime aid. Occasional comment, however, seems to go beyond the usually carefully worded generalizations, citing the "material assurance of our victory" provided by Soviet support.

The anniversary of the agreement occasions the usual exchange of felicitations between the Soviet and North Korean leaders, but the absence of Pak Hun Yong is revealed in the exchange of messages between the two foreign ministries. In Pak's stead, North Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee Tong Kun signs his name to the message to his Soviet counterpart, who in turn addresses his message to Lee. A similar absence of a message from Pak was noted in the exchanges on the occasions of Stalin's and Gottwald's death, although Pak was present at the giant Pyongyang rally on 9 March.

Malenkov, in his anniversary message to Kim Il Sung, continues to refer to the defensive nature of the Korean war. In contrast, Kim characterizes it as the "liberation war on behalf of the freedom and independence of the Fatherland," while a NODONG SINMUN editorial on the anniversary calls for a victory for the "unification and national independence of our Fatherland." The definition of "victory," however, is left ambiguous in general comment.

Editorials Reassure Koreans on Soviet Strength: North Korean eulogies of Stalin are highlighted by an article by Kim Il Sung appearing in PRAVDA and broadcast widely by Radio Moscow as well as by Pyongyang. Kim praises Soviet assistance to North Korea during the 1945-49 period, but again refers only to Soviet moral assistance during the war. No mention is made of the goal of unification of the Fatherland, however.*

Pyongyang makes an apparent effort to reassure the Korean people that the death of Stalin has not affected Soviet strength in two pertinent MINJU CHOSUN editorials. Both report that the Soviet people are "strengthening their unity" with the Soviet Party and Government "without dismay or confusion" and that a "strong guiding organization" has been established under the leadership of Malenkov. The Koreans are assured that the "brilliant victories" and "inexhaustible might" of the Soviet people "constitute a strong guarantee" of victory for the Korean people and that the Stalinist peace policy will be carried out.

Continued North Korean solidarity with the Soviet Union is indicated by an order of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party decreeing the study of documents concerned with Stalin's death including Soviet and Korean Party appeals, the addresses of Malenkov, Beria and Molotov on 9 March and Kim's PRAVDA article. These documents are to be studied "to further cement our friendship and solidarity with the great Soviet Union."

* For a fuller discussion of Kim's article, see SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS, 19 March 1953.
Bank Reports Expanded Credit Facilities: Evidence that the recent promise of financial assistance held out to the farmers is to be fulfilled by the Government is contained in a Pyongyang report on assistance planned for the spring agricultural preparations. The Farmers Bank reports the funds available for this purpose are almost quadruple those of last year and are to be largely utilized to increase stocks of food and draft animals and provide necessary farm implements and materials for sideline production. Reports of large loans to farmers evacuated to undisclosed areas may indicate the use of much of this expanded credit to meet the needs of this relocated farm population.

Pyongyang Limits Comment on Aid to Government Workers: Announcement of a recent Cabinet decree authorizing improvement of the living conditions of Government workers and their dependents is limited to generalized expressions of the warm consideration of the Party and Government, and contains no details as to how the improved conditions are to be effected. This may reflect a desire to avoid arousing popular resentment against a specially-favored class. Previous Pyongyang announcements of relief measures to aid farmers or workers have contained full details.

Apparent concern over the adverse effect on North Korean troops of reports of unsatisfactory treatment and care accorded their dependents prompts Pyongyang to demand compliance with the Government policy in this regard. The people are warned that aid to dependents, "one of the basic tasks to support the battlefront, is not satisfactory." Comment implies that the Government, which is providing monthly allowances as well as reduced taxes to dependents, is doing its share, but that the Korean people must exert increased effort to assure the dependents employment and secure living conditions.

"Patriotism" Binds Chinese and Korean Armies: North Korean comment recounting the virtues of the Chinese People's Volunteers, although remaining on a low level, has become increasingly specific in praise of the Chinese role. In contrast to usual comment which reviews the aid rendered by the Chinese, Soviets and other People's Democracies, present broadcasts contain comment devoting exclusive attention to the merits of the Chinese Volunteers. They are praised for having come at the "time of crisis" into Korean national life and much is made of their exemplary conduct based on a "pledge to protect Korea, respect Korean customs, love Korea and smash the American imperialist troops." Reference is also made to the contributions of the Chinese people to the war effort in the Resist-America, Aid-Korea campaign, which will continue "until the American imperialists want to settle the Korean war peacefully." Special praise is accorded the cooperation of the Chinese Volunteers and the Korean People's Army which are "united in patriotism and proletarian internationalism" and are successfully preventing the Americans from advancing beyond the 38th parallel. This attention to Chinese wartime aid is in contrast to the limited generalizations concerning corresponding Soviet aid.