GLOBAL AFFAIRS

KOREAN WAR: Comment Reveals No Plans for Retaliation in Korea:

The widely broadcast PRAVDA editorial on 23 June, "The Failure of the Foreign Hirelings Adventure in Berlin," links the South Korean unilateral "release" of Korean prisoners to the disturbances in East Germany, characterizing both as an attempt by extreme elements to thwart the world peace campaign. The relatively mild references to Rhee, however, occupy only a minor part of the editorial and for the most part Moscow broadcasts continue to rely upon NCNA and Western news sources to report developments in Korea. Communist reaction to the Korean developments—largely initiated by Peking—is characterized by the following points:

1. Although Syngman Rhee has claimed full responsibility for the unilateral "release" of the Korean prisoners, the U.N. Command must assume ultimate responsibility for its demonstrated negligence and complicity.

2. The prisoners were released in order to avoid exposure of the "so-called forced repatriation," in order to impress the prisoners into the South Korean army, and as a "last resort" by Syngman Rhee and the "American bellicose elements" to forestall a Korean truce.

3. The prisoner release is an acid test of American sincerity which must be met by the recovery of all released prisoners, "prompt and effective" American action to prevent further obstruction by Rhee, and positive American answers to the questions posed by Kim Il Sung and Peng Te-huai concerning the applicability of truce terms to the South Korean Government.

While the ultimate fate of a Korean truce is now said to depend on the course of action adopted by the Americans, Communist comment has failed to list any definite alternative to continuation of the truce negotiations and suggests a desire to seek an accommodation with the United States despite Rhee's recalcitrance. Comment seems most concerned with the actual state of U.S.-South Korean relations and Peking poses the question that if Rhee is not bound by any agreement, are "the Americans too not bound by any obligation toward this clique?" Peking also expresses its concern over the possibility of future obstruction by Rhee, entailing the independent use of the South Korean army. Both Peking and Moscow note the universal condemnation of Syngman Rhee's independent action and report various editorial opinion calling for the removal or curbing of the powers of the South Korean President.

Lack of Coordination Marks Attention to Post-Truce Objectives: Communist comment on the various problems attendant on the post-truce period in general does not maintain the same large measure of coordination which has marked the Communist propaganda efforts of Peking, Moscow and Pyongyang during the Korean war. This departure could be accounted for either by an agreed division of propaganda
responsibility or by a failure of the Communists to agree on the objectives or on the relative importance of the objectives to be sought in the post-truce period. The only post-truce objective supported propagandistically by all three transmitters concerns the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea following an armistice. A lack of propaganda coordination is apparent in the following publicized Communist objectives:

Unification of Korea: Both Peking and Moscow have explicitly expressed their desire to make the unification of Korea a primary goal of the post-truce period.* A speech by Kuo Mo-jo at the World Peace Council meeting in Budapest on 16 June and widely re-broadcast by both Peking and Moscow provides the most recent endorsement of this proposal. Pyongyang, however, which can logically be considered more intimately concerned with this problem, has completely avoided all attention to the specific assignment of the unification of Korea to the political conference. North Korean leaders may be concerned lest the projected Korean unification undermine their own power.

U.N. Membership for Communist China: Although Soviet representatives at various international gatherings have consistently advocated the seating of Communist Chinese delegates, propaganda attention to this issue has been limited. Exceptions to this occurred in Molotov's 1 April 1953 endorsement of a resumption of truce talks in which the Soviet Foreign Minister advocated the seating of a Chinese Communist representative (and a Korean representative as well) in the United Nations to facilitate a Korean settlement. On 18 and 21 June the Soviet commentator Korjonov presented Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations as a virtual sine qua non for a Far East settlement. The Korean delegate to the World Peace Council meeting on 16 June also listed Chinese membership as an essential element in a Far East settlement. Peking, however, has failed completely to include this objective as part of its announced plans for either a post-truce settlement or the more general Far East settlement. Peking's reticence may perhaps be explained by a desire to avoid intruding so controversial a subject into the present stage of negotiations, rather than by any abandonment of U.N. membership as an ultimate Peking objective.

Threat of American Aggression: Kuo Mo-jo, in his aforementioned speech before the WPC, raised anew Peking's concern over the possibility of continued American "aggression" in the Far East, a topic which has received little attention from Peking during the course of the recent negotiations at Panmunjom. Kuo pegs his charges on two points: (1) the proffered mutual defense agreement between South Korea and the United States which is termed "a premeditated scheme directed at the political conference," (2) a Dulles speech on 18 April which indicates that "Dulles and other bellicose elements in the United States Government" are planning to push the aggressive alliance in the

* See Survey of Far East Broadcasts, 18 June 1953, for a fuller discussion of this point.
Far East, "split Asia" and speed the scheme to pit Asians against Asians, and are "determined to continue the occupation of Formosa and to remain hostile to the Chinese people." This is Peking's first mention of its concern over the continued American "occupation" of Formosa since President Eisenhower ordered the removal of restraints on action by Chiang forces. Kuo failed however to link the problem of Formosa to the political conference. Extensive Moscow rebroadcasts of the Kuo Mo-Jo speech omitted these references to the alleged threat of continued American aggression in the Far East. Peking's concern over Formosa, as well as its apparent desire to bring about a successful solution of the Korean problem, reflects the apparent preeminence Peking gives to solution of problems it considers immediately threatening to its borders.