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FAR EAST SURVEY
17 DECEMBER 1953

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Conference Rupture Long-Planned by Dean: Prompt and voluminous Peking reaction to Ambassador Dean's "unilateral" recess of the Panmunjom negotiations--appearing in the form of an official statement by the Communist negotiators, editorials from authoritative Chinese Communist papers and widespread comment by leading NCNA correspondents--attempts to pin responsibility on the United States and justify the Communist position. Comment is characterized by the following themes:

1. Application of the charge of "perfidy" to the United States "corresponds perfectly to the truth," although Peking explains that the charge made in the meeting of 13 December applied to South Korea.
2. Willingness of the Communist negotiators to continue discussions at Panmunjom.
3. Rejection of the U.S. proposal of 8 December and reiteration of Communist objections to provisions of that proposal.

A joint statement by the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom on 14 December expressly repeats charges of U.S. perfidy and sets the tone for subsequent comment from Peking on the recessed negotiations. In apparent justification of the Communist position, the statement asserts that the original charge of perfidy at the meeting was directed against South Korea's violation of the NNRC terms of reference on 18 June 1953, but, the statement adds, Dean's objection to discussion of the matter violates the original U.N. agreement to refer the subject of the released prisoners to the political conference and therefore justifies the charge of U.S. "perfidy."

Peking has referred to the ultimate fate of the 27,000 prisoners released by Rhee only infrequently in recent months, and the present attempt to place principal responsibility for the release on Rhee is at variance with Peking comment in June which underscored alleged American responsibility and collusion.

All comment surrounding the break-off of negotiations is at one in accusing Dean of acting on a long-planned and premeditated scheme designed to wreck convocation of the political conference, facilitate forcible retention of Communist prisoners, and maintain world tension. Peking points out that Dean's action took place immediately following adjournment of the U.N., and that it was preceded by U.S.-inspired "rumors" that the discussions would soon collapse.

Continued Communist intransigence on the issues raised at Panmunjom is reflected in the heavy attention accorded the rejection, and in ridicule of the "cunning" American proposal of 8 December. Peking repeats its familiar demand that the Soviet Union participate in the political conference as a neutral, and denounces the American plan for unit-voting as a scheme to make possible the retention of U.S. troops in South Korea and South

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Korean resumption of hostilities. There is stress on the "reasonableness" of the 30 November proposal of the Communists.

Assertions of Communist willingness to continue discussions constitute but a minor element of the comment. It would appear that the Communists are more concerned in establishing American responsibility for the rupture than in providing a fresh basis for a resumption of negotiations.

An unusual development of recent Peking comment on the negotiations appears in a 12 December Peking broadcast accusing the British Government of "openly supporting" U.S. obstructionist tactics. Kiang Nan on 14 December, commenting on the rupture, accuses Britain of being an "accomplice" in Dean's action. Previous Peking broadcasts have credited Britain with opposition to the extremes of U.S. policy in Korea, as for instance in British support for the participation of neutrals in the political conference.

Radio Seoul on 15 December reports the denunciation of the Communist charges by both Syngman Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyon. President Rhee took the occasion to reiterate his opposition to talks with the Communists and Foreign Minister Pyon repeated that South Korean forces will take no independent action within the time-limit of six months following the armistice.

Chou Repeats Standard Propaganda Themes: The apparent unwillingness of Peking to revise its present position on Korean negotiations is also reflected in Chou En-lai's cable to the U.N. on 7 December. Chou refrained from any open request for U.N. intervention in Korea and reiterated the standard propaganda themes of the past month--e.g., that the prisoner explanation procedures have been "seriously violated," that the Panmunjon talks are in "serious difficulties," and that the political conference is being delayed by "treacherous designs." The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission must exercise its "legitimate authority," Chou warned, or further explanations will be "impossible." The note, which was not widely broadcast, seemed aimed at disrupting Western unity on the question of a renewed referral of the Korean issue to the U.N. Peking notes the "pigeon-holing" of the Korean question at the U.N. in a 12 December broadcast, and repeats its previous assertion that the U.S. desires to avoid the convening of the political conference.

U.N. Resolution Provokes Fresh Atrocities Outburst: The unusually vehement Communist reaction to the American atrocity charges before the United Nations fails to attain the volume of attention accorded previous atrocity campaigns. Broadcasts of this material to international and domestic audiences constitute only three percent of Peking's total volume, compared to the eight percent peak reached by the BW charges in November. While this discrepancy is in accordance with previous indications of greater Peking concern over the BW issue than over past mistreatment of prisoners, it is offset by the elite nature of the comment and by the voluminous, documented counter-charges which are being made at this time.

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Chinese Communist reaction to the U.N. resolution on the atrocities committed against U.N. prisoners in Korea is keynoted by a vituperative Chou En-lai statement of 6 December. Chou affirms the "revolutionary humanitarianism" which has imbued Sino-Korean policy throughout the war, and sharply contrasts this policy with U.S.-South Korean brutality which, he asserts, should properly be the "object of U.N. condemnation." Chou also declares belligerently that the U.S. is attempting to divert attention from its "monstrous scheme" to "intensify its military aggression against Southeast Asia, rearm Japan, extend military bases in Asia, organize an aggressive bloc in Asia, and continue expansionism and war preparations."

Kuo Mo-jo, in an interview on 5 December, revives the call for trial of U.S. war criminals by the peoples of the world, a recommendation made by the Women's International Democratic Federation in May 1951, and he repeats the conclusions of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers reached in April 1952--namely, that the United States violated the Hague Regulations of 1907, committed war crimes under Article Six of the Charter of Nuremberg, and is guilty of mass slaughter under the 1948 Genocide Convention.* Additionally, lead editorials in the PEOPLE'S DAILY and the TIENTSIN TA KUNG PAO enumerate U.S. and South Korean massacres of thousands of civilians in Sinchon, Pyongyang and Seoul during the occupation. TA KUNG PAO attributes its figures to a report of the "International Committee of the Red Cross." Primary documentation is also presented in a lengthy report of the Chinese Red Cross on 8 December, which records in minute detail the vicious brutality allegedly practiced against Chinese prisoners. The report is based on a study of the statements by returned CPV captives. A complementary report on U.S. and South Korean brutality and mistreatment of North Korean prisoners and civilians was issued by the Central Committee for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland on 12 December.

Arrival of Foreign Assistance Acknowledged by Pyongyang. The presence of Soviet and Chinese technicians and the arrival of aid materials, first acknowledged in detail in Pyongyang broadcasts during late November, are now the subject of increasing reference from the North Korean radio. The prospect of a further influx of foreign technicians is evoked in Pyongyang reportage of letters from Czech and Hungarian workers expressing their desire to come to Korea directly.

* Despite the presentation of these charges in 1951 and 1952, Communist propaganda has heretofore largely exploited the failure of the U.S. to ratify the Geneva Conventions of 1925 and 1948.