Korean War

Moscow Fails to Claim Credit for Truce Progress: Moscow reports the signing of the 8 June POW agreement promptly, citing both Western and Communist news sources. Chinese and Korean optimism concerning the imminence of a final truce is reported without independent comment. Moscow's failure to claim any credit for a Korean settlement is in marked contrast to previous claims of the Soviet's role following Malik's June 1951 suggestion which paved the way for truce talks and following the Soviet suggestions for a Korean settlement at the General Assembly. In the past, significant "breaks" in the talks have invariably elicited Soviet comment.

It seems possible that Moscow's present caution reflects a continued awareness that the agreement on prisoners has evolved from the Indian proposal at the United Nations which Vishinsky rejected so violently. On 5 June TASS repeated an AP report identifying the present Communist position as "a factual acceptance of the U.N. proposal presented ten days ago (25 May)." Pyongyang also reports that "important" Communist concessions can be "clearly seen" in the agreement. An apparent division of Communist interpretation of the prisoner agreement is indicated in Peking comment which claims that the Communist stand on the prisoner issue has been vindicated by the agreement signed.

Prior to agreement at Panmunjom on the prisoner issue, Moscow was apparently hesitant to commit its propaganda to the assumption that a final agreement would result. Senator Taft's comments on Korea were reported fully, and as late as 3 June the speech was said to represent "the essence and letter of U.S. policy." Attention was called to the threat of a revival of the former MacArthur policy in the Far East aimed at war against China. President Eisenhower's clear divergence from Taft's views was characterized as "evasive." No comment has been noted to date on Senator Taft's clarification and amplification of his Cincinnati speech.
Peking Claims "Unification" as Goal of Political Talks: Moscow has not commented on Peking's emphatic identification of "the peaceful unification of Korea" as "the object" of the political conferences to follow an armistice. Peking defined for the first time, in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 9 June, its intention at the political conference* and announced its readiness to negotiate on the problem of unification. The editorial also demonstrated some concern lest the envisaged mutual defense pact offered to South Korea by President Eisenhower threaten settlement of the Korean question. The pact is denounced by Peking as a "premeditated scheme" aimed either at "(sabotaging) the Korean armistice and peace or at deepening the disunity of Korea."

Although Soviet broadcasts have not commented on Peking's espousal of Korean unification, Soviet comment on its November 1952 resolution to the U.N. General Assembly as well as PRAVDA's 11 April 1953 editorial endorsed Korean unification "by the Koreans themselves," without however placing this task in the hands of the political conference.

* At the time of Chinese intervention in the Korean war, Peking listed three prerequisites for a Korean peace: (1) withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, (2) withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan, and (3) Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations.