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FAR EAST SURVEY
21 MAY 1953

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THE KOREAN WAR

Following five weeks of progressive decline in the volume of comment on the war, Peking's verbose denunciation of the U.N. 26-point counter-proposal brings a sharp rise in the level of attention. The following elements characterize present propaganda:

1. The U.N. counterproposal is rejected in terms of its deviation from basic principle--the transfer of disaffected POWs to the custody of a neutral state--and because of the unacceptability of other procedural details.
2. Doubt as to the ultimate intentions of the United States is reflected in comment which variously ascribes responsibility for present American policy to the previously neglected "China lobby," to an undefined group opposed to peace, and to the official "global strategy" of the Eisenhower regime which entails no relaxation of world tensions.
3. The Communist eight-point proposal is said to include major concessions to the U.N. viewpoint, as evidenced by Western and neutralist support of the plan as a virtual facsimile of the Indian Resolution.
4. In contrast to the virulence of Peking's castigation of American brutality subsequent to the return of sick and wounded POWs, the Communists have failed to exploit recent new BW and chemical warfare charges, and have not made a major issue of the alleged bombing of Chinese territory.
5. The provision for a unanimous vote of the commission rather than for a mere majority vote makes it likely that the work of the commission cannot be accomplished in the time allotted.

"China Lobby" Dictates American Truce Position: Apparent uncertainty concerning the rationale of the American truce proposal is indicated in Peking comment which variously describes the proposal as reflecting either the machinations of pressure groups or the official "global strategy" of the Eisenhower Administration. A commentary of 17 May accuses the China lobby, rarely mentioned by Peking, of aiming at "peace at no price," since peace would end the pretext for expanding the war and the economic blockade of China and might put an end to aid for Chiang. Senator Knowland, General Van Fleet, and Admiral Radford, the latter identified as an inveterate advocate of a strengthened China blockade, are attacked as members of this group of "war-hungry" Americans opposing a Korean peace. Alan Winnington on the other hand, makes the more serious charge that the American truce position results from official Administration policy aimed at preventing the solution of other problems by preventing a Korean armistice.

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Peking Rejects Principle and Details of American Plan: Voluminous Peking comment on the counterproposal presented by General Harrison on 13 May charges that the Americans have violated the "basic principle" upon which the resumption of the talks was based--the transfer of prisoners refusing repatriation to neutral custody. The American plan is said to call for the forcible and indefinite detention of Communist prisoners. The comment takes pains to point out that although a similarity in phraseology exists between the American plan and the Communist eight-point proposition, the two are actually "in substance mutually exclusive." Although the PEOPLE'S DAILY acknowledges that some of the administrative details contained in the American plan "may be capable of being adapted" if considered separately from the divergence in "principle," the daily fails to elaborate on this possible avenue of compromise. The following points are made in Peking's criticism:

1. Different treatment is provided for Korean and Chinese prisoners;
2. Unwarranted restrictions are placed on the repatriation commission, including a failure to provide the commission with "sufficient authority" to accomplish its mission in the close proximity of U.S. forces;
3. Unwarranted restrictions are placed on procedures connected with the presentation of "explanations" to the prisoners, so as to make such explanations "wholly impossible."

Communists Insist on Ultimate POW Disposition by Political Talks: The intransigent Communist denunciation of the American proposal is balanced by continued reference to their own 8-point proposal advanced on 6 May as entailing a "concession" to the American position and as another "clear demonstration" of Communist sincerity. Nam Il, however, identifies the concession as one involving "steps and procedure" rather than substance and reiterates that his proposal still "embodies the principles" of the Geneva Convention providing for repatriation for all prisoners. Communist comment remains insistent that after proper explanations "it is hard to imagine that there should still be POWs who are filled with apprehensions," but maintains that should this possibility arise, "only the political conference can settle it."

Comparison between the Communist and U.N. positions is provided through systematic exploitation of world reaction. Although the Communists themselves do not specifically identify their truce proposal as a virtual counterpart of the Indian Resolution, Peking does note Nehru's recent comparison and his favorable response to the Communist position. (Moscow exhibits some sensitivity on this point and omits Nehru's remarks on the similarity between the Communist and Indian proposals.) Other comment recounts the differences in the West concerning the American proposal. Peking dramatizes the popularity of its own position by reporting that Harrison was forced to pretend his proposal was like that of the Communists' "to escape the censure of world public opinion," and denounces as "pure deception" the State Department allegation of 16 May that the two proposals are similar.

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Atrocity Propaganda Remains at Low Level: Peking has developed no sustained attention to atrocity charges since the high level of denunciation occasioned by reports concerning the abuse to which returned sick and wounded prisoners had allegedly been subjected. Chou En-lai's protest over the American bombing of Manchurian cities, which he labelled a provocative action obviously intended to influence the truce negotiations, has not been exploited after its original wide dissemination. Nor have recent charges of BW and chemical warfare activity during late April and early May been accorded the attention customarily given such accusations.

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FAR EAST SURVEILLANCE
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N O R T H K O R E A

Pyongyang Reaffirms Allegiance to Soviet Leadership: Pyongyang, devoting widespread attention to various Soviet anniversaries and events, demonstrates its continued allegiance to Soviet leadership and preeminence, although none of the present-day leaders of the Soviet Union receive mention. Comment on Soviet Press Day prompts a Pyongyang review of the enhanced role of the North Korean press since liberation, a role equivalent to that of the Soviet PRAVDA, while commemoration of the Soviet victory over Germany entails a review of the debt owed to the Soviet Union for liberation of Korea from Japanese imperialism. The widespread activities of the Korea-Soviet cultural society and the necessity to learn from Soviet scientific and cultural advances also receive mention. Lenin's birth anniversary elicits renewed deference to the principles of Lenin-Stalinism from which the Koreans have benefited since liberation.

Korea also identifies itself with the present Soviet peace campaign, endorsing the five-power peace pact advocated by the World Peace Council, and praising the consistent Soviet peace policy demonstrated once again in PRAVDA's response to Eisenhower's speech of 16 April.

Domestically, Pyongyang continues to exhibit concern with the progress of the farmers. State agitators are warned to correct recent laxity in their work among the farm populations and to base their work on the practical needs of the moment. State trading organizations are again warned of past failures in supplying goods to rural consumers and are urged to comply with the needs and desires of the people.

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